Connection-Oriented DNS to Improve Privacy and Security (Extended) USC/ISI Technical Report ISI-TR-695, Feb 2015
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Uila Supported Apps
Uila Supported Applications and Protocols updated Oct 2020 Application/Protocol Name Full Description 01net.com 01net website, a French high-tech news site. 050 plus is a Japanese embedded smartphone application dedicated to 050 plus audio-conferencing. 0zz0.com 0zz0 is an online solution to store, send and share files 10050.net China Railcom group web portal. This protocol plug-in classifies the http traffic to the host 10086.cn. It also 10086.cn classifies the ssl traffic to the Common Name 10086.cn. 104.com Web site dedicated to job research. 1111.com.tw Website dedicated to job research in Taiwan. 114la.com Chinese web portal operated by YLMF Computer Technology Co. Chinese cloud storing system of the 115 website. It is operated by YLMF 115.com Computer Technology Co. 118114.cn Chinese booking and reservation portal. 11st.co.kr Korean shopping website 11st. It is operated by SK Planet Co. 1337x.org Bittorrent tracker search engine 139mail 139mail is a chinese webmail powered by China Mobile. 15min.lt Lithuanian news portal Chinese web portal 163. It is operated by NetEase, a company which 163.com pioneered the development of Internet in China. 17173.com Website distributing Chinese games. 17u.com Chinese online travel booking website. 20 minutes is a free, daily newspaper available in France, Spain and 20minutes Switzerland. This plugin classifies websites. 24h.com.vn Vietnamese news portal 24ora.com Aruban news portal 24sata.hr Croatian news portal 24SevenOffice 24SevenOffice is a web-based Enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems. 24ur.com Slovenian news portal 2ch.net Japanese adult videos web site 2Shared 2shared is an online space for sharing and storage. -
M3AAWG Tutorial on Third Party Recursive Resolvers and Encrypting DNS Stub Resolver-To-Recursive Resolver Traffic Version 1.0 September 2019
Messaging, Malware and Mobile Anti-Abuse Working Group M3AAWG Tutorial on Third Party Recursive Resolvers and Encrypting DNS Stub Resolver-to-Recursive Resolver Traffic Version 1.0 September 2019 The direct URL to this paper is: www.m3aawg.org/dns-crypto-tutorial Document 1 of 2: This document is intended to be accompanied by the paper “M3AAWG Companion Document: Recipes for Encrypting DNS Stub Resolver-to-Recursive Resolver Traffic (www.m3aawg.org/dns-crypto-recipes),” which provides detailed instructions and processes. This document was produced by the M3AAWG Data and Identity Protection Committee. Table of Content Executive Summary 3 Introduction 4 Recommendations for M3AAWG and Its Audiences 7 I. Is the Use of Alternative Third Party Recursive Resolvers and Encryption of Stub Resolver-to- Recursive Resolver Traffic “In-Scope" for M3AAWG Remit? 9 1. DNS Is an Operationally Critical Core Internet Protocol 9 2. DNS and Messaging/Anti-Abuse Work 9 3. User Privacy and Opposition to Pervasive Monitoring 10 4. M3AAWG Membership – Many M3AAWG Members Have a Keen Interest in This Topic 10 II. Recursive Resolvers (Default ISP, Third Party Alternatives and Dedicated Personal Recursive Resolvers) 11 5. How Do Recursive Resolvers Normally Work in an ISP Environment Today? 11 6. A Typical Day in a Typical User's Life Online: Many Different Internet Service Providers, Many Different Recursive Resolvers 12 7. How Can I Even Tell What Name Servers I Am Actually Using Right Now?" 13 8. Intentionally Configuring an Alternative Third Party Recursive Resolver 15 9. Well-Known Third Party Recursive Resolver Providers 16 10. Picking the Right Third Party Recursive Resolver Service 17 11. -
Adopting Encrypted DNS in Enterprise Environments
National Security Agency | Cybersecurity Information Adopting Encrypted DNS in Enterprise Environments Executive summary Use of the Internet relies on translating domain names (like “nsa.gov”) to Internet Protocol addresses. This is the job of the Domain Name System (DNS). In the past, DNS lookups were generally unencrypted, since they have to be handled by the network to direct traffic to the right locations. DNS over Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Transport Layer Security (HTTPS), often referred to as DNS over HTTPS (DoH), encrypts DNS requests by using HTTPS to provide privacy, integrity, and “last mile” source authentication with a client’s DNS resolver. It is useful to prevent eavesdropping and manipulation of DNS traffic. While DoH can help protect the privacy of DNS requests and the integrity of responses, enterprises that use DoH will lose some of the control needed to govern DNS usage within their networks unless they allow only their chosen DoH resolver to be used. Enterprise DNS controls can prevent numerous threat techniques used by cyber threat actors for initial access, command and control, and exfiltration. Using DoH with external resolvers can be good for home or mobile users and networks that do not use DNS security controls. For enterprise networks, however, NSA recommends using only designated enterprise DNS resolvers in order to properly leverage essential enterprise cybersecurity defenses, facilitate access to local network resources, and protect internal network information. The enterprise DNS resolver may be either an enterprise-operated DNS server or an externally hosted service. Either way, the enterprise resolver should support encrypted DNS requests, such as DoH, for local privacy and integrity protections, but all other encrypted DNS resolvers should be disabled and blocked. -
