YOUTH ARMED VIOLENCE INTERVENTIONS: The Caribbean and its Toronto Diaspora
Sandra Chadwick-Parkes, PhD
Project Ploughshares 57 Erb Street West Waterloo, Ontario Canada N2L 6C2 Tel: (519) 888-6541 Website: http//www.ploughshares.ca About this Paper This paper was prepared for the Small Arms Working Group of Peacebuild. Project Ploughshares was the Coordinator of the Small Arms Working Group from 2004 through to 2010. The paper is part of a series that explored the relationship between armed violence and development. .
Peacebuild Peacebuild, the Canadian Peacebuilding Network, is a member-based network of Canadian non-governmental organizations and institutions, academics and individuals engaged in a wide range of activities related to addressing the cause and consequences of violent conflict, Peacebuild 207-145 Spruce Street Ottawa, Ontario, KIR 6P1, Canada Tel: (613) 232-0647 www.peacebuild.ca
Project Ploughshares Project Ploughshares is a non-governmental organization that works with churches, nongovernmental organizations, and governments, in Canada and abroad, to advance policies and actions that prevents war and armed violence and build peace. Project Ploughshares 57 Erb Street West Waterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2 Canada 519-888-6541 Fax: 519-888-0018 [email protected] www.ploughshares.ca
Acknowledgment This research was undertaken with the financial support of the Government of Canada provided through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).
Disclaimer Peacebuild and Project Ploughshares Working Papers are published to contribute to public discussion and debate of peace and security issues. The views and policies presented in this paper are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the policies of Peacebuild, Project Ploughshares and its sponsoring churches and agencies, or the Canadian International Development Agency. TABLE OF CONTENTS
i Acronyms ii Acknowledgements 1 Executive Summary 5 1: Introduction 8 1.1 Organization of the Paper 8 2: Methodology 8 2.1 Case Study Selection Criteria 9 3: Background to the Problem: The Caribbean and Toronto 11 4: The Reasons behind Youth Armed Violence 13 5: Approaches to Youth Armed Violence 13 5.1 The Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) Approach 14 5.2 The Public Health Approach to Violence Prevention 15 5.3 The Ecological Approach 15 5.4 The Epidemiological Approach 16 5.5 The Integrated Framework Approach 17 5.6 The Comprehensive Community Gang Program Approach 18 5.7 Community Policing 18 5.8 Features of Successful Community Interventions 19 6: Community Approaches to Youth Armed Violence: The Case Studies 19 6.1 Breaking the Cycle (BTC): Youth Gang Exit Program and Ambassador Leadership Project 19 6.1.1 Background 24 6.1.2 BTC Program Design 25 6.1.3 Phase I: Assessment and Intake: The Leadership and Support Project 25 6.1.4 Intensive Training and Personal Development 26 6.1.5 The Case Management Process and Follow-Up Phase 27 6.1.6 Phase II: Selecting and Developing Leaders; Youth Ambassador Leadership and Employment Preparation Project 29 6.1.7 The Role of Women in Gangs and Violence 30 6.1.8 BTC Program Means 31 6.1.9 BTC Project Outcome 33 6.1.10 Summary 34 6.2. The Peace Management Initiative (PMI) Jamaica 34 6.2.1 Background 35 6.2.2 PMI Program Design 39 6.2.3 The Role of Women in Gangs and Violence 39 6.2.4 PMI Project Means 41 6.2.5 PMI Project Outcomes
42 7. Conclusion 44 7.1 Lessons Learned 47 Bibliography Figures 9 Figure 1: Homicide by Region (per 100,000 Inhabitants), 2004 10 Figure 2: Toronto Shooting Injury Levels (2006-2009) 14 Figure 3: The Public Health Approach to Violence Prevention 15 Figure 4: The Ecological Approach to Understanding Crime and Violence 16 Figure 5: The Integrated Model of Violence Causality 21 Figure 6: Birth Origins of BTC Participants (2008-2010) 24 Figure 7: Components of BTC’s Gang Exit Strategy 32 Figure 8: BTC Space and Action Continuum Points System
Tables 20 Table 1: Arrest Record of BTC Youth 22 Table 2: Age Demographics of BTC participants: August 2007–December 2009 32 Table 3: Results of the 9-week Follow-Up of Youth from the January 2009 BTC Program ACRONYMS
AVD Armed Violence and Development AVR Armed Violence Reduction and Prevention AYF Area Youth Foundation BDC The Black Daddy’s Club BTC Breaking the Cycle Program CAEP Canadian Association of Emergency Physicians CBT Cognitive Behavioural Therapy CTI Canadian Training Institute GTA Greater Toronto and Area HEART NTA Heart Trust, The National Training Agency (Jamaica) HRSDC Human Resources and Social Development Canada NGO Nongovernmental Organizations OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OSSD Ontario Secondary School Diploma PMI The Peace Management Initiative SDC Social Development Commission UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime WIGS Wildly Important Goal Setting WOLA Washington Office on Latin America
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research would not have been possible without the time and contribution of staff and participants of Project Ploughshares and the programs presented in this study. I would like to express my gratitude, first and foremost to Maribel Gonzales, program officer at Project Ploughshares, who shared considerable literature, research reports and other material on youth armed violence across the globe, and also provided input into this study. My gratitude goes to John Sawdon of the Canadian Training Institute, founder of the Breaking the Cycle program. I would also like to express my thanks to BTC project coordinator Gary Newman and program facilitators Shaka Licorish and Jumoke Famutimi, who detailed processes and supplied data. I am also grateful to the program participants who shared their experiences. For the Caribbean component of the research, Mr. Horace Levy, board member and mediator of The Peace Management Initiative (PMI) in Kingston, patiently endured a long telephone interview. His invaluable input helped me to understand PMI’s process and practice, and verify other research on the topic.
ii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
With 66 per cent of all homicides occurring in countries not experiencing major violent conflict, armed violence is now a global social problem. Even more alarming is that much of this violence is perpetrated by young people, who are also over-represented among the victims. Youth armed violence is now a grave concern at every level of society and initiatives to deal with this issue have been increasing. More recently, steps have been undertaken to map those initiatives, especially at the community level, and document and disseminate good practice in addressing the problem. In furtherance of the goal of the Small Arms Working Group and Project Ploughshares to reduce violence and build peace, this study presents case studies of two specific programs that are enjoying some measure of success: The Peace Management Initiative (PMI) in Kingston, Jamaica and the Breaking the Cycle (BTC) Project in Toronto. Both programs were selected because of their success with gang-associated, violent youth in Jamaica’s inner city and in Toronto’s Caribbean diaspora communities respectively. Both are linked by the study’s Caribbean youth focus. The link goes even deeper: the perception is that much of the violence in Toronto is perpetrated by youth of Caribbean, particularly Jamaican, heritage. The research highlights several models for addressing youth armed violence. While both programs adopt variations of these approaches, the Armed Violence Reduction and Development (AVR) approach, which aims at reducing the risks and impacts of armed violence, is particularly relevant. PMI intervenes first to quell violence and then offers livelihood opportunities to address poverty. Also acknowledging the direct link between low socio-economic status and violence, BTC offers the opportunity to exit gangs and lead more productive lives through education and by building leadership skills. Both programs also address the psychological issues typical of violence, such as anger management, conflict resolution and the need for life-coping skills. However, because of the complex and interrelated causes of such violence, the models associated with youth armed violence agree on the need for mult-isector, multi-level interventions. The two programs offer some common lessons. The first involves the utilization of former gang- and gun-associated persons in violence reduction programs. Though far more difficult to implement in Jamaican society than Canadian, this strategy is acknowledged to enhance program effectiveness, both in gang member rehabilitation and outreach to those on the brink of violent action. Both studies reveal a positive impact on violence reduction when youth are exposed to areas outside their community domain and to new learning experiences. These experiences serve to “open their eyes” to what exists outside their world and expose them to new growth possibilities. It must be understood that most gang-involved youth are exposed to violence from birth and, hence, view violence as a norm until they learn otherwise. Such an insight highlights the need for agencies involved in violence reduction to provide long-term growth
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opportunities and educational, cultural, sporting and personal development to replace negative experiences. One cannot stop the support as soon as a gang-involved youth graduates from a program or community violence is quelled. Both programs demonstrate that ‘at-risk’ is equally applicable to gang entry and recidivism. If there are no available opportunities to grow or earn money after leaving a gang or when violence stops, it is easy to fall back into old habits. The Armed Violence and Development approach speaks to this need as it acknowledges the complex links between violence and development. Neither program has a partnership with law enforcement officials, despite the importance the literature attributes to police presence in youth programs. BTC’s efforts to seek out such partnerships have met with the derision of Toronto police officers. Because inner-city Kingston residents strongly distrust their local officers, PMI deliberately distances itself from the police. But as these case studies illustrate, the police cannot make significant inroads into violence reduction until they treat residents of violent communities with dignity and respect. Despite their vital roles as perpetrators and victims, females tend to be ignored in the literature and programs. Yet they are the ones who egg on the males, facilitate the violence by transporting guns and luring victims, and are targeted to punish male relations. They, too, are brought up in violent environs and, like their males counterparts, form their own gangs. The lesson to learn is that programs must also target young women and girls. Both male and female youth from the Caribbean, especially Jamaica, associate guns and aggression with strength and manhood. Programs must include reorientation of both male and female ideals to create healthy social constructs of what it means to be Caribbean. Perhaps most critically, both case studies recognize the importance of community and its role in youth behavioural and attitudinal development, problems and, hence, solutions. The impact of stereotyping, marginalization and ostracism were very clearly articulated in both contexts. The process of preparing for a life of violence begins early. Young children mimic the colours, dress code and behaviours of elders and are indoctrinated into a culture of violence and weapons use, which they see as normal. As a result, family values break down and the community is fractured. The case studies demonstrate and reinforce the need for a holistic and systemic community development approach in which parenting skills, as well as family, community, socioeconomic, psychological and cultural development are all critical to reduce and end youth armed violence. Community events bring people together and enable them to see that they are more alike than different. Such events create bonds that cement relations, build social capital and thereby positively impact on youth. Social capital refers to “levels of general trust and inter-connectivity within society… shared norms and values, affirmed through sustained interaction and cooperation” (Gilchrist 2004: 4). It is well documented that in violent contexts, social capital acts as informal social control, shapes community interaction and helps to build safer communities (CTI 2010; Pantoja 1999; Woolcock 1998). As an old African proverb states, “it takes an entire village to raise a child,” and as the case studies reveal, individuals and groups outside the family who live in the community have as much impact on a child’s wellbeing or ill-being as does the family unit. This recognition and acknowledgement of the importance of community and promoting local development are critical in reducing youth armed violence. Hence, the best programs target the many layers of community life and are context specific. Youth Violence
To succeed, these programs require funding and meaningful partnerships. PMI has availed itself of partnerships to a greater extent than has BTC. However, in Kingston, violence is an acknowledged social problem on which government, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector expend significant resources. While Toronto also recognizes the mounting problem of youth violence, fear and perhaps the racialized nature of violence lead to many more difficulties in brokering partnerships and funding. The cynicism with which some ‘partners’ view programs like BTC is a cause for concern. If the problem of youth armed violence is dealt with only by traditional policing and larger penal systems, it will not be resolved. Unless the causes of violence are tackled, future growth and development will suffer. The author is aware of the problems of generalizing from two case studies, but Youth Armed Violence Interventions: The Caribbean and its Toronto Diaspora reveals several common strategies that serve as a starting point. It is recommended that the study be expanded to examine the situation and programs in other Caribbean countries where youth armed violence is on the increase, as well as the many programs serving the Caribbean diaspora in Canada. Both contexts offer much to inform new program development.
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1. Introduction
While community participation is implicit in community development, its importance to national development has gained renewed attention with popularization of the ‘bottom-up’ approach. Today there is a burgeoning literature on community interventions on any number of development issues—except in the field of youth armed violence, where documentation is somewhat new. Community and community-based initiatives in addressing youth violence are significant because of the escalating problem of armed violence in non-conflict areas. This significance is premised on the community’s role as an agent of socialization that helps shape both youth development and problem behaviours (Ferrer-Wreder et al 2004: 153). Hence, the community is also an appropriate setting for influencing youth positively and addressing violence (Ferrer-Wreder et al 2004: 153). This point is underscored by the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA 2008: 3), which notes that “small, locally-run programs” can have a significant impact on violence reduction in specific communities and can “grow into larger models.” The scale of the armed violence problem is reflected in findings, published in the 2008 Report on the Global Burden of Armed Violence, that 66 per cent of homicides occur in non-conflict settings (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008: 3). Armed violence spans a continuum that ranges from armed conflict, through chronic violent crime, to interpersonal violence. It is defined as the intentional use of illegitimate force (actual or threatened) with arms against a person, group, community, to inflict injury, death or psychosocial harm that undermines people- centred security and sustainable development (Adapted from the Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008: 2 and OECD 2009: 13).
This definition encompasses intercommunal and collective violence, organized criminal and economically motivated violence, politically motivated violence, and interpersonal violence. Youth—those aged 12-30 years—are the main perpetrators and victims (WOLA 2008: 1). This problem has escalated in the Caribbean since the mid-1990s. There, 80 per cent of violent crime is committed by men under the age of 35, with an increasing number under the age of 14 (Moser and van Bronkhorst 1999: 3). Youth armed violence often concentrates in those areas that can least afford it—poor and marginal communities (WOLA 2008: 2). Beyond its impact on the local area, this violence elicits a
Homicide is defined as “the unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another person” (UNODC 2009, accessed at http://www.chartsbin.com). The World Health Organization World Report on Violence and Health (2002) shows that during the 1991-2001 period, the majority of homicide victims were 15-24 years old. Youth Violence
significant toll on society in physical, human, social, economic, psychological, gendered and cultural terms. For example, crime and violence destroy physical infrastructure and negatively affect the overall investment climate (Ayres 1998: 7). Gun-related violence invades streets, kills innocent bystanders, creates an atmosphere of insecurity and fear, and depletes government resources. Homicide negates achievements in reducing child mortality, diverts development resources to security and penal institutions, and shifts medical resources from chronic and acute illnesses to violence-related injuries. Attempts at quantifying the costs of armed violence and crime reveal their significant economic toll. For example, the Canadian Association of Emergency Physicians (CAEP) states that “in addition to morbidity and mortality, the total medical cost (including direct care costs and lost productivity) associated with firearm-related injuries in Canada in 1991 was estimated at $6.6 billion” (Snider et al 2009: 65). In Jamaica, the cost of crime is estimated at 3.7 per cent of GDP (UNODC/WB 2007: 52). This latter figure includes health, lost productivity from mortality and injury, and public expenditure on security. It excludes private sector security costs, long-term social and economic impacts, victims’ emotional distress and the general effects of living in fear of victimization. At a community level, armed violence and crime erode productive investment, deter productive employment opportunities and create a vicious cycle of youth survival strategies based on violence and criminal activities (UNODC/WB 2007: 52). In all these ways and more, youth armed violence stymies development in the First World and perpetuates Third World underdevelopment. Governments are only now recognizing the critical deterrent to development that this violence represents, and are beginning to invest in policies and programs to address the problem (UNODC/WB 1999: 149; Buvinić, Alda & Lamas 2005: 3). Needless to say, youth armed violence cannot be separated from gang violence. Though crime, violence and gangs are not recent phenomena, the associated scale, scope, ferocity, use of weapons and youth involvement are. However, the literature reveals some confusion of terminology. For example, WOLA (2008: 2) uses the terms “youth”, “street” and “neighbourhood” gangs interchangeably to describe adolescents—primarily though not exclusively boys, ages 12-17—and young adults— primarily young males, ages into the early 20s—who come together in response to needs for identity and belonging. In these gangs, alcohol and drug abuse are common, as is violent intra- and inter-gang activity…. Youth gangs can mutate into organized criminal groups…. But the dominant model continues to be one in which violence is expressive, rather than instrumental, and criminal activity is a secondary rather than the central activity of the gang.
