The Structure of the Palestinian Legislative Council and the Politics of Separation

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Structure of the Palestinian Legislative Council and the Politics of Separation Fordham International Law Journal Volume 26, Issue 4 2002 Article 13 The Biggest Peace: The Structure of the Palestinian Legislative Council and the Politics of Separation Michel Paradis∗ ∗ Copyright c 2002 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke- ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj The Biggest Peace: The Structure of the Palestinian Legislative Council and the Politics of Separation Michel Paradis Abstract Part I of this Note summarizes the background leading up to the signing of the Oslo Accords. Part II details the overall structure and responsibilities laid out in Oslo II, with specific emphasis on the legal. Also, Part II presents for comparison the semi-autonomy arrangement devised and implemented in the Transkei of South Africa in the early 1960s. Part II concludes by examining the extent to which both of these arrangements were successful in satisfying the parties involved and makes some more general comparisons to similar reactions in Northern Ireland following the Good Friday Agreement. Part III attempts to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of limited autonomy to deal with the competing rhetoric of self-determination and the administration of viable political entities. COMMENT THE BIGGEST PEACE: THE STRUCTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND THE POLITICS OF SEPARATION Michel Paradis* INTRODUCTION The Israeli-Palestinian flirtation through the 1990s with non-State autonomy for the Occupied Territories culminated in a second uprising, more bloody than the first.' The 1995 Israeli- Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip ("Oslo II")2 set down the framework both for the Palestinian au- tonomous governing body, the Palestinian Council,3 and the scheme by which land would be redeployed in all agreements * The Author would like to thank Cara Hirsch, Inna Nazarova, Jason Otafio and Julie Wald for their comments and criticism that helped this piece take shape and, in particular, Briana Short without whom nothing would be possible. 1. See Chris Hedges, West Bank Clashes Kill 3 Soldiers and I Militant, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1993, at 3 (listing numbers killed in first six-year Intifada at 144 Israelis and more than 1,700 Palestinians); Cf Christian Chaise, PalestiniansLost the War, but Israel has not Won it Yet, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Sept. 25, 2002 (listing over 1,850 Palestinians and 600 Israelis killed during first two years of second Intifada). See also Don Radlauer, The "al- Aqsa Intifada" - An Engineered Tragedy, INSTITUTE FOR COUNTER TERRORISM, June 20, 2002 (citing 1900 Palestinians and 700 Israelis killed in second Intifada); Israeli Occupa- tion Policies 1, availableat www.passia.org (listing 173 Israelis and 1024 Palestinians killed in first Intifada). 2. See The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.-Palestinian Liberation Organization ("PLO") [hereinafter Oslo II]; GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO AccORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELI-PALES- TINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS (2000) (providing summary of main points of Oslo Accords, examining Israeli-Palestinian compliance and debating their classification as interna- tional documents). 3. See Oslo II, supra n.2, art. I. Article I of Oslo II reads, in relevant part: Israel shall transfer powers and responsibilities as specified in this Agreement from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Coun- cil in accordance with this Agreement. Israel shall continue to exercise powers and responsibilities not so transferred. Id.; See Oslo II, supra n.2, art III, Sec. 1. Section 1 of Article III of Oslo II reads: The Palestinian Council and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council constitute the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, which will be elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip for the transitional period agreed in Article I of the [Declaration of Principles (DOP)]. 1265 1266 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:1265 that followed.' This Note will examine the framework developed in Oslo II and the degree to which it accomplished the mutual objectives of self-determination, security and the end to an ex- 5 hausting conflict. Part I of this Note summarizes the background leading up to the signing of Oslo. Part II details the overall structure and responsibilities laid out in Oslo II, with specific emphasis on the legal. Also, Part II presents for comparison the semi-autonomy arrangement devised and implemented in the Transkei of South Africa in the early 1960s. Part II concludes by examining the extent to which both of these arrangements were successful in satisfying the parties involved and makes some more general Id.; See also WATSON, supra n.2, at 44-45 (describing Oslo II's importance in establishing "important organs of Palestinian self-government" and Palestinian Council structure). 