The ISP Column Diving Into The
The ISP Column A column on various things Internet October 2018 Geoff Huston Diving into the DNS DNS OARC organizes two meetings a year. They are two-day meetings with a concentrated dose of DNS esoterica. Here’s what I took away from the recent 29th meeting of OARC, held in Amsterdam in mid-October 2018. Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1 service Cloudflare have been running an open public DNS resolver service on 1.1.1.1 for more than six months now. The service, based on the Knot resolver engine, is certainly fast (http://bit.ly/2PBfoSh), and Cloudflare's attention to scale and speed is probably appreciated by users of this service. However, in a broader Internet environment that is now very aware of personal privacy it’s not enough to be fast and accurate. You have to be clear that as an operator of a public DNS resolution service you may be privy to clients’ activities and interests, and you need to clearly demonstrate that you are paying attention to privacy. Not only does this include appropriate undertakings regarding the way you handle and dispose of the logs of the resolvers' query streams, but also in being mindful of the way that users can pass queries to the service. The 1.1.1.1 service supports DNS over TLS 1.3 and 1.2 using the GnuTLS system. This supports long-lived connection with client systems and also supports session resumption. There are a number of DNS tools that can use the DNS over a TLS connection including kdig (http://bit.ly/2A9f9rX, http://bit.ly/2OoLu7a), GetDNS (https://getdnsapi.net/), Unbound (http://bit.ly/2CIKEf0), Android P and the Tenta browser (https://tenta.com/). -
Ikev2 Configuration for Encrypted DNS
IKEv2 Configuration for Encrypted DNS draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike Mohamed Boucadair (Orange) Tirumaleswar Reddy (McAfee, Inc.) Dan Wing (Citrix Systems, Inc.) Valery Smyslov (ELVIS-PLUS) July 2020, IETF#108 Agenda • Context • A Sample Use Case • IKE Configuration Attribute for Encrypted DNS • Next Steps 2 Problem Description • Several schemes to encrypt DNS have been specified – DNS over TLS (RFC 7858) – DNS over DTLS (RFC 8094) – DNS over HTTPS (RFC 8484) • …And others are being specified: – DNS over QUIC (draft-ietf-dprive-dnsoquic) • How to securely provision clients to use Encrypted DNS? This use can be within or outside the IPsec tunnel 3 A Sample Use Case: DNS Offload • VPN service providers can offer publicly accessible Encrypted DNS – the split-tunnel VPN configuration allows the client to access the DoH/DoT servers hosted by the VPN provider without traversing the tunnel 4 A Sample Use Case: Protecting Internal DNS Traffic • DoH/DoT ensures DNS traffic is not susceptible to internal attacks – see draft-arkko-farrell-arch-model-t-03#section-3.2.1 • encrypted DNS can benefit to Roaming Enterprise users to enhance privacy – With DoH/DoT the visibility of DNS traffic is limited to only the parties authorized to act on the traffic (“Zero Trust Architecture”) 5 Using IKE to Configure Encrypted DNS on Clients • New configuration attribute INTERNAL_ENC_DNS is defined to convey encrypted DNS information to clients: – Encrypted DNS type (e.g., DoH/DoT) – Scope of encrypted DNS use – One or more encrypted DNS server IPv6 addresses • For IPv4 -
A Cybersecurity Terminarch: Use It Before We Lose It
SYSTEMS ATTACKS AND DEFENSES Editors: Davide Balzarotti, [email protected] | William Enck, [email protected] | Samuel King, [email protected] | Angelos Stavrou, [email protected] A Cybersecurity Terminarch: Use It Before We Lose It Eric Osterweil | George Mason University term · in · arch e /’ t re m , närk/ noun an individual that is the last of its species or subspecies. Once the terminarch dies, the species becomes extinct. hy can’t we send encrypt- in the Internet have a long history W ed email (secure, private of failure. correspondence that even our mail To date, there has only been one providers can’t read)? Why do our success story, and, fortunately, it is health-care providers require us to still operating. Today, almost ev- use secure portals to correspond erything we do online begins with a with us instead of directly emailing query to a single-rooted hierarchical us? Why are messaging apps the global database, whose namespace only way to send encrypted messag- is collision-free, and which we have es directly to friends, and why can’t relied on for more than 30 years: we send private messages without the Domain Name System (DNS). user-facing) layer(s). This has left the agreeing to using a single platform Moreover, although the DNS pro- potential to extend DNSSEC’s verifi- (WhatsApp, Signal, and so on)? Our tocol did not initially have verifica- cation protections largely untapped. cybersecurity tools have not evolved tion protections, it does now: the Moreover, the model we are using to offer these services, but why? DNS Security Extensions (DNS- exposes systemic vulnerabilities. -
