A FRUSTRATED PARTNERSHIP: RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES DURING WORLD WAR I

by ROBERT EDWARD BARNETT, B.A., M.A. A DISSERTATION IN HISTORY

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

August, 1990 AC

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ACKMOWLE DGMENT S

I wish to thank Dr. Idris Rhea Traylor, Jr., the chairman of my graduate committee, under whose tireless work, encouragement, unstinting effort and unlimited help, this study was brought to completion. Thanks, too, are due to Drs. Brian Blakeley, James Brink, Dan Flores, and Dahlia Terrell, members of my committee, and to Drs. James Harper and Lowell Blaisdell. The generous sharing of their knowledge and professionalism has been a source of inspiration throughout my career. My appreciation also goes to the faculty of Texas Tech University, especially Drs. Alwyn Barr and Jacquelin Collins, who have helped me perceive the universe in a context beyond my small world. I owe a special debt to the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, and the Library of Congress and their staffs who so willingly aided in the location and use of special documents and materials used in the study. My thanks also go to Ms. Joan Weldon for countless suggestions offered as she was typing the dissertation.

11 To my parents. Dr. Glenn E. and Evadale Barnett, a thank you could never convey my appreciation for their support throughout my life. They have set admirable standards and values which have been of great benefit throughout the years. To my children, Christine, Brooke, Andrew, and Jordan, thank you for your love and patience. To Brenda, my wife, without whose love, understanding, faith and kindness this could not have been possible.

Ill TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. WAR AND THE DOWNFALL OF AUTOCRACY: THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND THE FIRST MONTHS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 23 III. POLITICAL TURMOIL: MILIUKOV, KERENSKY, AND THE CRISIS IN FOREIGN POLICY 80 IV. TO KEEP THE EASTERN FRONT: HENDERSON, STEVENS, AND ROOT IN RUSSIA 140 V. PARTICIPATION WANES: KERENSKY AND THE JULY OFFENSIVE 221 VI. THE FINAL FRUSTRATION: THE BOLSHEVIK UPRISING 278 BIBLIOGRAPHY 316

IV CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

Major historical events, their causative factors, and the persons involved in them are subject to continual research. New materials are utilized and fresh meanings developed as errors of fact are discovered and interpretations which have influenced earlier studies are examined. Diplomacy during the First World War, a complex and frequently frustrating subject for those who study it, has received such attention. The specific focus here is the Russian revolutions of 1917 which caused sweeping changes in this diplomacy. Beyond doubt one of the most significant series of events of modern history, the uprisings inextricably associated with Russia's involvement in the war threatened to make impossible the attainment of the wartime goals Russia and her allies had established. As a consequence of the Revolutions, Allied diplomatic efforts regarding Russia's participation in World War I assumed greater urgency and interrelations became more difficult as Russia's internal problems increasingly jeopardized her military performance. These latter efforts grew in complexity because of factors which were frustrating to representatives of the Allied nations as they sought to pursue the goal of the continued participation of Russia in the war. These factors included: the failure or, in some cases the complete absence, of Allied national policies as they related specifically to Russia; the influence of personal attitudes, abilities, experience, and ambitions of the representatives in Russia; and the influence on Allied relations with Petrograd, of special groups, for example the international Jewish community and commercial interests.

Prior to 1914, the widely shared expectation of a European war had led nations to scramble for allies and to stockpile weapons. The development of these diplomatic arrangements has attracted the attention of scholars such as Luigi Albertini, William Langer, and George Kennan whose examinations of European diplomacy and the origins of war are widely respected. In The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890-1894, Langer suggests that the expectation of conflict and the corresponding alliances that accompanied it were sufficient to plunge European nations into a war over issues in which they had little direct concern.^ Kennan shares the belief and, in The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia and the Coming of the First World War, argues that the belief in the certainty of a European conflagration was 3 a causative factor in its outbreak.2 Albertini's assessment is even sharper. He writes in his detailed account of the origins of the war that the mutual obligation to mobilize which was undertaken by St. Petersburg and Paris in the Franco-Russian Alliance was itself inflamatory in nature.3 Statesmen believed the resulting diplomatic arrangements were necessary because of the diplomatic and political climate of the period. The war, moreover, presented an opportunity to pursue many goals beyond that of simple victory. The possibility of acquiring territory, expanding commercial activities, and furthering political ideology proved attractive inducements for continuing the conflict.

Events in Russia in 1917, however, seriously jeopardized Allied efforts toward pursuit of victory. The Tsarist Government was replaced in March by a new regime whose aims became increasingly incongruous with those of Russia's partners. Additionally, the rapidity of change within the country, combined with the ever widening divergence between foreign and domestic objectives, created an insurmountable undertaking for those Allied representatives charged with keeping Russia actively engaged in the war.^ The majority of these representatives, elderly men who were also unfamiliar with the Russian language, were not only products of an earlier age but were also unaccustomed to the pressures forced on them by the chaotic and revolutionary situation within Russia. Perhaps, never before had diplomats been confronted by such extraordinary demands. Increasingly hindered by a deteriorating communications system, their reports often required a month to reach their capitals. Meanwhile, developments within Russia demanded instantaneous responses from the Allied governments, which, in turn, were hampered not only by a lack of current information but also an overabundance of bureaucracy. .. In the absence of concise and immediate direction from their governments. Allied ambassadors, who shared few common goals, proceeded to formulate their own responses as conditions changed. Consequently, the Allied policies regarding Russia assumed a character too frequently steeped in misconceptions, personal convictions and animosity. The result was an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust which could lead only to diplomatic failure.

Robert D. Warth, John Lewis Gaddis, Thomas A. Bailey, C. Jay Smith, and W. Bruce Lincoln have offered harsh criticisms of Allied diplomats in Russia during the turbulent months of the Revolution. In his new book. Red Victory, Lincoln writes that most were "singularly ill suited" for the chaotic conditions which followed the uprising.5 bir George Buchanan, British Ambassador, generally fares better than do his colleagues, among whom was French Ambassador Maurice Pal^ologue, an ardent monarchist who is described by Warth and C. Jay Smith as a snobbish Frenchman who did little to endear himself to the Provisional regime.^ Lincoln, in the later book, however, claims that Pal^ologue's "sage judgment" and insights into the Russian situation surpassed those of any other European diplomat.^

There is little argument over the abilities of the United States Ambassador, David Francis. "The Governor," as Francis was called, has been the target of vehement attacks by historians. In Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States, An Interpretive History, Gaddis writes that the representative was "ill-equipped" to interpret developments in Russia.^ Warth and Robert Bruce Lockhart, a British diplomat and contemporary of Francis, are similarly critical. Lockhart, whose insights are particularly interesting, suggests that the Ambassador was so ignorant that "he would not have known a Left Social Revolutionary from a potato."^ This view is echoed by Max Laserson who wrote in The American Impact on Russia that Francis had little understanding of Russia and did not know who was fighting whom during the March-November period.^^ Implicit in these negative critiques is the suggestion that Allied diplomacy with Russia during the Revolutionary period failed because of the ineffectiveness and ignorance of those who were sent to implement policy. In the study. The Allies and the Russian Collapse, March 1917-March 1918, Michael Kettle devotes an entire chapter to the thesis that Allied diplomacy did fail and offers Russian abandonment of the war through the Treaty of Berst-Litovsk of March 1918 as evidence of the diplomatic debacle. ^-^ Such an assessment is, however, erroneous. Allied diplomacy, at least during months of the Provisional Government, did, in fact, succeed in the primary goal—that of keeping active the Eastern Front and, in so doing, occupying large numbers of German troops who might otherwise have been deployed in the West. While such success did not long continue following the Bolshevik coup, Germany was forced to continue her military occupation of what had formerly been Russian territory even after the Brest-Litovsk agreement. Keeping German troops in the East, though certainly a success, was scarcely attributable to the activities of Allied representatives in Russia. It was, more often the consequence of a combination of factors, not the least of which was the Provisional Government's decision to remain in the war as a means of safeguarding the gains of the Revolution. Nonetheless, the constant prodding of Allied representatives arguably did have an 7 effect on Russians who were leading their nation's war efforts. There were other factors which influenced Allied relations with Russia during 1917. The attractive commercial and financial opportunities Russia offered were, according to Michael Kettle and William A. Williams, significant incentives for Allied interest in Russia. British, French, and American business interests were already heavily involved in many phases of the Russian economy. Further, there was concern that the deterioration of Allied economies, a consequence of the war, might trigger an international catastrophe. According to Arthur Link, this consideration may have had a profound effect on the United States' decision to enter the war.l2 on 5 March 1917, Walter Page, United States Ambassador to Great Britain, wired the State Department, "Perhaps our going to war is the only way in which our preeminent trade position can be maintained and a panic averted."^^

Interpretations like those of Link fail to consider the great influence of these business and financial pressures. The suggestion that the Wilson administration was guided wholly by altruistic idealism obviously conflicts with the realities of American commercial interests in Russia. Link writes that America's idealistic world mission was "not to attain wealth and 8 power, but to serve mankind through leadership in moral purposes and in advancing peace and world unity."14 This view underestimates American attraction to Russia's financial potential. If anything, Wilsonian idealism, the liberal-capitalist sentiment for which he was well-known became, as N. Gordon Levin suggests, synonymous with the vigorous continuation of the Russian war effort.^^ E. F. Gay, Dean of the Harvard School of Business, held that Russia was "an inviting field for American business enterprise."!^ Prior to the war, the President was urged by many business leaders to restore fully the nation's commercial relations with Russia. Tsar Nicholas II's government was also interested in the normalization of these relations. In 1913 a special mission from Russia had been sent to Washington, D.C. for the purpose of regularizing trade. William A. Williams' study on Russo-American relations, American-Russian Relations, 1781-1947, is especially intriguing. In it, Wilson is portrayed as being too absorbed in domestic issues to respond to this overture.!^ That year, however, the President had offered the Ambassador's post in St. Petersburg to Charles Crane, whose knowledge of Russia was well-known. Though based to a great extent on the time he had spent in Russia, Crane's interest was "buttressed by certain material considerations, including investments in the Westinghouse Company, which was heavily involved in Russia."18 Wilson must surely have been aware of Crane's financial interests in Russia. It is also logical that Crane's business skills had been a factor in the President's decision to offer him the diplomatic post. His "suitable" candidate, may have been responsible for Wilson's reluctance to open trade negotiations.!^

Francis, the man finally selected, shared the desire to improve commercial relations between the two countries, and he repeatedly urged his government to take appropriate action believing it wise for American merchants to involve themselves in Russia.20 Francis noted that Russia possessed "millions upon millions of acres of tillable lands, forests of immeasurable extent, ore deposits both precious and base, to say nothing of fast water power. The resources of the country ... is [sicl in fact, incalcuable."21 According to Francis, Russia was "the prize" of the war.22 The Ambassador became consumed by his desire to bring Russia into close connection with the United States, which he hoped could be accomplished through the conclusion of a commercial treaty, the primary objective of his appointment as Ambassador. "Several hints were given to me soon after I came that I had too keen a scent for commerce to make an ideal diplomat," wrote Francis, "but 10 such insinuations only served to amuse me and had no effect upon my plans."23

By 1917, the exigencies of the Russian political situation had made the conclusion of a new commercial treaty impossible. Laserson suggests that the perception that the United States was preoccupied with "ownership and money" did nothing to aid the Allied cause.24 There was little other diplomatic business for which Francis was suited, for he lacked the skills requisite to his post. While charges of the Ambassador's incompetence are valid, critics such as Warth, Bailey and Lockhart often understate the fact that Francis was a Wilson appointee and that the President must, therefore, share responsibility for the ineptitude of his representative. If, as Warth suggests, the Ambassador was intellectually deficient, it appears obvious that even greater criticism should be leveled at those who formulated United States' policy and were responsible for the appointment and recall of the representatives charged with its implementation.25 Despite his obvious lack of suitability for the post, his several offers to resign, and his questionable relationship with a suspected German agent, Matilda de Cram, Francis was not replaced. The de Cram incident was especially glaring, as it became the topic of extensive gossip within the Petrograd diplomatic community. Madame de Cram, who first 11 met Francis on the transatlantic voyage of the Oscar II in 1916, was returning to Russia to join her two sons, both naval cadets, after a six-month sojourn in the United States. The liaison between the Ambassador and this lady has been cited by many scholars as evidence of the former's incompetence. It appears more reasonable to question the competency of those who knew of the relationship and were aware of the demands for a replacement, yet took no step in that direction. Further, it must be noted that many scholars, Warth among them, have emphasized this information despite the fact, as Kennan suggests, that there was little evidence of either marital infidelity on the part of the Ambassador or treason on the part of de Cram.26 while Francis may have been guilty of poor judgment, little in his character suggests the lustful nature inferred by many historians. Francis did little to ingratiate himself with those around him. Unlike his British and French counterparts, the junior Ambassador of the Allied diplomatic community, Francis, disdained Petrograd society. Enjoying "good cigars, good whiskey, and a good card game," the Ambassador confined his activities to the American colony.27 Francis's disinterest in the life-style practiced by most continental diplomats, and his limited interaction with them, may have encouraged 12 their thinly disguised contempt for their American colleague.28 The fall of the Russian autocracy in March 1917 was, at first, enthusiastically welcomed by Russia's allies. A number viewed the Revolution as a means of keeping Russia in the war and did not recognize it as a reflection of frustration and war weariness. The Times of London reported that the Revolution was "not an effort to secure peace but was an expression of discontent with the Russian Government for not carrying on the war with efficiency and energy."29 others viewed the Revolution as the ideological triumph of democracy. There is, in fact, some question about the impact of events in Russia on American foreign policy. It has been suggested that the Revolution provided the Wilson administration justification for entering the European conflict. There is general agreement that this position was first suggested by Secretary Lansing and Colonel House, but there is some question as to the sincerity of Wilson's conversion to this view. Harley Notter states that the President took "sharp issue" with Lansing's statement of 20 March that the Russian uprising had "removed the last obstacle to viewing the war as one for democracy and against absolutism. "-^^ While he concedes the origin of the democracy versus absolutism argument to lie with House and 13 Lansing, Levin implies that Wilson's position was certainly not as decisive as Notter implies. "The glorious act of the Russians," Levin quotes the President, "in a way had changed conditions."31 Though House urged Wilson to extend formal recognition "as soon as England and France did so," the President was persuaded by views such as those from Francis in Petrograd that the new Russian political system was based on popular consent.-^2 with this conclusion, Wilson authorized Francis to extend diplomatic recognition to that regime, a step taken without waiting for a similar action by London and Paris. It seems evident, then, that Wilson was far more convinced than historians such as Notter have implied that Russia was indeed a "fit partner" for American liberal-capitalism. Such idealism, however, could scarcely be sustained in the face of the increasing hopelessness of Russian conditions. Ironically, the deterioration of the Russian military situation forced the American President to violate the very principles with which he was identified. Caught up in the desperate Allied attempt to keep Russia fighting, American diplomatic efforts were no longer confined to embassies and consulates, but they were carried on from the platforms of special missions and through propaganda and publicity campaigns. The goal of all became keeping Russia in the war. However, there were 14 no organized and consistent policies designed to attain this common goal. Allied representatives, often isolated from government instructions and frequently at cross purposes with each other, were forced to rely on their own appraisals of situations to further this goal, regardless of whether the objective enjoyed the support of the mass of the Russian people. The influence of factors other than the desire to extend commercial interests and the absence of clear national policies had a profound effect on diplomatic efforts and political relations between Russia and her allies. Treatment afforded Russian Jews had outraged their coreligionists worldwide. In February 1916, Victor Basch, Professor at the University of Paris, had proclaimed to an audience at Columbia University in New York that the first step toward the regeneration of Russia was the emancipation of the Jews and that only the autocracy, "which is of German origin," was their oppressor. ^-^ The T^erican Jewish lobby in particular had fervently embraced this notion and brought their political strength to bear on the issue of equality for Russian Jews. The lobby's influence was well-known, and had been a primary factor in 1913 in the decision to abrogate the Russo-American commercial treaty of 1832. Jewish leaders were determined to block the conclusion of a new trade agreement unless the Petrograd 15 regime introduced significant religious reforms in Russia. These efforts, as Francis believed, may have significantly contributed to the failure of the Ambassador's ability to secure a new agreement.34 Certainly, then, it seems unfair to attribute, as has Warth, the lack of success in that direction to Francis's own shortcomings.35

The Jewish issue was not confined to the United States. British efforts to aid Russia had lacked the support of the Jewish community in that country, where "both at the outbreak of [thel war, and during its course, there [had] been, let us say, an 'imperfect sympathy' on the part of the Jews with the fortunes of our Ally."36 What made the issue more complex in Britain was the presence of large numbers of Russian Jewish immigrants, many of whom were unwilling to fight for the Allied cause. The offer of British citizenship in return for voluntary service in the British Army had not been successful, attracting fewer than five percent of 25,000 immigrants.37 The notion that the international Jewish community, and that of Russia in particular, supported a renewal of military efforts under a Russian regime tolerant of their beliefs was not wholly accurate.38 Alexander Ginsburg, a leading Jewish financier in Petrograd, claimed that the report that Russian Jews supported the war was a broad exaggeration.39 m fact, well after the Russian 16 Revolution, the government of Lloyd George was forced to warn Russian Jews living in Britain who were unwilling to fight that they must either enlist in British military service or face repatriation to their homeland.40 The British Government was apparently well aware of the reluctance of Russian Jews to support the war. This realization may have been a significant factor in the decision to advocate the creation of a Zionist homeland. The so-called Balfour Proclamation was viewed by some British statesmen as a means of counteracting the Jewish pacifist movement and as a desperate attempt to keep alive Russian military participation.41 This dissertation joins the ranks of the numerous studies which comprise the historiography of Allied diplomacy with Russia during the revolutionary period. It offers arguments which both contradict and agree with those found in earlier scholarly examinations. It offers a far more sympathetic appraisal of Allied representatives than those monographs which blame the personal ineptitude of these men for the failure to maintain Petrograd's military participation in the war. While it is correct that many of these individuals were ill-suited for the extraordinary circumstances which developed in revolutionary Russia, historians such as Warth, Kennan, Notter and Thomas A. Bailey minimize the notion that 17 diplomacy was made substantially more difficult by the absence of current policies and concise instructions. Their critique also depreciates the inherent nature of diplomatic chains of command. These men were, after all, chosen representatives of their governments and were simply diplomatic instruments of those charged with the formulation of policy. Bailey's claim that Francis "egregiously misled Washington as to the prospects of the provisional government," overlooks the certainty that the White House had numerous opportunities to confirm its Ambassador's views yet seemed undecided or unwilling to respond otherwise.42

This study likewise contrasts with those that claim political idealism for Allied diplomacy. Arthur Link's suggestion, for example, that altruism was the cornerstone of Allied diplomacy in general and United States' diplomacy in particular fails to reconcile the obvious inconsistency that the Allied desire for an eastern front was often bought with Russian blood. In reality, diplomacy was affected by a variety of factors—errors in human judgment, divergence in national priorities, special interests, and the inherent difficulties of the chaotic situation within Russia—all of which this work examines in detail.