4. See, e.g., Oslo II, supra n.2, art. XI, Sec. 3(c). Article XI, Sec. 3(c) provides, in relevant part: "Area C" means areas of the West Bank outside Areas A and B, which, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will be gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in accordance with this Agreement. Id. See also WATSON, supra n.2, at 45 (describing Oslo It's redeployment arrangements). 5. See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arangements, Sept. 13, 1993, Israel-PLO, pmbl. (hereinafter Declaration of Principles]. The Preamble of Declaration of Principles states, in relevant part: [lit is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peacefil coex- istence and mutual dignity and security and achieve ajust, lasting and compre- hensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed politi- cal process. RECOGNIZING that the aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the cur- rent Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestin- ian Interim Self-Government Authority, i.e. the elected Council (hereinafter "the Council" or "the Palestinian Council"), and the elected Ra'ees of the Ex- ecutive Authority, for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years from the date of sign- ing the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (hereinafter "the Gaza-Jericho Agreement") on May 4, 1994, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338; Id.; Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, Israel-PLO, pmbl. [hereinafter Oslo I]. The Preamble of Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area states, in relevant part: Reaffirming their understanding that the interim self-government arrange- ments, including the arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area contained in this Agreement, are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. 20031 THE BIGGEST PEACE 1267 comparisons to similar reactions in Northern Ireland following the Good Friday Agreement. Part III attempts to draw conclu- sions on the effectiveness of limited autonomy to deal with the competing rhetoric of self-determination and the administration of viable political entities. I. THE RAGE OF COMMUNITIES After years of violent conflict over land and authority, the Palestinian Liberation Organization6 ("PLO") and Israeli leaders began a process of rapprochement in the late 1980s and early 1990s.7 Through a series of public statements and preliminary accords, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators set into motion a pro- cess of negotiations directed at reaching a final settlement.' These overtures and compromises resultantly sparked fierce crit- icism and resistance from their respective nationalist blocs that would carry through the negotiation and signing of Oslo II.9 6. See CHERYL A. RUBENBERG, THE STRUCTURAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE PLO's CHANGING OBJECIVWS IN THE POST-1967 PERIOD, in THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT, 95-98 (Westview Press 1988) (describing PLO as nationalist organization committed to self-determination in historic Palestine and PLO movement from guerrilla warfare to diplomacy in late 1980s); U.N. SCOR, Palestine Question - League of Arab States Declaration/Rights of the Arabs of Palestine/Letter to the President of the SecCo, U.N. Doc. S/6003 (1964) (stating establishment of Palestinian Liberation Organization and authorizing creation of its army); BENNY MORRIS, RIGHTEOUS VICTIMS 364-66 (2001) (ex- amining founding of PLO and its taking of recruits largely from refugee camps and students); GIRARD CHALIAND, THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE 56-58 (Pelican 1972) (describing founding of PLO in 1964 at Arab summit meeting in Alexandria and PLO's firm connection to Arab governments). 7. See Statement by Yasir Arafat, Dec. 14, 1988, availableat http://www.brook.edu/ dybdocroot/press/appendix/appen_k.htm. See also Yossi BEILIN, TOUCHING PEACE: FROM THE OSLO ACCORD TO A FINAL AGREEMENT 19-20 (1999) (describing Arafat's re- marks in Geneva as changed PLO position, accepting U.N. Security Council Resolu- tions 242 and 338, which affirm self-determination of Palestinian and Israeli people as grounds for permanent peace, as grounds for negotiation and renouncing terrorism). See also Id. Israeli Peace Plan, May 14, 1989 [hereinafter IPP] (outlining
Recommended publications
  • Urban Poverty in Vietnam – a View from Complementary Assessments
    INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT HUMAN SETTLEMENTS WORKING PAPER SERIES POVERTY REDUCTION IN URBAN AREAS – 40 Urban pov erty in V iet nam – a vi ew from com plementary asses sments by HOANG XUAN THANH, with TRUONG TUAN ANH and DINH THI THU PHUONG OCTOBER 2013 HUMAN SETTLEMENTS GROUP Urban poverty in Vietnam – a view from complementary assessments Hoang Xuan Thanh, with Truong Tuan Anh and Dinh Thi Thu Phuong October 2013 i ABOUT THE AUTHORS Hoang Xuan Thanh, Senior Researcher, Ageless Consultants, Vietnam [email protected] Truong Tuan Anh, Researcher, Ageless Consultants, Vietnam [email protected] Dinh Thi Thu Phuong, Researcher, Ageless Consultants, Vietnam [email protected] Acknowledgements: This working paper has been funded entirely by UK aid from the UK Government. Its conclusions do not necessarily reflect the views of the UK Government. © IIED 2013 Human Settlements Group International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) 80-86 Gray’s Inn Road London WC1X 8NH, UK Tel: 44 20 3463 7399 Fax: 44 20 3514 9055 ISBN: 978-1-84369-959-0 This paper can be downloaded free of charge from http://pubs.iied.org/10633IIED.html Disclaimer: The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed here do not represent the views of any organisations that have provided institutional, organisational or financial support for the preparation of this paper. ii Contents Contents ..............................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Ben-Gurion University of the Negev the Jacob Blaustein Institutes for Desert Research the Albert Katz International School for Desert Studies
    Ben-Gurion University of the Negev The Jacob Blaustein Institutes for Desert Research The Albert Katz International School for Desert Studies Evolution of settlement typologies in rural Israel Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of "Master of Science" By: Keren Shalev November, 2016 “Human settlements are a product of their community. They are the most truthful expression of a community’s structure, its expectations, dreams and achievements. A settlement is but a symbol of the community and the essence of its creation. ”D. Bar Or” ~ III ~ תקציר למשבר הדיור בישראל השלכות מרחיקות לכת הן על המרחב העירוני והן על המרחב הכפרי אשר עובר תהליכי עיור מואצים בעשורים האחרונים. ישובים כפריים כגון קיבוצים ומושבים אשר התבססו בעבר בעיקר על חקלאות, מאבדים מאופיים הכפרי ומייחודם המקורי ומקבלים צביון עירוני יותר. נופי המרחב הכפרי הישראלי נעלמים ומפנים מקום לשכונות הרחבה פרבריות סמי- עירוניות, בעוד זהותה ודמותה הייחודית של ישראל הכפרית משתנה ללא היכר. תופעת העיור המואץ משפיעה לא רק על נופים כפריים, אלא במידה רבה גם על מרחבים עירוניים המפתחים שכונות פרבריות עם בתים צמודי קרקע על מנת להתחרות בכוח המשיכה של ישובים כפריים ולמשוך משפחות צעירות חזקות. כתוצאה מכך, סובלים המרחבים העירוניים, הסמי עירוניים והכפריים מאובדן המבנה והזהות המקוריים שלהם והשוני ביניהם הולך ומיטשטש. על אף שהנושא מעלה לא מעט סוגיות תכנוניות חשובות ונחקר רבות בעולם, מעט מאד מחקר נעשה בנושא בישראל. מחקר מקומי אשר בוחן את תהליכי העיור של המרחב הכפרי דרך ההיסטוריה והתרבות המקומית ולוקח בחשבון את התנאים המקומיים המשתנים, מאפשר התבוננות ואבחנה מדויקים יותר על ההשלכות מרחיקות הלכת. על מנת להתגבר על הבסיס המחקרי הדל בנושא, המחקר הנוכחי החל בבניית בסיס נתונים רחב של 84 ישובים כפריים (קיבוצים, מושבים וישובים קהילתיים( ומצייר תמונה כללית על תהליכי העיור של המרחב הכפרי ומאפייניה.
    [Show full text]
  • Subterranean Warfare: a New-Old Challenge
    Subterranean Warfare: A New-Old Challenge Yiftah S. Shapir and Gal Perel Subterranean warfare is not new in human history. Tunnels, which have been dug in all periods for various purposes, have usually been the weapon of the weak against the strong and used for concealment. The time required to dig tunnels means that they can be an important tool for local residents against an enemy army unfamiliar with the terrain. Tunnels used for concealment purposes (defensive tunnels) can be distinguished from tunnels used as a route for moving from one place to another. The latter include smuggling tunnels used to smuggle goods past borders (as in the Gaza Strip), escape routes from prisons or detention camps, offensive tunnels to move forces behind enemy lines, and booby-trapped tunnels planted with explosives !"#$%#!#&'%()*+,+-+#.%/)%-)*-+*% .#"%0'%1)&).23 Operation Protective Edge sharpened awareness of the strategic threat posed by subterranean warfare. The IDF encountered the tunnel threat long ago, and took action to attempt to cope with this threat, but the scope of -4#%54#!6&#!6!7%).%0#*)&#%)55)$#!-%+!%8 ,'9: ; .-%<=>?7%@).%56$-$)'#"% as a strategic shock, if not a complete surprise, requiring comprehensive reorganization to handle the problem. Some critics argued that an investigative commission was necessary to search for the roots of the failure and punish those to blame for it. This article will review subterranean warfare before and during Operation Protective Edge, and will assess the strategic effects of this mode of warfare. !"#$%&#'()#*+,-"../0"/0#1/.2/." A 0-#$$)!#)!%@)$()$#%4).%)55#)$#"%&)!'%-+&#.%+!%-4#%:$)09B.$)#,+%*6!-#C-7% and the IDF and the Ministry of Defense have dealt with various aspects of the phenomenon of subterranean warfare for many years.