4.4 IT Infrastructure 4.4.1 Does the Institution Have a Comprehensive IT
4.4 IT Infrastructure 4.4.1 Does the Institution have a comprehensive IT Policy with regard to: 1. IT Service Management ITS Centre for Dental Studies & Research is focused towards the applications of new technologies for easing up the day-to-day jobs and functions performed within and outside the campus. To achieve the same we at ITS CDSR are running many application to facilitate the routine works including the OPD & IPD, Resource management through ERP, and effective complaint handling and resolutions using Cloud Hosted Complaint Management System. Seamless 24*7 availability of Internet plays a vital role for effective use of the mentioned applications. A core IT staff team provides immediate resolutions to the user complaints and maintain the application uptime. 2. Information Security • Server Level Security: Quick Heal End Point Security Server Edition is installed on all the Servers to protect the Information from all Threats. • Client Level Security: All the desktop machines are installed with Quick Heal End Point Security to protect the client side Information from various Threats. • Network Level Security: The Campus Network is protected using UTM Device which protects the entire network from breaches and intrusion attacks from Internet. • Backups: o Server Side: Daily backups of all the Servers a taken by the Server Staff on External Hard Drives. o Client Side: Daily backups are taken by the staff members of their data on External Hard Drives. 3. Network Security • Installation of Unified Threat Management (UTM) Device: The campus wide network is protected from the Threats which propagate from Internet using the UTM device which offers following facilities: o Firewall o Gateway Level Anti-Virus o Gateway Level Anti-Spyware o Gateway Level Anti-Malware o Intrusion Detection/Prevention System o SSL and IPSec VPN’s Note: Please find detailed UTM Policy implementation for Authentication, Web & Application Filtration, Quota Management, QoS, and Data Transfer Limits in ANNEXURE I. -
DNS As a Multipurpose Attack Vector
PANEPISTHMIO AIGAIOU DIDAKTORIKH DIATRIBH To Prwtόκοllo DNS wc Poluleitουργικός Forèac EpÐjeshc Suggrafèac: Μάριoc Anagnwstόπουλος Epiblèpwn: Αναπληρωτής Kaj. Ge¸rgioc Καμπουράκης Diatrιβή gia thn aπόκτηση Didaktorikoύ Dipl¸matoc tou ErgasthrÐou Ασφάλειας Plhroforiak¸n kai Epikoinwniak¸n Συστημάτwn Τμήματoc Mhqanik¸n Plhroforiak¸n kai Epikoinwniak¸n Συστημάτwn Septèmbrioc, 2016 University of the Aegean Doctoral Thesis DNS as a multipurpose attack vector Author: Marios Anagnostopoulos Supervisor: Associate Prof. Georgios Kambourakis A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Laboratory of Information and Communication Systems Security Department of Information and Communication Systems Engineering September, 2016 Declaration of Authorship I, Marios Anagnostopoulos, declare that this thesis entitled, \DNS as a multipurpose attack vector" and the work presented in it are my own. I confirm that: This work was done wholly while in candidature for a research degree at this University. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly at- tributed. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work. I have acknowledged all main sources of help. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself. Signed: Date: September 28, 2016 i Advising Committee of this Doctoral -
Detecting Malware in TLS Traffic
IMPERIAL COLLEGE LONDON DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTING Detecting Malware in TLS Traffic Project Report Supervisor: Author: Sergio Maffeis Olivier Roques Co-Supervisor: Marco Cova Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the MSc degree in Computing Science / Security and Reliability of Imperial College London September 2019 Abstract The use of encryption on the Internet has spread rapidly these last years, a trend encouraged by the growing concerns about online privacy. TLS (Transport Layer Security), the standard protocol for packet encryption, is now implemented by every major websites to protect users’ messages, transactions and credentials. However cybercriminals have started to incorporate TLS into their activities. An increasing number of malware leverage TLS encryption to hide their communications and to exfiltrate data to their command server, effectively bypassing traditional detection platforms. The goal of this project is to design and implement an effective alternative to the unpractical method of decrypting TLS packets’ payload before looking for signs of malware activity. This work presents a highly accurate supervised classifier that can detect malicious TLS flows in a company’s network traffic based on a set of features related to TLS, certificates and flow metadata. The classifier was trained on curated datasets of benign and malware observations, which were extracted from capture files thanks to a set of tools specially developed for this purpose. We detail in this report the complete development process, from data collection and feature extraction to model selection and performance analysis. ii Acknowledgments I would like to particularly thank Marco Cova and Sergio Maffeis, my project su- pervisors, for their valuable and continuous suggestions and for their constructive feedbacks on this project. -