Commercial ties, for example, were a significant consideration both for policy makers in the Allied capitals 18 and for western corporate entrepreneurs. This thesis, which has been expounded by scholars such as William A. Williams and Michael Kettle, is a viable one with which the body of research is in full agreement. Additional support is offered here, through the inclusion of correspondence of private businessmen interested in either maintaining or, in some cases, establishing commercial relations in Russia. It appears certain that diplomatic policy and sometimes the selection of diplomatic representatives could be attributed to such economic and financial aspirations. Business considerations, however, were not the only factor influencing Western statesmanship. Special interests likewise had a significant influence on Allied diplomacy. The effect of one of those voices, that of the international Jewish community, has been disregarded by many scholars of the period but is one that is specifically addressed in this dissertation. In addition to the sources previously addressed, memoirs and diaries, including those of David Francis, Maurice Pal^ologue, Sir George Buchanan, and David Lloyd George, have been used extensively in this study. The papers of Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, David R. Francis, United States' Ambassador to Russia from 1916 to 1918, and the consular reports and papers of North 19 Winship of the U.S. Consulate in Petrograd, which have recently been gathered from widely scattered sources, are also supporting documents. In this study, they are used in combination with published primary materials, such as the British Documents on the Origins of the War, Reports of the United States Department of State, and records of special delegations to Russia, such as those of the Commission headed by Elihu Root and the Railroad Mission led by John F. Stevens. Together, they provide a deeper understanding of the goals, interests, and efforts of the United States, Great Britain, and France diplomatically to assist and encourage Russia during the First World War. 20 Notes Iwilliam F. Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890-1894 (New York: Octagon Books, 1977), p. 415. 2George F. Kennan, The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia and the Coming of the First World War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), p. 257. 3Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 77. 4Russia in Transition. The Diplomatic Papers of David R. Francis, U. S. Ambassador to Russia, 1916-1918, available at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Francis to Perry Francis, 16 August 1917, Reel 15. The Ambassador remarks that "conditions change here so suddenly and so frequently that I cannot recall what they were when I wrote you." ^W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 164. ^Robert D. Warth, The Allies and the Russian Revolution (Durham: Duke University Press, 1954), p. 6; see also C. Jay Smith, Jr., The Russian Struggle for Power, 1914-1917 (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 44. ^Lincoln, Red Victory, pp. 164-165. 8john Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States, An Interpretive History (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1918), p. 65. ^Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, Memoirs of a British Agent (London: The Macmillan Press, 1974), p. 379. l^Max Laserson, The American Impact on Russia (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950), p. 409. llMichael Kettle, The Allies and the Russian Collapse, March 1917-March 1918 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), pp. 250-269. 12Arthur Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace (Arlington Heights, Illinois: AHM Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 6-7. 13u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, vol. 1, supplement 2, Page to Lansing, 5 March 1917, pp. 516-518. 21 14Link, pp. 6-7. l^N. Gordon Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 63, 105. l^William A. Williams, American-Russian Relations, 1781-1947 (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1952), p. 85. l^ibid., p. 86. ISlbid. l^The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed., Arthur Link, vol. 28 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), Wilson to Crane, 3 October 1913, p. 353. Here Wilson implores Crane to reconsider the appointment, stating he "simply [cannot] adjust [his] mind to giving up the idea of having you represent [the United States] at the Court of Russia." 20David R. Francis, Russia from the American Embassy, 1916-1918 (New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1970), pp. 28-29. 21lbid., pp. 27-28. 22ibid., p. 30. 23ibid., p. 25. 24Laserson, p. 400. 25warth, p. 31. 26Francis Papers, Francis to Perry Francis, undated. Reel 5. It is interesting that the Ambassador mentions the woman in a letter to his son. He does so again in a subsequent letter of 1 August 1917. Surely this suggests that Francis felt he had nothing to conceal. See Kennan, p. 40. 2'7George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 36-38. Here the author notes that Francis's "prowess at poker was legendary and his unerring ability to hit a spittoon at ten paces was considered a remarkable feat." See Warth, p. 30. 22 28it is significant that in their memoirs, Buchanan and Pal^ologue make little mention of Francis. 29The Times (London), 16 March 1917, p. 7. 30Harley Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson (New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1965), p. 634. 3lLevin, p. 42. 32Francis, p. 91. 33New York Times, 20 February 1916, p. 10. 34Francis Papers, Francis to William H. Williams, 9 June 1917, Reel 4. 35warth, pp. 30-31. 36The Times (London), 17 March 1917, p. 10. 37stuart A. Cohen, English Zionists and British Jews (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 253. 38The Times (London), 17 March 1917, p. 10. 39c. Howard Hopkins and John W. Long, "American Jews and the Root Mission to Russia in 1917: Some New Evidence," American Jewish History 69 (March 1980): 349. 40cohen, p. 253. 41N. Gordon Levin, The Zionist Movement in Palestine and World Politics, 1800-1918 (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974), pp. 137-138. 42Thomas A. Bailey, America Faces Russia (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1964), p. 233. 43ullman, p. 5. France had provided 160 million pounds. See William A. Williams, p. 85. The United States had helped Russia make purchases by a loan of $96 million through the New York office of J. P. Morgan, and $86 million through the firm's London office. CHAPTER II WAR AND THE DOWNFALL OF AUTOCRACY: THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND THE FIRST MONTHS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

The long predicted war that would sweep Europe in 1914 had led European Powers to embark on foreign policies built on reactions and self-interests.1 As the war continued, one goal commonly held by the Western Allies— that of maintaining an Eastern front—would become increasingly difficult to attain due to growing political and military instability within Russia. The Russian Revolution of 1917, at first thought to hold the promise of a renewed Russian military effort, would ultimately threaten not only the existence of the front itself but also of other interests, such as the commercial and economic prospects offered by Russia. The uprising, as well as demands made by concerned groups such as the international Jewish community would make much more difficult the already complicated task which confronted Allied representatives in war-torn Russia. The assassination in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian

23 24 thrones, and his wife tested the strength of the Triple Entente. Initially, the murder appeared to be of little consequence. On 9 July, the British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, reported that "the horror evoked by the [assassinations of] Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his consort has passed away," and that "the general impression would seem to be one of relief that so dangerous a personality should have been removed from the succession to the throne."2 Moreover, some believed that the combined strength of Great Britain, France, and Russia was enough to prevent the outbreak of war.3 such optimism was ill-founded; and, by early August, Europe was plunged into a conflagration of an intensity never before seen in history.

Observers agreed that Russian military capability would enable her to hold her own in the war easily. From the British Embassy in Paris, the Counselor Lord Granville, predicted that by the winter of 1916 Russia would possess an active army numerically greater than those of the Triple Alliance.4 in fact, there was concern that a primary consequence of the war would be Russian domination of the European continent. ^ The display of such power, however, did not take place. Despite success against the Austrians on her southwestern front, Russia proved incapable of meeting 25 these optimistic predictions. The primary desire of Russia's allies, however, was that Russian military involvement would require the German high command to deploy large numbers of troops on the Russian front. Alfred Knox, the British Military Attach^ in Russia, described what happened when he acknowledged that the Russian effort had "saved the Allies in the West and so turned the whole course of the war."6 The Allies, moreover, expressed little concern that the arrival of these additional troops did strengthen the already powerful German presence.^ Inside Russia, however, the seemingly endless string of military reversals, the shortage of food and supplies, and the insensitivity of the autocracy, began to take its toll. The Russian masses began to chafe under what were quickly becoming intolerable conditions. These developments did not go unnoticed in the Allied capitals, where statesmen considered Russia's continued participation a vital means of relieving pressure on Allied positions in France. Buchanan recalled that conditions in Russia were "going from bad to worse, and the general dissatisfaction with the war was venting itself in attacks on the Emperor and Empress."8 In order to ensure the continued involvement of Russia in the war, her allies considered various methods 26 of accomplishing this, including withholding from the proposed final settlement "some of the things which [Russia] so earnestly desires—that is a warm sea outlet, etc."9 Allied representatives in Petrograd also intensified their pressures on the Tsar's government to alleviate the problems that were hindering the action of his military forces. On 1 April 1916 the French Ambassador, Maurice Pal^ologue, met with Prime Minister B. V. Stiirmer and demanded that bureaucratic obstacles which were limiting Russian industrial production be removed. The Russian Minister, whom Pal^ologue believed to be a "base and treacherous schemer," offered a "fallacious assurance" that he would investigate the situation.1^ The following month, two French ministers, R^n^ Viviani and Albert Thomas, arrived in Russia hoping to persuade the Tsar's government to fulfull its pledge to dispatch 400,000 troops to France in groups of 40,000.11 Although Emperor Nicholas II reiterated his government's desire to meet this obligation, subsequent meetings with the Russian Chief of the General Staff, M. V. Alexeyev, were less successful. Russia, he told them, could send no more than five brigades, each 10,000 strong, in addition to one already in France and another about to be sent to Greece, to Salonika. In return, Russia 27 expected France to provide her with additional shipments of heavy guns.12

Britain, sharing French concerns for the deteriorating situation in Russia, hoped that a British delegation, headed by Lord Kitchener, would help restore Russia's military capacity.13 The mission, however, was never to reach its destination, as the vessel which carried it, the H.M.S. Hampshire, struck a German mine and was lost with all on board.14

As a result of increased Allied aid and a dramatic revival of Russian military industrial production, the situation on the eastern front improved in early summer 1916. General A. A. Brusilov's sudden but well conceived offensive against Austrian positions in Galicia had initially achieved stunning success. That Russia had been able to mount such a successful effort, as the Allies had repeatedly demanded, convinced many observers that she could be depended on to meet her military obligations. Such expectations, clouded in unrealistic optimism, failed to acknowledge significant and ultimately fatal flaws in the estimate of Russia's ability to continue the war. On 20 June 1916, General Knox warned his government that shortages of necessities and increasing prices had caused great discontent in Russia.15 Further, the entrance of Rumania in the war on the side of the Allies placed additional stress on the Russian 28 Army. As Rumania was quickly overrun, Russia was forced to extend her southwestern front an additional 250 miles.16 Rumania's collapse, according to the new British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, was the final and fatal blow to Russia. "The Moldavian Delta," said the British leader, "became the cemetery of the Empire of the Romanoffs."17 Not all believed that Russia's capacity to make war was shattered. Winston Churchill noted that in the first months of 1917, the Russian army was larger and better equipped than it had been at the beginning of the war.18 German General Erich von Ludendorff concurred that Russia in particular produced very strong new battalions. Divisions were reduced to twelve battalions, the batteries to six guns and new divisions were formed out of the surplus fourth battalions and seventh and eighth guns of each battery. This reorganization meant a great increase in strength.19 This prospective involvement of the United States, intimated by Secretary of State Robert Lansing in December 1916, further provided an additional boost to Allied morale. Lansing's statement provoked a storm of reaction, not the least of which came from the White House, where Wilson considered demanding the Secretary's resignation. Lansing, in fact, was not well thought of by many.20 George Creel, head of the Committee on Public Information, favored replacing Lansing, as the Secretary was "never anything but a disappointment . . . his slow mind. 29 unwilling and unable to cope with the midstream of life, clung like a limpet to the rocks of the backwater."21 Such optimism had little effect within Russia. On 18 February 1917, Buchanan cabled London, that Russia's continued participation in the war could not continue through a fourth winter.22 sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, then British Consul General in Moscow, admitted that he held little confidence in the capacity and will of the Russian army.23 By March, the situation had become desperate. Freezing temperatures had paralyzed Russia. Without coal for heat and without bread for their stomachs, dissatisfaction of the masses intensified dramatically. Critics of the government called for reforms of all types, but the Tsar, now in field command of the Russian armies, seemed oblivious to their demands. Letters from the Empress did little to placate the situation. "Be Peter the Great, John the Terrible, Emperor Paul," she had urged in a letter of 14 December, "crush them all under you."24 Nicholas, however, was not Peter, and conditions were far different from those of eighteenth-century Russia. Military reversals, shortages of all kinds, Rasputin's scandalous activities and rumors of the Empress' purported pro-German sympathies, proved sufficient tinder for the 30 spark of revolution which would spontaneously begin on 8 March and culminate in the overthrow of the Tsarist regime five days later.25

The Provisional Government created to fill the void left by the fall of the autocracy consisted almost entirely of those who hoped to resuscitate Russia's war effort. An observer to these dramatic developments. Princess Julia Cantacuzene, the American granddaughter of President Ulysses S. Grant, remembered that "honest patriots were not idle. . . . They wished to prevent anything that would disorganize the machines for war beyond repair."26 "Russia's new leaders," wrote liberal Paul Miliukov, the new Foreign Minister, believed that the revolution would by itself evoke enthusiasm . . . and would be expressed in an increase of the fighting capabilities of the army. In the first few moments, this hope was even shared by our allies—at least by the left wing of their press and public opinion.27 Miliukov underestimated foreign reaction. In fact, foreign optimism was not limited to the left wing or public opinion. Edward Heald, YMCA secretary for prisoners of war in Russia, wrote to his wife that his colleagues were "thrilled" to learn of the Tsar's abdication and noted that we now . . . can draw a full breath, that what we see is no longer a dream but a reality, that a new era has opened with consequences beyond imagination. We are thrilled with the new energy, purpose, and enthusiasm that has taken hold everywhere. It has been good to be alive these marvelous days.28 31 In Britain, Lloyd George hailed the revolution as "the greatest service that the Russian people have made yet to the cause for which the Allies are fighting."29 Headlines of the 16 March edition of The Times of London announced the birth of "A 'Win the War' Movement" in Russia, its correspondent declaring that "we may look forward to the resumption of national activity on a scale previously unknown, which would help us solve internal problems and prosecute the war with unparalleled vigour."30 In Washington, the news was met "with undiluted satisfaction as a long step towards the universal establishment of those ideals of Liberalism which are so warmly cherished."31 Samuel Harper was more straightforward in his assessment. "Had there not been a change of government, a revolution of some kind," said Harper, "Russia would have been out of the war and perhaps even on the side of Germany, through the treasonable action of the men kicked out [in] March."32 Not all agreed that the Russian war effort would prosper as a consequence of the uprising. Ludendorff noted that "despite Allied expectations to the contrary, [it] would adversely effect Russia's ability to pursue the war."33 The reaction of the French Government, reported The Times, was guarded. "Russia," Paris warned, "[was] perhaps, only at the beginning of her difficulties."34 Ambassador Pal^ologue echoed his government's fears. "The war is my main concern," he told a high Russian official. 32 I want the effects of the revolution to be kept down as much as possible and order to be restored at the earliest possible moment. Don't forget that the French army is making preparation for a great offensive and that the Russian army is bound by honour to do its share.35

Despite his otpimism, even Harper acknowledged the difficulty of jointly conducting a war and consolidating a revolution.36 French diplomat Count Louis de Robien, appointed to the Embassy in St. Petersburg in 1914, criticized press reports which characterized.the revolution as a movement conducted by those who heroically "rose against the rule of the Tsar in order to fight the war better until an Allied victory is achieved!!! People who wrote this," warned the Frenchman prophetically, "and those who believe it, are a lot of simpletons and are letting themselves in for bitter disappointments."37 Clearly, little was known about those now in power in Russia and even less as to what their intentions might be.38