In the Canadian context, Robert Gordon (Solicitor General 1999: 4) identifies three gang types: • Criminal business organizations, which are organized criminal groups with a formal structure and a high degree of sophistication; • Street gangs, which are semi-structured groups of youth and young adults who engage in planned and profitable criminal behaviour or organized violence against rival gangs; • Wannabe groups, which are unstructured groups of young people who engage in spontaneous social activity and exciting, impulsive criminal activity, including collective violence against other groups of youth.
This research does not focus on organized criminal groups. Youth Violence
He further notes the difficulty of distinguishing street gangs from wannabe groups: While street gangs may have a stronger negative impact on a community, through crime and violence, wannabe groups tend to be very visible. This can result in an inflated perception of a gang problem. In general, members of wannabe groups tend to be younger than those of street gangs (hence the term “youth gangs”) and often claim affiliations with street gangs, which may or may not exist. (Solicitor General 1999: 4)
This inflated perception of gangs is supported by estimates from the Canadian Training Institute (CTI) that “less than one per cent of youth in Canada belong to hard core criminal gangs” (CTI 2003: 3). In the case of Toronto, the site of the Canadian case study, the police defines a youth gang as “a group of three or more youth whose members routinely commit serious crimes and regularly engage in severe acts of violence” (CTI 2003: 3). It is estimated that there were 80 street gangs in 1998, of which 20 could be classified as ‘hard core gangs’ (Victims of Violence 2011) involving approximately 2,000 youth in the GTA (CTI 2003: 1). There are two gang types in the city: intercommunity gangs comprised of “a diverse group of youths who engage in violent or criminal activity within or to defend a specific territory” and sporadic gangs of groups of “youth involved in crime and/or violence (often motivated by thrill-seeking or influenced by popular media) but [which] do not have true gang affiliations” (Solicitor General 1999: 11). WOLA (2008: 2) stresses the importance of understanding “the nature of youth gangs, what they are and why they form” in order to formulate effective responses. In recognition of the scale of the problem and its implications for development, efforts to understand and address youth armed violence have increased. Organizations such as the Quaker United Nations Office have begun mapping community, civil society and government responses to youth violence and gangs (Drury 2010: 1). Mapping is intended to assist in discerning and disseminating successful interventions and promoting adaptation and replication of best practice elements. To advance documenting and disseminating of best practice, the Small Arms Working Group (SAWG), in association with Project Ploughshares, commissioned this study of successful community-based approaches in both GTA communities with large Caribbean concentrations and in the Caribbean islands. The study will document community interventions in these two areas and draw lessons. Justification for the Caribbean focus is threefold. First, very little Canadian research exists on youth armed violence and gang involvement (Solicitor General 1999: 1). Secondly, the issue is highly racialized, with gang members often portrayed as visible minorities, particularly black youth of Caribbean heritage (Solicitor General 1999:1). Third, the study is consistent with Project Ploughshares’ work in the region to reduce armed violence and build peace. Certainly, success in stemming violence in the Caribbean will have relevance to efforts within diaspora communities and vice versa.
CTI is a national voluntary organization that provides training and consulting services and undertakes applied research demonstration projects (Evans and Sawdon 2004). This statement is attributed to Mark Totten (1999) of the Youth Services Bureau of Ottawa-Carleton. However, the CTI document Youth Justice in Canada (2003) does not include a bibliographic reference. However, Fasiolo & Leckie (1993: page #?) argue that the Canadian media portrayal of “gangs as a modern phenomenon, widespread and a threat to society generates panic and may spur the growth of gangs than combat [please check quote] what may not even be a serious problem to begin with.” Youth Violence
1.1 Organization of the Paper This paper is organized into six main sections. Section 1, Introduction (above), introduces the problem and the purpose of this research. Section 2, Methodology, outlines the criteria for selecting the two case studies and is subdivided by location. Section 3, Background to the Problem, constitutes the literature review and is followed by Section 4, The Reasons behind Youth Armed Violence, which examines why youth are attracted to gangs and violence. Section 5, Approaches to Youth Armed Violence, examines six models: armed violence reduction and prevention (AVR), public health, epidemiological, ecological, integrated framework and comprehensive community approaches. Section 6 introduces the two case studies, Breaking the Cycle in Toronto and The Peace Management Initiative in Jamaica. The paper concludes and offers lessons learned in Section 7.
2. Methodology The purpose of the study is twofold: to document community-based initiatives that address youth armed violence and to glean lessons. This research defines youth as 15-29 years of age. Given that one goal of SAWG and Project Ploughshares is to reduce youth armed violence by replicating success factors, the study logically focuses on initiatives that have achieved some success in youth armed violence prevention, intervention and rehabilitation and law enforcement, or a combination thereof. Thus, notable success is one criterion for case study selection. The interventions were evaluated according to 1. Program design: What intervention strategies do the organizations use? How are they delivered? 2. Means: What is the nature of partnerships between the program, the community and other partners? Are these real or paper partnerships? Is funding a concern? To what extent are the funds available sufficient to realize program objectives? 3. Outcome: How effective are the interventions in deterring youth gang involvement and recidivism? How effective are interventions in addressing the barriers youth face? The methodology involved a combination of methods and data sources: • A literature review of existing research and other documents on youth armed violence and gangs, a significant proportion of which was provided by Ploughshares project associate Maribel Gonzales; • Review of websites and literature on the studied programs; • Telephone interviews with The Peace Management Initiative staff; • Face-to-face interviews with program staff and beneficiaries at Breaking the Cycle and the Canadian Training Institute. 2.1. Case Study Selection Criteria As previously noted, the literature fails to offer a consistent definition of youth. Though the researcher sought to select programs that conform to the age-related criterion of 15-29 years established in the Terms of Reference, this proved problematic as programs adopt their own age-related definitions. Moreover, prevention strategies will, invariably, target at-risk youth who are generally younger than 15. Adherence to the age criterion was especially difficult in the Caribbean, where programs focus on violence reduction and are, therefore, not age specific. In addition, comparing programs across different political, economic, social and cultural contexts challenges selection criteria as a whole. Given that the primary research goals are the mapping of Youth Violence successful process and practice and the distillation of best practice interventions, adherence to the age category was, in the case of Jamaica, made subservient to a record of success. However, it is to be noted that much of the Jamaican community violence is perpetuated by youth aged 17-30 (Levy 2005). The research objectives rendered purposive sampling the most appropriate method for selecting the case studies. Jamaica was selected because of its response to high levels of armed violence with community initiatives. It yielded seven community-based programs, including the Peace Management Initiative, which has an impressive record of brokering peace in 60 urban communities since its inception. Because five of the other programs did not respond and the sixth, Children First, targets street children who are not gang-involved and are considerably younger than the focus age group, PMI became the obvious choice for this study. The GTA has several gang and violence reduction programs. Based on the primary selection criterion of neighbourhoods with large Caribbean concentrations, Rexdale, Scarborough and Regent Park were evident choices. Relevant programs in these areas are Breaking the Cycle in the Rexdale and Scarborough areas; the Regent Park Community Health Centre, which operates a youth program, and Peacebuilders in Regent Park and St. Jamestown. The second stratification level was degree of success measured as the number of youth who were rehabilitated and did not re-offend, though this is tempered by the improbability of a 100 per cent success rate. Because the author was unable to contact the Regent Park Community Health Centre and Peacebuilders responded too late for inclusion, Breaking the Cycle was left as the sole GTA case study.
Figure 1 World South Africa Central America South America East Africa Caribbean East Europe North Africa North America Central Asia & Transcaucasian countries Near and Middle East/Southwest Asia Oceania South Asia Southeast Europe East & Southeast Asia West & Central Europe 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Source: UN Crime Trends Survey 2010
3. Background to the Problem: The Caribbean and Toronto In contrast to the idyllic setting portrayed in glossy magazines, Figure 1 shows that in 2004 the Caribbean had the fifth highest homicide rate in the world (UNODC/WB 2007; Muggah &
Purposive selection in case study research is well supported (Yin 2003; Hakim 2000; Neuman 2000). As Flick (1998:41), for example, points out, “it is the relevance [of the cases] to the research topic rather than their representativeness which determines the way in which the people to be studied are to be selected.” 10 Youth Violence
Krause 2008:1). Its homicide rates are surpassed only by those of regions that are experiencing serious conflict. The Caribbean murder rate doubled over the last decade with homicides, at 30 per 100,000 of the population. The rape rates are also above the average, with a reported 48 per cent incidence of forced adolescent female sexual initiation (Halcon et al 2003: 1855).
While several reasons account for these high violence levels, the most significant is that the Caribbean archipelago lies in the path of international drug trafficking. The islands are critical transhipment points for drug flows between producers in South America and consumers in North America and Europe (UNODC/WB 2008: iv). Kidnappings, robberies and other crimes aggravate insecurity and fear and lead some to seek safety in developed countries and, more particularly, cities such as Toronto. Yet, despite Toronto’s reputation as a safe city, youth violence has increased in the last decade. Crime figures (Figure 2) reveal the prevalence of gun-related injuries.10 The weapons, mainly handguns, enter Canada illegally from the United States and municipal demands to outlaw them have met with federal government resistance.11 Nonetheless, all three levels of government have acknowledged the seriousness of the problem and provided targeted funding and other resources, including a National Forum on Youth Gangs in 1999.12 Figure 2 Toronto Shooting Injury Levels 2006-2009
200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 x 40 x 20 x x 0 2006 2007 2008 2009
Death No Injuries Injuries x Unknown Source: Toronto Police Statistics 2010
These are reported incidents only. Jamaica is also a significant cannabis producer and exporter (UNODC/WB 2008: iv). 10 On December 26, 2005, 15-year-old Jane Creba was killed while shopping on Yonge Street in Toronto, when a gang shooting erupted. In April 2010, four male youth aged 22-27 were sentenced for her murder, while another six were released (Kaszor. 2010: 1). Two days later, crossfire claimed another innocent victim who was walking home from work. 11 As well, the establishment of a Canadian Gun Registry was scrapped millions of dollars after it was instituted by a different government. 12 In 2008, the Government of Canada allocated $4.9 million for a project to prevent and reduce street gang activity in Toronto (Public Safety Canada 2008). This money came from a dedicated Youth Gang Prevention Fund, which falls under the National Crime Prevention Strategy. Youth Violence 11
4. The Reasons behind Youth Armed Violence The literature abounds with reasons why youth join gangs and engage in violence. Frederick Mathews (1993) for example, contends that the media, home environment and peers shape social learning and can easily reinforce violent, aggressive or antisocial traits. Aggressive tendencies are especially bolstered by constant exposure to television and video game violence as neither medium portrays realistic outcomes. To the extent that acting out these behaviours goes unpunished or undetected, escalation is inevitable (Mathews 1993). Peer pressure, risk-taking, support, diffusion of responsibility, and feelings of solidarity also encourage violence (Victims of Violence 2011). Aggressive youth behaviour has also been linked to such aspects of community life as community disengagement, resident turnover, repeated exposure to crime and violence, poverty, lack of community resources, and both access and permissive attitudes to firearms, alcohol and other drugs (Ferrer-Wreder et al 2004: 153). Racism, family breakdown, and unemployment are also established factors (WOLA 2008:2). The majority of Toronto’s gang-involved youth reside in communities with few educational and recreational facilities, and limited economic and employment opportunities (Evans & Sawdon 2004). These community features affect their emotional, psychological and educational development, and create barriers to productive living. These findings reinforce the link between community conditions and deviance. Mathews (1993), however, paints a different profile of violent Canadian youth. He found that most of Southern Ontario’s gang-involved youth are from the middle class, with intact family structures and “access to material comforts, career pathways, part-time jobs, and other supports.” While similar factors of poverty, violence, drugs and access to firearms are push factors in the Caribbean, the root cause and environment that foster youth armed violence are somewhat different. Kenneth Pryce (2007:9) depicts Caribbean development as based on a system of exploitation that enriches a few and dispossesses the masses. In contrast to developed countries where unemployment rates of 7 per cent galvanize governments to action, 20-50 per cent levels in the Caribbean are considered the norm (Pryce 2007: 10). With few social safety nets, the unemployed are left to employ such survival strategies as “pimping, hustling, pushing, scrunting, prostitution, violence and wretchedness” (Pryce 2007: 9). Research shows that high levels of inequality and social exclusion fuel violence (Buvinić, Alda & Lamas 2005: 4). Hence, as Pryce (2007:9) observes, Caribbean development is “development of underdevelopment,” which fosters a general acceptance of unlawful behaviour. It is little wonder then that politics and the need to secure control over government largesse contribute to youth armed violence (Townsend 2009; Levy 2005; Mogensen 2005). The following description of inner- city life in Jamaica supports this argument: It is the existence of an inner city of black people suffering huge unemployment, poverty, often derelict infrastructure, few social services but considerable social stigma, and a justice system characterized by vigilante or trigger-happy police, over-long court proceedings and over-crowded prisons. This inner city concentrates the very communities at “war” so that middle class politicians can acquire and hold onto political power and the mostly lighter-skinned middle and upper classes can be secure behind their grills (Levy 2005: 2-3). In previous research by this author, it was documented that Jamaican inner city youth, whether gang-involved or not, live in abject poverty in communities lacking basic infrastructure such as 12 Youth Violence
sanitation facilities, have little to eat, and few employment opportunities due to area stigmatization (Harriott & Chadwick 1999). Educational attainment is generally low. While youth have access to educational facilities, hunger and disruptions from sporadic violence deter attendance. Conversely, a direct positive relationship is discerned between youth armed violence and GDP growth in Trinidad and Tobago (UNODC/World Bank 2007:33). Links have also been made between youth crime and violence and family structure, home environment and level of family carer. In the Caribbean non-nuclear family forms predominate.13 Ramesh Deosaran (2007a: 188) counters that the level of happiness in the home is a greater determinant to youth deviance than is the nature of the family structure. Yet his study of 486 incarcerated youth aged 16-18 in Trinidad reveals that 76 per cent lived without both parents, with a guardian, with friends, or alone (Deosaran 2007a: 187). Approximately 52 per cent had primary school education and 60 per cent came from homes where the household head was in a blue-collar occupation. Deosaran’s results demonstrate that youth crime and violence are influenced by family structure, educational attainment and economic situation. The concentration of armed violence in Jamaica’s inner city supports this conclusion. Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999: 3) report strong links between unemployment, pregnancy, domestic violence, and interpersonal and gang violence. Moreover, the presence of a large youth population, coupled with low economic growth and high unemployment, increases the probability of early exposure to the court system and youth crime and violence (UNODC/World Bank 2007: 27). As earlier mentioned, the Caribbean’s location along the drug transhipment route is a significant contributor to its high crime and violence rates and has, in turn, led to an influx of drugs and small arms into the region (UNODC/WB 2007: 19, 33). This situation is compounded by the inflow of criminal deportees, political corruption and links to criminal elements, police brutality and crime involvement, school delinquency and drug use (Deosaran 2007b: 242). Apart from the push factors for gang involvement, gangs also have social, political, and economic pull. Young males invariably veer toward group formation or gangs for reasons other than perpetrating crime and violence. Gangs offer social, political and economic inclusion, excitement and entertainment (Dowdney 2005: 12); are a means of seeking attention (Solicitor General 1999: 12), fulfill members’ needs for identity and belonging and provide outlets to alleviate feelings of alienation (WOLA 2008:2). As well, gangs enable adolescents to explore identity, including deviant identity, beget peer acceptance and fulfil the need for family and/or parental attachments (CTI 2003: 2). Hence, gangs act as a surrogate family in the absence of close attachments or reduced family care. In some instances youth become exposed to gang activity through family members (Solicitor General 1999:11). In sum, gang-involved youth share common characteristics: absence of close family ties, difficulty in school and a social network that includes gang members (CTI 2003:2).
