Online Security for Independent Media and Civil Society Activists
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What Is Threat Hunting?
$whoami ◎ Apurv Singh Gautam (@ASG_Sc0rpi0n) ◎ Security Researcher, Threat Intel/Hunting ◎ Cybersecurity @ Georgia Tech ◎ Prior: Research Intern at ICSI, UC Berkeley ◎ Hobbies ◎ Contributing to the security community ◎ Gaming/Streaming (Rainbow 6 Siege) ◎ Hiking, Lockpicking ◎ Social ◎ Twitter - @ASG_Sc0rpi0n ◎ Website – https://apurvsinghgautam.me 2 Agenda ◎ Introduction to the Dark Web ◎ Why hunting on the Dark Web? ◎ Methods to hunt on the Dark Web ◎ Can the Dark Web hunting be automated? ◎ Overall Picture ◎ OpSec? What’s that? ◎ Conclusion 3 Clear Web? Deep Web? Dark Web? 5 Image Source: UC San Diego Library Accessing the Dark Web ◎ Tor /I2P/ZeroNet ◎ .onion domains/.i2p domains ◎ Traffic through relays Image Sources: Hotspot Shield, Tor Project, I2P Project, ZeroNet 6 What’s all the Hype? ◎ Hype ○ Vast and mysterious part of the Internet ○ Place for cybercriminals only ○ Illegal to access the Dark Web ◎ Reality ○ Few reachable onion domains ○ Uptime isn’t ideal ○ Useful for free expression in few countries ○ Popular sites like Facebook, NYTimes, etc. ○ Legal to access the Dark Web 7 Relevant site types? ◎ General Markets ◎ PII & PHI ◎ Credit Cards ◎ Digital identities ◎ Information Trading ◎ Remote Access ◎ Personal Documents ◎ Electronic Wallets ◎ Insider Threats Image Source: Intsights 8 Sites Examples 9 Cost of products? ◎ SSN - $1 ◎ Fake FB with 15 friends - $1 ◎ DDoS Service - $7/hr ◎ Rent a Hacker - $12/hr ◎ Credit Card - $20+ ◎ Mobile Malware - $150 ◎ Bank Details - $1000+ ◎ Exploits or 0-days - $150,000+ ◎ Critical databases - $300,000+ 10 Product Examples 11 Image Source: Digital Shadows 12 Image Source: Digital Shadows 13 What is Threat Hunting? ◎ Practice of proactively searching for cyber threats ◎ Hypothesis-based approach ◎ Uses advanced analytics and machine learning investigations ◎ Proactive and iterative search 15 Why So Serious (Eh! Important)? ◎ Hacker forums, darknet markets, dump shops, etc. -
Uila Supported Apps
Uila Supported Applications and Protocols updated Oct 2020 Application/Protocol Name Full Description 01net.com 01net website, a French high-tech news site. 050 plus is a Japanese embedded smartphone application dedicated to 050 plus audio-conferencing. 0zz0.com 0zz0 is an online solution to store, send and share files 10050.net China Railcom group web portal. This protocol plug-in classifies the http traffic to the host 10086.cn. It also 10086.cn classifies the ssl traffic to the Common Name 10086.cn. 104.com Web site dedicated to job research. 1111.com.tw Website dedicated to job research in Taiwan. 114la.com Chinese web portal operated by YLMF Computer Technology Co. Chinese cloud storing system of the 115 website. It is operated by YLMF 115.com Computer Technology Co. 118114.cn Chinese booking and reservation portal. 11st.co.kr Korean shopping website 11st. It is operated by SK Planet Co. 1337x.org Bittorrent tracker search engine 139mail 139mail is a chinese webmail powered by China Mobile. 15min.lt Lithuanian news portal Chinese web portal 163. It is operated by NetEase, a company which 163.com pioneered the development of Internet in China. 17173.com Website distributing Chinese games. 17u.com Chinese online travel booking website. 20 minutes is a free, daily newspaper available in France, Spain and 20minutes Switzerland. This plugin classifies websites. 24h.com.vn Vietnamese news portal 24ora.com Aruban news portal 24sata.hr Croatian news portal 24SevenOffice 24SevenOffice is a web-based Enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems. 24ur.com Slovenian news portal 2ch.net Japanese adult videos web site 2Shared 2shared is an online space for sharing and storage. -
Reporters Without Borders TV5 Monde Prize 2015 Nominees
