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James H. Blundell, Oral History Interview – 2/18/1976 Administrative Information

Creator: James H. Blundell Interviewer: William Hartigan Date of Interview: February 18, 1976 Location: Washington, D.C. Length: 25 pages

Biographical Note Blundell, a political figure, friend of Lyndon B. Johnson, and member of the Democratic National Committee in 1960, discusses Johnson’s 1960 presidential primary campaign and vice-presidential campaign, as well as the relationship between Johnson and John F. , among other issues.

Access Open.

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Transcript of Oral History Interview These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room of the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts. Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have occurred at the bottoms of the pages of the original transcripts. If researchers have any concerns about accuracy, they are encouraged to visit the Library and consult the transcripts and the interview recordings.

Suggested Citation James H. Blundell, recorded interview by William Hartigan, February 18, 1976, (page number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.

Oral History Interview

Of

James H. Blundell

Although a legal agreement was not signed during the lifetime of James H. Blundell, upon his death, ownership of the recording and transcript of his interview for the Oral History Program passed to the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library.

The following terms and conditions apply:

1. The transcript is available for use by researchers.

2. The tape recording shall be made available to those researchers who have access to the transcript.

3; Copyright to the interview transcript and tape is assigned to the United States Government.

4. Copies of the transcript and the tape recording may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request for a fee.

5. Copies of the transcript and tape recording may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the John F. Kennedy Library. James H. Blundell

Table of Contents

Page Topic 1 Blundell’s political background and friendship with Lyndon Baines Johnson (LBJ) 2, 8 LBJ’s 1960 presidential campaign 4 John F. Kennedy’s (JFK) selection of LBJ as vice president 10 Blundell’s work on the Democratic National Committee in 1960 12 Relationship between JFK and LBJ 14, 16 LBJ’s 1960 whistle-stop tour from Washington to New Orleans 15 LBJ’s scruples about campaign contributions 17 Relationship between JFK and LBJ 20 Blundell’s temporary position in the U.S. Postal Service 22 JFK’s assassination 23 Blundell’s reflections on politics

Oral History Interview

with

James H. Blundell

February 18, 1976 Washington, DC

By William Hartigan

For the John F. Kennedy Library

HARTIGAN: Mr. Blundell is a public relations man and a business associate of Richard C. Maguire [Richard Maguire], former treasurer of the Democratic National Committee. Mr. Blundell is originally from Texas and a lifelong friend of former President Lyndon B. Johnson [Lyndon Baines Johnson]. Jim, would you care to tell us when and where you first met President Kennedy [John F. Kennedy]?

BLUNDELL: Bill, I think I ought to give you a little background leading up to my first association with the Kennedy campaign and the people.

HARTIGAN: I think that would be very interesting, Jim. Proceed.

BLUNDELL: I came by my political interest naturally. My father was always interested in public affairs although he had no direct participation in politics. But he was very interested in government, Texas politics, and I remember as a child, a young boy, he would take me to political rallies. I remember hearing Jim Furguson, Pat Neff [Patrick Morris Neff], some of the older Texas politicians. When I was in Baylor University I got actively involved in a campaign for the first time for Governor Jimmy Allred [James V. Allred], and

[-1-] that led up to my eventual almost constant participation in politics. In 1938 after I had been on a campaign during which I met [John B. Connally, Jr.], who at that time was President of the student body of the University of Texas. John and I had been in a campaign for Ernest Thompson [Ernest O. Thompson] who was Chairman of the Texas Railroad Commission and ran for governor against Pappy O'Daniel [Wilbert Lee O'Daniel], which as I might add, was quite a disastrous campaign. But through my friendship with John, he asked me to help him and then-Congressman Johnson in his first race for the Senate against Pappy O'Daniel. We went through that campaign. It was the first statewide campaign that Congressman Johnson had made. He wasn't known very well outside of his district which was the tenth district involving Austin and central Texas. That was my first acquaintance with Lyndon Johnson. We made a very effective campaign and lost by only 1,100 votes to O'Daniel. That was the first time that Mr. Johnson had run for state office. After the campaign, Congressman Johnson asked me if I would join his staff in Washington, which appealed to me very much but, I couldn't because I had a young.… I was just married and had a young child. My mother and father were elderly, I didn't feel I could leave them. But, from then on I was helpful to the congressman in different ways—more or less running errands and making contacts for him. In 1960 he called me from Washington one day and asked me to meet him at Love Field in , and drive him downtown. I had no idea what he had in mind but I knew that he didn't call me just to get a ride to town. On the way to town he told me that Sam Rayburn [Samuel Taliaferro Rayburn] and Sid Richardson [Sid Williams Richardson] and some of his very strong supporters and advisors were urging him to get into the presidential primary campaign. He didn't want to do it, he said, because he had too much responsibility in the Senate as majority leader. He didn't think that he.... I got the impression that he didn't feel that he had a chance to win. In fact, he said if Jack Kennedy won the primary in West Virginia that the show was over. He felt that if Kennedy won the West Virginia primary that he would go on to win the nomination. But he said they were putting so much pressure on him to get into the primaries and get into the presidential campaign that he had to make some kind of effort to, as he put it, to get them off his back. So he asked me if I'd go over to Fort Worth and talk to John, John Connally, see if we would... [Telephone Interruption]

HARTIGAN: I'm sorry about that interruption, Jim. Maybe you can continue—you were on your way to Fort Worth at that point to see John Connally. Would you....

BLUNDELL: Yes. I told Senator Johnson that I would go over and talk with John and see what we might work out. I talked to John, and John was a little reluctant, but he felt the same way that Senator Johnson did, that he should make some effort. And probably with the hope that it might turn

[-2-]

out more successfully than the senator anticipated. The result was that John and I came to Washington. Eventually opened an office in the Ambassador Hotel. Mr. Cafritz [Calvin Cafritz] gave us the space there, in fact, the whole mezzanine floor. The.... As I recall, the first meeting we had consisted of Walter Jenkins [Walter W. Jenkins], John Connally, one or two others, I don't recall right now, but it was a very small group.

HARTIGAN: Was the Speaker of the House at that first meeting?

BLUNDELL: No, no sir. It was what you might call a second level of staff. But we did begin to get some other people in from Texas, such as Marvin Washington, and at that time [William D. Moyers] was working for Senator Johnson on the hill. And he participated with us in our discussions. But primarily the initial effort consisted of a staff of about four or five people, including secretaries. John brought George Bellow up from Fort Worth. George was an advertising man. And we began to try to make an effort. The.... I might to say to begin with that Senator Johnson got an awful lot of encouragement from many of his Senate colleagues, such as Clinton Anderson [Clinton P. Anderson], Robert Kerr [Robert Samuel Kerr], and many others. And I could tell that he was beginning to get some encouragement, probably because of the assurances that he had from the different colleagues that they could deliver their delegates from their states. I think right here I should mention the fact that because of this association with the Senators, Senator Johnson got the idea—and I think so did John Connally—that our efforts should be directed at working through the senators and their staffs toward getting their delegates from their states. Well, this was our first mistake because senators don't control politics in their state.

HARTIGAN: Nor do congressmen.

