Secretary Hagel speaks at National Defense University on strategic and fiscal challenges facing DOD DOD (Glenn Fawcett)
BEYOND SEQUESTER Improving National Defense in an Age of Austerity
By Richard H. Kohn n his first day in the job, Sec- than that, we’re all there with you and we’ll retary of Defense Chuck Hagel figure it out.”2 Behind these blunt words lay told the Pentagon that “We live a challenge to the Armed Forces unlike any O in a very defining time . . . a seen for a generation or more: a cutback in difficult time . . . a time of tremendous chal- funding large enough to call into question lenge . . . with the budget and sequestration the policy, strategy, and force structure—in . . . . We need to figure this out. You are doing effect the purpose—underlying the entire that. You have been doing that. We need to military establishment. deal with this reality.”1 Chairman of the Joint Even with congressional permission Richard H. Kohn is Professor Emeritus of History Chiefs General Martin Dempsey put it more for flexibility to manage the reductions, and Peace, War, and Defense at the University of dramatically to Congress a week earlier: the puzzle will remain, in Secretary Hagel’s North Carolina at Chapel Hill and was Chief of Air “What do you want your military to do?” he words, how to “figure this out.”3 The choices Force History from 1981 to 1991. This article is asked. “If you want it to be doing what it’s will be painful. At one extreme, the Services adapted from a speech to the Office of the U.S. doing today, then we can’t give you another could surrender to less capacity to defend the Army General Counsel in May 2012. dollar. If you want us to do something less United States; at the other, they can revisit ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 47 COMMENTARY | Beyond Sequester roles and missions, turning jointness upside families, Congress, and the contractors who sesses the benefit of a long period of strategic down by igniting bitter inter-Service com- will supply and profit from the purchases warning. No Service organizes for, or even petition or making reductions that fracture insist on the most capability with less regard thinks much about, mobilizing the citizenry longstanding relationships with military for affordability. for large-scale war, the assumption being that contractors, retired officers, veterans groups, for lack of time, the Nation will have to fight and even foreign allies. Past as Prologue with the forces, Active and Reserve, present In the short run (fiscal 2013), nothing Austere (or worse) budgets are nothing at the beginning.4 Inducting people would will avoid real hurt—for people personally new for the Services. Inadequate funding be relatively simple; training, equipping, and and for programs, including delays and defer- has been the norm in nearly every peacetime leading a greatly expanded force when all or ments that will reverberate into 2014 and period, which always began (until 1991) most of the Active-duty and Reserve forces beyond, and may add to costs in the long run. with huge reductions. Today’s is the second have been committed to the fight would be something else. Could American industry provide the high-tech weapons, and could the Services quickly train the men and women to use them? Little or no serious planning goes on for such a contingency, and no scenario on the horizon suggests that it is likely to. But the United States has been surprised in
U.S. Air Force (Samuel King) U.S. Air Force war almost every time, to a greater or lesser degree. If the Pentagon is truly preparing for the full spectrum of conflict, planning for a full-scale mobilization beyond the call-up of the Reserves is by definition necessary, and even some preparations would be wise and worth some modest expenditures. Perhaps the most stressful period of General George C. Marshall’s 6 years as Chief of Staff of the Army were the first 2, from September 1939 to the eve of Pearl Harbor, when he struggled to create a modern mass army. Even as the war began in Europe, it was not altogether clear what kind of conflict was coming. The Army could hardly predict that F-35 Lightning II joint strike fighter delivered to 33rd Fighter Wing at official rollout ceremony, “37 percent of the total value of all materiel Eglin Air Force Base, Florida bought by the War Department” from 1940 through 1945 would be for airplanes or that keeping Britain and the Soviet Union in the But in the intermediate and long term, each contraction since the end of the Cold War. war would be the cornerstone of success.5 The Service and the military establishment as a Even during that conflict, in the 1950s Navy, focused determinedly on fleet action, whole can preserve American military power and late 1970s, one or more Service lost did not predict, even in 1941 after 2 years of for the future if they choose wisely in the the budget competition (usually the Army war in the Atlantic, that the first battle to be age-old tradeoff among readiness, modern- because of the need to maintain a strategic won would be against German submarines ization, and personnel. balance with the Soviet Union). Yet even the and that the Navy would lose that battle Outside pressures appear