APA Newsletters NEWSLETTER ON AND COMPUTERS

Volume 12, Number 1 Fall 2012

FROM THE EDITOR, Peter Boltuc

ARTICLES

WŁodzisŁaw Duch “Mind-Brain Relations, Geometric Perspective, and Neurophenomenology”

Patrick Grim, Aaron Bramson, Daniel J. Singer, Steven Fisher, Carissa Flocken, and William Berger “ in Modeling Polarization: Notes from a Work in Progress”

Shai Ophir “Automatic Generation of Philosophers Network from Google Books Repository”

Johnny Hartz Søraker “Prudential-Empirical of (PEET) – An Early Outline”

D.E. Wittkower “‘Friend’ Is a Verb”

Robin K. Zebrowski “Embodied Cognition and the Turing Test: An Uncomfortable (Re-)Union”

Cole Sohn, Maxwell Mainman, and Iris Oved “Selves in Video Games: Reflections by Two Middle-Schoolers in an After-School Program on ”

BOOK REVIEW

Darrel Ince: The Computer: A Very Short Introduction Reviewed by Katalin Bimbó

© 2012 by The American Philosophical Association ISSN 2155-9708 APA Newsletter on

Philosophy and Computers

Piotr Bołtuć, Editor Fall 2012 Volume 12, Number 1

Brooks’ critique in terms of embodiment. Zebrowski gives the rom the ditor old Turing Test an interesting defense against this well- F E presented theoretical background. The last article in this issue features children. I. Oved asked philosophically minded young teenagers, “Where are you, and who are you, when playing a Peter Boltuc video-game?” The answers may remind you of a debate on the University of Illinois–Springfield ontological status of web-based objects between L. Baker, A. Thomasson, R. Kurtz, and others, which we hosted in a couple There are many interesting articles in the current issue, of the recent issues of this Newsletter. We are also glad to have though some, including a note from the Chair, didn’t make it K. Bimbo’s review of A Very Short Introduction to The Computer in on time. The APA seems to be getting organized, sticking by D. Ince, published by Oxford. I am glad to mention that three to deadlines quite a bit more than it did in the past, which members of the Committee published papers in this issue. I bodes well, in the long run. We begin with an interesting hope the trend continues. paper in neurophenomenology, which argues that geometric (platonic) models embedded within some future connectionist architectures may give us the best chance of explaining consciousness. The article, by W. Duch, builds largely on recent work in neuroscience, e.g., by Damasio, as well as on Articles Gärdenfors’ framework of conceptual spaces. P. Grim and his colleagues bring us a truly delightful paper that highlights philosophical issues in their Mind-Brain Relations, Geometric Perspective, on modeling social polarization. This kind of philosophical and Neurophenomenology reflection and analysis of how various assumptions influence the outcome of an investigation is what usually seems lacking in Włodzisław Duch statistical research and modeling, especially in social sciences. Nicolaus Copernicus University, Poland, and Nanyang The authors show how different notions of polarization (and Technological University, Singapore other not-obvious assumptions) lead to vastly different models and predictions. I consider this approach to be the true applied Abstract philosophy of social sciences. Along the lines of computer This paper presents the rationale for creating geometrical modeling, S. Ophir presents a graph of philosophical influences approaches that may help to understand mental processes among the top philosophers, based on cross-references and relate them to neural processes. Current phenomenology in Google Books. There are some unexpected outcomes for describing mental processes is not sufficient to create of this search, which pertain especially to the role French first-person science. Models exploring relations between Enlightenment used to play—its legacy is so entrenched in our neurodynamics, geometric representation of mental events, and culture that we no longer notice the influence. inner perspective are the best chance for progress in this area. The second part of this issue pertains to moral theory. J. Søraker asks about the criteria we want to use in order to Understanding the Mind evaluate whether the technology enhances well-being. The Two general approaches to mental processes responsible author proposes a mixture of subjective criteria and objective for consciousness and behavior are currently pursued. recommendations. In his eye-opening paper D. E. Wittkower Psychologists approach the problem with verbal theories based asks the sort of question that seems to have crossed everybody’s on high-level concepts, such as “intelligence” or “working mind, “What kind of friends are Facebook friends?” The author memory,” that are useful to characterize behavior but quite claims that traditionally online friendships have lacked the hard to precisely measure and link to neural activity of the brain. aspect of “hanging out,” an essential part of real-life friendship. Neuroscientists tend to think that more details are needed, and Mobile take care of this problem, or so it seems. once they are known, cognitive mechanisms will become clear. The article reads very smoothly, so that one is not surprised that Michael S. Gazzaniga, a pioneer of cognitive neuroscience, does Wittkower is a best-selling author writing on the issues related not share this opinion: to technology and philosophy. Understanding how each and every neuron functions This is the Turing year, and I am sure many readers still tells one absolutely nothing about how the brain participated in any number of related conferences organized manufactures a mental state. in the U.K. and elsewhere. In the current issue, R. L. Zebrowski discusses recent approaches to the Turing Test, ranging The trick for any level of analysis is to find the effective from Dennett, Harnad, Lackoff, and Johnson, all the way to variables that contain all the information from below — APA Newsletter, Fall 2012, Volume 12, Number 1 —

that are required to generate all the behavior of interest correlates of mental experiences are probably captured with above. (Gazzaniga 2010) sufficient accuracy at a more coarse level of neurodynamics, rapid changes of electrical activations of neural assemblies in This is what I have been advocating for a long time the brain. (Duch 1994-2011), trying to create a new intermediate level of description between neuroscience and psychology. Brain Biochemical processes responsible for changes in the brain processes described by parameters derived from neuro­ at the molecular level, including neuroplasticity, determine imaging show activity of individual neurons and neural cell potentially accessible brain states. At this moment mental states that I may experience are determined by the general structure assemblies that are difficult to relate to mental events and inner of my brain (evolutionary factors), neural pathways that have experience. Psychological description of mental events is largely been formed as a result of development in infancy followed by a confabulation that ignores the real neurodynamical forces life-long learning, and recent priming by experiences (including responsible for activation of mental states. Consciousness will thoughts and feelings) that changed the landscape of potentially seem less mysterious if good metaphors can be found to talk accessible brain activations. All these factors determine the about models of mental processes, metaphors that will help us space of my potentially accessible mental states at this moment. to imagine what really goes on in our minds. Let’s call the current mental state M(B(t)), where B(t) is the We are visual beings; cortex engaged in analysis of visual brain state at time t and M is a function mapping brain states information takes a significant part of the brain, and thus the to mental states. most satisfactory way to understand is to see or imagine. John Locke (1690) defined consciousness as “the A geometrical model of the mind providing space in which perception of what passes in a man’s own mind.” What we mental events take place, linked with neurodynamics that are are able to perceive are just peaks of neural activity that are responsible for these events, could have a great explanatory sufficiently persistent to be internally categorized, so that power. the brain may know what is going on. This process requires Inner Perspective association of quasi-stable brain activity patterns at a given time with motor activity that allows animals to react, and with Detailed simulations of the brain will not necessarily help activation of symbolic representations (manifested as speech to understand the mind in a conceptual way. On the other or silent thoughts) in human brains, including representations hand, attempts to describe inner experience, or phenomenal of self (Damasio 2010). consciousness, started in the nineteenth century by introspective psychologists (Fechner, Wundt, Titchener, Würzburg school), Mapping continuous activations of the brain B(t) to mental and followed by phenomenological movement originated by states M(B(t)) leads to information compression, simplifying Husserl, failed to agree on such basic issues as the existence the decision-making process. Perception needs to be invariant; of imageless thought. Phenomenology eventually led to a ripe red apples should look red independent of the illumination deep analysis of perception by Merleau-Ponty. Heidegger conditions. Although information about the spectrum of light has focused on embodiment and situated cognition, paying reaches the brain, it is not a part of mental experience. Object attention to affordances. Varela formulated an experimental recognition allows us to recognize functional categories, phenomenology and neurophenomenology program trying to discover affordances, and prepare for action. Recognizing the link the first person approach to the objective science (Varela mental states of other people serves a similar purpose. The 1996). number of categories has to be limited to be useful; therefore, we cannot have an infinite number of symbols to describe However, recent experiments with random descriptive precisely all mental states. Although most of the time general experience sampling technique (Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel categories are sufficient to make decisions, brains may focus 2007) and Schwitzgebel’s (2010) discussion of phenomenal on particular experience, experiencing qualia, specific brain experience cast serious doubts on the feasibility of science activations that may be only roughly categorized at the symbolic of inner experience. The main reason for this difficulty is level. Strange qualia may be created in unusual situations rather clear: metaphorically speaking, mind may be seen as a (Schwitzgebel 2010; Duch 2011), in dreams, hallucinations, shadow of neurodynamics. Almost all processes that determine visual illusions, peripheral vision, through imagery, strong our thoughts and behavior are hidden behind the scenes, emotional experiences, or by direct transcranial stimulation inaccessible to conscious introspection (Lewicki and Hill 1987). of the brain with magnetic field. Brains need to learn through The richness of neurodynamics makes the verbal description repetition how to categorize new experiences, give them labels, of inner experience possible only in a restricted way, using and “explain the experience away” so there is no need to waste symbols for commonly encountered categories suitable for time on detailed analysis anymore. Names put the mind at ease, communication. drain neural activation, and relieve anxiety. Modern Platonic View Brains and Experience In the famous allegory presented in ’s Republic, prisoners Most animals have little brains and therefore can distinguish in a cave are able to see only shadows of real things projected only a relatively small number of ecologically important quasi- on the wall, while the task of the philosopher is to perceive stable brain states reflecting their and controlling the true form of things. Mental events resemble such shadows associated actions. Humans with much bigger brains have of reality, but instead of idealized forms what we are able to many parallel competing processes and thus a much higher experience can be best described at the level of neurodynamics. capacity for diverse mental experiences. Quasi-stable brain Mental events reflect in an active way those features of the states are categorized, associated with other states that win environment that are important for survival, and with the the competition (the Self grabs all the credit, calling this modern “mind reading” techniques based on various forms of process “I pay attention”) and comments are generated: “this neuroimaging (EEG, MEG, fMRI, NIRS) our ability to reconstruct is a great wine, with a rich taste, smell, and a deep red color.” mental experience from brain activations is improving (see, for These comments are intentional, pointing to something in the example, Nishimoto et al. 2011). Although many genetic and shared space out there in the world. In , they always refer biochemical processes that change glia and neural cells and to physical activation of the brain that makes them. They are their interactions are relevant to understanding behavior, neural brain reactions, subjective experiences of qualia that cannot be — 2 — — Philosophy and Computers — reduced to discrete categories labeled by a finite set of words. space HM of mental states. Billions of individual trajectories The brain-like systems, by their very construction, have to claim go through this space, but it is still constrained by human brain qualia and experiences (Duch 2005). capabilities, although potentially it may expand enormously due Brains are truly the meaning machines that physically to the brain-machine confluence. The limits of this expansions change themselves. They are changed by top-down causal are not yet fathomable. processes—mental events caused by environment, or by inner The mapping from neural activity to various categories of activity—and bottom-up processes that may either be initiated mental events is slowly elucidated by cognitive neuroscience by subliminal stimuli or have physiological or genetic origin. and it seems feasible that thoughts could be made audible— We do not have experience with building such systems and auditory cortex activation has already been analyzed to analyzing their behavior in conceptual terms. Our conceptual reconstruct speech signal (Pasley et al. 2012). Understanding understanding of what brains do is not expressed in terms that information flow in the brain will be greatly boosted by the are natural from a brain perspective. While the function of the Human Connectome project. Models showing how inner, primary sensory cortices may be partially understood using first-person point of view develops in complex systems have such concepts as spatiotemporal filters for specific information not been created yet. In “Self Comes to Mind,” Damasio (orientation of the edges, specific frequency, movement, color), (2010) argues that autonomous systems represented their we do not seem to have concepts that could be mapped to internal body images and patterns of the environment, reacting activation of some brain areas. For example, initially it seemed emotionally to stimuli that perturb their homeostasis. Self is that area V2 responds to simple visual characteristics (we see based on such emotional reactions and in complex brains, what we look for), but now it is known that it responds also to memory and feelings, and subjective experiences of emotion, complex shape differences and orientation of illusory contours, combined with symbolic representations, create conscious, and can distinguish between the same stimuli in foreground or mental perspectives. However, the road from such general background position. Higher visual areas V3-V5 have functions understanding to a detailed working model is long. that are associated with some combination of motion, shape, How can complex processes creating the inner perspective and color, but it may be easier to create a working model than be noted in the overall activity of the brain? I have proposed to describe it in conceptual terms. The same is true for other (Duch 1994-2011) to use visualization based on transformed sensory modalities. brain activity signals for bridging the infamous “explanatory Maybe we have not yet learned to pay attention to the kind gap” between brain and mind, with neuroimaging of neural of information that these intermediate areas are extracting activity on the physical side and the description of mental because it may not be that useful in communication. This could events from the phenomenological, first-person perspective on be an interesting area of research for neurophenomenology the other (Lutz and Thompson 2003). Visualization should lead (Varela 1996). to a geometrical model of mental events, showing mind state Information in Brains trajectories that may be linked to neurodynamics, information All signals that reach and change the brain carry some flow in the brain, and the subjective experience. Mental information, although its may not be immediately events, “shadows of neurodynamics,” may be seen in low- accessible at the mental level. Shannon information simply dimensional feature spaces where each dimension represents estimates signal entropy and thus is not a good measure of what a phenomenological property, a specific quality extracted from is intuitively regarded as information relevant for a cognitive neural processing. system. Calling entropy “information” creates a lot of confusion. What kind of phenomenology should be used for such The amount of change that is induced in the brain (or in any models? It is quite likely that current ways of describing our cognitive system) by incoming signals may be used to quantify mental experience will not be sufficient and that we shall have information (Duch 2007). Information is not only relative to a to invent quite new concepts. Description of cognitive systems cognitive system, but also may have different values depending from this perspective should be more detailed and faithful to on its influence on different functions of that system. From the underlying neurodynamics than our current folk psychology a formal Bayesian perspective cognitive system S that has allows for. probabilistic model of its environment p(S) is changed by a Language in the Brain new X to a posterior model p(S|X). The difference between p(S|X) and p(S) measures the size of the change Dynamical system approach to cognition has deep roots in induced by the new observation. It may be understood as the cybernetics. It has been mainly focused on description of value of the information in observation X relative to the model external behavior (Kelso 1995), including infants’ development S. This is not a static quantity; the change in cognitive system (Thelen and Smith 1994; Smith and Thelen 1994), and sensori- may be temporary, it may suddenly restructure the system or motor activity. In Mind as Motion, edited by Port and van Gelder slowly grow in time. New information may be generated by (1995), other perspectives on the use of dynamical system the internal flow of brain activations, thinking processes that theory for description of cognitions are introduced, including change the pathways through which neural activation is spread. language. The space of potentially accessible mental states evolves Flexibility of knowledge representation by patterns of brain over time, reduced due to the brain damage or enhanced due activity has not yet been matched by any other knowledge to learning and experiencing new stimuli. These changes may representation framework in . Jeffrey have a profound influence on mental states, but the space of all Elman (Port and van Gelder, Chap. 8) treats representations potentially accessible mental states in the lifetime of a person of concepts as regions in the space of brain activations, and is always limited. Imagine a space IB={B(L)} of all potentially grammatical rules as restrictions on the possible trajectories accessible states that a particular brain may go through in a in this space, leading to the attractor dynamics responsible lifetime L. Individual life history forms a single trajectory B(t∈L) for language structure. Simple, recurrent neural networks in this space, describing actual activation states of the brain and serve him as a model of linguistic systems, predicting the next resulting in corresponding trajectory of mental experiences. word in a sentence. The activity of the internal (hidden to the All human brains and their potential states span a space HB observer) neural units displayed in the principal component of potentially accessible brain states and the corresponding coordinates shows the dynamics of this process. Gilles — 3 — — APA Newsletter, Fall 2012, Volume 12, Number 1 —

Fauconnier introduced “mental spaces” (Fauconnier 1985) and hidden, psychological space. Both external and internal forces later conceptual blending (or integration) as a general theory are responsible for individual behavior and group dynamics. of cognition (Fauconnier and Turner 2002). Force Field diagrams, graphs, and tables, introduced by Lewin, Visualization of neural processes during reading shows how are still used in social psychology to analyze factors that push, associations are made (Dobosz and Duch 2011). Transitions block, or divert people from pursuing their goals, and determine between thoughts are due to neural fatigue, depletion of energy balance of power. Lewin’s basic idea was that behavioral needed to synchronize neural activity (fixing of attention, in space should be approximated by discrete meaningful states. psychological terms). Those groups of neurons that are only Such prototypical states may serve for prediction of behavior, slightly active may increase their activity and shift the pattern in a similar way as diagnosis of a disease, based on clinical to associated concept, forming a new coalition. Thoughts may phenotype, serves to select the therapy. Work on probabilistic jump to a seemingly unrelated subject when a new pattern of versions of these ideas continues (Rainio 2009). neuronal interactions is formed, giving earlier coalition time to George Kelly made another step towards visualization refresh. There are many transition pathways between concepts; of psychological processes in The Psychology of Personal the dynamics of the process is influenced by noise and many Constructs (1955), proposing explicit geometrical representation uncontrolled factors, including the history of previous activity. of personalities. In his view, constructs are a relatively small The order of learning matters. Teaching students ancient number of psychological processes that can be described concepts at the beginning of the curriculum, as it is usually using dimensions based on opposite concepts, such as “good- done in philosophy, creates a tendency to evaluate new ideas bad” or “happy-sad,” useful for making important distinctions. in terms of the old ones. Mapping from brain activity to events Personal, individual constructs are dimensions of psychological in mental spaces to behaviors and verbalizations is where the space that characterize people and their mental states, and “continuity of mind” will reveal itself (Spivey 2007). describe their subjective reality. Results of this analysis are Minds are embodied and studies of motor development are presented in Repertory Grid matrix, with rows representing certainly relevant for a better understanding of cognition. The constructs and columns representing various types of elements, ultimate goal of dynamical approach is to describe behavior for example, people or mental states (Shaw and Gaines 1992). using differential equations. This, however, is not the same as Personal Psychology (PCP) has been applied to describing inner experience and in the current form may not cognitive modeling, and is used in practical applications in be a good candidate approach to bridge the explanatory gap. social psychology, psychotherapy, personality assessment, and human resources in a business context. Connectionist movement has focused on low-level brain processes and has not been connected with mental events. Peter Gärdenfors (2000) introduced conceptual spaces as Paul Churchland (1996) has made the best attempt so far to a framework for modeling representations, using spaces based introduce connectionist ideas to the , but on qualities (for example, perceptual qualities), phenomenal the influence of these ideas on philosophy and psychology has dimensions that can be inferred from perceived similarities not been significant. Brainwise: Studies in Neurophilosophy using multidimensional scaling, as Shepard has done. This by Patricia Smith Churchland (2002) elucidates many points approach is also aimed at using a high-dimensional geometrical related to perception, using diagrams that show how perception model of cognitive representations for perceptual and linguistic of male and female faces changes with mouth fullness, nose concept representations as an alternative to symbolic and width, and eye separation. Taste space may be represented connectionist models. Gärdenfors’ book, Conceptual Spaces: using aggregates of sour, salty, and sweet cell responses. The Geometry of Thought, has been very popular and, among many other trends, gave rise to formal conceptual space algebra, the Churchlands’ proposal “that brains develop high-dimensional Conceptual Space Markup Language (CSML), an exchange maps, the internal distance relationships of which correspond format for sharing conceptual spaces (Raubal and Adams 2010). to the similarity relationships that constitute the categorical structure of the world” (Churchland and Churchland 2002) Work on knowledge representation in artificial intelligence follows earlier work of Roger Shepard (1987, 1994) on universal has brought very similar ideas; for example, Conceptual and invariants in psychology. Knowledge Markup Language developed from the perspective of formal semantics, ontology, and semantic networks. Many Shepard’s dream to create a theory of mind similar applications of conceptual spaces have been developed in to theories in physics pointed him to search for cognitive such areas as cognitive linguistics, analysis of actions and universals, natural invariances in perception reflecting functional properties of agents, and understanding the dynamics properties of the world. Indeed, similarity in brain responses of empirical theories as conceptual change in structured in perceptual and conceptual domains reflects similarity or collections of dimensions. dissimilarity of observed objects and events in the space of salient features. This space is obviously different for different In Continuity of Mind, Spivey (2007) describes mental animal species and different people, changing in many ways events as continuous trajectories in the state spaces based with different time scales, depending on the age, current goals, on activity of neurons or neural assemblies. This idea follows and motivations that control the focus of attention. “neural spaces” that internalize various regularities encountered in the environment (Edelman 2002), for example, tune neurons Many Faces of Dynamical Cognition and sensory organs to respond with maximum discriminatory Similar ideas have been floating around in psychology for a long power to subtle differences found in the environment. time. Kurt Lewin (1938), recognized as the father of modern Thinking about temporal dynamics of mental processes, social psychology, wrote a book outlining dynamic psychology “continuity of mind” moves away from discrete, symbolic in 1938 (Lewin 1938). Psychology should represent and derive representations towards geometric, continuous models. To psychological processes in a conceptual way, but observable explain and understand what these models do, Spivey (2007) are not sufficient to achieve it; therefore, hidden tries to describe trajectories of the brain activations in a symbolic “constructs,” or “intervening concepts” have to be postulated. way using a technique known as “symbolic dynamics,” but Inspired by the successes of physics, Lewin introduced this is a crude approximation that suffers from combinatorial psychological forces. Human behavior should be described by a explosion of the number of symbols necessary to use it in high- trajectory in physical space, controlled by forces defined in the dimensional spaces. Moreover, trajectories in the brain-based — 4 — — Philosophy and Computers — state space have to be related first to the qualities of experience processing (Duch 2005). Bottom-up constraints are easily built that are used for description of inner experience. in the cognitive architecture models. Top-down factors that should change mental content and lead to a reconstruction of Mental Models internal models as a result of interaction with environment, or The field of mental models has been developed with the hope as a result of internal model dynamics, are not yet well captured of explaining language and reasoning (Johnson-Laird 1983), in such programs. Cognitive architectures have brains that act with symbolic elements constructed from real and imagined as control systems, but no minds, no space in which to place percepts. A large number of possible complex models will dynamic processes where mental content, actual percepts, of course lead to poor performance. A tendency to focus on thoughts, and stream of associations, all information about a few among many possible models will lead to erroneous itself that the system can directly sense. Concepts do not have conclusions and irrational decisions. Mental models represent proper semantics, they are not grounded in perception and explicitly what is true, but not what is false, contributing to affordances; ontologies are a poor substitute for rich imagery systematic errors in thinking. How and why do we reason the of objects and events. way we do? Why should such questions have answers that Perhaps a combination of mental models, conceptual are independent of neurodynamics? Theory of mental models spaces, and conceptual blending may be quite fruitful and will has ignored many forms of learning, including priming effects help to illustrate why we suffer so easily from cognitive illusions that are quite pronounced in experimental psychology and are (Pohl 2004). shown clearly in computational models. Conceptual constructions used in mental models may be Geometry of Mind considered true only if they capture simplified neurodynamical In geometrical approaches there is no direct relation between processes, but no systematic attempt in this direction has been objects and events and their abstract representations; only made. Mental models could probably be derived by analyzing relative similarity relations are preserved. Representation is activations of brain subnetworks resulting from priming (or thus not on the level of individual objects, but rather the whole more general learning processes) by the description of the domains, called by Churchlands (2002) “domain-portrayal problem, creating probabilistic models of the flow of neural semantics.” activation, and discretizing this model to express it in a symbolic Although interesting applications of abstract geometrical way. A step towards this has been made using the Fuzzy models may be found (some mentioned in previous sections), Symbolic Dynamics (FSD) technique (Dobosz and Duch 2011). the impact of these ideas on understanding cognition has In counterintuitive situations, for example, in the been limited, no links to cognitive neuroscience have been inverse-based rate categorization experiments, psychological discovered, and very few visualizations that could help in conceptualizations are confabulations with insufficient understanding cognitive functions have been made. grounding in reality (Duch 1996). If the empirical results were Geometrical approaches have some obvious difficulties. mislabeled, psychological explanations could still be easily First, mathematical similarity functions are symmetric created, making this type of explanation not much better than S(A,B)=S(B,A), but psychological similarity, or relations theories of psychoanalysis. between brain activations representing concepts, are usually Even simple logical forms of reasoning may be difficult for not symmetric. In psychology individual preferences are the brain. Consider the following syllogism: added to context; therefore, similarity from A’s point of view • All academics are scientists. may be distinguished from similarity from B’s point of view. • No wise man is an academic. As noted in “Platonic Model of Mind as an Approximation to Neurodynamics” (Duch 1997), the desired properties of What precise conclusion follows about the relation between similarity measures require the use of Finsler spaces instead wise men and scientists? Out of 256 possible syllogisms only of the more familiar Riemannian spaces. twenty-four are valid and thus there is ample room for making errors. Indeed, students faced with such syllogism make The second difficulty is related to high dimensionality all kinds of errors and have great difficulty discovering true of conceptual spaces. As a result, analysis of even relatively conclusions. Even when they are told the answer, after a few simple, but counterintuitive categorization phenomena, such as months they may give the wrong answer during an exam. the inverse base rate effects, requires at least five dimensions Syllogisms have been known since ancient times and with (Duch 1996). Such applications show the danger of conceptual proper training in errors may be avoided, but numerous explanations disconnected from neural models that can natural biases leading to cognitive illusions and errors in thinking capture the dynamics of some real cognitive processes: one have their roots in brain dynamics. can invent all kinds of explanations ad hoc, but the true reasons for behavior may be much deeper, and without connecting Cognitive Architectures geometrical models with neurodynamics we will not be able Cognitive Architectures (Duch et al. 2008; Taatgen and Anderson to understand them. 2009) are computational models of agents that act and reason In , similarity relations between geometrical using some form of perception. These models are formulated representation of mental events should reflect similarities either at the symbolic, conceptual level, using theoretical between patterns of activations of the brain areas aroused by constructs such as executive controllers, or at the subsymbolic, these events. Understanding high-dimensional neurodynamical connectionist, or more detailed neural level where complex systems described by neural activations seems to be hopelessly cognition should emerge from simpler interactions. In practice difficult unless some way of dimensionality reduction is applied. many models are based on hybrid combinations of various Neuroscience provides us with only very rough functions modeled at different levels. representation of the brain’s global state, but reading intentions This level of modeling is suitable for extended behaviorism, from the EEG signals, used in the Brain-Computer Interfaces, but it ignores the dynamics of the inner processes. Ultimately makes constant progress and shows that transformation from cognitive architectures should provide insight into the relation brain-related variables to mind-related variables describing of computations to mental states, although such programs lack intentions is possible, although our conceptual framework will persistent dynamical states needed for brain-like information not be sufficient to accurately describe it. — 5 — — APA Newsletter, Fall 2012, Volume 12, Number 1 —