13 Within the Caribbean context of migration and plantation, Afro-Caribbean peoples tended toward matriarchal family structure, nuclear or not, while the patriarchal extended family structure was typical of Indo-Caribbean families (Deosaran 2007a: 187). M.G. Smith (1965) identified common-law and visiting structures. Visiting relationships fell within a matriarchal extended structure among Afro-Caribbean families. Hence, multi-fatherhood, whereby a man fathers children with several women, and the female-headed household are common features. However the modern common single female-headed household lacks the support of the extended family in which children were always supervised and cared for when the mother worked outside the household. Youth Violence 13
5. APPROACHES TO YOUTH ARMED VIOLENCE Traditional approaches to youth issues and development focused on deviance and measures to prevent repeat offending. Youth violence, for example, tends to be addressed through the criminal justice system, incarceration, remedial prison programs and tougher sentencing (Moser & van Bronkhorst 1999: 6). Irving Spergel’s (1995) view is that this approach treats the symptoms, not the causes and thereby fails to address the problem. Research shows that youth problem behaviours develop in early childhood and are preventable. Burt (1998: 54), for example, argues that youth behaviour is learned “in the context of the…family and family dynamics, peer group, and neighbourhood and social opportunities.” Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999:3) proffer a similar perspective: Youth, particularly those living in marginalized neighborhoods, face trauma and stress related to living in violent situations, both from local violence and gangs and from household violence (child abuse and domestic violence). Some of the consequences include low educational attainment, lack of employment alternatives, and involvement in gang activities, criminal activities, and delinquency.
Several new approaches or models have since been developed. A number are discussed in the forthcoming sections. 5.1 The Armed Violence Reduction and Prevention (AVR) Approach Integrated, comprehensive and inclusive armed violence reduction and prevention (AVR) represents an emergent area in development. This approach is promoted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It promotes integrated, multi-sectoral approaches that combine both developmental and preventive strategies with effective law enforcement efforts (OECD 2009: 15). AVR also advocates multi-level responses that address armed violence risk factors at local, national, regional and global levels. Though it is acknowledged that every armed violence situation is unique, AVR practitioners have discerned common structural and risk patterns regardless of the nature of the violence. The key elements and levels that shape armed violence are (i) the people affected by armed violence; (ii) the perpetrators and their motivations; (iii) the availability of arms; (iv) the wider institutional and cultural environment that enables and/or protects against armed violence. The AVR lens posits that identifying and acting upon these commonalities can, through a combination of models/approaches, help in diagnosing and responding to armed violence. AVR programmes utilise direct and indirect approaches. Directly, they aim to explicitly prevent and reduce violence. Indirectly, they seek to adapt existing sector-specific interventions to address known risk factors that contribute to armed violence (OECD 2009:17). AVR targets armed violence from community, government, and donors’ perspectives in recognition that reducing armed violence necessitates keen understanding of its multi-faceted and multi-level nature. As such, AVR entails a thorough diagnosis of the local situation, and local ownership of program design and implementation. Hence, the armed violence “lens” is a people centred approach which tries to understand those affected by violence, perpetrators and their motivation, availability of arms, and the institutional and cultural environment at multiple levels. 14 Youth Violence
Community groups and government lead multi-sector and multi-level programs, while donors focus on prevention, law enforcement and diplomacy. Common characteristics of AVR programming are • Rigorous diagnosis of the local situation via multiple methods and data sources; • Local ownership and leadership; • Bottom–up perspectives on security; • An understanding of the multifaceted and multi-level nature of armed violence; • Multi-sector responses; and • Investing in prevention by identifying and responding to risk factors and fostering community and country resilience (OECD 2009: 18). 5.2 The Public Health Approach Yet another approach to violence reduction is the public health approach (see Figure 3) developed by the Centre for Disease Control. Obviously the impact of armed violence on public health systems is significant when 66 per cent of homicides occur in non-conflict regions, additional millions of patients suffer injury, and armed violence is the main cause of death among males aged 10-44. The World Health Organization (WHO) posits that tools used to manage other health issues can be effective in addressing armed violence. This view is premised on the belief that violence as a foreseeable and, hence, treatable phenomenon, similar to malaria, traffic accidents and tuberculosis (Luz 2008). Thus it assumes that violence can be studied and analyzed using epidemiological methods, since violence follows predictable patterns and occurs with modifiable risks and protection factors. If malaria has been controlled by mosquito eradication, so too, according to this model, can violence be addressed by identifying risk factors and developing strategies that modify behaviour and reduce social and physical exposure to violence. Figure 3: The Public Health Approach to Violence Prevention
Assure widespread adoption
Develop and test prevention strategies
Identify risk and protective factors
Define the Problem Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (http://www. cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/overview/publichealthapproach.html)
As Figure 3 details, the Public Health Approach is a four-step process of (1) problem definition; (2) identification of risk and protective factors; (3) formulation and testing of prevention strategies; and (4) widespread adoption. Problem definition is premised on violence being preventable if it is understood. Data collection is essential to problem definition to allow assessment of the Youth Violence 15 magnitude of the problem.14 Then risk factors or characteristics that either increase or decrease the probability of becoming victim or perpetrator must be identified. Next, an evidence-based program planning approach draws on local data to develop and test prevention strategies. Once implemented, programs are rigorously evaluated on effectiveness. The final step, widespread adoption, involves dissemination and local adaptation of successful programs and involves training, networking, technical assistance and process evaluation. 5.3 The Ecological Approach The ecological approach (Figure 4) is used by international agencies such as the United Nations Organization on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the World Bank and the World Health Organization to conceptualize the factors that lead to crime and violence. It uses a multidisciplinary approach (economics, sociology and public health) in identifying factors at the four levels that influence crime and violence (individual, relationship, community and societal) (WHO 2002: 12). At the individual level, factors such as education, marital status and biological endowments are used to ascertain proclivity to crime and violence.
Figure 4: The Ecological Approach to Understanding Crime and Violence
Societal Community Relationship Individual
Source: WHO (2002: 12)
The relationship level encompasses relations with peers, partners and family. Community-level factors refer to broader social relationships in schools and neighbourhoods, while societal factors comprise cultural norms and economic conditions. 5.4 The Epidemiological Approach The epidemiological approach is favoured by the Inter-American Bank (IDB) and highlighted in the work of Buvinić, Alda and Lamas (2005). It is premised on the conviction that the numerous causes of violence require a multitude of solutions. Like the public health approach, it targets risk factors. The first step is to identify dominant risk factors associated with violent activities, and then to implement specific interventions to reduce those risks. It focuses on violence prevention rather than crime or violent crime. It acknowledges that the fight against crime must include criminal and non-criminal culturally accepted forms of violence, and that solutions must extend beyond court and police interventions and involve a multipartnered strategy of non-traditional actors working together. 14 Examples of data used in problem definition are the number of violence related behaviours, injuries and deaths. These indicate the frequency of violence, where it occurs, trends, and identify victims and perpetrators. 16 Youth Violence
5.5 The Integrated Framework Approach The integrated framework approach (Figure 5), developed by Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999), is the most recent model for examining different causal levels of youth violence and associated interventions. The diagrammatic representation reveals that the conceptual framework is borrowed from the ecological approach. However, it differs in that it incorporates psychological, and social factors at the individual level, external factors that impinge on the individual, and the links between them (Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999: 9).It is grounded in the view that violence is a complex, multifaceted social phenomenon; the interrelated nature of the causes and consequences of violence will require multisectoral, integrated interventions. In this approach, violence has four interrelated levels of causation, impact and intervention: individual, interpersonal, institutional and structural (Moser and van Bronkhorst 1999: 9). At the individual level, an analysis is conducted of the perpetrator’s personal history, biophysical makeup, and developmental factors. This would involve, for example, personality, which shapes the perpetrator’s responses and interpersonal institutional stressors. This analysis looks at traits such as low self-esteem, the desire for status and greed.
Figure 5: The Integrated Model of Violence Causality
Individual
Interpersonal Structural Institutional Interpersonal Individual Institutional
Structural Source: Moser & van Bronkhorst (1999: 10)
At the interpersonal level, the focus is on the immediate context in which violence occurs: interpersonal interactions, situational factors of family and household, and intimate or acquaintance relationships. Interpersonal indicators include whether the perpetrator has a family member in a gang, comes from a dysfunctional or violent family, and maintains delinquent peer associations. At the institutional level are the formal and informal institutions and associated social capital in workplaces and communities, and the social networks and identity groups in which interpersonal relations are embedded. Institutional-level factors include the nature of the school system, gang presence in the community, lack of employment opportunities and availability of firearms. The structural level is a macro-level analysis of the political, economic and social structure and policy environment; and the societal opinions, beliefs and cultural norms in which the perpetrator exists. Key issues concern impunity, racism and legitimization of violence as a conflict resolution tool. Youth Violence 17
Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999: 11) emphasize that violence is not caused by any one single variable, but a combination of factors and levels. Therefore, violence prevention (and reduction) necessitates interventions at each of the four levels. Examples of individual-level interventions include behaviour modification to reduce risk factors or promote protective factors. The interpersonal level requires education and training in non-violent relationships and strategies for conflict resolution. Institutional-level solutions revolve around building community assets, strengthening social capital in poor communities, multisector training initiatives to improve service quality, and development and enforcement of responsive policy and procedures. Structural-level interventions include policy innovations, legislative reform and media campaigns. 5.6 The Comprehensive Community Gang Program Approach The final approach highlighted here is Irving Spergel’s (1995) comprehensive community gang program model, which is rooted in community development principles. Like the other models, it too has a comprehensive multidimensional, multifaceted and multisector approach to violence prevention and reduction. Several stakeholders are involved: community; governments; NGOs; and institutions of education, healthcare, religion and security, especially the police. The model advocates that appropriate supports be provided, given the multiplicity of factors that contribute to youth armed violence and gang involvement. As is typical of community development models, this approach embeds community mobilization and capacity building. In violent contexts, community mobilization entails community-driven programming. This means that a key characteristic of successful community-based anti-violence strategies is identification of violence as a problem by the community, which formulates interventions specific to its local context (Gowis Roman, 2008:5). This is critical as communities have distinct problems and demographic, cultural, relational and other characteristics that render them unique social entities. A top-down or blanket solution formulated by outsiders or another community will not replicate results. The comprehensive approach brings additional benefits to the community by enhancing local capacity to deal with issues. Building community capacity refers to a process of investing resources and efforts to strengthen the community’s ability to develop and support its own strategy to work with its youth population (Gowis Roman 2008: 5). The model, therefore, builds social capital by creating multiple networks in and external to the community (Gilchrist 2004). Indeed, social capital is widely acknowledged for its propensity to counter disadvantages of socioeconomic background at the individual level (Coleman 1988), and contribute to economic development at community and national levels (Putnam 1993). Within violent contexts, it can serve as informal social control and help shape social interaction in the community (CTI 2010). In this way, it can lead to safer communities and more effective government (Pantoja 1999; Woolcock 1998). In summary, the above approaches all share common characteristics. Each advocates a bottom-up and comprehensive approach to the problem of youth armed violence, the tailoring of strategies to the local context and the specific cause of violence in the community, and the need to include multiple stakeholders from a variety of sectors. They recognize that there is no single cause of deviance and that addressing the problem requires multidimensional, multisectoral interventions. They require accurate and detailed data to understand and address the problem. Because each displays significant overlap with the others, it is difficult to associate a strategy with any single model. 18 Youth Violence
5.7 Community Policing The police are a critical stakeholder. In the last decade or so, law enforcement has adopted a community-oriented model called community or neighbourhood policing. Although community policing is not a youth armed violence model per se, its use in this regard has been highlighted in the literature or received attention in case studies. Community policing is a policing strategy and philosophy premised on the idea that community interaction and support contribute to crime control and fear reduction. Community members identify suspects, detain vandals and alert the police to problems. There are three components to community policing: 1. community partnerships 2. organizational transformation 3. problem solving. Several case studies on youth armed violence report success when police work with and build a relationship with the community to fight crime and violence. While Toronto began community policing recently, Jamaica has actually institutionalized the practice with a dedicated department. Community policing is a compulsory aspect of training for all members of the Jamaica Constabulary. 5.8 Features of Successful Community Interventions Community interventions take three forms: a ‘top-down’ approach in which the community is asked to support a planned outside intervention, a ‘hybrid’ approach that invites residents to participate in planning and implementing the intervention, and a ‘bottom-up approach’ in which the community itself designs and implements the intervention (Ferrer-Wreder et al 2004: 155). Interventions that combine multiple strategies enable the community to address as many risk factors as possible (Ferrer-Wreder et al 2004: 164). This point is well supported by Evans and Sawdon’s (2004: 3) observation that the complexity of “gang violence and youth attraction to gang membership” in the GTA warrants a comprehensive, multipartnered strategy. Successful community interventions involve a combination of strategies that target all of the following stages along the youth armed violence continuum: • Prevention: Targets those in difficult situations and at risk of becoming involved in gangs. It is aimed at helping them to meet their needs and avoid gang involvement and violence; • Intervention: Offers alternatives to those attracted to gang life; • Rehabilitation: Targets those who want to leave gangs; and • Law enforcement: Seeks to deter crime and reduce violence (WOLA 2008: 2). It must be noted that, although successful anti-gang and youth armed violence reduction strategies are not transferable, they do, in fact, demonstrate similarities that are adaptable to specific contexts (Gowis Roman 2008: 5). According to WOLA, successful programs are those that a. Analyze the local situation, develop community specific responses, and tailor approaches based on the causes of local gang membership; b. Reach out to youth; c. Recognize young people’s need for identity and belonging; d. Offer activities, workshops and discussions as alternatives to gang life; e. Believe young people can become productive members of society with support and encouragement; Youth Violence 19
f. Believe youth have tremendous energy that needs to be channelled constructively rather than destructively; g. Involve program graduates as outreach workers and staff. This ‘peer-to-peer’ model strengthens the program’s ability to reach out to and involve neighbourhood youth; h. Develop strong relationships with a broad range of community organizations that support the program’s work with young people; i. Are designed by municipal government agencies and community actors with national government agencies providing technical assistance, guidance and funding (WOLA 2008: 3).