BLUNDELL: The governors do. And while we later learned that the Kennedy people were working directly with the governors and the state chairmen, and people like that, we were relying—Senator Johnson was relying—on the senators to deliver their votes. For example, in New Mexico, Senator Anderson was assuring Senator Johnson that he'd have the New Mexico delegation. Well, we did get most of it, but not all of it. I don't remember how many delegates they had, 14 for example. Well, I think we probably got about eight, but Kennedy got the others. Same was true in North Carolina and many other states which I could mention. But we did make a pretty good effort, and we eventually developed a headquarters staff of, oh, ten, twelve, fourteen people. John wasn't here regularly. I was the...

HARTIGAN: You mean John Connally?

[-3-]

BLUNDELL: John Connally was back and forth to Texas. He was working for Sid Richardson at that time. But, I was here full-time and did the best we could. Our effort was nothing to compare with the professionalism of the Kennedy organization. They had been working for two years, ever since the—well, you might say four years—since the last convention when Kennedy almost got the vice-president nomination, if you recall. And Senator Johnson and John Connally were very strong for him at that time for the vice-presidential nomination when Kefauver [Estes Kefauver] was selected. The effort continued and we got more and more people out of Texas, and off the hill, who were making trips for us, and making phone calls, trying to contact delegates and state leaders. But we just never could really get off the ground. To such an extent that it became a real horse race. However, I think under the circumstances and under the time that with the time that we had and the late start we had, the fact that we got four hundred votes at the convention was, I think, a real credit to Senator Johnson and, if I may be immodest, the efforts that we made. When we got to the convention we had an awful lot of interest. We had—Governor Daniel [Marion ] was working very hard—a lot of people from Texas. And I remember my job was sitting in the trailer outside of the auditorium directing the fellows we had on the floor. But, it was pretty amateurish compared to the Kennedy operation. After the presidential nomination when Senator Kennedy was nominated, I assumed that that was it. My efforts and our efforts were terminated, ended. But then during the night, the question came up of the vice-presidential nominee. I didn't know until early the next morning that Senator Kennedy had decided that he wanted Senator Johnson on the ticket with him. Well, as you know, this created quite a conflict of opinion, and there was an awful lot of rumors going around as to what was happening and whether Johnson was going to be, or wanted to be, or would be, the vice-presidential nominee. But, it was apparent that John Kennedy wanted him. It was also apparent that very few of Senator Johnson's close advisors were in favor of it. Most of them felt, including Speaker Rayburn, John Connally, that he should stay in the Senate because of the power he had there. That he'd be much more influential, that if he gave that up he would be a figurehead vice-president. I felt—and of course I was not at the center of the storm—that he had no choice. And I think that opinion was shared by some of the people that did influence him. Because on the one hand, if he had turned down the nomination, and Kennedy had been elected, Kennedy people would say well, “Who needs you now? We didn't need you.” It's doubtful he would have continued to be majority leader of the senate.

HARTIGAN: On that one point, Jim, it recalls a position that was stated at various times that one of the possibilities that President Kennedy had in mind in selecting Johnson was the fact that he would then be out

[-4-]

of power in the senate and leave the senate free to be more or less friendly towards President Kennedy, in case there happened to be any bitterness on the part of the Johnson entourage with reference to being defeated. Now, that's just another thought. Have you any observations on that theory?

BLUNDELL: Yes, I do. I don't think there was any question but what Senator Kennedy's selection of Johnson was based on—one and one only consideration—that Senator Kennedy thought that he could not be elected without Johnson on the ticket. Because Johnson could get enough votes in the South, particularly Texas, to make the difference. I think that was the determining factor. Now, as I said, on the one hand, had Johnson not accepted the nomination and Kennedy had been elected, the result would have been that they don't need Johnson any longer, and they didn't need him. On the other hand, if he had not accepted it and Kennedy had been defeated, they would have blamed Johnson for the defeat. So I don't think he had any choice. The other consideration was that you just don't turn down your party. If your party wants you, you're going to stay on the team. I remember Mr. Garner had an expression. He always said he was a gangster, he either stayed with his gang or he didn't play. And I think that's a rule of politics.

HARTIGAN: When—you stated that Mr. Rayburn's position was one point in favor of him staying in the senate as was John Connally's—at what point did they change their mind because I'm assuming that they must have agreed with him... [Telephone Interruption].

BLUNDELL: When did they change?

HARTIGAN: That was another interruption, Jim, but I was asking the question, at what point did Speaker Rayburn and John Connally change their minds with reference to President Johnson accepting the vice- presidency? At one point they thought he'd be better off staying with the senate.

BLUNDELL: Well, I'm not sure that Mr. Rayburn ever changed his mind until after the fact. I am sure that John Connally never changed his mind. [Telephone Interruption]

HARTIGAN: Back to the same question, Jim. But didn't they finally advise him to accept it? Are you saying even though they advised him to accept, they still felt better with the attitude that he should stay in the senate?

BLUNDELL: I don't think John Connally ever did.

HARTIGAN: You mean he did not advise him to accept it?

[-5-]

BLUNDELL: John left the convention very disappointed and still very much opposed, and said he wouldn't have any part of it. And at the risk of being critical of John—which I'm not—he kept his word. He did not take any part in the campaign until the last week when Senator Johnson returned to Texas to close the campaign. John did appear with him in Fort Worth and I think one or two other places. During the campaign, almost daily, the Senator would ask me on the phone “What do you hear from John? Can't you get him to come up to Washington?” And while I did talk to John, he told me every time, he said, “I'm not coming up there.” And he did not participate in the campaign. To use his expression, he sat it out. After the convention—of course, there's a lot more to this vice-presidential situation, I wasn't privy to everything that went on, but it's my understanding that Phil Graham [Philip Leslie Graham] probably was the determining factor in resolving the situation between all of the various factors. There were people on the Kennedy side who opposed Johnson's being selected, as you know. I know Bobby Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] was opposed to it. Ken O'Donnell [Kenneth P. O'Donnell] was opposed to it until Kennedy said “This is it.” And I may be mistaken, and I don't have all the information, but it has always been my feeling that actually there were only two men involved in making this decision, Jack Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. I think Jack Kennedy said “I want him,” and ultimately and in the final analysis Johnson said he would go. And both of them were being pulled both ways by their close advisors. The labor people opposed Johnson, as well as Kennedy's inner circle. But I think it's another example of the relationship, the personal relationship between Jack Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. I think there was a close personal relationship, mentor and protégé, or however you want to describe it. I think that Jack Kennedy admired and respected Lyndon Johnson's ability, his political expertise. I think Johnson recognized the innate political ability of Jack Kennedy. I think there was a relationship there that as long as the two principles understood each other they got along fine.

HARTIGAN: In other words, outside of the two principles, Kennedy and Johnson, the only other person you felt that had a strong influence was Phil Graham, who for the purpose of identifying him, was the publisher of the Washington Post at the time. Is that correct?

BLUNDELL: I think that's right. I think he was—if this is a correct term—the negotiator, the mediator, the peace-maker. I do know he was the channel of communication between the two.