Maurice Paleologue, the French Ambassador, had little desire to develop close ties with the new provisional regime. A brilliant conversationalist, the fifty-eight-year-old Frenchman was also a respected author whose literary endeavors produced not only his own memoirs but also a study of the life of Tsar Alexander I. Like Buchanan, the Ambassador had previously served in Sofia where his assignment had acquainted him with the British 33 diplomat. Arriving in Russia in 1914, Paleologue, an intense monarchist who "tended toward snobbery," had been attracted to the ceremony and tradition that surrounded the Tsar's government and court.39 jn An Ambassador's Memoirs, Paleologue portrays Nicholas II as virtuous and courageous and his consort, the Empress Alexandra, in an equally favorable light. The Ambassador, who was "addicted to flights of sharp rhetoric which probably went sometimes beyond his actual instructions from Paris," did little to ingratiate himself with the new Russian government.40 Following the Revolution, Paleologue repeatedly demanded the restoration of order within Russia so that the war effort might be renewed and Germany defeated.41 His ties with the Russian autocracy, his friendship with Foreign Minister Paul Miliukov, and Paleologue's increasing frustration with the Provisional Government led French Premier Alexandre Ribot to send Albert Thomas, socialist Minister of Munitions, to relieve the Ambassador, pending the arrival of Joseph Noulens, "a Radical politician" who would be permanently installed in the French embassy.42 Noulens, who reached Russia in time to witness the Bolshevik revolt in July, was himself critical of those who managed Russian affairs following the overthrow of the Tsar. He found Kerensky to have "an excessive confidence in gestures and words combined with 34 a marked incapacity for action."43 such criticism had little effect, for Noulen's arrival came too late to alter the deterioration of the Russian war effort. Paleologue's counterpart. Sir George Buchanan, the sixty-four-year-old British Ambassador, was the senior Allied representative, having been appointed to his post in St. Petersburg in 1910. With his white mustache, charm, and courteous manner, Buchanan was the epitome of a European diplomat. His 1885 marriage to Lady Georgina, the beautiful daughter of Lord Bathurst, had provided him an aristocratic, elegant, and cultured partner whose personal qualities complemented his own. The couple's young daughter, Meriel, had an interest in literature and would later record her impressions in several monographs including Diplomacy and Foreign Courts and The City of Trouble. During his distinguished diplomatic career, Buchanan had served in a variety of posts in Europe, including a lengthy assignment in Sofia, Bulgaria, from 1903 until 1908. His appointment to the embassy in St. Petersburg in 1910 was to be the climax of his many years in the Foreign Service. A firm believer in constitutional monarchy, the Ambassador had since his arrival in Russia enjoyed great prestige at the Imperial court and had twice warned the Tsar of the danger of 35 revolution and the need for reform. His prompting, however, had been to no avail. His associations with the Tsarist regime led the Lloyd George government to consider his recall. He retained his post only because of the remonstrances of Arthur Henderson, who was to take over the post, and his friendship with Kerensky and Michael Tereshchenko, the wealthy Ukrainian sugar manufacturer who was to become Finance Minister and later Foreign Minister. Many of his contemporaries, in fact, viewed Buchanan with great respect. Sir Bernard Pares, a British expert on Russia who chronicled the period, argued that Buchanan's efforts towards better relations between his government and Petrograd had been underestimated. The Ambassador, wrote Pares, had "played his difficult part with consummate skill . . . and . . . [had] rendered conspicuous service both to the development of constitutional liberty and to the prosecution of the war."44 Alfred Knox, the British Military Attache who departed Russia with Buchanan in January 1919, concurred: "No Ambassador that England had sent to Petrograd ever loved Russia more or worked harder in her interests."45

Miliukov's promise on 17 March that the new government would honor those obligations assumed by the Tsarist regime did much to ease Allied concerns. The 36 Foreign Minister's announcement was at least partially a response to a note from French Premier Aristide Briand which stated his government's desire to honor French commitments made to Russia in 1915, including the settlement of Constantinople and the Straits in Russia's favor.46

On 20 March, the Provisional Government reiterated Miliukov's promise that it would "sacredly observe the alliances which bind us to other powers," and would "unswervingly carry out agreements entered into by the Allies."47 Ambassador Francis was personally assured that Russia's "entire army accepts the authority of the Provisional Government," and Francis cabled Secretary Lansing that "all appearances and advice confirm the same."48 Russia, he reported, could "vigorously prosecute the war."49 Heald was of similar opinion. "I am struck," he said of the Russians, "with their continued loyalty to the Allies," and reported conversations with Russian troops in which they said, "Give us a week to clean this up and then we'll go back and clean up the Germans so quick no one can stop us."^^ Lansing had requested the views of Harper at the University of Chicago, who cabled that the revolution would "make it possible for Russia to bring into force all her strengths [and] therefore more effective prosecution of the war 'til victory."51 37 It was not long until the error of such expectations became obvious. Ten days after the Provisional Government's creation. General Alexeyev informed the Minister of War, Alexander Guchkov, that it would be impossible for Russia to fulfill obligations made to the Allies at a conference at Chantilly the previous November, which called for a combined Allied offensive to occur in early 1917.^2 Russia, reported the Minister, would not be able to offer military support before July.53 In spite of their frustration, there was little the Allied government could do but be patient with the new regime. On 18 March, Miliukov approached Buchanan concerning the possibility of recognition of the Provisional Government. The British Ambassador requested assurance that discipline would be restored in the Russian army and that Russia would fight the war to its conclusion.54 The United States Ambassador, David Francis, was more enthusiastic in his reception of the Provisional Government. "Such a government," he wrote, "merited the support of all foreign governments that favor law and order and especially of that government represented in Russia by me."55 On 19 March, Francis cabled the State Department requesting the authority to recognize the Provisional Government. Not only was it desirable for the United States to be the first to extend recognition, it would 38 also have a "stupendous moral effect" on Russia. The Ambassador was firmly convinced that Russian military success "absolutely" depended on the "salvation of the revolution and the perpetuity of the government it establish[ed]."56

Secretary of State Lansing also favored recognition as did Colonel Edward House who thought that such a development could be in his country's best interest. "I think," House wrote the President two days before Francis had made his request, "this country should aid in every way the advancement of democracy in Russia for it will end the peril which a possible alliance between Germany, Russia, and Japan might hold for us."57 interior Secretary Franklin Lane likewise believed that such a combination was a likelihood at the war's conclusion because the nations were at similar stages of development.58 Wilson told Lane that he doubted this possibility because "The Russian peasant might save the world this misfortune."59

Four days later, Francis received a "sweepingly favorable" endorsement of his proposal and immediately informed Miliukov of his government's decision. On 22 March, American recognition was formally extended the Provisional Government, "an achievement of which [Francis] was always very proud."^^ 39 United States recognition allowed Wilson to proclaim to the American people two weeks later that the United States was part of a democratic coalition in a war against autocracy. This position, which appears a reflection of Wilsonian liberal-capitalism, may not have been the President's doing. On 10 March Lansing had written Wilson that American military participation would not only "encourage and strengthen the new democratic government of Russia" but would likewise materially increase America's influence on international affairs.61 According to Francis, recognition provided decisive encouragement to the Provisional Government at a time when the regime was threatened by monarchists and radicals who desired a separate peace with Germany.62 Further, claimed the Ambassador, the action "vastly strength[ened] the Provisional Government, and served to dissipate all fear of the restoration of the monarchy."63 Two days later, on 24 March, the British, French, and Italian Governments followed the example of the United States. A diplomatic delegation from these governments, headed by Ambassador Buchanan, was received at the Mariinsky Palace, meeting place of the Council of Ministers, in a room "with a dirty floor and broken windows."^4 The senior diplomat, Buchanan, spoke first repeating his government's expectations of the Russian war 40 effort.65 Italy's Ambassador, Marquis Carlotti, followed, in part reiterating his British colleague's words. Paleologue then spoke for France, emphasizing "the necessity of continuing the war to the bitter end."66 Foreign Minister Miliukov replied for the Provisional Government, pledging that Russia would continue its war effort and "fight till her last drop of blood."67

These assurances, however, did little to dispel the fears of Knox who, as the British Military Attache had accompanied Buchanan to the meeting. "I have no doubt," wrote Knox, "that Miliukov would [fight to the last drop of blood], but can he answer for Russia?"68 At the conclusion of the meeting Knox confronted General Manikovsky, then Acting War Minister, concerning the lack of discipline in the Russian armies. The Attache also spoke to Alexander Kerensky, the Minister of Justice, whom Paleologue believed to be the only "man of action" among the Ministers.69 Knox, however, was less impressed. "It seems to me that we are moving straight to anarchy and a separate peace."70 Count de Robien insisted he was glad to have been excused from the ceremony for a government which was the product of "revolt, treachery and cowardice."71 in a lengthy dispatch to Buchanan, Lockhart warned that "it seems impossible that the struggle between the bourgeoisie 41 and the proletariat can be liquidated without further bloodshed. When the clash will come no one knows, but the outlook for the war is full of foreboding."72 The same day that Britain had extended recognition. Lord Newton had warned from the Foreign Office that Russia was "by no means out of the woods. The revolutionary people are very strong, and the Petrograd regiments seem to have sacked their officers right and left and announce they will work only 4 hours a day."73

Well aware of the Russian turmoil, Berlin did all it could to take advantage of the situation and flooded the trenches with propaganda.74 on 17 April, the British diplomat. Sir Horace Rumbold, wrote from Switzerland that the Central Powers "are banking on coming to an arrangement with Russia and are moving heaven and earth to bring this about. Amongst other things they have collected a good number of Russian extremists, nihilists, etc., who were living in exile in this country and have shipped the gentry off to Stockholm via Germany in order to work on the Russian Socialists in favor of peace."75 Among this group was Vladimir Ulyanov, known as Lenin, founder of the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. The Kaiser's government had provided Lenin and forty-two of nis colleagues with a sealed railroad car to transport them across Germany to Sweden. From there the 42 group traveled to Petrograd, reaching the Finland Station there on 16 April.76 German expectations were quickly realized as the Bolshevik leader immediately demanded an end to the war. "From a military point-of-view," said Ludendorff later, "his journey was justified, for Russia had to be laid low."77 Lenin's impact would shortly be felt, not only in Russia, but internationally as well.

The Russian Government continued its efforts to convince its allies of its military dependability. This was the theme of a letter Kerensky addressed to Jules Guesde, a member of the French Chamber of Deputies, which referred to the Russian Socialists as "being to a man in their determination to continue the war to a conclusion worthy of democracy. . . ."78 In early April, Secretary Lansing met with Charles Crane, Stanley Washburn, and Samuel Harper and was assured that the moderates within the Russian Government would be able to maintain sufficient political control to bring representative government to Russia.79 on 5 April, Francis forwarded Wilson's congratulations to Miliukov. The President, who had suggested that the Tsarist Government stood in the way of complete sympathy from the United States and the Allies, enthusiastically welcomed its fall.80 43 "Every American," wrote Wilson, believed that the future peace of the world had been assured by the "wonderful and heartening things" that had occurred in Russia. Wilson suggested that Russia had always been "democratic at heart, in all the vital habits of her thoughts, in all the intimate relationships of her people that spoke their natural instinct, their habitual attitude towards life." Together, said the President, Russia and the United States were "fighting for freedom in the world, for justice and for peace."81 The revolution, Lansing told a meeting of the cabinet, "had removed the objection to affirming that the European War was a war between democracy and absolution."82 in addition to Wilson's remarks, Francis forwarded a greeting from Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, which applauded "the intelligence, courage and conviction of a people who even while concentrating every effort upon defense against foreign aggression have reorganized their own institutions upon principles of freedom and democracy. . . ."83 In the face of American enthusiasm, Lansing was visited by the Russian Ambassador to the United States, George Bakhmeteff. The Ambassador's assessment of the situation in his country differed sharply from that given by Crane, Harper and Washburn several days earlier. The 44 Provisional Government could not last, warned Bakhmeteff, but would be taken over by the radical Socialists. State Department officials, however, were reluctant to heed the warnings of "an intense monarchist" who was completely devoted to the Tsar.84 Lansing's personal dislike for the Russian Ambassador also played a role in the failure of his department to respond positively to Bakhmeteff. The Secretary viewed the Russian as a "barbaric and cold-blooded" cynic, indifferent to the "terrible slaughter of his countrymen on the battlefield and to the privations of the Empire."85 Most American journalists in Russia shared Washington's enthusiasm for these political developments. One, Isaac Marcosson, noted that "in principle and fact the Revolution realizes every ideal of liberty because it was achieved with justice, mercy, and order," and predicted that Russia will now do her duty in winning the war on whose outcome hang the peace and prosperity of the universe. ... In a word, the Russian Revolution now makes the whole Allied battle-line one unbroken bulwark of democracy.86 The majority of British publications echoed a similar sentiment. In London, the Globe suggested that the rebellion had "given to autocracy and absolutism a shock from which they will never recover. ... It has been a fearful blood-letting, but without the knife there could never be any hope that the cancer would be removed."87 45 The Manchester Guardian argued that Russians had the right to their own destinies. Other journalists were less positive. Associated Press correspondent Robert Long saw little good resulting from the upheaval. His critical assessment of the Russian situation provoked Samuel Harper to complain to the Associated Press concerning Long's "cynical views."88

Western interest in the Revolution extended beyond the democratic promises it offered and the possibility of a renewed, more successful Russian war effort. That nation's vast economic potential was an attractive incentive, especially to those nations with which she was allied.89 The development of Russian industries and finance depended on foreign capital. Foreign loans, especially those from France, had been an important base for Russia's growth. In short, Russia was tied economically as well as politically to her partners. As the war continued. Allied aid became increasingly indispensable to Russia's war effort as the inability of her industries to bear the burden of war became apparent.90

The significance of Allied capital had been obvious to the Imperial Government. Meeting with Buchanan in May 1916, Nicholas II had raised the possibility of closer economic cooperation with Britain following the war. 46 The Tsar's government, determined to prevent a single nation from assuming commercial ascendancy, had previously made similar overtures to the United States. In 1914, Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov had told an American businessman of the significant opportunities his country offered American trade.91

No official commercial agreement existed between the United States and Russia. America's abrogation in 1913 of the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce of 1832 had created tremendous tension between St. Petersburg and Washington. The terms of the agreement had allowed each nation's commercial representatives to conduct business inside the other's borders with the same privileges and protection afforded natives. It had not seemed important that many Russian citizens were not afforded equal security and protection. Though the Tsarist Government had routinely allowed foreigners to visit and reside in Russia, Jews had been specifically denied this freedom.92 It was not until later that many Americans realized these clauses were obvious examples of religious persecution and were "inconsistent with the spirit of the Treaty of 1832."^3 Critics of Russia's anti-Semitic practices demanded that the United States terminate the 1832 agreement on the grounds that the Tsarist Government had violated its first article regarding discriminating 47 against American Jews. On 4 December 1911, Representative William Sulzer of New York introduced a joint resolution in Congress calling for the abrogation of the Treaty on the grounds that the St. Petersburg government had violated its terms by "rufusing to honor American passports duly issued to American citizens, on account of race and religion."94 Sulzer's resolution passed by an overwhelming vote and President Taft informed the Russian Government of America's decision to terminate the Treaty as of 1 January 1913.

News of the American action brought bitter recriminations in the Russian capital. Thirty-one members of the Duma signed a bill criticizing the Taft government for bending under Jewish pressure and suggested that "the agitation has been stirred up as much by newspapers, almost all of which in the United States are owned by Jews or are dependent upon them. . . ."95 Russian reaction was based on the fear that if the right to restrict the entry of American Jews was condeded, it would not only be impossible to restrict Jews of other nationalities but would lead to other calamities as well. In his book. The Conflict Between the United States and Russia, Basile von Egert, a member of the St. Petersburg Bar Association, argued, "With the residence in Russia of Jewish subjects of Foreign Powers, how would it then be 48 possible to maintain the Pale of Settlement and those other limitations of rights among her own Russian Jews?"96 Despite the obvious fervency of such arguments, economic reality seemed to necessitate continued commercial interaction between the two countries. Russia was in great need of American goods of virtually all types—copper, lead, copper, lead, cotton, and raw iron, to name but a few. For American corporations, the Russian market was substantial. Indeed a diverse assortment of their products were exported there. American cosmetics, shoes, leather goods, typewriters, cement, bicycles, skates, fishing tackle, and firearms could be purchased in Russia.97 American plumbing was installed in the Winter Palace, Steinway pianos could be found in the parlors of aristocratic townhouses in St. Petersburg and Moscow, Westinghouse air brakes were installed on Russian locomotives, and International Harvester's agricultural machinery tilled Russian soil. Singer sewing machines were manufactured in a factory on the outskirts of Moscow. Both the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and General Electric had significant interests in Russia.98 The Tsar's Government reacted to the commercial crisis by dispatching a special delegation to Washington. Reaching the United States in early 1913, the mission hoped to repair quickly the damage inflicted by the treaty's 49 abrogation and to regularize trade. Wilson, who was newly installed in the White House, appeared reluctant to respond to the Russian overtures. In December 1911, Wilson, then Governor of New Jersey, had spoken at a rally at Carnegie Hall sponsored by the National Citizens Committee for Abrogation and had indicated that commercial relations between the two nations might be reestablished only on conditions of "mutual honor."99

Wilson's position may have been dictated by political considerations, for even then he was considered as a possible candidate for the presidency in the elections to be held the following year. Soon after his inauguration, the President had approached Charles Crane concerning the latter's acceptance of the ambassadorship in Russia. A close friend of Wilson's, Crane had appeared a logical choice for such an appointment. The plumbing magnate's interest in Russia was well-known and his son, Richard, was personal secretary to Robert Lansing. Due to his personal holdings in the Westinghouse Company, Crane stood to profit greatly as a result of American corporate investments in Russia. Though Crane rejected the Ambassador's post, his interests in Russia were protected through his protege, Samuel Harper, whose department he subsidized at the University of Chicago.100 It would be Harper who would later accompany Francis to Russia in 1916. 50 Clearly Wilson's desire to regularize trade was growing. In early 1914, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, the British Ambassador in Washington, reported to his government that the President had "strongly urged" Congress to conclude a commercial treaty with Russia.101