6. Community Approaches To Youth Armed Violence: The Case Studies 6.1 Breaking the Cycle: Youth Gang Exit Program and Ambassador Leadership Project. 6.1.1 Background In response to rising youth armed violence, intruder violence in schools and youth swarming, CTI piloted a comprehensive community development project in 1998 called Beyond the Halls. The project goal was the transformation of GTA high schools into “safe, respectful and inclusive learning environments” (Evans & Sawdon 2004: 1). More than 100 shootings and multiple gun- and gang-related incidents occurred during the project period in Rexdale and Scarborough, where two school intervention sites were located. Rexdale had a history of gang presence, limited youth economic and employment opportunities, and few educational and recreational resources (Evans & Sawdon 2004: 1). The majority of youth were visible minorities, predominantly recent immigrants who had either been involved with the courts or had difficulties at school. A U.S. Court Department Report contends that the labour market penalizes youth involved with courts and gangs for their failure to complete school. They are unable to secure stable employment and tend to earn reduced wages throughout their working lives (Evans & Sawdon 2004: 2). To break this cycle, CTI sought to enhance the life chances of youth who wanted to leave gangs. Beyond the Halls led to the design of a comprehensive youth gang exit program and a youth ambassadorship leadership project known as Breaking the Cycle. The birth of BTC began with CTI’s proposal to the national Crime Prevention Centre (Canada) to create a gang prevention strategy. This money was used to prepare A Literature Review of Youth Violence: From Risk to Resiliency Utilizing a Developmental Perspective. CTI also designed two 10-day intensive personal development courses for gang-involved males and females respectively and an intake and case management process that incorporated a variety of assessment instruments to aid in identifying issues/needs and to evaluate progress throughout the program. The funding enabled the organization to also engage in a community mobilization process, including a visioning process with police, schools, students, youth-serving agencies, politicians and officials of Parks and Recreation, Toronto Housing and Toronto Public Health and other city staff. CTI established a gang advisory committee comprised of interested parties who had participated in the visioning process and wanted to address the gang violence problem in Rexdale. CTI also participated in the City of Toronto’s Gang Working Group and the Community and Services Neighbourhood Branch, which launched the Common Cause/Youth Violence Symposium. The 20 Youth Violence
City of Toronto provided a $50,000 one-time grant to support the pretesting of the 10-day course, the case management follow-up process and the strengthening of existing partnerships that would bring additional support for a comprehensive gang exit project. From December 2003-July 2004, CTI received 37 referrals to the project and pretested the design of the two components. During this period, it approached Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) to fund a three-year pilot demonstration project (Figure 7). Although the project was well received, HRDC agreed to finance only the Youth Ambassador Leadership Employment Preparation Project or Phase II. This phase aimed to build leadership skills among gang-involved youth so that they could reach out to and prevent other youth from joining or remaining in gangs. The BTC project opened on April 1, 2005 to gang-involved Rexdale and Scarborough youth. Scarborough and Rexdale share similar youth socioeconomic characteristics: a youth population with histories of violence, family conflicts and exposure to home or community violence and guns. As stated earlier, Evans and Sawdon (2004:2) found a large number of the youth were involved with gangs and drugs and had already encountered the courts and corrections.15 While the arrest record of BTC youth (Table 1) confirms this, the interviews suggest that the figures may not reflect the extent to which they actually engage in criminal or violent activity.
Table 1: Arrest Record of BTC Youth
6-10 11+ Number of Arrests 0 Arrests 1-5 Arrests Arrests Arrests
Number of Times Arrested to Date 1 42 19 17
Source: BTC 2010
One interviewee recalled being arrested as he stepped on the curb outside his apartment soon after rising that morning. He “fit the perpetrator profile” in an earlier incident, despite protests he was asleep at the said time. Another spoke of having been beaten, since he was 14, in the back seat of squad cars as the police tried to elicit information. When asked whether his family had lodged a complaint, his jaded response was, “Who would take my word against that of police officers?” Each male respondent reiterated the futility of reporting incidents of police brutality and victimization. The literature identifies this type of consistent victimization and brutality as factors that breed anger among youth and lead them to become violent and involved in gangs (Moser & van Bronkhorst 1999: 13). In addition, BTC participants’ school and literacy problems have translated into lack of self- regulation and employable skills, and unsteady job records. These youth face barriers to gainful employment due to • Lack of basic life skills • Low educational attainment • Poor work force preparation
15 BTC data reveals that 5 per cent of participants began their first substance use (alcohol or marijuana) at ages 0-6, 10 per cent at ages 7-11, 70 per cent at 12-16 years and 15 per cent at age 17 and above. Youth Violence 21
• Poor social skills • Absence of appropriate peer and adult role models • Disjointed service delivery plans and processes • Low expectations of self and by others • Negative peer influences and • Negative perceptions by the community and employers (Evans & Sawdon 2004: 2).
BTC’s mandate is “to facilitate the development of pro-social, leadership and employment skills to gang involved youth between the ages of 15-30 years old in contributing to an alternate lifestyle, one in which pro-social dreams can be realized” (CTI 2010). The program’s main goal is to enable youth to make meaningful contributions to their communities. Each branch was established with an intake of 25 but HRDC’s funding cuts forced the Scarborough operations to close in 2006. Rexdale subsequently cut its own intake quota to accommodate seven youths from Scarborough.16 BTC Rexdale has three staff: a coordinator and two facilitators. It targets males and females who a. Are or have been gang-involved; b. Preferably reside in North Etobicoke17; c. Are not currently attending school or are unemployed; d. Are committed to participate in the project; and e. Are committed to cooperative group norms and agreements (CTI 2005:2). BTC serves mainly youth of Caribbean heritage, predominantly Jamaicans (Figure 6).18
Figure 6: Birth Origins of BTC Participants (2008-2010)
West Indian Caribbean Excluding Jamaican 13%
28% 59% Other West Indian Caribbean From Jamaican
Source BTC 2010 More than half (59 per cent) of BTC participants to date are of Jamaican ancestry. However, while respondents of the current cohort all spoke with Caribbean accents and self-identified as
16 Rexdale includes the Jane and Finch neighbourhood. 17 As stated in the BTC brochure. 18 This includes youth born in Canada to Caribbean immigrants. Approximately 79 per cent of program participants to date were born in Canada, 11 per cent in the Caribbean and 10 per cent elsewhere. 22 Youth Violence
Jamaicans, the majority of program participants (79 per cent) to date are Canadian-born, while 11 per cent are Caribbean émigrés. The émigrés were too young to recollect or feel affinity to their birthplace and none of the interviewees had visited the Caribbean.19 Hence, their Caribbean accents are acquired. Additionally, youth from other cultures, for example Somalis and Nigerians, imitate Caribbean accents and self-identify as “Jamaican” when asked.20 This perpetuates the view that all gang-associated and violent youth are from the Caribbean and further ostracizes those of Caribbean heritage within the community itself. Africans, in general, are vehemently opposed to association with Caribbean youth, whom they regard as a bad influence on their own offspring.21 Despite the upper age limit of 30, most project participants are 21 or younger; three-quarters to date are in the 15-21 age group (Table 2). BTC staff tend to steer those over 25 toward interventions such as Job Connect or the YMCA’s Job Readiness Skills and Training Program. BTC prepares those eligible for college to meet entry requirements and has established a partnership with Humber College.
Table 2: Age Demographics of BTC participants: August 2007- December 2009
Age Range 15-18 19-21 22-24 25+ TOTAL
Number 22 44 15 8 89
Per Cent 25% 49% 17% 9% 100%
Source: BTC 2010
As a staff member notes:22 As you get older, sometimes intervention here [at BTC] may not be as important and as you get younger, and some of the guys here are under 18, it might just be a matter of getting you into the right school. So you might use an alternative school program or Apple program or work with them on a co-op based program or something else as opposed to coming into the [BTC] program. Sometimes you have a guy 15 coming into the program. He might need it more when he’s 19 and if he’s gone through it already, he can’t come back in again when he’s 19. So we might look at him and say, “You know what, let’s get you ready for school, let’s give you some support, if you need help we’re ready to help you.” So it’s 15-30 but more or less 16-26 is where we’re at.
Though designed to target the gang-involved, the program also serves at-risk youth23 The at-risk of gang association tag was put on because some of these guys are riding the brink. So they wear the colours, they’re involved with the people [and] they know the people. So [at] any moment in time the police can pull them over and say, “You’re a gang
19 The other 10 per cent also immigrated, but the data was not disaggregated along specific country origins. 20 This is also true for those of Caribbean heritage who self-identified as Jamaican, yet spoke with accents that indicated they were from other Caribbean islands. 21 Interview at BTC, April 2, 2010. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. Youth Violence 23
member.” So we use the gang-association tag and at-risk of association because everyone in the program is gang-associated or at-risk of gang association at the moment.
For this reason, program staff uses the term “gang-associated” rather than “gang-involved”24 We use the term association because…we’ve gotten it from our own participants who’ve said, “You know what? Saying gang-involved you’re probably going to get maybe 10 per cent of the people saying I’m gang involved. If you say association you’re going to get people saying, ‘Wait a second, I know what you mean, I understand that’ because the term gang involved becomes so ostracized where you don’t want to say it.” Most of the guys aren’t going to say it but they know they are associated, they know they wear the bandana in the pocket for a reason, they know all their friends wear a certain colour for a reason but association is what we use.
Gang association can begin when children are as young as seven or eight, when they start identifying friends, kinship and neighbourhoods, engage in symbolic interaction and obey the rules established by the elders and the neighbourhood. Project staff explained that this early identification with community symbols results in a single-minded resolve within youth to adhere to neighbourhood rules. None of the current male cohort interviewed considered himself gang- involved and emphasized it was not a deliberate choice to enter a gang. Instead, association evolved out of congregating and interacting with childhood friends, gradual participation in the activities in which their friends engaged, and wearing the colours they observed worn in their neighbourhoods. These colours were associated with community affiliation and safety. Figure 7 shows the status of BTC youth in relation to gangs: one-third is involved while almost half are gang-associated. Interviews with a sample of current participants revealed similar life histories and behaviours. Male respondents all spoke of police harassment and brutality at a young age, the lack of adult male support and guidance both at home and in the community, as well as ostracism by non-Caribbean adults. Those of Caribbean heritage, particularly Jamaicans, must also live up to constructed ideals of the Jamaican man or woman. The coordinator explains: The art and entertainment cultures establish a level that Caribbean youths have to live up to. Everything from code of the streets, code of sex, to code of relationships that come out of the Caribbean whereby you have to fight to keep yourself in that box, which differs from Americans and Africans who do not have that tight box, and which has a lot of these guys really wound up…. This is the box to be Caribbean: how you must treat your wife, how she ought to move, how you must dress, this is the music you must listen to. And if you come out of that box, you’re not Jamaican, you’re not West Indian. You’re a bunch of names that degrade you to female traits, genitalia and body parts which produces an action from the youth that says, “Wait a second. If you’re calling me these types of names, that’s telling me I am a woman. I’m going to fight doubly hard to get back into this box to show you I am a true Jamaican.” We have the ‘Man in the Box’ that we teach them about.
They grew up in either single or no-parent households; one interviewee practically raised herself from age 11 when her mother was deported. Though she lived with her older siblings, they took no interest in her welfare. Another 19-year-old female was placed by her mother into foster care at age 11. She lived in several foster homes until she was old enough to live independently. In many cases,
24 Ibid. 24 Youth Violence
youth as young as 16 assume responsibility for the welfare of mothers and siblings, even though they are not gainfully employed. The majority of BTC participants reported abuse as children. All participants lacked exposure to activities that most Canadian children take for granted. Prior to BTC, none of the youth respondents had visited typical places of interest such as the zoo, the museum or art gallery. All interviewees enthused about a trip to the Ontario Science Centre organized by BTC staff and expressed regrets that the program no longer offered such learning opportunities. This excursion was funded by a one-time grant from the Toronto Argonauts. The remainder of the money was used, over time, to subsidize participants’ short-term necessities such as rent, groceries, tuition and books. Here, BTC is clearly engaged in prevention by helping the youth meet their needs. Were it not for these supports, they would easily slip back into gang life. This finding demonstrates that the term “at-risk” is as applicable to gang-exit as to gang-entry. Besides the lack of parental guidance and certain cultural experiences, these youth have failed to acquire life-coping skills, including such basic competencies as grocery shopping and meal preparation. The BTC facilitators are teaching these skills outside of work hours and maintain a 24-hour support hotline of their own volition. Indeed, participants spoke highly of the personal staff support they receive and how this has bolstered their determination to change their lives. In essence, the BTC staff have become surrogate parents. Their lack of coping skills and exclusion contribute to youth feelings of dissociation and marginalization. Low educational attainment exacerbates these emotions and reduces self-esteem. This is clearly visible in the educational attainment of BTC participants upon entry: 88 per cent entered the program without an Ontario Secondary School Diploma.25 6.1.2 BTC PROGRAM DESIGN This section examines BTC’s intervention strategy and program delivery. The BTC program consists of two project streams delivered within a six-month period: (i) The Leadership and Support Project; and (ii) The Youth Ambassador Employment Preparation Project to enhance employment readiness. In both phases, participants receive a weekly stipend. Figure 8 diagrams the gang-exit strategy. Figure 7: Components of the BTC Gang Exit Strategy
Stream 1: Ongoing Training, ↓ Group Meetings and Unique Internship Placements 10-Day Intensive Assessment Case Management ↓ Training Component ↓ and Intake (More than 60 Hours) and Weekly Training Stream 2: HRDC-Funded Youth
↓ Ambassador Employment Preparation Project
Source: Evans and Sawdon (2004: 2)
25 The lack of self-confidence is evident among some participants. For example, one interviewee expressed her desire to use YWCA facilities, but lacked confidence to enter the facility and enquire about programs. Youth Violence 25
CTI’s hope is that upon completing the program, participants will have learned • Self -identity and how to live the life they desire without hurting others • Not to allow others to control their actions, feelings and thoughts • To manage their feelings, thoughts and actions to achieve their goals • To set realistic, achievable goals • To manage their anger and the anger of others • To understand the cycle of violence and ways they can stop violence in their lives with family members, peers and in the community • How to have healthy, fun and safe relationships with others • How to make a difference in their communities and be a leader in non-violence • Skills to help them succeed in future career choices (CTI 2005: 2).
