Vice-Senior General Soe Win Attends 74Th Union Day Celebrations in Nay Pyi Taw
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Us Department of the Treasury
2/12/2021 United States Targets Leaders of Burma’s Military Coup Under New Executive Order | U.S. Department of the Treasury U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY United States Targets Leaders of Burma’s Military Coup Under New Executive Order February 11, 2021 Washington – Today, the Biden administration launched a new sanctions regime in response to the Burmese military’s coup against the democratically elected civilian government of Burma. In coordination with the issuance of a new Executive Order (E.O.), the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated, pursuant to that E.O., 10 individuals and three entities connected to the military apparatus responsible for the coup. The United States will continue to work with partners throughout the region and the world to support the restoration of democracy and the rule of law in Burma, to press for the immediate release of political prisoners, including State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, and to hold accountable those responsible for attempting to reverse Burma’s progress toward democracy. These sanctions specifically target those who played a leading role in the overthrow of Burma’s democratically elected government. The sanctions are not directed at the people of Burma. “As the President has said, the February 1 coup was a direct assault on Burma’s transition to democracy and the rule of law,” said Secretary Janet L. Yellen. “The Treasury Department stands with the people of Burma — and we are doing what we must to help them in their eort to secure freedom and democracy.” “We are also prepared to take additional action should Burma’s military not change course. -
(BRI) in Myanmar
MYANMAR POLICY BRIEFING | 22 | November 2019 Selling the Silk Road Spirit: China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Myanmar Key points • Rather than a ‘grand strategy’ the BRI is a broad and loosely governed framework of activities seeking to address a crisis in Chinese capitalism. Almost any activity, implemented by any actor in any place can be included under the BRI framework and branded as a ‘BRI project’. This allows Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and provincial governments to promote their own projects in pursuit of profit and economic growth. Where necessary, the central Chinese government plays a strong politically support- ive role. It also maintains a semblance of control and leadership over the initiative as a whole. But with such a broad framework, and a multitude of actors involved, the Chinese government has struggled to effectively govern BRI activities. • The BRI is the latest initiative in three decades of efforts to promote Chinese trade and investment in Myanmar. Following the suspension of the Myitsone hydropower dam project and Myanmar’s political and economic transition to a new system of quasi-civilian government in the early 2010s, Chinese companies faced greater competition in bidding for projects and the Chinese Government became frustrated. The rift between the Myanmar government and the international community following the Rohingya crisis in Rakhine State provided the Chinese government with an opportunity to rebuild closer ties with their counterparts in Myanmar. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) was launched as the primary mechanism for BRI activities in Myanmar, as part of the Chinese government’s economic approach to addressing the conflicts in Myanmar. -
8.2.1.6 Zhejiang Fangyuan Wood Co., Ltd. 8.2.1.7 Shanghai New Sihe Wood Co., Ltd
Part A Global Witness Research and Investigations in China 2006-09 / 8 The Trade in Burmese Timber on China’s Eastern Seaboard 8.2.1.6 Zhejiang Fangyuan Wood Co., Ltd. 8.2.1.7 Shanghai New Sihe Wood Co., Ltd. “Discipline and Flexibility, the unity of the dichotomy in Shanghai New Sihe Wood Co., Ltd. is one of China’s Chinese traditional wisdom, reminds us of the enclosed largest producers of engineered flooring with an annual square doors in ancient courtyards that stand erect firmly output of 200,000 m2, at the time of Global Witness’ and persistently, which only when guided with a pair of 2 round knockers can open to a more capacious space.” visit, and planned to increase this to 500,000 m from Fangyuan company brochure, 2006 October 2006. All of the company’s production was destined for the export market. Production was focused Fangyuan is one of the leading companies in Nanxun on oak, padauk (Pterocarpus macrocarpus)e7 and teak Town, outside Shanghai, where about 200 companies from Burma, sourced by the Burma-China border and manufacturing wood products are located. In 2006, available at the time of Global Witness’ visit. One of Fangyuan specialised in flooring made from timber the company’s sales representatives explained that while sourced in Burma; 50% of its supply originated in New Sihe Wood had faced some problems with supply, Burma. It was also one of the few companies that due to the restrictions imposed by the Burmese told Global Witness that it had found it very difficult government, it was, “almost okay now”.212 to import timber across the Burma-China border As for certificates for legality or sustainability, the following the new restrictions. -