HARTIGAN: You mentioned prior to the interview an incident when Senator Robert Kennedy, who was not a senator at the time, but Bobby Kennedy visited Speaker Rayburn. Would you like to....

[-6-]

BLUNDELL: Well, that was a story that was going around and had gotten a lot of discussion that apparently Senator Kennedy selected Bobby to be the emissary to advise Mr. Rayburn of the decision. And as the story goes, he went down to see Mr. Rayburn early the following morning and Mr. Rayburn came in his pajamas, and before Bobby could say anything he said—Mr. Rayburn said—“Bobby, you're here to talk about the vice-presidency. You're not the man to do the talking.” Now, you can interpret that anyway you want to. I assume that he meant that Bobby was not on the level of the Speaker and the Senator, and he meant that it was his feeling that if Jack Kennedy wanted to talk to him about the vice-presidency he should talk himself.

HARTIGAN: Do you think it also reflected that he knew at that point that the Senator, the then-Senator Johnson and then Senator Kennedy had already made the decision?

BLUNDELL: No in fact, I don't think the decision had been made at that time. I mean as far as an agreement was concerned. But, it did work out that way. I remember John Connally and Senator Johnson had quite a heated discussion about it. And it's my opinion that John left Los Angeles in a pretty bad mood.

HARTIGAN: Jim, there has been—and I'm sure you've heard—the story that the President's father, Joe Kennedy [Joseph P. Kennedy] was deeply involved in this decision and there's even mentioned in certain books and articles that a large sum of money was paid to Johnson to get him to accept the vice- presidency. Would you have, comment on that?

BLUNDELL: I don't think it's worth commenting on, Bill, but my reaction would be that it's ridiculous. In fact, this is the only time I've ever heard that subject mentioned. And I don't believe it. I don't think there's any credence to it whatsoever.

HARTIGAN: I think for the record, Jim, I should tell you the source that that came from. It was a J. Evetts Haley who wrote a book called A Texan Looks at Lyndon. I am assuming you are familiar with J. Evetts Haley. Is that correct?

BLUNDELL: Yes, I recall Mr. Haley as a professor of history, I think at the University of Texas or Texas Tech, who became imbued with the idea that he was potentially a political star. In my opinion, Mr. Haley was a crackpot. He was a darling of the John Birchers if there was a John Birch Society at that time, I don't think there was. But, he represented the far right radical fringe of Texas politics, which was a very small minority. I think he ran for governor once or twice, and was very unsuccessful. He seemed to have taken up a crusade against Johnson and quite a few other Texas political leaders. And I think that anyone you talk to in Texas who has any

[-7-] memory of the events of that time will tell you that very few people paid any attention to J. Evetts Haley. He was a real political nut. So there's just absolutely no foundations for that...[Interruption].

HARTIGAN: Turn the tape over, but getting back to the last reference I'm going to make to this book, A Texan Looks at Lyndon by J. Evetts Haley, he made mention and took great pain to describe Lyndon Johnson at the time the vice-presidency was being considered, as being an outrage and totally angry with the world, so to speak. Do you recall any such action?

BLUNDELL: You mean as far as accepting the vice-presidency?

HARTIGAN: His attitude towards President Kennedy for losing, and his attitude towards Bobby Kennedy and all the Kennedy staff. He goes to great length to....

BLUNDELL: No, I don't recall that. As everyone knows, Lyndon Johnson was a very forceful personality. He was torn over this decision he had to make because so many of his close advisors and friends whom he respected and loved were pushing and pulling, and I don't think he liked to be in a situation like that. And being a forceful personality, he probably reacted forcefully, I wouldn't use the word violent. But, no, I don't know of anything in that respect.

HARTIGAN: Jim, the Johnson for President organization was in fact, in effect during the primaries, more specifically the West Virginia primary and the Wisconsin primary. Is that right? Did you form, were you formed before those two primaries?

BLUNDELL: Bill, I don't recall exactly the timing, but it seems to me that it was after, because at the time Senator Johnson talked with me, the West Virginia campaign was under way, because he mentioned the fact that if Jack won West Virginia that he felt sure he'd be nominated. Now, this leads up to another situation that I was going to mention later. A lot of Senator Johnson's very close friends, like Jim Rowe [James H. Rowe] and others, were so anxious for Johnson to get into the campaign and perhaps so firm in their opposition to Jack Kennedy that they were looking for some way to oppose Kennedy. And when it became apparent to them that they couldn't get Johnson to get into the campaign, they got behind Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey]. And this led up to a lot of the dissension between Johnson and the Kennedy people. Because I think a lot of the Kennedy people felt that Johnson was backing Humphrey or encouraging or helping him financially, which to my knowledge was not true.

HARTIGAN: Well, there are references, that's why I was trying to pin down the time when Johnson actually announced his presidency, if it was before the...

[-8-]

BLUNDELL: Now, that's another story I'd like to tell you as far as his announcing is concerned. Go ahead.

HARTIGAN: Well, in reading some background and doing some research on this particular campaign, I note that there's a reference—several—a reference made several times to the fact that Johnson actually went to West Virginia and made a speech in behalf of Humphrey. Do you recall anything?

BLUNDELL: I don't think he did. As far as I know he didn't.

HARTIGAN: I intend to check that out further, but...

BLUNDELL: I'm sure he didn't. I just can't imagine him doing that in the first place.

HARTIGAN: Well, that's why I thought it was important that the date of the announcement may be relevant. If it was before he was announced it possibly could have been he was there. But at any rate....

BLUNDELL: Well, it was before he announced.

HARTIGAN: Would you like to comment on the announcement then?

BLUNDELL: Well, in regard to this subject of Humphrey, the Humphrey campaign, I think that Senator Johnson leaned over backwards to keep from being identified with the Humphrey campaign because of his relationship with Senator Kennedy and because of his position in the Senate. He'd be put in the position of taking sides between his colleagues in the Senate. Not only that but he was a smarter politician than to get involved in something like that, even though he may never have decided to run, to get into the campaign himself. There's one interesting story about his announcing formally. I think he put it off as long as he could. And we had opened—I say opened—we had moved into the Ambassador Hotel and began to set up our little staff, and the big question was if and when Senator Johnson was going to make a formal announcement. It so happened that my second daughter was graduating from high school and, of course I had to go back for her graduation. We had been making our tentative plans for the announcement and for kick-off of the campaign. And I had been talking to a sign painter in regard to putting up signs on the Ambassador Hotel. I authorized him to go ahead and paint the signs but to hold them until he heard from me. While I was in Dallas only for a couple of days to attend my daughter's graduation, for some unknown reason the signs start to go up on the Ambassador Hotel. Well, I got an emergency call from one of the staff—I don't recall who it was—that they're putting the signs up on the hotel and the press and the photographers are taking pictures. And did I authorize the signs to go up? I said,

[-9-]

“No, I didn't.” And whoever it was said “You better get back here as soon as you can. Senator Johnson is pretty unhappy about it.” So I got back, and the day I arrived there was a two or four column picture on the front page of the Washington Post of the signs coming down, being taken down from the front of the Ambassador Hotel which created quite a lot of interest in Washington among the politicians and not a little consternation on the part of Senator Johnson and his staff, and of course we all heard from him—particularly me. Nevertheless, he did announce soon thereafter and the signs went back up.