On the technical side there are many approaches to illuminate important elements on the grand stage of mental dimensionality reduction that preserve important information, space. Sometimes specific lights may be missing and the with multidimensional scaling popular for visualization of phenomenological interpretation of the resulting picture relations in psychology and latent semantic analysis (Landauer becomes difficult or even impossible (Schwitzgebel 2010, and Dumais 1997) used for visual representations of lexical Duch 2011). concepts. There is no phenomenology ready to be used for relating Relevance of Philosophy the mental scene to existing knowledge. New concepts have to be invented and learned. The final questions are how can Although the brain matter is a necessary substrate for mental we know about ourselves, what may be learned from internal processes, detailed neural models may not bring us closer to information flow in the brain, and what has to be learned from understanding the mind any more than detailed models of bird observation of the results of our own action in the world? wings and feathers would help to understand the dynamics of flight. Cognitive neuroscience is a quite young discipline that References tries to create a coherent picture of the brain and its functions. Baars, B.J. 1997. In the Theater of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. Many research groups are attempting detailed brain simulations, Churchland, P.S. and Churchland, P.M. 2002. Neural worlds and real but even if perfect simulation of all functions is achieved, worlds. Reviews Neuroscience 3:903-907. will it help us to understand mental events? The famous Churchland, P.S. 2002. Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy. Blue Brain project has created precise simulation of cortical Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. minicolumns but it has not proposed any new ideas helpful Churchland, P.M. 1996. The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul. for conceptual understanding of relations between neural and Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. mental processes. Damasio, A. 2010. Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious This is still an area where philosophy, systematic reflection Brain. Pantheon. on concepts, can make important contributions, provided that Duch, W. 1994. A solution to the fundamental problems of cognitive relevant questions are asked. Philosophy has largely ignored sciences. International Philosophical Preprint Exchange, all papers are reality, staying at the rarefied conceptual level, making itself linked to the project page: http://www.is.umk.pl/projects/platonic.html. irrelevant to science. This is true also for many branches of Duch, W. 1996. Computational physics of the mind. Computer Physics psychology, where theoretical constructs determine the way Communication 97:136-53. experts think and analyze experiments. This may be a more Duch, W. 1996. Categorization, Prototype Theory and Neural Dynamics. subtle extension of folk psychology concepts (Churchland Proc. of the 4th Int. Conf. on SoftComputing, Iizuka, Japan, pp. 482-85. 1996). Like in the joke about the man who was searching for the Duch, W. 1997. Platonic model of mind as an approximation to lost keys near the lantern where there was light, although the neurodynamics. In Brain-like computing and intelligent information keys were lost somewhere else, we search for the knowledge systems, edited by S-i. Amari, N. Kasabov. Springer, chap. 20, pp. 491-512. not where it can be found but follow the concepts that structure Duch, W. 1998. Neural implementation of psychological spaces. Int. our ways of thinking. Conf. on Neural Network and Brain, Beijing, China, October 1998, pp. 32-35. Neuroscience’s answer to Searl’s Chinese Room (2001) Duch, W. 2005. Brain-inspired conscious computing architecture. thought experiment is to look at what generates in the brain the Journal of Mind and Behavior 26(1-2):1-22. feeling of understanding, how the brain may learn proper model Duch, W. 2007. Towards comprehensive foundations of computational of relations between the concept, mapping it to what is already intelligence. In Challenges for Computational Intelligence, edited by W. known. One does not need special powers of neurons to do it. Duch and J. Mandziuk. Springer Studies in Computational Intelligence Certainly scientists are not going to take such conclusions well. 63:261-316. Some fundamental problems of cognitive science, Duch, W. 2011. Neurodynamics and the mind. Proc. of the Int. Joint Conf. neuroscience, and brain-inspired cognitive architectures in on Neural Networks, San Jose, CA, IEEE Press, pp. 3227-34. artificial intelligence may be due to the wrong conceptualization. Duch, W., Oentaryo, R.J., Pasquier, M. 2008. Cognitive architectures: One such example is the proposal to use kernel methods, where do we go from here? In Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and popular statistical technique for analysis of data, loosely Applications 171, IOS Press, pp. 122-36. connected to perceptrons that are rough models of single Dobosz, K., and Duch, W. 2011. Visualization for understanding of neurons (Jäkel et al. 2009). neurodynamical systems. Cognitive Neurodynamics 5(2):145-60. Systematic approximations to neurodynamics may provide Doidge N. 2007. The Brain That Changes Itself. Viking. an alternative, more fruitful approach. Several questions Edelman, S. 2002. Neural spaces: a general framework for the should be discussed: In view of the complexity of the mind is understanding of cognition? Behavioral & Brain Sciences 24(4):664-65. geometrical approach possible at all? Can approximations to Fauconnier, G. 1985. Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction neural dynamics at the mental level be really successful despite in Natural Language. MIT Press. limited knowledge of brain mechanisms? Will a geometrical Fauconnier, G. and Turner, M. 2002. The Way We Think: Conceptual approach indeed help to explain mental processes? Will it lead Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities. Basic Books. to a better method of knowledge representation? How should Gazzaniga, M.S. 2010. Neuroscience and the correct level of explanation it be approached? for understanding mind. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14(7):297-92. Many (hundreds?) of subspaces connected to specific Gärdenfors, P. 2000. Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought. brain functions may be defined: perception breaks into many MIT Press. components, motor activity memory, social perception, Hurlburt, R. and Schwitzgebel, E. 2007. Describing Inner Experience? speech—phonemes, prosody, general sounds, emotion, and Proponent Meets Skeptic. MIT Press. moral reasoning, abstract concepts. Activity in these subspaces Johnson-Laird, P. 1983. Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science is combined in a combinatorial way in real time due to the of Language, Inference and Consciousness. Harvard University Press. competition for attention. Jäkel, F., Schölkopf, B. and Wichmann, F.A. 2009. Does cognitive science Thus, the final picture of mental processes may be need kernels? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13(9):381-88. composed of not just one stage with a spotlight of conscious Kelly, G. 1955. The Psychology of Personal Constructs. New York: Norton. attention, but numerous flashlights that in a coordinated way Kelso, J.A.S. 1995. Dynamic Patterns. Bradford Book, MIT Press. — 6 — — Philosophy and Computers —

Landauer, T. and Dumais, S. 1997. A solution to Plato’s problem: Our purpose here is not to sing the praises of computational the latent semantic analysis theory of acquisition, induction and modeling as a new philosophical technique. Our purpose is representation of knowledge. Psychological Review 104:211-40. rather to emphasize the continuity of computational model- P. Lewicki and T. Hill. 1987. Unconscious processes as explanations of building with the long philosophical tradition of conceptual behavior in cognitive, personality, and social psychology. Personality analysis (Hanna 2000; Sandin 2006; Beaney 2009). With and Social Psychology Bulletin 13:355-62. reflections from the process of building a specific model, we Lewin, K. 1938. The Conceptual Representation and the Measurement want to emphasize two points: that (1) the work of constructing of Psychological Forces. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. a computational model can serve the philosophical ends of Lutz, A. and Thompson, E. 2003. Neurophenomenology: Integrating conceptual understanding, in part because (2) attempts at subjective experience and brain dynamics in the neuroscience of computational modeling often require clarification of the core consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10:31-52. concepts at issue. Nishimoto, S., Vu, A.T., Naselaris, T., Benjamini, Y., Yu, B., and Gallant, J.L. 2011. Reconstructing visual experiences from brain activity evoked I. Computational Modeling and Philosophical Analysis by natural movies. Current Biology 21:1641-46. In their final form, papers in scientific computational modeling Pasley B.N. et al. 2012. Reconstructing speech from human auditory always look perfect: they appear to be the work of a rational cortex. PLOS Biology 10(1):e1001251, 1-13. investigator who thought things through step by step in advance: Pohl, R. 2004. Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases from methods, to results, to discussion and conclusion. It’s good in Thinking, Judgement and Memory. Psychology Press. that these papers look that way—good for brevity, evaluation, Port, R. and van Gelder, T.J., eds. 1995. Mind as Motion. MIT Press. and use in future work. That is how we want our work on belief Rainio, K. 2009. Kurt Lewin’s dynamical psychology revisited and networks and polarization to look eventually. revised. Dynamic Psychology 2009:1-20. But, of course, the polished published form of a paper Raubal, M. and Adams, B. 2010. The needs more can give an entirely misleading impression of the research cognition. Semantic Web Journal 1(1-2):69-74. trajectory—the impression that both the conceptual work at Schwitzgebel, E. 2011. Perplexities of Consciousness. MIT Press. issue and the path of design and programming were neat, tidy, Searle, J. 1980. Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain and fore-ordained. Almost inevitably, they were not. We will use Sciences 3:417-57. our current work in progress as an example. Here, unlike its Shaw, M. and Gaines, B. 1992. Kelly’s ‘geometry of psychological space’ future final form, we will lay out the research in something more and its significance for cognitive modeling. The New Psychologist like real time, complete with fits, starts, and second thoughts. 10:23-31. A key point is that those fits, starts, and second thoughts often Shepard, R. 1987. Toward a universal of generalization for indicate the need for philosophical analysis in a fully traditional psychological science. Science 237:1317-23. sense. Computational modeling calls for and enforces a full and Shepard, R. 1994. Perceptual-cognitive universals as reflections of the explicit conceptual understanding of what it is one is trying to world. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 1:2-28. model. To employ computational techniques, one must have Smith, L.B. and Thelen, E., eds. 1994. A Dynamic Systems Approach to a full and explicit understanding of what it is one is trying the Development. MIT Press. to find out, within what parameters, with what background Spivey, M. 2007. The Continuity of Mind. New York: Oxford University assumptions, and why (Pollock 1998). Press. We offer our current work on belief polarization as a case Taatgen, N. and Anderson, J.R. 2009. The past, present, and future of in point. The history of this project is one in which we have cognitive architectures. Topics in Cognitive Science 1:1-12. repeatedly had to ask what abstract representations of social Thelen, E. and Smith, L. 1994. A Dynamic Systems Approach to the information contact were plausible. We’ve had to ask and ask Development of Cognition and Action. MIT Press. again whether certain modeling assumptions were realistic Varela, F. 1996. Neurophenomenology: a methodological remedy for portrayals of belief and , and whether it matters the extent the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:330-49. to which they clearly were not. The history of the project is one in which we have repeatedly had to return to questions of how to define and measure the phenomenon we were after, Philosophical Analysis in Modeling Polarization: and even whether there was just one phenomenon at issue. Notes from a Work in Progress This exploration, which is at the edge of various sciences, has repeatedly demanded far more than computational resources. Patrick Grim, Aaron Bramson, Daniel J. Singer, Flying under the colors of updating algorithm design and Steven Fisher, Carissa Flocken, and William Berger definition of quantitative measures, for example, we repeatedly University of Michigan found ourselves doing just good old-fashioned conceptual analysis in a new-fangled computational terminology. Introduction II. Understanding Polarization: Initial Motivations Computational modeling and computer simulation have What we wanted to know about was polarization of beliefs quickly established themselves not merely as useful add-ons in society. We started with the impression that the increased but as core tools across the range of the sciences. We consider polarization of America was an agreed and established computational modeling to be a promising approach to a sociological fact. Everybody talks about it and a range of range of philosophical questions as well, and to questions that books are written about it (McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal sit on the border between philosophy and other disciplines 2006; Brownstein 2007; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Fiorina, (Burkholder 1992; Bynum and Moor 1998; Holyoak and Abrams, and Pope 2010), so we thought it must be real. Thagard 1997; Grim, Mar, and St. Denis 1998; Grim 2004). The idea was to use the tools of agent-based modeling to try Questions regarding the transference of belief, social networks, to understand that polarization better—to understand the factors and opinion polarization fall in the latter category, bridging that influence polarization: factors necessary for polarization, , , sociology, political science, perhaps a handful of factors sufficient for polarization, and network studies, and complex systems. This is the focus of perhaps even social measures that could be used to reduce some of our current research. polarization. — 7 — — APA Newsletter, Fall 2012, Volume3 12, Number 1 —

form (Grim, Reade, Singer, Fisher, and Majewicz 2010; Grim, Singer, Reade, and Fisher 2011; Grim, Singer, Reade, and Fisher 2012). We used a more complicated version of that kind of belief updating in building models of information networks for Black and White communities, based on data in the Greater Pittsburgh Random Household Health Survey. In this latter model we had also used data on trust: What kind of trust do members of each community put in information they receive from the government, for example, from their friends and family, and from their church or religious leaders (Figures 2, 3)? This last piece of work had shown patterns of belief polarization in the two communities given conflicting input from, for example, governmental and religious sources. Why not apply the computational techniques developed in this earlier work, geared to belief change on networks and the effect of FigureFigure 1. Types 1. Types of linked of linked sub-networks sub-networks used in previous used work in previous on belief andwork infection on dynamicstrust, in order to try to understand opinion polarization more (Grim,belief Reade,and infection Singer, Fisher, dynamics and Majewicz (Grim, 20 10;Reade, Grim, Singer,Singer, Reade, Fisher, and and Fisher 2011).generally? Majewicz 2010; Grim, Singer, Reade, and Fisher 2011). We had used a more complicated version of that kind of belief updating in building modelsIII. The First Models of information networks for Black and White communities, based on data in the Greater PittsburghAt Randomthe beginning, Household Health we Survey. had In athis hunch latter model that we had increased also used data on trust:Our initial models were built along the following lines. Model Whatpolarization kind of trust in do Americamembers of mighteach community have somethingput in information to theydo withreceive the from the individuals are connected via a communication network. government, for example, from their friends and family, from their church or religious leadersThey start with randomized “beliefs” modeled as numbers (Figuresstructure 2, 3)? of media sources. The core idea was the following: We seem to have been less polarized when there was essentially between 0 and 1. They update their beliefs based on the beliefs one source from which everyone got their news: the Evening of their neighbors on the network. The idea is simply that we News on ABC, NBC, and CBS. The news coverage on the three are influenced by the beliefs of those around us. If my friends major networks was essentially interchangeable—all a version all confirm my beliefs, those beliefs will be reinforced. If my of Walter Cronkite. All followed a journalistic code that insisted contacts all seem to believe something different than I do, that editorializing be kept strictly separate from reporting. my beliefs can be expected to shift in that direction over time (Visser and Cooper 2003). News is no longer like that. Fox News and MSNBC have obvious political slants, are positioned at rival ends of the In practice we made belief updating a weighted average political spectrum, and do not seem to care where journalism of an agent’s previous belief and the beliefs of other agents leaves off and the editorial begins. Perhaps the change in where with whom he had informational links in the network. Is this we get our news has something to do with why America is so artificial? Certainly. Implausible? Not as a rough approximation, polarized. perhaps. Precedented in the literature? Numerous times (French 1956; Harary 1959; DeGroot 1974; Golub and Jackson 2010, That was the initial motivating hunch. Could a model forthcoming). What we were after was an explanatory model; illustrate those belief dynamics? Could it show us whether as modeling assumptions go, that representation of belief split news media was an easy route to polarization, or even a reinforcement seemed a promising start. possible route? Could it give us hints as to what kinds of factors might ameliorate or reduce polarization? From the beginning, however, we also wanted to build in issues of trust. Here again, the goal was to start with something We had worked previously with networks of artificial agents simple. The simple assumption we started with was that widely whose beliefs were modeled as numbers between 0 and 1 divergent opinions can strain bonds of trust (Lord, Ross, and and who updated those beliefs in terms of the other agents Lepper 1979). If the views expressed by a particular source with whom they had contact. We had used that abstraction in are views I consider radically incorrect, wrong, or misguided, the context of investigating infection, belief transference, and then ceteris paribus I can be expected to discount information genetic crossover as alternative modes of information diffusion from that source. on networks. All that work saw final presentation in polished 4 Our first models, therefore, had two forms of updating running in tandem: a belief updating in terms of a weighted averaging of my network contacts, and a trust updating based on belief distance that is reflected in those weights. The hypothesis was that we can more fully understand the dynamics of belief polarization in terms of the interplay between (a) belief revised in terms of trust and (b) trust revised in terms of belief. Perhaps the fact that people discount information from contrary sources is enough to explain polarization. Perhaps a single media source—Walter Cronkite, CBS, NBC, ABC—would tend to counteract that force toward polarization. Perhaps multiple media sources—Fox and MSNBC, or the infinite number of sources one can find online to reinforce any chosen FigureFigure 2. Histograms 2. Histograms and and networks networks constructedconstructed to tomatch match degree degree distributions distributions drawn from position—would tend to make polarization worse. drawndata fromwithin data the Black within and the White Black communities, and White Pittsburgh communities, Random HouseholdPittsburgh Health Random Survey Household(Grim, Health Thomas, Survey Fisher, (Grim, Reade, Thomas,Singer, Garza, Fisher, Fryer, Reade, and Chatman Singer, 2012a, Garza, 2012b). Fryer, and Chatman 2012a, 2012b).

— 8 — — Philosophy and Computers — 5 that. I may come to trust you on one issue in one hundred, Trust Levels - Black Community despite initial disagreement, if I have learned to trust your judgment in the other ninety-nine. Family and Friends Government All of these are conceptual issues of a type that should be familiar to philosophers: conceptual issues regarding what belief and trust are and how they change. Here those issues arise in terms of the interpretation of a computational model: Are belief and trust enough like their “representations” in the formal model to allow us to draw useful conclusions from that model, or have we sacrificed so much in the course of model simplification that we have disqualified ourselves from genuine conclusions regarding the dynamics of belief? Goals of simplicity play a significant role in evaluating models. A model is useful only if it is simpler and easier Religion to understand than the reality it is meant to capture, but is also useful only to the extent that it matches its target in those respects relevant to the purposes of design. Whether a model has adequately captured the relevant respects, and captured them in relevantly significant degree, is always an open question (Miller and Page 2007; Grim, Rosenberger, Anderson, Rosenfeld, and Eason 2011; Rescher 2011, 2012). Even waiving those interpretational concerns in the name of model simplicity, however, we faced an issue regarding trust updating that had to be resolved in order 7 to build the model at all. If I do discount information from that couldthose be used who ceteris hold paribus views? Might weopposed build a model to inmine, which weprecisely tracked the howeffect of that FigureFigure 3. 3. TrustTrust levels levels in the in Black the community Black community correlated with correlated network position, with Pittsburgh networkfactor asmuch if it were should the only ourone, drawingmodel conclusions discount of those the explicitly views? hypothetical Should form trust “were position,Random Household Pittsburgh Health Random Survey. Red Household nodes indicate Health low trust; Survey. blue nodes Red indicate nodes high indicate trusttrust a matterupdating simply ofbe belief modeled distance. linearly,. . ?” Or is that as clearin Figure over-simplification 4a, or more a modeling like (Grim, Thomas, Fisher, Reade, Singer, Garza, Fryer, and Chatman 2012a, 2012b). assumption that goes too far, losing track of the phenomena with which we are really concerned? low trust; blue nodes indicate high trust (Grim, Thomas, Fisher, Reade, Singer, Wein worried Figure that belief4b? Inwas the single-issue latter andcase, one-dimensional what precisely in our model, should and that our trust Garza,This lastFryer, piece and of workChatman had shown 2012a, patterns 2012b). of belief polarization in the two communities followedcurve suit. Our of real trust-discounting beliefs are multiple, and look our disagreements like? often reflect that. I may come given conflicting input from, for example, governmental and religious sources. Why not applyto trust you on one issue in one hundred, despite initial disagreement, if I have learned to trust In both cases, τ is the distance from an agent’s belief theIV. computational Conceptual techniques Questions developed in from this earlier Computational work, geared to belief Models change on networksyour judgment in the other ninety-nine. and the effect of trust, in order to try to understand opinion polarization more generally? at whichAll of these there are conceptual is a shift issues from of aincreased type that should trust be familiar to decreased to philosophers: trust. It was at this point in model development, however, that things conceptual issues regarding what belief and trust are and how they change. Here those issues ariseCall in that terms trustof the interpretationwatershed of athe comp τutational-point. model: What Are should belief and the trust τ enough-point like III.started The First getting Models messy. They got messy both in the model results theirbe “representations”in our model in thefor formal trust model updating? to allow us toMoreover, draw useful conclusions what field from ofthat and in the conceptualization of the model itself. model,comparison or have we shouldsacrificed sowe much use in thfore course such of amodel calculation? simplification Should that we have we In the first models we built, given our initial updating disqualifiedincrease ourselves and decrease from genuine trust conclusions on a localregarding scale, the dynamics with theof belief? scope of Goals of simplicity play a significant role in evaluating models. A model is useful only if it assumptions for belief and trust, we kept getting convergence isour simpler trust and updatingeasier to understand calibrated than the realityto each it is meant individual’s to capture, but immediate is also useful only rather than polarization. Polarization didn’t seem easy to tocontacts? the extent that That it matches would its target mean in those that respects our relevantindividuals to the purposes discount of design. the produce, even with contrasting media sources. We therefore Whetherbeliefs a ofmodel those has adequately among capturedtheir network the relevant contacts respects, and most captured distant them infrom relevantly significant degree, is always an open question (Miller and Page 2007; Grim, Rosenberger, had a wonderful model illustrating the fact that everyone is Anderson,them. Or Rosenfeld, should and weEason discount 2011; Rescher on 2011, a global 2012). scale, in the sense always destined to come to the same view on everything—a thatEven an waiving individual those interpretational distrusts concernsthose whoin the namewould of model be simplicity,most distant however, we model that explained perfectly something that we knew didn’t facedfrom an himissue regardingacross trustthe updating full field that ofhad beliefs to be resolved, whether in order toor build not the he model has at all. If I do discount information from those who hold views opposed to mine, precisely how much really happen. shouldimmediate our model contact discount those with views? agents Should widely trust updating differing be modeled in belief? linearly, as in Figure From another direction, and independently, we began to 4a, or more like in Figure 4b? In the latter case, what precisely should our curve of trust- worry about conceptual foundations. A major issue was trust. discounting look like? As one of the research group repeatedly reminded us, trust can be of various forms, from various sources. Bob has great trust in the thinking of his friend Alice. He takes Alice’s views seriously and pays close attention to Alice’s arguments and evidence, despite the fact that they are often in wide disagreement. That is a classical philosophical counter-example. It shows, quite legitimately, that trust does not correlate with belief distance alone. We have clearly over-simplified. But is that over-simplification one that can be tolerated for purposes of FigureFigures 4a and4a and 4b. 4b. Two Two ways of of graphing graphing trust trustupdating. updating. In each case In eachan agent case increases modeling? Is it a modeling assumption that could be used ceteris trustan agent as shown increases in an agent trust with aas belief shown less than in an in agentdistance with from ahis belief own, and less decreases than trust  paribus? Might we build a model in which we tracked the effect τ in distance fromas shown his own,in an agent and with decreases a belief greater trust than as shown from his. in an agent with a belief greater than τ from his. of that factor as if it were the only one, drawing conclusions In both cases,  is the distance from an agent’s belief at which there is a shift from increased of the explicitly hypothetical form “were trust a matter simply trust to decreased trust. Call that trust watershed the -point. What should the -point be in our of belief distance. . . ?” Or is that clear over-simplification a model for trust updating? Moreover, what field of comparison should we use for such a calculation?V. Exploring Should we the increase Impact and decrease of trustAlternatives on a local scale, with the scope of our trust modeling assumption that goes too far, losing track of the If we were to wait for psychologists to tell us how people update phenomena with which we are really concerned? trust in terms of belief differences, whether in accord with We worried that belief was single-issue and one- Figure 4a or 4b and whether against a local or global standard dimensional in our model, and that trust followed suit. Our of comparison, we would have a long wait indeed. The truth real beliefs are multiple, and our disagreements often reflect is undoubtedly that trust updating does not occur in terms — 9 — — APA Newsletter, Fall 2012, Volume 12, Number 1 — 10