DASHED HOPES the Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in Myanmar WATCH
HUMAN RIGHTS DASHED HOPES The Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in Myanmar WATCH Dashed Hopes The Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in Myanmar Copyright © 2019 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-6231-36970 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org FEBRUARY 2019 ISBN: 978-1-6231-36970 Dashed Hopes The Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in Myanmar Summary ........................................................................................................................... 1 Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 5 I. Background ..................................................................................................................... 6 II. Section 66(d) -
Additional Agenda Item, Report of the Officers of the Governing Bodypdf
International Labour Conference Provisional Record 2-2 101st Session, Geneva, May–June 2012 Additional agenda item Report of the Officers of the Governing Body 1. At its 313th Session (March 2012), the Governing Body requested its Officers to undertake a mission (the “Mission”) to Myanmar and to report to the International Labour Conference at its 101st Session (2012) on all relevant issues, with a view to assisting the Conference’s consideration of a review of the measures previously adopted by the Conference 1 to secure compliance by Myanmar with the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry that had been established to examine the observance by Myanmar of its obligation in respect of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29). 2. The Mission, composed of Mr Greg Vines, Chairperson of the Governing Body, Mr Luc Cortebeeck, Worker Vice-Chairperson of the Governing Body, and Mr Brent Wilton, Secretary of the Employers’ group of the Governing Body, as the personal representative of Mr Daniel Funes de Rioja, the Employer Vice-Chairperson of the Governing Body, visited Myanmar from 1 to 5 May 2012. The Mission met with authorities at the highest level, including: the President of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar; the Speaker of the Parliament’s lower house; the Minister of Labour; the Minister of Foreign Affairs; the Attorney-General; other representatives of the Government; and the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services. It was also able to meet and discuss with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, President of the National League for Democracy (NLD); representatives of other opposition political parties; the National Human Rights Commission; labour activists; the leaders of newly registered workers’ organizations; and employers’ representatives from the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI) and recently registered employers’ organizations. -
Chapter 1 Introduction to the Geology of Myanmar
Downloaded from http://mem.lyellcollection.org/ by guest on October 2, 2021 Chapter 1 Introduction to the geology of Myanmar KHIN ZAW1*, WIN SWE2, A. J. BARBER3, M. J. CROW4 & YIN YIN NWE5 1CODES ARC Centre of Excellence in Ore Deposits, University of Tasmania, Private Bag 126, Hobart, Tasmania 7001, Australia 2Myanmar Geosciences Society, 303 MES Building, Hlaing University Campus, Yangon, Myanmar 3Department of Earth Sciences, Southeast Asian Research Group, Royal Holloway, Egham TW20 0EX, UK 428a Lenton Road, The Park, Nottingham NG7 1DT, UK 5Myanmar Applied Earth Sciences Association (MAESA), 15 (C) Pyidaungsu Lane, Bahan, Yangon, Myanmar *Correspondence: [email protected] Gold Open Access: This article is published under the terms of the CC-BY 3.0 license. The Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Pyidaungsu Tham- northern part of the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Mottama mada Myanmar NaingNganDaw), formerly Burma, occupies (Martaban). The central lowlands are divided into two unequal the northwestern part of the Southeast Asian peninsula. It is parts by the Bago Yoma Ranges, the larger Ayeyarwaddy Valley bounded to the west by India, Bangladesh, the Bay of Bengal and the smaller Sittaung Valley. The Bago Yoma Ranges pass and the Andaman Sea, and to the east by China, Laos and Thai- northwards into a line of extinct volcanoes with small crater land. It comprises seven administrative regions (Ayeyarwaddy lakes and eroded cones; the largest of these is Mount Popa (Irrawaddy), Bago, Magway, Mandalay, Sagaing, Tanintharyi (1518 m). Coastal lowlands and offshore islands margin the (Tenasserim) and Yangon) and seven states (Chin, Kachin, Bay of Bengal to the west of the Rakhine Yoma and the Anda- Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine (Arakan) and Shan). -
Burma Coup Watch