    [Show full text]
  • ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT Primer to Understanding the Centuries-Old Struggle
    ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT Primer to understanding the centuries-old struggle “When people criticize Zionists, they mean Jews. You’re talking anti-Semitism.” Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. HonestReporting Defending Israel From Media Bias ANTI-SEMITISM IS THE DISSEMINATION OF FALSEHOODS ABOUT JEWS AND ISRAEL www.honestreporting.com 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Part 1 History Part 2 Jerusalem Part 3 Delegitimization Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Part 4 Hamas, Gaza, and the Gaza War Part 5 Why Media Matters 2 www.honestreporting.com ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT Primer to understanding the centuries-old struggle The Middle East nation we now know as the State of Israel has existed throughout history under a va riety of names: Palestine, Judah, Israel, and others. Today it is surrounded by Arab states that have purged most Jews from their borders. Israel is governed differently. It follows modern principles of a western liberal democracy and it pro vides freedom of religion. Until the recent discovery of large offshore natural gas deposits, Israel had few natural resources (including oil), but it has an entrepreneurial spirit that has helped it become a center of research and development in areas such as agriculture, computer science and medical tech nologies. All Israeli citizens have benefited from the country’s success. Yet anti-Israel attitudes have become popular in some circles. The reason ing is often related to the false belief that Israel “stole” Palestinian Arab lands and mistreated the Arab refugees. But the lands mandated by the United Nations as the State of Israel had actually been inhabited by Jews for thousands of years.
    [Show full text]
  • Armed Conflicts Report - Israel
    Armed Conflicts Report - Israel Armed Conflicts Report Israel-Palestine (1948 - first combat deaths) Update: February 2009 Summary Type of Conflict Parties to the Conflict Status of the Fighting Number of Deaths Political Developments Background Arms Sources Economic Factors Summary: 2008 The situation in the Gaza strip escalated throughout 2008 to reflect an increasing humanitarian crisis. The death toll reached approximately 1800 deaths by the end of January 2009, with increased conflict taking place after December 19th. The first six months of 2008 saw increased fighting between Israeli forces and Hamas rebels. A six month ceasefire was agreed upon in June of 2008, and the summer months saw increased factional violence between opposing Palestinian groups Hamas and Fatah. Israel shut down the border crossings between the Gaza strip and Israel and shut off fuel to the power plant mid-January 2008. The fuel was eventually turned on although blackouts occurred sporadically throughout the year. The blockade was opened periodically throughout the year to allow a minimum amount of humanitarian aid to pass through. However, for the majority of the year, the 1.5 million Gaza Strip inhabitants, including those needing medical aid, were trapped with few resources. At the end of January 2009, Israel agreed to the principles of a ceasefire proposal, but it is unknown whether or not both sides can come to agreeable terms and create long lasting peace in 2009. 2007 A November 2006 ceasefire was broken when opposing Palestinian groups Hamas and Fatah renewed fighting in April and May of 2007. In June, Hamas led a coup on the Gaza headquarters of Fatah giving them control of the Gaza Strip.
    [Show full text]
  • Does Policy Lead Media Coverage?