The American Jewish community, however, was outraged by the prospect. "No sooner was the President's statement made,"102 recorded Spring Rice, "than a Jewish deputation came down from New York and in two days 'fixed' the two houses [so] that the President had to renounce the idea of making a new treaty with Russia."103 Still, desire for a new commercial agreement remained strong. There was, in fact, evidence that the Tsar's government would go "a long way" to secure such a treaty.104 in a conversation with the Secretary of the American Embassy in St. Petersburg, Charles Stetson Wilson, Count Serge Witte reported that he had only conditionally agreed to Nicholas II's request that he go to Washington to secure a loan for Russia. Among these conditions was the conclusion of a commercial treaty which would guarantee that "all American citizens, Jews, Christians, naturalized or native, [who were] furnished with [an] American passport [would] have equal treatment in Russia."105 The American Government, noted Wilson, would "view with much satisfaction" a commercial agreement with Russia.106 51 Such an agreement proved difficult to arrange. The President blamed the difficulty not on Jewish opposition but on the absence of an American ambassador in Russia. In February 1916, Crane had written Wilson suggesting George Rublee, a Progressive, for the Ambassadorship. Rublee, wrote Crane, had the "proper temperament (a vital thing in these campaign days) to get along with the Russian people who [were] simple in their modes of thought and the most democratic people [Crane] knew of."107 The President, however, responded that, as he had been rejected from serving on the Federal Trade Commission, it would have been difficult to "put Rublee through the Senate."108 Actually, Wilson had already decided to offer the post to David R. Francis, a midwestern politician and businessman whom he hoped could conclude the commercial treaty the Wilson administration now desired. The President continued to believe that such an agreement, if based on the conditions suggested by Witte, would be enthusiastically received by the American Jewish community.109 David R. Francis, the new Ambassador of the United States, could claim neither diplomatic experience nor substantial knowledge of his new post. Sixty-five at the time of his appointment in 1916, he would write, I had never seen Russia before, I had never been an Ambassador before. My knowledge of Russia up to the time of my appointment had been that of the average intelligent American citizen—unhappily slight and vague. "HO 52 In his biography of the diplomat and statesman Elihu Root, Philip Jessup characterized Francis as "a charming old gentleman with no appreciation of what was going on in Russia and without any particular qualifications for his difficult post."Ill It is not unexpected that the reasons for Francis's appointment have been the source of much controversy. George Kennan states that while the explanation of his selection is unclear, the fact that Francis was a "good Democrat" was clearly significant.112 Warth agrees, suggesting that the appointment was primarily based on Francis's political loyalties.113 Samuel Harper, the American expert on Russia who accompanied the new Ambassador to Petrograd in 1916, believed that the selection had been the consequence of Francis's "liberal tendencies."114

The implication that the United States Ambassador's appointment was a result of political patronage may have had some basis in fact. Francis was a well-known midwestern politician, having been Mayor of St. Louis, Governor of Missouri (a title he retained even while in Russia), and Secretary of the Interior in the Cleveland administration. His inexperience in diplomatic affairs was overshadowed by his notable business success. President Wilson hoped that the prominent banker, grain merchant. 53 and railroad entrepreneur could restore Russo-American commercial relations, which had been dealt a serious blow by the abrogation of the Treaty of Commerce in 1913. The new ambassador shared his President's belief that direct commercial relations between his country and Russia could, and should, be established.115 Writing to his friend, Breckenridge Jones, President of the Mississippi Valley Trust Company, Francis observed that his "judgment from the beginning was, and [his] experience [had] only served to strengthen that opinion, that friendly diplomatic relations could be engendered and fostered and promoted by close commercial relations."116 with this in mind, Francis devoted much time and energy to that end, telling the Tsar shortly after arriving in Petrograd that his main purpose was to negotiate a new treaty.117 Nicholas admitted that his government was "equally desirous" of an agreement and suggested "there would be no difficulty in negotiating one."118 The United States Ambassador discovered, however, that most of the major obstacles still remained and that continuing Jewish opposition would make it impossible for such a treaty to gain Senate approval.119 Incensed, Francis wrote Charles Hamlin of the Federal Reserve Board on 20 April 1916: 54 The Jews should not expect us to regulate the internal affairs of Russia, as we would not permit any country to interfere with the enactment of our laws or administration thereof. . . . You are aware that Russia has about 20,000,000 Chinese subjects whom the United States excludes from residence or citizenship.120 Francis believed the Jewish position to be inconsistent with reality. The Jews of America are unreasonable if they demand, as they appear to be doing, that we regulate the domestic affairs of Russia. If Russia should presume to tell us how to handle the Negro problem, we would very probably resent it; in fact, we would brook no interference with our laws excluding the Chinese. . . .121 The Ambassador was especially upset that American Jews, "who hardly number 2% of the population," could block the conclusion of a commercial treaty.122 Such opposition, warned Francis, not only antagonized American commercial interests but also encouraged anti-Semitism. The issue of the plight of Russian Jews had been raised by Victor Basch, a professor at the University of Paris, in a speech at Columbia University in February 1916. The Frenchman had suggested that there was a "Jewish aspect" of the war and had prophetically warned that during the course of the war, Russian Jews would find an opportunity for emancipation. This momentous event, he said, would probably be accompanied by the fall of Tsardom, as the autocracy which was "of German origin" was the major obstacle in the path to their freedom.123 55 Such assumptions appeared to be correct, as initial reactions from Jewish quarters to the March revolution of 1917 appeared sweepingly enthusiastic. The Times of London reported Jewish bankers and businessmen to be particularly satisfied with the fall of the Tsar. "Their view is," wrote The Times, "that, under a regime of effective consitutional government, improved conditions for the Jews in Russia are sure to be forthcoming."124 Recent events, implied the paper, could have a profound impact on Jewish support for the war. Many Jews had fled Russia during the war and had made their way to Britain, where they appeared content to sit out the conflict while criticizing their government from abroad.125 Their actions aroused great hostility among the British public, which was intent on winning the war and showed little sympathy with Russians who were unwilling to fight for their country. The issue would become a significant one for the coalition government of Herbert Asquith. In April 1916 the Asquith government had sought to persuade Russian Jews in Britain to volunteer for service in the British army in return for British citizenship. The proposal had met with meager response. Of the potential 25,000 Russian volunteers, only 700 accepted the offer.126 The refusal antagonized the British government, which in August 1917 threatened that Russian 56 immigrant Jews unwilling to fight under the British flag would face repatriation to Russia for military duty. The threat aroused great hostility among the Russian Jews who actively resisted through such organizations as the "Foreign Jews' Protection Committee against Conscription, Deportation to Russia, and Compulsory Military Service." A compromise was finally reached by which Russian Jewish immigrants would be allowed to enlist in civil defense service or join "labor battalions" in Britain or France. There were those in the upper echelons of the British Government who realized that the Jewish movement within Russia could be an influential factor in keeping that country in the war. In April 1917, a suggestion was made to Lloyd George's Government concerning the possibility of sending a Zionist Mission to Russia for propaganda purposes. Shortly afterward, the Foreign Office wired Ambassador Buchanan as to the desirability of an Allied declaration of support for Jewish national aspirations in order to counteract what was perceived as being an influential pacifist movement among Russian Jews. Coincidentally, Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour traveled to Washington to discuss methods of keeping alive Russian military participation. It was apparently at this time that Balfour recognized an opportunity to gain the 57 support of Russian and American Jews alike and concluded that Jewish opinion might be favorably influenced by his government's assurance that it supported the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Balfour's realization became a primary motivating force behind the 1917 proclamation that bears his name.127

The United States government was also aware of the importance of Jewish support for the war. In April 1917, Lansing was informed of the active participation of Russian Jews in "Socialist anti-militarism and peace propaganda."128 The Secretary was urged to use his influence to convince American Jewish leaders to urge their coreligionists in Russia to defend their government and discontinue their peace propaganda. New prospects of an American loan found Wilson more enthusiastic than he had been previously. In October 1914, he had written Lansing of the impropriety of American involvement in soliciting a loan for a belligerent government.129 "Money," said Wilson, "was the worst of all contrabands—it commands all other things."130 Russia's Finance Minister, Pierre Bark, had confirmed that Petrograd's reliance on foreign credits was considerable, though the majority of the capital Russia required could be acquired through internal loans. According to the Minister, these credits carried no risk and would be 58 "mutually beneficial" as they could encourage commerce between Russia and the United States.131 Bark's government had considerable success in securing loans from private American financiers, among them Samuel McRoberts of the National City Bank of New York. McRoberts' syndicate had negotiated a loan of $50,000,000 with the Russian Finance Minister, who had offered his assurances that his government's financial difficulties were the temporary result of its "inability [to] quickly mobilize [Russia's] vast wealth."132 Francis was suspicious of the Minister, believing Bark to be "completely" under British influence, having recently arranged that France would provide sufficient credit to pay for French munitions supplied Russia.133 McRoberts was among many attracted by the economic prospects which Russia offered. Captain David Hough, an American businessman and engineer, believed Russia to be a "land of great possibilities."114 in an article published just prior to America's entry in the war. Hough extolled these opportunities. "So vast are the possibilities," he wrote, "that they arouse those looking to broaden their markets, to introduce their inventions, or to investigate developable properties."135 Many American companies had achieved success in Russia.136 The Singer Sewing Machine Company, with its modern manufacturing plant near Moscow, 59 was enjoying great prosperity as were the International Harvester Company, the Equitable Life Insurance Company, the New York Life Insurance Company, and the Underwood Typewriter Company. New companies, like the Walk-Over Shoe Company, were doing brisk business. In addition, the National City Bank and the Guaranty Trust were actively working to secure profitable financial relations in Russia. According to Hough, America required little of what was produced in Russia; but there were many American products needed and desired by Russians. Although they did not welcome exploitation by foreign businessmen and investors, the Russians did not object to foreign development of the country if such financial involvement was mutually beneficial.137

The rewards of such an undertaking could be easily collected at war's end, as American entrepreneurs could fill the vacuum created by the economic confusion following the European conflict. Hough thus recommended that the United States should "... in time of war . . . prepare for peace" by constructing manufacturing plants in Russia, establishing sales organizations there, and appointing agents for those American companies anxious to expand into the Russian market.138 Many American businessmen agreed with Hough's assessment. A number had, in fact, traveled with Francis 60 and Harper to Russia. One of these, Hayden Eames, a "well-known [corporate] trouble shooter," stayed particularly close to the Ambassador throughout the voyage, apparently in hopes of cultivating Francis's support.139 During his tenure in Russia, Francis was repeatedly approached by businesses which hoped for immense profit in Russia. In June 1917, Gaston Plauteff, a manager of the Ford Motor Company, wrote Francis concerning his company's interest in Russia. Ford, he said, would not rely on agents after the war "but will handle the business ourselves without a doubt, probably putting up assembly plants, etc."140 The following month, Evans R. Dick, President of the Railways Company General, wrote to Francis of the enormous opportunity awaiting [American business] in that country both in manufacturing, in exploiting its mines, minerals and forests, and in handling its commercial business on much the same lines the old English merchants used to handle the business of the world.141 His company, wrote Dick, had $500,000 in available cash which "while very little for these days of enormous concentrations of wealth ... is enough money to do a tidy little business, and if the right kind of business was forthcoming it could be greatly increased."142 Dick also wrote as President of the Stamford Rolling Mills 61 Company, which manufactured brass, copper, and other metal products. He requested that the Ambassador suggest an agent who might represent the company in Russia. The Stamford Rolling Mills Company, said its President, believed Russia to be "a likely field not only for war munitions at the present time," but in the future when "enormous amounts of brass will be used in building up the country after the war is over and the wheels of industry begin to go round agains."143

C. G. Craddock, Vice-President and Sales Manager of the Craddock-Terry Company, a shoe manufacturing concern, also inquired about possible investment opportunities in Russia. "We have great faith in the new Russian government," Craddock wrote Francis, "... it does seem to me that if the Allies are successful Russia will develop more rapidly after the war than any other country in the world."144 Coincidentally, Craddock questioned the Ambassador as to the validity of Russian currency and bonds as wise investments. Francis, who believed the time to be "opportune for making investments," had already purchased $3,000 worth of Russian rubles for speculative purposes and noted that the rate of exchange would not last after peace negotiations began.145 Francis was not the only American official involved in speculation. William Boyce Thompson, a wealthy copper 62 magnate and Vice-Chairman of the American Red Cross Mission to Russia, requested that the J. P. Morgan Company cable him 425,000 rubles in order that he might acquire a 500,000 ruble interest in the Russian Liberty Loan. Thompson said that he "recommended these bonds as the best investment [he knew] of" and offered to "look after [other investors'] purchases [in Russia] without compensation."146 it would require, according to Thompson, "twenty percent of syndicate purchasing five million rubles or ten percent of syndicate purchasing ten million or more rubles including [his] present subscription of part of syndicate."147

While he invested much of his own capital in the Provisional Government, Thompson's alleged motivations attracted the suspicions of many. Dr. Frank Billings, a noted Chicago physician who initially headed the Red Cross delegation, believed Thompson to be a "money-mad-go-getter."148 Henry Krumb, a former business associate, remembered Thompson as having the ability to "look into the future and see the possibilities of a proposition much better than most men. ... He did promote many enterprises and loves to create new things."149 Dr. Orrin Wightman, in charge of the motion picture work of the Mission, charged that it was a "cloak for a deliberate effort on WB's part to make commercial contacts in Russia and secure concessions."150 while 63 Wightman's accusations were probably incorrect, Thompson's actions created the impression that he was indeed interested disproportionally in personal gain. On his arrival in the Russian capital, the flamboyant Thompson "ensconced himself with his wolfhound" at the Hotel Europe and quickly became, in the view of many Russians, the most visible symbol of the United States then in Russia.151

Their nation's turmoil had forced many wealthy Russians, intent on leaving the country, to offer their valuables for sale. "I cannot help feeling sorry for a lot of the titled families," Thompson wrote his wife Gertrude and predicted that most of the Russian aristocrats would sell not only their homes but their art treasures as well.152

Despite his sympathy for the plight of the wealthy Russians, the American, an avid collector and astute businessman, was quite willing to purchase their luxuries at a fraction of their value. A frequent visitor to the art auctions in Petrograd, Thompson also purchased directly from owners and accumulated a number of important works. He described several of them in a note to his wife, "Two beautiful Cazanovas, a small sketch by Corot, a beautiful Baron, 'The Maconna' by Sohout, a very important, large picture by Poorhout painted in 1698 of the 'Good 64 Samaritan.•"153 in addition to these paintings and sketches, Thompson acquired "a large bronze Easter egg" once belonging to Paul I and "a pair of bronze candlesticks" originally owned by Alexander 11.154 The American collector also purchased the extensive Chinese collection of the Grand Duke Nicholas, a cousin of the Tsar. Thompson was clearly aware of its value: The collection comprises 300 pieces that have at various times been presented to the house of Romanoff (The Grand Duke Nicholas and his ancestors) for the past hundred or two hundred years. The collection is perfectly beautiful, consisting of a fine lot of vases— beautiful old cloisinet, old carved cabinets inlaid with priceless ivory carvings, old paintings, beautiful screens, etc., etc.155 In addition, Thompson reportedly shipped home a "carload of furniture," Dresden dishes and had "been looking around to see what [he could] do on jewels."156 His quest for the latter, however, was unsuccessful as there was "absolutely nothing ... to purchase," probably because such objects could easily be smuggled out of the country.157 Though his activities caused many in Russia to perceive him as a shining example of capitalism, Thompson's purchases were not intended for speculation, but instead reflected the preoccupation of the American rich for things European. These individuals, longing for anything that iTiight provide them a sense of history and aristocracy, became avid participants in the exchange of European 65 accouterments and social titles for American money.158 Thompson's purchases had far more to do with social position and life-style than investment potential. Nonetheless, actions such as those of Thompson did little to discourage the conclusion, then popular in Russia, that America was in the war primarily for financial gain.159 in addition, Thompson's free-wheeling donations to the Provisional Government and others may have ultimately done more harm than good, as these beneficiaries were fearful that when the source of the money became public knowledge, they would be labeled as paid accomplices of capitalism.160 in fact, the conspicuousness of Thompson's gifts played into the hands of the Bolsheviks, who labeled the money "not Revolution but Prostitution."161 Francis's attempt to control Thompson's actions came to naught. In his efforts, the Ambassador employed the American Military Attache in Petrograd, Brigadier General William Judson, who was in close contact with Thompson. The businessman's reply was that, as he was spening his own money, "he would quit if he was not permitted to do it in the way he liked."162

The Provisional Government's desperate need for money had been abundantly clear since the regime's establishment. Interior Secretary Lane acknowledged the necessity of American aid to Russia and was almost euphoric in his willingness to provide it: 66 The first thing to do is to let Russia . . . have money. And the second thing, to see that Russia has munitions of which they are short. ... I shouldn't be surprised if we would operate the Russian railroads. And ships, ships! How we do need ships, and there are none in the world. Ships ... to make the Russian machine work. Hindenburg is to turn next to Petrograd—he is only three hundred miles away now. I fear he will succeed. But that does not mean the conquest of Russia! The lovable kindly Russians are not to be conquered—and it makes me rejoice to be with them.163 Some observers, however, questioned whether such noble sentiments were genuine. In Petrograd, Count de Robien voiced his skepticism. "In spite of their lofty principles," charged the French diplomat, "The United States are only coming into the war to get their money back. . . ."164 QQ Robien questioned whether American military involvement was necessary at all. "The declaration of war by the United States," he wrote soon afterwards, "has had no effect whatsoever on the Russian people."165 A different assessment was rendered by Lloyd George who believed that it "lightened the deepening gloom" in the Allied capitals.166 While Lane's assessment of Russian needs would be proved correct, little did he realize the extent to which Russia, and in fact, Britain and France, would depend on American aid.167 m addition to monetary aid, material of all types—tanks, trucks, armored cars, railroad equipment, artillery, rifles, and ammunition—would be poured into 67 Russia in a desperate effort to short up Petrograd's military effort. Coming in 1917, however, such help arrived too late. Two years earlier Bernard Pares, a respected British scholar then acting as official correspondent with the Russian army, had warned that the failure of his government to supply Russia with gravely needed material was "jeopardizing the relations of the two countries and in particular their cooperation in the work of the . . . war."168 The Allied decision to increase supply shipments to Russia was a risky venture. Lloyd George concluded that, owing to the March Revolution, there was little chance of an Allied victory unless Austria could be induced to abandon hostilities.169 Ambassador Paleologue believed that it would be impossible for the Provisional Government to mount a successful war effort unless it could first carry out much needed reforms.170 in Britain, Viscount Esher pointed out that "Russia never had been (and never can be) steadfast to the bitter end."171 Nevertheless Allied efforts were destined to continue because of the commitment of these governments to do all in their power to increase the Provisional Government's participation in the war. So long as there were ministers in Russia who supported their government's military involvement. Allied efforts were believed to have some chance for success. 68 In their zeal to maintain an Eastern front and the prospect which a successful Russian war effort entailed, the Allied governments failed to comprehend fully the significance of the uprising of March 1917. Regardless of the avowed support of Russian leaders, diplomatic recognition of the Provisional regime and congratulatory messages were insufficient to maintain a government increasingly at odds with a war-weary population. The extraordinary circumstances of March 1917 and the additional demands such as those of the Jewish community created a diplomatic problem of virtually overwhelming complexity for those charged with its implementation in Russia and forced the Allies to resort to other methods of keeping Russia actively engaged on the Eastern front. These efforts, however, would prove to be equally frustrating. 69 Notes Iw. Bruce Lincoln, lj\ War's Dark Shadow (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1983), p. 421. 2British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol. 10, part 2, Buchanan to Nicolson, 9 July 1914, p. 39. 3lbid., Nicolson to de Bunsen, 27 April 1914, 786.