6.1.3: Phase I: Assessment and Intake—The Leadership and Support Project As a referral program, BTC cannot engage in youth outreach. Program graduates refer 65-70 per cent of its intake, with the remainder from Parole and Probations, agencies unable to serve them, high schools, alternative schools and parents.26 However, an increasing number of parents are now requesting admission for their children. The 85-90 applicants to each program cycle indicate its success as well as the desire of many youth to exit gang life. The assessment and intake phase begins with a half-hour introduction and information session with each youth. They are invited back a second time to a 1.5- hour interview in which BTC identifies the interest and motivation of applicants and the amount of gang involvement, also building a family social and educational history. BTC staff selects 25 applicants to enter the upcoming program cycle. Once accepted, the youth are placed on a waiting list until training begins; unsuccessful applicants are encouraged to reapply in the next program cycle. 6.1.4 Intensive Training and Personal Development Phase I consists of separate curricula for males and females. The sexes are separated for the first three weeks and exposed to gender-specific workshops.27 The aim is to create an atmosphere of openness that allows females to freely discuss personal and relationship issues, including problems with boyfriends who may be known to the male participants. It also relieves the males from the need to assume a macho image to impress the girls and allows them to identify with their emotions without the risk of being labelled “soft” by the females. This phase consists of 60 hours of training. Topics include anger, aggression, sexism, racism, homophobia and bullying. The curriculum also focuses on communication and building interpersonal skills, anger management, problem-solving and job search techniques. Each youth receives $214.50 per week if s/he attends every day of the course for both phases.28 This phase offers participants • Support in linking them to educational and job training opportunities • Assistance in managing relationships with peers, employers and parents
26 All the program participant interviewees stated that they had applied to join the program based on referrals by friends who had turned their lives around after completing BTC. According to the coordinator, the number of applicants referred by graduates is on the rise; this demonstrates the “credibility of the program on the street level.” 27 To date, BTC has served 36 females and 56 males. 28 A bonus is awarded upon program completion. 26 Youth Violence
• Assistance in nonviolent conflict resolution • Support and guidance to secure internships • Financial compensation as training pay (CTI 2005: 2). The workshops also include psychological and behavioural testing exercises such as Man in the Box, Lady in the Flower,29 Heart Exercise,30 and Gangs in You. The Man in the Box and Lady in the Flower are exercises in which the youth use magazine cut-outs to construct collages that reflect their perceptions of the ideal man and woman. The male perception of the ideal man seems to revolve around wealth. He wears expensive clothes and jewellery. In one collage, he is dressed in a fur jacket while speaking on the bathroom phone. The collage also includes a flashy car, a gun, and a beautiful, curvaceous, scantily clad woman sitting on a bed surrounded by money. The male impression of the ideal woman reflects the content of the ideal man collage. The woman is, again, the beautiful, scantily clad, curvaceous, bejewelled woman to be showered with material gifts. She is strong and physically able to fight for what she wants. This strength is portrayed in the collage by a pair of female fists. Interestingly, pictures of the ideal female are of women of ill repute. Whether this is due to the source of the pictures or their ideal type was, unfortunately, not discussed. When asked, male participants responded that their image of the ideal woman had changed since their entry into the BTC program. The ideal woman is now educated, works for what she wants, has a strong character and is able to defend herself, not by fighting, but with the self-confidence that allows her to stand up for herself. The females constructed similar collages of their ideal man and woman. The coordinator explained the links between these constructed ideals and youth violence. These ideals are the Caribbean “Man/Woman in the Box” image and associated behaviours discussed earlier. Each sex acts out this ideal by engaging in behaviours to attract the other as well as to force others to see them in this light. Realization of this ideal image is thwarted when youth cannot acquire the associated material possessions because they lack the education and means. 6.1.5 The Case Management Process and Follow-Up Phase The Case Management Phase involves individual support of participants’ goals and plans of action and an ongoing meeting for each group. The process is geared toward supplementing and reinforcing the 10-day training, and to address the changing life circumstances of participants. Issues addressed in this phase are housing matters, links with family members, school referrals, coordination with probation and parole officers, court attendance, drug treatment referrals and assistance with financial matters such as opening bank accounts. Participatory psychological assessments are used to evaluate characteristics and behaviours. Assessments begin with the Employment Readiness and Skills (ERS) Assessment, which provides baseline data on employability. It is followed by
29 The ‘Man in the Box’ and ‘Lady in the Flower’ collages are constructed upon entry and exit to ascertain whether perceptions have changed. 30 The Heart Exercise involves a drawing of the heart divided into two sections. One half contains the happy memories of childhood while the other contains bad memories. Negative behaviours are then layered around the heart, as a shield, to reflect coping mechanisms adopted to deal with negative memories. These behaviours include drinking, fighting, carrying a gun and promiscuity. This exercise enables the youth to see how their behaviours are linked to past unpleasant experiences and promotes behavioural changes. While the heart exercise is done by itself, the findings are incorporated into the other techniques. Youth Violence 27 the Genogram,31 which documents social family history. Later in the program, the Genogram is extended to include friendship and relationship styles. The STAXI assessment measures anger levels and is complemented by anger management courses.32 In combination, the Genogram and STAXI encourage critical thinking and comprehension of behavioural patterns and offer guidance on anger management. Throughout the program the youth keep a personal journal, known as a personal compass, to chart their learning and progress, and record their thoughts. Workshops are followed by one week of intensive one-on-one case management. Case management entails an interdisciplinary group of professionals overseeing the needs of youth (Moser & van Bronkhorst 1999: 18). In addition to the ERS Assessment, the Myers Briggs Personality Test33 and DAPS34 are used to evaluate personality types and post-traumatic stress levels. Youth respondents confirmed that the participatory processes and evaluations have enabled them to understand their personalities, past behaviours, what they need to change about themselves and what steps they must take to achieve what they want. For example, one interviewee expressed her desire to become a fashion designer, but was aware she lacked the matriculation requirements to attend college. At the time of the research she was preparing for college entry. Case management is also used to build responsible leadership qualities. It is expected that upon completion of Phase I, participants will • Exit and stay out of gangs • Make pro-social lifestyle choices • Develop a sense of hope and envision a future for themselves • Enjoy better relationships with peers, employers and parents • Achieve greater success in school, training and employment • Be less likely to use violence for conflict resolution and • Resist alcohol and other drugs. Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999: 18) identify the use of case management systems as one “ingredient of success in youth serving programs.” It allows for the provision of individualized care and for addressing youths’ interdisciplinary needs. Those who complete BTC training can exit the program once they are returning to school or have found employment. At the end of this phase, some youth are selected to participate in Phase II, the Youth Ambassador Leadership and Employment Program. 6.1.6 Phase II: Selecting and Developing Leaders—Youth Ambassador Leadership and Employment Preparation Project Each participant develops an individual plan, including goals and activities to achieve them. The youth meet regularly with their individual case manager to review, revise or engage in actions
31 A genogram is a graphic representation of intergenerational personalities. It is used to identify hereditary patterns and psychological factors that punctuate relationships, and repetitive patterns of behaviour and relationship tendencies (Wikipedia 2011). 32 The State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI) measures the intensity of anger and the disposition to experience angry feelings as a personality trait. 33 Myers Briggs is a personality test to measure personality type, cognitive styles, interaction with society, leadership qualities, and suitable career choices. 34 The Detailed Assessment of Post Traumatic Stress (DAPS) is a 105-item inventory that provides detailed information on a person’s history of various types of trauma exposure, his/her immediate psychological reactions (cognitive, emotional and dissociative), enduring post-traumatic stress symptoms (re-experiencing, avoidance, hyper-arousal) and the level of post-traumatic impairment in the context of a specific traumatic event (Briere n.d.). 28 Youth Violence
necessary to achieve the goals. This 25-week phase aims to enhance employment readiness. At morning workshops they acquire CPR and conflict mediation skills for which they are certified. They complete a Ropes leadership course and continue to receive training in leadership, communication and problem-solving skills, anger management and job search techniques, as well as accessing additional personal growth opportunities.35 The Phase I techniques are repeated in Phase II, in combination with or in addition to new methods such as the 5 Percenter Teaching and Philosophy,36 Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, Positive/Negative Spin Cycles,37 and action planning. These combinations enable the youth to compare their past and current behaviours in light of what they have learned. Apart from the employment readiness preparation program, they also participate in strategic planning groups and community awareness-raising through public speaking engagements and project development across Toronto. Each is expected to conduct a minimum of 10 community presentations to schools, community centres, youth-serving agencies, Parent Teachers Associations and any other organization or group that requests a presentation. At these presentations they explain the training exercises. Both presentations and project development give youth the opportunity to make a difference by reducing gang involvement and creating a positive image of youth. As one staff member noted during an interview: We’re trying to go into different institutions. We’ve been to York University, Humber College 2-3 times, Ryerson is coming up as well. We’re trying to get into the corporate world, trying to get into the TD’s [and] those places because we’re seeing these are the parents that might not know what their children are doing, these are the parents that have the privilege in society to make a difference; that when they see black males on TV, things unfortunately like a Jane Creba shooting, they can say, “Wait a second, I know what that young person might be going through and I can see that’s not a case of a bad guy shooting a white girl.” So we’re trying to educate the public more so that there could be more inclusion and empathy for these guys because a lot of times there’s no empathy for them. So that’s part of the presentation piece. After graduation we’re trying to get them into school, meaningful employment and in some cases another program intervention [such as] a job skill program.
Each presentation is awarded a golden star. Observation revealed the majority had exceeded the 10-star quota, even though they were only halfway through the program This program requirement is similar to the peer-to-peer model whereby those who participated in gang-exit programs act as community outreach workers—a feature of successful programs (WOLA 2008: 3). BTC tailors the tools and techniques to the specific needs and disposition of each participant. The program structure has also been changed to better meet their needs, indicating a degree of program monitoring and evaluation, and program learning. For example, a staff member indicates changes in the timeframe within which résumés are completed: As opposed to having a scattered, pick as you’re ready kind of programming…, it’s more of a structure the way it’s set up. So one step leads to another step and then another. So
35 See http://www.stepscorp.com for information on the Ropes leadership course method. 36 The 5 percenter teaching and philosophy is a more recent teaching method that seeks to combine the history and philosophy of science. 37 Spin Cycles are about the manipulation of facts, negative or positive, to make a case. The purpose of this exercise is to enable the youth to develop independent thinking rather than being influenced by others. Youth Violence 29
an example of that is the résumé. One would have been done whenever the youth needed a résumé done….what was happening is that résumés were being made early and youths weren’t getting jobs and things were getting changed in résumés as the program went on and therefore when they weren’t getting jobs and they weren’t leaving with good résumés there was an efficacy problem. They felt more dissociated…more excluded from society.
Résumés are now prepared at the end of the program. By this time, the coordinator explains, the youth can critically evaluate themselves, have learned to take responsibility for themselves, and are able to discern their core values. He affirms that the best time to complete the résumé is when core values have been established: So now when we have résumés made at the end of the program, self-efficacy is really high. The outcome with the last group is that 14 out of the 17 graduates are working or in school right now. As opposed to past groups [which] were taking upwards of two to four months [for] half of them [to get] something after they graduate. So that’s a good measurement. I just need to validate [it] again with this group to see [if] it [was] just luck or…actual validation towards what …could be redone in other parts of the system.
Another strategy is teaching the youth to dissociate from their old neighbourhoods and way of life. Moving out of the community reinforces the gang exit strategy and curbs the temptation to return to old habits. As was said in an interview, As is written they have to, in some form or fashion, not associate with that community in the same way. So it could be a matter of hanging out at the same time of day, or not just being around so often so they have to, in some form, dissociate themselves at some level with their community. For a lot of them it’s just a lot easier to move as opposed to learning how to dissociate from their community because what’s really going to get you in trouble is when you’re associated with the community and always out in the community. When you dissociate it’s because you’ve traded new things you’re going to be doing, so you’re doing those things on the outside.
However, BTC acknowledges the difficulty of total dissociation and that participants will visit their old neighbourhoods from time to time. Some youth have shifted from 4-5 hour stopovers with family and friends, including their old gang circle, to visits of 20 minutes or less. At this point in the program, they are re-entering their former neighbourhoods with a purpose in mind and refrain from lingering longer than necessary. This indicates that BTC is changing youth behaviours and thinking. When asked what would influence them to rejoin a gang after completing the program, interviewees responded that friendship ties, not coercion or fear, was the only factor. These findings contradict the literature that gang exit is dangerous or that gang membership is a lifetime commitment. In contrast to the experience of U.S. gang exit programs, where both staff and youth seeking to exit gangs must take precautions and document the process since risks are high for both parties, BTC is praised by gang members for assisting their peers to a better life.
6.1.7 The Role of Women in Gangs and Violence The females in BTC are deemed gang-associated. One interviewee opined that the majority of programs fail to comprehend female importance and influence and therefore target only males: 30 Youth Violence
Over half these guys are doing what they do because they want to get a girl and over half these guys are influenced in the stuff they do because of a girl. We’ve also noticed a lot of the girls are the ones who, when the guys are in jail, take care of everything else. And a lot of times the girls are as associated as any guy would be. It’s just that they go under the radar because everyone assumes they’re a girl they’re not going to be doing this, this, this. They forget that association is the same thing as involvement in many forms and fashion. So the girls are involved.