Reporters Without Borders TV5 Monde Prize 2015 Nominees Journalist Category Mahmoud Abou Zeid, aka Shawkan (Egypt) “I am a photojournalist, not a criminal,” Shawkan wrote from Tora prison in February. “My indefinite detention is psychologically unbearable. Not even animals would survive in these conditions." Shawkan is an Egyptian freelance photojournalist who has been in pretrial detention for more than 760 days. He was arrested on 14 August 2013 while providing the US photojournalism agency Demotix and the US digital media company Corbis with coverage of the violence used to disperse demonstrations by deposed President Mohamed Morsi’s supporters in Rabiaa AlAwadiya Square. Three journalists were killed that day in connection with their work Aged 28, Shawkan covered developments in Egypt closely from Mubarak’s fall to Morsi’s overthrow and on several occasions obtained striking shots of the popular unrest. His detention became illegal in August of this year because, under Egyptian law, pretrial detention may surpass two years only in exceptional cases. Few people in Egypt have ever been held pending trial as long as him. A date has finally been set for the start of his trial, 12 December 2015, when he will be prosecuted before a Cairo criminal court along with more than 700 other defendants including members of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was declared a terrorist organization in December 2013. Many charges have been brought against him without any evidence, according to his lawyer, Karim Abdelrady. The most serious include joining a banned organization [the Muslim Brotherhood], murder, attacking the security forces and possession of weapons. -
M3AAWG Tutorial on Third Party Recursive Resolvers and Encrypting DNS Stub Resolver-To-Recursive Resolver Traffic Version 1.0 September 2019
Messaging, Malware and Mobile Anti-Abuse Working Group M3AAWG Tutorial on Third Party Recursive Resolvers and Encrypting DNS Stub Resolver-to-Recursive Resolver Traffic Version 1.0 September 2019 The direct URL to this paper is: www.m3aawg.org/dns-crypto-tutorial Document 1 of 2: This document is intended to be accompanied by the paper “M3AAWG Companion Document: Recipes for Encrypting DNS Stub Resolver-to-Recursive Resolver Traffic (www.m3aawg.org/dns-crypto-recipes),” which provides detailed instructions and processes. This document was produced by the M3AAWG Data and Identity Protection Committee. Table of Content Executive Summary 3 Introduction 4 Recommendations for M3AAWG and Its Audiences 7 I. Is the Use of Alternative Third Party Recursive Resolvers and Encryption of Stub Resolver-to- Recursive Resolver Traffic “In-Scope" for M3AAWG Remit? 9 1. DNS Is an Operationally Critical Core Internet Protocol 9 2. DNS and Messaging/Anti-Abuse Work 9 3. User Privacy and Opposition to Pervasive Monitoring 10 4. M3AAWG Membership – Many M3AAWG Members Have a Keen Interest in This Topic 10 II. Recursive Resolvers (Default ISP, Third Party Alternatives and Dedicated Personal Recursive Resolvers) 11 5. How Do Recursive Resolvers Normally Work in an ISP Environment Today? 11 6. A Typical Day in a Typical User's Life Online: Many Different Internet Service Providers, Many Different Recursive Resolvers 12 7. How Can I Even Tell What Name Servers I Am Actually Using Right Now?" 13 8. Intentionally Configuring an Alternative Third Party Recursive Resolver 15 9. Well-Known Third Party Recursive Resolver Providers 16 10. Picking the Right Third Party Recursive Resolver Service 17 11. -
Inside Dropbox: Understanding Personal Cloud Storage Services
Inside Dropbox: Understanding Personal Cloud Storage Services → Idilio Drago → Marco Mellia → Maurizio M. Munafo` → Anna Sperotto → Ramin Sadre → Aiko Pras IRTF – Vancouver Motivation and goals 1 Personal cloud storage services are already popular Dropbox in 2012 “the largest deployed networked file system in history” “over 50 million users – one billion files every 48 hours” Little public information about the system How does Dropbox work? What are the potential performance bottlenecks? Are there typical usage scenarios? Methodology – How does Dropbox work? 2 Public information Native client, Web interface, LAN-Sync etc. Files are split in chunks of up to 4 MB Delta encoding, deduplication, encrypted communication To understand the client protocol MITM against our own client Squid proxy, SSL-bump and a self-signed CA certificate Replace a trusted CA certificate in the heap at run-time Proxy logs and decrypted packet traces How does Dropbox (v1.2.52) work? 3 Clear separation between storage and meta-data/client control Sub-domains identifying parts of the service sub-domain Data-center Description client-lb/clientX Dropbox Meta-data notifyX Dropbox Notifications api Dropbox API control www Dropbox Web servers d Dropbox Event logs dl Amazon Direct links dl-clientX Amazon Client storage dl-debugX Amazon Back-traces dl-web Amazon Web storage api-content Amazon API Storage HTTP/HTTPs in all functionalities How does Dropbox (v1.2.52) work? 4 Notification Kept open Not encrypted Device ID Folder IDs How does Dropbox (v1.2.52) work? 4 Client control Login File hash Meta-data How does Dropbox (v1.2.52) work? 4 Storage Amazon EC2 Retrieve vs. -