HARTIGAN: Jim, are there any other observations you'd like to make before we move on to your coming to the National Committee after the, after the convention and the nomination.

BLUNDELL: Well, I can't think of anything right now, Bill, but I may during the course of our conversation. I don't know exactly what you have in mind.

HARTIGAN: Well, I thought we'd move on to your activities in the actual campaign for election. I know that from personal experience, you did come to the Democratic National Committee.

BLUNDELL: That's true.

HARTIGAN: Would you like to comment on your arrival at the Democratic National Committee?

BLUNDELL: I might preface that by saying that as soon as the convention ended in Los Angeles I immediately went back to Dallas to try to revive my business which I'd neglected for several months. And after about a week Walter Jenkins called and asked me if I would come back to handle the Vice- President's campaign in the National Committee. I told him I didn't think it was that urgent for me to do it. They certainly had plenty of people and plenty of talent. And he said “No, Mr. Johnson wants you to come up and do the job.” I said “Alright, I'll be there.” So I think I left the next day. When I got to town Senator Johnson was out some place, out of town. And Walter briefed me not very well, but I guess as well as he could at that time, on the situation in the National Committee. And he did say that the problem seemed to have been the fact that the people that Johnson had in the National Committee working with the Kennedy people were all men who had been in West Virginia and who had supported Humphrey. Which didn't sit very well with the Kennedy people. They were a little suspicious and they just had no communication.

HARTIGAN: This leads up, Jim, to the question that certainly you've heard many times—it seems to be a popular attitude—that the great friction between Kennedy staff and the Johnson staff. What was your experience with

[-10-] reference to that?

BLUNDELL: Well, I'd like to develop that a little later.

HARTIGAN: Alright go ahead.

BLUNDELL: And I will because it, I think, is interesting. If not important. After visiting with Walter, I think the next morning I reported in to the—is it 1101, 1001 Connecticut?

HARTIGAN: 1001 Connecticut is correct.

BLUNDELL: That's right. The Johnson headquarters in the National Committee consisted of one room. I would say it was about 12x14. There were three of four people there. I might say that when Walter called me to come up, I told him I would if I could have Wilson McCarthy as my assistant. Wilson had worked in the pre-convention campaign, and I became very fond of him and he was very effective. And of course, Walter agreed. So we started with my secretary, whom I brought up from Dallas and Wilson McCarthy, and I got Jim Teague, Congressman Tiger Teague's [Olin E. Teague] son, I think at Walter's suggestion. Jim Rowe had already left. He wasn't there when I reported. But Ryan VanderZee was there. And Ryan had been handling the scheduling and remained after I got there, for a while. So, there were four or five of us in this small room. I think.... If I recall, it was a day or two before I officially met any of the Kennedy people. There was no welcoming committee for me when I got there. But, we started setting up business and getting organized, and the first thing I had to do was to review the schedule that had already been committed. A lot of which I didn't agree with, and many of the scheduled events Senator Johnson didn't like. So one of the first things I had to do was to either revise the schedule or live with it. And that presented quite a problem. But we managed to proceed as well as we could, and I think it was about a week later that Senator Johnson returned to Washington. As I recall it was for the purpose of attending Senator Tom Hennings’ [Thomas C. Hennings, Jr.] funeral. When I had talked to him before his return, he said that he'd like for me to go with him to the funeral and we'd visit on the way in and on the way back. During that time in the car we discussed scheduling and went over what we had already committed. He gave me his opinion about several of the things and suggested changes. And I remember he said, “There's three places I will not go, so don't schedule me. One is , one is New York, and the other is .” Well, I thought that was strange because that happens to be the three of the largest and most important states in which we had to campaign. I asked him why. He said he didn't want to be embarrassed in New York because they looked upon him as a Texas conservative. He didn't want to embarrass Jack Kennedy by having himself embarrassed. And I just passed it off and said, “Well we'll work it out the best we can.”

[-11-]

HARTIGAN: What was his reason for, you mentioned Chicago and California?

BLUNDELL: I think the same thing, the same thing probably applied to California. Now I'm not sure why he felt that way about Chicago. Unless there was some relationship with Mayor Daley [Richard J. Daley] that he might have felt that Mayor Daley didn't look upon him with favor. I don't know. May have been something in the background that I didn't know about. We got back to his office and I had not made any comment about my relations with the Kennedy people at the headquarters. I didn't want to be in the position of complaining about anything. But when we got back to his office he says, “How you getting along with the Kennedys?” I said, “Well, they, they're speaking to me, and they say good morning.” He smiled and said, “What can I do to help?” I said, “Well, it would help if they knew that I was your man. The people that you had down there, without being critical, have been people who worked for . They may feel that I'm just another Hubert Humphrey man that you sent down to work.” He said, “What do you want me to do? Who do you want me to talk to?” I said, “There are two people that I have gotten acquainted with. We speak and carry on some conversation.” That's Dick Maguire and Steven Smith [Stephen E. Smith]. He said, “Which one do you want me to call?” I said, “Well, I think Steve Smith might be the best because he's a little closer to the throne.” So, he turned to Mary Margaret and asked her to get Steve Smith, which she did. He chatted with Steve a little while and then he says, “Steve, how's my man Blundell getting along?” I don't know what Steve said but the Senator says, “I want you to know that he's been taking care of my business for fifteen or twenty years and he's my man. And anything he says is just as good as me saying it.” And that was about the extent of the conversation. He said, “What else do you want me to do?” That was his method. Very direct and he'd do anything he thought would make you more effective. I told him, “That's fine.” So I got back to the headquarters, and I'd been back about fifteen minutes and Steve Smith came in, and—very friendly—and asked how I was getting along, and I told him fine. He said, “Don't you need a little more space? Kinda crowded here.” I said “Well, we're doing alright but it would help.” He said, “We'll see about that.” So we visited and he left and in about 30 minutes Dick Maguire came in with the same much more friendly attitude. And we had a nice chat. Our offices were adjoined. And that afternoon about six o'clock Dick came in and said, “How about a drink?” I said, “Fine.” So we went over to Duke's and spent three or four hours exchanging big talk. And from then on I had no problems as far as the Kennedys were concerned. I had not met Ken O'Donnell. In fact, I didn't meet him until the last week of the campaign because he was on the road all of the time. But Dick and I got to be very close, and we either had lunch or dinner every evening. His family was still in Boston. And it became a very, very happy, effective relationship. But it wasn't until Senator Johnson let them know what I was really his man that I became accepted.

[-12-]

HARTIGAN: From that point on did you notice any serious conflicts between the two organizations?

BLUNDELL: No. There was such an absence of communication, or operation, that there couldn't be any conflict. The.... it was almost like there were two separate campaigns. In other words, the Kennedy campaign was operating their business and Johnson was operating his business.

HARTIGAN: Wasn't that the strategy of it though? Didn't it appear from where the scheduling was going on that the utilization of who did the best job where seemed to prevail? Was that into it at all?