of single beliefs, is not solely in terms of belief distance, and varies in terms of update function and background comparison depending on the people and the issue involved. That means that a predictive model of precisely what the belief dynamics will be in a particular community and a particular case is beyond us, and perhaps beyond generally. But prediction is not the only purpose behind computational modeling, and perhaps not the primary purpose. Explanation of general phenomena through an understanding of general mechanisms is of value even where point prediction is possible—and may indeed tell us that there will be many cases in which point prediction is not possible. Understanding potential dynamics in a range of cases can be as important, or even more important, than offering a specific prediction in a particular case. Understanding what factors can be expected to carry particular weight, individually or in combination, can be as important as any specific prediction based on a specific set of values for those factors. Figure 6. Horizontal location represents belief. Snapshots show a typicalFigure evolution 6. Horizontal of randomlocation represents network belief. with Snapshots local showtrust a typicalupdating. evolution Gen of- As modelers, therefore, an alternative course of action is random network with local trust updating. Generations 5, 15, and 30 shown. entirely appropriate. Our goal need not be to build some single erations 5, 15, and 30 shown. set of realistic psychological assumptions into some specifically VI. Philosophical Analysis in Computational Modeling: The Case of Polarization predictive model. What psychological assumptions are realistic At thisWithout point, we had being the essentials able toof aanswer more promising some model. of theWith questionsnetworks of agents, our may vary from person to person, from belief topic to belief topic, beliefinitial updating models by weighted raised, averaging, we and began a range toof possibilities make models for trust updating, with whichwe could from community to community, and from case to case. In the startwe to measurecould various explore factors whatand their happenedinfluence on polarization. on some What ofdifference the various to polarization does the type of network make—a random network of connections, for example, or attempt to understand belief dynamics in general, it is entirely a scale-freeoptions network available. more like manyIn some real social of networks?the models What difference we were to polarization building does appropriate to ask what the impact of alternative assumptions theat shape this of stage,trust-updating polarization make? We are still currently refused working to with appear. the linear But graph the because scale it’s regarding trust will be for belief dynamics across a community easieron to which handle. But trust even givenupdating that shape, was what applied—thedifference does a shift scale in  make? on What which polarization difference does it make if I discount those .5 distant from my current view, .4 and for belief polarization, for example. In that case, we are not distant,beliefs or .3 distant?were discounted—did seem to make an important attempting to peg the “right” value of potential factors for any difference.The exploration of those parameters form the core of our work in progress. That work is particular case. In that case we are attempting to figure out the currently qualitative, eyeballing the belief distributions that those parameter differences make, just as weFigure invited you 5 showsto eyeball thema typical in the figures evolution above. of beliefs in a network relative importance of those potential factors across a range of thatWhat startswe would with like in thea end,random however, connection is something more: between a quantitative agentstake on of cases, real, hypothetical, and counterfactual. questionsdifferent of belief beliefs dynamics, and network in which structure, trust media in effects, other and agents the issue is at discounted hand. Within a range of abstract model assumptions, we’d like to know just how much each of these factors can For purposes of point prediction, the level of abstraction be inseen terms to contribute of belief to polarization. distance For on that awe global need a quantitative scale. This measure is the of polarization. evolution at which we are building computational models would be a But,of there beliefs another in conceptual a community difficulty arose. in which agents discount those far detriment; the variations in variables we are considering would from their own beliefs, but far from their own beliefs in terms simply represent a confession of ignorance. For purposes of a of the entire spectrum of opinion in the community. The result more general understanding of a phenomenon, the level of is convergence. abstraction of models like ours can be a positive gain. With the Figure 6, in contrast, shows a typical evolution of beliefs in abstract unreality of distance from the specifics that would be a similar random network but in which trust is discounted in required for prediction in a specific case comes the power of 9 terms of belief distance on a local scale. This is the evolution of generality. Aspects of dynamics observable in a wide range of beliefs in a community in which agents discount those far from appear.general But the abstract scale on which models trust updating will wasbe applied—the good candidates scale on which for beliefs aspects were their own beliefs in their own network of immediate contacts. discounted—didof dynamics seem that to make will an importanthold across difference. not just one but a range of Figure 5 shows a typical evolution of beliefs in a network that starts with a random The result starts to look more like polarization. connectionspecifiable between cases. agents of We different can beliefs come and to in whichknow trust where in other results agents is discountedchange in termswith of belief changes distance in on oura global variables. scale. This is the evolution of beliefs in a community in VI. Philosophical Analysis in Computational Modeling: which agents discount those far from their own beliefs, but far from their own beliefs in terms of the entire spectrum of opinion in the community. The result is convergence. The Case of Polarization At this point, we had the essentials of a more promising model. With networks of agents, belief updating by weighted averaging, and a range of possibilities for trust updating, we could start to measure various factors and their influence on polarization. What difference to polarization does the type of network make—a random network of connections, for example, or a scale-free network more like many real social networks? What difference to polarization does the shape of trust-updating make? We are currently working with the linear graph because it’s easier to handle. But even given that shape, what difference does a shift in τ make? What polarization difference does it make if I discount those .5 distant from my current view, .4 distant, or .3 distant? The exploration of those parameters form the core of our work in progress. That work is currently qualitative, eyeballing the belief distributions that those parameter differences make, just as we invited you to eyeball them in the figures above. Figure 5. Horizontal location represents belief. Snapshots show What we would like in the end, however, is something Figure 5. Horizontal location represents belief. Snapshots show a typical evolution of more: a quantitative take on questions of belief dynamics, a typicalrandom evolutionnetwork with ofglobal random trust updating. network Generations with 5, global 15, 25, and trust 30 shown. updating. Generations 5, 15, 25, and 30 shown. network structure, media effects, and the issue at hand. Within Figure 6, in contrast, shows a typical evolution of beliefs in a similar random network but in which trust is discounted in terms of belief distance on a local scale. This is the evolution of beliefs in a community in which agents discount those far from their own beliefs in their own— 10 — network of immediate contacts. The result starts to look more like polarization. — Philosophy and Computers — a range of abstract model assumptions, we’d like to know just and Lyons 1980; Wilcox 1997). This non-parametric method how much each of these factors can be seen to contribute examines two sets of data and determines the probability that to polarization. For that we need a quantitative measure of they were drawn from the same distribution (without making 12 polarization. But, there another conceptual difficulty arose. any assumptions about what those distributions might be). The resulting p-values for their being separate distributions act As indicated in the introduction, we started with the parametric method examines two sets of data and determines the probability that they were impression that the increasing polarization of America was asdrawn measures from the for same how distribution distinct (withoutthe groups’ making beliefs any assumptions are. A related about what those an agreed and established sociological fact. Everybody talks N-sampledistributions test might or be).Bayesian The resulting method p-values can forextend their being that separateapproach distributions act as about it, a range of books are written about it, so it must be formeasures any number for how ofdistinct groups. the groups' beliefs are. A related N-sample test or Bayesian method real, we thought. can extend that approach for any number of groups. Has polarization in American increased? What exactly do people mean when they talk of polarization? Is there just one thing they mean, or are there various senses of the term? How are we to measure them? If you try to build a model, however simple, in which you measure polarization, that kind of abstract conceptual question becomes immediate and pressing. A major task we have faced is simply to tease out different senses of “polarization” which appear at various points in literature of sociology and political science but which are not clearly distinguished in that literature. Often entire articles appear on the topic of polarization, but with little attempt to make it clear what precisely is meant by the term. A real understanding of the phenomena at issue demands that we do better. The methodology of computational modeling strengthens that demand. Figure 7. Attitudes toward , distribution by year, Without claim to completeness, the following is a brief Figure 7. Attitudes toward abortion, distribution by year, from the full sample General from the full sample General Social Survey 1997-1994 catalog of senses of the term in the literature that we have found Social Survey 1997-1994 (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996, p. 709). it necessary to distinguish, and which we intend to pursue in (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996, p. 709). quantitative form in further modeling: There is no necessary connection between polarization in sense 1 and 2; between spread and distinctness. A population might have a very diverse set of views on an issue without particular Polarization type 1: Spread clustersThere emerging is no necessaryaround any particular connection view. between But there is polarization no necessary disconnection,in either. Polarization is measured in terms of the range of opinions. One senseAttitudes 1 and toward 2; between abortion between spread 1970 and and distinctness. 1990 show both A populationa great spread and distinctness, for might therefore ask: How far apart are the extremes? In one of mightinstance have (Figure a very 7). In diversetheir words, set "If of attitude views polarization on an issue entails without increased variance, increased the best sociological pieces on the issue, DiMaggio, Evans, and particularbimodality, clusters and increased emerging opinion aroundconstraint, any then particular only attitudes view. towards But abortion [amongst Bryson (1996) call this “dispersion”: “The event that opinions therethose isconsidered no necessary in the article] disconnection, have come more either. polarized Attitudes in the past toward twenty years, both in the are diverse, ‘far apart’ in content.” They also outline a dispersion abortionpublic at betweenlarge and within 1970 most and subgroups"1990 show (DiMaggio, both a great Evans, spread and Bryson and 1996, 738). "No principle: “Other things being equal, the more dispersed opinion distinctness,issues represents for contemporary instance (Figure social conflict7). In theiras vividly words, as does “If abortion,attitude the struggle over polarizationwhich has become entails symbolic increased of the so-calledvariance, culture increased wars (Hunter bimodality, 1994)… Americans have Comment [WB1]: Hunter (1994) refers to the becomes, the more difficult it will be for the political system become more divided in their attitudes towards abortion and, less dramatically, in their feelings description of “culture wars” not the claims about and increased opinion constraint, then only attitudes towards abortion, per se. to establish and maintain centrist political consensus” (694). toward the poor. The fact that division on these latter issues has increased without large Hunter, James Davison. 1987. Evangelism: The abortion [amongst those considered in the article] have come Coming Generation. Chicago: University of Chicago In our model, we can measure polarization in the sense directional change in central tendencies confirms the importance of inspecting change in Press. more polarized in the past twenty years, both in the public of spread as the belief level of the agent with the highest belief distributions as well as in means" (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996, 715). Comment [WB2]: Do we need the last half of value minus the belief level of the agent with the lowest belief at largeIn other and sociological within most work, subgroups” Bartels 2000 ar(DiMaggio,gues that voting Evans, behavior and shows increased this quote? value. Polarization in this sense, however, does not consider Brysondistinctness 1996, between 738). political“No issues groups represents since the 1950s. contemporary Bartels demonstrates social that party conflictidentification as vividly increased as does sharply abortion, in the 1990s, the wstruggleith both strongover whichand weak has identifiers increasing whether the agents with minimum and maximum beliefs are along with a corresponding down-tick in the number of voters that identify as independents extreme case outliers or the edges of large clusters. Spread is become symbolic of the so-called culture wars (Hunter 1994) … Americans(Bartels 2000, have 36-7). become The trend more identifies divided a grow in theiring distinctness attitudes oftowards the political parties along also independent of any measure in terms of groups; even if the with the diminishment of independent, non-affiliated voters in the middle. The impact of minimum and maximum agents are representative of groups abortion and, less dramatically, in their feelings toward the at the ends, the measure will ignore any groups in between. poor. The fact that division on these latter issues has increased Although polarization in the sense of spread is important, it is without large directional change in central tendencies confirms also clear that we will want to measure other aspects of the the importance of inspecting change in distributions as well as phenomenon as well. in means” (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996, 715). In other sociological work, Bartels 2000 argues that voting Polarization type 2: Distinctness behavior shows increased distinctness between political groups If we can identify different belief or attitude groups—clusters since the 1950s. Bartels demonstrates that party identification along a scale, for example—how distinct are these factions? increased sharply in the 1990s, with both strong and weak Unlike polarization in the sense of spread, polarization in the identifiers increasing along with a corresponding down-tick sense of distinctness is a measure explicitly defined in terms of in the number of voters that identify as independents (Bartels groups. What matters here is how clearly distinct those groups 2000, 36-7). The trend identifies a growing distinctness of the are, regardless of the distance between them. DiMaggio and political parties along with the diminishment of independent, his co-authors call this “bimodality.” People are polarized in this non-affiliated voters in the middle. The impact of distinctness second sense “insofar as people with different positions on an on presidential and congressional races has been greater than issue cluster into separate camps, with locations between the at any time since the mid-sixties (Bartels 2000, 42). two modal positions sparsely occupied” (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996, 694). Polarization type 3: Uniformity within Groups One way to measure distinctness would be to rank How diverse are opinions within each group? In contrast to the groups in order of their mean belief values and then distinctness, this measure looks at uniformity within, rather than perform pair-wise comparisons of the distributions using the between, groups. The more single-minded or unanimous views Kolgomorov-Smirnov (KS) two-sample test (Kaner, Mohanty, are within distinct groups, the greater this sense of polarization

— 11 — — APA Newsletter, Fall 2012, Volume 12, Number 1 — between them. A suggestive measure is absolute deviation. Polarization in the sense of coverage is related to dispersion, The smaller the variance within distinct groups, the greater this but does not include the shape of the belief dispersion. We sense of polarization across the population. might therefore think of coverage as a sub-measure of global Increased uniformity as a measure of polarization is dispersion, measuring how much dispersion there is without clear in the Congressional voting records of the major parties. measuring its location. Between 1969 and 1976—the Nixon and Ford years—the rate Polarization type 6: Regionalization at which Republicans voted along party lines was about 65 While polarization in the sense of coverage represents how percent in both the House and the Senate. The same was much belief dispersion there is without accounting for where true of Democrats. Between 2001 and 2004, under George beliefs are dispersed, we might also want to measure certain W. Bush, Republicans voted with their party 90 percent of the aspects of belief regionalization without attending to the belief time. Democrats voted with their party 85 percent of the time area covered over all. In considering small bins of possible (McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). belief, for example, we might mean by polarization not how Baldassarri and Gelman (2000) also find increasing party few bins are filled but the extent to which there are regions of polarization. They write, empty bins between regions of bins that are occupied. Looking separately at trends among Republican With 100 bins, for example, there might be three different and Democratic voters . . . we find clear evidence of cases: (a) that in which bins 1-50 are the only bins filled, (b) increasing constraint within issue domains, especially the situation in which bins 1-25 and 31-55 are filled, and (c) among Republicans. In fact, Republicans have become the situation in which 5-bin regions are filled, separated by more consistent on economic and civil issues, 5-bin holes: regions 1-5, 11-15, 21-25, 31-35. . . are the only ones while Democrats have lost constraint on these issues filled. Each of these will be equally polarized in the sense of and become a bit more coherent in their moral views. polarization as coverage. Counting the number of empty regions In both groups of voters, the constraint is growing faster between regions of occupied spaces, however, gives us a than in the populace as a whole. (436) measure of polarization in which (c) is more polarized than (b), which is in turn more polarized than (a). Regionalization seems On numerous accounts, the Democratic and Republican parties a further intuitive sense of polarization well worth quantifying. have become more internally uniform. It should be noted that regionalization per se does not Polarization type 4: Size disparity distinguish between the case in which (b) bins 1-25 and 31-55 A society that has one dominant opinion group with a few are filled, and (d) that in which 1-25 and 75-100 are filled. In small minority outliers seems less polarized than one with a terms of regionalization that may be exactly what we want: small number of comparably sized competing groups. Groups beliefs in the two cases are regionalized in precisely the same are more polarized in this sense if the different beliefs are held sense, though the groups are farther apart in the sense of spread. by equal numbers of people. Using the notation that G is the Senses 1 through 6 of polarization can all be seen in terms set of groups, and γi is the size of group i, size disparities can of histograms of beliefs on a single issue across a population. be measured by calculating the absolute deviation: 1/(2N) × But there are other senses of the term that are essentially (a)

Σ | γi - μG |. This is just the normalized sum of distances from multiple-opinion or (b) network-based. the mean community size; it equals zero when all the groups Polarization type 7: Multiple opinion convergence are the same size and increases the more groups differ from the mean size. It maxes out at 1 as the number of groups and Given polarized groups on issue A, are these same groups size differences go to infinity, making it a nice measure for polarized on B, C, and D? The more interlocked rival beliefs comparison across different configurations. are within rival groups, the greater the polarization across the community. Fiorina and Abrams (2008) note that intra-group Views on women’s role in public life are no longer as polarization in this sense may increase even though population polarized in this sense as they once were, even though there distributions on particular issues may not change. Bishop are small groups who continue to hold anti-feminist views that notes that individuals may move to “neighborhoods where were once much more common. In the past, major portions of others have similar political views, changing their partisan the population fought racial integration vociferously. Even if the identifications to match their ideological and issue positions” views represented there are still held by some, polarization on (2008, 578). the issue of racial integration has clearly decreased. Polarization type 8: Community fracturing Polarization type 5: Coverage Sub-communities may be polarized simply in the sense that We think of polarized societies as having a few tightly packed there is little or no communication between them. Even if two sets of beliefs. The inverse of this, a broad spectrum of beliefs, separated communities have identical and uniform beliefs, that can be captured in a variety of ways. One example is the uniformity may be coincidental and temporary. proportion of the belief spectrum held by members of society. The larger the areas of unoccupied belief space, the more In Ethnic Conflict and Civil Life, Varshney (2002) polarized the society. The more focused and less diverse the demonstrates how group interactions ameliorate levels of inter- beliefs in a society are, the more polarized it is. group violence, and conversely, how group isolation increases the likelihood of violence. Varshney’s central claim is that A simple way to envisage the measure in a discrete “pre-existing local networks of civic engagement between two instantiation is to think of the spectrum of possible beliefs communities stand out as the single most important proximate between 0 and 1 as divided into small bins of size d (e.g., d = cause” for the difference between peace and violence (9). Put 0.01 or normalized by setting d to 1 / the number of agents). another way, cities with social networks that connected Hindus We can then measure coverage in terms of the proportion of and Muslims through the same institutions were much less likely bins filled. Alternatively, we might want a continuous measure to see outbreaks of ethnic violence than cities in which Hindus over the belief space. This can be done by summing the amount and Muslims belonged to distinct civic institutions. covered by d-diameter halos around each agent; i.e., any portion of the belief space that is within d of an agent is considered VII. First Results and Work in Progress covered; the rest is uncovered. We think we have made progress, along the lines above, in