strongest in Army survived to succeed after the reduc- for well over a year.6 Nor did either Service readiness and modernization, the first from tion, largely for three reasons: the country anticipate the indispensable role that landing political leaders at home and abroad and enjoyed strategic warning and thus time to craft would play in both the European and the second from contractors and domestic prepare; the Army understood that it was to Pacific theaters, or the numbers and types constituencies. The country is on record be the core for a mass citizen ground force that would be required.7 as demanding that combat forces be ready, to be mobilized from the population; and although ready for what is unclear to most outstanding military leadership at the top Readiness, Modernization, and everyone, and the record of prediction of during the buildup and ensuing war. Personnel what will be the next war, contingency, or Today differs from the more distant As the United States enters a period deployment has been astonishingly poor for past because the United States both attempts of relative peace, the chief challenge is how over a generation. After more than 10 years to guarantee stability in several regions of the to choose among the three priorities of of continuous war, military equipment needs world and faces terrorist threats, and each of readiness, modernization, and personnel. refurbishing or replacing. Few advocate fore- these challenges could require forces ready Given the uncertainty and unpredictability going the best technologies; Soldiers, their to intervene. The country no longer pos- of future war, the top priority must be to
48 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KOHN develop leadership that recognizes the kind unlike their uniformed counterparts, are ing him again and again into combat. The of war that occurs or threatens, is flexible subject to cuts in pay and diminished con- textbook Combat and Operational Behavioral enough to adapt the people and forces to tracts under sequestration. While all the Health, published in 2011 by the Office of the tasks, devises the menu of strategies that Services will shrink, each retains the extraor- the Army Surgeon General, concluded that will support the Nation’s objectives in the dinarily experienced combat forces, as has Department of Defense “behavioral health- conflict, and then executes the decisions of been the case after every war. care delivery has improved dramatically,” the political leadership with speed, secrecy, The future, however, may prove much but “one point that remains constant is that and least cost in blood and treasure. All of the more challenging. First, combat experience the human ability to adapt to the horrors of Services know that wars are won by people, inevitably declines over time even when combat is finite.”15 As the medical services and particularly—crucially—by leadership. retention is relatively high, as people retire or learn more, it may be that such wounds make The quality of the people—how they are leave the Service and operations and training sending these soldiers repeatedly into battle trained, how they are educated, and how they funds level off or drop. is neither militarily helpful nor ethically or are led—will in the end, as much or more Second, as the economy improves, politically acceptable.16 We seem already to be than how they are equipped or whether they recruiting will come under pressure both in breaking new ground in allowing wounded are ready for the first fight, determine the numbers and quality even with cutbacks in soldiers to continue on Active, though outcome. To give one recent example, leader- the size the Army and Marine Corps. Some perhaps limited, duty, and it is unclear how ship largely explains why the Army came so 75 percent of American youth are ineligible far that can go. In any event, it has become close to failing in Iraq, and how in the end it to serve due to deficiencies of health, mental clear that the military health system is not prevailed in that troubled country.8 or other physical incapacities, or criminal adequately covering all the veterans suffer- Douglas MacArthur, an officer of great records.11 Some 85 percent of today’s youth ing from wounds, particularly in the area of accomplishment who was Chief of Staff from plan to attend college within a year of gradu- mental health.17 1930 to 1935 during the depth of the Great ating from high school, few of whom con- The all-volunteer force was never Depression, provided a grim warning. He sider military service. And as the economy designed to sustain a large war or military faced an even more desperate funding equa- expands and unemployment declines—even campaign over time; the last two succeeded tion. He was so frustrated and so burdened by “emotional exhaustion,” as he recounted in his memoirs, that in a meeting with the 75 percent of American youth are ineligible to serve due to President and Secretary of War in the White deficiencies of health, mental or other physical incapacities, or House, he “spoke recklessly and said some- criminal records thing to the general effect that when we lost the next war, and an American boy, lying in the mud with an enemy bayonet through his slowly—recruiting and retention are likely to because of the patriotic surge after 9/11, weak belly and an enemy foot on his dying throat, become more difficult.12 civilian job creation, and the ingenious work- spat out his last curse, I wanted the name not Furthermore, people are expensive now arounds mentioned above. Almost no one to be MacArthur, but Roosevelt.” Roosevelt and may prove to be more so years hence; wants a return to a draft, no matter how tem- “grew livid. ‘You must not talk that way to the cost of soldiers and equipping them has porary; it would be impossible to administer the President!’ he roared.” MacArthur recog- risen dramatically in recent years.13 The all- fairly anyway. The Pentagon would be wise to nized immediately the truth of that, “apolo- volunteer policy survived the campaigns in spend whatever is necessary not only to treat gized,” offered his resignation, and after Iraq and Afghanistan through raising the today’s wounded, but also to improve preven- Roosevelt brushed it off, left and vomited on maximum enlistment age, offering signing tion, assessment, diagnosis, and treatment the White House steps.9 and reenlistment bonuses, expanding educa- so the volunteer force is capable of sustained MacArthur consistently chose poorly, tion and other benefits, upping pay, modify- combat and future budgets are not consumed focusing on the size of the Army, starv- ing standards, the massive use of contractors, by the costs of disability and medical treat- ing modernization, neglecting technology and other changes.14 ment for veterans who will live longer than in (except for the Air Corps, which had its own Other problems loom. The incidence of the past. vocal constituency in the Army and, more Post-traumatic Stress Disorder and traumatic importantly, in Congress), and blaming Con- brain injury, which by some estimates are of The Primacy of Leadership gress for the penury visited on the ground epidemic proportions among combat troops Of greater long-term significance, and forces. His successor, Malin Craig, Chief returning from deployment, is only begin- far less visible, is the effectiveness of the of Staff from 1935 to 1939, actually decided ning to be understood, not only medically but officer personnel systems corps in each of “to freeze weapons development.”10 Yet the also as challenges to treatment and healing, the Services. Officers are critical not only to emphasis on personnel, while it sacrificed impacting the ability to send those affected tactics and operations, but also to the indis- readiness and modernization, may have back into combat. At present, the military pensable function of advising the political lessons for today. does not possess the personnel to diagnose leaders (and through them the American Nowadays, on the surface, personnel every individual, treat him, predict how long people) on the policies and strategies to worries seem secondary or even tertiary it would take to restore him to wellness, and accomplish national objectives. To do that, except for civilians and contractors who, what the consequences would be for deploy- officers at the highest levels must understand ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 49 COMMENTARY | Beyond Sequester
strategy in enough depth and breadth to of wars are possible or likely in the near guide their staffs and decide on the choices and distant future. The possibilities are most likely to succeed with a minimum of far larger and more complex than coun- blood and treasure. In other words, each terinsurgency or high-tech conventional NEW personnel system must develop officers who combat. It is unlikely, after the last decade, from NDU Press are engaged in the serious study of war. It has that the American people will soon counte- to recruit them, educate them, assign them, nance another long, indecisive limited war for the Center for Strategic Research and promote them to the highest commands where American security and interests are Institute for National Strategic Studies in the military establishment. Equally impor- dubious. “As General Marshall once suc- tant, it is this capability—in policy, strategy, cinctly put it, ‘a democracy cannot fight a and the underlying study and understanding Seven Years’ War.’”19 Strategic Forum 280 of war—that will enable a Service in peace- The greatest threats today are transna- Russia Still Matters: time to advise civilian leadership and Con- tional terrorism, particularly with weapons Strategic Challenges and gress about the best choices in circumstances of mass destruction, and cyber attack. None Opportunities for the such as the Pentagon faces today. of the Services appears to have a significant Obama Administration During the first half of the 20th century, role in countering that threat except for their the United States succeeded in military special forces.20 The larger, more indistinct By John W. Parker and Michael Kofman it is unlikely that the American people will soon countenance another long, indecisive limited war where Russia’s recent authoritarian turn American security and interests are dubious and Putin’s pandering to anti-American sentiment have highlighted the obstacles to a genuine partnership with the United