Cops Don't Stop Violence

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Cops Don't Stop Violence COPSCOPS DON’TDON’T STOPSTOP VIOLENCEVIOLENCE COMBATINGCOMBATING NARRATIVESNARRATIVES USEDUSED TOTO DEFENDDEFEND POLICEPOLICE INSTEADINSTEAD OFOF DEFUNDINGDEFUNDING THEMTHEM CO-PRODUCED BY SUPPORTED BY TABLE OF CONTENTS Key Points ............................................................................................. 3 Introduction ........................................................................................... 4 The Facts ............................................................................................... 5 Decoupling from Defund ............................................................................6 What is Crime? ...................................................................................... 9 Some Key Points ........................................................................................9 Problems with Crime Statistics & Studies ........................................... 11 Cops Cause Violence ................................................................................12 Cops & Safety ...................................................................................... 14 Effect of Increased Police Presence .........................................................14 Effect of Police Response Times .............................................................. 15 After the Fact ...........................................................................................15 Using Crime Data to Drive Policing ..........................................................16 The Shift to “Community Policing” ...........................................................17 We Can Reduce Violence Without Cops ................................................ 18 Who Stops Violence? Violence Interrupters ...............................................19 Five Evidence-Based Strategies to Stop Violence ......................................20 Conclusion ........................................................................................... 22 APPENDIX: A Deeper Dive into Challenging The Research on Police and Crime ...................................................... 23 Problem 1: Measurement.........................................................................23 Problem 2: Community Selection Bias .....................................................26 Problem 3: The Wrong Questions ............................................................. 27 This report was written by Jared Knowles and Andrea J. Ritchie. We are grateful to Delores Jones Brown, Tamara Nopper, Brendan McQuade, Alec Karakatsanis, Niaz Kasravi, Mariame Kaba, and Wesley Ware for reviewing and contributing to this report. Design by Trevor Messersmith / 80east Design. 2 /// COPS DON’T STOP VIOLENCE KEY POINTS > Fearmongering about “crime” and > CRIME STATS: “violence” is an age-old tactic whenever police legitimacy, power, or resources are > Only reflect what is defined as a “crime” challenged. — which is a political decision. Who is policed and punished for crime is both > Politicians and pundits are conflating homicide, a political and police decision. Not all violence & crime — homicides have gone up, crime is violence, not all violence is other forms of violence have gone down. crime. > Experts suggest homicides are increasing > Are collected and reported by cops. due to pandemic and economic stress, increased gun sales, and closure of > Can be manipulated for public relations community institutions. purposes. > Spending pandemic recovery funds on > Don’t account for other social and policing runs contrary to addressing root economic factors that affect violence. causes of violence. > Most violence is not reported — so > The increase in homicides we are seeing stats and studies that show a decrease is not unprecedented — homicide rates in “crime” due to policing are not have been going up since 2014, and are accurately measuring effect on all equivalent to other periods in history where violence. police budgets were consistently increasing. > Compare apples and oranges by > The increase in homicides happened before generalizing results from unique any police department’s funding was cut, conditions and communities. and was seen in cities that both increased and decreased funds to police. > Only compare options involving more or less cops — don’t compare cops to > Cuts to police funding in 2020 represented other options. less than 1% of total annual expenditures on policing nationwide. Policymakers only > Research does show that increasing invested a fraction of those funds into community-based organizations reduces community-based safety strategies homicides without increasing violence through police. > Research does not conclusively show that cops decrease homicides, violence, or crime — and any relationship between increased policing and decreased crime is smaller than previously indicated and not sustainable over time. > Research does show cops increase violence. Combating Narratives Used to Defend Police Instead of Defunding Them /// 3 INTRODUCTION “SKYROCKETING MURDER RATES.” — THE NATIONAL FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE “An explosion of violent crime.” — SENATE MINORITY LEADER MITCH MCCONNELL “Democrat-run cities across the country who cut funding for police have seen increases in crime.” — U.S. REP. PATRICK MCHENRY, R-N.C. Police are facing one of the greatest crises of legitimacy in a generation. In the wake of the largest uprisings in U.S. history, sparked by police violence, bloated police budgets, and the deadly impacts of a failure to invest in community health and safety laid bare by the pandemic, pro-police forces are on the defensive. So they are reaching for one of their