www.policy-network.net e: [email protected] +44(0)2073402211 f: t: +44(0)2073402200 United Kingdom London SW1P3QB 11 Tufton Street Third floor Policy Network policy network paper the EU before the referendum Britons’ conflicted attitudes to Mixed feelings: Sofia Vasilopoulou Contents

Introduction 3 British Euroscepticism in retrospect 4 The sources of UK Euroscepticism 5 The political salience of the EU 6 The in-out question 8

Before the referendum: what do Britons want from the EU? 8 paper policy network Special focus: Immigration, Welfare and the EU 12 Concluding remarks 15 References 17

Summary Euroscepticism will weigh heavily in the UK’s referendum debate on EU membership, but do we know exactly what we are talking about? Beyond general assertions, it is necessary to understand the sources, patterns and effects of Euroscepticism among the British people. This paper aims to provide a detailed picture of how Britons think about the EU based on an online survey conducted two weeks before the 2015 general election. It shows that there is significant variation in UK support for different EU policies. Beyond economic calculations, emotions also form a key component of people’s attitudes towards the EU.

About the Author Sofia Vasilopoulou is a lecturer at the Department of Politics at the University of York. Her work examines the theme of political dissatisfaction with democracy and democratic institutions across Europe. Topics include Euroscepticism, the far right, and the EU’s democratic legitimacy. Her work appears in the European Journal of Political Research, Journal of Common Market Studies, Journal of European Public Policy, Government and Opposition, Nations and Nationalism, South European Society and Politics, among others. She is the co-author of The Golden Dawn’s Nationalist Solution: Explaining the Rise of the Far Right in Greece (Palgrave 2015). She has been awarded support from The UK in a Changing Europe Commissioning Fund to run a series of public engagement events on the impact of Euroscepticism on UK national politics.

This paper was produced in conjunction with the University of York, with funding from the ESRC’s UK in a Changing Europe initiative. Cover image credit: Charles Clegg https://www.flickr.com/photos/ glasgowamateur/7892308660/

2 | Mixed feelings: Britons’ conflicted attitudes to the EU before the referendum | Sofia Vasilopoulou | September 2015 www.policy-network.net Introduction: More entangled and less attached

The victory of the Conservatives in the 2015 UK parliamentary election has paved the way for a referendum on the UK’s EU membership by 2017. British prime minister David Cameron has a mandate to hold the referendum on the question of whether Britain should remain a member of the EU. Prior to the referendum, Cameron is expected to renegotiate the UK’s place in the EU on a number of key issues, which include giving greater powers to national parliaments, cutting red tape, an opt-out for Britain from the principle of ever-closer union, and restrictions to welfare entitlements

of EU migrants. paper policy network

Britain’s place in the EU is now one of the most important questions in British politics. The result of this referendum will determine not only Britain’s future in the EU but also its international status more broadly. Given the nature of this type of public consultation, the debate has been structured in binary terms: should the UK stay in or leave the EU? Discussions have taken a predominantly economic angle, focusing on an economic cost-benefit analysis of the country’s EU membership. Specific debates relate to the cost of red tape and regulation to UK businesses, and the financial impact of EU migration on the welfare state and ultimately UK political independence. Other important issues, however, such as the role of public opinion, have not yet entered the UK political debate. What are the different aspects of UK citizens’ attitudes towards the EU? What are the sources of UK Euroscepticism? What type of renegotiation do UK citizens want?

This paper revisits the debate on British attitudes towards the EU. Going beyond existing evaluations of public attitudes, which focus on the EU project in general terms, this paper examines public opinion on specific policy areas and from a socio-demographic perspective. Using data from an original survey of 3000 respondents conducted two weeks prior to the 2015 general election, it provides a nuanced picture of British public opinion on the EU.

Findings indicate that there is great variation not only on the level of power that Britons want to give to the EU but also in their support for specific policy areas. Somewhat against expectation, there is a substantive section of the population that supports a greater role for the EU in all EU policy areas. About a quarter of respondents on average also neither agree nor disagree with the statement that the EU should have more authority over the EU member states in specific policy areas, which suggests that they are broadly happy with the current levels of integration. The British public tends to support a greater role for the EU in policies that are perceived to be optimal for all countries involved, such as trade and the digital economy. They also support integration in policies such as environment and climate change, which by their nature require international cooperation. They tend to oppose further integration in social policies, such as labour market, employment and social affairs, education and health, as well as economic and monetary policies, which are perceived to belong to the realm of the nation state.