strategy but in the second half failed. Ameri- external threats involved in climate change, States, assuring that bilateral relations can arms have been operationally mag- cyber attack, global financial instability, will be a lower priority for both nations nificent but strategically inept beginning in transnational crime on land or sea, and other in the next 4 years. Nevertheless, as a key Vietnam and in almost every significant war political and economic threats hardly suggest United Nations member, a still formida- since.18 It would be easy—and mistaken—to the choices among manpower, readiness, and ble military and nuclear power, and new blame civilian leadership or the American modernization or clarify the military’s role member of World Trade Organization, people for these failures, as many did after in national defense. Other national security “Russia still matters,” and the authors Vietnam. Of course the civilian leaders were requirements—homeland defense—do not find and explore a set of mutual interests part of the problem. But our generals and promise much of a role at least for the Active- and concerns that necessitate pragmatic admirals have little say in determining who duty force unless a disaster is so enormous engagement between Washington and is elected or appointed, how Congress oper- it requires every available resource for con- Moscow. In the near term, U.S.-Russian coordination will be required on the ates, or how the American people feel and sequence management. War is also merging issues of Syria, Afghanistan, and missile react to war. Some of our most successful with crime, both internationally in such defense in Europe. On a longer fuse, war leaders—Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow places as Latin America and the Caribbean, cooperation will be needed on such Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt in the and at home in some of our cities.21 This, too, topics as the rise of China, security and Presidency, and John C. Calhoun, Edwin does not suggest much of a role, although the development in the Arctic, and bilateral Stanton, Elihu Root, Henry Stimson (in his Army has been involved historically, even trade and development. In all these first stint as Secretary of War), and Melvin though that can be controversial given our areas, the authors point out opportuni- Laird overseeing the military—had little or posse comitatus limitations at home and ties for the United States to advance its no uniformed experience. And some of our the unintended consequences of military strategic goals. most knowledgeable civilian officials, such as interventions abroad.22 The “responsibility to Jefferson Davis, Louis Johnson, and Donald protect” that is so prominent at policymak- Rumsfeld, had the least success. Senior gener- ing levels is unclear in meaning and offers als and admirals do have a huge impact on no guidance for the Armed Forces. Thus, the what politicians think, the choices they have, easiest (but not necessarily wisest) choice is to and the goals they pursue, and that requires fall back on the most recent experience and military advisers to have a deep knowledge of what each Service has traditionally assumed war and the keen judgment that arises from to be its chief role, usually defined by its military experience. weapons systems, organization, or doctrines. Such capability is the first and chief It is true that each Service must maintain Visit the NDU Press Web site requirement for making the budgetary core competency, indeed excellence, in suc- for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu choices facing the military today, for that cessful warmaking in its domain against a requires informed guesses about what kinds peer competitor. While each of the Services
50 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KOHN needs to be ready for different types of wars, the filling of these joint positions.23 So, too, forfeits their training, education, experience, each has the responsibility to wage the most do the Navy and the media closely watch the and accomplishment. Many officers would be sophisticated conventional war possible to number of commanders relieved for cause, fully capable of serving longer in assignments defeat any possible adversary. which seems to have risen in recent years. they desire and in which they excel. The solution to the puzzle of how to Two years ago the Independent Review To conform to best practices in human absorb large budget cuts lies in developing Panel for the 2010 Quadrennial Defense resources in the civilian world, and to reduce officers who are thinkers as well as warriors. Review proposed several changes to an toxic leadership at the higher ranks, the Over time, officers must be devoted to the officer personnel system rooted in the experi- annual officer evaluation system should profession of arms in all its varied aspects, to ence of World War II and designed for the require so-called 360-degree written evalu- include the serious study of war—and many Cold War. The recommendations below, ations; that is, assessments by subordinates must be promoted to the topmost ranks. The first duty of senior military commanders is to determine what kind of wars they are in.