4lbid., vol. 11, Granville to Grey, 18 July 1914, p. 53. Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, was of the opinion that Russia would not require British aid. In May, Grey had written that in the event of war, "Russia's resources were so great that, in the long run, Germany would be exhausted without our helping russia." See ibid., vol. 20, Grey to Bertie, 1 May 1914, p. 788. See also Michael Brock and Eleanor Brock, eds., H^ H^ Asquith, Letters to Venetia Stanley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 146. Here the British Prime Minister wrote that Britain was under no obligation to provide Russia with military help. 5paul Hayes, The Twentieth Century, 1880-1939 (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1978), p. 195. See also Wilson Papers, vol. 30, House to Wilson, 22 August 1914, p. 432. 6Alfred Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914-1917, Being Chiefly Extracts from the Diary of a. Military Attache vol. 1 (London: Hutchinson Company, 1921), 92. 7warth, p. 6. The author suggests that the French Government in particular saw the Russian troops as "splendid cannon fodder." 8sir George Buchanan, M^ Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories, vol. 1 (London: Cassell, 1923), 245. 9wilson Papers, vol. 40, House to Wilson, 20 January 1917, 528. lOMaurice Paleologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, vol. 2 (New York: Octagon Books, 1972), 226-227, 257. lllbid., 249. This promise had been made the previous December. 70 12Knox, 2:417. 13ibid., 2:419-420. Knox unsuccessfully attempted to persuade his government to postpone the mission in order that the Russian Government might have an opportunity "to digest the many plain and unpalatable truths which M. Thomas has fed them." Knox believed that the Tsar's Government was more interested in British financial aid than military advice.

14sir George Arthur, Life of Lord Kitchener, vol. 3 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920), 352-355. See also Philip Magnus, Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist (New York: C. P. Culton and Company, Inc., 1959, p. 379. 15Knox, 2:425. l^Norman Stone, The Eastern Front, 1914-1917 (London: Hodder and Staughton, 1975), pp. 273-274. 17David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, vol. 3 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1935), 295-296. See also Wilson Papers, vol. 40, House to Wilson, 22 January 1917, p. 540. Though Britain and France supported Rumania's entrance in the war, they took no responsibility for her loss claiming instead that a conspiracy involving "high Russian officials" was to blame. 18winston Churchill, The World Crisis (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923), p. 224. l^Erich von Ludendorff, Ludendorff's Own Story, vol. 1 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1919), 361. 20Robert Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing, Secretary of State (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1935), pp. 186-187. See Wilson Papers, vol. 40, Wilson to Lansing, 21 December 1916, p. 307. Though Lansing maintained that he had not implied that the United States was about to enter the war, interpretations were quite the opposite. See also. Link, pp. 16, 57. 2lGeorge Creel, The War, The World and Wilson (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1920), pp. 67-68. 22Buchanan, 2:56-57. 23sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, The Two Revolutions, An Eyewitness Study of Russia, 1917: A Background Study (London: Bodley Head, 1967), p. 45. 71 24Letters from the Tsaritsa to the Tsar, 1914-1916 (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1973), p. 455. 25There are innumerable studies of the Russian Revolution. Among the best are Alan Moorehead, The Russian Revolution (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958); Leonard Schapiro, The Russian Revolution of 1917) (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1984); Marcel Liebman, The Russian Revolution (New York: Random House, 1970); Harrison Salisbury, Black Night, White Snow; Russian Revolutions, 1905-1917 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 19 78). For an eyewitness view from the Russian perspective N. N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution, 1917 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Alexander Kerensky, Russia and History's Turning Point (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1965).

26princess Cantacuzene, Revolutionary Days, Recollections of Romanoffs and Bolsheviki, 1914-1917 (Boston: Small, Maynard and Company, 1919), p. 129. 27paul Miliukov, M;^ Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, trans. Carl Goldberg (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967), p. 428. 28Edward Heald, Witness to Revolution (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1972), pp. 63-65. 29Lord Vansittart, The Mist Procession (London: Hutchinson and Company, Ltd., 1958), p. 169. 30The Times (London), 16 March 1917, pp. 6, 8. 31lbid, p. 8. 32paul Harper, ed. , The Russia I^ Believe In: The Memoirs of Samuel N. Harper, 1906-1914 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945), p. 102. 33Ludendorff, 2:13-14. 34The Times (London), 17 March 1917, p. 8. 35paieologue, 3:228. 36Harper, p. 102. 37count Louis de Robien, The Diary of a Diplomat in Russia, 1917-1918 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 23. 72 38Martin Gilbert, Sir Horace Rumbold, Portrait of a Diplomat, 1869-1941 (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1973), p. 147. The fear remained that an extremist coup would end Russian involvement in the war. 39warth, p. 6. 40smith, p. 44. 41warth, p. 6. 42Richard Ullman, Intervention and the War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 14. 43G. P. Gooch, Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy (New York: Russell and Russell, 1957), p. 307. 44 Ibid., p. 398. 45ibid., p. 412. See also Thomas Masaryk, The Making of a State; Memories and Observations, 1914-1918 (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1952), p. 135. 46smith, p. 465. An Anglo-Russian agreement to this end had been signed in March 1915. The following month France adhered to the pledge, as did Italy in December 1916. Russia, in turn, had agreed to the division of enemy territories among her allies. 47ibid., p. 469. See also Lockhart, p. 79. 48Francis, pp. 90-91. 49ibid. 50Heald, p. 65. 51wilson Papers, vol. 41, Harper to Wilson, 16 March 1917, pp. 416-417. 52Bernadotte E. Schmitt, and Harold Vedeler, The World in the Crucible, 1914-1919 (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1984), p. 167. 53Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, pp. 428- 429. 54Buchanan, 2: 90-91. See also Warth, pp. 31-32. 55Francis, p. 90. 73 56ibid. 57wilson Papers, vol. 41, Lansing to Wilson, 19 March 1917, pp. 422.

58Anne W. Lane, and Louise Herrick, eds.. The Letters of Franklin K. Lane (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1922), p. 234. 59ibid. 60Buchanan, 2:91. ^Iwilson Papers, vol. 41, Lansing to Wilson, 19 March 1917, pp. 426-427. 62Francis, p. 95. See also Cantacuzene, p. 147. 63Francis, p. 100. 64De Robien, p. 23. 65Buchanan, 2:91, 94. Ironically, some Russian reactionaries blamed the British Ambassador for the revolution. One report circulating in the Russian capital suggested that the pervasive German influence at the Russian court had convinced the British Ambassador to act— that he had gotten in touch with radicals and purportedly had "attended revolutionary meetings with a false nose and a false beard." 66paieologue, 3:269. 67Knox, 2:585. 68ibid. 69paieologue, 3:269. See also Richard Abraham, Alexander Kerensky, The First Love of the Revolution (New York; Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 151. The author reports that the only Russian leaders who impressed Buchanan at this meeting were Kerensky and Guchkov. ^ORnox, 2:586. 7lDe Robien, p. 23. 72Lockhart, The Two Revolutions, An Eyewitness Study of Russia, p. 75. 74 73Martin Gilbert, Sir Horace Rumbold, Portrait of a Diplomat, 1869-1941 (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1973), pp. 147-148. ^4Ludendorff, 2:14. See also de Robien, pp. 23-24. The French diplomat was incensed that these efforts were apparently well-received by the Russian troops. 75Gilbert, p. 148. 76Robert Payne, Lenin (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964), pp. 285-300. See also Ronald W. Clark, Lenin (New York; Harper and Row Publishers, 1988), pp. 191-212. 77Ludendorff, 2:126. 78paieologue, 3: 272. 79papers of Robert Lansing, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C, Container 74. 80wilson Papers, vol. 40, Wisemann to Foreign Office, 16 January 1917, p. 504. 8lFrancis, pp. 96-97. 82wilson Papers, vol. 41, Lansing memorandum, 20 March 1917, p. 440. Again, the Secretary of State appeared to be offering the notion of the new democratic partnership between Russia and the United States as a means of gaining support for the war. 83Francis, p. 97. Gomper's cable was requested by Francis to serve as evidence of American support for the Provisional Government and its determination to continue the war. 84Lansinq Papers, Container 74. 85ibid. 86Francis Papers, Reel 3. Marcosson also suggested that the revolution held great significance for Russia's Jewish population and noted that "it gladdens the heart of American Jewry which has so long ached over the travails of its comrades in Russia." See also Francis, p. 99. At the same time the American Ambassador reported to Lansing that maljustice against the Russian Jews "has by no means been eradicated; it pervades the peasants to a wonderful extent. ..." 75 87The Globe, 14 April 1917. 88Harper, p. 107. 89Francis Papers, David Hough, "Russia from the Point of View of an American Engineer and Business Man," Reel 3. ^OGeorge Vernadsky, Political and Diplomatic History of Russia (Boston: Little, Brown and company, 1936), p. 392. ^iRobert R. McCormick, With the Russian Army (New York; The Macmillan Company, 1915), p. 34. ^2Laserson, p. 354. Article 819 of the ninth volume of the Code of Statutes and Article 230 of Russia's passport regulations restricted the entry of foreign Jews into Russia. 93"The Passport Question Between the United States and Russia," American Journal of International Law 6 (January-April 1912); 187. 94u.S. Congress, House, Senator Sulzer speaking for the abrogation of the Treaty of 1832, 62d Cong., 2d sess., 13 December 1911, Congressional Record 48:311. ^5Laserson, p. 360. 96ibid., p. 362. 97williams, pp. 82-83. 98ibid., p. 83. The International Harvester Company was the largest American Corporation in Russia. 99ibid, p. 78. lOOibid., p. 86. lOlwilson Papers, vol. 29, Spring Rice to Tyrrell, 3 February 1914, p. 217. 102ibid., vol. 37, Wolf to Wilson, 25 May 1916, p. 110. 103ibid., vol. 29, Spring Rice to Tyrrell, 3 February 1914, p. 218. 104McCormick, p. 35. 76 105wilson Papers, vol. 31, Enclosure, Wilson to Lansing, 16 October 1914, p. 182.

106ibid., Enclosure, Wilson to Lansing, 10 October 1914, p. 187.

107wilson Papers, vol. 36, Crane to Wilson, 17 February 1916, p. 192.

108ibid., Wilson to Crane, 21 February 1916, pp. 202-203. The Senate had failed to confirm Rublee's nomination to the Federal Trade Commission in 1915. See Arthur Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), p. 74. Rublee was rejected due to New Hampshire Senator Jacob Gallinger's personal animosity. 109Bailey, p. 222. Here the author suggests that Wilson hoped that a warm response for the American Jewish population would translate into political support in the presidential election of 1916. llOFrancis, p. 3. lllphilip C. Jessup, Elihu Root, vol. 2 (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1938), 354. 112Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 35. 113warth, p. 30. 114Harper, p. 91. 115jamie H. Cockfield, Dollars and Diplomacy, David Rowland Francis and the Fall of Tsarism, 1916-1917 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1981), p. 13. llOFrancis, p. 25. 117ibid., p. 14. 118ibid. 119Francis Papers, Francis to Williams, 9 June 1917, Reel 4. 120cockfield, p. 14. 121ibid., p. 15. 122ibid. 77 123New York Times, 20 February 1916, p. 10. 1249The Times (London), 17 March 1917, p. 102. The paper reported that the news was "enthusiastically received" in British financial and commercial circles as evidenced by an increased demand for Russian securities. 1255 Hansard, 91 (1917); 1891. 126cohen, p. 253. The author states that the "burning issue of immigrant concern, provoking more grandstand agitation and backroom debate than Zionism and Socialism combined" was that of the nonparticipation of Russian immigrant Jews. 127Levin, pp. 137-138. 128Lansinq Papers, vol. 26, Gottheil to State Department, 12 April 1917. 129Francis Papers, Francis to Williams, 9 June 1917, Reel 4. 130Link, p. 28. 13lNew York Times, 20 February 1916, p. 2. 132wilson Papers, vol. 38, Francis to Lansing, 25 July 1916, p. 70; Francis, p. 19. See also New York Times, 20 February 1916, p. 2. 133ibid. 134Francis Papers, David Hough, "Russia From the Point of View of an American Engineer and Businessman," Reel 3. 135ibid. 136john Lewis Gaddis, Russia, The Soviet Union and the United States, An Interpretive History (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1978), p. 49. The author notes that American investment in Russia assumed two forms: private business enterprises and investment in government securities. Though Russian bonds were occasionally sold on the New York Stock Exchange, they achieved little popularity. The majority of American capital invested in Russia went into business enterprises. By 1911, International Harvester, Westinghouse, Singer, and the New York Air Brake Company had plants in Russia. See also Richard B. Fisher, "American Investors in Pre-Soviet Russia," American Slavic and East European Review 8 (April 1949): 90-105. 78 137Francis Papers, David Hough, "Russia From the Point of View of an American Engineer and Businessman," Reel 3. 138ibid. 139Harper, p. 91. 140Francis Papers, Plauteff to Francis, 13 June 1917, Reel 4. 141ibid., Dick to Francis, 12 July 1917. 142ibid. 143ibid. 144ibid., Craddock to Francis, 10 April 1917. 145cockfield, p. 12. 146Thompson Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C, Thompson to J. P. Morgan and Company, 10 August 1917. See also Williams, pp. 80-86. 147ibid. 148ibid., Thacher to Hagedorn, 13 March 1921. 149ibid., Krumb to Hagedorn, 20 June 1931. 150ibid., Robins to Hagedorn, 20 June 1931. 15lRobert Chadwell Williams, Russian Art and American Money, 1900-1940 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 19. 152ibid. 153Thompson Papers, Thompson to Gertrude Thompson, 17 October 1917. 154Robert Chadwell Williams, p. 19. 155Thompson Papers, Thompson to Gertrude Thompson, 29 September 1917. 156ibid., Thompson to Gertrude Thompson, 17 October 1917. 157ibid. 79 158Robert Chadwell Williams, p. 21. See also S. N. Behrman's Study, Duveen (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1952), for the best biography of Joseph Duveen, a British art dealer who was the most successful purveyor of such luxuries at this time. 159Thompson Papers, "Report of the Red Cross Commission to Russia," 22 October 1917. lOO^ennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 57. 161ibid. 162ibid., p. 59. 163Lane, p. 243. 164De Robien, p. 27. 165ibid. 166Lioyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, p. 541. 167ibid., p. 559. "When America Came into the War," remembered the British Prime Minister, "the financial situation was eased and we were able to borrow on credit from the States . . . but their Government [was] . . . slow to realize how vast a financial support would have to be provided." 108ibid., p. 494. Pares offers interesting insights into Russian affairs. See Bernard Pares, A Wandering Student (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1948). 109v^ H. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 1914-1916 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 85. 170paieologue, vol. 3, p. 247. He doubted whether the Provisional Government could make such reforms. 171viscount Esher, The Captains and the Kings Depart, Journals and Letters of Reginald Viscount Esher, vol. 2 (New York; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938), p. 101. CHAPTER III POLITICAL TURMOIL: MILIUKOV, KERENSKY, AND THE CRISIS IN FOREIGN POLICY

In order to maintain her participation in the war, Russia's allies were willing to support virtually any leader who offered the promise of sustaining the Russian military effort. As a consequence, they willingly abandoned their support of those ministers who could not maintain Russia's military effort and had little regard for Russian political stability so long as the Eastern front could be continued. This practice led them to involve themselves inextricably in the political struggle between Foreign Minister and Kadet leader Paul Miliukov and Justice Minister and Soviet representative Alexander Kerensky. This ministerial conflict, primarily concerning the foreign political goals of the new government, commanded the attention of the Allied governments because it clearly reflected the political turmoil within Russia. The chaotic state of affairs made decisive action imperative if Russia was to continue the war. On 16 March, Izvestia published the regime's program which, among other things, called for the restoration of military discipline. 80 81 The problem had become increasingly serious, for the absence of discipline had greatly disrupted military operations. There were conflicting reports on Russia's military capability. The British Military Attache, Sir Alfred Knox, believed that the Russian army was basically "sound at heart."1 Alexander Kerensky, the new Minister of Justice, concurred, suggesting that while morale was critical, the Russian military was better equipped, better trained, and better organized than it had been earlier in the war.2

Despite contrary hopes, the revolution had introduced new factors into Russia's military equation that made use of these advantages virtually impossible. The government was faced with several difficult tasks: conduct of the war, consolidation of its political authority, preparation for Russia's political future, and the introduction of much-needed reforms. In addition, Russia's economy was a disaster after nearly three years of war. Significant problems in transportation, shortages of raw materials, low productivity, and lack of manpower further compounded the problems.3 Another question closely related to the war was the direction of Russian foreign policy. The new Foreign Minister, Paul Miliukov, was a highly respected historian, author of a number of well-known works including The 82 Russian State Under Peter the Great and Essays on Russian Culture, and a leader of the Kadet Party, a liberal faction which favored either a constitutional monarchy or a republic. Miliukov enthusiastically accepted the momentous challenge of his post, believing it had "long been intended" for him.4 "i wanted to immerse myself in everything," remembered Miliukov, who held daily conversations with the Allied ambassadors.5 The goal of Miliukov's foreign policy was, in many respects, a continuation of that of Nicholas II—postwar control of Constantinople and the Straits.6 The Minister's determination to adhere to this goal reflected his inability, or perhaps his unwillingness, to recognize the mood of the Russian masses. V. D. Nabokov, a fellow Kadet and close friend of the Foreign Minister, expressed to Miliukov his view that the basic cause of the revolution had been the war-weariness of Russia and the reluctance of her people to support continued participation in the war. Nabokov remembered that the Foreign Minister "decidedly disagreed" and suggested, "perhaps it is due to the war that everything here is somehow still holding together. Without the war," said Miliukov, "everything would soon collapse."7 The inflexibility of the Foreign Minister concerned others as well. Kerensky viewed 83 Miliukov's actions as dangerously incompatible with the changing conditions in Russia.8 Miliukov, said Kerensky, was a remnant of an old Russia which "had ceased to exist on March 12, 1917."9 Miliukov was not alone in his errors. Knox met Duma President M. V. Rodzianko on 15 March and expressed his reservations concerning Russia's continuation in the war. "My dear Knox," reassured Rodzianko, "you must be easy. Everything is going on all right. Russia is a big country, and can wage a war and manage a revolution at the same time."10 Knox remained skeptical. The following morning, he spoke with N. D. Sokolov, a socialist member of the Soviet Executive Committee who many believed to have been the author of the infamous Order No. 1. Sokolov promised Knox that, as a consequence of the order, "there would now be an unbounded enthusiasm for the war."ll It was apparent, however, that the goals for which many Russians would fight were quite different from those espoused by Miliukov. Sokolov and his colleagues, for example, were willing to pursue the war in order to free Russia from occupation, but were opposed to the territorial conquests championed by the Foreign Minister. According to Ambassador Francis, Miliukov's desire for Constantinople was held not only by the minority in the Council of Ministers but also by the minority of the public.12 84 At the same time, Russia's co-belligerents were urging the Provisional Government to renew the war effort. On 18 March, the heads of the Allied Military Mission sent telegrams to the front urging Russian commanders to continue to fight for the triumph of liberty. Though the affirmative replies were actually meaningless, they did convince a number of the Allied representatives that the alliance with Russia remained strong. Knox was among the few who disagreed. The British Attache, in fact, argued that continued shipments of British materiel be curtailed until Russia proved her willingness to continue the fight.

Earlier the same day, Paleologue, concerned over Russia's internal situation, wired Briand, warning that "it would be a serious mistake to think that time is working for us." The French Ambassador doubted that the Provisional Government could solve the grave problems facing it.13 To restore his hope that Russia could reestablish military discipline and continue its prosecution of the war, Paleologue visited Miliukov, who told him of his hope that the Russian Government's forthcoming manifesto on the war and the maintenance of the alliance would satisfy all concerned. Paleologue's response was direct and to the point, "You mean to say you only hope? A hope's no good to me: I want a certainty."14 85 Miliukov pleaded that although he "would do everything in his power" to fulfill Russia's obligations, he had to proceed cautiously in order to prevent a rupture with the Petrograd Soviet and avoid civil war. "Whatever reasons you may have for going slowly with the hotheads of the Soviet," Paleologue reminded him, "you must realize that I cannot tolerate any doubt about your determination to continue the Alliance and carry on the war."15 Miliukov remembered the meeting quite differently and would record that he had "fully guarantee[d]" the French Ambassador that Russia would stand by her obligations to her Allies.16 The next day, Miliukov's initial statement was dispatched to Russian representatives abroad. The Provisional Government pledged to make every effort to correct as rapidly as possible the errors of the past, which may have paralyzed up to now the enthusiasm and the spirit of sacrifice of the Russian people . . . [and to] strictly observe the international obligations contracted by the Tsar's government . . . and to "fight [the] common foe to the end, unswervingly and indefatigably."17 The statement did not satisfy Ambassador Paleologue, however. Incensed by the "long and verbose" manifesto, the French diplomat immediately visited Miliukov and chastised the Foreign Minister for failing to include a pledge to "prosecute the war at any cost until full and 86 final victory."18 Miliukov defended the document on the grounds that it was intended only for the Russian nation.19 Admittedly, Miliukov's position was a difficult one. Most members of the regime desired a modification of their government's war aims.20 in addition to the growing objection to the Foreign Minister's imperialist goals, there were other consideration which greatly jeopardized his position. His belief that following the revolution power should be retained by the bourgeois elements of society alienated many Russians.21 Given Miliukov's precarious political situation, the statement was, in all probability, the best that could have been expected.22 Paleologue remained unsympathetic. "The question is this," he told the Foreign Minister bluntly, "yes or no, will Russia go on fighting at the side of the Allies until full and final victory, without faltering and without ulterior motives?"23 Though perhaps not "ulterior," Miliukov's motives were anything but altruistic. He had pledged that his government would "remain mindful of the international engagements entered into by the fallen regime."24 m return he expected her allies to guarantee the territorial promises made to Russia early in the war. The guarantees to which Miliukov alluded— concerning the Straits and Constantinople—were no longer shared by the entire Russian Government. Kerensky, 87 Nekolai Nekrasov, the Minister of Transport, and Michael Tereshchenko did not support Miliukov's policy. Many of those opposed to the Foreign Minister's goals now found themselves battling the political aims not only of Germany but also of Miliukov and his allies.25

With this in mind the Provisional Government's first pronouncement made no mention of territorial ambitions, instead promising that Russia would "sacredly observe the alliances . . . and . . . carry out . . . agreements entered into by the Allies."26 This declaration did much to assuage fears in the Allied capitals regarding Russian intentions.27

Miliukov continued to be unwilling to abandon territorial aggrandizement. In an interview with the Kadet newspaper, Rech', on 24 March, the Foreign Minister defended Russia's acquisition of the Straits as compatible with a previous American request for a definition of war aims. The request, sent to both belligerent and neutral countries on 20 December 1916, urged a cooperative effort to secure "peace [and] the rights of peoples and governments."28 According to Miliukov, Russian control of Constantinople would in itself be an act of liberation "because the Turkish Nation, in spite of five hundred years' domination . . . remain[s] an alien element there. 88 resting exclusively on the rights of the conqueror, the rights of the strongest."29 Russian control of the Straits did not contradict Wilsonian principles. The Foreign Minister believed Russian control of the Straits to be of paramount importance. He argued that their complete neutralization would be even less acceptable than continued Turkish control.30 Four days later, the Petrograd Soviet issued a statement of its own. Addressed to the "brother- proletarians of the Austro-German coalition," the declaration appealed for a "decisive struggle against the grasping ambitions of the governments of all countries" and called for an end to the "horrible butchery" caused by the war which was directed by "kings, landowners, and bankers."31 The Soviets' "Call to the Peoples of the World" was immediately followed by a number of editorials in its official publication, Izvestia, demanding that the Provisional Government cut loose completely from the traditions of Izvolski and Stiirmer "and publicly disassociate itself" from the "traditional policies of conquest."32 The paper acknowledged the "fundamental differences" between the Soviets' position and that of Miliukov's "imperialistic bourgeoisie" and went so far as to declare Russia as guilty as the Austro-German 89 combination for the continuation of the war because of its territorial desires.33

Russia's divided opinion regarding the war alarmed the Allied representatives. The Soviets' insistence in negotiations with the Austro-German proletariat, its "renunciation of all plans for conquest or annexation," and its call for fraternization, greatly troubled Count de Robien.34

In the face of mounting criticism against his ministry, Miliukov remained steadfast, constantly reminding all who would listen of the distinguishing features of various types of imperialism.35 This opposition only served to strengthen his resolve to hold fast to his policy. "Miliukov's attitude toward the war became more and more definite," recalled Nabokov, "more closely tied to the position of our Allies, England in particular, and more implacable toward Germany."36 The Foreign Minister's refusal to modify his position on war aims left him "almost in a minority of one in the Government."37 The deteriorating situation led Knox to inform the Russian Minister of War, Alexander Guchkov, that he was recommending that no more British war material be sent to Russia until order had been restored. Guchkov, who held the Soviets responsible for the chaotic situation, hoped 90 this threat might strengthen the Government's position. Though he admitted that the Soviet interfered "in everything," the War Minister remained optimistic. "Things are getting gradually better; they are better to-day than they were yesterday, and they were better yesterday than they were the day before."39

Among the Allied representatives, only Francis was optimistic as to the future of the Provisional Government. This may have been due to his unrealistic expectations of the effect American entry into the war would have on Russia. On 5 April, the Ambassador wrote that his country's involvement "is not only thrilling and impressive but ... an inspiration to the Russian people . . . [that will] prompt them to a patriotic support of the government which [Miliukov] and [his] Colleagues are so faithfully administering."40 Francis noted that the United States entry in the war was "not only hailed with delight in Russia but was vastly strengthening to the Provisional Government."41 Francis had overemphasized the impact of American involvement. North Winship, American Consul in Petrograd, informed the State Department that the Socialist press had completely disregarded his government's declaration of war.42 Constantine Nabokov, Russia's Charge d'Affaires in London, blamed the Provisional Government's failure to establish close contact with Washington and to 91 use propaganda to win "forever the support and sympathy of the people of the United States." Instead, he charged the "Russian Government did nothing."43

To British representatives, Miliukov was increasingly becoming a liability. They began to see in Alexander Kerensky the only prospect of prolonging Russian military involvement. "Kerensky," remembered Buchanan, "was the only Minister whose personality . . . had something arresting about it that it did not fail to impress one."44 Knox was even more forthright: There is only one man who can save the country and that is Kerenski, for this little half-Jew lawyer of thirty-one years of age has still the confidence of the over-articulate Petrograd mob, who, being armed, are masters of the situation. The remaining members of the Government may represent the people of Russia outside the Petrograd mob, but the people of Russia, being unarmed and inarticulate, do not count. The Provisional Government could not exist in Petrograd if it were not for Kerenski.45

Buchanan agreed, "With his hold on the masses, with his personal ascendancy over his colleagues, and in the absence of any qualified rival, Kerensky [is] the only man to who [sic] we [can] look to keep Russia in the war."46 Kerensky thus appeared to be indispensable if Russia was to remain militarily active.47 Hig dislike of Miliukov, the "confirmed imperialist," was equally obvious.48 The Foreign Minister, Kerensky argued, had 92 "no tact" and warned that the Allies should not "believe him when he says that Russia wants Constantinople."49 Miliukov, recalled V. D. Nabokov: . . . could not and would not understand, the would not be reconciled to the fact that the three-year war remained alien to the Russian people, that they continued it unwillingly, from under the lash, not understanding its meaning or its aims, that they were exhausted by it, and that the revolution was received with ecstatic sympathy because they hoped it would lead to a swift end to the war.50

Kerensky considered Miliukov's "utopian" war aims to be exceedingly dangerous, fearing that they might well lead to civil war.51 The animosity which existed between the two Ministers stemmed from a variety of issues. Miliukov's support of Grand Duke Michael as Nicholas II's successor had angered Kerensky while the latter's role as the "hostage of democracy," which he so skillfully exploited for his own political benefit, greatly irritated the Foreign Minister.52 The Foreign Minister was Kerensky's bete noire in the fullest sense of the word. Kerensky did not miss an opportunity to speak ill of Miliukov, to speak scarcastically of him and sometimes to express genuine hate of him.53 Miliukov's stubbornness, or as V. D. Nabokov referred to it, his reservatio mentalis, was a tremendous 93 political liability for the young regime. Nabokov desperately tried to persuade the Kadet leader to modify the wording of the government's declaration to allow "a very broad and subjective interpretation, that had no meaning at all that could bind one in the future at a peace conference should the war end to [Russia's] advantage.54

In the months immediately following the March revolution, Miliukov had every confidence that the war would end successfully and would provide Russia the opportunity to acquire Constantinople and the Straits. He believed Russia's army to be capable not only of participating in the war but of doing so successfully.55 While he believed that a successful conclusion to the war would "give rise to new feelings in the hearts of men," Kerensky believed that the war should not be pursued for the purpose of territorial enrichment.56 Further, the troops would be unwilling to participate if their government's war aims were not revised to reflect the philosophy of the new Russia. "To make the army fight," wrote Kerensky, "we had to give it new war aims, which to the rank and file would fit in with its new spirit born of the revolution."57 War Minister Alexander Guchkov was less optimistic. Ultimately concluding that the war would be 94 lost, he remained at his post only for the benefit of his own conscience.58 on 7 March, Guchkov told a gathering of the ministers, "There is no question of getting fat, let us try and stay alive."59

V. D. Nabokov would write. If it had been clearly realized . . . that for Russia the war was hopelessly lost and that all attempts to continue would lead nowhere . . . catastrophe perhaps would have successfully been avoided. . . . Any kind of successful conducting of the war was incompatible with those problems which the revolution raised inside the country and with the conditions under which these conditions had to be resolved.60 Nabokov held that a separate peace was the Provisional Government's only choice. A number of Russian leaders agreed and believed they had nothing to lose, and indeed everything to gain, through pursuing such a policy. Even if it were unsuccessful, such a proposal, suggested Sukhanov, would prove to both Russia's masses and her army that the country was conducting the war for the revolution and freedom.^1 Like many of his colleagues, Sukhanov violently opposed the Miliukov war program, demanding its rejection by the Provisional Government followed by the acceptance of a new policy based on peace without annexations or indemnities. This new concept, which attracted increasing support in Russia, was a source of growing concern for the Allies. While some experts in the Untied States, such 95 as Samuel Harper and Professor Vladimir Simkhovitch of Columbia University, remained convinced that Russia would not seek a separate peace, others were more cautious. On 14 April, President Wilson told J. Howard Whitehouse, an anti-war leader in the British Parliament, that Russia's position "was very uncertain. It might be that in setting up their new form of Government . . . they would find the war an intolerable evil and would desire to get to an end of it on any reasonable terms," and warned that such a development "would be a serious blow" to the Allied war effort.62

Ironically, Wilson, who had spoken of "peace without victory" in January 1917, had himself undergone a dramatic reorientation of thought. This change coincided with the Petrograd Soviet's declaration of the war's injustice.63 Wilson now agreed with America's allies that only total victory would guarantee a permanent peace. He viewed the Soviet's position as a threat not only to the ability to achieve that goal but also to the new world order he hoped would emerge at the war's conclusion. Nevertheless, he supported the Russian uprising, extended diplomatic recognition to the new government, and, by early April, officially joined the new "fit partner" in the war for democracy. His decision evoked strong support in Petrograd.64 96 The United States hoped to distance herself from some obligations to her allies. Like House, the President believed that American interests should not be too closely tied to those of her co-belligerents.65 Wilson desired to protect his government's right to conclude peace once its objectives were attained. He rejected a proposed Allied agreement prohibited a separate peace.66 The goals of the Untied States, including the conclusion of a new commercial treaty, were markedly different from those of the other Allies who hoped to profit territorially from participation in the war. Still, the President believed that his much-hoped-for extension of liberalism and capitalism, which he mistakenly perceived in the Russian revolution could only be gained through cooperation with those powers.67 This sort of misunderstanding was, in fact, principally responsible for the failure of American policy towards Russia. The Wilson adminsitration's belief that the Provisional Government would quickly develop a western style liberalism and could continue full participation in the war reflected its ignorance of both Russian attitudes and Russian political developments.68 American belligerency, moreover, might allow Wilson to achieve the peaceful settlement which had heretofore eluded him. Now the United States would enjoy greater 97 influence both with her allies and with their enemies and would be able to use that power to bring about a reasonable settlement. Jane Addams, a well-known social reformer and a member of the Emergency Peace Federation, recalled the President's comment that he would "have a seat at the Peace Table" if the United States was involved in the war, otherwise he could "at best only call through a crack in the door."69

Wilson's goals could only be accomplished if the Allies were victorious, a more probable outcome if Russia remained involved. This goal became a major focus of United States' policy following April 1917. President Wilson was, therefore, unwilling to discuss war aims, thinking comments on the volatile issue could weaken the war effort and jeopardize victory. In a letter to Colonel House, Wilson acknowledged that "England and France have not the same views with regard to peace that we have by any means. ..." "When the war is over," he observed, "we can force them to our way of thinking, because by that time they will among other things, be financially in our hands."70 Although unwilling to discuss war aims, the American President continued to search for means of strengthening the Russian war effort. It was well-known that Russia desperately needed money and materiel.71 98 Russia's Military Attache in Washington, Captain J. V. Mishtowt, asked Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels for American ships, including destroyers and trawlers, to aid his country.72 on 11 April, Lansing received a cable from Francis, informing him tht "naval conditions [are] precarious, [and] military not wholly satisfactory. Social circles urging peace and fears are entertained by some that army will be influenced thereby."73 The Ambassador urged that his government do whatever possible to strengthen the situation. Wilson, knowing the uncertainty of Russia's situation, acknowledged that it was "too early ... to know what was going to happen there."74 while he realized that Russia was in desperate need of American assistance, the President was "not prepared to finance Russia ... in order that she might get out of the war."75 The United States continued its reluctance to extend credit until the Russian Government demonstrated its intention to remain in the war. Of the 450 million dollars earmarked for distribution in Russia, less than half was given before the fall of the Provisional Government in November.76 Other Allied leaders shared the American President's concern. Like the United States, Great Britain had enthusiastically welcomed the Provisional Government. Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour claimed that Russia, next to France, was Britain's most important ally.77 on 99 22 March, Bonar Law, Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader in the House of Commons, moved that the government send to Russia its "fraternal greetings . . . and heartiest congratulations" and express its confidence that recent events in Russia would lead not only to the rapid and happy progress of the Russian nation but to the prosecution with renewed steadfastness and vigour of the war against the stronghold of . . . autocratic militarism which threatens the liberty of Europe.78 Law's resolution, which reiterated Britain's faith in the "Government which has been formed with the declared intention of carrying this War to a successful conclusion" was seconded by Asquith, who expressed his own belief that Russia's new leaders would use all of their "resources to bring the War to such an end as [would] justify all the sacrifices of the Allies."79 Asquith and Law's unrestrained confidence was based largely on Miliukov's pledge of 18 March that his government would "remain mindful" of the agreements authorized by the deposed Tsar.80 Two days later, Lloyd George sent a personal message to his counterpart in Russia, G. E. Lvov. "This War," wrote the British Prime Minister, "is at bottom a struggle for popular government as well as for liberty." He did not doubt that Lvov's government would be "strengthened in [its] resolve to prosecute this War 100 until the last stronghold of tyranny on the Continent of Europe [is] destroyed."31

Allied statesmen, however, were in doubt whether the new Russian regime could, or would, live up to the promises made by its Foreign Minister. After a conference with "some distinguished Frenchmen," on 10 April, House wired Wilson that the two, Stephane Joseph Vincent Lauzanne, head of the French Information Office in the United States, and Marcel Knecht, his assistant, had asked him to suggest to his President that the United States immediately send an American delegation to Russia "authoritatively" to inform that government "that if they are to have the good will and financial support of [the United States], they must compose their internal differences and not make a separate peace at this time."82 Allied fears were based on a combination of real and imagined factors. The most valid of these was the Provisional Government's continuing inability to gain control of the political situation within Russia. While there remained no doubt that the revolution was an "accomplished fact," internal political turmoil continued. The revolution, recalled Lloyd George, "was by no means completed. It was quite clear in the first few days that this Revolution was to follow the course of all revolutions. The Government might decree, but it was the 101 Jacobins that determined the course of events."83 The "Jacobins" to whom the Prime Minister referred could be found in the Petrograd Soviet, a body whose existence, goals, and policies were increasingly at variance with those of the Provisional Government and who, particularly since the introduction of Order No. 1, had assumed great political power in Russia. "It appealed to the world in favour of peace without annexations or indemnities," said Winston Churchill, then British Minister of Munitions, "it developed its own strength and connections and debated and harangued . . . almost continuously. . . . The object of the Petrograd Soviet was to undermine all authority and discipline."84

Though the Allies knew that Russia was "sick, politically, socially and militarily," the rapid evolution of events, the absence of rapid communication, and the often unrealistic reports made by their representatives, made it difficult to assess adequately the developments in Russia.85 The ideals reflected by Miliukov, philosophically linked to the western concepts of constitutionalism and liberalism, were easily comprehensible to men such as Buchanan and Francis. The ambassadors, however, found it difficult to comprehend other, distinctly Russian, ideologies that were primarily reflected in the Soviet.86 Their ignorance in this regard was reflected in their reports which were made with "remarkable sang-froid."87 102 Wilson planned to send an agent to Russia to gather additional information and had chosen Senator Philander Knox, former Secretry of State in the Taft administration, but had changed his mind on learning that "anyone sent to Russia must be of commanding physical appearance," a qualification Knox could not offer.88 On 26 April, Britain's Ambassador to the United States, Sir Cecil Spring Rice cabled London that Wilson, like the rest of us is anxious ... he is perfectly aware that [the] Russian Revolution with all its possibilities for good is full of dangers for [the] Allied cause and he is resolved to exercise his whole influence to prevent her [from coming] under [the] influence of [the] extreme party . . . making a separate peace.89 The President, concluded Spring Rice, had pledged to send an American commission to Russia to this end. The use of this, and subsequent missions, became a cornerstone in Wilson's attempts to keep Russia involved and to find ways his government might aid the Russian war effort.^0 One of the earliest suggestions for such a mission had come during House's conversations with Lauzanne and Knecht. The Frenchmen had proposed that such a delegation should consist of "a prominent Jew, a business man, a labor leader and an educator."91 Lansing suggested that, in view of the deteriorating situation there, a three-man delegation should be dispatched to Russia. The Secretary advised that one of the members be Samuel Gompers, 103 "who would have a very decided influence with the labor element in Russia and prevent . . . the tendency of the Socialists towrd a seprate peace with Germany."92 The White House responded immediately. Such a commission, thought Wilson, would be a "good plan."93 The question remained as to the delegation's composition. Previously, Colonel House had suggested Oscar Strauss, a prominent American Jew, Benjamin Wheeler, a well-respected educator at the University of California, and Gompers. Wheeler, however, seemed to Wilson, "a bit too ladylike," and the President, instead, proposed the inclusion of Samuel Harper, who, said Wilson, was "widely known and trusted" in Russia, and who was an ardent supporter of the Provisional Government.94 Though Lansing agreed with the selection of Gompers, he, too, had reservations concerning the membership of Wheeler. Further, he felt it unwise to send "another Jew" like Strauss, as there was a "measure of danger" in overplaying the Jewish element, and noted that Harper was "not as popular as . . . supposed in Russia."^5 instead, Lansing suggested John R. Mott, a well-known medical man; Cyrus McCormick; Howard Elliot, the President of the New Haven Railroad; and Samuel R. Bertron a respected lawyer.96 The following day Wilson received the suggestions of House, who disagreed with Lansing concerning the 104 membership of a representative of the American Jewish community. House was convinced of the need for a Jew of "pro-Ally" sentiments to offset the activities of German Jews then actively engaged in efforts to convince their Russian coreligionists to make a separate peace.97 House subsequently became involved in the effort to organize members of his country's Jewish community for the purpose of "influencing the Russian Jews in the direction desired."98 On 17 April, Treasury Secretary William McAdoo provided his list of names for the proposed delegation. The Secretary agreed than an influential Jewish member was needed and recommended Eugene Meyer, Jr. According to McAdoo, Meyer was "a prominent Hebrew of strong pro-Ally sympathies . . . [and was] a businessman and banker of unusual ability."99 Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, arguably the most respected American Jew at that time, thought Meyer would have great influence on Russian Jews outside the Socialist element.100 in addition to Meyer, McAdoo's list included Alfred Holland Smith, President of the New York Central Railroad, who, like Meyer, was a Republican; Charles Crane; Cyrus McCormick; Samuel R. Bertron; and as leader, Elihu Root, an experienced politician and statesman who had held the posts of Secretary of War and Secretary of State. McAdoo also urged Wilson to consider enlarging the delegation to 105 include representatives of the military and a socialist "in sympathy with our programme."101 Two days after receiving McAdoo's letter, the President sent Lansing his own choice for the commission. Included in this list were Root, McCormick, Crane, Mott, Meyer, Bertron, and, as railroad expert, John F. Stevens of New York, an engineer who had worked on the Panama Canal. Wilson considered it unwise to include Gompers, as the labor leader's well-known opposition to socialism might reduce his effectiveness with Russian labor factions.102 Gompers would be more useful in advising who should be sent as the representative of American labor. That individual, cautioned Wilson, should not be a socialist.

The choice of Elihu Root to lead the mission was not supported by all. Rabbi Stephen Wise charged that Root stood "before the American people as the most eminent and powerful representative of those theories of government and political life to which [Wilson] as the leader of the American democracy [was] opposed," and who "throughout a lifetime has, represented those very influences and powers from which the Russian people have at last liberated themselves."103 Certainly, reasoned the Rabbi, Root, "who [was] not of [Wilson's] mind, who [was] not a sharer of [Wilson's] own spirit touching the fundamental issues of democracy," should not lead the delegation.104 on 106 28 April, Meyer London, a socialist Congressman from New York, demanded that Wilson revoke the appointment of Root, whom London stated was "the last person in the world to command the confidence of Russia's Socialists who would view the choice as a calamity."105

The criticism of Root's selection, as well as that of both McCormick and Meyer, was founded on the belief that they represented America's capitalist institutions as much as they did its democratic principles. Root, according to George Creel, "stood in the public mind as the very high priest of stand-pattism. He was ... an offense to all Democrats and Republicans of progressive thought ... no man in our public life is so absolutely distrusted by the workers of the nation."106 McCormick, the President of International Harvester and a director of the National City Bank of new York, knew of Russia's economic potential. In fact, his companies already had invested heavily in Russia. Meyer, a prominent stockbroker, was known as a reactionary with a "doubtful reputation."107 House attempted to warn the President of the possible confusion which the Commission's membership might create, "Among the ultra liberals ... it will be felt that the Commission is to be sent to Russia for the commercial benefit of [America] and not to steady the republic there."108 107 The United States was not alone in its decision to send a group to Russia. In fact, while the debate continued in the United States as to who would be included in what ultimately became the Root Mission, representatives from Britain and France were already in Russia attempting to win support for the war effort. The attitude of Lloyd George's government towards the new Russian regime had gone from one of "benevolent expectation" to one of "diffidence, mingled with irritation."109 British observers were becoming increasingly pessimistic. "The military outlook is most disappointing," reported Buchanan, "... I do not take an optimistic view of the immediate future of this country."110 in early April, Constantine Nabokov warned that Britain was concerned with the Provisional Government's stability, its failure to seize complete political control in the face of mounting competition from the Petrograd Soviet, its inability "to paralyze the harmful influence of the extreme parties," and the deterioration of Miliukov's prestige within the government.m These concerns were reinforced by Russia's declaration of 10 April, which repudiated her interest in the "domination . . . seizure ... or forcible occupation of foreign territories."112 Though it placated the criticism of the Soviet, which had threatened to withhold 108 its permission for the "Liberty Loan," so desperately needed to finance the government's policies, the statement was clearly at variance with the aims of Miliukov who had grudgingly consented to the declaration on the stipulation that it was an appeal to the Russian people rather than a diplomatic note. "I refused," said Miliukov, "to throw this torch into Europe."113 immediately following the publication of the government's war aims, the Foreign Minister "let it be known that this declaration . . . did not in any way bind him as Minister of Foreign Affairs."114 Miliukov's position, Kerensky recalled, produced the "impression of a bomb explosion."115 In a conversation with Ambassador Paleologue on the morning of the declaration's publication, the Foreign Minister claimed that he had "achieved a great triumph" in this latest battle with his opponents.116 The Frenchman, however, believed the victory to be a temporary one, as the Soviet was fast becoming the "Master of Petrograd."117 Count de Robien realized Miliukov's precarious position and knew that the Foreign Minister's days were numbered. "It seems certain," wrote de Robien, "that [Miliukov] will be forced to leave the Ministry. He would be followed in his resignation by the moderates, and the government would fall into the hands of Kerensky and his party."118 within the Soviet, there existed a plethora of groups which only added 109 to the confusion.119 one of them, warned de Robien, "is insisting on the entire government, Kerensky included. If this demand were given in to, there would be complete anarchy."120

It was amid this seething political turmoil that socialist delegations from France and Great Britain arrived on 13 April. The French group included the lawyer Marius Moutet and professors Marcel Cachin and Ernest Lafont, all members of the Chamber of Deputies. The British representatives, who had been chosen by Arthur Henderson, a member of the Special War Cabinet and a Labourite, included James 0'Grady, a cabinetmaker and Will Thorne, a plumber. They were accompanied by William Sanders, the Secretary of the Fabian Society. Ambassador Paleologue noted the differences between the two delegations. "French Socialism," he said, "is . . . represented by intellectuals with a classical education, English Socialism by manual workers, 'matter-of-fact men.' Theory on one side, practice on the other."121 The purpose of the group, according to French Premier Alexandre Ribot, was to dissipate the "extravagant dreams with which the minds of the Russian revolutionaries were haunted."122 Not all had agreed with the British group's purpose. One member of Parliament sarcastically asked whether his government had discussed the desirability 110 of inviting representatives of free Russia to cross the channel and consider the government of Ireland.123 o'Grady and Thorne, however, made a favorable impression on Buchanan. Paleologue, too, was pleased with the French delegation. "At first glance one could not desire anything better. . . . They are mainly concerned over whether or not Russia can continue the war and whether or not there is reason to hope that her effort will allow us to realize our program of peace."124 Robert Bruce Lockhart recalled the British contingent's visit to Moscow less positively; From the first the visit was a farce. The delegates fulfilled their task honourably. But as anyone might have foreseen, they were completely lost in the wilderness of Russian revolutionary phraseology. They were bewildered by the endless discussions of peace terms. . . . They were handicapped by their ignorance of the language.125

The Mission was afforded a cool reception by the Petrograd Soviet. Sukhanov remembered; We had not only been expecting them for a long time, but had heard a great deal about them. And not of a favourable kind. However honourable and well-meaning they were as citizens, or however convinced as Socialists for us . . . these British and French representatives were really delegates from the Allied Governments and agents of Anglo-French imperialism. We were sufficiently informed of their chauvinism and their important, extremely harmful role in their own countries and in the working- class movement, or rather in the struggle against the working-class movement in Great Britain and France during the war.126 Ill The French Ambassador admitted that the reception given the Allied delegates was "frigid."127 o'Grady spoke for the British and Cachin for the French. Cachin, in particular, was so "taken aback . . . [that he] thought it his duty to make any sort of negotiation possible, to 'throw out ballast.' The 'ballast' was nothing less than Alsace-Lorraine." The upset Paleologue complained, "If that is all the help our delegates have come to bring me, they would have been better advised to spare themselves the trouble of the journey!"128 The Ambassador was surprised by the leftist position adopted by his three countrymen and asked that they temper their "far too conciliatory" statements.129 Cachin admitted that he had been intimidated by the Soviet reception. Though the French deputies pledged that they would do all in their power to negate those concessions, the damage had been done. Following his discussion with Cachin, Moutet, and Lafont, Paleologue visited Miliukov at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was now the Russian's turn to be sarcastic. "How can you expect me," asked the Foreign Minister, "to resist the demands of our Maximalists when the French Socialists themselves abandon the struggle?"130

Actually, the delegation had not been given the opportunity to present its views. Before the representatives arrived, the Soviet had been warned of 112 "those Allied parliamentary Socialists" by the Menshevik leader, Julius Martov. Further, the anti-war British Independent Labour Party, led by Ramsay MacDonald, sent a telegram charging that the group were "paid emissaries of the British Government . . . [and] not real representatives of British Labour."131 Hence, the Soviet was not prepared to give the Allied representatives a fair hearing. "We felt ourselves to be too strong, both by conviction and by authority," said Martov scornfully. The 'Allied' visitors, not being friends, did not appear to us to be even worthy opponents, but rather tiresome emissaries to the victorious Russian Revolution from the frightened Allied bourgeoisie. We had no respect for them; their role seemed to us to be wretched and disagreeable.132