Britons are reluctant to support policies that entail a level of redistribution across the EU that goes beyond traditional EU funding, such as EU citizens’ right to work and access to the welfare state of another EU country. This is problematic as opposition to free labour movement infringes upon a fundamental EU principle. Changing this may require a full EU treaty change, which is unlikely to occur by 2017. Consistent with previous research, opposition to EU citizens’ right to work in another EU country derives primarily from older, less educated and working-class citizens, who may feel threatened by such mobility. UK Independence party and Conservative party supporters tend to be less supportive of free movement of labour within the EU.

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7 Oct-08 The The Jun-09 Nov-09 Jun-10 May-11 Press. Surveys. Oxford: Oxford University 1, Case Studies andCountry Politics ofEuroscepticism, Volume Europe? The Comparative Party and Taggart, P. (eds.) Opposing Frustration, A. inSzczerbiak, Perplexity, andSometimes System: ‘A Source ofFascination, Euroscepticism Party intheBritish N. andSeawright D. (2008) 9. Baker, D., Gamble, A.,Randall, 62(3): 367-389. politics, InternationalAffairs, and interdependence inBritish independence? Sovereignty 8. Wallace, W. (1996) What price Press. Surveys. Oxford: Oxford University 1, Case Studies andCountry Politics ofEuroscepticism, Volume Europe? The Comparative Party and Taggart, P. (eds.) Opposing Frustration, A. inSzczerbiak, Perplexity, andSometimes System: ‘A Source ofFascination, Euroscepticism Party intheBritish N. andSeawright D. (2008) Baker, D., Gamble, A.,Randall, Amsterdam: Rodopi. and European integration, politics,Party national identity Spiering, M.(eds.) Euroscepticism: Euroscepticism, R. & inHarmsen, Spiering, M.(2004) British 62(3): 367-389. politics, International Affairs, and interdependence inBritish independence? Sovereignty 7. Wallace, W. (1996) What price 22(1): 15-33. ofEuropeanJournal Integration, Anatomy ofaEurosceptic state, 6. George, S.(2000)Britain: Amsterdam: Rodopi. and European integration, politics,Party national identity Spiering, M.(eds.) Euroscepticism: Euroscepticism, R. & inHarmsen, 5. Spiering, M.(2004) British Press. 110. Surveys. Oxford: Oxford University 1, Case Studies andCountry Politics ofEuroscepticism, Volume Europe? The Comparative Party and Taggart, P. (eds.) Opposing Frustration’, A. inSzczerbiak, Perplexity, andSometimes System: ‘A Source ofFascination, Euroscepticism Party intheBritish N. andSeawright D. (2008) 4. Baker, D., Gamble, A.,Randall, 77(1): 1-13. European?, InternationalAffairs, Ash, Garton T. (2001)IsBritain Politics, 15(1):33-42. Britain’s relations withtheEU, Reassessing an awkward partner: 3. Eg see: Buller, J. as (1995)Britain www.policy-network.net

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policy network paper EU in different areas of public policy. It is also possible that citizens find the current levels of EU of levels current integration. more or less the either wish not for do and acceptable cooperation find citizens that possible also is It policy. public of areas different in EU the to authority more giving oppose or support may they on, so and status occupation their level, educational their dimension, left-right the on positioning individuals’ on based example, For areas. policy different towards orientations attitudinal different have may citizens that conceivable thus public policy entails that attitudes towards the EU may also be complex and multifaceted. and complex be also may EU the towards attitudes that entails policy public national of majority overwhelming the over spread policies EU that fact the and system EU the of complexity The policymaking. national upon impact they because significant highly are level EU the at taken Decisions policy. social and trade, development, citizenship, defence, policy, foreign education, regulation, market including areas, policy key of number a over authority jurisdictional areas. Over the past decades, the EU has enlarged to include 28 member states and has its expanded Going beyond the general in-out question, we should also explore public attitudes on specificpolicy Before the referendum: what do Britons want from the EU? www.ipsos-mori.com Source: would how Union, 1977-2015 vote? you European the of out get or in stay should Britain whether on now referendum a were there If 4: Figure day.as is howvote it would they unclear polling the on of the ‘undecided voters’ who are likely to influence the referendum’s outcome beyondpredictions, tosignificance the points This BritishEU on membership. held was vote would they referendum a if decreasing (see figure 2).It isnoteworthy that about 10per centof thepopulation do not know what steadily been has EU the of image negative a have who Britons 2011 of of percentage the onwards end the from Interestingly is widening. camps two the between gap EU the the in and is rising, stay to want who 2011Britons From of membership. EUpercentage of the onwards, disadvantages and advantages the about mind their changing continuously are Britons that suggests which volatile, the was been has EU community the in remaining the for support 1993Fromonwards, in 1989-92period. the remaining during highest for support that shows 4 Figure EU. the from withdrawal country’s their of favour in unequivocally been not have they dilemma, in-out the with faced are Despite low levels of for support the EU as indicated above, trend polling suggests that when Britons stay inshould of out or get the Britain European Union” whether have sinceregular the 1970s.been survey questions asking the British 2017. public what they would early vote Yet,“if there were in a referendum now on announced was re-elected if referendum in-out an hold to decision Cameron’s question in-out The