The same can be said for peacetime periods: U.S. Army what is the situation of the country and what is most likely? Without such officers in the flag ranks, there will be little possibility of breaking out of business as usual, meaning a reaction to whatever comes and a period of catchup as the institution figures out the war it faces and how to adjust to it. These worries about military leader- ship extend beyond the problems of strategy in the last half century. The loss of so many midgrade officers in the late 1990s and again just a few years ago may diminish the quality of the officer corps. So, too, may the high promotion percentages to O4, O5, and O6. In the last 22 years, the military has lost a surprising number of four-star officers to relief or unexpected early retirement Soldiers stand guard during force protection exercise at Forward Operating Base Hadrian, Uruzgan before the end of their normal tours of duty: Province, Afghanistan three chiefs of staff of the Air Force; a com- mander of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command; a Supreme Allied Commander, taken from that report with an added recom- and peers as well as by supervisors. Officers Europe, and three U.S. Central Command mendation, aimed to prepare officers for the assessing their supervisors as well as their commanders; the suicide of a Chief of challenges of this century and to strengthen peers and subordinates would rapidly learn Naval Operations; a Chairman of the Joint military leadership over the next generation.24 that their Service values delegating author- Chiefs of Staff not reappointed to a second ity, treating others with dignity and respect, term; and the relief of two commanders in Career Parameters communicating candidly, mentoring and Afghanistan. Such turbulence at the top sug- Extend the length of career for every leading by example, deciding with dispatch gests that each of the Services should review rank by 5 or more years to accommodate the and transparency, avoiding micromanage- its officer personnel system from recruit- broader assignment experiences involved in ment and zero-defects expectations, and ment to education to assignment to promo- producing strategists and removing incen- other traits conducive for inspiring leader- tion. It should not escape Army leadership tives to leave the Service for second careers. ship. The Chairman and Service chiefs are that in 2012, with nearly four times more Longer careers would also save money in instituting this system for flag officers; it flag officers than the Marines, the Army recruiting, training, and education, as well as should be extended to officers at all ranks.25 held only 60 percent of the warfighting four- by deepening experience. People live longer star slots and only 50 percent overall of the and are healthier and more productive at Precommissioning Education four-star billets filled by Army and Marine older ages. Already numbers of the most At the Service academies, expand full generals. Certainly in a sample so small senior flag officers serve for more than 35 instruction in ethics, American history, other factors were involved, but this trend years in very high-pressure assignments. military history, security studies, and related has been ongoing for years, and it is common Modify or abandon the system of “up or subjects. War is more a human than an knowledge that the Services monitor the out.” Current personnel policy, constructed engineering phenomenon, so more require- filling of joint billets closely. Indeed, one to avoid a superannuated leadership and ments in the humanities and social sciences Service secretary complained last year about favor youth and vigor, expels many capable and fewer in the technical areas would better his Service being discriminated against in officers at the waste of their capabilities and prepare graduates for the profession of ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 51 COMMENTARY | Beyond Sequester U.S. Navy (Kenneth Abbate)
USS Mobile Bay at sea
arms, leadership at junior levels, and gradu- retaining even stronger officer candidates, ally and to sharpen their skills in critical, ate school in the disciplines relating to war improving their educations, and saving precise, rigorous, and imaginative thinking including staff and war colleges. uniformed personnel for other duties and and writing. If the Services offer fully funded, Also at the academies, radically perhaps saving money. This could be tested in-residence graduate degree study at the reduce the numbers of athletes recruited for with a few scholarship winners, but at a country’s most distinguished civilian institu- varsity teams. As a group, they come in with minimum, the cost of such a system should tions to all promising officers, retention of lower academic scores than their peers, do be compared honestly with the direct and the most capable would increase, as would poorer in their academic work, drop out in indirect cost of ROTC.27 the quality of the officer corps over time. higher numbers, remain in the Service in Require foreign language proficiency To broaden experience and deepen lower numbers, and rise to high rank less and a foreign area familiarity for commis- their understanding of, and connection to, frequently. The academies should not lower sioning, waived only for rare specialties civilian society, encourage the most qualified their standards just to compete athletically, needed in the Services. Officers undoubtedly officers in the middle ranks to take sabbatical as do so many other institutions of higher serve overseas in their careers in a variety of assignments in civilian industry, nonprofits, education. Academy educations cost too unpredictable situations. The study of any civilian government, or elsewhere—actual much, and national security cannot afford to foreign language and country improves an working jobs, not research or study posi- subsidize athletic prowess at the cost of too officer’s ability to understand and respect tions—with the opportunity to drop back many less-capable officers.26 people of different perspectives, behaviors, in year group so as not to fall behind in the Replace ROTC with all-expense schol- motivations, and cultures. opportunity for promotion. arships to schools of choice for high school Require application for attendance at graduates selected on a competitive basis Midcareer Education and intermediate and senior Service schools, and in exchange for enlisted Reserve service Assignments selection by entrance examination admin- while in school and 5 years of Active-duty Require all officers promoted below the istered by the schools in cooperation with service. Many youngsters would take those zone to earn a graduate degree in-residence Service personnel offices. Too many officers scholarships to the most selective public at a top-tier civilian graduate school in a dislike and disparage these educational and private colleges and universities (as war-related discipline in the humanities and opportunities, are unprepared for them, students often equate quality with cost), social sciences. No matter what their college approach them largely as necessities for reconnecting officership with the country’s or undergraduate major, officers headed for promotion, and expend a minimum of effort educational elite, perhaps attracting and high rank need to be challenged intellectu- during the year’s course of study.