This publication is produced in cooperation with Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN), Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK), the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Progressive Voice (PV), US Campaign for Burma (USCB), and Women Peace Network (WPN). BN 2021/2031: 1 Mar 2021 BURMA COUP WATCH: URGENT ACTION REQUIRED TO PREVENT DESTABILIZING VIOLENCE A month after its 1 February 2021 coup, the military junta’s escalation of disproportionate violence and terror tactics, backed by deployment of notorious military units to repress peaceful demonstrations, underlines the urgent need for substantive international action to prevent massive, destabilizing violence. The junta’s refusal to receive UN diplomatic and CONTENTS human rights missions indicates a refusal to consider a peaceful resolution to the crisis and 2 Movement calls for action confrontation sparked by the coup. 2 Coup timeline 3 Illegal even under the 2008 In order to avert worse violence and create the Constitution space for dialogue and negotiations, the 4 Information warfare movement in Burma and their allies urge that: 5 Min Aung Hlaing’s promises o International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 6 Nationwide opposition immediately freeze existing loans, recall prior 6 CDM loans and reassess the post-coup situation; 7 CRPH o Foreign states and bodies enact targeted 7 Junta’s violent crackdown sanctions on the military (Tatmadaw), 8 Brutal LIDs deployed Tatmadaw-affiliated companies and partners, 9 Ongoing armed conflict including a global arms embargo; and 10 New laws, amendments threaten human rights o The UN Security Council immediately send a 11 International condemnation delegation to prevent further violence and 12 Economy destabilized ensure the situation is peacefully resolved. -
BURMESE JADE: the INSCRUTABLE GEM by Richard W
BURMESE JADE: THE INSCRUTABLE GEM By Richard W. Hughes, Olivier Galibert, George Bosshart, Fred Ward, Thet Oo, Mark Smith, Tay Thye Sun, and George E. Harlow The jadeite mines of Upper Burma (now Myanmar) occupy a privileged place in the If jade is discarded and pearls destroyed, petty thieves world of gems, as they are the principal source of top-grade material. This article, by the first will disappear, there being no valuables left to steal. foreign gemologists allowed into these impor- — From a dictionary published during the reign of tant mines in over 30 years, discusses the his- Emperor K’ang Hsi (1662–1722 AD) , as quoted by Gump, 1962 tory, location, and geology of the Myanmar jadeite deposits, and especially current mining erhaps no other gemstone has the same aura of mys- activities in the Hpakan region. Also detailed tery as Burmese jadeite. The mines’ remote jungle are the cutting, grading, and trading of location, which has been off-limits to foreigners for jadeite—in both Myanmar and China—as P well as treatments. The intent is to remove decades, is certainly a factor. Because of the monsoon rains, some of the mystery surrounding the Orient’s this area is essentially cut off from the rest of the world for most valued gem. several months of the year, and guerrilla activities have plagued the region since 1949 (Lintner, 1994). But of equal importance is that jade connoisseurship is almost strictly a Chinese phenomenon. People of the Orient have developed jade appreciation to a degree found nowhere else in the world, but this knowledge is largely locked away ABOUT THE AUTHORS in non-Roman-alphabet texts that are inaccessible to most Mr. -
Myanmar Security Outlook: a Taxing Year for the Tatmadaw CHAPTER 4
CHAPTER 4 Myanmar Security Outlook: A Taxing Year for the Tatmadaw Tin Maung Maung Than Introduction 2015 was a landmark year in Myanmar politics. The general election was held on 8 November and the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi (daughter of Myanmar armed forces founder and independence hero General Aung San) won a landslide victory over the incumbent Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP; a military-backed party led by ex-military officers and President Thein Sein). This was an unexpected development that could challenge the constitutionally-guaranteed political role of the military. The Tatmadaw (literally “royal force”) or Myanmar Defence Services (MDS) also faced a serious challenge to its primary security role when the defunct Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a renegade ethnic armed organization (EAO), unleashed a furious assault to take over the Kokang Self-Administered Zone (KSAZ; bordering China) leading to a drawn out war of attrition lasting several months and threatening Myanmar-China relations. Tatmadaw: fighting multiple adversaries Despite actively participating in the peace process, launched by President Thein Sein’s elected government since 2011, The MDS found itself engaged in fierce fighting with powerful EAOs in the northern, eastern and south-eastern border regions of Myanmar. In fact, except for the MNDAA, most of these armed groups that engaged in armed conflict with the MDS throughout 2015 were associated with EAOs which had been officially negotiating with the government’s peace-making team toward a nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) since March 2014. Moreover, almost all of them had some form of bilateral ceasefire arrangements with the government in the past. -