most reliable weapons — fear. This is nothing new — cops and policymakers have always used fearmongering to push “law and order” agendas and pour more and more money into police departments. Now, with police budgets under scrutiny by campaigns to defund the police and refund our communities all across the country, lawmakers and the media are once again recycling old talking points about increasing violence and crime, claiming that campaigns to defund police are responsible . Police fraternal associations, police chiefs, and policymakers are using an uptick in homicides to whip up a frenzy of fear that a “crime wave” is sweeping the country — for which they blame campaigns to defund police — to justify continued increases in police spending. The facts simply don’t bear this out. 4 /// COPS DON’T STOP VIOLENCE THE FACTS President Biden cited a study showing a According to the John Jay Research Advisory 30% increase in homicides, a 6% increase in Group on Preventing and Reducing Community aggravated assaults and 8% increase in gun Violence, “Community violence is more prevalent assaults in 2020 over the previous year in 34 in neighborhoods where residents face severe U.S. cities to justify paving the way for much and chronic financial stress.”4 As outlined in needed pandemic relief funds to be poured into the recommendations of the COVID19 Policing police coffers instead of into the pockets of Project’s latest report, investment of funds in people struggling to survive.1 He recommended direct support and community-based safety that communities use $350 billion in funds from strategies, toward a just recovery, instead of the $1.9 trillion coronavirus relief package doubling down on policing, is more likely to to hire more cops.2 The White House has also produce lasting public safety.5 proposed an additional $300 million in the 2022 federal budget for COPS Hiring Program Second, neither the President nor the pundits grants to local police departments. citing an increase in homicides to justify more police funding mention that the same study First, spending pandemic relief funds on cops found that homicide rates remain well below instead of care is likely to fuel more violence, historic rates. It also found that robbery rates including police violence, rather than more fell by 9%, and property and drug crime rates, safety. It also runs contrary to the findings of with the exception of motor vehicle theft, fell the very report cited by the President, which significantly during 2020. Additionally, in 2020 concluded: residential burglaries decreased by 24%, nonresidential burglaries by 7%, larceny by [T]he pandemic has placed individuals 16%, and drug offenses by 30%.6 According to and institutions under tremendous strain, previously released FBI data, crime was down ultimately pushing homicide rates higher. overall in 2020 by about 6 percent, one of the In addition, the pandemic has impeded largest decreases in decades.7 outreach to at-risk individuals — a key component of most evidence-informed This illustrates the third key point, which is anti-violence strategies.3 that politicians and pundits are playing fast 1 Fact Sheet: Biden-Harris Administration Announces Comprehensive Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gun Crime and Ensure Public Safety, June 23, 2021, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/23/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-comprehensive- strategy-to-prevent-and-respond-to-gun-crime-and-ensure-public-safety/. For further analysis and demands that American Rescue Plan funds not be spent on law enforcement, see Community Resource Hub, Ensuring that Federal Stimulus Funds Support Care Not Cops, available at: https://communityresourcehub.org/wp-con- tent/uploads/2021/04/0407_CARES_ARPA_B.pdf and Divesting from Pandemic Policing and Investing in a Just Recovery, May 2021,
Recommended publications
  • United States District Court Eastern District of Louisiana
    Case 2:19-cv-13553-CJB-KWR Document 10 Filed 12/20/19 Page 1 of 22 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA MILES MORAN and GERARD TAYLOR, for themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. KEVA LANDRUM-JOHNSON, Chief Judge Case No. 19-cv-13553-CJB-KWR of Orleans Parish Criminal District Court; PAUL A. BONIN, CAMILLE BURAS, (Class Action) DARRYL A. DERBIGNY, TRACEY FLEMINGS-DAVILLIER, KAREN K. HERMAN, ARTHUR L. HUNTER, ROBIN D. PITTMAN, DENNIS WALDRON, LAURIE A. WHITE, BENEDICT WILLARD, and FRANZ L. ZIBILICH, in their official capacity as Judges of the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, Defendants. AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 1. Defendants, the Judges of the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, are responsible for setting conditions of release for people who are arrested and charged with certain crimes in Orleans Parish. Defendants consistently and unlawfully impose secured financial conditions of release in an amount that individuals cannot afford, without any inquiry into or findings concerning their ability to pay or alternatives to incarceration. As a result, the money- based orders of post-arrest release that they impose constitute de facto orders of pretrial detention for those unable to pay — orders that are issued without the legal and factual findings and Case 2:19-cv-13553-CJB-KWR Document 10 Filed 12/20/19 Page 2 of 22 procedures required for a valid order of pretrial detention. See Caliste v. Cantrell, 329 F. Supp. 3d 296, 308–15 (E.D. La. 2018). 2. Defendants have an institutional financial conflict of interest in every secured money bond that they impose because they act both as supposedly neutral judicial officers and as executives responsible for managing the funds generated by each such bail order that they set.