Universidad Pol Facultad D Trabajo
UNIVERSIDAD POLITÉCNICA DE MADRID FACULTAD DE INFORMÁTICA TRABAJO FINAL DE CARRERA ESTUDIO DEL PROTOCOLO XMPP DE MESAJERÍA ISTATÁEA, DE SUS ATECEDETES, Y DE SUS APLICACIOES CIVILES Y MILITARES Autor: José Carlos Díaz García Tutor: Rafael Martínez Olalla Madrid, Septiembre de 2008 2 A mis padres, Francisco y Pilar, que me empujaron siempre a terminar esta licenciatura y que tanto me han enseñado sobre la vida A mis abuelos (q.e.p.d.) A mi hijo icolás, que me ha dejado terminar este trabajo a pesar de robarle su tiempo de juego conmigo Y muy en especial, a Susana, mi fiel y leal compañera, y la luz que ilumina mi camino Agradecimientos En primer lugar, me gustaría agradecer a toda mi familia la comprensión y confianza que me han dado, una vez más, para poder concluir definitivamente esta etapa de mi vida. Sin su apoyo, no lo hubiera hecho. En segundo lugar, quiero agradecer a mis amigos Rafa y Carmen, su interés e insistencia para que llegara este momento. Por sus consejos y por su amistad, les debo mi gratitud. Por otra parte, quiero agradecer a mis compañeros asesores militares de Nextel Engineering sus explicaciones y sabios consejos, que sin duda han sido muy oportunos para escribir el capítulo cuarto de este trabajo. Del mismo modo, agradecer a Pepe Hevia, arquitecto de software de Alhambra Eidos, los buenos ratos compartidos alrrededor de nuestros viejos proyectos sobre XMPP y que encendieron prodigiosamente la mecha de este proyecto. A Jaime y a Bernardo, del Ministerio de Defensa, por haberme hecho descubrir las bondades de XMPP. -
The Limits of Commercialized Censorship in China
The Limits of Commercialized Censorship in China Blake Miller∗ September 27, 2018 Abstract Despite massive investment in China's censorship program, internet platforms in China are rife with criticisms of the government and content that seeks to organize opposition to the ruling Communist Party. Past works have attributed this \open- ness" to deliberate government strategy or lack of capacity. Most, however, do not consider the role of private social media companies, to whom the state delegates information controls. I suggest that the apparent incompleteness of censorship is largely a result of principal-agent problems that arise due to misaligned incentives of government principals and private media company agents. Using a custom dataset of annotated leaked documents from a social media company, Sina Weibo, I find that 16% of directives from the government are disobeyed by Sina Weibo and that disobedience is driven by Sina's concerns about censoring more strictly than com- petitor Tencent. I also find that the fragmentation inherent in the Chinese political system exacerbates this principal agent problem. I demonstrate this by retrieving actual censored content from large databases of hundreds of millions of Sina Weibo posts and measuring the performance of Sina Weibo's censorship employees across a range of events. This paper contributes to our understanding of media control in China by uncovering how market competition can lead media companies to push back against state directives and increase space for counterhegemonic discourse. ∗Postdoctoral Fellow, Program in Quantitative Social Science, Dartmouth College, Silsby Hall, Hanover, NH 03755 (E-mail: [email protected]). 1 Introduction Why do scathing criticisms, allegations of government corruption, and content about collective action make it past the censors in China? Past works have theorized that regime strategies or state-society conflicts are the reason for incomplete censorship. -
