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Transportation Board TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINE~ON~D.C. 20594 PROVINCETOWN-BOSTON AlRLINES FLIGHT 1039 EMBRAER BANDEIRANTE, EME- 1 10P 1, M96PB JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA DECEMSER 6, 1984 NTSB/AAR-86/04 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT .. t' . .. I I. Performina Oraaniz+tion Name and Address I 10.Uork Unit_ No. National Xkmsprtation Safety Board wlreau of Accident ltlvestiition WasYi--D.C. 20594 Period Covered l2.Spoj~soring Agency Name and Address Aircraft Aeciaent Repart December s, 1984 NAlIONAL TRANSPORTATEIN SAFETY BOARD Washington, D. C. 20594 14.Sponsoring Agency We 1 - lS.Supp1~1ltaryNotes 16.Abstract Provincetown-Won Airlines FIight 1039, 811 Emher EIandeirante, was cleared from the Jacksonville Internationai Airport, Jacksmdle, FlMda, to Tampa, Piorida at 1805 eastern standard time on December 6, 1985, in visual fight conditiom. There were 11 pesserrgers and 2 crewmembers aboard the scheduled domestic pessenger flight operating under 14 CPR 135. At 1812, flight 1039 was eleared for takeoff, and, at 181.3, while over the aeparture end of the runway and climbing, the crew acknowledged a ZresVRncJr clumge. Thirty seconds later, about 1814, the was seen in a steep descent near the extended centerline of the runway. Plight 1039 struck the ground 7,800 feet beyond the deparhm end of RuLwajT 31 and 85 feet to the northeast (right) of the extemkd mway centerline in an inverted mse down attitude, after which it caught fiiand burnod The airplane .naS demolished, and all 13 persons aboard were killed. Before ground impact, the horizontal stfhilize?,including bulkhead No. 36, had separated from the fuselage. kth elevators and elevator tips, th *& eone asembly, and the aft portion of the ventral fm aIso had separated in f-t. ' 17.Key Words 18.Distribution Statenwnt Embraer E&mdeumte;in -flight separation; structurd failme; ekvator control system; nosedown pitch; docFument is available asymmetrical elevator deflection; full trailing edge up trim tOthepubliCthrotlgtrthe tab dendon; -way trim; mmmanded nose down trim; Natiorlal Ioso of con* 2; compression lading; InfWlMtim %I!ViCe, sp~+ngm14v- 2a1s1 19-Security classification 20.Security Classification 21.m. of Pages 22.Pric.e i (of rhis. remrt) (of this page) UNCLASSIFIED I UNCLASSIFIED I 1 NTSB Form 1765.2 (Rev. 9/74) meNationai Transport8tia Safety Bcard determines that tite probable cause of this accident was a malfunction of either the elevator control -.stern or the elevator trim e system, which resulted in an airplene pitch control problem. The reaction of the flightcrew to correct the pitch control problem overstressed the left elevetor control rod, which resulted in eqmrnetrical elevator defiwtion and overstress failure of the horizontal stabilizer attachment structure. The Safety Board was not able to determine the precise problem with the pitch cmtrol system. ii corn . SNOW ......................................................... i 1. FACTUAL INFOBB6ATIOp.I ........................................... 1 1.1 HistoryoftlleFfight ................................................ 1 1.2 InjuriestoPersons .................................................. 2 1.3 DamagetoXkpLarte ................................................. 2 1.4 CNer Dam ........................................................ 2 1.5 Pemeihforrnation. ............................................... 3 1.6 -&rplaneInformation ................................................ 3 i.7 Meteoro:ogical Jnformation ........................................... 3 1.8 Aidsto Navigation .................................................. 4 1.9 Communications. ................................................... 4 1-10 AerodromeInformation .............................................. 4 1.1 1 Fli.t~ .c orders .................................................... 4 1.12 Wreckage and Irnpsct L?fwmation ..................................... 4 1.12.1 WreckageDescription ............................................... 4 1.12.2 Fuselageand Wingf .................................................. 4 1.i2.3 Separation of Horizontal Stabilizer .................................... 5 1.12.4 Separationof Elevatorsand ElevatorTips .............................. 9 1.12.5 Elevator ControlSystem ............................................. 10 1.12.6 EnginesandPropelle rs ............................................... 15 1.13 ?.Iedicsl and Pathological Information ................................. -16 1.14 Fire ............................................................... 18 1.15 SurvivalASpects.................................................... 16 1.16 Testsand F.psearch .................................................. 16 1.15.1. Failure .a .nalysis of the Eorizontal StaSilizer and Attachment Strdcttzes ..................................... 