52 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KOHN U.S. Army (George Hunt)
Soldier provides security in Paktika Province
Require graduates of senior Service men and women. Extraordinary accomplish- called “the military after next.” To assure the schools to serve at least 5 years of additional ment at the tactical and operational level may strongest, most capable, and most effective Active or Reserve duty after graduation. Too not always produce the best experience for force possible, he should think deeply about many war college and fellowship graduates service at the policy and strategy levels. The its leadership: recruiting the best of American retire within 5 years in the Army (as of 2010, serious study of war goes far beyond tactics, youth who can be attracted to the military, the other Services did not record any data), operations, leadership, and a host of other, educating them effectively, retaining as many thus robbing the military establishment and more specialized subjects. Our Services are as possible, and making sure the officer the American people of a reasonable return unmatched in the world today, and are proba- personnel system develops a large number on the educational investment. bly the champions of all their American prede- of them to compete for the topmost leader- cessors historically, in waging war. But warfare ship positions in their respective Services. Flag Rank is broader. The U.S. military has demonstrated Nothing could provide a greater gift of care Require a tour teaching on a professional weakness in strategy and strategic thinking, and support to the men and women serving military education faculty for flag rank. Teach- which are the translating of national goals and the country in the Department of Defense, ing a subject or discipline to college- and grad- government policy into military operations uniformed and civilian. In doing so, he will uate-level officers provides time for reflection, that will achieve the Nation’s objectives—even assure that his successors, and those in the sharpens critical thinking and rigorous, precise those that change—in the shortest possible White House and on Capitol Hill, will receive writing, and reconnects officers bound for flag time, with the least expenditure of treasure the very best advice the most capable and rank with their disciplinary or military exper- and blood, and the fewest harmful unintended experienced military officers can offer—the tise, which are both helpful for the highest consequences. kind of knowledgeable and sophisticated staff and command responsibilities. thinking that can either keep the Nation out Finally, loosen the rigidity of required The Challenge for the Secretary of of war or ensure that it prevails in the quick- assignments for promotion to the various flag Defense est, cheapest, and most salutary way for the ranks. Must an officer command at every As the new Secretary of Defense best interests of the country. If the Secretary level to reach three or four stars? Marshall grapples with the difficult choices involved can address the broader personnel challenges and Eisenhower did not. Seed the promotion in reducing military spending, he will need today and modernize the officer personnel boards with flags who possess career experi- to address important personnel issues facing system along the lines suggested here at the ences beyond the operational, and instruct the Armed Forces. He will need to nurture same time, his term in office will be conse- them to select a larger proportion of similar the military of the future, or what some once quential indeed. JFQ ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 53 COMMENTARY | Beyond Sequester
N ote s entry/wwii-vs-today-cost-equipping-gi>; Todd Boardrooms, and Backyards: The New Face of Harrison, Looking Beyond the Fog Bank: Fiscal National Security,” Durham, NC, March 2, 2013. 19 1 “All-Hands Meeting with Secretary Hagel Realities Facing Defense (Washington, DC: Center Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for from the Pentagon,” February 27, 2013, available at for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944 (Washington, DC: 54 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu