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Walking Away from Nuremberg: Just War and the Doctrine of Command Responsibility in the American Military Profession

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Walking Away from Nuremberg: Just War and the Doctrine of Command Responsibility in the American Military Profession WALKING AWAY FROM NUREMBERG: JUST WAR AND THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE AMERICAN MILITARY PROFESSION By LAWRENCE P. ROCKWOOD A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2005 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS At the University of Florida, special thanks go to Robert McMahon, Michael Gannon, and Paul Magnarella who all were indispensable to this project. The chair of my doctoral committee and academic adviser for almost three decades, Dr. McMahon, bore the five years of my research and composition with patience and grace while guiding the advancement of this dissertation through many last minute obstacles. Mike Gannon’s and Paul Magnarella’s life’s work inspired my interest in professional ethics and human rights leading to this project. The history department’s Betty Corwine, and later Joanne Fort, provided much kindhearted assistance over the years. Additionally, I would like to thank the many the Freedom of Information Act (FIOA) officers who made this project possible, especially the archivists at the at the U.S. Army Military History Institute at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle Pennsylvania. Finally, I dedicate this dissertation to the memory of my father, Lieutenant Colonel William P. Rockwood, U.S. Air Force, graduate, Army Officer Candidate School, Class No. 1 (September 27, 1941). iii TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..................................................................................... vi FIGURE ................................................................................................................ vii ABSTRACT......................................................................................................... viii CHAPTER INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................1 1 JUST WAR DOCTRINE AND GENERAL ORDER NO. 100..........................17 Origins of General Orders No. 100....................................................................... 18 Augustinian Just War Doctrine............................................................................. 23 Just War Doctrine and Post-Westphalian Legalism.............................................. 32 Just War Criteria and General Order No. 100....................................................... 40 Just Cause.................................................................................................. 41 Competent Authority................................................................................ 42 Comparative Justice.................................................................................. 45 Right Intention.......................................................................................... 49 Last Resort................................................................................................ 51 Probability of Success............................................................................... 53 Proportionality .......................................................................................... 54 Discrimination........................................................................................... 56 The Legacy of General Orders No. 100................................................................ 57 General Orders No. 100 and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)...... 58 The Andersonville Trial............................................................................ 61 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 67 2 THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY PROFESSION............................................................................................70 Constitutional Allegience and the American Military Profession ........................ 71 The Prussification of the American Military Professionalism ............................. 73 Clauswitze contra Lieber (political realsim vs. political ethics) .............. 74 Emory Upton's Love Affair with Prussia ................................................. 79 Elihu Root and the Birth of Military Professionalism .......................................... 84 iv The Formalization and Specialization of American Military Doctrine ................ 90 The Field Service Regulations.................................................................. 91 Rules of Land Warfare.............................................................................. 95 The Military Professionalism Under the Tutelage of the Legal Profession.......................................................................................... 97 The Re-democratization of the American Military............................................. 101 Conclusion.…. .................................................................................................... 108 3 COMMAND RESPONSIBIITY AND THE MEANING OF NUREMBERG110 Command Responsibility Before Nuremberg..................................................... 112 The Origins of the Nuremberg............................................................................ 114 The International Military Tribunal and the Nuremberg Principles ................... 122 The Yamashita Precedent ................................................................................... 127 Trials under Control Council Law No. 10 .......................................................... 130 The High Command Case....................................................................... 131 The Hostage Case ................................................................................... 133 Competing Standards of Command Responsibility ........................................... 135 International Validation and Codification ......................................................... 139 The Other Nuremberg ........................................................................................ 143 The 1957 Edition of Field Manual 27-10 ........................................................... 149 Conclusion………. ............................................................................................. 151 4 THE AMERICAN MILITARY ETHIC IN EARLY COLD WAR ............... 154 Formal and Informal Norms: .............................................................................. 157 The Post-War Civil-Military Relationship.............................................. 160 The Normal Theory of the American Military Professionalism............. 163 The Rehabilitation of the Wehrmacht and the Re-Prussification of the American Military Profession....................................................... 168 Army Doctrine and the Vietnam War................................................................. 176 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 182 5 COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MY LAI MASSACRE .......... 183 My Lai, the Peers Commisssion, and American Military Justice....................... 189 Lieutenant Calley and the Defense of Superior Orders .......................... 191 Captain Medina's Responsibility ............................................................ 194 v The Taylor Thesis ................................................................................... 202 Yamashita v. Medina, Subjective Criteria .......................................... 209 The Legacy of My Lai Massacre ........................................................................ 213 Post My Lai Professional Reform, An Attempted Return to Just War... 213 Post-Vietnam Revisionism...................................................................... 218 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 223 6 THE 1977 GENEVA PROTOCOL I AND THE POST-VIETNAM MILITARY DOCTRINE........................................................................ 225 U.S. Negotiations at the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva .............................. 227 North / South Debate, Just War Doctrine, and Amended Article 1........ 231 Command Responsibility and Protocol I ................................................ 242 The U.S. Military Evaluation of Protocol I......................................................... 244 U.S. Army War College Study of Protocols........................................... 246 Department of Defense Review of Protocol 1 ........................................ 248 A Neo-Clausewitzian Critique of International Humanitarian Law....... 254 Clausewitzian Realism as Formal American Military Doctrine......................... 258 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 265 7 CONCLUSION:...............................................................................................269 APPENDIX: CONTEMPORARY STANDARDS OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY................................................................................. 274 The ad hoc Criminal Tribunals............................................................... 276 The International Criminal Court (ICC) ................................................. 278 Command Responsibility and the Abu Ghraib Investigations................ 282 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................288 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...............................................................................314
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