16 1.16.2 Testsbnductadbythe Xanufacturer .................................. 17 L.16.2.1 Determiration of Static Strength. Stiffness. and Frequencies of Horizontal Tail aqd Rear Fuselage with Bulkhead No .33 Damage .....17 1.i6.2.2 Static Tests for Special Conditions at Horizontal S'abilizer Atta~hment................................................... 18 1.16.2.3 Vibration Levels Due to Propeller Unbalance ............................ 19 1.16.2.4 Flight Test Load Xmurements for Horizontal Stabilizer ................. 19 1.16.3 Elevator Control Rod Breaking Force Conducted by the Manufacturer and the P*&tionalI3ureauofStandar.................................. 20 1.17 OtherL?formation ................................................... 20 1.11.1 Electric Elevator Trim S., .em ....................................... -20 1.17.2 Manufattturer's Xnalysis of Pilot Wheei Force to Produce Compression Failure of Lett Elevator Control Rod ............................ -21 1.11.3 Maximal Ststic Pome Exerted on an Aircraft Control Stick by Seated .xal. .................................................. 21 1.17.4 Service History of EXB-1lOP: and P2 ................................. -25 1.17.5 Special Certification Review ......................................... 26 1.17.6 PBA's EMB-lEOPl Takeoff Profile .................................... -27 1.17.7 PBA's Raining for Rdnaway Tri.n ..................................... 27 ... 111 CONTBNTs (conthud) 2. ............................................................ 27 2.1 Theilccid.nt ....................................................... 27 2.2 P~ghtcrew......................................................... 28 2.3 ..e ........................................................... 28 2.4 EnginesandPmpellers ............................................... 28 2.5 weather ........................................................... 28 2.6 Preexisting Condition of Airplane Structure ............................ 29 2.7 Structural and Aeroelsstic Consideration ............................... 30 2.8 Vib~atoryLoadConsideratic ns ........................................ 31 2.9 Abnormal Stabilizer Loading Caused by Flight Control Malfunctions .................................... -31 2.10 Left Control Rod Fracture .......................................... -32 2.11 Control System Overload ............................................ 32 2.12 Elevator Trim .................................................... -33 2.13 Sequence of Events Leading to Stabilizer Separation ..................... 34 2.14 RunawayTrimTheory .............................................. 34 2.15 Seized or Jammed Control System Theory .............................. -37 2.16 Review of FAA Certification ......................................... 38 2.17 Flight Data and Cockpit Voice Recorders ............................... 40 3 . CONCLUSIONS ..................................................... 43 3.1 Findings ........................................................... 43 3.2 .Sablecause ..................................................... 45 4 . BEC..NDATIONS ............................................... 45 5 . APPENDrxps ...................................................... 49 Apperdiix A.. Investigation and Hearing ................................ 49 Appendix B.. Personnel Information ................................... 50 Appendix C.. Aircraft Information .................................... 51 Appendix D-.WreckageDiagrar? ...................................... 52 Appendix E..Amendments, Airwort?iness Directives and Service Bulletins .-53 Appendix F--Table1 ................................................. 97 iv NATI0i’JA.L TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594 AlECW ACCIDENT BEPORT Adopt&. June w1986 PROWCEFOWN-BOSTON dIfcLINBs PLIGHT 1039 EME3RAER BANDEIBANTB. EMB-IlOP1. N96PB JACILSONVILLE,~PLORIDA ’ DECEMBER 6,1984 SYNOPSIS Provincetown-Boston Airlines Flight 1539, an Embraer Bandeirante, was cleared from the Jacksonville International Airport, Jacksonville, Florida, to Tampa, Florida, at 1805 eastern standmd time on December 6, 1985, in visual flight conditions. There were 11 passengers and 2 crewmembers aboard the scheduled domestic passenger flight operating under 14 CFR 135. At 1812, flight 1039 was cleared for takeoff, and, at 1813, while over the departure end of the runway and climbing, the crew acknowledged a frequency change. Thiity seconds later, about 1814, the airplane was Seen in a steep descent near the extended centerline of the runway. Flight 1039 struck the ground 7,800 feet beyond the departure end of runway 31 and 85 feet to the northeast (right) of the extended runway centerline in an inverted nose down attitilde, after which it caught fire and burned. The airplane was demolished, and
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