— 12 — 16 updating function—that difference between global and local scaling makes a major difference in the emergence of polarization, in several senses. Figure 8 shows a sample of what happens with a  point of .25 and global updating. Figure 9 shows by contrast what happens with a  point of .25 and local updating. More— Philosophycomplete and Computers — animations for each are available at www.pgrim.org/workinprogress. spread of beliefs of my immediate contacts. In this case it will be guaranteed that one of my contacts is the farthest out—and I will decrease trust in that individual no matter how close our beliefs on the “objective” scale of the entire spread within the population. This is a “local” updating model. I trust those among my contacts with beliefs like mine, gauged against the field of opinion among those with whom I am in contact. Given the other particulars of the model—a random network of 50 agents and a linear updating function—that difference between global and local scaling makes a major difference in the emergence of polarization, in several senses. Figure 8 shows a sample of what happens with a τ point of .25 and global updating. Figure 9 shows by contrast what happens with a τ point of .25 and local updating. More complete animations for each are available at www.pgrim.org/ workinprogress. Figure 10 shows results side by side for different τ points from .05 to .75 with the same initial random seed, so that the initial beliefs in the community are the same. On the left are results for global updating. On the right are results for local updating. Global updating, it turns out, goes to belief convergence with even a very small τ value. Local updating produces polarization all the way up to a τ value of .5. What these initial results indicate is that in looking for factors that favor polarization, local versus global updating can play a major role. FigureFigure 8. 8. Horizontal Horizontal location location represents belief. represents Representative belief. slides Representative from evolution of a randomslides array from with evolution a  point of .25of anda randomglobal updating. array Ag withents update a τ pointtrust positively of .25 in and those Note also that we can distinguish many different types of closestglobal to their updating. beliefs, update Agents trust negatively update intrust those positivelyfarthest away, in with those a transition closest point to from polarization mentioned above in these images. In the image for theirpositive beliefs, to negative update update trust at negativelyt = .25. See also in www.pgrim.org/workinprogress. those farthest away, with a local updating with a τ of .5, polarization is high in a number of transition point from positive to negative update at t = .25. See also senses. We have two major groups and a smaller intermediate www.pgrim.org/workinprogress. group that are clearly distinct—polarization sense 2. They vary in how sharply peaked they are—polarization sense 3. The the conceptual foundations necessary to model building with 17 an eye to understanding polarization. Simple assumptions of a single belief scale and belief updating will remain, but with a range of variability to be explored in (a) trust updating functions with (b) different τ values against (c) local and global scales, with further variations in (d) social network structures and sizes, (e) initial configurations, and (f) media sources and effects. Our measures in exploring variations in those parameters will be measures of polarization in the distinct conceptual senses outlined above. The following is a sample of the kinds of results we are headed for. Begin with a random network of 50 agents, initially assigned beliefs between 0 and 1. Begin with a simple linear function for belief updating. That function is “tune-able”: it may be when a contact is within .2 of an agent’s belief that his trust in that contact increases, and beyond .2 that he begins to discount input from that source. Or that τ-point may be wider: it may be a distance of .3 that marks the difference, or any other number. Consider now two variations. In one, the τ-point is marked on a scale calibrated to the entire spread of beliefs across the population. In that case the belief spread of my particular contacts may not be as important. Relative to the range of opinions across the population, all of my friends may think pretty much like me. We will have a mutual opinion admiration society, increasing trust in each other and influence on each other based on trust. This first variation is a “global” updating model. I tend to trust individuals with beliefs like mine, gauged Figure 9. Horizontal location represents belief. Representative against the whole spread of public opinion. Figure 9. Horizontal location represents belief. Representative slides from evolution of a slides from evolution of a random array with a τ point of .25 and Consider a second variation that differs only in the scale random array with a  point of .25 and local updating. Agents update trust positively in those closestlocal to their updating. beliefs, update Agents trust updatenegatively trustin those positively farthest away, in with those a transition closest point to from on which trust updating is measured. In this case τ-points .2, theirpositive beliefs, to negativeupdate update trust at negativelyt = .25. See also in www.pgrim.org/workinprogress. those farthest away, with a .3, .4 aren’t measures across the whole spread of beliefs within transition point from positive to negative update at t = .25. See also  the population at large. They are measures across just the www.pgrim.org/workinprogressFigure 10 shows results side by side for different. points from .05 to .75 with the same initial random seed, so that the initial beliefs in the community are the same. On the left are results for global updating. On the right are results for local updating. Global updating, it turns out, goes to belief convergence with even a very small  value. Local updating produces — 13polarization — all the way up to a  value of .5. — APA Newsletter, Fall 2012, Volume 12, Number 1 — 18 or conceptually that polarization in one sense need accompany polarization in others. As the work progresses, it will be interesting to see whether some of these senses nonetheless appear together in modeled network dynamics much as they often seem to go together in the social dynamics that are our ultimate target. Note also how patterns of polarization change in trust updating on a local scaling with increases in the τ point. Consider, for example, the patterns of polarization with τ points at .2, at .3, at .4, and so on. Several senses of polarization stay the same at those points. Distinctness does—polarization sense 2. Sharpness of peak on each side stays about the same—polarization sense 3. The major units remain comparative in size—polarization sense 4. The sense of polarization that changes with increasing τ is polarization sense 1—the distance of the extremes. With increasing τ points the objective position of the two groups comes closer together. Polarization in sense 1 slowly decreases. In the other senses it remains fairly uniform, without decrease, until the two groups actually meet. Polarization in the other senses disappears in this progression only when polarization in sense 1 does, and only because polarization in sense 1 does. VIII. Conclusion All the work offered here is work in progress, with just a tease of initial results. We have found that polarization in all the senses outlined is a complex phenomenon, sensitive to initial conditions. Global trust updating uniformly gives us consensus. Local updating clearly does not, but the clarity, extent, and patterns of polarization differ widely across runs. In a random network of 50 agents, with a linear trust update, local 19 and global scaling mark a major difference. But other factors are of importance as well. We know that the shift from a random to a scale-free network gives a different picture—one in which that difference between local and global scaling is not so pronounced. Even population size will be important. It is a better appreciation for the role of different factors in the network dynamics, not of polarization, but of polarizations that is the wider area we want to explore. What we have tried to indicate here is that an exploration of this form, though computationally instantiated, remains in large part conceptual in the sense that philosophical analysis has always been conceptual. We want our final results to be scientifically grounded. We hope they may offer some genuine social understanding. But in order to fill those goals they must also be philosophically sound, with a clear conceptual base. We have also tried to make it clear that exploration FigureFigure 10. Results Results for forglobal global (left) (left)and local and (rig localht) scaling (right) with scaling the same with trust updatingthe same trust of this kind often involves demands and openness to functionupdating (as in functionFigure 4a) (asand indifferent Figure  points4a) and from different .05 to .75, τ usingpoints the from same .05initial to random.75, using the and opportunistic exploitation of the unexpected. We seedsame throughout. initial random seed throughout. encounter conceptual problems we didn’t anticipate, which force us to distinctions and tools we didn’t have What these initial results indicate is that in looking for factors that favor polarization, local in advance, which lead us to build different models versustwo global major updating units can are play fairlya major equalrole. in size, at least in this run— Note also that we can distinguish many different types of polarization mentioned above in than we initially envisaged, which promise unanticipated polarization sense 4. If network links are broken when trust these images. In the image for local updating with a  of .5, polarization is high in a number of results. We hope those results will tell us something genuinely falls below a certain level, it’s a good guess that the networks senses. We have two major groups and a smaller intermediate group that are clearly distinct— new about the real social polarization we want to understand. polarizationat issue sense are 2. fractured They vary in in how polarization sharply peaked sense they are—polarization 6. sense 3. The two major units are fairly equal in size, at least in this run—polarization sense 4. If network links are In the end, of course, when this is more than work in It is worth emphasizing that those senses of polarization broken when trust falls below a certain level, it’s a good guess that the networks at issue are progress, we will write up our results in standard scientific fracturedare conceptually in polarization sense distinct. 6. There is nothing that says logically It is worth emphasizing that those senses of polarization are conceptually distinct. There is nothing that says logically or conceptually that polarization in one sense need accompany— 14 — polarization in others. As the work progresses, it will be interesting to see whether some of these senses nonetheless appear together in modeled network dynamics much as they often seem to go together in the social dynamics that are our ultimate target. Note also how patterns of polarization change in trust updating on a local scaling with increases in the  point. Consider, for example, the patterns of polarization with a  points at .2, at .3, at .4, and so on. Several senses of polarization stay the same at those points. Distinctness does—polarization sense 2. Sharpness of peak on each side stays about the same—polarization sense 3. The major units remain comparative in size—polarization sense 4. The sense of — Philosophy and Computers — fashion. We will make it look like we knew what we were doing Hanna, R. 2000. “Conceptual Analysis.” Concise Routledge Encyclopedia all along, step by step, using a well-motivated methodology from of Philosophy. London: Routledge. a clear initial plan that produces a compelling compilation of Hetherington, M. and J. Weiler. 2009. Authoritarianism and Polarization results toward a tidy conclusion. In that final report, the crucial in American Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. role of philosophical analysis in computational modeling may Holyoak, K. and P. Thagard. 1997. “The Analogical Mind.” American also go unmentioned. Psychologist 52:35-44. Hunter, James Davison. 1987. Evangelism: The Coming Generation. Acknowledgments Chicago: University of Chicago Press. We are grateful for comments on an earlier version of the paper Kaner, H.C., S.G. Mohanty, and J.C. Lyons. 1980. “Critical Values of presented at the Human Complexity 2012 conference at the University the Kolmogorov- Smirnov One-sample Tests.” Psychological Bulletin of North Carolina, Charlotte. That conference grew in turn from an 88:498-501. NEH Institute for Advanced Topics in the Digital Humanities: Computer Simulations in the Humanities, hosted at the University of North Carolina Lord, C.G., Ross, L., and Lepper, M.R. 1979. “Biased Assimilation and in the summer of 2011. Research supported in part under a MIDAS grant Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently NIH 1U54GM088491-01, “Computational Models of Infections Disease Considered Evidence.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Threats,” administered through the Graduate School of Public Health 37:2098-2109. at the University of Pittsburgh. McCarthy, N., K.T. Poole, and H. Rosenthal. 2006. Polarized America: The Dance of and Unequal Riches. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. References Miller, J.H. and S.E. Page. 2007. Complex Adaptive Systems: An Bartels, L.M. 2000. “Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996.” Introduction to Computational Models of Social Life. Princeton, NJ: American Journal of Political Science 44:35-50. Princeton University Press. Beaney, M. 2009. “Analysis.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Pollock, J. 1998. How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon. Cambridge, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/ MA: MIT Press. Bishop, B. 2008. The Great Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded Rescher, N. 2011, 2012. “How Modeling Can Go Wrong: Some Cautions America is Tearing Us Apart. New York: Houghton Mifflin. and Caveats on the Use of Models.” Epistemology of Modeling and Brownstein, R. 2007. The Second Civil War: How Extreme Partisanship Simulation, University of Pittsburgh, April 2011, and forthcoming, has Paralyzed Washington and Polarized America. New York: Penguin. Philosophy and Technology. Burkholder, L. 1992. Philosophy and the Computer. Oxford: Westview Press. Sandin, P. 2006. “Has Psychology Debunked Conceptual Analysis?” Bynum, T. and J. Moor, eds. 1998. The Digital Phoenix: How Computers Metaphilosophy 37:26-33. are Changing Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell. Varshney, A. 2002. Ethnic Conflict and Civil Life: Hindus and Muslims in DiMaggio, P., J. Evans, and B. Bryson. 1996. “Have American’s Social India. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Attitudes Become More Polarized?” American Journal of Sociology Visser, P.S., and Cooper, J. 2003. “Attitude Change.” In Sage Handbook 102:690-755. of Social Psychology, edited by M. Hogg and J. Cooper. London: Sage Fiorina, M.P., and S.J. Abrams. 2008. ‘‘Political Polarization in the Publications. American Public.’’ In Annual Review of Political Science 11, edited by Wilcox, R.R. 1997. “Some Practical Reasons for Reconsidering the M. Levi. Palo Alto: Annual Reviews. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test.” British Journal of Mathematical and Fiorina, M.P., S.J. Abrams, and J.C. Pope. 2010. Culture Wars? The Myth Statistical Psychology 50:9-20. of a Polarized America. New York: Longmans. French, J. 1956. “A Formal Theory of Social Power.” Psychological Review 63:191-94. Automatic Generation of Philosophers Golub, B., and M.O. Jackson. 2010. “Naïve Learning in Social Networks: Network from Google Books Repository Convergence, Influence, and the Wisdom of Crowds.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2:112-49. Shai Ophir Golub, B., and M.O. Jackson (forthcoming). “How Homophily Affects Starhome, in Motion Learning and Diffusion in Networks.” http://arxiv.org/pdf/0811.4013v2.pdf. Grim, P., C. Reade, D.J. Singer, S. Fisher, and S. Majewicz. 2010. “What Abstract You Believe Travels Differently: Information and Infection Dynamics The ability to search through millions of books, aggregate the Across Sub-Networks.” Connections 30:50-63. results, and analyze them all together enables a search for new Grim, P., D.J. Singer, C. Reade, and S. Fisher. 2011. “Information patterns of historical events that could not be identified before. Dynamics across Linked Sub-Networks: Germs, Genes, and Memes.” Analytic tools which track the data traffic on the can Proceedings, AAAI Fall Symposium on Complex Adaptive Systems: be used in historical research to identify historical trends. The Energy, Information and Intelligence. FS-11-03, AAAI Press. possibility of having a very large amount of historical texts, Grim, P., D.J. Singer, C. Reade, and S. Fisher (2012). “Germs, Genes, images, and other media types under a unified access, search, and Memes: Function and Fitness Dynamics on Information Networks,” and analytic engine enables a more complete and balanced ALife 13 Proceedings, MIT Press. view of the historical scene, either on the micro history or the Grim, P., S.B. Thomas, S. Fisher, C. Reade, D.J. Singer, M.A. Garza, C.S. macro history level. This analysis is relevant especially for the Fryer, and J. Chatman. 2012a. “Belief Polarization within the Black and White Communities: Information Dynamics in Data-based Networks.” history of philosophy, where ideas cross the boundaries of time MIDAS scientific presentations, MIDAS Network meeting, Boston. and location, creating chains of concepts. Grim, P., S.B. Thomas, S. Fisher, C. Reade, D.J. Singer, M.A. Garza, C.S. A new domain, Digital Humanities, has been established Fryer, and J. Chatman. 2012b. “Polarization and Belief Dynamics in the to achieve these goals, and others. However, text analysis Black and White Communities: An Agent-Based Network Model from projects performed so far were usually based on an import of the Data.” ALife 13 Proceedings. MIT Press. e-Text corpora into a software-specific internal database. This Grim, P., R. Rosenberger, B. Anderson, A. Rosenfeld, and R.E. Eason. restriction imposed a major limitation on the order of magnitude 2011. “How Simulations Fail.” Synthese, forthcoming. Advanced online of the input being analyzed. This paper reflects an attempt to version at http://www.pgrim.org/articles/howsimulationsfail.pdf. derive historical knowledge from a very large online corpora Grim, P., G. Mar, and P. St. Denis. 1998. The Philosophical Computer: of text, Google Books, without the need to import the data to a Explorations in Philosophical Computer Modeling. Cambridge, MA: software-specific storage database. The automatic derivation MIT Press. of a philosophers map will serve as an example. The map will — 15 — — APA Newsletter, Fall 2012, Volume 12, Number 1 — include most of the major philosophers and will reflect the are taken from books, reflecting the 2,500 years of the history of number of references they made for each other as a possible philosophy, and (2) the books are taken from the Google Books measure for a level of intellectual influence. online open repository, using a different technique than that used by the reference projects so far. Keywords Philosophers Map, Philosophers Network, Conceptual Map, Creating a Philosophers Map: Data and Software Tools Social Network Analysis, Citation Analysis Text analysis projects performed in the past were usually based on an import of e-Text corpora into a specific software History Analytics: A New Dimension for Research tool internal database. The texts had to be fetched, stored, The online corpora of historical e-Texts may create a organized, cleaned, and sometimes sorted and managed tremendous opportunity for a new type of historical research. manually, where inappropriate texts needed to be removed. The ability to search through millions of books, aggregate the This restriction imposed a severe limitation on the historical results, and analyze them all together may bring to light new value of the analysis, due to the relatively small amount patterns of relations and events that could not be identified of text. This paper reflects an attempt to derive historical before. Conceptual changes, for example, may be tracked knowledge from a very large online corpora of text, Google down, using relations between terms and concepts over the Books, without the need to import the data to any specific years. It may be possible to identify the exact timing of minor internal storage tool. cultural changes that finally brought about major conceptual changes. The following will demonstrate only a small portion This paper describes the creation of a philosopher’s of the potential of e-Text research. network from the writings of the great philosophers of all times. The list is taken from the EpistemeLinks website, a The possibility of having a very large amount of historical well-known site in the philosophy community, which provides texts, images, and other media types under one access, search, a list of the 75 most common philosophers according to the and analytic engine allows for a more balanced view of the ranking of their popularity (through access to their writings). historical scene, either on the micro history or the macro history The full list of philosophers used for this paper can be found level. Up until now, the researcher was limited by the manual at http://www.epistemelinks.com/Main/MainPers.aspx. capacity of searching through hard copy books and a limited set of online texts. Very few historians, such as Toynbee or Spengler, The aim of the software developed for this project is to for example, or world-system social science researchers, such count the number of references of each one of the philosophers as Fernand Braudel or Immanuel Wallerstein, could have a (writings) to each one of the other philosophers on the list. claim for a global macro-history view. The information age Using such a matrix of references, a network of “influences” may radically change this situation, enabling more sociologists, or “philosophy concepts” can be created. There are 75 historians, and scholars to have a broader world view of history. philosophers on the list; hence, the matrix of mutual references We may discover that significant resources were left outside of is composed of 75x75 relations = 5,625. There is a need, the research borders because they were simply unknown to therefore, to search Google Books 5,625 times, for each pair contemporary researchers. Using analytic techniques we may of philosophers, while one of them is the search term and the identify “dark matter” of knowledge which was used in the past second is the author. However, there is no viable tool provided but abandoned over the years. by Google for searching Google Books in batch mode. Google Books provides a very preliminary Application Programming Background: Citation Analysis and Science Mapping Interface (API), which is intended mainly for including links to Mapping science activities according to reference analysis is Google Books from other websites. There was a need, therefore, an area of research that has been emerging for a few decades to develop an automatic search tool that was able to receive already. a table of search items, invoke Google Books search for each The CiteSpace software created by Chaomei Chen line, and fill in the table with the search results. Google limits demonstrates remarkable analysis of author relations, automatic search for ~200 sequential queries, and also limits derived from a corpus of scientific journals published the number of queries per day, so there was a need to split during a specific range of years. Using CiteSpace, pivotal the search into multiple sub-tasks and perform them over a points in co-citation are identified according to their few days. “betweenness centrality,” i.e., a factor derived from the The matrix of references was converted to a graph of number of links connected to many other nodes (Chen relations by the software package Pajek. This is a popular 2006, 2007). The software is open for public use on Chen’s data visualization tool for network analysis, which is website at http://cluster.cis.drexel.edu/~cchen/citespace. provided for free. More details about Pajek can be found at Loet Leydersdorff argues that betweenness centrality is an http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.si/pub/networks/pajek/. indicator for transformative changes (Leydersdorff 2007). The Another visualization tool used in this project was Microsoft argument is demonstrated using co-citation analysis of scientific NodeXL, an Excel plug-in dealing with node graphs. journals. Shibata further argues for the predictive function of betweenness centrality, where predicting changes in areas of Philosophers Network Visualization and Findings research according to current changes in citation references Figure 1 is composed of the references of the great philosophers (Shibata, Kajikawa, and Matsushima 2007). to other great philosophers (all within the same group of 75 Other research concentrates on burst detection of philosophers). The nodes stand for the philosophers, where references as a measure of a conceptual change (Kleinberg the edges (the lines between the nodes) represent the number 2002). Garfield developed a practice to predict Nobel Prize of references. The thickness of the edges is proportional to winners based on citation analysis (Garfield 1992). the number of references. The network is visualized using the These efforts, as well as many others, show the relevance of Pajek software tool. citation analysis for the research of the , science The philosophers are organized along the timeline, from left development, and the history of concepts and ideas in general. to right, so references to the left represent references to earlier This project adopts the citation reference analysis to the area of philosophers, while links to the right of a philosopher show philosophy, with major fundamental changes: (1) the references the references made to this philosopher by later philosophers. — 16 — represented by one node only. — Philosophy and Computers —

The philosophers were sorted according to their degree of centrality, and then displayed on the spiral graph. The NodeXL software has an algorithm for calculating the “closeness centrality” of the vertices (nodes) according to the number of links and the weights of the links (number of ). According to Wikipedia, “In graph theory closeness is a centrality measure of a vertex (node) within a graph. Vertices that are closed to other vertices (that is, those that tend to have short distances to other vertices within the graph) have higher closeness.” More details can be found at http://en.wikipedia. Figure 1. Great Philosophers References Map. org/wiki/Centrality#Closeness_centrality. Figure 1. Great Philosophers References Map The resulting graph is shown in Figure The mapIn someprovides cases a view theof the philosophers intellectual relations are representedbetween the great by philosophers. 2 It enables us 2. Again, it is hard to show all details in a nodes,to see a high since level both picture the of full philosophical name and influen the shortces in (known)a way that wasname not viableclear in the way past. in a document format, due to the large amount of haveNote, ofbeen course, used that in this the number search. of citations For example, was not made both only “ImmanuelSpiral during visualization Plato’s life, informationmode, but inwhere many position (nodes on and the spirallinks). reflects There the is centrality a need ofto the zoom philosopher. in for Kant”of Plato’s and books “Kant” that were were published used. In during other the cases next 2,500 the fullyears,The name philosophersin various did languages. werespecific sorted Hence, areasacco therding of the to their graph degree in order of centrality, to identify and then all names.displayed Some on the notnumber produce of references any results, also reflects so the the numberphilosopher of publications is representedspiral made graph. on behalf by of ofthe theauthor. names are hidden by other names, due to software However, as long as the number of publications is higher, the influence of the author is higher, as one node only. limitations. Therefore, a zoom into the very center of the well as the importance of the reference to other philosophers,The so the NodeXL thickness software of centralitythe hasedge an is algorithm indiagram for is calcu shownlating in the Figure “closeness 3. centrality” of the vertices proportionThe tomap the relativeprovides importance a view of ofthe thereferen intellectualce. Having(nodes) said relations this, according we can seeto the central number hubs of of links and the weights of the links (number of citations). betweeninfluence around the great philosophers. and Plato, Thomas It enables Aquinas usand toAugustine, Accordingsee a high Kant, to Wikipedia, Hegel, Rousseau, The“In graph next theory figure clo magnifiesseness is a centralitythe heart measure of the ofspiral, a vertex showing (node) leveland Voltaire. picture In of my philosophical view, the centrality influences of Voltaire in anda way Rousseau thatwithin wasis asurprising. graph. not Vertices Thethe large levelthat numberare of closed centrality to othe ofr verticesthe most (that cited is, those philosophers. that tend to have The short fonts viableof links ingoing the to past. and fromNote, Voltaire of course, and especially that this Rousseau number showdistances of citations their to major other centrality verticesagain within overlap,in the the butgraph) we have can higher see that closeness.” Socrates More is atdetails the heartcan be of found the at washistory not of ideas.made I believeonly during it is beyond Plato’s the perceptionlife, but inof theirmany rolehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C of so Plato’s far. spiral, thenentrality#Closeness_centrality Plato (hidden by others),. then Rousseau, Voltaire, books that were published during the next 2,500 years, in various Augustine, Aquinas, , Parmenides, Descartes, , The correlation between networks automatically produced fromThe Google resulting Books graph andEpicurus, is ourshown in Pascal,Figure 2. Kant, Again, Schopenhauer, it is hard to show Emerson,all details in Zeno,a clear Hegel,way in a languages.knowledge is Hence,an important the milestone number for of thereferences validity of alsodata documentreflects methods. theformat, Kant, due toDescartes, the large amount of information (nodes and links). There is a need to and Marx. Again, the centrality of Rousseau and Voltaire is numberLeibniz, Locke, of publications Hobbs, Spinoza, made and on Pascal behalf are of all the important author.zoom hubs However, asin forwell. specific Strong areas links of going the graph in order to identify all names. Some of the names are asfrom long Marx as to the Adam number Smith, of Hegel, publications and Mill are is higher,clearly seen. the influencehiddenIn the North by other of America names,surprisingly area due to software high. limitations. Therefore, a zoom into the very center of the the(upwards), author we is higher,can see strong as well links as thefrom importance Emerson, Peirce, of the Dewey, centrality James, diagram and Thoreau is shown to inthe Figure 3. referenceclassical philosophers. to other philosophers, There is a link betweenso the thickness Thoreau and of Mary Wollstonecraft, an eighteenth- thecentury edge British is in philosopher proportion and to advocatethe relative of women's importance rights. Nietzsche, of course, is a central ofpoint the of referencereference. in the Having late nineteenth said this, century we, along can with see Husserl. As for the twentieth century, centralBertrand Russell,hubs of Wittgenstein, influence Michel around Foucault, Socrates Sartre, and Davidson, and Heidegger are the main hubs of references in the network. Plato, and Augustine, Kant, Hegel, Rousseau,Centrality Measurements and Voltaire. In my view, the centrality of Voltaire and Rousseau is surprising. The large numberThe network of oflinks philosophers going towas and visualized from byVoltaire the Microsoft and NodeXL tool as well, under the especially Rousseau show their major 4centrality in the history of ideas. I believe it is beyond the perception of their role so far. The correlation between networks automatically produced from Google Books and our knowledge is an important milestone for the validity of data mining methods. Kant, Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, Hobbs, Spinoza, and Pascal are all important hubs as well. Strong links going from Marx to Adam Smith, Hegel, and Mill are clearly seen. In the North America area (upwards), we can see strong links from Emerson, Peirce, Dewey, James, and Thoreau to the classical philosophers. There is Figure 2. GreatFigure Philosophers 2. Great Philosophers Central Closeness Central Closeness via Spiral via Graph. Spiral Graph. a link between Thoreau and Mary Wollstonecraft, an eighteenth-century British philosopher and advocate of women’s rights. Nietzsche, of course, is a central Summary and Future Research The next figure magnifies the heart of the spiral, showing the level of centrality of the most cited point of reference in the late nineteenth century, along One target for this paper was to demonstrate how a huge with Husserl. As for the twentieth century, Bertrandphilosophers. Russell, The fonts again overlap, but we can see that Socrates is at the heart of the spiral, then Plato (hidden byonline others), corpus then Rousseau, such as VoGoogleltaire, Augustine,Books can Aquinas, be used Cicero, for analyzing Parmenides, Wittgenstein, Michel Foucault, Sartre, Davidson, and Heidegger Descartes, Aristotle,historical Epicurus, Pascal,texts without Kant, Sc thehopenhauer, need to Emerson, import theZeno, data Hegel, sources and Marx. into are the main hubs of references in the network. Again, the centralityan of internalRousseau and and Voltaireproprietary is surprisingly database. high. Centrality Measurements The second target was to investigate the citation reference The network of philosophers was visualized by the Microsoft of major philosophers, over philosophy’s 2,500-year history. The NodeXL tool as well, under the Spiral visualization mode, where visualization of references5 showing the relative importance of position on the spiral reflects the centrality of the philosopher. philosophers matches the high-level picture we had in mind.