BLUNDELL: No, I think it was until I went into the campaign. After I'd been there a couple of weeks we had a meeting in the Senator's office—he wasn't there—to talk about how things were going and particularly this problem of scheduling where we had, where they had made a lot of commitments without any co-ordination with the Kennedy people as far as I could tell. And in fact, without too much consultation with Senator Johnson. So we had this meeting for the purpose of better scheduling and by this time advancing got to be important. So we discussed that also. And Walter asked me for my opinion, and I said, “Well, in my opinion, I think that the scheduling and advancing should be handled in one place.” Apparently it had never been done in a campaign before. Somebody handled the scheduling and turned it over to the advance department, and they take it from there. But it was my opinion that you could do a lot more effective job if you had the same team doing the scheduling and directing the advance work. Because you wouldn't have so many different people communicating with the local people for your meetings and your appearances. One of the problems was people out in the states would get four different calls in one day from four different people regarding the schedule regarding advancing and so forth. Well, Walter said, I remember he said, “Well, do you think you could handle it?” I said, “Sure, I can handle it.” He said, “Well, you've taken on a big load.” I said, “Well, I think it would simplify the operation.” So that's what we did, we adopted that method. And I also said I think there should be a better co-ordination between the scheduling of both candidates. And by this time I had been working more closely with Dick Maguire and.... So from then on, before we made any schedules, I would meet with Dick. And we would go over their schedule and ours, and it worked out a lot better because there were places where one of the candidates was more effective than the other one. There was more reason for one to go to a certain place than the other. So working jointly it was more effective.

HARTIGAN: Did you have dealings with Dick O'Hare at that time also?

[-13-]

BLUNDELL: Yes, I said dealings. I remember Dick O'Hare and John Rielley, and probably some others I don't recall, were directing the advance work, I think. Dick was spending more time on scheduling with, working with Ken O'Donnell.

HARTIGAN: Do you recall—we're getting towards the end of your session here—do you recall any noteworthy events that took place—this is during the campaign now—that may be of interest to somebody studying these oral histories in the future?

BLUNDELL: Well, in my opinion, Bill, there's nothing new in the art of campaigning. There are a lot of refinements, but when you boil it down it's very simple. You've got a candidate. You want exposure. You want the most effective people where he's going to make the arrangements. It's a matter of logistics, and the most effective people are the ones that do the best job. The.... I think the outstanding event in the Johnson campaign was the whistle-stop train from Washington to New Orleans which is a whole story in itself because it really was a big undertaking. When you have a train load of people, you decide who's going to be on the train, and who's going to get on here, and who's getting off there, and you've got a schedule to meet, and you're tied to the train. You certainly have very little flexibility. You've got advance people in every stop the train makes, which was every depot between Washington and New Orleans. [Interruption]

HARTIGAN: Want to proceed, Jim? I'm sorry for the interruption again.

BLUNDELL: As I mentioned, the, one of the two highlights of the Johnson campaign was the whistle-stop train. I don't know how the idea originated. I know we talked about it quite a bit. The whole strategy was, of course, to get as much support in the South as possible. And it was my feeling that the grand strategy had been determined that Johnson could be effective in that respect. We had to make some inroads into the South because there was a lot of opposition to Kennedy because of the religious issue, eastern intellectual, eastern establishment, and so forth. Without going into too much detail, the organization of this thing was quite a task. I think we had about fifty advance men, most of whom were from Texas. We had Texas senators, businessmen almost every type of personality you could think of. And we had a big meeting here in Washington of all the advance men. We briefed them and gave them material. We had already, of course, been tied to the schedule that the train operated on. And there were a lot of interesting incidents that occurred, of course. But the general plan was that the local or the United States senators from each state would join the train through their state. The governors, congressmen… [Interruption]

[-14-]

[BEGIN TAPE TWO, SIDE ONE]

HARTIGAN: Whistle-stop, you can probably pick up from there.

BLUNDELL: Well, there were many incidences, some humorous, some serious, that occurred, which you would expect in an operation of this nature. One thing that I think illustrates Senator Johnson's philosophy of campaigns—which probably doesn't fit with his reputation—and that is in regard to campaign financing, and contributions. I worked for six Texas governors, three United States senators, and I've been exposed to nearly every phase of campaigning including raising money, accepting contributions. And I've never known a politician or an office holder who was as careful and as strict as Lyndon Johnson was about campaign contributions, who they came from, the nature of the contributions. And as an example, the night before the whistle-stop train was to pull out of Washington, I got a call from one of the fellows working on the train, that there was an individual on the train who planned to ride to New Orleans, whose presence was a possible embarrassment for Senator Johnson and possibly President Kennedy. Well, as soon as he told me who it was, I saw that it was a problem. So I called a fellow that was in charge of VIPs and asked him if this man was on the train. He said, “yes.” Well, I said, “You've got to get him off. He shouldn't be on there.” He said, “Well, he’s got to be on there.” I said, “Why?” He said, “Because he's given me a fifty thousand dollar contribution.” I said, “Well, I don't think that's reason enough for him to be on the train.” I called Walter Jenkins. And Walter said, “Yes, I know. I'm familiar with the problem. You're going to have to get him off.” I said, “No. In the first place it's not my train. I don't dictate who rides and who doesn't.” He said, “Well, I think you're to have to talk to Senator Johnson.” Which I did. As soon as I got the Senator on the phone and told him the situation he said, “The son-of-a-bitch is not going to ride on my train.” I said, “Well, there's a problem.” He said, “What is it?” I said, “He's made a fifty thousand dollar contribution.” He said, “Give him his money back and get him off the train.” I said, “Senator, I can't do that.” He said, “Well, I'll do it. And if he's on the train when I get on there in the morning, I’ll personally throw him off.” I recall that....

HARTIGAN: You would care to mention this man's name?

BLUNDELL: No, I wouldn't.

HARTIGAN: He's still alive today, I'm assuming.

BLUNDELL: I remember that Senator Johnson had three lawyers handling his financial, his political contributions, reporting, as required on the Texas law, as well as reporting to the clerk of the House. Everett Hutchinson was

[-15-] one. Everett was assistant attorney general at the time the contributions law was revised in Texas and was more or less an expert on political reporting, and I remember that Senator Johnson had him working on it. But, all the reports and reputation to the contrary, I don't think there has ever been anybody in public life who was as careful about campaign contributions and reporting campaign contributions as Senator Johnson was.

HARTIGAN: You mentioned a name, Everett Hutchinson. Didn't he eventually become deputy secretary of transportation?

BLUNDELL: Yes. Before that he was a member of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

HARTIGAN: Yea.

BLUNDELL: I also recall—and you might know this better than I but—I remember each week during the campaign Walter Jenkins would ask me for a report of the amount of money that we had spent out of the National Committee for advance work and other expenses. And he told me that Senator Johnson wanted him to replace that money, and he would take that amount of money to Steve Smith every week. Because he said that Senator Johnson wanted to pay his own way as far as the National Committee finances were concerned. He didn't want the Kennedys to think that they were carrying him. [Laughter]

HARTIGAN: So he was very sensitive about money?

BLUNDELL: Yes, he was, and very careful. The other thing I particularly remember about the whistle-stop was that Senator Johnson thought we were overworking him all the time. And every night when I would talk to him he'd say, “I made fourteen speeches today and you had three scheduled.”