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policy network paper economic benefits that derive from it. it. from thatderive benefits economic the and membership EU British of importance the showing by emotions people’s into tap also to actors pro-EU for scope be might there that indicates This EU. the of membership Britain’s about the EU provokes less positive hopeful that data emotions, feel suggest of a the quarter respondents they do turn out to vote, they might how decide to vote quite late. In although on addition, average if or vote; to out turn not may voters of pool this that indicates which indifferent, feels also quarter a strikingly, Quite actors. Eurosceptic by exploited strategically be can it as referendum, the to up in successful run- the be in role major a to play can Emotiveness likely membership. EUBritain’s against people are persuading emotions people’s into tap to intend which those particularly and campaigns political negative that per (18suggests This cent). anger (15 per disgust are and provokes cent) (16 per EU fear cent), the that emotions negative Other it. about uneasy felt they that reported respondents of half almost EU, the of membership Britain’s about feelings their describe to asked When membership. EU country’s their vis-à-vis reactions emotional their of terms in also but integration, EU towards attitudes their of terms in differ citizens British do only Not 8). (figure it of membership British EUand towardsthe attitudes people’s of component key a form emotions words (angry, disgusted, uneasy, afraid) and one word indicating indifference. Findings suggest that from a selection, which included four positive words (happy, hopeful, confident,proud), four negative words four to up choose to invited were participants EU.Survey the of Britain’smembership about Beyond attitudes to policies,specific we also askedwhich respondents wordsdescribe their feelings of York. University Bone, John and Vasilopoulou © Sofia 23/04/2015-05/05/2015, period the in conducted respondents 3000 of survey original from Data Source: areas policy following the in states member EU the over authority more have should EU the that disagree or agree you do 7: extent To what Figure Justice, fundamental rights and equality

Competition andbusinessregulation Digital security anddata protectionDigital security Environmental and climate change 11 |Mixed feelings: Britons’ conflicted attitudes to theEUbefore the referendumSofia | September Vasilopoulou| 2015 Overseas aid/DevelopmentOverseas policy Employment andsocialaffairs Foreign policy andSecurity Sustainable development Agriculture andfood Monetary policy Monetary Asylum seekers Defence policy Labour market Education Taxation Energy Health Trade 0% 10% Agree 20% 30% Neither agree nor disagree nor agree Neither 40% 50% 60% 70% Disagree 80% 90% 100% www.policy-network.net