— 17 — — APA Newsletter, Fall 2012, Volume 12, Number 1 —

Kreuzman, H. 2001. “A Co-citation Analysis of representative Authors in Philosophy: Examining the Relations between Epistemologists and Philosophers of Science.” 51(3):525-39. Leydersdorff, L. 2007. “Betweenness Centrality as an Indicator of the Interdisciplinary of Scientific Journals.” Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 58(9):1303-19. Melissa, M. Terras. 2009. “The Potential and Problems in using High Performance Computing in the Arts and Humanities: The Researching e-Science Analysis of Census Holdings (ReACH) Project.” Digital Humanities Quarterly 3(4). Roth, C. and Cointet, J. 2010. “Social and Semantic Coevolution in Knowledge Networks.” Social Networks 32:16-29. Shibata, N., Kajikawa, Y., and Matsushima, K. 2007. “Topological Analysis of Citation Networks to Discover the Future Core Article.” Journal of the American Society of Information Science and Technology 58(6):872-82. Figure 3. Great Philosophers Central Closeness via Spiral Graph – Zoom In Synnestvedt, M., Chen, C. and Holmes, J. 2005. “CiteSpace Figure 3. Great Philosophers Central Closeness via Spiral Graph – Zoom In II: Visualization and Knowledge Discovery in Bibliographic Databases.” AMIA Annu Symp Proc., 724-28. https://www. This fact strengthens the value of the citation analysis and ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1560567/. network visualization methods, and the value of the Google Summary and Future Research Books repository as a corpora source. One targetSpecifically, for this paper the wasproject to demonstrate shed light how on a hugethe onlinecentral corpus role such of as GooglePrudential-Empirical Books can Ethics of Technology somebe used of for the analyzing philosophers historical (Plato,texts without Aristotle, the need Augustine, to import the Thomas data sources (PEET)into an internal – An Early Outline Aquinas,and proprietary Kant, database. Hegel, Rousseau, and Voltaire). The centrality of VoltaireThe second and target Rousseau was to investigate is a novel the resultcitation of reference this research. of major philosophers,Johnny over Hartz Søraker philosophy’sThere is2,500-year still work history. to do The in visualizaanalyzingtion referencesof references betweenshowing the relativeUniversity importance of Twente specificof philosophers pairs matchesof philosophers. the high-level Philosophers picture we had can in mind. be organizedThis fact strengthens the value of inthe clusterscitation analysis to find and sub-groups network visualizati with ona highermethods, internal and the value level of ofthe Google1. Introduction Books repository as a corpora source. reference. A deeper analysis of the references could help to The pace of technological innovation and its prevalence identifySpecifically, patterns the project of ideas shed light and on concepts. the central role of some of the philosophersin (Plato, modern life leaves little reason to doubt that technology Aristotle,As ofAugustine, today, theThomas majority Aquinas, of Kant, online Hege eTextl, Rousseau, resources and Voltaire). are Thehas centrality had a ofprofound impact on our well-being. Computers in lockedVoltaire andbehind Rousseau usernames is a novel and result passwords of this research. by universities and the workplace reduce the number of challenging activities other research institutes, although most of them are funded by There is still work to do in analyzing references between specific pairs of philosophers.that require skill, which turns working life into nothing but the public. Google Books is one of the first examples, and the Philosophers can be organized in clusters to find sub-groups with a higher internala meanslevel of to other ends. The same goes for technologies that mostreference. significant A deeper andanalysis practical of the referen one cesfor couldnow, help of opento identify access. patterns I of ideasallow and us to passively absorb entertainment, which for many hopeconcepts. this situation is going to change soon, by opening more people constitute the default option when returning from an and more online resources for the benefit of all. apathetic or anxiety-ridden day at work (Csikszentmihalyi As of today, the majority of online eText resources are locked behind usernames and passwords References 1991, 69). With both work and leisure activities being by universities and other research institutes, although most of them are funded byincreasingly the public. intertwined with (computer) technology and Anderson,Google Books C. 2008. is one The of the End first of examples,Theory: Will and the the Data most Deluge significant Makes and thepractical one for now, of Obsolete? EDGE http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/ our volitional activities being the only way to transcend anderson08/anderson08_index.html. the well-being set-point that our genetic dispositions and 6 Chen, C. 2007. Holistic Sense Making: Conflicting Opinions, Creative circumstances determine (Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, and Ideas and Collective Intelligence. Library Hi Tech 25(3):311-27. Schkade 2005), one way to better understand and potentially

Chen, C. 2006. “CiteSpace II: Detecting and visualizing emerging trends improve people’s well-being in both domains is to investigate and transient patterns in scientific literature.” Journal of the American how and when technology tends to improve or worsen Society for Information Science and Technology 57(3):359-77. our well-being. In this outline I will present an approach, Cohen, D. 2008. “Interchange: The Promise of Digital History.” The currently in its early stages of development, which analyzes Journal of American History 95(2). http://www.journalofamericanhistory. technologies according to their positive or negative effects org/issues/952/interchange/index.html. on well-being, and grounds these prudential considerations Cohen, D. 2006. “From Babel to Knowledge, Data Mining Large Digital in empirical research—while at the same time subjecting this Collections.” D-Lib Magazine 12(3). http://www.dlib.org/dlib/march06/ evaluation to ethical scrutiny. To clarify what this involves, cohen/03cohen.html. I will proceed by explaining each of the four elements Collins, R. 1998. The Sociology of : A Global Theory of of the approach (“prudential,” “empirical,” “ethics,” and Intellectual Change. Harvard University Press. “technology”) before pulling the strings together and Elmqvist, N. and Tsigas, P. 2007. “CiteWiz: A Tool for the Visualization discussing the pros, cons, and limitations of this approach. of Scientific Citation Networks.” Information Visualization 6:215-32. 2. Prudential... Frickel, S. and Gross, N. 2005. “A General Theory of Scientific/Intellectual Movements.” American Sociological Review 70: 204-32. The realization that technology can drastically change our lives even if there is no involved has led to what we Heidegren, C. and Lundberg, H. 2010. “Towards a Sociology of Philosophy.” Acta Sociologica 53(1):3-18. may term an “axiological turn” in ethics of technology (Brey 2006; Brey, Briggle, and Spence, forthcoming; Higgs, Light, and Kleinberg, J. 2002. “Burst and Hierarchical Structure in Streams.” Presented in ACM SIGKDD, Edmonton Alberta, Canada. Strong 2000; Søraker 2010). This is a natural consequence of the realization that technologies can change our lives radically — 18 — — Philosophy and Computers — without there being any right- or wrongdoing involved. Few philosophical theory of the good life. For instance, it has technologies have changed our daily lives as much as the been argued that relationships in virtual worlds cannot meet television, but it seems pointless to try to point fingers at the Aristotelian criteria for being the kind of relationship that someone to be blamed for this effect. This means that when contributes to the good life (Fröding and Peterson, forthcoming), evaluating technologies where no direct wrongdoing is involved, and that technology-driven consumerism threatens non- the traditional way of applying ethical theories also becomes material and non-hedonistic values (Brey 2007). Although these insufficient. As a complement to considering the ethical, analyses may be instructive, there is often a lack of attention to societal, and political implications of technology, the axiological whether the applied theories are actually true. If a technology turn asks us to also consider the prudential effects. fails to meet certain philosophical conditions for a good life, it The term “prudential” (or “prudential value”) refers to is typically left as an open question whether those philosophical something that is valuable for someone, contrasted with conditions in reality lead to better lives—was Aristotle really something that may be good in itself (if there is such a thing) correct when claiming that genuine friendship is necessary for or something that is good for something (which would typically a good life, and do material and hedonistic values really make be an instrumental value). To take an example, the Mona Lisa us unhappier? Together with numerous other problems with may have a certain aesthetic value in itself, it may have a certain applying philosophical theories of the good life to technology instrumental value in of its value for something else (e.g., assessment—including naturalistic fallacies, intuition pumps, for the Musée du Louvre, for the French republic, for the Italian and imprecise terminology1—a more substantial way to sense of pride, etc.)—but it also has a certain prudential value ground the analysis is to consider empirical research on what in virtue of being good for some individual human beings. If actually tends to increase or decrease our well-being. This something is good for you without being merely instrumentally does presuppose a subjectivist account of well-being, since good, then we are talking about how that thing contributes this empirical research is typically based on self-reports, but it to your well-being. This is the sense in which I use the term allows us to provide recommendations grounded in concrete “prudential” for present purposes. activities that have a strong tendency to increase most people’s This immediately raises the question of what it really means well-being (more on this later). for something to be good for someone. This is a long-standing In his 1998 inaugural address, former president of the debate that cannot be fully accounted for within the scope of this American Psychology Association Michael Seligman argued paper, but one of the main dividing lines lies between objective that psychology should not only be a science of negative mental and subjective accounts. Briefly put, objective accounts of the health—explaining, predicting, and curing mental illness—but good life prescribe one or more “” that must be present for also a science of positive mental health: explaining, predicting, someone to genuinely have a good life—such as the necessity of and enabling well-being. Seligman thereby founded “positive friendship as expressed in Aristotle’s Nicomachian Ethics (book psychology,” which is the empirical study of the kinds of events VIII, 1). Unlike subjectivist accounts, objectivist theories of the and experiences that tend to lead to well-being and what can good life can make the claim that one who experiences one’s be done to improve it. This field has grown tremendously since life as good may be completely wrong about this, and that the then, with its own conferences, journals, and graduate programs good life does not have to be experienced as such. Subjectivist throughout the world. accounts, on the other hand, prioritizes first-person, subjective Although controversial and fraught with methodological experience; thus, a life that is experienced as good is ipso facto and conceptual problems, one of positive psychology’s a good life (although there will typically be a few additional advantages is that it pays tremendous attention to these conditions that have to be met, such as being sufficiently problems, resulting in a level of self-scrutiny unparalleled by informed, capable, and rational). many other empirical disciplines (cf. Lopez and Snyder 2003; The advantage to objective accounts is that they can Ong and Van Dulmen 2007; Peterson 2006). Although findings more substantially claim that one has deluded oneself into are typically based on self-reports, whether in real-time (“What an existence that may appear to be a good life, but which in are you doing right now, and what is your level of well-being?”) reality cannot be a good life—thereby accounting for the ways or in retrospect (“Overall, how satisfied are you with your in which delusion, confabulation, and various forms of mental life?”), increased validity is sought by means of extensive illness may hinder us from understanding what is good for meta-studies, correlations with other statistics, neuroscientific us. The advantage of the subjective accounts lies in taking and evolutionary explanations, as well as trying to control for the individual seriously, and allowing for a plurality of ways in cognitive biases. At the end of the day, “subjective well-being” which to attain well-being. As Griffin aptly puts it: “To get an remains an operational term, and it can be questioned whether account of well-being that would be of use in moral theory this actually corresponds to a deep philosophical notion of the we have to move . . . on to what is valuable to the particular good life. Nevertheless, it is the most concrete, substantial, person affected in each case we judge“(Griffin 1998, 72). I have a posteriori account of which events and activities that tend argued this point at length elsewhere (Søraker 2010), but there to make people happy we have, and the methodological is a need to find a golden mean between these positions—a challenges should simply be a reminder not to apply these golden mean between staunch paternalism (you are wrong findings blindly. about what is good for you) and complete relativism (anything goes). I think we can find such a golden mean in the notion of One discovery is that we have a “set point” which partly “recommendations,” which may be of the form: This tends to determines how happy we can be, but an equally consistent increase the subjective well-being for most people, so it might be finding is that there are still numerous “volitional activities” worth trying. Admittedly, this leaves the notion of well-being a that can bring us up to or beyond our set-point of well-being contingent one, but we can still add substance to it by grounding (cf. Lyubomirsky et al. 2005; Peterson 2006). After some ten these recommendations in empirical research (in addition to years of intensive research, a scientific picture of human ethical considerations, which I will return to later). well-being is starting to emerge, constituted by a large body of empirical findings that has largely been left untapped in ethics 3. ... Empirical ... of technology. Many of these findings can be “translated” to Within the aforementioned axiological turn, a technology concrete technological features, as I will return to below, but is typically assessed according to its agreement with a we cannot do so with the purpose of achieving a quick fix — 19 — — APA Newsletter, Fall 2012, Volume 12, Number 1 — of . Given the methodological challenges and the our subjective well-being. The variables emphasized by the somewhat controversial practice of quantifying well-being, we researchers typically relate to general human characteristics, need to bring ethics into the approach. such as age, , and income—or to events and experiences that do not directly involve technology, such as the effect 4. ... Ethics ... of engaging in skill-demanding activities (Csikszentmihalyi Rather than drawing the notion of well-being from philosophy, as 1997; Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi 2009; Seligman 2002), most other similar approaches do, PEET draws the responsible belonging to a community (Demir and Weitekamp 2007; Okun, application of these findings from philosophy. As I will illustrate Stock, Haring, and Witter 1984), perceived meaningfulness by way of examples below, most of the events and experiences (Peterson, Park, and Seligman 2005; Seligman 2002; Wong and that have been shown to increase well-being can often come Fry 1998), (Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, and Ryan with negative effects as well, either due to having multiple 2000), physical health (Zautra and Hempel 1984), and various effects on well-being or due to introducing side effects that are forms of sensory pleasure (Kubovy 1999; Reber, Schwarz, undesirable for other ethical, cultural, or political reasons. Most and Winkielman 2004; Seligman 2002). Thus, one major fundamentally, something being good for me may, of course, challenge lies in translating from empirical findings to concrete be impermissible because it is not good for others. If we design technological features. technology solely according to what is directly beneficial for the The first step requires careful attention to the research users’ well-being, we might lose sight of any negative effects the design and methodology. On the one hand, the empirical same technology may have—not only on the users (which I will findings need to be scrutinized in order to narrow down, return to in the next section) but also unintended side-effects on as far as possible, precisely what is being measured. The other users. For instance, it has repeatedly been shown that acts digest version of these findings will often state something like of kindness increase one’s own well-being (Lyubomirsky et al. “being social makes you happy,” but we need to look into the 2005; Otake, Shimai, Tanaka-Matsumi, Otsui, and Fredrickson actual research design and the methods employed in order 2006), but since positive psychology is primarily concerned with to see what “being social” actually entails in these cases. For subjective experiences, the same effect can be achieved from instance, whether the findings are relevant for the value of the mere illusion that one does acts of kindness. To illustrate, we being social in virtual worlds depends on whether the sociality can imagine an immersive virtual environment where simulated in question required physical proximity. When the conditions acts of kindness give rise to increased well-being, when those for the positive effect have been identified, the next step is to acts in reality have no effect on the actual world at all. Indeed, translate these to concrete technological features—quite often “liking” a cause or charity on Facebook may give us such an in the form of specific types of interaction. This is probably best illusory feeling that we are being altruistic, when the action in illustrated with an example. reality has little if any effect. This could provide the user with increased well-being, but it might make us less inclined to act “Flow” is a state of mind that has been found to have a similarly in the actual world. Likewise, well-being gained from profound and lasting boost to well-being (Csikszentmihalyi being social in virtual worlds could leave us with a society where 1997; Seligman 2002). It is achieved when we are engaged in there is less and less need to meet others in the flesh, with all activities that are challenging and we have the skills to master the ethical, political, and cultural ramifications that may have. the challenge. For this to occur, it must be possible to control the difficulty level in order to avoid that it is no longer challenging This may sound like a purely utilitarian deliberation, when we reach a certain skill level while at the same time be weighing the positive consequences for myself against the manageable when still a beginner. It must also be something negative consequences for others, but this is where it is to which you can dedicate your whole attention without important to distinguish between prudential and ethical value. distraction, and that provides clear and immediate feedback on Separating between prudential and ethical value allows us to how well you are doing. Typical examples include the mastery operate with subjective criteria for the former, while including of sports, musical instruments, or hobbies like gardening, objective criteria for the latter. For instance, we can invoke the dancing, or singing in a choir. If we want to translate this into categorical imperative on the ethics side, and disallow an activity technological features, the requirements map perfectly onto that entails using a person as a mere means towards this end, computer games as an source of flow—when it comes to regardless of how beneficial it may be for subjective well-being. difficulty settings, immediate feedback, and attentiveness. This The prudential considerations can also be complemented is indeed one of the few technologies that have been studied with , for instance, by arguing that a flow-inducing empirically, and the evidence suggests that computer games activity is in disagreement with what it means to be a virtuous do have a range of beneficial effects (Baranowski, Buday, person. In short, even if PEET emphasizes the importance of Thompson, and Baranowski 2008). applying empirical findings in a responsible manner, it leaves it open which ethical theory to “plug in.” A utilitarian can Despite the strong evidence that flow is beneficial for well- simply enrich her utilitarian calculus with empirical findings, being and computer games being ideal sources of flow, this a Kantian can use empirical research to evaluate (only) that does not mean that computer games are the perfect source of which is morally permissible, and a virtue can forbid any increasing well-being. One problem with translating empirical beneficial activity that is inconsistent with what it means to be findings to technological features lies in the fact that the same a virtuous person. Furthermore, the analysis can (and should) features may also have negative effects, by themselves or be augmented by political and cultural considerations, such because they necessitate certain other features. The same as whether a prudentially good activity could be detrimental features that give rise to flow can also give rise to addiction, to democratic ideals, lead to social unrest, or threaten cultural which is clearly detrimental to well-being. They also necessitate norms and values. particular practices, such as (in most cases) staying at home in front of a computer screen, which may lead to social isolation— 5. ... of Technology one of the clearest indicators of reduced well-being (Demir and Despite all the advances in positive psychology and related Weitekamp 2007; Okun et al. 1984). The same practice could fields, and the clear between technology and also lead to deterioration of health, another threat to well- well-being, surprisingly few of these researchers have being. Rather than simply concluding that computer games directly investigated how concrete technologies influence are therefore to be avoided, we can use this constructively — 20 — — Philosophy and Computers — instead. For instance, the right question to ask is whether concrete and grounded recommendations, thereby avoiding the technology can be modified so that it maintains the flow- both relativist and paternalist extremes. It is also possible to use capability, yet requires us to simultaneously be social. Gaming this approach with varying levels of refinement, depending on technologies like Kinect, Wii, and Rock Band implicitly follow whether it is intended to inspire engineers, inform the public, this principle insofar as they require the users to cooperate in report to policy makers, or form part of more foundational physical proximity and this cooperation heightens the sense academic analysis. of flow. This illustrates how the translation between empirical As the reader surely has picked up, there are still many findings and technological features is difficult, and requires us challenges and problems facing this approach. First, it rests on to scrutinize which features are necessary and/or sufficient for a subjectivist notion of well-being that prioritizes first-person the positive effect to occur, whether the same features may experiences. This requires solid justification, and is perhaps be detrimental in some other respect, and whether any such the most controversial presupposition from a philosophical detrimental effects can be remedied by adding, modifying, or standpoint.2 Closely related, it also presupposes that empirical removing technological features. research can have philosophical implications, a presupposition 6. Putting it all together: Prudential-Empirical Ethics that has not gone unchallenged (Feldman 2010). of Technology Second, it can be fiendishly difficult to translate between empirical findings and technological features, in order to Summing PEET up in one phrase: The purpose of Prudential- Empirical Ethics of Technology is to, retroactively or proactively, safeguard that a non-technological activity retains its beneficial evaluate the impact particular technologies have on their users’ effects when instantiated in a technology. Abstract terms like and secondary stakeholders’ well-being by carefully translating “being social” and “acts of kindness” are complex, and it will between empirical research on subjective well-being and often be challenging to find concrete technological features concrete technological features, and as restricted by ethical, that give similar positive results. political, and cultural concerns. A third problem concerns the ethical, political, and cultural The approach can be summarized as the following step- considerations, where there is clearly a wide range of choices that by-step procedure (although this glosses over many of the will determine how often well-being concerns are overridden by nuances involved): other concerns. This is not a problem unique to this approach, however, as most technology assessments presuppose some 1) Start with empirical findings that identify concrete ethical, political, and/or cultural framework. It can also be seen events or experiences that tend to increase or decrease as an advantage, since it means that the well-being component subjective well-being. Critically evaluate their validity can be combined with one’s favorite ethical theory without (Is it statistically significant, validated by independent losing the important considerations stemming from the former. researchers, what is actually being measured and by Indeed, this approach may be particularly helpful combined which method, are the results congruent with other with a , since the latter typically gives little findings, etc.?) guidance when it comes to that which is morally permissible. 2) If found to be valid and significant, carefully investigate Last but not least, it is difficult to find an appropriate how the empirical findings can be translated into balance between applicability and robustness. It aims to be concrete, technological features. an all-things-considered approach, but the range of things 3) Consider whether the technological features identified to consider must be balanced against the applicability of the above come with other side effects. approach—in particular how well it can be appropriated by 4) Consider whether there are ethical, political, or social engineers and policy makers themselves. I plan to develop both values that go against using a technology to increase a condensed and comprehensive version of PEET, so that the well-being, for instance, due to non-consequentialist range of necessary considerations is determined by the purpose duties and responsibilities, political , or cultural and target group of the analysis. values. 8. Concluding Remarks Although this is just a preliminary and general sketch, I believe that a procedure along those lines is necessary in order to arrive PEET aims to further the axiological turn by combining the at an empirically grounded yet value-sensitive and socially normative, evaluative work that is the hallmark of philosophy responsible assessment. In the order outlined above, the steps and ethics, while using psychological research to empirically lead to a foundation for developing new technologies. If the ground prudential claims so as to avoid armchair speculation. To purpose is to evaluate existing technologies and their potential avoid any misunderstandings as to the scope of this approach, it impact on well-being, steps 1 and 2 should be reversed and the should be emphasized that this is not an approach that rivals any first step then consists in comparing concrete, technological other approaches and it is intended to form a complementary features with existing empirical results. form of . I am not arguing that we should stop considering issues of right and wrong, but that we should The steps, although encompassing a number of issues that complement such analysis with prudential considerations, and require more careful elaboration, serve to illustrate how a robust that this should be grounded in empirical research. Allow me analysis of the relation between technology and well-being is to again emphasize that “ethics” is still an integral part of the inherently interdisciplinary. Although psychological research approach, and that a subjective account of well-being can and constitutes the empirical grounding, careful attention to ethics (in my view) should be combined with an objective account and other values is also needed to avoid easy technological fixes of ethics, to allow for ethical concerns to override any positive to what may be deep-rooted ethical, social, or political problems. The key to approaching such issues is to find an appropriate effects on well-being. balance between self-interest (well-being) and other-interest I have already presented the approach to numerous (ethics, politics, and other values), and this is why this project engineers, computer science graduates in particular, and I often must include both empirical research and philosophy. receive feedback that the approach is, above all, a good source of inspiration for creating novel and creative solutions. This gives 7. Advantages, Problems, and Challenges me hope that PEET can become an important addition to the The advantage with this method lies in the ability to provide ethicist, policy maker, or engineer’s toolbox. The result will be — 21 — — APA Newsletter, Fall 2012, Volume 12, Number 1 — a holistic, ethical, and concrete theory of the role different types Nakamura, J., and Csikszentmihalyi, M. 2009. Flow theory and research. of technology ought to have in our lives, of the steps needed In Oxford Handbook of Positive Psychology, edited by C.R. Snyder and to make such an assessment—a framework that presents S.J. Lopez, 195-206. Oxford: Oxford University Press. normative guidelines for engineers, designers, policymakers, Okun, M.A., Stock, W.A., Haring, M.J., and Witter, R.A. 1984. The social parents, caregivers, and others concerned with how technology activity/subjective well-being relation: a quantitative synthesis. Research may or may not contribute to a good life. I have only recently on Aging 6(1):45-65. been able to start developing this approach, and I would be very Ong, A. D., and Van Dulmen, M.H.M. 2007. Oxford Handbook of Methods grateful for any criticism and constructive suggestions. At the in Positive Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. very least, I hope that this preliminary and cursory overview is Otake, K., Shimai, S., Tanaka-Matsumi, J., Otsui, K., and Fredrickson, sufficient to convey its potential advantage and utility, and to B. 2006. Happy people become happier through kindness: a counting start a fruitful discussion on the role of prudential value and kindnesses intervention. Journal of Happiness Studies 7(3):361-75. empirical research in ethics of technology. Peterson, C. 2006. A Primer in Positive Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Acknowledgments Peterson, C., Park, N., and Seligman, M.E.P. 2005. Orientations to This approach has been in the works for a long time so it is impossible happiness and life satisfaction: the full life versus the empty life. Journal to mention everyone who has helped out in some way. I am particularly of Happiness Studies 6(1):25-41. indebted to Philip Brey and Pak Hang Wong for important feedback and discussions, along with the participants at the ECAP’11 and WICS’12 Reber, R., Schwarz, N., and Winkielman, P. 2004. Processing fluency and conferences. I would also like to thank the many students who have aesthetic pleasure: is beauty in the perceiver’s processing experience? expressed enthusiasm for the approach, along with suggestions for Personality and Social Psychology Review 8(4):364-82. improvement. Thanks, finally, to Peter Boltuc for encouraging me to Reis, H.T., Sheldon, K.M., Gable, S.L., Roscoe, J., and Ryan, R.M. 2000. write up this early outline. Daily well-being: the role of autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Pers Soc Psychol Bull 26(4):419-35. Endnotes Seligman, M.E.P. 2002. Authentic Happiness: Using the New Positive 1. Again, there is no room for a full critique in this paper, nor Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment New York: is that my main purpose, but I discuss this in more detail in Free Press. Søraker 2010. Søraker, J.H. 2010. The Value of Virtual Worlds and Entities – A 2. Although a full defence is beyond the scope of this paper, I Philosophical Analysis of Virtual Worlds and Their Potential Impact on presuppose a variant of Fred Feldman’s “Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism,” but one that is “confidence-adjusted” rather than Well-Being [dissertation]. Enschede: Ipskamp. “truth-adjusted.” I defend this approach in Søraker 2010, and Wong, P.T.P., and Fry, P.S. 1998. The Human Quest for Meaning: A more systematically in a forthcoming publication. Handbook of Psychological Research and Clinical Applications. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. References Zautra, A., and Hempel, A. 1984. Subjective well-being and physical Aristotle. 2009. The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford health: a narrative literature review with suggestions for future research. University Press. International Journal of Aging & Human Development 19(2):91-110. Baranowski, T., Buday, R., Thompson, D.I., and Baranowski, J. 2008. Playing for real: video games and stories for health-related behavior change. American Journal of Preventive Medicine 34(1):74-82. e10. “Friend” Is a Verb Brey, P. 2006. Evaluating the social and cultural implications of the internet. SIGCAS Comput. Soc. 36(3):41-48. D.E. Wittkower Brey, P. 2007. Theorizing the cultural quality of new media. Techné: Old Dominion University Research in Philosophy and Technology 11(1). Brey, P., Briggle, A., and Spence, E.H. Forthcoming. The Good Life in a People linked together by friendship, affection, or Technological Age. physical love found themselves reduced to hunting for Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1991. Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience tokens of their past communion within the compass New York: Harper Perennial. of a ten-word telegram. And since, in practice, Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1997. Finding Flow: The Psychology of Engagement the phrases one can use in a telegram are quickly with Everyday Life. New York: Basic Books. exhausted, long lives passed side by side, or passionate Demir, M., and Weitekamp, L. 2007. I am so happy ’cause today I found yearnings, soon declined to the exchange of such trite my friend: friendship and personality as predictors of happiness. Journal formulas as: “Am well. Always thinking of you. Love.” of Happiness Studies 8(2):181-211. Feldman, F. 2010. On the philosophical implications of empirical —The Plague, Albert Camus (1991, 69) research on happiness. Social Research: An International Quarterly 77(2):625-58. In the situation described in this passage, surely much of the Fröding, B., and Peterson, M. Forthcoming. Why virtual friendship is no problem follows from the very short form of the communication genuine friendship. Ethics and Information Technology (online first). possible. Twitter exchanges seem luxurious, indulgent by Griffin, J. 1998. Well-being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral comparison. But surely much of the problem follows from the Importance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. format, regardless of length. “Mutual ” is equated Higgs, E., Light, A., and Strong, D. 2000. Technology and the Good Life? here with “flesh and heart,” and surely we today agree with Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Camus that there is a kind of intimacy and connection far easier Kubovy, M. 1999. On the pleasures of the mind. In Well-being: The to establish in face-to-face interaction, or, more accurately, Foundations of Hedonic Psychology, edited by D. Kahneman, E. Diener, body-to-body interaction (Fortunati 2005, 53), than in writing, and N. Schwarz, 134-54. New York: Russell Sage. no matter whether that writing is limited to ten words. And Lopez, S.J., and Snyder, C.R., eds. 2003. Positive Psychological yet, while the centrality of co-presence and body-to-body Assessment: A Handbook of Models and Measures. Washington, DC: interaction might be of unquestionably central concern to American Psychological Association. erotic relationships, it is far less clear that it should be crucial Lyubomirsky, S., Sheldon, K.M., and Schkade, D. 2005. Pursuing to friendship. Why, exactly, does writing seem to us to be such happiness: the architecture of sustainable change. Review of General a poor substitute for physically co-present interaction within Psychology 9(2):111-31. the realm of friendship as well? — 22 — — Philosophy and Computers —