HARTIGAN: Jim, in terms of that whistle-stop and measuring it against the success in the election, do you think it was worth it?

BLUNDELL: I don't think there's any question about it. Had we not done it—of course it's speculation—Monday morning quarterbacking but—I think the impact of it nationally was very important. In the overall campaign. Not just the effect in the individual states. But here was Johnson going right into the opposition. And he talked right to them. He met the racial issue, the religious issue, and I think he was most effective in regard to the Catholic issue. He told a story—you might remember—about when Joe Kennedy Jr. [Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr.] was lost during the war. And his navigator—I believe his navigator or co- pilot—was a boy from New Bronsville, Texas. I don't recall his name right now. But Johnson told this story at almost every rally, in meeting the religious issue. He

[-16-] said then when that plane went down with Joe Kennedy and the crew and this boy from New Bronsville, Texas, they weren't concerned with each other's religion, and.... I want to talk about the New York summit meeting that we had.

HARTIGAN: Go right ahead.

BLUNDELL: And, but that comes a little later. Anyway the, I think the whistle-stop was the most effective thing that was done in the whole campaign on either the Johnson or the Kennedy people because it covered so many states, and involved so many local leaders, local politicians. I remember Mrs. Johnson [Claudia Alta “Lady Bird” Johnson] was very effective. She made a number of speeches. They'd made side trips which caused problems because that train had to run. And I remember different senators would say, “Well, now you gotta come to my hometown, which is sixty miles from the railroad.” Well, it created a physical problem for Senator Johnson. And he was always complaining about how hard we worked him, and how many speeches he had to make. But anytime a politician gets six people together he's gonna make a speech.

HARTIGAN: The technique of trains in this day and age of course has to be measured very carefully against the time aspect, as you probably know.

BLUNDELL: That was the main problem.

HARTIGAN: And it does take an awful lot of a candidate’s time to cover an area like that. Would you like to move on to another subject that you....

BLUNDELL: Yes, I would like to say in this respect that the people we had from Texas doing the advance work on this whistle-stop train did one of the greatest jobs I think has ever been done in campaigning. They'd go into a little town, they were strangers. We had one fellow that got so well acquainted that he taught the Sunday school class one Sunday morning. Of course, we had some good advance men and some bad advance men. We had some very successful men in business or publishing or newspapers. They'd get into a town and if they couldn't find a sign painter, they'd paint their own signs. Improvise. And I was real proud of the boys from Texas. Now, during the campaign—and this touches a little bit on the Kennedy-Johnson relationship—Senator Johnson was very sensitive about the attitude of the Kennedy people toward him. This might be a good place to go into that a little deeper. While there was never any criticism, personal criticism or even conflict between the top level people, of the Johnson and the Kennedy campaigns there was enough mention in the press, criticism from some of the Kennedy people about this rough-talking Texan who was crude and, some thought, uneducated. There was never anything like that from people like Ken O'Donnell or Dick Maguire, the people who were close to Kennedy. Now on the other hand there were from people

[-17-] like the Schlesingers [Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.] or people like that who I guess you'd call the intellectuals. I think that gave Senator Johnson a complex, frankly. Maybe justifiably, I don't know. I don't know how true it was. But every day or so when we'd talk on the phone I might say, “It was a good speech you made last night.” And his reaction would be, “Well, who else thinks so?” And I could tell that he was very anxious, very conscious of wanting to be looked upon favorably, and his contribution in the campaign, favorably by the Kennedy people. And I remember one time he mentioned the fact that he and Kennedy had never appeared together. He said, “Nixon [Richard Milhous Nixon] has Lodge [Henry Cabot Lodge] with him every once in a while. They travel together, they appear together.” I tried to pass over the problem by saying, “Well, I'm sure that there's time for that, and there'll be opportunities.” But he mentioned it several times. So I mentioned it to Dick Maguire one day, and I don't remember exactly Dick's reaction, but he felt it was unimportant. Or at least didn't feel that it was important enough to do anything about it immediately. So it evolved in our discussions to where we developed the idea that the two candidates would appear together at the big New York rally which was actually closing the campaign, it was on Thursday before the election. And when I told Senator Johnson he was very pleased. So we began to plan it. And we called it the summit meeting. And there was one interesting story that I recall. You may remember the incident in Texas when Bruce Alger and some of the Johnson opponents created a disturbance at the Baker Hotel. When Senator and Mrs. Johnson were leaving the Baker Hotel after a luncheon, and there was a mob outside, and they began shoving and pushing, and it almost became serious. Well that got a lot of sympathy for Senator and Mrs. Johnson, particularly Mrs. Johnson. That happened the afternoon before they came to New York for this meeting. And we.... One other thing I'd like to mention. I took Wilson McCarthy and Leonard Marks and my secretary and one other advance man to New York to handle the logistics and the problems of the rally. But of course, it was a Kennedy rally, but both candidates were appearing together. So that morning I met with the Secret Service and the New York police about the Johnson caravan and the Johnson part of the meeting. During the meeting I got a call from Leonard Marks, who was in the hotel. I took him along to coordinate the television program, and Johnson's part of it. Well, Leonard called and said, “You'd better come down here to this meeting. We've got a problem.” I said, “No, you handle that. I'm tied up with this other stuff.” “No,” he said, “you've got to come down.” So I went down and there were four or five Kennedy people who handled their communications and television. Sorenson [Theodore C. Sorensen] and I think one of them was Wilson, and Leonard was the only one there representing Johnson. So I walked in and shook hands around. Nobody said anything. I finally said, “Well, what's the problem?” And Leonard said, “Well, Jimmy, they want to give Senator Johnson four minutes on the telecast.” I said, “Well, he's not gonna appear for four minutes. That's an insult.” Well then these Kennedy boys began....[Telephone Interruption]

[-18-]

HARTIGAN: Just before that interruption, Jim, we were talking, you were talking about the time allocated to Senator Johnson at the New York rally just prior to the, to election day. Do you want to continue?

BLUNDELL: They told me that the problem was that Senator Kennedy had been getting so much applause that he couldn't finish his text. [Laughter] I said, “Well, I think maybe you'd better shorten the text.” Well, anyway, I said “If his plane hasn't left Austin, I'm gonna call and tell him not to come. Because he' s not gonna fly from Texas to New York to appear with Senator Kennedy on a national hookup for four minutes.” Well, they started discussing it, and the result was we ended up, he got nine minutes. When his plane landed at La Guardia, I had Wilson McCarthy and the other two men go out to meet the plane. When Johnson got off the plane and saw them there he didn't like it. He said, “What are you? What's Blundell got you all up here for? This is Kennedy's show. We don't have anything to do with it.” Well the.... Unfortunately it rained terribly all night. I don't know whether you recall or not, but I'm sure that Ken will. Senator Kennedy's entourage was making a lot of stops around Manhattan and Long Island. And he had the chief-of-police and the commissioner-of-police and all kinds of police escorts. And they got lost. [Laughter]

HARTIGAN: I was in that motorcade.

