Legacies of Revolution: Popular Militias and the Rule of Law Mariano Sánchez-Talanquer ∗ Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies Harvard University Department of Politics Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE)
[email protected] October 2018 Working draft. Abstract I examine why emerging revolutionary regimes delegate control over the use of violence to popular militias despite associated agency risks, and the long-run legacies for the rule of law. Drawing on a new geocoded dataset of over 1,700 semi-official peasant militias in postrevolutionary Mexico, I first argue that militias help central elites establish local control during early phases of revolutionary state-building and show that militia mobilization maps onto the geography of mass counterrevolutionary contention. I next document that militia mobilization stunts the development of institutions that underpin the rule of law in the long run. Historical reliance on militias foreshadows more rudimentary local civilian police forces today, weaker formal institutional channels to adjudicate local disputes, and vigilantism in the context of the Mexican drug war. Findings are based on various quantitative identification strategies, while archival materials support pathways connecting historical experience to long-term outcomes. The article provides unusually fine-grained insight into the formation of states with lax control over violent means and brings attention to dynamic inconsistency during state-building as a source of territorial variation in the strength of the rule of law. ∗I am grateful to Kenneth Roberts, Gustavo Flores-Macías, Tom Pepinsky, and Sid Tarrow for their guidance. I also thank Xiomara Chávez, Gustavo Gordillo, Fran Hagopian, Imke Harbers, Horacio Larreguy, Steve Levitsky, Nathan Nunn, Raúl Sánchez de la Sierra, Abbey Steele, Rachel Sweet, David Szakonyi, and Yuhua Wang for helpful comments.