The Aristotelian tradition of thought on friendship had space are no longer shared. Our own days are encountered accustomed us to dividing friendships between those of virtue, through a microscope, and each moment is one whose passage of pleasure, and of utility (and to disparaging the latter two). This we feel, no matter how unimportant its content. In speaking to puts us on a path to view formal and final causes as determining the distant friend, however, we view our life as from afar, and of friendship—the most prominent distinction between them we find ourselves answering simply “Not much” when asked has to do with their ends, and the friendship of pleasure, “What have you been up to?” as if we were limited to the space concerned so much more with a passing experience than a of a telegram as in Camus’s story. lasting goal, seems cheap; a guilty pleasure. But friendships with There are certainly friendships that continue and strengthen all sorts of formal and final causes have efficient and material in important aspects when this transition takes place—Briggle causes as well, and these cannot be ignored or discarded. (2008) provides an excellent example of pen-pals who are better In terms of formal and final causes we might say that able to share meaningful and deeply personal thoughts due to friendship may be based on shared concerns, mutual support their lack of a shared location. This can be expected to occur in acting on personal and political commitments, principled in proportion as the friendship has its basis within final and disagreement and debate, a similar sense of human, shared formal causes rather than efficient and material causes; within interests, or common activities and pastimes. In efficient and commitments and projects held in common rather than jokes, material aspects, the basis of friendship is found in complaining movies, and boredom; and, most broadly, within contemplative about the soup, walking together silently, passionate debate, life rather than active life. But even the friendship based on laughing about something unimportant, shopping, playing cards, common values or on intellectual exchange is still a friendship drinking beer, sharing music, and being bored. Friendship is realized in moments lived and shared, and when fully abstracted not a static fact, but a πραξις; part of the active rather than into an exchange of letters it becomes a placeholder for and the contemplative aspect of living—and it must be enacted in shadow of its true form. order to exist. Or, at least, this was the case until recently. We are all familiar with the challenges of maintaining a I began this section by asking why physically co-present friendship over distances. The practice of friendship, when interaction seemed to us to be so central to friendship, and placed within the context of the longhand letter, must attempt to why written interaction seemed to us to be such a poor realize a portion of active life using tools proper to contemplative substitute. Although this fits the way many often think about life. As Vallor puts it, and talk about friendship, there are surely a great many Initially, the possibilities for sharing lives online look Facebook users who do not see the dire consequences for relatively impoverished if we grasp the distinction friendship that theorists and commentators so frequently between sharing lives and sharing about lives; the bemoan, and many today, markedly but not exclusively former involves performing together the activities that tweens and teens, see nothing strange about choosing make up a life, the latter involves communicating to to IM or text someone who is easily available in person. I one another information concerning our lives, without don’t believe this is because there’s something wrong with implying shared activity. (forthcoming, n.p.) “these kids today,” or because we’ve lost the “true meaning And not only is shared activity seemingly precluded, but the of friendship,” or because new social media have brought sharing which is possible tends towards reporting only those our society into “the shallows.” I think it’s because we’re aspects of life which appear to us objectively meaningful, wrong to think of Facebook posts, texts, tweets, and many removing access to a large portion of what life is to each of other forms of new social media communication as written us as it is lived, and what would have been shared in a life language; or, perhaps less paradoxically put, that writing is lived together. “Sharing about” can capture well something of increasingly an active and shared activity between distant the final cause of friendship—our common values, passions, persons rather than an act of individually composing and interests, or humor—but it is hard to see how the written form subsequently sharing meaning and information. could contain the material causes of friendship. Changing Communications A life lived alongside another is disfigured when transferred Email has been much decried for the way in which the ease, into narrative: the trivialities of life are no longer a binding speed, and weightlessness of email communication has connection, but instead the subject of reportage, and the resulted in a decline in emphasis upon spelling, grammar, vibrancy of life can only be made again engaging through formalities, and etiquette. Moving from email to other new literary talent on the part of the letter-writer or the empathetic media communications, we see this decline continue, as well as imagination of the reader. As Schopenhauer said, when we seeing a positive rise in norms of casual, creative, and informal view an individual human life objectively in all its many and usage, either through convenience (e.g., “ur” for “yours,” or varied details, the foregoing of apostrophes, which the iOS virtue keyboard it is like a drop of water seen through a microscope, puts on a separate screen) or through individual or collective a single drop teeming with infusoria; or a speck of identity construction (as in the case of “l337” typographical cheese full of mites invisible to the naked eye. How conventions or speech patterns stylized after LOLcats, Y U NO we laugh as they bustle about so eagerly, and struggle guy, or innumerable other Internet memes). with one another in so tiny a space! And whether here, We are not wrong to fear and lament the loss of habits or in the little span of human life, this terrible activity of thoughtful composition and proper language use, even if produces a comic effect. there are, as I will argue, some positive aspects to this change as well. As the speed and frequency of writing has increased, It is only in the microscope that our life looks so big. writing as a practice has become increasingly more functional It is an indivisible point, drawn out and magnified by than thoughtful, and has moved from contemplative to active the powerful lenses of Time and Space. (2007, 25) life. Heidegger even claimed that this process, which he saw Once we live apart from a friend, and share our lives at a far earlier stage in the mere act of abbreviating of words only through the time-shifted asynchronous written word (1968, 34-5), threatens the very existence of meditative thought communicated at a distance, the magnifying lenses of time and as we use words more and more as tools rather than as bearers — 23 — as well as seeing a positive rise in norms of casual, creative, and informal usage, either through convenience (e.g. “ur” for “yours,” or the foregoing of apostrophes, which the iOS virtue keyboard puts on a separate screen) or through individual or collective identity construction (as in the case of “l337” typographical conventions or speech patterns stylized after LOLcats, Y U

NO guy, or innumerable other internet memes).

We are not wrong to fear and lament the loss of habits of thoughtful composition and — APA Newsletter, Fall 2012, Volume 12, Number 1 — proper languageof meaning.use, even The if phenomenologicalthere are, as I will changes argue, that some bring positive about aspectsmakes clear to this in her change discussion as of media multiplexity in personal this danger, through our loss of wider perspectives and our relationships, closer relationships are conducted over more well. As the speedincreasing and frequencyincapacity to ofstep writing back and ha considers increased, things carefullywriting as anumerous practice media has become (2010, 132). Facebook, as a communications and as a whole, bring writing within the realm of the trivial, platform, can be used in very thin, one-dimensional forms of functional, and immediate. The momentary writing of new communication, but its capacity for a variety of different sorts of increasingly moresocial functional media loses than the thoughtful,slow and deep an aspectsd has moved of traditional from contemplativecommunication to leaves active multiplexity life. as an open possibility within written thought, but gains the immediacy and vibrancy of all relationships conducted in part over Facebook. Heidegger evenmomentary claimed speech.that this process, which he saw at a far earlier stageStatus in updatesthe mere supply act the of opportunity to be present with the Along with this change in the form and experience of other in quotidian trivialities, but do so in a minimally invasive writing, the subjects of communication have undergone a general broadcast rather than a specific communication that abbreviating ofsimilar words alteration. (1968, 34–5), The over-sharing threatens andthe micro-reportingvery existence of of meditamighttive obligate thought the other as we to userespond. At the same time, the the stereotypical constant texter or tweeter exemplify the publication of interests, personal details, notes, postings, and words more andmost more mindless as tools and ratherunimportant than formas bearers of sociality. of meaning. And yet, it isThe phenomenologicalvideos allows others to changes hear from one and learn about one’s technologies such as these—and for exactly this reason—that current interests and concerns, and for one to share with are able, finally, to recreate at a distance those “microscopic others without having to decide to communicate with anyone that bring aboutlenses this ofdanger, time and through space” ourwhich loss allow of wider two people perspectives to have andin ourparticular. increasing In general, incapacity it is a pull-oriented interpersonal the shared experiences that form the material and efficient communications platform. Rather than the “push” of to step back andcauses consider of friendship. things Thiscarefully destroys and the as distance a whole, that bringresults writing in information within the outward realm in of the the letter, phone call, email, or SMS, the report, “I didn’t really do anything today,” when we have a great proportion of the communication that takes place is been busy from dawn to dusk with meaningless errands. generated as static content and “pulled down” by viewers of trivial, functional,Through and constantimmediate. tweets The and momentar texts, we ycan writing be bored of new and socialpersonal media pages. loses the slow frustrated constantly alongside one another—indeed, the In these ways, the Facebook page is a venue for allowing and deep aspectstweeter of traditional may very well written bring thoughta lived experience, but gains of the boredom immediacy others and to vibrancy get a sense of of the texture of our day-to-day lives, to all his friends, much to their annoyance. As obnoxious as without explicitly inviting anybody to follow it day-by-day. this may be, it does indeed replicate the element of friendship This certainly has its negative aspects, such as the now well- momentary speech.most easily lost in distance. established practice of Facebook stalking, but it also means that Here we see a resurgent orality in writing itself—a kind of there is, in effect, always an open door for our connections to Along secondarywith this literacychange based in the in formand taking and itsexperience characteristics of writing, from getthe to subjects know us ofbetter. orality; a kind of distorted mirror image of Ong’s secondary Targeted communication within one’s network is also orality. Secondary orality is “superficially identical with that of always a possibility. Messaging allows for private or personal communicationprimary have oralityundergone but in deptha similar utterly alteration. contrary, planned The over-shari and self- ngresponses and micro-reporting to public conversations, of the or for conversations requiring conscious where primary intimacy or seclusion—and stereotypical constantorality is texter unplanned or and within this slower, more unselfconscious” (Ong 1977, email-like communicative 298). While secondary orality channel, longer-form writing tweeter exemplifyis oral the language most derivativemindless of with a lesser resurgent written language, secondary orality can take place in, as and unimportantliteracy form partakes of sociality. in various it were, a quiet side-room and undifferentiated from the buzz of the friend mixtures of literacy and feed. But more active forms And yet, it is technologiesresurgent orality. such as Some of direct communication new social media writing are also possible. The “like” is composed with care these—and for exactly this reason— button functions much like a and concern for meaning, head nod or an encouraging support, and precision in “uh-huh” in body-to-body expression, and is altogether communication. Cuonzo in line with our pre-digital “Le Twittre,” Penny Arcade, 4/23/2008 (2010) argues that part of the expectations for the written http://www.penny-arcade.com/comic/2008/4/23/ function of virtual gifts is a word. Some is entirely kind of post-linguistic social contextually bound and grooming, in keeping with written extemporaneously Dunbar’s gossip hypothesis from within an ongoing (1997). The purpose, then, of conversation. Most, of course, is some unknowable admixture sending someone a flower in a Facebook application, or poking between the written form and this resurgent orality, and many of or throwing a sheep at them, is simply to re-establish contact the conflicts which take place in new social media can be traced and revitalize a social bond. These things are in some sense back to different proportions of literacy and orality adopted by meaningless, of course, but so is much of the small talk we those in conversation. One user’s thoughtful and respectful engage in regularly, and both serve the same social purpose. discourse is another’s tl;dr, and both serious communication All this, however, approaches Facebook merely as a and sarcastic or absurdist banter fit within the norms of new communications platform. In addition to this, Facebook is social media writing. able to provide a platform for asynchronous shared activities. Facebook Friending To some extent, this is clearly possible through the other The flexibility and multiplicity of communication structures in communications technologies discussed previously—I may Facebook form a platform for the practice of friendship which certainly send you a video by email which we can then share is able to provide the active experience of proximity seen in our thoughts on, in the same way as I might send you a letter texting and tweeting, while providing scalable avenues towards recommending visiting a certain museum—but the multimedia more robust forms of communication and sharing. As Baym integration of Facebook walls and applications allows for a

— 24 — — Philosophy and Computers — weightless, immediate, and intuitive approach to distant shared surely has some negative aspects—users tend to accumulate media experiences. Furthermore, the embedded display of friends who they know and care very little about—but the linked visual media on the one hand, and the small text-entry lowered expectation allows people to establish connections windows on the other, both encourage that communications with those they are very much out of touch with. tend to become an asynchronously shared experience of The case of the old friend to whom we have little to say media along with a comment, rather than a written message exemplifies the most characteristic strengths of Facebook as a containing a link to some content referred to. The integration communications platform and as a platform for asynchronous of applications allows collaborative or competitive games shared activity. In this kind of relationship, contact would and projects to create even more concrete and interactive be unlikely in other media, for we would not have sufficient asynchronous shared experiences. initial desire and purpose to motivate the investment of time This is where I disagree with Vallor’s otherwise excellent and feeling requisite to reestablish a meaningful relationship. article, “Flourishing on Facebook.” Vallor characterizes our The low commitment of friending allows this contact to be actions in new social media as “communicating to one another established, which then, through status updates and news information concerning our lives” and “providing the kinds of feeds, gives us a sense of who our old friend has become, and of informational and emotional reciprocity that maintain the will what the course of her life now consists. We may find we share to live together with our friends” (forthcoming, n.p.). I find interests, commitments, and projects—either those that once instead that the writing that takes place in new social media, bound us together, or others that have arisen in the intervening in line with the idea of resurgent orality, is better characterized period. We may find we have more in common than expected, as a shared activity rather than mere information sharing. or we may rediscover, for example, that shared sense of humor Just as in a conversation in person, what we enjoy is not the which had always been the only thing we had in common. information but rather the back-and-forth, the playfulness of And, on Facebook, a shared sense of humor and fun banter, and the closeness and connection with our friend, so is enough to re-establish a relationship—and, even more too do we in new social media often find our conversations to remarkably, a relationship that can grow. Simple activities with be more about activity than about content. As with in-person scalable levels of interaction, such as Facebook games, allow conversations, the content itself certainly wouldn’t always us to move smoothly from playing a game because the game (often?) merit the time we spend on it—but that it is time is itself diverting to playing a game as a way of being together spent with friends does. with a friend. Competition and chatting as we play allows a Similarly, I see no reason to describe the performance of return to the quotidian moments of passing time which once reciprocity as going no further than a demonstration of the will brought us together, without the artificial attempt to reestablish to live together—is there not enough reason to call it a way of a friendship using means foreign to the shared activities which actually living together asynchronously and at a distance, at formed an initial, now lapsed bond. least within a limited scope of activities? If I post another picture In these ways, Facebook is a remarkably well-suited of baby sloths on the wall of a sloth-obsessed friend, I am not platform for the activity of friendship. Where the connections indicating something we would do together. The sending of forged are superficial, they allow avenues for growth and sloths and lolruses is itself a practice within our friendship. If I intensification. Where the messages and posts are terse and listen to a lo-fi Mountain Goats video posted by another friend, simple, they allow for conversations and shared experiences I do so with the understanding that she listened to it just as I to emerge. Where the group associations and activities are am now, and through my experience of the song I understand thin and basic, they allow opportunities to raise awareness more about her experiences and aesthetic sensibility. Every and recruit others to causes that may become passionate posting can be an invitation to others to encounter the posting commitments. as if alongside ourselves, and in this way we can have a To be sure, the movement of communications technologies meaningfully robust asynchronous version at a distance of many from the realm of contemplative to that of active life presents of the everyday material causes of friendship: watching TV or cultural problems and dangers, but it allows the long-distance a movie, discussing the news or an article, shopping together, elements of friendship to become not a mere sharing of playing Scrabble, and so forth. Through the limited forms of information about activities engaged in separately, but an cellphone and camera photos and videos, we can even, in a active asynchronous sharing of activities themselves. This limited and thin way, invite our network to visit our family, or active component of new social media communications is keep up to date on our vacation (or a party) as it happens. Now, both important and easily misunderstood, and as long as we Vallor is concerned specifically with complete friendships and do not grasp that communications here are not reportage and friendships of virtue, so she has other reasons to dismiss these summary, but asynchronously shared experience at a distance, activities as relatively trivial to her primary concern, but I think much of what happens in new social media will appear to be it important nonetheless to recognize that new social media useless self-important triviality. We can call this the “sandwich provide us not just with a means of communication but a means problem.” of living together, and, as Vallor well recognizes, friendships of virtue usually come about as a deepening of relationships Why do people talk about their sandwich? Why do people initially established in the pursuit of utility or pleasure. post pictures of lunch? Surely it is not because they are under any illusion that their sandwich is of significant objective Old Friends, New Media importance. Neither, if we are to be charitable, can we assume To see how new social media are relevant to the possibility of that it is because the sandwich-sharer believes that he is of such deepening relationships towards virtue, consider the difference great importance to friends and associates that the slightest between making contact with old friends via Facebook versus and most uninteresting details of his life take on interest by via email, telephone, or letter. association, like Catholic relics touched by saints. What, then, In friending someone, there is a very minimal social can be the motivation? commitment. Users often seem to use friending as a means This will be ever a mystery to us as long as we believe that of recreating former social groups, and will friend those with the point of the communication is the information it contains. whom they have no immediate desire to communicate, but just The point is to invite friends to lunch. The sharer can then eat want to check in on, touch base with, or keep in touch with. This alongside his absent friends, who he knows to be experiencing — 25 — — APA Newsletter, Fall 2012, Volume 12, Number 1 — the appearance of his sandwich, as if sitting across the table. The genuine intelligence, and setting the bar for AI theorists friends, for their part, have been granted this window into the life indefinitely. And while Turing almost certainly never intended of their friend, which they may either ignore entirely, or choose for his Imitation Game (what has come to be known as the to reflect upon and, in so doing, revitalize their connection. If this Turing Test) to be an operational definition (that only and exactly kind of asynchronous, opt-in broadcast, mediated togetherness- those things that pass it count as intelligent), the test took on a at-a-distance displaced more robust forms of shared activity, life of its own over the sixty-plus years since Turing proposed this would certainly be a worry—but the point is that we can’t it. In fact, I know of almost no one in the field of AI theory who even make sense of why people do this unless we accept that defends the test as written (excepting maybe , this is experienced as a shared activity of communion, rather whose defense will be discussed below), and yet it remains the than a communication of information. benchmark that everyone almost-embarrassingly references, “Friend” is a verb, now, thanks to Facebook—and it is well seemingly dismissing it as overly simplistic while using the that this is so. While “friending” is the mere establishment of same breath to grudgingly admit that no machine or program a connection on this social networking site, what is both most has yet passed it. It is this apparent contradiction that I intend important and most surprising about Facebook is its affordances to discuss here, while offering evidence and argument that the for friendship as an activity. Turing Test is overdue to be re-examined as a potentially valid test for artificial intelligence. References Despite the Turing Test being generally the most talked- Baym, N. 2010. Personal Connections in the Digital Age. Malden, MA: about and well-known test for AI, most discussion in the Polity. literature has remained critical. Particularly in light of what I will Briggle, A. 2008. Real friends: how the Internet can foster friendship. call the Embodied Revolution in the fields of AI and cognitive Ethics and Information Technology 10(1):71-79. science, the Turing Test has been pushed even further from Camus, A. 1991. The Plague, trans. S. Gilbert. New York: Vintage. prominence in recent years. As more and more researchers Cuonzo, M. 2010. Gossip and the evolution of Facebook. In Facebook embrace the claims of embodiment theories, a purely linguistic and Philosophy, edited by D.E. Wittkower. Chicago: Open Court. test begins to look less and less viable as a candidate for a true Dunbar, R. 1997. Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of Language. test of intelligence. By “intelligence,” I include the concept of Cambridge: Harvard University Press. mind or consciousness that is the true goal of AI. (It isn’t clear to Fortunati, L. 2005. Is body-to-body communication still the prototype? me what intelligence looks like in the absence of a mind, since The Information Society 21:53-61. arguably we have many machines that are already intelligent in Heidegger, M. 1968. What is Called Thinking? New York: Harper & Row. that sense and yet we do not believe we have achieved true AI. Ong, W. 1977. Interfaces of the Word. New York: Cornell University Press. Searle’s (1980) distinction here between Strong and Weak AI is Schopenhauer, A. 2007. The vanity of existence. In Parerga and relevant, and I’m interested only in the notion of Strong AI here.) Paralipomena, trans. T.B. Saunders. New York: Cosimo. In what follows, I will give the reader a brief background of AI’s Vallor, S. Forthcoming, n.p. Flourishing on Facebook: virtue friendship history, including the role played by the Turing Test, spending & new social media. In Ethics and Information Technology. Published some time on the Embodied Revolution and what it has meant online: http://www.springerlink.com/content/k7754743398g3k65/ (Jan. to the field. Then, I will argue that Lakoff and Johnson’s work 8, 2011). on Conceptual Metaphor specifically (and ironically) offers us a reason to re-think this move away from the Turing Test. Ultimately, it seems as though one can reject many of the Embodied Cognition and the Turing Test: assumptions of what Haugeland (1986) called “GOFAI” (Good Old-Fashioned AI), including that human thought is primarily An Uncomfortable (Re-)Union symbol manipulation, and still accept that the Turing Test is a Robin L. Zebrowski valid test of human-like intelligence. Beloit College Historically, AI has gone through a number of research . Different philosophers have carved this history up Abstract differently, but one can see fairly clearly that there have been at least three major approaches to the field, all of which overlap For decades, the artificial intelligence community has questioned one another chronologically at some point, and all of which the validity and strength of the Turing Test as a way to evaluate remain active research projects today. We often use the term the presence or absence of a mind. Given the recent surge of “GOFAI” to describe the earliest work in AI, that which is based evidence for embodiment theories, the Turing Test has been on the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis of Newell and Simon considered largely irrelevant. However, conceptual metaphor (1976). In their words: theory, a strong theory of embodiment, ironically offers a way to save the Turing Test. In spite of the fact that the theory, as A physical symbol system has the necessary and articulated by Lakoff and Johnson (1987, 1999) is explicit in its sufficient means for general intelligent action. By rejection of AI, it offers a strong linguistic basis for evaluating “necessary” we mean that any system that exhibits the presence of an underlying mind. general intelligence will prove upon analysis to be a physical symbol system. By “sufficient” we mean Keywords that any physical symbol system of sufficient size can Embodied cognition, Turing Test, embodiment, conceptual be organized further to exhibit general intelligence. metaphor, cognitive semantics, artificial intelligence By “general intelligent action” we wish to indicate the same scope of intelligence as we see in human action. (116) It is almost impossible to over-estimate the impact that Alan Turing’s 1950 paper Computing Machinery and Intelligence It’s not difficult to see how the Physical Symbol System has had on the artificial intelligence (AI) community. Turing’s Hypothesis approaches the problem of intelligence in AI historic paper set the stage for a sort of “put up or shut up” much the same way Turing did, in so far as the focus remains moment in the field, challenging those who spend their time firmly on the symbolic representation of information. Although working out what it might mean for a machine to exhibit Turing wanted to limit the test to only digital computers, the — 26 — — Philosophy and Computers —