An Investigation Into the Security and Privacy of Ios VPN Applications
An Investigation Into the Security and Privacy of iOS VPN Applications Jack Wilson Division of Cybersecurity School of Design and Informatics Abertay University, Dundee A thesis submitted for the degree of Bachelor of Science with Honours in Ethical Hacking 1st May 2018 Word Count: 11,448 Abstract Due to the increasing number of recommendations for people to use VPN’s for privacy reasons, more app developers are creating VPN apps and publishing them on the Apple App Store and Google Play Store. In this ‘gold rush’, apps are being developed quickly and, in turn, not being developed with security fully in mind. This paper investigated a selection of free VPN applications available on the Apple App Store (for iOS devices) and test the apps for security and privacy. This includes testing for any traffic being transmitted over plain HTTP, DNS leakage and transmission of personally-identifiable information (such as phone number, IMEI 1, email address, MAC address) and evaluating the security of the tunnelling protocol used by the VPN. The testing methodology involved installing free VPN apps on a test device (an iPhone 6 running iOS 11), simulating network traffic for a pre-defined period of time and capturing the traffic (either through ARP spoofing, or through a proxy program such as Burpsuite). This allows for all traffic to be analysed to check for anything being sent without encryption. Other issues that often cause de-anonymisation with VPN applications such as DNS leakage can be tested using websites such as dnsleaktest.com. The research found several common security issues with the VPN applications that were tested, with a large majority of the applications tested failing to implement HTTPS. -
Openfire Service Level Agreement
Service Level Agreement Technical Services — Communications Service University Technology Services 1. Overview This Service Level Agreement (SLA) is between University Technology Services (UTS) and either departments or groups choosing to utilize the internal Oakland University instant messaging (OUIM) service. The OUIM service is currently referenced by talk.oakland.edu and runs XMPP/Jabber software called Openfire. Under this SLA, UTS agrees to provide specific information technology (IT) services. This SLA also covers performance and reliability targets and objectives. Section 7 requires the signature and contact information of the group coordinator as an agreement to the SLA. OUIM is an online service that is available on campus and off campus. The requirements to utilize the service are a NetID, an XMPP client, and an Internet connection. XMPP clients are available online. The UTS Helpdesk supports the XMPP clients Spark, Pidgin, and Adium. Instructions are available on the UTS Web site at http://www.oakland.edu/?id=13849&sid=70. 2. Purpose The purpose of this SLA is to establish a cooperative partnership between UTS staff members with the community of customers who may opt into its use by clarifying roles, setting expectations, and providing service objectives and limitations. 3. Terms of Agreement This service is provided on an ongoing basis. From time to time, it may be reviewed and modified by UTS. Modifications to this agreement will be done at the sole discretion of UTS and the Technical Support and Services team (TSS). 4. Service Hours Regularly scheduled maintenance will be scheduled during low-use hours as much as possible; such work will be done either before 8:00 A.M. -
AUTHENTICATION TECHNIQUES for HETEROGENEOUS TELEPHONE NETWORKS by BRADLEY GALLOWAY REAVES a DISSERTATION PRESENTED to the GRADUA