    Does Policy Lead Mainstream Media? How Sources Framed the 2011 Egyptian Protests by Kristen E. Grimmer Submitted to the William Allen White School of Journalism and Mass Communication and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science ________________________________________ Scott Reinardy Associate Professor Chairperson Committee Members# ________________________________________* Barbara Barnett Associate Dean for Undergraduate Studies _______________________________________* Doug Ward Associate Professor Date defended: ___04/09/2012________ ii The Thesis Committee for (Kristen E. Grimmer) certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis: Does Policy Lead Mainstream Media? How Sources Framed the 2011 Egyptian Conflict Committee: ____________________________ Scott Reinardy, Associate Professor Chairperson* Barbara Barnett, Associate Dean Doug Ward, Associate Professor Date approved: __05/01/2012__ iii Abstract This study uses a quantitative content analysis to determine the framing used by U.S. mainstream newspapers in media coverage of the 2011 Egyptian protests. The study examined 153 stories from The New York Times and The Washington Post. The study focuses on how sources framed the protests, former President Hosni Mubarak, and the effects the protests had on both Egypt and the United States. The analysis reveals that the viewpoints of U.S. official sources were overrepresented in news coverage and framed the conflict overall in a neutral
    [Show full text]
  • Strateg Ic a Ssessmen T
    Strategic Assessment Assessment Strategic Volume 19 | No. 4 | January 2017 Volume 19 Volume The Prime Minister and “Smart Power”: The Role of the Israeli Prime Minister in the 21st Century Yair Lapid The Israeli-Palestinian Political Process: Back to the Process Approach | No. 4 No. Udi Dekel and Emma Petrack Who’s Afraid of BDS? Economic and Academic Boycotts and the Threat to Israel | January 2017 Amit Efrati Israel’s Warming Ties with Regional Powers: Is Turkey Next? Ari Heistein Hezbollah as an Army Yiftah S. Shapir The Modi Government’s Policy on Israel: The Rhetoric and Reality of De-hyphenation Vinay Kaura India-Israel Relations: Perceptions and Prospects Manoj Kumar The Trump Effect in Eastern Europe: Heightened Risks of NATO-Russia Miscalculations Sarah Fainberg Negotiating Global Nuclear Disarmament: Between “Fairness” and Strategic Realities Emily B. Landau and Ephraim Asculai Strategic ASSESSMENT Volume 19 | No. 4 | January 2017 Abstracts | 3 The Prime Minister and “Smart Power”: The Role of the Israeli Prime Minister in the 21st Century | 9 Yair Lapid The Israeli-Palestinian Political Process: Back to the Process Approach | 29 Udi Dekel and Emma Petrack Who’s Afraid of BDS? Economic and Academic Boycotts and the Threat to Israel | 43 Amit Efrati Israel’s Warming Ties with Regional Powers: Is Turkey Next? | 57 Ari Heistein Hezbollah as an Army | 67 Yiftah S. Shapir The Modi Government’s Policy on Israel: The Rhetoric and Reality of De-hyphenation | 79 Vinay Kaura India-Israel Relations: Perceptions and Prospects | 93 Manoj Kumar The Trump Effect in Eastern Europe: Heightened Risks of NATO-Russia Miscalculations | 103 Sarah Fainberg Negotiating Global Nuclear Disarmament: Between “Fairness” and Strategic Realities | 117 Emily B.
    [Show full text]
  • The Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan
    The Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan 6 June 2004 Addendum A - Revised Disengagement Plan - Main Principles Addendum C - Format of the Preparatory Work for the Revised Disengagement Plan Addendum A - Revised Disengagement Plan - Main Principles 1. Background - Political and Security Implications The State of Israel is committed to the peace process and aspires to reach an agreed resolution of the conflict based upon the vision of US President George Bush. The State of Israel believes that it must act to improve the current situation. The State of Israel has come to the conclusion that there is currently no reliable Palestinian partner with which it can make progress in a two-sided peace process. Accordingly, it has developed a plan of revised disengagement (hereinafter - the plan), based on the following considerations: One. The stalemate dictated by the current situation is harmful. In order to break out of this stalemate, the State of Israel is required to initiate moves not dependent on Palestinian cooperation. Two. The purpose of the plan is to lead to a better security, political, economic and demographic situation. Three. In any future permanent status arrangement, there will be no Israeli towns and villages in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, it is clear that in the West Bank, there are areas which will be part of the State of Israel, including major Israeli population centers, cities, towns and villages, security areas and other places of special interest to Israel. Four. The State of Israel supports the efforts of the United States, operating alongside the international community, to promote the reform process, the construction of institutions and the improvement of the economy and welfare of the Palestinian residents, in order that a new Palestinian leadership will emerge and prove itself capable of fulfilling its commitments under the Roadmap.