Turing Test was less concerned with the specific underlying We Live By in 1980. (These dates and originating works will mechanism of intelligence, presumably beyond symbol almost certainly be debatable amongst researchers depending manipulation itself, as Turing was intentionally moving away upon one’s goals, and my back-of-the-envelope calculations of from trying to define what intelligence actually is. However, where these movements began can be put aside as irrelevant language is itself a symbol system, and it is the symbol system to my greater point.) Metaphors We Live By was the text that with the deepest relationship to human thought. GOFAI and originated Conceptual Metaphor Theory, which, in its simplest the Turing Test were very closely tied, to the point that around form, claims that much of our conceptualization is structured the 1960s, one could see both programmers in AI as well as metaphorically, from aspects of our physical, cultural, and social philosophers and theorists all working specifically on how to environments. What this means is that the very possibility of get a machine to pass the Turing Test, while discounting most my acquiring some concepts rests first on the way my body other questions about the nature and structure of intelligence is structured and how it interacts with my environments. In itself (as Turing intended). other words, metaphor is not merely a matter of language, The second of the three major research paradigms in but a matter of thought itself. To take one of the most famous AI is connectionism, and all of the various forms it took. examples, we use our sensory experiences with vision to make While the history of the similarities and differences between sense of the abstract concept of knowledge itself. (This is the connectionism and GOFAI is fascinating (and we might even say KNOWING is SEEING metaphor). We can see examples of this there was a connectionist revolution at one point) it isn’t entirely in our language about knowledge, such as in the following common phrases: “I see what you’re saying,” “I see what you relevant to my discussion here today. It is worth noting, however, mean,” “It looks different from my point of view,” “The argument that when the connectionist approach did challenge the GOFAI is clear,” “It was a murky discussion,” “I view that differently” approach, the primary arguments about what connectionism (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 54; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 48). could and could not do were primarily focused on the failures This is one of many hundreds of conceptual metaphors that of connectionism with regard to language itself (Fodor and have been dis-covered (a word which itself is almost certainly Pylyshyn 1988; Fodor and McLaughlin 1990; McLaughlin 1993; related to this metaphor). Smolensky 1988, 1994). It seemed, for a very long time, that no connectionist system would be able to process natural language The field of embodied cognition, though slow to get a at all, let alone ever pass the Turing Test. foothold, has grown across all relevant domains in recent years. It is fairly safe to say that almost all fields related to mind Then, in the late 1980s, Rodney Brooks challenged both of or cognition now have sub-fields working on embodiment these traditions and made an argument that, in principle, the theories. The Embodied Revolution has been robust, and Physical Symbol System Hypothesis was incorrect. Instead, work in the philosophy of mind, neuroscience, linguistics, Brooks claimed that the body itself had primacy in intelligence, artificial intelligence, , biology, and psychology (at least) and that in order to understand and replicate human now exists to both explore and support the embodied mind intelligence, we needed to start with simpler intelligences hypothesis. As a challenge to the last 2,000 years of metaphysical that lacked symbolic representation in the traditional fashion foundations in science and philosophy, embodied mind theories altogether (1991). He argued that “mobility, acute vision and can and are changing the way we think about everything from the ability to carry out survival related tasks in a dynamic ourselves to the world itself. environment provide a necessary basis for the development of Importantly, Conceptual Metaphor Theory offers a true intelligence” (141). In a 1999 anthology of his work, Brooks challenge to the functionalist theory of mind that underpins reports that this now-historic paper (“Intelligence Without the entire field of artificial intelligence. The theory shows us Representation”) was turned down by journals for four years that we often reify abstractions in order to talk about them and before finally being published in the most well-regarded journal make sense of things that otherwise elude our senses. Lakoff in the field. This historic fact is important because it shows and Johnson sometimes call these “ontological metaphors,” that there was widespread resistance to this move toward and argue that viewing an abstraction as an entity allows us to embodiment, and it is here that I would argue the Embodied “refer to it, quantify it, identify a particular aspect of it, see it as Revolution in AI truly began. It is worth noting that one can—and a cause, act with respect to it, and perhaps even believe that many do—trace the primary arguments in Brooks’ work back we understand it” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 26). Importantly, through many earlier philosophical movements, and many of of course, since these are ways that we conceptualize things, his claims can be found in the work of the phenomenologists we rarely recognize any of this as metaphorical: we understand like Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, and even in some of the early the mind, for example, as a thing precisely for these reasons, American Pragmatists, like Dewey (Gallagher 2009). I place the and it is precisely because this is useful that we fail to realize beginnings of the Embodied Revolution here only as it relates that this is not necessarily any sort of objective truth about to Artificial Intelligence. It arose almost independently across the mind. (Indeed, we can see the different sorts of research various fields of cognitive science at other points in history. projects that follow from fundamentally different ontologies of When I refer to “embodiment,” or refer to the mind as mind; we might have decided mind was a process rather than “embodied,” I mean simply that the structure of our bodies a thing, which brings with it very different assumptions and is a primary determinant of the possibilities of our cognition. research methodologies.) Lakoff and Johnson have argued According to Tim Rohrer, “the embodiment hypothesis argues that the field of AI is largely a result of at least three metaphors that minds are fundamentally not disembodied algorithmic that Anglo-American analytic philosophy has given us. First, processes like those in a (serially-driven discrete state) the THOUGHT as LANGUAGE metaphor. This will be familiar digital computer program, but are instead constituted and to anyone trained in traditional analytic philosophy because of constrained by the kinds of organization reflected in the Chomsky and Fodor’s arguments that claimed thought literally biological, anatomical, biochemical, and neurophysiological was a kind of language (Fodor 1975). Some of the language characteristics of the body and the brain” (Rohrer 2001a, 3). we have that reveals this underlying conceptualization can While the roots of contemporary Embodiment Theories reach be found in the following common phrases: “Let me make easily back through phenomenology and , we might a mental note of that,” “I can read her mind,” “He’s reading argue that the philosophical Embodied Revolution began in between the lines,” and “Her thoughts are eloquent” (Lakoff earnest with the publication of Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors and Johnson 1999, 244-245). We can see Newell and Simon’s — 27 — — APA Newsletter, Fall 2012, Volume 12, Number 1 —

Physical Symbol System Hypothesis as a clear result of the belief hands themselves, which first and foremost do our grasping that thought has the properties of language, although of course for us (Rohrer 2001b). Therefore, one necessarily must have they are making a literal claim where Lakoff and Johnson are grounded that physical experience first before being able to arguing it is metaphorical conceptualization. use the term in a metaphorical way. (There’s something to be We might look to another metaphor for mind: THOUGHT is said here for a solution to the symbol grounding problem, as MATHETHAMTICAL CALCULATOR. With this conceptualization, well, which I will return to shortly.) There is evidence from we understand reasoning to be like addition, for example. developmental psychology that we do, in fact, go through We might say of thought, “I put two and two together,” or “It these stages of usage developmentally, including a stage doesn’t add up” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 246). Again, both of conflating the literal and the metaphorical usages before Newell and Simon’s physical symbol systems and Turing’s properly using the metaphorical form correctly (Lakoff 2008). own understanding of human-level intelligence as symbol If this theory of conceptual metaphor is true, and I think we manipulation can be seen in this metaphor. If numbers can have, in the last three decades, acquired enough evidence to be represented by sequences of written symbols, by this believe that some version of it is, then our language really does understanding of a mind, so can thoughts (247). The Turing reveal something deep and important about the underlying Machine itself comes into play here. structure of our minds. In fact, without natural languages, we would almost certainly have no access to this information Finally, of course, this leads to the most important about how minds work. conceptualization for our purposes: the MIND as MACHINE And now it’s time to bring this back to the very beginning: metaphor. It must be noted that within the field of AI, most the Turing Test. It is true that the Turing Test has been dismissed of us do not believe this conceptualization of a mind to be widely in the last few decades as not being a proper test of metaphorical at all. It is in some ways obvious that this is intelligence (including arguments that we will be able to “brute taken to be literal, and some researchers are explicit about this force” a win before we have reason to believe there is genuine (Pinker, 259). The MIND as MACHINE metaphor plays out in the intelligence, and arguments from the other side that intelligence following way: the physical computer is used to understand the will arise way before the test is passed). One interesting revision person (and especially the brain); we understand the mind to of the Turing Test comes from Steven Harnad, who formulated be like a computer program, concepts to be formal symbols, the the symbol grounding problem, illustrating that symbols need conceptual system to be like a computer language, thoughts to to be given content in a way that is meaningful for the system be like formal symbol sequences, thinking to be formal symbol itself. Over the last several decades, Harnad has offered manipulation, memory to be a database, knowledge to be the revisions of the Turing Test in order to differentiate various levels contents of that database, and the ability to understand is the at which a system might be capable of acquiring meaningful ability to successfully compute (257). Lakoff and Johnson see symbols. He has laid out a hierarchy that stretches from the this mapping of mind onto machine as merely metaphor, and toy level Turing Test (T1) that of the Loebner competition, for hence do not see AI as a viable research project. While I agree example, to the test as Turing formulated it (T2), to a version that this conceptualization is metaphorical and that our minds where the system has human-level sensori-motor capacities may not be machines in this literal sense, I do not see this as via robot (T3), and even to a neural level model (T4) (Harnad the death of the AI project. In fact, the work in embodied AI of 1989, 1995). Harnad ultimately seems to argue that T3 (robotic people like Brooks and Pfeifer shows us that we can accept this capacities) is the appropriate level at which we need to aim if conceptualization as metaphorical and still continue working we want to be able to assume the test is being passed in the on artificial intelligence with no apparent contradiction (Pfeifer appropriate way (with grounded symbols). However, it seems and Iida 2004). Harnad’s argument differs from mine in an important way: he Here is the great irony of Lakoff and Johnson’s work in is claiming that intelligence is more than a linguistic capacity, conceptual metaphor theory: while they argue that it shows and as such the robotic level of the Turing Test is the appropriate the error of AI in general (and the misguidedness of physical one because humans do more than linguistic things. While I symbol systems like those on which Turing based his famous agree wholeheartedly with Harnad, our goals are somewhat Imitation Game), I argue that they have offered us a valuable different. He is illustrating the problem with the traditional reason to re-consider the Turing Test as a valid test for artificial version of the test itself, and giving us a more rigorous version of intelligence. It is worth pointing out that there is a tremendous the test that involves other sorts of intelligence that humans and amount of independent evidence for conceptual metaphor other animals certainly have. I agree with Harnad’s claims with theory at this point, across an incredible number of different regard to this revision. However, my own project is to show that fields and domains of knowledge (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). if we want to restrict ourselves only to Turing’s formulation of In spite of the fact that we can now see evidence of these his test, Harnad’s T2, then passing the test as Turing articulated claims in neuroscience and experimental psychology (for it is still a powerful proof. I just happen to think it cannot be example), and using a number of different methodologies, it done without there also being a fully embodied creature with is, in an important way, still a linguistic theory. The structure grounded symbols. Harnad’s argument and my own converge of our deeper levels of conceptualization is revealed through in practice, but are distinct on the level of theory. our language usage, even though that language usage isn’t One notable exception to the overwhelming number of itself the structure of thought. When I ask someone whether critiques of the Turing Test has been Daniel Dennett’s 1984 they truly grasp my idea, they must necessarily understand paper, in which he defended it on the basis of world knowledge. the word “grasp” metaphorically, in an embodied way, from In this piece, Dennett claims that the Turing Test is a strong test how they would physically grasp an object. In fact, there of an underlying mind, but not because mind is, at heart, nothing is neural evidence that our minds arose evolutionarily by but pure symbol manipulation. Rather, Dennett argues that the piggy-backing on the sensory-motor neurons already in test will only be passed by a creature who has a tremendous place for sensing and movement, using the same structures amount of background information about the world and can to understand abstract ideas rather than building new neural parse ambiguous language in complex contexts. In other words, structures from scratch (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). So, when the test works because language and the world are both highly I ask someone if they “grasp” what I’m saying, the evidence complex systems, and the Turing Test taps into that complexity shows that our brains are activating the neural area for our in a tightly controlled way. For example, Dennett offers the — 28 — — Philosophy and Computers — distinction between the following two sentences, originally Bibliography identified by Terry Winograd, that we who live in human Brooks, R. Cambrian Intelligence: The Early History of the New AI. societies can parse easily enough. Note there is only a single Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999. word that differs between them, but that the meaning is entirely Dennett, D. “Can Machines Think.” In How We Know, edited by M. changed: 1) “The committee denied the group a parade permit Shafto. San Francisco: Harper & Row. because they advocated violence” and 2) “The committee Fodor, J.A. The Language of Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard denied the group a parade permit because they feared violence” University Press. (Dennett 51). As Dennett points out, the difference in the verbs Fodor, J.A. and Pylyshyn, Z. “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: (advocated and feared) changes who the pronoun refers to. A Critical Analysis.” In Connections and Symbols, edited by S. Pinker Both are legal parsings, but no one who understands what and J. Mehler. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (A Cognition Special Issue). a parade permit is would likely misinterpret the pronoun. Fodor, J.A. and McLaughlin, B. “Connectionism and the Problem of Dennett’s world knowledge argument is an interesting one, and Systematicity: Why Smolensky’s Solution Doesn’t Work.” Cognition 35 it’s not clear to me that there isn’t some accidental overlap with (1990): 183-204. my own argument. However, there is no clear understanding of Gallagher S. “Philosophical Antecedents of Situated Cognition.” In The what Dennett’s “world knowledge” is, how one can measure Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, edited by P. Robbins and it, or whether it isn’t simply another thing that can be “brute M. Aydede. 35-53. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. forced” in a sufficiently complex system. (We might consider Harnad, S. “Minds, Machines and Searle.” Journal of Theoretical and looking to IBM’s Watson for a candidate system with apparent Experimental Artificial Intelligence 1 (1989): 5-25. world knowledge and nothing we would consider genuine Harnad, S. “Grounding Symbolic Capacity in Robotic Capacity.” In Steels, thought. It is worth pointing out that Watson is a long way from L. and R. Brooks (Eds.) The “artificial life” route to “artificial intelligence.” passing the Turing Test.) Dennett accounts for this somewhat Building Situated Embodied Agents, edited by L. Steels and R. Brooks. by pointing out that he believes the test is powerful enough 276-86. New Haven: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1995. that if bodies are genuinely needed for minds, then nothing will Haugeland, J. Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge, MA: pass the Turing Test without a body, but he leaves it an open MIT Press, 1985. question. He also claims it is an empirical question. I’m arguing Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago, IL: University that we have that comes down clearly on of Chicago Press, 1980/2003. the side of embodiment, and that it is conceptualization itself Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind rather than world knowledge that matters. and its Challenge to Western Thought. New York: Basic Books, 1999. Therefore, I believe Conceptual Metaphor theory gives Lakoff, G. “The Neural Theory of Metaphor.” In The Metaphor Handbook, us a precise methodology1—a body sufficient like ours—and edited by R. Gibbs. 17-38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. plenty of specific examples that would sufficiently indicate that McLaughlin, B.P. “The Connectionism/Classicism Battle to Win Souls.” a system or person had some sort of genuine understanding of Philosophical Studies 71 (1993): 163-90. even very abstract concepts. (See, for example, the conceptual Newell, A. and Simon, H. “Computer Science as Empirical : metaphors for such things as LOVE is a JOURNEY; IDEAS Symbols and Search.” Communications of the ACM 19, no. 3 (1976): are FOOD; KNOWING is SEEING, to name a few.) Ironically, 113-26. embodiment theory alone would seem to preclude the Turing Pfeifer, R. and Iida, F. “Embodied Artificial Intelligence: Trends and Test from being a valid test of intelligence, given that it is a Challenges.” In Embodied Artificial Intelligence: International Seminar, purely linguistic test, except that Conceptual Metaphor Theory Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, July 7-11, 2003, Revised Selected Papers, edited by F. Iida, R. Pfeifer, L. Steels, and Y. Kuniyoshi. Heidelberg: has shown us that language is our very window into that mind. Springer, 2004. In the process of shifting our best practices in AI research Pinker, S. The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window into Human to embrace embodiment theories, many of us have tended to Nature. New York: Penguin Press, 2007. throw out the Turing Test as a remnant of an outdated view Rohrer, T. “The Cognitive Science of Metaphor from Philosophy to of minds. However, we’ve thrown the metaphorical baby out Neuroscience.” Theoria et Historia Scientarium 6, no.1 (2001a): 27-42. with the metaphorical bathwater; language itself is still our Rohrer, T. “Understanding through the Body: fMRI and ERP Investigations best tool with which to uncover hidden minds—a shortcut of into the Neurophysiology of Cognitive Semantics.” Paper presented at sorts. And while this still cannot account for the possibility of ICLC 2001. UCSB, Santa Barbara, July 2001b. minds without language (in which I of course see no inherent Searle, J. “Minds, Brains and Programs.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences contradiction and plenty of real world examples), it gives us a 3, no. 3 (1980): 417-57. strong way to discover if there’s a genuine mind in any sort of Smolensky, P. “On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism.” Behavioral creature that has language. and Brain Sciences 11 (1988): 1-23. Endnotes Smolensky, P. “Connectionism, Constituency, and the Language of 1. It is probably worth an aside to mention that I cannot say Thought.” In Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, edited by B. Loewer here what “sufficiently like ours” means. It is clear that our and G. Rey. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1990. social, physical, and cultural environments all seem to play Smolensky, P. “Constituent Structure and Explanation in an Integrated a role in our embodied existence, and things we might take Connectionist/Symbolic Cognitive Architecture.” In The Philosophy for granted like gravity, or the fact of our having fronts and of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, edited by C. backs and tops and bottoms, are all relevant. I do not want Macdonald and G. Macdonald. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1994. to imply that there is a single sort of human body (although Turing, A.M. “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” Mind 59 (1950): I think Lakoff and Johnson are claiming this). There is real 433-60. human variation and it matters for us, but the degree to which we must have bodily overlap, and what aspects must overlap, is not yet apparent. I think this is an empirical question, but a lack of critical examination of the concept of embodiment itself has kept us from even recognizing the importance of the question. Wittgenstein may have been exactly right when he wrote of talking lions and our inability to communicate with them.