    [Show full text]
  • Download Legal Document
    Case: 18-11368 Document: 00514815688 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/30/2019 No. 18-11368 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT SHANNON DAVES; SHAKENA WALSTON; ERRIYAH BANKS; DESTINEE TOVAR; PATROBA MICHIEKA; JAMES THOMPSON, On Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated; FAITH IN TEXAS; TEXAS ORGANIZING PROJECT EDUCATION FUND, Plaintiffs-Appellants Cross-Appellees, v. DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS; ERNEST WHITE, 194th; HECTOR GARZA, 195th; TERESA HAWTHORNE, 203rd; TAMMY KEMP, 204th; JENNIFER BENNETT, 265th; AMBER GIVENS-DAVIS, 282nd; LIVIA LIU FRANCIS, 283rd; STEPHANIE MITCHELL, 291st; BRANDON BIRMINGHAM, 292nd; TRACY HOLMES, 363rd; ROBERT BURNS, Number 1; NANCY KENNEDY, Number 2; GRACIE LEWIS, Number 3; DOMINIQUE COLLINS, Number 4; CARTER THOMPSON, Number 5; JEANINE HOWARD, Number 6; STEPHANIE FARGO, Number 7 Judges of Dallas County, Criminal District Courts, Defendants-Appellees Cross-Appellants, MARIAN BROWN; TERRIE MCVEA; LISA BRONCHETTI; STEVEN AUTRY; ANTHONY RANDALL; JANET LUSK; HAL TURLEY, Dallas County Magistrates; DAN PATTERSON, Number 1; JULIA HAYES, Number 2; DOUG SKEMP, Number 3; NANCY MULDER, Number 4; LISA GREEN, Number 5; ANGELA KING, Number 6; ELIZABETH CROWDER, Number 7; TINA YOO CLINTON, Number 8; PEGGY HOFFMAN, Number 9; ROBERTO CANAS, JR., Number 10; SHEQUITTA KELLY, Number 11 Judges of Dallas County, Criminal Courts at Law, Defendants-Appellees. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Case No. 3:18-cv-00154-N BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE CURRENT AND FORMER PROSECUTORS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICIALS, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, AND JUDGES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS _______________________________ [Counsel listed on inside cover] Case: 18-11368 Document: 00514815688 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/30/2019 MARY B.
    [Show full text]
  • Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor
    University of Minnesota Law School Scholarship Repository Minnesota Law Review 2021 Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor Benjamin Levin Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Levin, Benjamin, "Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor" (2021). Minnesota Law Review. 3206. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/3206 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Essay Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor Benjamin Levin† INTRODUCTION In the lead-up to the 2020 Democratic presidential primary, Sen- ator Kamala Harris’s prosecutorial record became a major source of contention.1 Harris—the former San Francisco District Attorney and California Attorney General—received significant support and media attention that characterized her as a “progressive prosecutor.”2 In a moment of increasing public enthusiasm for criminal justice reform, Harris’s rise was frequently framed in terms of her support for a more †Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. For helpful comments and conversations, many thanks to Jeff Bellin, Rabea Benhalim, Jenny Braun, Dan Far- bman, Kristelia García, Leigh Goodmark, Aya Gruber, Carissa Byrne Hessick, Sharon Jacobs, Margot Kaminski, Craig Konnoth, Kate Levine, Eric Miller, Justin Murray, Will Ortman, Joan Segal, Scott Skinner-Thompson, Sloan Speck, and Ahmed White. Thanks, as well, to the students in my Advanced Criminal Justice Seminar at Colorado Law School whose deep ambivalence about progressive prosecution helped inspire this Es- say.