AUTHENTICATION TECHNIQUES FOR HETEROGENEOUS TELEPHONE NETWORKS By BRADLEY GALLOWAY REAVES A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2017 © 2017 Bradley Galloway Reaves For Sarah ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Iamonlywritingthistodaybecauseofthemultitudeoffamily,friends,teachers,and colleagues who helped get me here. This journey began in high school, when Mrs. Reid, my English teacher, suggested that I would make a good college professor. I wasn’t sure about the idea until my second programming class in college. I loved programming, so I would do the lab assignments at home, then show up in the lab to demonstrate the project to the TA. My work for the week was done, but I didn’t leave the lab. Instead, I stayed for the next few hours helping other students when they needed help with the programming assignments. It became the best part of my week, and I realized that there was no career I wanted more than to be a professor of computing. Having a goal and knowing what it takes to achieve it are two very di↵erent things. At the time I knew I needed a PhD, but nothing of what it took to get one. Luckily, I had wonderfully supportive professors and advisors who told me what it took, and one in particular helped me take the first steps toward a research career. Tommy Morris was a new professor at Mississippi State, and after teaching my digital design class o↵ered me a (paid!) position in his research lab. -
Analysis of Effect of Zfone Security on Video Call Service in Wireless Local Area Network
International Journal of Computer Techniques -– Volume 6 Issue 6,November 2019 ANALYSIS OF EFFECT OF ZFONE SECURITY ON VIDEO CALL SERVICE IN WIRELESS LOCAL AREA NETWORK Arip Solehudin 1 Bayu Priyatna 2 Nono Heryana 3 Teknik Informatika Fakultas Ilmu Komputer School of Engineering and Computer Science Sistem Informasi Fakultas Ilmu Komputer Universitas Singaperbangsa Karawang Universitas Buana Perjuangan Karawang Universitas Singaperbangsa Karawang Karawang, Indonesia Karawang, Indonesia Karawang, Indonesia [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Abstract—Along with the development of WLAN (Wireless VoIP LAN that uses cable began to move using wireless Local Area Network) network technology, many services that network technology, namely wireless. The use of wireless used cable networks began to migrate to wireless networks. networks as a medium for the flow of data makes VoIP VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) is one service implemented services can be used in several communication technology in wireless local area networks. However, VoIP that uses tools such as personal computers, laptops, and smartphones. wireless technology as a data stream media Video Call service has a high risk of tapping pictures. To avoid tapping pictures, The use of VoIP technology that is implemented on you can add a security system to the service, one of which is to WLAN networks with video call services found in VoIP use Zfone security. With him adding a security system that will facilities is an excellent solution for conducting influence the work of Video Call services on the quality of conversations at affordable costs compared to the VoIP service. -
4-BAY RACKMOUNT NAS Technical Specifications
4-BAY RACKMOUNT NAS Technical Specifications Operating System Seagate® NAS OS (embedded Linux) Number of Drive Bays 4 hot-swappable 3.5-inch SATA II/SATA III Processor Dual-core 2.13GHz Intel® 64-bit Atom™ processor Memory 2GB DDR III Networking Two (2) 10/100/1000 Base-TX (Gigabit Ethernet) • Two (2) USB 3.0 (rear) • Two (2) USB 2.0 (rear) External Ports • One (1) eSATA (rear) • One (1) USB 2.0 (front) Hard Drive Capacity Seagate NAS HDD 2TB, 3TB, 4TB for preconfigured models Total Capacity 4TB, 8TB, 12TB, 16TB Compatible Drives 3.5-inch SATA II or SATA III (see NAS Certified Drive list PDF for more details) Power 100V to 240V AC, 50/60Hz, 180W Power Supply and • Sleep mode for power saving • Scheduled power on/off Power Management • Wake-on-LAN Cooling Management Two (2) fans Transfer Rate 200MB/s reads and writes1 Network Protocols CIFS/SMB, NFS v3, AFP, HTTP(s), FTP, sFTP, iSCSI, Print serve, failover and load balancing and Services (LACP 802.3ad), Wuala file system integration (W:/ network drive), Active Directory™ • RAID 0, 1, 5, 6, 10 RAID • Hot spare • SimplyRAID™ technology with mixed capacity support, volume expansion and migration • Web-based interface through http/https • Hardware monitoring (S.M.A.R.T., casing cooling and temperature, CPU and RAM load) Management • Log management and email notification • NAS OS Installer for diskless setup, data recovery and restore to factory settings • Product discovery with Seagate Network Assistant 1 Tested in RAID 5 configuration utilizing load balancing for Ethernet ports. Actual performance may vary depending on system environment.