The females engage in violence of a different nature. They are less likely to use as many weapons as the males, but have their own weapon choices. While the males tend to weapon- based violence, females veer toward fights, particularly swarming other females. During the early stages of entry into BTC, female participants tend to engage in the majority of fights to impress the males and reinforce their stature as ‘top girl’. 6.1.8 BTC Program Means This section examines the nature of partnerships among the program, the community and other stakeholders. It also looks at funding issues and the extent to which funds are sufficient to realize program objectives. One BTC facilitator established the Black Daddy’s Club (BDC), which targets fathers. He meets with them in neighbourhood barbershops to discuss the importance of parenting and being a role model to their children. While the neighbourhood barbers encourage customers to attend with their sons, the facilitator hopes to expand it to a venue where he can increase attendance and extend discussion beyond that allowed by the limited space. Another community outreach initiative is reviving engagement with participants’ parents. In the initial stages, regular meetings were held with mothers to improve interactions with their offspring. This component of programming was subsequently cancelled because the mothers used it as a forum to blame and complain about their children, which was considered unhealthy and debilitating for participants. BTC hopes to revive parent involvement to include fathers, but with a more positive focus. In 2008, BTC hosted a conference with CTI. The conference was aimed at the neighbourhood level, using focus groups of parents to discuss issues of youth reintegration and the incarcerated, as well as to formulate a neighbourhood action plan and policy.38 As a young program, BTC faces program and institutional challenges. The first challenge is its partners. The CTI website and BTC project brochure list 22 partners, including community members and organizations, government, educational institutions, the police and correctional services. While these organizations may be sympathetic, many are partners on paper as only 10 are actively involved. None has changed its approach in dealing with BTC youth. This is especially true of the police. While a few officers are empathetic and some community policing efforts have been undertaken in tougher neighbourhoods, the Toronto Police Service as a whole regards its primary responsibility as law enforcement and accountability to victims (Solicitor General 1999: 12). Despite police efforts at raising awareness in GTA schools and communities, its approach to BTC youth can best be described as suppression to the point of harassment. Project experience indicates that the police view BTC with disdain. Participants recalled several occasions when they were accosted by police officers. When they identified themselves as BTC participants, the officers derided them
38 At the time of the research, the report was not yet completed. Youth Violence 31 and the program, and proceeded to frisk them. A squad car is a fixture across the street from the building in which BTC rents space. Some youth exhibit signs of mental health problems and posttraumatic stress disorder associated with early exposure to violence. When BTC approached another “partner”, the Canadian Association of Mental Health (CAMH), to provide treatment for such cases, CAMH staff refused, although they had never met the BTC participants. Hence, the participants’ mental issues were not unresolved. Additional stress is levied by neighbours who want BTC evicted. At the time of the research, the building owner was pressuring the organization to move. This harassment represents another level of marginalization and ostracism for the youth. Though they are demonstrating their willingness to change, it would appear that neither the police nor society is willing to give them that chance. BTC’s greatest challenge is the absence of sustainable, long-term funding. CTI devotes much of its time to writing funding proposals for each program cycle, in accordance with federal government procedures, rather than focusing on policy development and advocacy. This lack of sustainable funding limits the capacity to recruit adequate human resources, restricts program expansion and introduces a high degree of precariousness to BTC’s existence, as was demonstrated by the closure of the Scarborough program and the consequent repercussions discussed earlier. The one- time Toronto Argonauts grant, discussed earlier, which helped participants meet their immediate needs, had a significant impact in enabling the youth to cope and in preventing recidivism. It also gave the youth a chance, through the Ontario Science Centre visit, to see other possibilities and experience alternatives. Much of the literature notes the importance of such experiences for gang-associated/involved and at-risk youth. The unavailability of such educational activities is, according to participants, the one lamentable feature of the BTC program. 6.1.9 BTC Project Outcome This section explores the effectiveness of BTC’s interventions in deterring youth gang involvement and recidivism, and the extent to which interventions address the barriers youth face. While informal estimates indicate that few return to gang life after the program, BTC did not institutionalize its data collection process and database development until January 2009, 39 when It instituted a tracking and follow-up system to ascertain program impact in deterring recidivism. The data will also assist with ongoing monitoring, adaptation and redesigning of the program. The follow-up conducted nine weeks after the January 2009 program completion (Table 3) reveals that only 13 per cent of participants failed to benefit from BTC. While it is difficult to laud the success of the project without longer-term data, the available statistics infer project success despite some setbacks. As noted earlier, it is overly optimistic to expect a 100 per cent success rate from any program, given the nature of the problem and the fact that some youth continue to live in their old community, where it is easy to be drawn back into old ways.
39 Data collection was previously informal and coordinator-dependent. 32 Youth Violence
Table 3: Results of the Nine-Week Follow-Up of Youth from the January 2009 BTC Program
No. of Participants Points and Definition Per cent (N=23)*
5- Good Space, with Action 11 48
4- Good Space, without Action 2 9
3- Poor Space, with Action 7 30
2- Poor Space, no Action 2 9
1- No Change 1 4
Source: BTC 2010 *NB: Follow-up included non-graduates, three of whom reoffended, and one graduate who was involved in a shooting. The previous and current project coordinators created a qualitative point system to assess participants on a bimonthly basis for the duration of the 28-week program, followed by a nine- week post-graduation report. The point system is based on a needs-based, goal development, action- oriented case management model called the Space and Action Continuum. Figure 9 highlights the Space and Action Continuum Points System. Figure 8 : BTC Space and Action Continuum Points System
1 - Less than 80 per cent Attendance 2 - Poor Space with No Action 3 - Poor Space with Action 4 - Good Space with No Action 5 - Good Space with Action
Operational Definitions: SPACE: Measured by Cognitive Clarity in Identifying Emotions and Rationale for Ac- tion (cognitive behavioural therapy or CBT)
ACTION: Measured by Needs-Based Goal Setting (i.e., WIGS–wildly important goal setting), and Objective-Task Planning to follow through.
Source: BTC 2010 Youth Violence 33
Results for the January 2009 graduates were as follows: • 12 of the 17 graduating youth (71 per cent) achieved a score of 5; • More than 70.9 per cent of graduates completed the program with feelings of high self- efficacy; • 16 (94 per cent) experienced and were aware of what “5” means; • 94 per cent of graduates know how to live in good space with action; • 10 of the 17 graduates (59 per cent) know how to improve their score by 3 points (BTC 2010). BTC has other positive stories. Participants said they applied to BTC because the program helped their gang-associated friends turn their lives around, was highly recommended by those who had left gang life behind, and they wanted a better life for themselves and their children.40 The program is seen as a steppingstone to upward mobility. Hence, at the time they entered the program they want and were amenable to change. One program benefit is educational improvement. The sole participant to complete a college degree graduated in June 2010. The coordinator explains: We’re about to graduate our first participant during the entire program, since I’ve been here, who went to college and is finishing with a certificate. So as a reward, every 4 or 5 months we take her out to dinner as long as she is in school, I call her twice per week to make sure she’s doing good in school, help her with her homework, with books, help her with her scholarship, because we realize that support is needed continually and then for some of the guys we’re trying to help them [improve their education] so Humber College is helping us with tutors, with books, tutoring material so when they get there they’re more successful. So that we can get them the scholarships, get them into the school, and the money barrier is not an issue. Our participants, if they’re 18 and older are given an assessment. If they perform well, they access upgraded courses at Humber to bring them up to speed and then they can enrol in college courses.
Because participants are unable to afford these courses and some are barred from re-entering the high school system, BTC accesses the Literacy Basic Skills (LBS) program to pay for their education. Humber College and more recently George Brown College are providing assistance through special programs designed to upgrade educational attainment and facilitate college entry. The Apple Program and the Independent Learning Centre (ILC) enable them to complete high school. Thus, youth who would generally be marginalized by the education system, relegated to a cycle of poverty and prone to returning to a life of crime and violence now have opportunities for upward mobility. 6.1.10 Summary CTI conducted and used problem and situation analyses in Rexdale and Scarborough to develop specific community responses. Breaking the Cycle was tailored to local conditions inboth communities. The study reveals that the youth enrolled in BTC fit the profile offered by WOLA (2008: 2) of ‘street’ or ‘wannabe’ rather than hard-core criminal gangs. As is typical of street gang members, they also exhibit alcohol and drug abuse, and violence tends to be expressive rather than instrumental (WOLA 2008:2).
40 Many program participants were parents. 34 Youth Violence
BTC’s program incorporates characteristics of the various approaches presented in section 5.1, using a combination of prevention, intervention and rehabilitation strategies. Although it abstains from the law enforcement strategy, it does not establish barriers to law enforcers who are carrying out their duties. It adopts a multidimensional approach to youth rehabilitation by addressing psychological, educational, economic and social issues such as self-esteem and anger management, job and other skills training, provision of stipends and linking participants to internships and job opportunities. On a more restricted basis, it offers additional coping supports such as assistance with rent, tuition and books. Although it partners with a number of organizations and involves community members, CTI has sought to expand the involvement of local residents in the development and maintenance of BTC. Because of past problems with this approach, it is proceeding slowly. The partnership with law enforcement has borne little fruit because the officers themselves support neither the program nor the youth. 6.2 The Peace Management Initiative, Jamaica 6.2.1 Background Home to approximately 2.6 million people, Jamaica has a homicide rate that is higher than the death rate in many war zones.41 Jamaica, as a non-conflict zone, has recorded steadily increasing homicides since 1989: from 439 (1989) through 1,139 (2001) and 1,471 (2004) to 1,618 in 2008 (Levy 2005: 1; McLean 2009: 47). During the 1940s, conflict became violent between Jamaica’s two main political parties, the People National Party (PNP) and the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP). At that time, Kingston’s inner-city neighbourhoods were divided according to political affiliation. Known as ‘garrison communities’, they are populated by supporters of only one party (Levy 2010). These political borders have fostered armed intercommunity violence, and are reinforced and perpetuated by patronage and the supply of weapons. While politics and patronage retain their importance to community identity and local conflict, Mogensen (2005: 2) notes that most gang-related violence is now less political and more strongly affiliated with rising drug-related organized crime, protection and extortion rackets and gang warfare. Turf control and expansion (Levy 2010) have added to the violence. Garrison communities have become increasingly fragmented as intra-community conflict now pits street against street, the upper end of a street against the lower, or one housing block against the other (Levy 2010).42 Such narrow demarcations highlight the tight restrictions on freedom of movement and have severe implications for human, social and economic development of these areas. These boundaries prevent children from attending school, hamper daily activities, and deter public services as garbage disposal and other sanitation, water and electricity from reaching the community (Ferreira- Sutherland 2010: 4). This intensifying lack of social interaction has caused and is caused by violence, mistrust, insecurity, and high levels of illiteracy, but especially poverty. For one inner-city resident life means
41 Project Ploughshares (2011) defines armed conflict as, in part, conflict in which at least 1,000 people have been killed by the fighting during its course. An armed conflict is deemed to have ended when there are fewer than 25 combat deaths a year. 42 PMI spokesperson Horace Levy explains the two main types of garrisons. One is dominated by a single Don and is very homogeneous; the other is fragmented into multiple corners characterized by lesser Dons or lesser leaders on each corner. Youth Violence 35
hunger, vengeance/retaliation, conflict and unemployment/low economic status…. To [bring about] change [you] have to change social conditions…better housing, plumbing, schools, economic conditions. Livin(g) in one room, you gotta take up a gun. There’s no other way. Persons hungry! You change the social condition you affect people’s thinking, behaviour. (Mogensen 2005: 13)
These borders are established by youth as young as 15 years of age and generally illiterate, whose goal is to carve out and control a piece of turf and control, so gaining respect (Ferreira-Sutherland 2010: 11).43 While a few communities remain internally cohesive under the rule of a single Don, most tend to internal fragmentation. Thus, corner Dons (and corner gangs/crews) exist alongside area Dons (and area gangs) and criminal gangs, adding multiple layers of violence to inner city communities and to Jamaican society.44 The World Health Organization (WHO 2002) report on violence and health catalyzed Jamaica’s adoption of a coordinated approach. Following in the wake of the Global Violence Prevention Alliance (VPA) in January 2004, Jamaica established its own VPA that November. VPA Jamaica is made up of a network of organizations that share a vision of violence prevention and information sharing while embracing a participatory approach.45 It works at the sector (government, NGOs and private) and area (national, regional and community) levels.46 PMI is one of its members. 6.2.2 The Peace Management Initiative Program Design This section looks at PMI’s intervention strategies and intervention delivery. In 2002 the Ministry of National Security, in conjunction with civil society (church, university and the Dispute Resolution Foundation) and the two main political parties, established PMI. The Jamaica Information Service (JIS 2005) describes PMI as An early intervention mechanism, which works proactively to prevent conflict from rising to the level of violence, and to strengthen civic organizations that provide stability, sustainable development, security and pride within inner-city communities.
43 Respect, as both Ferreira-Sutherland and Levy (2010) have noted, is critical to Jamaicans. Gaining respect in the inner city includes living by the code of silence—minding your own business and keeping your mouth shut. Gang members alert those they respect to imminent violence; the police accord respect to the Don, trusting him to deal with internal community issues; and residents openly discuss homicides with outsiders they respect and who in turn respect them. 44 Beginning in the late 1960s, politicians and enforcers or area Dons were mutually dependent. Enforcers and area Dons ensured inner-city party loyalty and politicians depended on them to deliver votes. In return, politicians delivered patronage in the form of jobs via public works programs and public housing. By the 1970s, politicians had begun distributing guns to be used in political violence (Mogensen 2005: 2). However, the more recent easy availability of guns has reduced the power of the area Don and rendered gangs less dependent on politicians. Hence, as Levy noted in a 2010 interview, politically motivated violence has declined since 2002. The area Dons and area gangs (the Don’s army) do not engage in intra-community violence and robbery and are viewed by residents as protectors and disbursers of economic spoils and justice. 45 The VPA Working Group representatives are UN agencies (UNICEF/UNDP/PAHO), Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education and Youth, Ministry of National Security, Jamaica Defence Force, Jamaica Constabulary Force, NGOs, Planning Institute of Jamaica, Social Development Commission, Private sector representatives, Nursing Association of Jamaica, Peace Management Initiative, PALS, youth representatives, Dispute Resolution Foundation, Kingston Restoration Company Ltd, Medical Association of Jamaica, sports fraternity, tertiary institutions (UWI/UTECH), music/dancehall fraternity, Media Association of Jamaica, church fraternity, community representatives. 46 The VPA Charter can be found at www.vpajamaica.com. 36 Youth Violence
It is mandated to address the high homicide rates in Jamaica by preventing or defusing explosions of community violence in the Kingston Metropolitan Area and areas in the adjoining parish of St. Catherine (Levy 2005: 1; Levy n.d.). It fulfills this mandate through • Mediation (e.g., brokering peace treaties) • Counselling and therapy (e.g., therapeutic and psychological assistance) • Social development in the form of small-scale livelihood grants (McLean 2009: 45). Because PMI is funded by the Ministry of National Security and so viewed as a government entity, attracting additional funding is difficult. Limited funding translates into a small staff complement. However, its human resources have grown from a voluntary board and two staff members to four staff, three of whom are field officers. More recently, an assistant joined its field staff. Yet, despite manpower challenges it has an impressive record; by the third year of its establishment it had intervened in 60 communities in 16 different areas of the St. Andrew and St. Catherine parishes.47 In Kingston, it has successfully defrayed violence in hotspots such Dunkirk, Duhaney Park, Jones Town/Torrington Park, Mountain View, Rock Hall and Woodford Park. PMI does not target a specific age group but focuses primarily on those involved in community gangs or corner crews, but not criminal gangs.48 Community gang members are mainly between 16 and 45 years of age, with some in their 50s. Hence, the term youth is defined quite loosely in Jamaica. However, 17-30 year-olds generally predominate in community gangs and are invariably the main target of PMI interventions. PMI spokesperson Horace Levy (2010) speculated that Inner city youth use a gun at 18 or older, but admits to having heard rumours of 9-year-olds being used as “gun bags, carrying guns for older youths and…learn[ing] to clean guns and be familiar with them.” Findings by Ferreira- Sutherland (2010: 7) confirm that sons are asked to “bring the gun” to their fathers by the age of 3, are cleaning and assembling by age 8, and considered old enough “to carry out his own mission” by age 11 or so. By this time, she adds, some are operating “parallel versions of the community gang and border issues in schools” (Ferreira-Sutherland 2010:7). She describes these youth as boys who lost their fathers [and/or close family members] violently from a very young age, and have become very angry, aggressive and resolute to avenge these deaths. These are the ones who are “on a mission to kill” and do not need much coaching or prompting to do so and are often not open to reason.