The ISP Column Ipv6 and The
The ISP Column On Things Internet July 2020 Geoff Huston IPv6 and the DNS These days it seems that whenever we start talking about the DNS the conversation immediately swings around to the subject of DNS over HTTPS (DoH) and the various implications of this technology in terms of changes in the way the DNS is used. It’s true that DoH is a rich topic space and while much has been said and written already, there is still more to say (and write). But that's not my intention here. I’d like to look at a different, but still very familiar and somewhat related, topic relating to the DNS, namely how IPv6 is being used as a transport protocol for DNS queries. Before I set out the questions that I want to consider here, it’s useful to remember why we are deploying IPv6 in the first place. IPv6 is not intended to sit alongside IPv4 in a dual-stack situation as the end objective of this transition process. A fully deployed dual-stack world is not the goal here. We need to push this transition process one step further, and the objective is to get to the point where IPv4 is not only no longer necessary but no longer used at all. In other words, we are attempting to get to the point where IPv6-only services are not only a viable way of using the Internet but are the only way of using the Internet. One of the key elements in the overall transition is the way in which we manage a dual-stack networked environment. -
Online Security for Independent Media and Civil Society Activists
Online Security for Independent Media and Civil Society Activists A white paper for SIDA’s October 2010 “Exile Media” conference Eric S Johnson (updated 13 Oct 2013) For activists who make it a priority to deliver news to citizens of countries which try to control the information to which their citizens have access, the internet has provided massive new opportunities. But those countries’ governments also realise ICTs’ potential and implement countermeasures to impede the delivery of independent news via the internet. This paper covers what exile media can or should do to protect itself, addressing three categories of issues: common computer security precautions, defense against targeted attacks, and circumventing cybercensorship, with a final note about overkill (aka FUD: fear, uncertainty, doubt). For each of the issues mentioned below, specific ex- amples from within the human rights or freedom of expression world can be provided where non-observance was cata- strophic, but most of those who suffered problems would rather not be named. [NB Snowden- gate changed little or nothing about these recommendations.] Common computer security: The best defense is a good … (aka “lock your doors”) The main threats to exile media’s successful use of ICTs—and solutions—are the same as for any other computer user: 1) Ensure all software automatically patches itself regularly against newly-discovered secu- rity flaws (e.g. to maintain up-to-date SSL certificate revocation lists). As with antivirus software, this may cost something; e.g. with Microsoft (Windows and Office), it may re- quire your software be legally purchased (or use the WSUS Offline Update tool, which helps in low-bandwidth environments). -
Dns / Opennic / Dnscrypt
dns / opennic / dnscrypt Serial: 2015111401 What is DNS ● Domain Name System ● In simple words when you are looking for hackerspace.gr you 're looking for the IP of the server that hosts the hackerspace site. ● But how ? How DNS works public/open dns ● Goodle dns – 8.8.8.8 2001:4860:4860::8888 – 8.8.4.4 2001:4860:4860::8844 ● OpenDNS – 208.67.222.222 2620:0:ccc::2 – 208.67.220.220 2620:0:ccd::2 ● norton dns/comodo/dns advantage/dns.watch ● fdn/freeDNS/Verisign ● BUT THEY ALL track what you are watching!!!! https://www.opennicproject.org/ ● OpenNIC is an alternate network information center/alternative DNS root which lists itself as an alternative to ICANN and its registries. ● Total DNS Neutrality ● Have A Say In Your DNS ● Protect Your Privacy ● No More ISP DNS Hijacking ● No Cost (Gratis) ● Freedom From Government Intervention openic website/wiki New Top Level Domains .bbs .ing .dyn .micro .free .neo .fur .null .geek .oss .gopher .oz .indy .parody 1. How does opennic work? . 82796 IN NS ns9.opennic.glue. 82796 IN NS ns3.opennic.glue. 82796 IN NS ns8.opennic.glue. 82796 IN NS ns4.opennic.glue. 82796 IN NS ns10.opennic.glue. 82796 IN NS ns6.opennic.glue. 82796 IN NS ns7.opennic.glue. 82796 IN NS ns2.opennic.glue. ;; Received 174 bytes from 94.242.59.170#53(94.242.59.170) in 126 ms 2. gr. 172800 IN NS gr-br.ics.forth.gr. gr. 172800 IN NS gr-at.ics.forth.gr. gr. 172800 IN NS estia.ics.forth.gr.