    [Show full text]
  • An Amicus Brief in Odonnell V. Harris County
    No. 17-20333 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ________________________________ MARANDA LYNN ODONNELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS; ERIC STEWART HAGSTETTE; JOSEPH LICATA, III; RONALD NICHOLAS; BLANCA ESTELA VILLAGOMEZ; JILL WALLACE; PAULA GOODHART; BILL HARMON; NATALIE C. FLEMING; JOHN CLINTON; MARGARET HARRIS; LARRY STANDLEY; PAM DERBYSHIRE; JAY KARAHAN; JUDGE ANALIA WILKERSON; DAN SPJUT; JUDGE DIANE BULL; JUDGE ROBIN BROWN; DONALD SMYTH; JUDGE MIKE FIELDS; JEAN HUGHES, Defendants-Appellants. LOETHA SHANTA MCGRUDER; ROBERT RYAN FORD, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS; JILL WALLACE; ERIC STEWART HAGSTETTE; JOSEPH LICATA, III; RONALD NICHOLAS; BLANCA ESTELA VILLAGOMEZ, Defendants-Appellants. ________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court, Southern District of Texas, No. 4:16-cv-01414 _______________________________ BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE CURRENT AND FORMER DISTRICT AND STATE’S ATTORNEYS, STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICIALS, IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES _______________________________ [Counsel listed on inside cover] MARY B. MCCORD Counsel of Record JOSHUA A. GELTZER ROBERT FRIEDMAN INSTITUTE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER 600 New Jersey Ave. NW Washington, D.C. 20001 (571) 447-3902 [email protected] Counsel for Amici Curiae CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS Maranda ODonnell et al. v. Harris County, Texas et al., No. 17-20333 The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons and entities as described in the fourth sentence of Rule 28.2.1 have an interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that the judges of this Court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.
    [Show full text]
  • United States District Court Eastern District of Louisiana
    Case 2:19-cv-13553-EEF-MBN Document 1 Filed 11/11/19 Page 1 of 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA MILES MORAN, for himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. KEVA LANDRUM-JOHNSON, Chief Judge of Orleans Parish Criminal District Court; Case No. 19-cv-13553 PAUL A. BONIN, CAMILLE BURAS, DARRYL A. DERBIGNY, TRACEY (Class Action) FLEMINGS-DAVILLIER, KAREN K. HERMAN, ARTHUR L. HUNTER, ROBIN D. PITTMAN, DENNIS WALDRON, LAURIE A. WHITE, BENEDICT WILLARD, and FRANZ L. ZIBILICH, in their official capacity as Judges of the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, Defendants. CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 1. Defendants, the Judges of the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, are responsible for setting conditions of release for people who are arrested and charged with certain crimes in Orleans Parish. Defendants consistently and unlawfully impose secured financial conditions of release in an amount that individuals cannot afford, without any inquiry into or findings concerning their ability to pay or alternatives to incarceration. As a result, the money- based orders of post-arrest release that they impose constitute de facto orders of pretrial detention for those unable to pay — orders that are issued without the legal and factual findings and procedures required for a valid order of pretrial detention. See Caliste v. Cantrell, 329 F. Supp. 3d 296, 308–15 (E.D. La. 2018). Case 2:19-cv-13553-EEF-MBN Document 1 Filed 11/11/19 Page 2 of 21 2. Defendants have an institutional financial conflict of interest in every secured money bond that they impose because they act both as supposedly neutral judicial officers and as executives responsible for managing the funds generated by each bail order that they set.
    [Show full text]
  • The Punishment Bureaucracy: How to Think About “Criminal Justice Reform” Alec Karakatsanis1
    THE YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM M ARCH 28, 2019 The Punishment Bureaucracy: How to Think About “Criminal Justice Reform” Alec Karakatsanis1 [W]e do not expect people to be deeply moved by what is not unusual. That element of tragedy which lies in the very fact of frequency, has not yet wrought itself into the coarse emotion of mankind; and perhaps our frames could hardly bear much of it. If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel’s heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies on the other side of silence. —Mary Ann Evans, Middlemarch2 i On January 26, 2014, Sharnalle Mitchell was sitting on her couch with her one-year-old daughter on her lap and her four-year-old son to her side. Armed government agents entered her home, put her in metal restraints, took her from her children, and brought her to the Montgomery City Jail. Jail staff told Shar- nalle that she owed the city money for old traffic tickets. The City had privatized the collection of her debts to a for-profit “probation company,” which had sought a warrant for her arrest. I happened to be sitting in the courtroom on the morn- ing that Sharnalle was brought to court, along with dozens of other people who had been jailed because they owed the city money. The judge demanded that 1. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of anyone else, including Civil Rights Corps.
    [Show full text]
  • The Punishment Bureaucracy: How to Think About “Criminal Justice Reform” Alec Karakatsanis1
    THE YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM M ARCH 28, 2019 The Punishment Bureaucracy: How to Think About “Criminal Justice Reform” Alec Karakatsanis1 [W]e do not expect people to be deeply moved by what is not unusual. That element of tragedy which lies in the very fact of frequency, has not yet wrought itself into the coarse emotion of mankind; and perhaps our frames could hardly bear much of it. If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel’s heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies on the other side of silence. —Mary Ann Evans, Middlemarch2 i On January 26, 2014, Sharnalle Mitchell was sitting on her couch with her one-year-old daughter on her lap and her four-year-old son to her side. Armed government agents entered her home, put her in metal restraints, took her from her children, and brought her to the Montgomery City Jail. Jail staff told Shar- nalle that she owed the city money for old traffic tickets. The City had privatized the collection of her debts to a for-profit “probation company,” which had sought a warrant for her arrest. I happened to be sitting in the courtroom on the morn- ing that Sharnalle was brought to court, along with dozens of other people who had been jailed because they owed the city money. The judge demanded that 1. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of anyone else, including Civil Rights Corps.
    [Show full text]
  • The Missing Link: Jail and Prison Conditions in Criminal Justicereform
    Louisiana Law Review Volume 80 Number 1 Fall 2019 Article 6 3-3-2020 The Missing Link: Jail and Prison Conditions in Criminal JusticeReform Andrea Craig Armstrong Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev Part of the Law Commons Repository Citation Andrea Craig Armstrong, The Missing Link: Jail and Prison Conditions in Criminal JusticeReform, 80 La. L. Rev. (2020) Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol80/iss1/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Missing Link: Jail and Prison Conditions in Criminal Justice Reform * Andrea Craig Armstrong TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ...................................................................................... 1 I. Criminal Justice Reform Consensus? ............................................... 4 A. Justice Reinvestment Initiative and Associated Reforms .......... 4 1. Louisiana’s Justice Reinvestment Initiative ........................ 6 B. Beyond Diversion and Re-entry .............................................. 10 1. Diversion ........................................................................... 10 2. Re-entry ............................................................................. 12 II. Prison and Jail Conditions .............................................................
    [Show full text]
  • 1024 State Bans on Debtors' Prisons and Criminal
    NOTES STATE BANS ON DEBTORS’ PRISONS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT Since the 1990s, and increasingly in the wake of the Great Reces- sion, many municipalities, forced to operate under tight budgetary constraints, have turned to the criminal justice system as an untapped revenue stream.1 Raising the specter of the “debtors’ prisons” once prevalent in the United States,2 imprisonment for failure to pay debts owed to the state has provoked growing concern in recent years.3 These monetary obligations are not contractual liabilities in the ledger of an Ebenezer Scrooge,4 but sums that the state itself assesses through the criminal justice system. Sometimes called “legal financial obliga- tions” (LFOs), the total debt generally includes a mix of fines, fees, court costs, and interest.5 And unlike civil collection actions (for the most part6), incarceration is very much on the menu of sanctions that the unpaid creditor, usually a municipality,7 can impose. ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 1 See, e.g., Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the Original Meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833, 886–87 (2013); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1098–99 (2015). 2 See infra section III.A, pp. 1034–38. 3 See, e.g., Alec Karakatsanis, Policing, Mass Imprisonment, and the Failure of American Lawyers, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 253, 262–63 (2015); McLean, supra note 1, at 885–91; Campbell Robertson, Suit Alleges “Scheme” in Criminal Costs Borne by New Orleans’s Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/us/suit-alleges-scheme-in-criminal-costs -borne-by-new-orleanss-poor.html.