In such a context, PMI’s record of reducing community violence, including a 15 per cent decline in homicides since 2001, and stopping “wars” in the August Town, Browns Town and Mountain View communities are significant achievements (Levy 2005; McLean 2009: 45). PMI’s success is, in part, due to its persona as a politically neutral entity, which enables staff to enter politically charged garrisons. PMI staff are able to initiate dialogue and work with, and mediate among, warring factions (McLean 2009: 45). However, this trust and ‘respect’ are also a result of PMI’s distancing itself from the law enforcement aspect associated with successful anti-gang programs, as well as its adherence to the community code of silence. As Levy (2010) reports:
47 Kingston, the capital, is located in the parish of St. Andrew. A western arm of PMI was launched on April 27, 2005 in Montego Bay in the parish of St. James (JIS 2005). 48 Though Levy (2010) prefers the term “corner crew,” the members tend to self-identify as gangs. He makes the point that, while some members of community gangs may commit crimes, their orientation differs from that of mature criminal gangs in that they “defend a piece of community, a piece of turf. In that process they have guns…and kill, but this is different from the orientation of a criminal gang, which professionally sets out to trade in guns or drugs, to rob or to extort or to launder money or hijack cars or assassinate.” Youth Violence 37
It’s not our job to inform the police. We keep a distance from law enforcement. That’s crucial, otherwise we lose [the] confidence of people. They will tell us a lot of things… talk openly about …who did that shooting, who did that one. The only thing they don’t talk openly about is where they have their guns hidden, but they will talk about these other things fairly openly.
Apart from building confidence, this approach is essential to staff survival and to achieving PMI’s mandate. Although interventions were initially targeted at entire communities, staff engagement has evolved to include sections of communities and key individuals. Proactively preventing conflict from escalating to violence rests on early detection. To this end, PMI provides a small subvention to approximately 16 “liaison persons” across these communities to be its “eyes and ears” on the ground. They alert staff when situations begin to escalate and establish contact, prior to mediation, with the warring factions.49 This is the only way that PMI’s meagre staff can fulfill its mandate. Moreover, its most recent hire, a former “shotta” (shooter), is acquainted with other gang-involved youth in the targeted communities. His knowledge and experience are invaluable in identifying perpetrators and assessing their willingness to take part in mediation. This intelligence is also important to the unit’s tactical decisions about when to conduct a community walk and which areas need urgent targeting. Employment of a former “shotta” raises ethical questions but as Levy (2010) explains: First, it is not “obvious” he would have killed someone. Not every shotta has done that. Second, while some information does come to the PMI about killings in a community and often who has done them, we do not make a point of investigating responsibilities—that is the job of the police. Our job is to try to build peace through mediation, counselling and development. Third, even if an individual has committed a crime for which s/he has not been tried and convicted, this does not make him/her ineligible for work, including peacemaking. Such at least is my view. More important than court, conviction, prison, etc. are remorse and conversion. Those in a community who come forward and take part in our peacemaking efforts we take to, at least, be moving in that direction and we engage with them.
On-the-ground intelligence is supported by ongoing data collection and analysis. PMI collects data to ascertain target areas and to measure its impact. Its homicide data is more accurate than police statistics since local residents provide the information.50 Levy (2010) credits PMI’s success to its approach of going directly to the origins of the violence, listening and talking with those involved, mediating among them and seeking to assist them. Over the years, the entity has also built a reputation for its work so that communities sometimes request intervention. PMI’s approach begins with mediation between the contenders alongside counselling for the traumatized, followed by developmental inputs. The mediation process begins with PMI’s going into the community and meeting with the warring factions and other residents. Those interested in peace come forward, mainly older heads and younger residents; sometimes the ‘shottas’ themselves do so. Those engaged in criminal activities tend to shy away. PMI brings the warring factions to the table to discern the source of conflict. This is generally conducted in an upscale hotel outside
49 The amount is about J$5,000 (C$60). 50 Some homicides do not make it into police records. 38 Youth Violence
the community, since garrisons have no neutral zones. Not only does this prevent reprisals during mediation but it places the participants in a setting where particular behaviours are expected. Seating arrangements preclude physical attacks. Given Jamaica’s high level of religiosity, the mediation, counselling and therapy processes all begin and end in prayer. Levy (2010) outlines the mediation process The first thing is to listen to them. Hear what they have to say and let them say it. Basically when it’s between a community or a section of a community it’s usually the same thing they’re saying: the other side attacked me first or killed a member of my group first. So it’s useless at that point saying to them, “Well, the other side is saying the same thing.” Initially we don’t know what the history of it is so we’re not really in a position to argue with them, and it doesn’t make much sense arguing with them. You listen and you suggest, “Well, let’s try and talk to the other side. There might be another side to this story.” So you manage to persuade them to sit down at the table. And then each side hears the other side saying the same thing it is saying. Now sometimes when they sit down to talk they do manage to trace how it started in the short term. In the longer term it gets lost in the midst of history and is pretty hard to track down. I remember in one community it started with the theft of a necklace and that was what triggered a violent reaction and set off a whole chain reaction.
He notes that the youth are generally reasonable. However, the success of mediation depends on the extent to which each side wants the situation to end. If they do, reason prevails; otherwise they make excuses and “bob and weave and so on.” The mediator must retain a firm hand: You have to give each side a chance to talk, each side to listen to the other. That’s the first step. Say your piece. Listen. Let the other person talk. Don’t interrupt. Listen; you’ll get your chance to talk. I mean that only works up to a certain point because people are heated, they have suffered, they have losses gone on for years. There’s a lot of emotion and feeling involved—relatives of those who died are there. Hence, one has to allow for a certain amount of venting. And this venting can go on meeting after meeting because in the first meeting you might have seven of the 15 or 20 people involved. The next meeting you might have two of that seven and a fresh five and so on over several meetings; so you have to allow a certain amount of venting. Our second technique is to allow venting. You have to try and control the cross-talking to some extent, but you can’t completely and it’s hard to keep one’s temper or one’s cool. I’ve lost it more than once. (Levy 2010)
Mediation can take weeks or drag on for months, before warring factions agree to a ceasefire. PMI initiates a simultaneous counselling process with community children, women and men to alleviate distress among the first two and prevent retaliation by the men, particularly those who lost family and friends to the violence. Counselling and therapy are conducted by a trained staff social worker in conjunction with a team of 30 volunteers (retired doctors, teachers, counsellors, psychologists and pastors) and can go on for months. PMI also organizes retreats and field trips to take gang members out of the inner city and expose them to a range of different skills such as conflict resolution, problem solving and leadership training. It organizes outings for the children. They are taken to a park outside Kingston to expose them to a calm country atmosphere, or to the University of the West Indies (UWI) Child Development clinic. Youth Violence 39
During mediation, if the factions agree to keep the ceasefire, PMI offers economic inducements, to which individuals have responded positively. Once violence is quelled, PMI initiates its social development component, which involves provision of small grants to help them devise an alternative to the gun. It has sponsored poultry farms and a block-making factory in August Town to provide 50 at-risk youth with a legitimate source of income. However, outbreaks of violence disrupted the projects and killed some participants. Only two poultry farms survived. Browns Town has a better record. Four of five poultry farms are still operational despite violent outbreaks in 2005; the fifth farm was in the process of revival during the study period. Though the lack of ready markets has meant slow product turnover, the projects offer purpose and hope to those who can easily slip back into a violent life. 6.2.3 The Role of Women in Gangs and Violence While males predominate as perpetrators and victims of armed violence, women also play a vital role. Although they generally move freely across borders in ‘peacetime’, wives, girlfriends and mothers are killed to lure ‘shottas’ and betrayers back into the community for execution. Others are active participants and perpetrators of gun violence and crime. For some it is a way of life, while others traffic guns in baby carry-bags, diapers, thermoses and prams…[are asked] to rent the car they need to carry out the robbery/murder, to get sale for stolen goods, to maintain “the link” with gang leaders and other criminal elements overseas who still control communities here, or to clear guns and ammunitions at the wharves, etc. (Ferreira- Sutherland 2010: 5-6).51
Levy (2010) has not encountered overt female involvement but has discerned indirect participation and support that includes “hiding the weapon, cleaning the blood-stained clothes, acting as lookouts and encouragement.” He further notes instances when “mothers of those killed…encourage their other sons or urge on other groups to avenge.” As “accessories to crime and violence” (Ferreira Sutherland 2010: 6) women publicly block roads to protest the killing of their youth by police, despite awareness of youth gang involvement. This reaction is often more of a protective mechanism, to avoid branding as a traitor or police informer. 6.2.4 PMI’s Project Means This section examines the nature of partnerships between PMI, the community and other partners, as well as funding issues and the extent to which the budget is sufficient to realize PMI’s objectives. Some of this material has been discussed in the section on program design. This section will, therefore, focus on four other means used by PMI to stem violence and build peace: sports interventions, cultural events, retreats and opportunity fairs. In 2007, when the sports intervention was last used, PMI organized 26 games that were held in various spots in Kingston—even during elections.52 It offered substantial prizes of J$60,000-$70,000. The games emphasized the importance of discipline, dress codes and behaviour on the field. The most disciplined team received a special prize. According to Levy, these events were not only effective but also meaningful to a community in which sports are very important.
51 The women are called ‘cow-girls’ or ‘gun girls’ and often fight with the men. 52 The run-up to elections and Election Day are marred by intercommunity violence. The games were suspended on a few Sundays when particular areas became “hot” (Levy 2010). 40 Youth Violence
The cultural interventions have also had significant impact. In June 2003, one year after PMI came into existence, the six Mountain View-area communities exploded with 10 homicides. In July PMI approached the Area Youth Foundation (AYF)—a cultural group of inner-city youth that uses drama, theatre, song and dance as an educational tool—to train a group from each Mountain View community. Training had to be conducted outside Mountain View. Each group was charged with organizing a small production in their community and inviting other areas to visit them. Invitees were encouraged to bring food for what was envisioned as a day-long event. The movement of the youth across boundaries began slowly at first but later picked up speed. In October a fairly large event was launched, which entailed closure of the highway, from noon to midnight, to allow the erection of a giant stage. The day consisted of sports competitions such as netball and soccer, bun-eating and beer-drinking contests and ended with a showcase of local and outside talent. Thousands mingled. Four months before, these communities had been engaged in very violent conflict; no one would cross boundaries and driving along the highway was dangerous to motorists because members of different communities were shooting at each across the divide. Yet, the community youth achieved this peace and interaction. Levy (2010) describes it as “an example of the power of the cultural event.” In response, another community launched a monthly talent show to allow its youth to showcase their talent. It attracted an audience of hundreds until it was stopped by violence. Mountain View subsequently established a Community Development Area Council, which continues to function. When PMI began working in this area, the local community college offered to help. Over several years, it has trained a significant number of youth in skills such as appliance repair, sewing, electronics, hospitality and academics.53 Some completed high school and went on to university. According to Levy (2010) training has caught on; many inner-city youth now recognize the need to be trained and certified. Hence, as Levy (2010) points out, addressing violence and crime requires sustained attention. By addressing an area with all the resources—sport, culture, training, employment, retreat, opportunity fairs—we bring the full panoply across the whole section, because what the garrison has done is to destroy community life and community life spans all human activities—the recreational, the cultural, the employment, all the things that people need to be fully human. And so rebuilding communities, which is basically what we are trying to do— rebuild the community, rebuild the social capital, get the community back and responsible for itself, with its own organizations, its own development. That is what has to be done. With a dearth of human and financial resources, PMI seeks partnerships wherever it can. For example, when a group in the community of Waterhouse indicated it wanted to establish a youth club, PMI approached the Social Development Commission for assistance. It also utilizes the services of HEART NTA, a government training agency, to provide job and skills training for inner- city residents. Although McLean (2009: 48) recommends that PMI should work in a community for three months and then exit, this is impractical because When you’ve built up trust with a set of people over a period of one or two years, you don’t just toss them aside; It’s a very interpersonal thing. We can bring in another agency, but we need to continue to hold their hands for a while. It would take longer than three months. It’s something that would have to be very flexible. It’s not that we want to hold on to turf. One of the things that forces us to stay in communities is that some of these other organizations are so bureaucratic.
