Hallstrom V. Barker CA2/7
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Filed 9/8/04 Hallstrom v. Barker CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN HOLLY ANN HALLSTROM, B165008 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC140407) v. BOB BARKER et al., Defendants and Respondents. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. George H. Wu, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part. Nick A. Alden for Plaintiff and Appellant. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, Patricia L. Glaser and Sean Riley for Defendants and Respondents Bob Barker, TPIR, LLC, Jeremy Shamos, Roger Dobkowitz and Jonathan Goodson. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, Jeffrey A. Berman, James M. Harris and Sonya S. Brenner for Defendants and Respondents Mark Goodson Productions, L.P., Price Productions, Inc. ______________________________________ After being fired from her role as a model on a television game show plaintiff brought this action against defendants for violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), breach of contract, defamation, violation of the Labor Code, abuse of process and infliction of emotional distress. The issues in this case revolve around plaintiff’s claims defendants trimmed her from the show because she had a disability which caused her to gain weight or in retaliation for her refusal to back the show’s host when another model sued him for sexual harassment. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW For 19 years Holly Hallstrom appeared as a model on the television game show “The Price Is Right.” Her employment on the show ended in 1995. The parties dispute whether Hallstrom resigned or was terminated but defendants conceded the issue of termination for purposes of their motion for summary adjudication. According to Hallstrom, the events leading up to her termination were triggered when another of the show’s models, Dian Parkinson, brought a FEHA action for sexual harassment against the host and executive producer, Bob Barker, and Hallstrom refused to “rally to [Barker’s] defense.” In retaliation, Barker and others affiliated with the show attempted to force her to resign citing as their reason the fact she had recently gained weight and was too fat to model swimsuits. Hallstrom admitted she had gained some weight in the months prior to her termination as the result of taking a prescription medication to treat her hormone imbalance. She denied this weight gain adversely affected her ability to perform as a model on the show. When Hallstrom rejected defendants’ retirement offer they fired her. After she was fired, Hallstrom gave interviews on television shows and in newspapers stating Barker and the show’s producers forced her off the show because she had gained weight. 2 Hallstrom’s television appearances and interviews caused Barker and the show’s production company, TPIR, LLC, to bring a defamation action against her. The complaint alleged Hallstrom’s statements to the media claiming defendants forced her off the show were false and made with malice. Hallstrom cross-complained against Barker, TPIR, its predecessor Mark Goodson Productions (MGP) and other related individuals (hereafter “defendants”). She stated “[i]n the spring of 1995, [she] gained weight because of prescription medication [she] was taking. [Defendants] criticized and harassed [her] because of her weight gain, and attempted to force [her] to resign her employment.” She further stated that although she lost the weight during the summer hiatus of “The Price Is Right,” defendants terminated her nevertheless and hired a younger model to replace her. Hallstrom alleged her termination violated the FEHA’s prohibitions against discrimination based on disability, age and sex as well as an implied contract she would not be fired from the show without good cause. She also alleged causes of action for defamation, violation of the Labor Code, abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants filed a petition to compel arbitration of all causes of action except the FEHA discrimination claims. They argued Hallstrom was a member of the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA) and the terms of her employment were governed by the AFTRA National Code of Fair Practice for Network Television Broadcasting (“AFTRA agreement”), which contains an arbitration provision. The trial court denied the motion to compel. It found the non-contract causes of action were not arbitrable and the contract cause of action, although arbitrable, should be stayed pending the outcome of the non-arbitrable claims. We affirmed the trial court’s 1 order in an unpublished opinion. 1 Barker v. Hallstrom (Dec. 21, 1998, B107908) [nonpub. opn.]. 3 Defendants subsequently moved for summary adjudication on the causes of action not subject to arbitration. The trial court granted the motion and ordered the 2 parties to arbitration on the breach of contract cause of action. Barker and TPIR dismissed their defamation action against Hallstrom. Four months later Hallstrom moved to amend her cross-complaint to allege defendants terminated her in violation of public policy because she refused to aid Barker in defending the FEHA action brought by former model Parkinson. The trial court denied this motion. In the arbitration proceeding the arbitrator dismissed Hallstrom’s contract claim as untimely because she had not initiated arbitration within 12 months from the time the claim arose as required by the AFTRA agreement. The trial court granted defendants’ petition to confirm the award. This appeal timely followed the entry of judgment for defendants. We reverse the trial court’s rulings (1) granting defendants’ motion for summary adjudication on Hallstrom’s causes of action for disability and age discrimination, defamation and violation of Labor Code section 1050; (2) denying her motion to amend her complaint to allege wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (retaliation for opposing sexual harassment); and (3) sustaining defendants’ demurrer to her cause of action for infliction of emotional distress. We affirm the trial court’s rulings (1) granting defendants’ motion for summary adjudication on Hallstrom’s causes of action for sex discrimination and abuse of process, and (2) confirming the arbitration award for defendants on Hallstrom’s cause of action for breach of contract. 2 The trial court earlier sustained a demurrer to the cause of action for infliction of emotional distress on the ground the claim was barred by the Workers Compensation Act. We reverse that ruling. See Part VII, post. 4 DISCUSSION I. TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT EXIST AS TO HALLSTROM’S CLAIM OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION. Hallstrom’s first cause of action, labeled “medical condition discrimination,” alleges in relevant part: “During the Spring of 1995, Hallstrom was required to take prescription medication for a hormonal condition. This medication caused Hallstrom to gain weight. Hallstrom requested a reasonable accommodation from [defendants] to allow her to lose the extra weight during a regular vacation period while the show was on hiatus during the summer of 1995. [Defendants] . refused that accommodation. Although Hallstrom lost the extra weight prior to the resumption of the taping of the show, she was nevertheless terminated due to her perceived weight problem. The [FEHA] prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of a medical condition.” Hallstrom asserts she lost the extra weight by discontinuing the medication prescribed for her hormone condition. She ceased taking the medication, she says, after Barker told her to “do whatever it takes” to lose the weight. In California, employment discrimination is unlawful whether based on a “medical 3 condition” or on a “physical disability.” These are separate forms of discrimination; each with its own statutory definition. At the time Hallstrom was terminated from her employment a “medical condition” for FEHA purposes was limited to “any health impairment related to or associated with a 4 diagnosis of cancer[.]” The much broader category of “physical disability” was then and is now defined by a two prong test. A “physical disability” includes, but is not limited to, “any physiological disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss that does both of the following: (A) Affects one or more . body systems [including 3 Government Code section 12940, subdivision (a). 4 Government Code section 12926, former subdivision (f), (Stats. 1993, ch. 1214, § 5). 5 the reproductive system] (B) Limits an individual’s ability to participate in major life 5 activities.” In their motion for summary adjudication, defendants argued Hallstrom could not prevail on a cause of action for discrimination based on a “medical condition.” She never contended her hormone imbalance was “related to or associated with a diagnosis of cancer” and, in fact, made judicial admissions to the contrary. We agree with defendants and the trial court. Hallstrom cannot maintain an action for discrimination based on “medical condition.” Anticipating Hallstrom would claim her first cause of action was actually for discrimination based on “disability,” not “medical condition,” defendants explained why this