Fordham International Law Journal Volume 26, Issue 4 2002 Article 13 The Biggest Peace: The Structure of the Palestinian Legislative Council and the Politics of Separation Michel Paradis∗ ∗ Copyright c 2002 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke- ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj The Biggest Peace: The Structure of the Palestinian Legislative Council and the Politics of Separation Michel Paradis Abstract Part I of this Note summarizes the background leading up to the signing of the Oslo Accords. Part II details the overall structure and responsibilities laid out in Oslo II, with specific emphasis on the legal. Also, Part II presents for comparison the semi-autonomy arrangement devised and implemented in the Transkei of South Africa in the early 1960s. Part II concludes by examining the extent to which both of these arrangements were successful in satisfying the parties involved and makes some more general comparisons to similar reactions in Northern Ireland following the Good Friday Agreement. Part III attempts to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of limited autonomy to deal with the competing rhetoric of self-determination and the administration of viable political entities. COMMENT THE BIGGEST PEACE: THE STRUCTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND THE POLITICS OF SEPARATION Michel Paradis* INTRODUCTION The Israeli-Palestinian flirtation through the 1990s with non-State autonomy for the Occupied Territories culminated in a second uprising, more bloody than the first.' The 1995 Israeli- Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip ("Oslo II")2 set down the framework both for the Palestinian au- tonomous governing body, the Palestinian Council,3 and the scheme by which land would be redeployed in all agreements * The Author would like to thank Cara Hirsch, Inna Nazarova, Jason Otafio and Julie Wald for their comments and criticism that helped this piece take shape and, in particular, Briana Short without whom nothing would be possible. 1. See Chris Hedges, West Bank Clashes Kill 3 Soldiers and I Militant, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1993, at 3 (listing numbers killed in first six-year Intifada at 144 Israelis and more than 1,700 Palestinians); Cf Christian Chaise, PalestiniansLost the War, but Israel has not Won it Yet, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Sept. 25, 2002 (listing over 1,850 Palestinians and 600 Israelis killed during first two years of second Intifada). See also Don Radlauer, The "al- Aqsa Intifada" - An Engineered Tragedy, INSTITUTE FOR COUNTER TERRORISM, June 20, 2002 (citing 1900 Palestinians and 700 Israelis killed in second Intifada); Israeli Occupa- tion Policies 1, availableat www.passia.org (listing 173 Israelis and 1024 Palestinians killed in first Intifada). 2. See The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.-Palestinian Liberation Organization ("PLO") [hereinafter Oslo II]; GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO AccORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELI-PALES- TINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS (2000) (providing summary of main points of Oslo Accords, examining Israeli-Palestinian compliance and debating their classification as interna- tional documents). 3. See Oslo II, supra n.2, art. I. Article I of Oslo II reads, in relevant part: Israel shall transfer powers and responsibilities as specified in this Agreement from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Coun- cil in accordance with this Agreement. Israel shall continue to exercise powers and responsibilities not so transferred. Id.; See Oslo II, supra n.2, art III, Sec. 1. Section 1 of Article III of Oslo II reads: The Palestinian Council and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council constitute the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, which will be elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip for the transitional period agreed in Article I of the [Declaration of Principles (DOP)]. 1265 1266 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:1265 that followed.' This Note will examine the framework developed in Oslo II and the degree to which it accomplished the mutual objectives of self-determination, security and the end to an ex- 5 hausting conflict. Part I of this Note summarizes the background leading up to the signing of Oslo. Part II details the overall structure and responsibilities laid out in Oslo II, with specific emphasis on the legal. Also, Part II presents for comparison the semi-autonomy arrangement devised and implemented in the Transkei of South Africa in the early 1960s. Part II concludes by examining the extent to which both of these arrangements were successful in satisfying the parties involved and makes some more general Id.; See also WATSON, supra n.2, at 44-45 (describing Oslo II's importance in establishing "important organs of Palestinian self-government" and Palestinian Council structure). 4. See, e.g., Oslo II, supra n.2, art. XI, Sec. 3(c). Article XI, Sec. 3(c) provides, in relevant part: "Area C" means areas of the West Bank outside Areas A and B, which, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will be gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in accordance with this Agreement. Id. See also WATSON, supra n.2, at 45 (describing Oslo It's redeployment arrangements). 5. See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arangements, Sept. 13, 1993, Israel-PLO, pmbl. (hereinafter Declaration of Principles]. The Preamble of Declaration of Principles states, in relevant part: [lit is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peacefil coex- istence and mutual dignity and security and achieve ajust, lasting and compre- hensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed politi- cal process. RECOGNIZING that the aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the cur- rent Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestin- ian Interim Self-Government Authority, i.e. the elected Council (hereinafter "the Council" or "the Palestinian Council"), and the elected Ra'ees of the Ex- ecutive Authority, for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years from the date of sign- ing the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (hereinafter "the Gaza-Jericho Agreement") on May 4, 1994, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338; Id.; Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, Israel-PLO, pmbl. [hereinafter Oslo I]. The Preamble of Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area states, in relevant part: Reaffirming their understanding that the interim self-government arrange- ments, including the arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area contained in this Agreement, are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. 20031 THE BIGGEST PEACE 1267 comparisons to similar reactions in Northern Ireland following the Good Friday Agreement. Part III attempts to draw conclu- sions on the effectiveness of limited autonomy to deal with the competing rhetoric of self-determination and the administration of viable political entities. I. THE RAGE OF COMMUNITIES After years of violent conflict over land and authority, the Palestinian Liberation Organization6 ("PLO") and Israeli leaders began a process of rapprochement in the late 1980s and early 1990s.7 Through a series of public statements and preliminary accords, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators set into motion a pro- cess of negotiations directed at reaching a final settlement.' These overtures and compromises resultantly sparked fierce crit- icism and resistance from their respective nationalist blocs that would carry through the negotiation and signing of Oslo II.9 6. See CHERYL A. RUBENBERG, THE STRUCTURAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE PLO's CHANGING OBJECIVWS IN THE POST-1967 PERIOD, in THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT, 95-98 (Westview Press 1988) (describing PLO as nationalist organization committed to self-determination in historic Palestine and PLO movement from guerrilla warfare to diplomacy in late 1980s); U.N. SCOR, Palestine Question - League of Arab States Declaration/Rights of the Arabs of Palestine/Letter to the President of the SecCo, U.N. Doc. S/6003 (1964) (stating establishment of Palestinian Liberation Organization and authorizing creation of its army); BENNY MORRIS, RIGHTEOUS VICTIMS 364-66 (2001) (ex- amining founding of PLO and its taking of recruits largely from refugee camps and students); GIRARD CHALIAND, THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE 56-58 (Pelican 1972) (describing founding of PLO in 1964 at Arab summit meeting in Alexandria and PLO's firm connection to Arab governments). 7. See Statement by Yasir Arafat, Dec. 14, 1988, availableat http://www.brook.edu/ dybdocroot/press/appendix/appen_k.htm. See also Yossi BEILIN, TOUCHING PEACE: FROM THE OSLO ACCORD TO A FINAL AGREEMENT 19-20 (1999) (describing Arafat's re- marks in Geneva as changed PLO position, accepting U.N. Security Council Resolu- tions 242 and 338, which affirm self-determination of Palestinian and Israeli people as grounds for permanent peace, as grounds for negotiation and renouncing terrorism). See also Id. Israeli Peace Plan, May 14, 1989 [hereinafter IPP] (outlining