BLUNDELL: Well, you remember that. But, this leads up to the climax of the trip. One thing I want to mention—after the telecast, they had a platform outside and there were twenty-five thousand people waiting outside of the armory, if you recall, in the pouring down rain. When the telecast was over Senator Kennedy went into a studio to make some tapes. And we went on out to get ready for the outside rally. There was no one on the platform. And Senator and Mrs. Johnson were there ready to go on the platform. Well, somebody had to introduce him. I looked around and finally I called Bill Moyers over and I said, “Bill, you gotta get up there and introduce the Vice-President.” Well, I was very proud. This country boy from Marshall, Texas got up in New York City before a crowd of twenty-five thousand people and made the best introduction I think I ever heard. Now, one other point I want to make about this. In Senator Johnson's speech he talked about Joe Kennedy, Jr. going down in his plane with this boy from New Bronsville, Texas and said Joe didn't ask him what church he went to. And I looked over and Jack Kennedy had come out of the studio and was standing waiting for Johnson to finish his speech. And I watched Senator Kennedy as Johnson was talking about Joe Kennedy. And I noticed that he had his head bowed. And I know that he was very moved by that story.

[-19-]

After the rally, Senator Kennedy had some other stops to make. I think in Connecticut, and I think they always wind up in Waterbury, don't they? So, he said that he would take Senator and Mrs. Johnson and the daughters to the airport, which was a very nice gesture. They got to the airport and—I didn't mention the fact that Johnson brought forty or fifty people with him from Texas, friends and supporters, newspapermen—so as he got on the plane—I got this story later from Bill Moyers—Johnson went up and down the plane saying, “Kennedy's people got him lost on Long Island, but my boys saved the day.” [Laughter]

HARTIGAN: Jim, in closing, I like to always find out just, the activity that people played in the administration. Now, I know that this was a problem area for you at the time because of some Texas politicking, Texas politics. Would you care to comment on your brief tenure in the Kennedy administration?

BLUNDELL: After the election, a day or two later, I was getting ready to go back to Texas. And I went in to visit with people like Larry O'Brien [Lawrence F. O’Brien] and Steve Smith, bid them farewell and tell them how much I enjoyed working with them. And Larry O'Brien said, “Well, aren't you going to stay up here and help us?” I said, “No, I, all I want to do is to get back home to my family and my business.” He said, “Isn't there anything you want in this administration?” I said, “No, not a thing.” He said, “Well, you're the first man that's ever said that.” I did go home. About two weeks later Dick Maguire called and said, “Ken and I would like you to come up and talk.” I didn't see any particular reason to do it, but I thought if they were interested enough to ask me to come up I certainly ought to do it. So, I came up, we had lunch at the Mayflower Hotel. They talked about different things and said they'd like to have me part of the administration, and they needed someone from Texas or the south for a different viewpoint. And it developed that they wanted me to go into the Post Office department as assistant postmaster general. I did not...

HARTIGAN: That was for the Bureau of Facilities?

BLUNDELL: Yes. I did not discuss this with Senator Johnson because I didn't want him to become involved. I was talking off and on with Walter Jenkins and, in fact, I went back to Texas and then came back for the purpose of assuming this job. At that time the Foreign Aid Bill was being debated and they didn't want to send my name up until that was out of the way. Walter told me that he didn't think that Senator Yarborough [Ralph W. Yarborough] would ever agree to my appointment. I said, “Well, that's alright with me.” He said, “Well, I think you ought to talk to some people in Texas and get them to talk to him.” I said, “Well, Walter, I don't want to be in a position of asking

[-20-] for a favor.” He said, “You're not asking him for a favor. You're helping people who want to get you up here.” Ralph Yarborough had been an assistant attorney general under Governor Allred, when Jimmy Allred was attorney-general. I knew him fairly well. Governor Allred had died, but I called his wife, Jo Betsy Allred [Jo Betsy Miller Allred]—we were very close friends— and told her that the President was considering appointing me as assistant postmaster general and it would require the approval of Senator Yarborough. She said, “Well, I'll certainly call him.” Which she did. And then she called my wife to tell her that she had talked to Ralph Yarborough, and he said, “Well, of course, I wouldn't oppose Jimmy.” My wife relayed that information to me. I relayed the information to Walter Jenkins. I still had not even spoken to Vice-President Johnson. So one day Dick Maguire called and said, “Ken O'Donnell wants you to come over to the White House in the morning to talk about this thing.” I said, “Fine.” So I went over to the White House and Ken said, “We've got a real problem.” He said, “Senator Yarborough is giving Larry O'Brien hell about your proposed appointment, and Larry didn't know anything about it. Would you go up and explain to Senator Yarborough that also that this is not a Johnson appointment but a Kennedy appointment. And also tell him that Larry O'Brien didn't know anything about it.” I said, “Well, I'm not going up and asking Ralph Yarborough to support me. I will go up as you requested and do what I can to resolve the situation.” So I did. I went to Ralph's office. He kept me waiting an hour. I went in and he began waving his arms and saying that he was getting telephone calls from Texas after it appeared in the paper from all his supporters. And he said, “They're not going to sit still for another Johnson appointment. Especially the appointment of a man who kept me from being governor two times.” I said, “Ralph, you're giving me a lot of credit which I probably don't deserve. But the one thing I want to assure you is that this is not a Johnson appointment.” He said, “I don't believe you, Jimmy.” I said, “Well Ralph, whether you believe me or not, I have not spoken to Lyndon Johnson.” He said, “The Kennedys won't even give me the time of day. And every time I pick up the paper, there's another Texan being appointed who's a Johnson...” [Interruption]

HARTIGAN: Explaining your meeting with Senator Yarborough, and he was responding curiously. Would you continue?

BLUNDELL: I reported back to Ken O'Donnell the results of my visit. Ken made the statement that, “We'll send you name up anyway.” And I said, “No, I'd rather not do that. I don’t want to get the Vice-President involved in a confirmation fight involving Yarborough. I’d just rather not do it.” So, they worked it out where I went to the Post Office Department on a consultant basis until my appointment as a deputy, which did not require Senate confirmation. I remained there about four months and then was offered a position with Douglas Aircraft,

[-21-] which because of my financial situation was so attractive that I thought I owed it to myself and my family to accept it. I opened an office in Washington and had several other clients. But in the meantime, I continued to work very closely with Dick Maguire and the National Committee in fundraising, and I put together the convention book for the convention that occurred, of course, after Senator Kennedy was assassinated. And I continued to work in the President's club and worked very closely, particularly with Dick Maguire.

HARTIGAN: One last subject that I'd like to cover with you, Jim, before—I know you've spent a lot of time with us this morning—but if you will, where were you at the time of President Kennedy's assassination?

BLUNDELL: Well, this is another story, Bill, that I wouldn't have brought up if you hadn't of asked me about it. John Connally, who was then governor, came to Washington to plan the President's trip or to begin work on it. I met with Governor Connally and Dick Maguire at the Mayflower Hotel. The big problem of course, was the relationship with Ralph Yarborough, who was John Connally's mortal political enemy and was not too friendly with the Vice-President. John could not even talk with Yarborough, so he asked Dick to go up to see Yarborough, and had several things they wanted to clear. John and I stayed at the hotel until Dick got back. The first thing Dick said when he came to the room in a laughing manner was that well, he had one order from Senator Yarborough. And that was that when the President's plane landed in Texas he did not want to see Jim Blundell come off the plane. [Laughter] Well, for that reason, I didn't make the trip to Texas. For which I'm grateful to Senator Yarborough.