    [Show full text]
  • Wye River Memorandum: a Transition to Final Peace Justus R
    Hastings International and Comparative Law Review Volume 24 Article 1 Number 1 Fall 2000 1-1-2000 Wye River Memorandum: A Transition to Final Peace Justus R. Weiner Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/ hastings_international_comparative_law_review Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Justus R. Weiner, Wye River Memorandum: A Transition to Final Peace, 24 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 (2000). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol24/iss1/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Wye River Memorandum: A Transition to Final Peace? BY JusTus R. WEINER* Table of Contents Introduction ...........................................................................................2 I. Inception of the Wye River Memorandum .................................5 A. The Memorandum's Position in the Peace Process ............. 5 B. The Terms Agreed Upon ........................................................8 1. The Wye River Memorandum and Related Letters from the United States .....................................................8 2. The Intricate "Time Line".............................................. 9
    [Show full text]
  • Jnf Blueprint Negev: 2009 Campaign Update
    JNF BLUEPRINT NEGEV: 2009 CAMPAIGN UPDATE In the few years since its launch, great strides have been made in JNF’s Blueprint Negev campaign, an initiative to develop the Negev Desert in a sustainable manner and make it home to the next generation of Israel’s residents. In Be’er Sheva: More than $30 million has already been invested in a city that dates back to the time of Abraham. For years Be’er Sheva was an economically depressed and forgotten city. Enough of a difference has been made to date that private developers have taken notice and begun to invest their own money. New apartment buildings have risen, with terraces facing the riverbed that in the past would have looked away. A slew of single family homes have sprung up, and more are planned. Attracted by the River Walk, the biggest mall in Israel and the first “green” one in the country is Be’er Sheva River Park being built by The Lahav Group, a private enterprise, and will contribute to the city’s communal life and all segments of the population. The old Turkish city is undergoing a renaissance, with gaslights flanking the refurbished cobblestone streets and new restaurants, galleries and stores opening. This year, the municipality of Be’er Sheva is investing millions of dollars to renovate the Old City streets and support weekly cultural events and activities. And the Israeli government just announced nearly $40 million to the River Park over the next seven years. Serious headway has been made on the 1,700-acre Be’er Sheva River Park, a central park and waterfront district that is already transforming the city.
    [Show full text]
  • Light at the End of Their Tunnels? Hamas & the Arab
    LIGHT AT THE END OF THEIR TUNNELS? HAMAS & THE ARAB UPRISINGS Middle East Report N°129 – 14 August 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. TWO SIDES OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS .................................................................... 1 A. A WEDDING IN CAIRO.................................................................................................................. 2 B. A FUNERAL IN DAMASCUS ........................................................................................................... 5 1. Balancing ..................................................................................................................................... 5 2. Mediation ..................................................................................................................................... 6 3. Confrontation ............................................................................................................................... 7 4. The crossfire................................................................................................................................. 8 5. Competing alliances ................................................................................................................... 10 C. WHAT IMPACT ON HAMAS? ......................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Forgotten Fronts the First World War Battlefield Guide: World War Battlefield First the the Forgotten Fronts Forgotten The
    Ed 1 Nov 2016 1 Nov Ed The First World War Battlefield Guide: Volume 2 The Forgotten Fronts The First Battlefield War World Guide: The Forgotten Fronts Creative Media Design ADR005472 Edition 1 November 2016 THE FORGOTTEN FRONTS | i The First World War Battlefield Guide: Volume 2 The British Army Campaign Guide to the Forgotten Fronts of the First World War 1st Edition November 2016 Acknowledgement The publisher wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the following organisations in providing text, images, multimedia links and sketch maps for this volume: Defence Geographic Centre, Imperial War Museum, Army Historical Branch, Air Historical Branch, Army Records Society,National Portrait Gallery, Tank Museum, National Army Museum, Royal Green Jackets Museum,Shepard Trust, Royal Australian Navy, Australian Defence, Royal Artillery Historical Trust, National Archive, Canadian War Museum, National Archives of Canada, The Times, RAF Museum, Wikimedia Commons, USAF, US Library of Congress. The Cover Images Front Cover: (1) Wounded soldier of the 10th Battalion, Black Watch being carried out of a communication trench on the ‘Birdcage’ Line near Salonika, February 1916 © IWM; (2) The advance through Palestine and the Battle of Megiddo: A sergeant directs orders whilst standing on one of the wooden saddles of the Camel Transport Corps © IWM (3) Soldiers of the Royal Army Service Corps outside a Field Ambulance Station. © IWM Inside Front Cover: Helles Memorial, Gallipoli © Barbara Taylor Back Cover: ‘Blood Swept Lands and Seas of Red’ at the Tower of London © Julia Gavin ii | THE FORGOTTEN FRONTS THE FORGOTTEN FRONTS | iii ISBN: 978-1-874346-46-3 First published in November 2016 by Creative Media Designs, Army Headquarters, Andover.
    [Show full text]