policy network paper to see EU migration curbed and to reduce EU migrants’ ability to access the British welfare state. welfare British the access to ability migrants’ EU reduce to and curbed migration EU see to the agenda items in Cameron’s renegotiation agenda. The prime minister has claimed that he wants Mediterranean but also to the British domestic debate on intra-EU migration. The latter forms one of which taps into not only economics but also identity and raises the question of who should be be should who of question to state. the of haveentitled goods access tothe collective the raises and identity also but economics only not into taps which dimension, migration anti-EU an assumed thus has Euroscepticism British nationals. own country’s the a to only at belong services accesssocial movement to and housing, jobs, that felt is It citizens. British labour of expense EU from gaining are citizens EU ie nature, zero-sum of be to perceived are welfare and employment that EUlaw.by suggests guaranteed This freedoms EU’sfundamental the of one is which state, member EU another in freely work and move to right the ie movement, with this findings These with revealstatement. labour that areBritish uncomfortable feeling people disagree only cent per and 13 origin, of country their in only benefits welfare receive to allowed be should citizens EU that agree cent) per (73 respondents of majority overwhelming The degrees). varying to (although restricted be should right this that think cent) per (56 respondents the of half countries should be restricted; 17 per cent neither agree nor disagree with the statement, while over per cent of disagree respondents with the statement that the right of EU citizens to work in other EU and their country access to the state, welfare responses are much more negative (figure 10).Only 27 EU another in work to right citizens’ EU to comes it Interestingly,when place. taking be not should redistribution sample of type this the that feel cent 42per of and statement, this with quarter disagree nor agree A neither place. taking be should countries and regions EU poorer to richer from Figure 9 shows that over a third of British citizens (34 per cent) agree that of redistribution resources in another EU country. benefits to welfare with three statements that relate to redistribution across the EU, EU citizens’ right to work and agreement access of levels people’s examining by so does It EU. the across welfare and redistribution on public’sthe views unpacks thisof this current the prominence section issueGiven in British politics, 6 e cn respectively). cent per 36 and cent per (35 first it ranking Britons of third a over with immigration, is moment the and at EU Britain the both facing issue important most the survey, Eurobarometer latest the to According Special focus: Immigration, Welfare andtheEU of York. University Bone, John and Vasilopoulou © Sofia 23/04/2015-05/05/2015, period the in conducted respondents 3000 of survey original from Data Source: to up (choose EU the words) four of membership Britain’s about feelings your describe words following the of any, if Which, 8: Figure

Indifferent Disgusted Confident 12 |Mixed feelings: Britons’ conflicted attitudes to theEUbefore the referendumSofia | September Vasilopoulou| 2015 Hopeful Uneasy Happy Angry Afraid Proud 0% 10% 16 20% This is a key issue that relates not only to the migration crisis in the the in crisis migration the to only not relates that issue key a is This 30% 40% 50% 60% 17

President-says.html EU-workers-is-illegal-European- immigration-through-quotas-for- David-Camerons-plans-to-limit- uknews/immigration/11172379/ www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ President says. Available at: http:// EU workers isillegal, European immigration through quotasfor Cameron’s plansto limit 17. Telegraph (2014)David Spring. First results, Eurobarometer 83, opinion intheEuropean Union, 16. Eurobarometer (2015)Public www.policy-network.net

policy network paper national insurance numbers issued to issued EU insurancenational years. citizens numbers have past in the increased as migration such of recipients largest the of one be to perceived is Britain EU. the across movement labour encouraging also are scheme, mobility targeted a is which programme, to migration from poorer richer EU countries. EU such schemes as the ‘Your First EURES Job’ labour intra-EU of in terms also but eurozone within the transfers fiscal of terms in only not place taking been has redistribution crisis, the of outbreak the Since crisis. the leaders manage to EU of attempts the constrain they as consequences severe have attitudes These of York. University Bone, John and Vasilopoulou © Sofia 23/04/2015-05/05/2015, period the in conducted respondents 3000 of survey original from Data Source: (1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree) 2.EUcitizens shouldbeallowed to receive welfare oforigin. benefitsonlyintheir country 1. The rightofEUcitizens to work inotherEUcountries shouldberestricted. origin of country their in only benefits welfare receive to allowed be should EU citizens 2. restricted. be should EU countries other in work to EU citizens of 1. right The statements: following the of each with disagree or agree you do 10: Toextent Figure what of York. University Bone, John and Vasilopoulou © Sofia 23/04/2015-05/05/2015, period the in conducted respondents 3000 of survey original from Data Source: (1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree) countries and EU regions poorer to richer from resources redistribute EU should The statement: this with disagree or agree you do extent 9: To what Figure