    [Show full text]
  • Moving Beyond Money- a Primer on Bail Reform
    OCTOBER 2016 Moving Beyond Money: A Primer on Bail Reform CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM HARVARD LAW SCHOOL ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Moving Beyond Money: A Primer on Bail Reform was prepared by the Criminal Justice Policy Program (CJPP) at Harvard Law School. Substantial research and drafting were contributed by Harvard Law School students William Ahee, Micaela Alvarez, Jevhon Rivers, and Grace Signorelli, who participated in the 2015-2016 Criminal Justice Fellows Seminar. The drafting of this primer was overseen by CJPP’s executive director, Larry Schwartztol; faculty co-directors, Prof. Carol Steiker and Prof. Alex Whiting; and legal fellow, Anna Kastner. CJPP is grateful for generous insights and feedback from Cherise Fanno Burdeen, Brandon Buskey, Paul Heaton, Alec Karakatsanis, Sandra Mayson, and Timothy R. Schnacke. CRIMINAL JUSTICE ABOUT THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM POLICY PROGRAM The Criminal Justice Policy Program (CJPP) at Harvard HARVARD LAW SCHOOL Law School conducts research and advocacy to support criminal justice reform. It generates legal and policy analysis designed to serve advocates and policymakers throughout the country, convenes diverse stakeholders to diagnose problems and chart concrete reforms, and collaborates with government agencies to pilot and implement policy initiatives. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction to Bail 4 A. Bail Basics 5 B. Pathologies of Money Bail and the Growing Movement for Reform 6 C. Core Legal Principles 8 1. Federal Constitutional Principles 8 2. Basics of State Law 9 II. Crucial Safeguards for Pretrial Systems that Use Money Bail 10 A. Guaranteeing Ability to Pay Determinations 10 B. Individualizing Bail Determinations and Eliminating Bail Schedules 11 C. Regulating or Prohibiting Compensated Sureties 12 III.
    [Show full text]
  • “Set up to Fail” the Impact of Offender-Funded Private Probation on the Poor WATCH
    HUMAN RIGHTS “Set up to Fail” The Impact of Offender-Funded Private Probation on the Poor WATCH “Set up to Fail” The Impact of Offender-Funded Private Probation on the Poor Copyright © 2018 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-6231-35737 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Seoul, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org FEBRUARY 2018 ISBN: 978-1-6231-35737 “Set Up to Fail” The Impact of Offender-Funded Private Probation on the Poor Summary ........................................................................................................................... 1 Recommendations .............................................................................................................. 7 To the Federal Government ......................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Plaintiff-Appellee, Defendants-Appellants. Plaintiffs
    Case: 17-20333 Document: 00514112116 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/10/2017 No. 17-20333 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT __________________________ MARANDA LYNN ODONNELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS; ERIC STEWART HAGSTETTE; JOSEPH LICATA, III; RONALD NICHOLAS; BLANCA ESTELA VILLAGOMEZ; JILL WALLACE; PAULA GOODHART; BILL HARMON; NATALIE C. FLEMING; JOHN CLINTON; MARGARET HARRIS; LARRY STANDLEY; PAM DERBYSHIRE; JAY KARAHAN; JUDGE ANALIA WILKERSON; DAN SPJUT; JUDGE DIANE BULL; JUDGE ROBIN BROWN; DONALD SMYTH; JUDGE MIKE FIELDS; JEAN HUGHES, Defendants-Appellants. __________________________ LOETHA SHANTA MCGRUDER; ROBERT RYAN FORD, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS; JILL WALLACE; ERIC STEWART HAGSTETTE; JOSEPH LICATA, III; RONALD NICHOLAS; BLANCA ESTELA VILLAGOMEZ, Defendants-Appellants. __________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, No. 4:16-cv-01414 __________________________ BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS- APPELLEES AND AFFIRMATION __________________________ KATHERINE R. GOLDSTEIN Counsel of Record [caption continued on following page] Case: 17-20333 Document: 00514112116 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/10/2017 MICHAEL E. KAUFMANN JOSEPH J. KAMMERMAN Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP 28 Liberty St. New York, NY 10005 (212) 530-5000 [email protected] MICHELLE TUEGEL 5th Circuit Vice Chair Hunt & Tuegel, PLLC 425 Austin Avenue P.O. Box 726 Waco, TX 76701 (254) 304-6354 [email protected]
    [Show full text]