53 PMI paid for this training at reduced tuition rates. Youth Violence 41
They don’t respond quick…they have to fulfill certain requirements, advertise every contract and get three bidders. It’ll take them six months to a year to respond. But in the meantime, if we don’t respond, all the work we put in to gain a ceasefire is lost. We’ve got to act quickly, put a block- making thing in to satisfy the needs of a particular group or supply them with chickens, etc. So there is that sort of immediate response, which is needed. And secondly, some agencies think that because you give training, the thing to do is to train them how to manage their association. That’s not good enough. You have to find jobs, put them in touch with agencies. You have to bring the state agencies in, and some of the state agencies are reluctant to go in there—they are afraid. So part of the work of PMI has been to open up these communities for other agencies to come in and we have to do this. (Levy 2010) Small businesses have supported PMI by providing access to goods on credit. Contrary to McLean’s (2009: 46) claim, PMI does not provide grants directly to beneficiaries, but issues an invoice to collect chicken feed or lumber, and pays the vendor itself. More recently it has approached the Jamaica Business Development Corporation to provide training in management, bookkeeping and other skills to increase the success of the small businesses it helps to establish. But large Jamaican businesses have not been forthcoming with additional funding for PMI, primarily because it is regarded as a state agency. Thus, like BTC, PMI also suffers from severe financial constraints. To address funding issues in 2009 it changed its status to that of a private limited company, which will enable it to apply for domestic and international funding. 6.2.5 PMI’S Project Outcomes This section looks at PMI’s effectiveness in deterring youth gang involvement and addressing the barriers faced by youth. Many of these outcomes have already been discussed. However, data from a sample of six PMI communities show a general decline in homicides, despite intermittent spikes (Figure 10). Violence in Rock Hall is almost nonexistent; it has petered out in Duhaney Park and markedly declined in Woodford Park. Homicides significantly decreased in Dunkirk, although there were some spikes from 2007 onwards. Although Browns Town is not included in Figure 10, homicides there remained low throughout the period 2005-2009 (McLean 2009: 46). But the communities border on areas in which interventions have not yet been implemented. The culture of violence translates into a reluctance to relinquish guns and occasionally causes peace agreements to fall apart. Thus, even where intracommunity violence is obviated, intercommunity tensions can unravel these gains. The garrisons’ culture of violence has been ingrained since the 1940s and is one in which drugs and other criminal activities have become inextricably interwoven. So change will not be quick or easy. Despite such setbacks, however, PMI has achieved a measure of success that has gained significant public attention. McLean (2009: 72) found that 85 per cent of inner-city communities with access to any programs were highly satisfied with the service provided. Community policing has been going on in August Town for some time, with positive results. A Crime/Violence Prevention Committee of police, community members and stakeholders from outside the community was established. Levy (2010) notes the considerable dialogue among these parties. However, police can strain relations with the community by, for example, forbidding corner sessions (parties), closing them down on some feeble pretext, or not taking action against a group of men shooting off their guns. However, the community has, to date, managed to steer around these road-blocks, sometimes by taking issues to higher authorities. 42 Youth Violence
The PMI case study reveals the disjuncture between theoretical approaches and actual practice in particularly volatile contexts, where violence is ingrained in the sociocultural fabric. While PMI adheres to the violence prevention, intervention, and rehabilitation aspects of youth armed violence, it distances itself from law enforcement. It owes its credibility and success to this last factor. However, one may conclude that, were the community policing programs effective in these communities, the probability of recurring violence would be far lower.
7. Conclusion It is quite startling to realize that two-thirds of fatalities across the globe are the result of violence occurring in places that are not in a state of war. Even more disturbing is the fact that young people act as both the main perpetrators and victims of this violence. Most violent behaviour is concentrated in poor, marginalized communities. It is evident that the problem of youth armed violence in these areas is escalating. Thus, youth armed violence represents a significant deterrent to development by negating improvements in human health and deterring economic investment, while at the same time diverting capital from development to crime and violence issues. Above all, it undermines social and economic development by spreading fear and insecurity. In furtherance of the goals of the Small Arms Working Group and Project Ploughshares to reduce violence and build peace, this report documented two community-based, best-practice approaches that have achieved some success in rehabilitating and preventing youth armed violence. The study looked at two distinct areas: the City of Toronto, where youth armed violence is perceived to be on the rise and Kingston, Jamaica, where the problem has become part of the sociocultural fabric. The case studies were the Breaking the Cycle Project (BTC) in Rexdale, a community in Toronto and the Peace Management Initiative (PMI) in Kingston, Jamaica. These areas are linked by the report’s focus on Caribbean youth, which is based on the common perception that much of the Toronto violence is perpetrated by youth with Caribbean, and especially Jamaican, roots. A number of similarities are to be noted in the two case studies. First of all, contrary to the findings by Matthews (1993), I found that the youth in both Toronto and Jamaica share, to varying degrees, some common characteristics. They are marginalized, ostracized, reside in communities lacking resources and facilities, and are deprived of sufficient educational and life skills for gainful employment. They have all been raised in communities with gangs, guns and violence and often have family members who are also gang-associated. In these communities, a cultural portrait of manhood that valorizes aggression and the gun plays a critical role in shaping male behaviours and attitudes. Women in both cases perpetuate these behaviours as they too are indoctrinated to value the same ideal. In addition, young women are gang-associated, if not gang-involved, performing certain violence-related roles. Both communities are extremely permeable to exterior influences, with both positive and negative consequences. International drug trafficking and gun running affect both areas, as does a shared “self-identification” with macho and often violent lifestyles. Both communities experience a general breakdown in the family unit, as well as a lack of services and/or access to them. On the other hand, the ability of members of these communities to travel relatively short distances outside their deprived areas into more stable social contexts has allowed both PMI and BTC to Youth Violence 43 develop cultural, sporting and educational interventions. Such exposure to other lifestyles and opportunities has been instrumental in breaking cycles of gang violence and destructive behaviour and were made possible largely by the direct intervention of stakeholders and institutions from outside the focal communities. As discussed in the theoretical outline, there is a common thread throughout the models associated with decreasing youth armed violence that stresses the importance of multisectoral, multilevel intervention, as well as noting the importance of a multitude of solutions to the complex problems of violence. Both BTC and PMI seem to have based their interventions on these premises and adopted variations of the approaches discussed in Section 5. They have both achieved a reasonable measure of success in their focal communities. PMI cites a 15 per cent decline in homicides in Jamaica since 2001, as well as a drop in “wars” in several communities. While BTC has not yet achieved the same level of formalized data collection, its caseworkers also informally estimate that violent behaviour is slowly being reduced; few program participants return to gang life and many go on to further education and/or jobs. A critical link between these two programs and the theoretical models is the relationship between violence and development. Ultimately, violence makes development impossible. Both case studies highlight the negative socioeconomic circumstances of victims and perpetrators and the important benefits of economic incentives in the form of small-business, educational and job- related support. There are certainly a number of differences in the two programs’ approaches, which are commensurate with the dissimilarities in core communities. Even though the groups serve a similar clientele, they do not operate in totally similar environments. In seeking to address youth armed violence, it is important to understand why youth engage in violence; while violence is a learned behaviour, macro-level influences also play a critical role. The macro-level influences on the Caribbean’s high violence rates (particularly in “garrison” communities) are: the existence of a large population of youth (an age group most prone to aggression), growing income inequality, the increasing trade in drugs and weapons and inertia, whereby violence leads to more violence (Buvinić, Alda & Lamas 2005: 4). The West Indian communities are also more vulnerable because of the lack of infrastructure and safety nets, such as social welfare, which can limit complete destitution. In Canada greater opportunity for change in status exists because of the higher level of development in the country as a whole. Despite the limited resources of the target population, there are more national bodies and organizations with the means and vested interest to help. There is, of course, much improvement to be made in both countries in serving underdeveloped areas and deprived populations. Different administrative organization and associations have certainly influenced the operation of programs. PMI can be seen to have benefited by its exposure to a structured, coordinated approach based on the international WHO principles and programs, which have presumably aided and informed its policy and practice. Yet its founding as a government institution has both helped and hindered it. While it has been able to draw on the institutional expertise of the larger development community, its government standing limited its ability to attract private funding to such an extent that it has now changed its status. It has nonetheless been encouraged by its wider connections to embrace a larger area of influence, expanding to now include programs in 60 44 Youth Violence
communities in 16 areas, despite its limited staff and budget. The similarity of the problems in the communities it addresses and the relatively small size of the island has allowed the staff to adopt similar approaches in several zones. Thus, many of its initiatives have been more focused on general group interventions and meditations. PMI does engage in follow-up counselling and individualized interventions, but projects have experienced similar levels of difficulty in maintaining reliable funding and enlisting cooperative agreements with big business and national agencies. This has, perhaps, had the positive effect of encouraging closer connections to local small business and residents, as well as leading to the identification and involvement of community liaison volunteers and advisors. In Canada, BTC has remained relatively focused on a smaller clientele and specific area, perhaps by choice, but also due to limited government support. Certainly, the perception that “Jamaicans” are the perpetrators of most violence in Toronto is based on the somewhat skewed premise that those who self-identify as Jamaican actually have some connection to the island. This “racializing” of crime has led to difficult relations with security forces and sometimes limited the success of the BTC’s initiatives. However, it has also led to highly individualized programming, with a detailed focus on personalized counselling and ongoing interventions. It can be argued that it is just this type of tailoring to local conditions that has led to BTC’s successful growth within the community, with recent program cycles attracting 85-90 applicants. Despite its narrower sphere of influence and associations, BTC has taken longer to adapt formalized methods of evaluation and data gathering. This makes it more difficult to assess the efficacy of its interventions and may have contributed to its inability to attract long-term reliable funding. I do not mean to say that PMI and BTC have not managed to attract support for their interventions. Both have had quite reasonable cooperation from important groups, including educational institutions and NGOs. They also continue to seek out local partnerships and formalize relationships with concerned parties both within and outside their focal zones. Nevertheless, it seems that no matter how closely these programs have tried to work with multiple stakeholders, nor how connected they were to formal government initiatives, they have met with serious restraints. Funding has certainly proved the most limiting factor for both programs. Neither has been able to maintain adequate staffing levels and both have had difficulties in financing suitable outreach projects. This is perhaps somewhat more understandable in the Jamaican context, given the extent of problems faced by developing countries. However, as research has shown, taming violence is critical in addressing larger development concerns. 7.1 Lessons to be drawn Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999: 18) identify the use of case management systems as one of the “ingredients of success in youth-serving programs.” Individualized care can be provided and the interdisciplinary needs of youth met. However, these youth management systems are part of larger systems and both operate in challenging environments where many variables are beyond their influence. Thus, it is particularly important to assess the lessons learned about the wider context in which both programs have operated. As mentioned previously, both PMI and BTC seemed well aware of the multilevel and multifaceted problems they addressed. In fact, for PMI, political neutrality and an insistence on “distancing itself from law enforcement programmes” were important factors in its success. Unfortunately, PMI was not always supported—either financially or practically—by other agencies. Youth Violence 45
The focal communities were also subject to constant instability due to a countrywide lack of security, essential services and adequate infrastructure. In Canada, the politics of cooperation were less visible, but the lack of reliable support from provincial and national agencies was an important variable in program success. This case study notes the prevalence of paper partners, “none of whom has changed its approach” to program participants, with only 10 out of 22 bodies “sympathetic” to the program actively involved with BTC’s initiatives. While there was better access to superior facilities in the Toronto area, inadequate social services and a lack of cooperation from parents and authorities encouraged or exacerbated the problems faced by local youth enrolled in the Rexdale program. It is particularly noteworthy that, contrary to the literature, there is no close collaboration between law enforcement and either BTC or PMI. BTC interviewees specifically mention that the police do not support the program and “view it with disdain.” While this report does not go into recent global tightening of immigration policy, it should be noted that discussion of Canadian immigrant issues often centres on a perceived link between growing crime, juvenile gangs and (visible) minorities. This perception, whatever its validity, has obviously played a role in the evident reluctance of Toronto security forces to buy into programs focusing on “bottom- up” re-socialization of gang-associated youth. Their stereotyping of “Jamaican” juveniles has led to harassment and ostracizing of these young people and helps to reinforce their self-image as “tough gangsters.” In Jamaica, police have consistently been accused of strong-armed brutality and vigilante tactics (see Levy 2005; Deosaran 2007b). The general gun and “don” culture affects not only youth, but also works against the effectiveness of mediation, counselling and anti-violence measures instigated by PMI. This study highlights a peculiar finding on how image and culture relate to identity in the two cases. Jamaican inner-city youth pattern their behaviours and dress on North America images and find identity in their violent communities, Canadian youth, who have never visited the Caribbean, tailor their behaviour on what they perceive to be Caribbean, predominantly Jamaican, culture. Perhaps a poignant solution for entities such as BTC would be to expose their youth to the reality of inner-city life in Jamaica and what their future would look like should they choose to return to gangs and guns. It is guaranteed to be a rude awakening. In the end I must offer some recommendations. First, any group wanting to effect change in youth armed violence must consistently work on a variety of levels to put out the message of peace and opportunity, while working within the parameters established for their organization. The permeability of communities in crisis is two-way: attitudes and consequences flow both inwards and outwards, as do the victims and perpetrators of violence. Therefore, it is doubly important to coordinate both vertical and horizontal initiatives to address the circumstances that lead to violence, as well as the interventions that limit its spread. Important to the above recommendation is an acknowledgement of the relationship between youth armed violence reduction and development or lack of development. Policymakers need to adopt an AVD lens when crafting policies to address violence. Two types of reinforcing policies are necessary: policies that bring about socioeconomic development and help to reduce the risks and effects of violence, and policies that increase security via targeted armed violence reduction strategies which, in turn, lead to sustainable socioeconomic development (Drury 2010: 1). However, 46 Youth Violence
as the research has shown, development initiatives must be holistic and include community- building dimensions associated with community development. Additionally, they must incorporate psychological interventions in which youth are active participants. In essence, this research calls for a mix of interventions that span economic, social, psychological and cultural aspects of life. At the program level, the inclusion of past graduates in outreach efforts is critical. In the testimonies of BTC graduates or participants gang-associated youth see hope for themselves. These presentations also act as a deterrent to at-risk youth and enhance organizational effectiveness in reaching the targeted audience, particularly program cohorts. PMI also uses the skills and knowledge of a former “shotta” to increase its outreach effectiveness. Although ethical questions arise in employing individuals once engaged in criminal activities, this peer-to-peer approach is, in fact, highly recommended by WOLA (2008: 3). Second, violence must be addressed by multiple partners, both within and outside the criminal justice system. Both case studies have proven that community-based, “bottom-up” programs can be successful in redirecting and retraining juvenile offenders and gang-associated youth. However, sensitizing security and social services to the negative influence of stereotyping and racial profiling is critical, as is their cooperation in influencing public opinion and policy. A lack of trust is typical for programs serving gang-associated youth; youth and program staff are highly suspicious of police, while police believe that these interventions protect criminals. Third, it is essential to collect and use hard data on various interventions. Reliable data will help to build program/project efficiency and provide benchmarks; it will also be instrumental in grant applications and fundraising. Properly maintained records will also facilitate the development and transfer of institutional knowledge within and between programs and communities, and facilitate the transfer of “best practice.” I would encourage academics and larger funding organizations to consider underwriting formalized interorganizational communication that would provide support and address disjuncture between theory and delivery of common multisectoral development and governance goals. In essence, the penetration of the local by the global is both physical and notional. We have seen in these two localities how cultural images and behaviours have been reinforced by good or bad role models, as well as how exposure to options can be limited by available funds. The allocation of public and private funding follows the demands of the citizens who lead. It is easy, then, to appreciate how critical it is to press forward with the struggle to end armed youth violence if we wish to find some harmony at home. BIBLIOGRAPHY
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