10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 10% 13 |Mixed feelings: Britons’ conflicted attitudes to theEUbefore the referendumSofia | September Vasilopoulou| 2015 0% 5% 0% 5% 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 18

co.uk/news/uk-30243472 Available at: http://www.bbc. What’s really happening? 18. BBC(2014)UKmigration: www.policy-network.net

policy network paper Green party supporters at 54 per cent. per at 54 supporters party Green cues deriving from these mayparties that not be as clear. suggests The highest levels which of disagreement derive from supporters, party Conservative and Labour among highest the are opinions of half under just interestingly Very also agree with and supporters the or Labour Democrat Liberal Undecided statement. more neutral cent. per 64 at supporters party Conservative among been high also have statement the with agreement of Levels cent. per 80 at work to right citizens’ EU © Sofia Vasilopoulou and John Bone, University of York. of York. University Bone, John and Vasilopoulou © Sofia 23/04/2015-05/05/2015, period the in conducted respondents 3000 of survey original from Data Source: and region attainment, educational age, affiliation, party status social gender, of terms in down broken Data restricted. be should EU countries in other to work EUof citizens right The statement: this with 11: or disagree Figure agree do you To extent what cues party and opinions partisanship. from shaping deriving parties political of importance the suggest which statement, the to responses and affiliation party of terms in differences significant observe also we Crucially Ireland. All other characteristics are significantly associated with responses to the statement. gave similar responses to the statement compared to those who live in Scotland, Wales and Northern nosignificant variation in the responses based on region. In other words,people who live in England interestingstatementcitizens’ofnumberworkrevealsEU patterns(figuretorightthe a 11). is There to response Britons’ affiliation of politicalcharacteristics andsocio-demographic the ofanalysis An measures and through an emphasis on the maintenance of national boundaries and independence”. the typical losers from globalisation processes who “seek to protect themselves throughare These EU.protectionist the movementwithin labour free for support to comes it when play at aredynamics Britain. integrationinEuropean of supportiveless be withprevious research, which has shown that older, less educated andworking-class citizens tend to more with the statement compared to the working class (category C2DE). These results are consistent restricted. Social class also matters. Middle and upper-middle classes (category ABC1) in tend spendsto disagree respondent a education, years the more likely more he/she theis to disagree that fact, EU citizens’ right In to work respondents. across the educated EU should be less to compared EU the restricted.Those with universitya degree are more likely toopen beto freelabour movement across be countriesshouldEU other in work to right the that more agree to tend old, years55 over those a clear pattern when it comes to age, education and social status. Older respondents, and particularly opposition to free labour movement in the EU; women tend to express a more neutral opinion. ofThere gender, is we observe that men are slightly more likely to agree with the statement, and thus express

14 |Mixed feelings: Britons’ conflicted attitudes to theEUbefore the referendumSofia | September Vasilopoulou| 2015 Secondary school exams (eg GCSEs or equivalent) University (eg degree, professional qualifications) College exams (eg A-levels, NVQ, or equivalent) Less than secondary school exams 22 Conservative party Ukip supporters have overwhelmingly supported the restriction of of restriction the supported overwhelmingly have supporters Ukip Liberal Democrats Northern Ireland Northern Labour party Green party 18–34 years 35–54 years Scotland England Female Wales C2DE ABC1 Male Ukip 55+ 0% Disgree 10% 20 20% They also serve to demonstrate that similarthatdemonstrate to serve also They 30% Neither agree nor disagree nor agree Neither 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% Agree 19 100% In terms 21 13–35. European UnionPolitics, 8(1): future ofEuropean integration, andthe linkages Mass-elite cueing whom: and de Vries, C.E. (2007) Who’s Steenbergen, M.R.,Edwards, E.E. 31(5): 569–601. Comparative Political Studies, for Europeansupport integration, toward domesticpoliciesand in doubt, useproxies: Attitudes 22. Anderson, C.J. (1998) When 921–956. 922. ofPoliticalJournal Research, 45: countries compared, European political space: SixEuropean the transformation ofthenational Frey, T. (2006)Globalization and R., Dolezal, M.,Borschnier, S.and H.,Grande,21. Kriesi, E., Lachat, 47–82. Politics,1983–2005, British 4(1): the European UnioninBritain, for influences onpublicsupport sociological andpsychological 20. Clements, B. (2009) The >.01forp-value region. age, education andsocialstatus; <.01 for gender, affiliation, party 19. Two-tailed tests: p-value www.policy-network.net