Sanctions and Export Control Developments in the First 50 Days of the Biden Administration
Sanctions and Export Control Developments in the First 50 Days of the Biden Administration By Elizabeth G. Silver, John E. Bradley and Aleksandra Rybicki March 17, 2021 Monitoring sanctions developments as a heat map for U.S. foreign policy and national security under the Biden Administration. As the calendar flipped past the 50th day of President Joe Biden’s administration on March 11, 2021, a survey of economic sanctions and export control-related developments shows where the Administration felt a pressing need to impose new sanctions, alter existing policies or, in several areas, clarify existing programs. To date, we have not seen substantial changes to any ongoing sanctions programs by the Biden Administration, but we will be watching complex hot spots such as China and Iran as the Administration works through the nuances of its foreign policy and deepens its diplomatic efforts over the coming weeks and months. In this bulletin, we share our thinking on these early developments with our clients and friends to help you keep your sanctions programs current and monitor shifting risk levels posed by your international operations. Africa Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique The Biden Administration advanced the long-standing sanctions program against foreign terrorist organizations operating on the African continent with the designation by the Department of State of two affiliates of the Islamic State, one each in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique, as “foreign terrorist organizations,” adding them to the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (“OFAC”) Specially Designated Nationals (“SDN”) List and subjecting them to broad sanctions. Allied Democratic Forces (also known as ISIS-DRC (“ADF”)) and Ansar al-Sunna (also known as ISIS- Mozambique) are believed to be responsible for multiple attacks on civilians and government security forces that have Vedder Price P.C. -
From Kunming to Mandalay: the New “Burma Road”
AsieAsie VVisionsisions 2525 From Kunming to Mandalay: The New “Burma Road” Developments along the Sino-Myanmar border since 1988 Hélène Le Bail Abel Tournier March 2010 Centre Asie Ifri The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental and a non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Using an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. With offices in Paris and Brussels, Ifri stands out as one of the rare French think tanks to have positioned itself at the very heart of European debate. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the authors alone. ISBN : 978-2-86592-675-6 © All rights reserved, Ifri, 2010 IFRI IFRI-BRUXELLES 27 RUE DE LA PROCESSION RUE MARIE-THÉRÈSE, 21 75740 PARIS CEDEX 15 - FRANCE 1000 - BRUXELLES, BELGIQUE PH. : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00 PH. : +32 (2) 238 51 10 FAX: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 FAX: +32 (2) 238 51 15 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] WEBSITE: Ifri.org China Program, Centre Asie/Ifri The Ifri China Program’s objectives are: . To organize regular exchanges with Chinese elites and enhance mutual trust through the organization of 4 annual seminars in Paris or Brussels around Chinese participants. -
U.S. Restrictions on Relations with Burma
U.S. Restrictions on Relations with Burma Updated March 18, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R44570 U.S. Restrictions on Relations with Burma Summary Major changes in Burma’s political situation since 2016 have raised questions among some Members of Congress concerning the appropriateness of U.S. policy toward Burma (Myanmar) in general, and the current restrictions on relations with Burma in particular. During the time Burma was under military rule (1962–2011), restrictions were placed on bilateral relations in an attempt to encourage the Burmese military, or Tatmadaw, to permit the restoration of democracy. In November 2015, Burma held nationwide parliamentary elections from which Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) emerged as the party with an absolute majority in both chambers of Burma’s parliament. The new government subsequently appointed Aung San Suu Kyi to the newly created position of State Counselor, as well as Foreign Minister. While the NLD controls the parliament and the executive branch, the Tatmadaw continues to exercise significant power under provisions of Burma’s 2008 constitution, impeding potential progress towards the re-establishment of a democratically-elected civilian government in Burma. On October 7, 2016, after consultation with Aung San Suu Kyi, former President Obama revoked several executive orders pertaining to sanctions on Burma, and waived restrictions required by Section 5(b) of the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-286), removing most of the economic restrictions on relations with Burma. On December 2, 2016, he issued Presidential Determination 2017-04, ending some restrictions on U.S.