HARTIGAN: Where were you at the time?

BLUNDELL: I was in my apartment at the Towers at 4201 Connecticut.

HARTIGAN: Did you ever at any time after that discuss that fatal day in Texas with John Connally?

BLUNDELL: Yes.

HARTIGAN: Would you care to make any remarks about that?

BLUNDELL: No. I'd rather not. I do recall very vividly that John was very much opposed to the President making that trip. Totally for political reasons. He didn't think it was necessary as far as support was concerned. He thought that it would create more problems regarding Yarborough and the others. And he did think that there would be some hostility in Dallas. But, of course, he anticipated nothing like what happened, but John felt very strongly about the Yarborough situation. And I think that was one of the main purposes of the trip. To resolve

[-22-] those problems.

HARTIGAN: Did John Connally ever feel free to discuss his personal feelings with reference to that fatal time, that fatal day in Texas?

BLUNDELL: In what respect?

HARTIGAN: His personal reaction to it all, did he ever at any time discuss it with you?

BLUNDELL: No, no he did not. I would like to add one thing that my relationships that I've developed as a result of the Kennedy-Johnson campaign are one of my happiest memories, happiest associations. And I feel that I have as many friends in Boston as I have in Texas. At one time that worked two ways. Some of the Johnson people felt that I was a little too close to the Kennedy people, and that maybe I had gone back on my allegiance to Johnson. But...

HARTIGAN: Do you think they thought we converted you to a Bostonian, Jim? [Laughter]

BLUNDELL: No, I don't think anybody would feel that that was possible. But, I do value my relationships. I feel that the experience of the campaign itself was one of the highlights of my political career. And I'll always be grateful for the opportunity.

HARTIGAN: Do you have any final remarks that you'd like to make with reference to the whole era that we just discussed?

BLUNDELL: There probably would be a lot of remarks I could make, Bill. I think that it has been one of the most interesting periods of our history. The events since then have been so dull in comparison it's hardly any fun to be in politics any more. The excitement of the Kennedy-Johnson years I don't think will be duplicated. John Kennedy's personality, Lyndon Johnson's astute political leadership, I don't think we'll see anything like it in our lifetime.

HARTIGAN: Well, Jim, as a highly regarded politician and political strategist...

BLUNDELL: Some people would disagree with that.

HARTIGAN: Well, I don't. Do you have any remarks you would like to make with reference to our current situation in the country, in terms of politics, and do you have any predictions you'd like to go on record as making?

BLUNDELL: According to my feeling of politics, Bill, I've

[-23-]

always regarded politics as a very honorable endeavor. I've been in many campaigns. I always thought I was on the right side. Didn't always win. But even when we lost, subsequent events proved that we were right. I think it's one of the most challenging and one of the most constructive fields that, particularly a young person, could become interested in.

HARTIGAN: Any predictions for the future?

BLUNDELL: No, I don't think I could make any predictions. I feel and have always felt that there's no problem that the American people cannot overcome or meet. It always works out that way. There've been so many disillusionments in the last four or five years, but we always overcome them. There are always leaders who rise up to take over, to lead the American people, and I think that will always be true.

HARTIGAN: Well, that was spoken as a true political strategist, and I appreciate the time that you've given me and also on behalf of the Kennedy Library, and also I'd like to hopefully if we need any more information or if you think of any more information, we can come back and pick up some loose ends. You wouldn't by any chance be in possession of any memorabilia that would be interesting to the Kennedy Library?

BLUNDELL: None that I recall right now, Bill.

HARTIGAN: If you happen to come across some, Jim, the library is always looking for this sort of material. It's helpful. And if you do come across anything we can have somebody come down and review it and evaluate it, and....

BLUNDELL: I do have a photograph of Senator Johnson and Senator Kennedy—I think it was taken at the convention—that I had never seen published. We were going to use it in the convention book before Kennedy, was assassinated. Let me say in conclusion that I'm not only flattered, but I feel honored that I'm going to become a part of history in the Kennedy Library. I think it's a very, very, high honor, and I don't feel that I've contributed anything because my part in this situation has not been of a major extent. But, as I said before, I'm very grateful to have had any part in it at all.

HARTIGAN: Well, Jim, we are very grateful to you for giving us this time. And we'll just conclude the interview at the moment. And thank you very much.

BLUNDELL: I hope so. [Interruption]

BLUNDELL: The fifty thousand dollar contribution and the fellow on the train. [Interruption]

[-24-]

HARTIGAN: I kind of suspected that.... Well, Bobby was....

BLUNDELL: Levin told me one time that—this is another refutation of the rumors and the criticism of Johnson. [Interruption]

[-25-]

[END OF INTERVIEW]

James H. Blundell Oral History Transcript Name Index

A Kennedy, John F., 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24 Alger, Bruce, 18 Kennedy, Joseph P., 7 Allred, James V., 1, 21 Kennedy, Joseph P., Jr., 16, 17, 19 Allred, Jo Betsy Miller, 21 Kennedy, Robert F., 6, 7, 8, 25 Anderson, Clinton P., 3 Kerr, Robert Samuel, 3

B L

Bellow, George, 3 Levin, 25 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 18 C M Cafritz, Calvin, 3 Connally, John B., Jr., 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 22, 23 Maguire, Richard, 1, 12, 13, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22 Marks, Leonard, 18 D Mary Margaret, 12 McCarthy, Wilson, 11, 18, 19 Daley, Richard J., 12 Moyers, William D., 3, 19, 20 Daniel, Marion Price, 4 N F Neff, Patrick Morris, 1 Furguson, Jim, 1 Nixon, Richard Milhous, 18

G O

Garner, Mr., 5 O’Brien, Lawrence F., 20 Graham, Philip Leslie, 6 O’Daniel, Wilbert Lee, 2 O’Donnell, Kenneth P., 6, 12, 14, 17, 19, 20, 21 O’Hare, Dick, 13, 14 H

Haley, J. Evertts, 7, 8 R Hennings, Thomas C., Jr., 11 Humphrey, Hubert H., 8, 9, 10, 12 Rayburn, Samuel Taliaferro, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 Hutchinson, Everett, 15, 16 Richardson, Sid Williams, 2, 4 Rielley, John, 14 Rowe, James H., 8, 11 J

Jenkins, Walter W., 3, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 20, 21 S Johnson, Claudia Alta “Lady Bird”, 17, 18, 19, 20 Johnson, Lyndon Baines, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., 18 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, Smith, Stephen E., 12, 16, 20 23, 24, 25 Sorensen, Theodore C., 18

K T

Kefauver, Estes, 4 Teague, Jim Teague, Olin E., 11 Thompson, Ernest O., 2 W

V Washington, Marvin, 3

VanderZee, Ryan, 11 Y

Yarborough, Ralph W., 20, 21, 22