policy network paper people’s attitudes to the EU. This would also need to be considered in the campaigns. in the to considered EU. the to be attitudes also would need This people’s of dimension emotional an with co-exists rationality – fashion contradictory somewhat a in – that with the EU would be beneficial to thecampaign to remainpart of it. But it is also important tonotice integration in specific areas.It appears that afocus on theeconomic benefits of Britain’s relationship should articulate a much more nuanced discourse focusing on the merits and drawbacks of European campaigning actors’ in the to run-up the referendum. Going beyond question, the politicians in-out political and renegotiation UK the to approach minister’s prime the inform should findings These that positive emotions such as hopefulness and neutral emotions such as indifference alsoexist. noted bealso mustprominentelectorate, it morethe amongbut be to tendEU the membership of UK’s the torelation in disgust and fearanger, as Euroscepticism.suchBritishemotions Negative of heart the at are calculations– economic only not and – EmotionsEuroscepticactors. by exploited strategicallyEuropeprovokesquestionemotionalbeof reactions,may revealedwhichthethatalso to be utilitarian, as Britons find that their country hasbenefited from EU membership. The analysis has currentintegration.thelevelshappywithofissecondquarter however, Support,a about and tends overwhelminglyEurosceptic. Aboutquartera ofthesample inthis notsurvey supportsmore integration is opinion publicBritish that – expectations to to Europeancontrary – theshown also fromhas It authority level. national of the change see to wish would public British the ones which and support; most thereceive to tendpolicies EUrevealedwhich has concealspaperdiversity.this This potentiallyquestiondivisiveand binary a tochoice Restrictingattitudes. EU of complexity the and policy EU ofdimensions multipleconsideration the into take mustreferendum the on debate The increased EU. the within mobility is labour crisis eurozone ongoing the of implications the of one as ever than more important including EU citizens’ right to work and access to the welfare state of another EU country. This is now EU, the across redistribution of level a entail that policies support to However, reluctant more off. much are worse they be to perceived is one no where ie efficient, Pareto be to perceived are that areas policy EUin the for role greater a support to happy are people British that appears It security. digital and environment the development, sustainable trade, of areas the in observed maybe level social affairspolicy. and for monetary transferfromSupport further employment, of thepolicymaking nationalto to the EU related areas in higher is integration further to Opposition so. do to want not only in terms of how Britons much wantauthority to give to the EU but also in they which policy arising from their country’s benefits EU membership. the Research in of this aware paper is shows that public there British is the great variation of majority the integration EU of analysis cost-benefit a to comes it when However, EU. the against unequivocally is that electorate the of part significant a polarises Europe of question The conditional. and nuanced is EU the on opinion public Overall, The discussion over the referendum is likely to further increase its salience in the coming months. public’s political evaluations. The question of Europe was prominent during thethe 2015in featuresEurope withgeneralvolatility,concern overtimeelection.Despite Britain. in issuepolitical important an is Europeexpectations, prior againstrelationship.Britain’sSomewhat over debate on-going an resultedin hasUkip, Euroscepticas continuingsuccesssuch ofelectoralTheparties,EU. the exiting country their see to want who thosethan persistentlyhigher been has andrising, is EU the in stay EU.From2011country’stheirwithdrawaltheto from want Britonswho percentage onwards, ofthe dilemma,unequivocallyBritonstheyhavethatin-outwhen beenthewithfacednot arefavour in of worsenedBriton’sEU.theHowever, of imageEU, thepollingtrendindicates for despitesupport low average.eurozoneThe crisis undermined furtherhasBritish politicalfor supportintegration hasand British support for membership has been persistently low over time and much lower than the EU-wide Concluding remarks

15 |Mixed feelings: Britons’ conflicted attitudes to theEUbefore the referendumSofia | September Vasilopoulou| 2015 www.policy-network.net

policy network paper alignments. weakening and electoral globalisation of fear parties, mainstreampolitical with go attitudes such that indicates This dissatisfaction of malaise, political feeling Euroscepticism. of beyond a aregeneral a They symptom mobility. such by threatened feel may who citizens, class citizens’ right to work in another EU country derives primarily form older, EU less for educated and support working- of lack The renegotiation. ministers’ prime the of timeframe short the in change to unlikely freedom EU fundamental a is this hand other the on EU; the within movement labour free in restrictions see to want Britons of majority the hand one the catch-22 on a situation: in caught is government the Here campaigns. referendum parties’ in feature to likely redistributive is it and major minds people’s its in prominent given is systems politics welfare states’ British member to in access and lot movement Labour a consequences. matters migration EU of issue the Lastly,

16 |Mixed feelings: Britons’ conflicted attitudes to theEUbefore the referendumSofia | September Vasilopoulou| 2015 www.policy-network.net

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policy network paper