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In the final few weeks of the after-school program, two Selves in Video Games: Reflections by Two of the students (the first two authors of this paper) started developing ideas for a poster presentation in the international Middle-Schoolers in an After-School Program Toward a Science of Consciousness conference, which was on Consciousness being held in Tucson (as it is biennially) in April of 2012. For the poster, the students were asked to come up with their own Cole Sohn and Maxwell Mainman questions, hypotheses, reasons, and “why I might be wrong.” Saint Gregory Preparatory Middle School, Tucson, This paper develops the ideas presented in the poster. They Arizona mostly focused their discussions on the video game Minecraft. Iris Oved 2. Description of Minecraft (written by Maxwell University of Arizona Mainman and Cole Sohn) Minecraft is a computer game in which everything is made 1. Introduction of blocks. Everything is pixelated, and cubed. It is a randomly Take a moment to remember playing some of your favorite generated, open world game where there is no story line. You video games. Maybe you loved Pac Man as a teenager, or Super may play in single player by yourself, or multiplayer with others. Mario Brothers, and maybe now you play World of Warcraft or Separate programmers create expansion packs, called mods, Second Life. If they are good games, perhaps youSelves would say in that Video to Games: the original Reflec game. Thetions Minecraft by Two world Middle-Schoolers is designed like the you are able to escape into them, maybe for hours at a time.in Did an Afterreal world School with minor Program exceptions. on YouConsciousness start out by cutting down you ever stop to reflect on this phenomenon of “escaping into” trees to get wood to make tools and items. As you move along you upgrade your tools, weapons, and items to be better at their a video game? The first two authors of this paper did, at age 12, 1 1 2 when asked to come up with questions to explore during anCole tasks.Sohn You, Maxwell use these Mainman tools and items, and to Iriscomplete Oved the goals of after-school program called Puzzles About Consciousness. The the game. The game has many goals, but they all lead up to questions they raised were: (1) Where are you when1. Saint you Gregory are building Preparatory great things.Middle The School side goals2. University include mining,of Arizona crafting, playing a video game? (2) Are you Tucson, a different Arizona self when Tucson, playing Arizona building, farming, fighting, and exploring. different video games? (3) Does how engaging a video game Mining consists is influence where you are and who you are when playing the of going through game? The next few sections of this paper were written by the cave systems and kids, in exploration of these questions. abandoned mines SelvesFirst, in Video a few words Games: about Reflecthe after-schooltions byprogram. Two ThisMiddle-Schoolers while using your programin wasan developedAfter School by the Paradox Program Center, on which Consciousness is in the pickaxe and mining process of becoming a non-profit organization with the aim of out ores. Crafting is when you combine teaching and studying creative1 critical thinking1 in the youth. 2 We met onceCole a week,Sohn from, Maxwell January Mainman to May of 2012,, and at Iris Saint Oved l e sse r it e m s t o Gregory Preparatory Middle School in Tucson, Arizona. For the create greater items 1.majority Saint Gregory of the sessions, Preparatory we used Middle methods School designed 2. University by the of Arizonaon a special bench Tucson, Arizona PhilosophyTucson, Arizona for Children movement, in which students are given called a “crafting [Innera stimulus circle from (a left movie to right: Davidbench.” Chalmers, Building [Maxwell Maxwell Mainman Mainman and Cole and Sohn Cole with Peter Sohn Boltuc] with Uriahclip, Kriegel, a picture, Maxwell Mainman, a is Cole when Sohn] you place Peter Boltuc. piece of a story, to material blocks to name a few), and create structures. 1. Introductionthe facilitator either Farming in Minecraft is like farming in real life. You prepare Take a momentraises ato questionremember playingthe ground some with of tools, your plant favorite seeds, video wait forgame thems. Maybeto grow, you loved Pac Man as a teenager,for the students or Super to Marioand harvest Brothers, them and when maybe they’re now ready. you There play are Wo randomlyrld of Warcraft or Second Life.explore If they or allowsare good generatedgames, perhaps monsters you roaming would your say world. that You you can are destroy able tothe escape into the students to monsters with various weapons and get items that are only them, maybec o m for e hours u p w iat t h a time.attainable Did you by killingever stthem.op to You reflect can exploreon this yourphenomenon world and of "escaping into” a videoquestions game? and The vote first findtwo different authors biomes of this with paper different did, resources, at age 12, advantages, when asked and to come up with questionson one to orexplore two for duri disadvantages.ng an after-school program called Puzzles About Consciousness. group discussion. [Inner circleInner from circleleft to fromright: leftDavid to right: Chalmers, David Chalmers, [Maxwell Mainman and Cole Sohn with3. Peter Where Boltuc] Are You When Playing a Video Game? (written by The questionsT h e they s t u raised d e n t s were: (1) Where are you when you are playing a video game? (2) Are Uriah Kriegel,Uriah Maxwell Kriegel, Mainman, Maxwell Cole Mainman, Sohn] Cole Sohn. Cole Sohn) you a differentthen self take when turns playing I thought different about video this question games? after (3) Doesthinking how about engaging “Where a video game is influence contributingwhere you toare the and who you are when playing the game? The next few sections of this 1. Introduction is Daniel?” A guy named Daniel has to leave his brain in a inquiry, calling on one anotherpaper after making were writtentheir moves, by theand kids,container, in exploration connected of bythese radio questions. waves to his body, and then Take a moment labelingto remember their moves playing in the inquirysome of(hypothesis your favorite, reason , videoexample game, s.travel Maybe underground you loved with Pac his body. I started to wonder, where Man as a teenager,distinction or Super, analogy Mario, clarification Brothers, request and). maybe The facilitator now youis there play Wodo yourld existof Warcraft when you orare playing a video game like Minecraft? to ensure that the inquiry is fairFirst, and aon few topic words and otherwise about the after-school program. This program was developed by the Paradox Second Life. If theycontributes are good only games,minimally perhaps to the content. you would The aim say is that to give you are ableI think to itescape depends into on whether your mind determines where Center, which is in the processyou of are becoming or your body a non-profit does. My hypothesis organization is that withwhen theplaying aim of teaching them, maybe forstudents hours atthe a opportunitytime. Did youto follow ever their stop own to reflectpath of oninquiry. this phenomenon of "escaping video games, your mind is1 partly in the video game world and into” a video game?For the The majority first twoof the authors sessions andof in th thisstudyingis paperafter-school creativedid, atprogram, age critical 12, when thinking asked in tothe come youth. up We met once a week, from January to May we discussed well-known thought experiments from the partly in the real world, and more of you is in the game2 if you with questions to explore during an after-schoolof 2012, program at Saint called Gregory Puzzles Preparatoryare About more Consciousness. engagedMiddle by School it. in Tucson, Arizona. For the majority of consciousness literature, simplified,the sessions, kiddified, weand usedshortened. methods designed by the Philosophy for Children movement, in which The questions theyTopics raised included were color: (1) inversion Where are(originally you when from youJohn areLocke, playing a videoIn support game? of the (2) idea Are that part of your mind is in the video you a different self1689), when Daniel playing Dennett’s different “Wherestudents Amvideo I?” (1978), games? are givenFrank (3) Jackson’s aDoes stimulus how (agameengaging movie world, clip,a Ivideo have a picture, observedgame isa piecethat sometimes of a story, when to nameyou are a few), and the Monochromatic Mary (1986), andfacilitator a video of a either robot with raises human- a questionplaying for some the videostuden games,ts to yourexplore bodily or actions, allows sensations, the students and to come up influence where you are and who you are when playing the game? The nextemotions few coincide sections with of thiswhat your character would feel if he like skin, coupled with the question,with questions “If you discovered and vote that on one or two for group discussion.3 The students then take turns paper were writtenyour by granny the kids,was a inrobot, exploration would you ofstill these think shequestions. loves you?” were real and in the game world. For example, in Minecraft, when contributing to the inquiry, calling on one another after making their moves, and labeling their — 30 — First, a few words about the after-school progr am. This program was developed by the Paradox Center, which is in the process of becoming1 For a non-profitinformation onorganization the center, see with www.paradoxcenter.org. the aim of teaching 1 and studying creative critical thinking in the2 The youth. school Wehas nomet religious once aaffiliation. week, from It is namedJanuary after to the May patron saint of education. of 2012, at Saint Gregory Preparatory Middle3 The School Philosophy in Tucson,for Children Arizona. movement2 For was the initiated majority in the of 1970s by Matthew Lipman with his philosophical the sessions, we used methods designed bychildren's the Philosophy book, Harry for Stottlemeier's Children movement, Discovery, in in which which Harry and his 5th-grade friends discover Aristotelian logic students are given a stimulus (a movie clip,while a picture, discussing a piece their daily of a experiences. story, to name For informa a few),tion and about the the IAPC (Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children) see http://www.montclair.edu/cehs/academics/institutes-and-centers/iapc/. facilitator either raises a question for the students to explore or allows the students to come up with questions and vote on one or two for group discussion.3 The students then take turns contributing to the inquiry, calling on one another after making their moves, and labeling their

1 For information on the center, see www.paradoxcenter.org. 2 The school has no religious affiliation. It is named after the patron saint of education. 3 The Philosophy for Children movement was initiated in the 1970s by Matthew Lipman with his philosophical children's book, Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery, in which Harry and his 5th-grade friends discover Aristotelian logic while discussing their daily experiences. For information about the IAPC (Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children) see http://www.montclair.edu/cehs/academics/institutes-and-centers/iapc/. moves in the inquiry (hypothesis, reason, example, distinction, analogy, clarification request). The facilitator is there to ensure that the inquiry is fair and on topic, and contributes only minimally to the content. The aim is to give students the opportunity to follow their own path of inquiry. For the majority of the sessions in this after-school program, we used as discussion stimuli well-known thought experiments from the consciousness literature, simplified, kiddified, and shortened. Topics included color inversion (originally from John Locke, 1689), Daniel Dennett’s “Where Am I?” (1978), Frank Jackson’s Monochromatic Mary (1986), and a video of a robot with human-like skin, coupled with the question, “If you discovered that your granny was a robot, would you still think she loves you?”4

In the final few weeks of the after-school program, two of the students (the first two authors of this paper) started developing ideas for a poster presentation in the international Toward a Science of Consciousness conference, which was being held in Tucson (as it is biennially) in April of 2012. For the poster, the students were asked to come up with their own questions, hypotheses, reasons, and “why I might be wrong.” This paper develops the ideas presented in the poster. They mostly focused— Philosophy their disc andussions Computers on the— video game Minecraft. you find a special item like diamonds and get back to your home you feel happy and relieved; when you lose your valuable items in Minecraft, you feel upset and down; also, when you are falling off a cliff, you feel a slight vertigo. The more engaged you are by the game, the more extreme the experience is. Despite all of this, I think that part of your mind remains in the real world. You can still talk to people in the real world and Poster from [Poster Towards from a Towards Science ofa ScienceConsciousness of Consciousness, April 2012., April 2012] you know what is going on around you. It is like dreams. You don’t2. always Description know that of you Minecraft are dreaming. (written byEven Maxwell though Mainmansome aspects and of Cole your Sohn)personality change Sometimes you think thatMinecraft it is real. This is a means computer there game is a higher in which wheneverythi young play is amade video of game, blocks. core Everything aspects stay is the pixelated, same. One percentage of you in the dream than there would be of you in observation is that when some people choose the character at the and cubed. It is a randomly generated, openbeginning worl dof gamea game, where they choosethere is the no same story features line. You in different may the video game. Also, theplay more in options single theplayer game by has, yourself, the more or multiplayer with others. Separate programmers create engaged you are, and the more you are in the game. games. For example, one of us (Max) is a dwarf in Minecraft and expansion packs, called mods, to the originalDungeons game. and The Dragons, Minecraft and prefers world to is use designed dwarven like weapons the real in I might be wrong. Peopleworld might with thinkminor your exceptions. mind is always You start Skyrim.out by Also,cutting skills down remain trees constant to get acrosswood togames make (such tools as and skill in the same place, where your body is. But I believe that the with a bow and arrow). Dwarfs usually have similar abilities in world you are experiencing is where your mind is, so if you are each game, and that allows the player to keep the same traits. 4 experiencing a video game The world, video of your the robot,mind Jules,is in theby Hanson game robotics,It is acan bit be different viewed atwith dreams. You have different abilities in a world, and when you arehttp://www.youtube.com experiencing the real/watch?v=xRR33WDFi_k. world, your dream, like flying, but you are still yourself in your dreams. mind exists in the real world. When playing a video game, you are experiencing both the real world and the video game There are some reasons to think we are wrong about this. world, so your mind is in both. I don’t think that when you People who cheat in games may not cheat in real life, like on experience a table your mind is in the table. It is the world you tests. Also, people could be mean and aggressive in a game but are experiencing that determines where your mind is. in real life they are kind and shy. This seems to suggest that some core values may change when playing a video game. But, maybe Another way I might be wrong is if people think you are this is just because they are worried about consequences in real completely in the video game or dream because that is where life. Being aggressive would still be their core value. Another you think you are at the time. I think that you are not completely observation is that when playing video games you are more in the video game or dream because you know it’s a video game adventurous than you are in real life. But maybe this is just and at least sometimes you know it’s a dream. Also, things from because in real life you have real risks. the real world affect you when you’re playing a video game, and also they can affect your dream. For example, if you hear 5. Options, Engagement, and Escaping Into the Game a loud noise, something could happen in your dream that has (written by Cole Sohn and Maxwell Mainman) a similar noise. More of you exists in a dream than in a video We think that the more engaged you are in a video game, the game because less of the real world affects your experience. more you exist in the game world and the more you become the 4. Who Are You When Playing a Video Game? (written character. We think that the more options you have in the game by Maxwell Mainman and Cole Sohn) the more engaged you are (options about what the character does, not about the consequences). A major example of this Who are you when playing a video game, and are you a different is role-playing games (RPGs). You become more creative, you self while playing different video games? Our hypothesis is have more to think about and consequences to consider. that you are a different self in different games because of the environments and consequences but you retain core aspects To explore this hypothesis, we considered many different of your real-world self like morals and values. The “game you” kinds of games, and surveyed our friends, and often the more sometimes reflects your personality but it is more exaggerated. engaging ones are the ones with more options. In Open-world It also sometimes reflects what you wish you were able to do games and RPGs you usually have more options as in ability in the real world. to interact with more things and character customization. Minecraft would be classified as an Open-world game. Other One thing we have observed is that you are a slightly games, like basic arcade games like Tetris and Pacman, have different self in a video game because video games have very fewer options and tend to be less engaging. In a simple arcade different environments from the real world and from other game that has no character, such as Tetris, or in a movie or a games. Because the environments are different, there are book, less of you changes. There is less that you can control and different things that you can do, and different things that you interact with in these examples, and less that you can choose can experience. about your features.

— 31 — — APA Newsletter, Fall 2012, Volume 12, Number 1 —

A reason why we may be wrong is that a very interesting of the sort initiated by Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001) and Mario game could be much more engaging than an RPG where Knobe (2003). you have many options, but maybe with terrible graphics and References bad storylines. Our response to that would be to exclude the variables of graphics and storyline. If you could customize your Clark, Andy and Chalmers, David. 1998. The extended mind. Analysis 58:10-23. Mario character to have your style of attacks and clothing, and everything was intractable, it would probably be more fun. Cogburn, Jon and Silcox, Mark. 2008. I, player: the puzzle of personal Another big counterexample would be that movies and books identity (MMORPGs and virtual communities. Philosophy Through Video Games. Ch 1. Routledge. are very engaging, yet you have no options besides pausing the movie, and the pace at which you read the book. Maybe this is Dennett, Daniel. 1978. From Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Bradford Books. because books and movies expose you to experiences you do not have in real life. Maybe the main character of the book is Gopnik, Alison, Meltzoff, Andre, and Kuhl, Patricia. 1999. The Scientist in very competitive, and you don’t have that quality. This makes the Crib: What Early Learning Tells Us about the Mind. William Morrow and Company. it exciting because you are experiencing something new and are forced to try it out and see if you like it. Some people may Gopnik, Alison, and Wellman, Henry. In press. Reconstructing constructivism: causal models, Bayesian learning mechanisms and think of a basic arcade game such as Tetris to be much more the theory theory. Psychological Bulletin. engaging than an RPG. Our theory on this is that these people are used to playing the basic games and are confused by the Gopnik, Alison. 2009. The Philosophical Baby: What Children’s Minds Tell us About Truth, Love, and the Meaning of Life. Farrar. Straus, and Open-world and RPG games that have so many options and Giroux. can be too overwhelming. Some people haven’t gotten used to Jackson, Frank 1986. What Mary didn’t know. Journal of Philosophy all the options, so they stick to the simple games that are less 83:291-95. confusing and are easier to play. Knobe, J. 2003. Intentional action in folk psychology: an experimental 6. Concluding Remarks investigation. Philosophical Psychology 16: 309-24. Consciousness as a topic of philosophical inquiry seems to be Lipman, Matthew. 1974. Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery. Upper Montclair, a natural way to inspire rigorous thinking in middle-schoolers. NJ: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children. Children, like the child inside of many adults, are naturally Locke, John. 1689/1975, II, xxxii, 15. Essay Concerning Human curious about consciousness, and curiosity seems to be a Understanding, Oxford: Oxford University Press. key to rational thinking. For over twenty years, Gopnik and Weinberg, Jonathan., Nichols, Shaun., and Stich, Stephen. 2001. her colleagues have been reporting studies suggesting that Normativity and epistemic intuitions. Philosophical Topics 29: 429-60. babies and children are often forming hypotheses during play, conducting experiments, and doing statistical analysis on their data (1999; forthcoming). They argue that children are like little scientists (indeed, Gopnik prefers to say that scientists are like Book Review little children). She has also suggested that babies and children are like little philosophers (2009). These observations might lead us to think that when we struggle to show adults the joys of inquiry, it is not because inquiry is a special skill that must The Computer: A Very Short Introduction be learned, but rather a natural tendency that we must prevent Darrel Ince (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, from being unlearned. Solving puzzles about consciousness is going to require a great creative leap, and creativity comes 2011). xi + 140 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-958659-2. naturally to children. Encouraging children to think rigorously Reviewed by Katalin Bimb´o about consciousness might be our only hope for solving some University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada of these most enduring human problems. The students in this program were not exposed to The book—as the title indicates—belongs to the “very short philosophical theories. For most sessions, they were simply given introduction” series, which has been published by Oxford thought-experiments as stimuli followed by questions, and taught University Press for nearly two decades. This imposes certain some philosophical notions along the way (such as hypothesis limitations such as the moderate length of the book, but at the and counterexample) to facilitate their inquiry. Their own paths same time, a reader might expect to be able to tackle the text of inquiry often mimicked discussions found in the philosophical without specific knowledge of computer science. The Computer literature. For the ideas presented this paper the students were lives up to this expectation—while it provides a wealth of simply given an invitation to ask questions of their own, and interesting and useful information. discuss with the the other students their hypotheses, reasons, and The book comprises eight chapters, from “The naked why they might be wrong. You may notice that the hypothesis for computer” to “The next computer” through the small, the question (1), Where is your mind when playing a video game? is ubiquitous, the global, the insecure, the disruptive, and the in the direction of the view in “The Extended Mind” of Clark and cloud computers. At first, the chapter titles may seem nothing Chalmers (1998). Clark and Chalmers argued that your mind is more than a cleverly constructed sequence of puns, but actually, not confined to the boundaries of your skull, but reaches out into they reflect the content of the chapters fairly accurately. the world it experiences. Likewise, a question similar to (2), Who The author starts with the general concept of computers are you when playing a video game? was explored by Cogburn and he defines what a computer is. The definition goes as and Silcox in their book, Philosophy Through Video Games. In follows. their first chapter, called “I, Player: The Puzzle of Personal Identity (MMORPGs and Virtual Communities),” they ask the personal A computer contains one or more processors which identity question, Is it you who carried out the tasks in the video operate on data. The processor(s) are connected game? Moreover, the students’ initiative to survey their friends to data storage. The intentions of a human operator to gather intuitions about the levels of engagement of various are conveyed to the computer via a number of input games suggests a natural inclination for experimental philosophy devices. The result of any computation carried out by — 32 — — Philosophy and Computers —

the processor(s) will be shown on a number of display idea of separation, which is a good start (though hardly doable devices. (6-7) by an average user) toward complete security. The description is intended to capture a wide range of A computer that stands alone with no connections computers, and the first chapter already gives a number of to a network is perfectly safe from any technological concrete examples of computers—from Elliot (a computer attack; the only threat that the owner of the computer of the 1960s) to Deep Blue (the chess victor of the 1990s). should be aware of is that of having it stolen. (14) Here the author also outlines the themes that he highlights The next chapter, “The disruptive computer,” is devoted to some in the later chapters to paint a broad picture of computers of the economic and social effects of the latest developments and of computing, as well as of their use and usefulness (or in computer technology. The industrial revolution disrupted harmfulness). The three driving topics are the development of hardware, of software, and of the Internet. These advancements, the wheelwright trade (among others), and similarly, the latest in turn, caused drastic changes in the understanding of what a advances in computing replace certain established types of computer is and where and how it can be put to use. businesses. The most widely known examples come from the entertainment retail industry, where digitized forms of products Chapter 2, “The small computer” gives an outline of the (from music to movies to books) enabled online distribution typical hardware components of a computer. Not only are the and sale, resulting in incredible cost savings. These changes base-2 number system and ASCII mentioned, but the author may be perceived as mainly negative; however, the author manages to outline the fabrication procedure of a silicon chip, points out (following Chris Andersen) that a positive outcome the major types of memory, and various file storage systems. of digitization is the wider availability of a greater variety of Although the author does not write a history of hardware, he products. Beyond the commercial aspects, the very same provides sufficiently many details to give an idea of the scale technologies that are used in digitization opened up creative at which computers became smaller and more powerful in the and artistic fields to the masses. Nowadays, anybody can set up last fifty or so years. These changes lead straightforwardly to a recording studio, create flicks, or take and edit photos—all of the topic of the next chapter. which appear to be superior to their 30-40-year-old counterparts. “The ubiquitous computer” reminds the reader (or “The cloud computer” explains the cloud computing demonstrates to him) that computers are everywhere. Beyond . The author paints a somewhat gloomy picture miniaturization, which was emphasized in the previous chapter, of computer programs running only on centralized servers. the ruggedness of chips and the emergence of wireless The options, then, seem to be free and inferior software communications are mentioned as further factors contributing to ubiquity. The author does not shy away from pointing out both (e.g., a simple word processor or a spreadsheet with basic the pros and the cons of the potency of ever-present computers: functionalities) or highly specialized and expensive software he gives many examples where unobtrusive computers and the (such as an accounting application or a recommendation data they can generate and transmit are welcome additions, but program for targeted marketing). The author mentions a he also cautions about possible safety and security problems. parallel (following Nicholas Carr) with electricity becoming a RFID tags and cell phone apps, when used in large numbers, utility “flowing” from centralized sources. One should wonder generate enormous amounts of data—just as certain types of whether a closer analogy can be drawn with the electric scientific experiments and measurements do. The problem of motor of which it was once thought that one medium sized handling and analyzing huge amounts of data has been nudging per household would suffice. Some widely used instances of researchers toward across-the-board cooperations for decades. cloud computing are the social networking platforms, where the users do not compute much; rather, they distribute content The next chapter, “The global computer,” takes up the issue and engage in small-scale (self-)advertising. of largeness from the point of view of the amount of computation that has to be performed. The author introduces the class of The book concludes with an inevitably speculative chapter NP-complete problems, which he colorfully labels as “wicked about the future of computing. The main focus here is on new problems,” using two easy-to-understand examples. Problems, types of computers, some of which might even depart from like the traveling salesman, are solvable in principle; however, the so-called von Neumann (or stored-program) structure. The they are too complex for their solution to be feasible to compute versatility of modern computers is due (at least at the level of in all but very small cases. A practical way to deal with such processors) to their capability of inputting programs as data; problems is to give up the requirement of obtaining an exact then, instructions are executed one by one. Neural networks solution and, instead, settle for finding a “good enough” one. have a different structure, which was originally motivated by The author mentions as potential approaches to discovering ideas about how neurons in the brain form a network. The most approximate solutions genetic algorithms and swarm computing, radical divergence from the currently existing computers would as well as variants of AI—before turning to the idea of combining be quantum computers and DNA computers that are already in computers. Supercomputers, Beowulf clusters, and grid sight. They are in their initial phase of development, that is, they computing are different ways of amassing the computational are at the stage of the “proof of concept.” However, theoretical capabilities of many processors. In each case, coordination and work on their properties shows that if they become reality, then communication between the processors is required either within they will revolutionize computing. It is well-known, for example, a stand-alone computer or over longer distances. that quantum computers would effect a complexity jump. Chapter 5 bears the title “The insecure computer.” This This little book will be welcomed by anybody who would like chapter would be a very useful read for every computer user to form an overall picture of the current state of computing and because it explains some of the risks of interactions between some of its future perspectives. The author gives an interesting computers. (Presumably, everybody knows the benefits.) selection of concrete examples, which enliven the book quite a The author provides a list of malware actions (which should bit, but he does not overload the text with computer science appear quite scary to most users) and he gives advice on how terminology. References are provided (at the end of the book) an average user (who is not an IT or CS expert) can protect for those who would like to pursue further some of the themes. his computer. On a slightly more technical side, elements of I am sure that philosophers interested in problems related to cryptography are described (such as symmetric ciphers, public- technology and, in particular, related to computing will find The key cryptography, and SSL). Earlier, the author mentioned the Computer a thought-provoking book and a gratifying read. — 33 —