Given such animosity, it was apparent that the Allied socialists would need to discover other means of influencing events in Russia. Paleologue invited Kerensky to meet with the French deputies at his Embassy. Here the Minister of Justice elaborated in his dispute with Miliukov, stating that at its core lay the question of the revision of war aims in order that they would be compatible with Russian democratic ideals.133 Apart from this, Kerensky claimed he strongly supported the continuation of the war. On 18 April the delegation was given a more favorable reception by the Provisional Government than that given by the Soviet. Speaking for the British, 113 William Sanders applauded the common effort in which "democratic England goes hand and hand with democratic France, Russia, and America."134 Moutet then offered a similar position. The Russian response was given by Miliukov and Kerensky. The Foreign Minister pledged that Russia would "redouble its efforts to destroy German militarism."135 Kerensky's response, however, reflected the attitude of the Soviet, "We expect you to exert . . . the same decisive influence in your country that we in Russia have exerted on our bourgeois classes, which have now renounced their imperialistic ambitions."136 The following day, the Allied socialists addressed the Executive Committee of the Soviet. Once again they were forced to defend the imperialist activities of their respective nations—the French concerns in Africa and the British interests in Ireland and India. The French and British socialists then traveled to Moscow where anti-war sentiment appeared to be diminishing. "Of course," recorded Lockhart, "they all want the war to stop. Still, the majority began to realize that the war cannot be stopped at once and now admit the necessity for defensive warfare."137 speaking before the Moscow Soviet, the Allied representatives were once again confronted by a hostile audience which, among other things, was especially critical of the territorial agreements reached earlier in 114 the war and now defended by Miliukov. Frustrated by his inability adequately to respond to those criticisms, one of the British representatives cried, "If you don't want Constantinople, then damn it, we'll take it." M. Philips Price, the special correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, noted that the outburst was met by painful silence.138

Several days later, Kerensky was invited to dine at the British Embassy with the British representatives. There, Buchanan reiterated his fears concerning the will of the Russian military. "Quite frankly," he told Kerensky, "... [my] confidence in the army, and even in the Provisional Government, [is] shaken."139 Kerensky argued that the spirit and military capacity of the Russian army would again assert itself once the Germans renewed their offensive. He hoped to make the war a national effort, as it was in France and Britain, and labeled Buchanan's fears as ill-founded. The Allied socialists left Russia "sadder and wiser men, much depressed by their experiences both at the front and at the rear."140 Buchanan, too, was disappointed by the failure of the visit. "I had hoped," he wrote, that they would have impressed the workmen's delegates in the Soviet and made them understand that we were not fighting the Germans for imperialistic or capitalist aims. But those delegates were not real working men. They were only demagogues.141 115 Charles Russell, an American socialist who was a member of the Root Commission, reported one of the Englishmen as saying, "My Gawd, if this is democracy we don't want any of the bloody thing in our country."142

Shortly after the departure of the Socialist delegations, Albert Thomas arrived in Petrograd on 22 April. Thomas, the French Socialist Minister of Munitions, had been dispatched by his government which "[claimed] by its tradition to possess a special knowledge of Revolutions."143 His purpose was to "bring home to the Provisional Government and the Soviet a few severe truths."144 After Thomas was settled at the Hotel Europe, he and Paleologue discussed the deteriorating conditions in Russia. The Ambassador provided Thomas with details of the conflict between Miliukov and Kerensky and urged support of the former as he best represented Allied policy.145 The French Socialist, however, urged caution. "We must be careful," said Thomas, "not to offend Russian democracy."146 Though he had been sent to Russia to appraise the situation, Thomas's more important role was to deliver Paieologue's note of recall. This he presented to the Ambassador the following day. In it, Paleologue was informed that he was being replaced by Thomas, who, "in view of the pleasant memories he left behind him in Russia and 116 the influence he may be able to exert in certain quarters, [will] be well received by the Provisional Government and particularly M. Miliukov."147 This development came as little surprise to Paleologue, who noted that he had "enjoyed the confidence of the old regime and [did] not have faith in the new one."148 Paleologue assured Thomas that before his departure, he would do all he could to assist him. The following afternoon, Buchanan and the Italian Ambassador, the Marquis Ribarbelli de Carlotti, met with Thomas and Paleologue to discuss further the Russian situation. Paleologue reaffirmed his belief that the Allies should support Miliukov: With Miliukov and the moderates of the Provisional Government we still have a chance of arresting the progress of anarchy and keeping Russia in the war. Kerensky implies the sure and certain triumph of the Soviet, which means giving the rein to all the passion of the mob, the destruction of the army, the rupture, of the National ties and the end of the Russian State. And if the disintegration of Russia is now inevitable, at least let us refrain from promoting it!149

Though Carlotti supported this view, Buchanan positioned himself on the side of Thomas, who favored Kerensky. "The whole strength of the Russian democracy," said Thomas, "lies in its revolutionary fervour. Kerensky alone is capable of establishing, with the aid of the Soviet, a government worthy of our confidence."150 Thomas was 117 impressed by Kerensky's argument for a revision of war aims and told Paleologue that, as Cachin had indicated earlier, it was necessary to "jettison the ballast" and abandon the policy of annexations and indemnities.151 Paleologue was not the only French representative who considered it unwise to support Kerensky. Robien feared Kerensky to be "very dangerous for the moderate party in the Provisional Government, and consequently for us."152 In the event that Kerensky assumed power, Robien believed a German peace proposal based on the status quo might be accepted by the Russian Government. Such a development would be catastrophic to French territorial ambitions: The English will always get some colonies . . . but what about us? . . . And anyway, would it not be folly to want to fight on alone, or even with the English, against a Germany supplied by Russia . . . the future looks very black, and the Russians have done us a terribly bad turn by having their silly revolution just at the moment when things were going a little less badly.153 By April, Kerensky had emerged as a force to be reckoned with in the Provisional Government. Even Miliukov was forced to acknowledge the Justice Minister's influence. In an address to the Soviet, Kerensky boasted that he had converted everyone, including Thomas, and indicated that he viewed himself as "sole director in matters of foreign policy."154 118 Clearly, opposition to Miliukov was mounting. Victor Chernov, Minister of Agriculture and a leader of The Socialist Revolutionary Party, joined the campaign. As editor of Revoliutsionnaia Rossaiia, Chernov wrote that though his party supported the government, it would not support Miliukov.155

Despite these developments, Paleologue held fast to his belief in the Foreign Minister and telegraphed Ribot that the Allies should "stand firmly" by the agreed upon war aims and "insist once more on our determination to continue the war to full and final victory."156 To enter into discussions for another purpose with Kerensky, he warned, would destroy confidence in Miliukov, Guchkov, and others who were "struggling so heroically to revive Russian patriotism and save the Alliance." In addition, such a turn would adversely affect those forces "not yet contaminated by pacifist propaganda . . . [That were] a reserve of national energy which may have an enormous influence on the course of the war."157 Though his suggestion threatened the existence of the Alliance, he viewed it as the only gamble worth taking. "Even supposing we had to continue the war without Russia's help," he wrote the French Premier, "we should be in a position to make our victory yield us a harvest of highly profitable advantages at the expense of our defaulting Ally."158 The other 119 course would allow the Soviet to seize power and force a general peace. Before sending the telegram, the Ambassador read it to Thomas, whose consternation was evident. When Paleologue reiterated his intentions to send the note, Thomas replied, "All right! Send it! but it will be your last!"159

Thomas followed with a telegram of his own stating his decision to become his government's only source of Russian information and to take sole responsibility for the implementation of policy. Those familiar with the situation had assured him that military conditions were improving.160 A similar view was held by Kerensky, who promised that the Russian army would emerge as a more formidable force than before. Few in the Provisional Government had realized that, in addition to the deterioration of the army's discipline and will to fight, rampant inflation, a calamitous transportation crisis, food shortages, and an overall demoralization of the masses had made it unlikely, if not impossible, for Russia to continue the war.161 This was the situation which Knox, by now a well-known critic of Russian incompetence, discovered on visiting the northern front in mid-April.162 Formerly, he wrote, the Russian soldier "fought because he was afraid of his officers and of punishment. Now he has 120 lost all respect for his officers and knows he cannot be punished. He has no patriotism or any possible motive for enthusiasm."163

Despite the obvious weakening of Russian military might and the growing opposition to himself, Miliukov adamantly refused to give up the prospect of territorial acquisition. He considered using the army to seize Constantinople and the Straits and continued these plans until his removal as Foreign Minister in early May.

Kerensky was determined to purge the government and remove his rival from the Foreign Ministry. He told Thomas that the two paramount dangers facing Russia were the group which followed Lenin and the group which followed Miliukov. Though his support for Kerensky was unshaken, Thomas was concerned that a revision of war aims might lead Russia into a separate piece, an idea quickly rejected by Kerensky. Interestingly, Thomas still hoped that France might emerge from the war in control of Alsace and Lorraine and was able to persuade Kerensky that acquisition of these areas was not tribute but reparation. With this issue settled, Thomas could now legitimately renounce the policy of annexation and, in so doing, throw even more support behind Kerensky. Though Miliukov protested that Thomas had no authority to renounce annexations and indemnities, the damage was done. The "battle royal" that had been raging 121 between the two ministers was now all but over. Buchanan reported that he would not be surprised if the Foreign Minister had to leave the government. "He would be a loss in many ways as he represents the moderate element in the cabinet . . . but he has so little influence . . . one never knows whether he will be able to give effort to what he says."164

Kerensky concluded that Miliukov's continued presence as Foreign Minister was becoming "a real national danger."165 with this in mind, the justice Minister forced the issue by announcing that the Russian Government was preparing a note informing her allies of its new war aims based on the 27 March declarations so vehemently opposed by Miliukov—that is, that they renounce all annexations and indemnities. The situation provided Miliukov with an opportunity to launch an offensive of his own. Where had Kerensky gained the authority to issue such information, asked the Foreign Minister, who acknowledged that he had intended to raise the issue of such an announcement in the near future.166 Beaten at his own game, Kerensky was forced to agree that Miliukov was "quite justified" in demanding that the Provisional Government officially deny that such a note was tnen being prepared or had been discussed.167 This provoked a strong reaction in the Soviet, which threatened 122 that it would not endorse the effort to float a domestic loan, a so-called "Liberty Loan," unless such a note was sent.168 The situation, and the involvement of Thomas on the side of the Soviet, forced Miliukov to acquiesce to the dispatch of the note. Thomas's conversations with Russian leftists, wrote the Foreign Minister, had "already altered the situation for which alteration part of the responsibility falls upon . . . Thomas."169 Given its importance, it was decided that the note would be drafted by the entire Cabinet, which met at Guchkov's apartment on the Moika Canal.170 The task proved difficult. At first, Miliukov described the Allied war aims as "liberating" in nature, wholly consistent with the democratic spirit of free Russia. He pledged that Russia would observe its obligations and cooperate to achieve "those guarantees and sanctions . . . necessary for the prevention of new bloody conflicts in the future."171

Kerensky took exception to much of the draft and demanded its revision. The version that emerged may not have actually broadened the letter of the 27 March proclamation, but was an "unquestionable contravention of its spirit."172 Kerensky, however, was quite pleased, believing that it would satisfy Miliukov's harshest critics.173 123 Reaction to the note was immediate. "It raised a perfect storm in the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies," reported Buchanan, "... [and] was regarded as a revocation of all that had been said in the [earlier] proclamation."174 The Soviet leaders were upset by the vague wording of the document. Though it did not implicitly state Russia's intentions to annex Constantinople, it did not exclude the possibility. Further, Russia pledged to support the return of Alsace and Lorraine to France, Italy's acquisition of Slavic Dalmatia, and the annexation of former German colonies by Britain and Japan. Nikolai Chkheidze, head of the Petrograd Soviet, was particularly incensed, calling the Foreign Minister the "evil genius of the revolution."175

The note precipitated the first armed demonstration against the Provisional Government. On the afternoon of 3 May, the Finland regiment marched to the Mariinsky Palace, the headquarters of the Provisional Government. They were soon joined by workers and sailors, many carrying banners calling for land, peace, liberty, and Miliukov's resignation. Russia was on the verge of civil war as the situation gave rise to counterdemonstrations by a variety of disparate elements. The bourgeoisie marched for the first and last time during the revolution.176 The Bolsheviks, attempting to take advantage of the 124 situation, harangued the crowd against the government. Kadet demonstrators used it to attack Lenin, whom they portrayed as a German agent set on the destruction of Miliukov.

Later, Francis wrote Lansing that the unrest was caused by "Lenin and his followers, who are inspired and possibly paid by Germany."177 Hoping to quiet the crowd, Buchanan addressed it on three occasions,178 Paleologue ventured out to observe the situation and encountered Thomas and his "Russian comrades." Thomas's face, remembered Paleologue, "fairly beamed with revolutionary enthusiasm." "Isn't it splendid!" Thomas declared. Paleologue, however, viewed the situation in a different light. "Today," he wrote, "marks the end of a social order and the collapse of a world."179 Though his assessment was exaggerated, events in Petrograd did indeed signal a grave threat not only to Miliukov but to Russia as a whole. That evening, the Executive Committee met with members of the government for consultation. The Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Israklii Tsereteli, urged the issuance of a new note disowning that of Miliukov, whose dismissal he demanded.180 Chernov suggested Miliukov be appointed Minister of Education. The Foreign Minister, who appeared like "a man who [was] finished," would not submit to the 125 growing cries against him.181 "i was not afraid for Miliukov," he wrote, "I was afraid for Russia."182 Aware that continued political instability within Russia might jeopardize aid from the United States, and possibly the other Allies, Miliukov argued that his intention had been to convince the Allies that Russia was not preparing to make a separate peace and withdraw from the war.183 Though the Foreign Minister opposed the sending of a new note, it was decided, at Tsereteli's suggestion, that the government publish an explanatory note that would first be circulated within Russia, and then sent abroad. This note, published 4 May, explained that by the original note's description of "guarantees and sanctions," the Provisional Government "actually [has] in mind tne limitation of armaments, international tribunals, etc."184 The Provisional Government's action placated the Soviet which, in its acceptance of the explanatory note, claimed

that it had made it clear to the Provisional Government, and to the nations of the world, that the revolutionary democracy of Russia will never agree to a return of the Tsarist foreign policy, and that it is working . . . for international peace.185 Though Miliukov argued that the Provisional Government had conceded nothing, the Finance Minister disagreed, noting that while "in the purely moral sense, it was a victory ... it may be that the government will have 126 to bring into its membership one or two Socialists."186 The creation of a coalition government had become a necessity in the face of the power of the Soviet. Though Miliukov and Guchkov adamantly opposed including more Socialists, Kerensky threatened to resign unless a coalition was formed.187 on 8 May, in response to "the frightful specter of civil war and anarchy [that] hovers over Russia," Lvov announced that his government would extend its base to include additional representatives from the Soviet. The Executive Committee voted against joining the government but, as a result of Kerensky's insistence, reversed its position and agreed to participate. It demanded that Miliukov be replaced, called on the Provisional Government to press immediately for a general peace without annexations or indemnities; and to secure a revision of the earlier treaties. It was obvious that Miliukov's policy was diametrically opposed to such a plan and that it would be necessary to appoint someone with greater "flexibility" to head the Foreign Ministry.188 Guchkov, who was unwilling to "share responsibility for the grave sin being committed against the country," resigned as Minister of War on 13 May.189 Determined to remove Miliukov from his post, the other Ministers seized on Chernov's suggestion that, though his continued participation was necessary, "Miliukov would better develop 127 his talents at any other post, even as Minister of Education."190 Though urged to accept this post as a means of retaining his political influence, the Foreign Minister would not agree to compromise his position. On 16 May, the day following Paieologue's departure from Russia, Miliukov resigned, opposed to the principle of a coalition and a new course in foreign policy. To the end, Miliukov maintained that Russia's war aims should provide her with advantages in territory, prestige, and influence and believed Russia's "common effort" with her allies should be covered by "common reward" for her needs.191 His resignation would be a victory for those increasingly influential voices in Russia calling for a general peace without such gains, and would make it all the more difficult for Allied representatives to keep Russia in the war. Russia's Allies, however, did not understand the significance of Miliukov's resignation. Instead they perceived Kerensky only as a mechanism to keep Russia in the war. In reality, however, the ministerial change reflected the Provisional Government's acceptance of a new direction in foreign policy. Though Kerensky continued to support russia's military participation, his motivations were vastly different from those of the former Foreign Minister. Russia would no longer be engaged in an 128 aggressive campaign for territorial aggrandizement but would instead be fighting a defensive war to protect the rewards of the Revolution. This reorientation, clearly incongruous with the goals of the other Allies, would create even more confusion within the alliance. Moreover, it would establish a dangerous precedent and convince opponents of the Provisional Government that public dissatisfaction could result in significant political changes. 129

Notes iKnox, 2:552. 2Alexander Kerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty (New York: The John Day Company, 1934), pp. 205-206. See Abraham, p. 137. The introduction of Order No. 1 by the Petrograd Soviet quickly negated this advantage by allowing soldiers to form their own committees, increasing the influence of the Soviet in Military affairs, and doing away with military forms of address. Order No. 1 destroyed officer authority and military discipline. 3Leonard Schapiro, The Russian Revolution of 1917, the Origins of Modern Communism (New York; Basic Books, 1984), p. 97. 4Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, p. 427. 5lbid. 6lbid., p. 349. 7virgin D. Medlin and Steven L. Parsons, ed., V^ D. Nabokov and the Russian Provisional Government, 1917 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 87. 8Alexander Kerensky, The Catastrophe (New York; D. Appleton and Company, 1927), p. 129. 9lbid., p. 130. lORnox, 2:569. lllbid., p. 573. 12Francis, p. 89. 13paieologue, 3:246-247. 14ibid., p. 248. 15ibid. 16Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, p. 439. 17Robert P. Browder and Alexander Kerensky, eds.. The Russian Provisional Government, 1917, Documents, vol. 2 (Stanford, California; Hoover Institution Publication, 1961), p. 1042. 130 18paieologue, 3:254. 19ibid. 20Browder and Kerensky, 2:1039. 2lKerensky, The Catastrophe, p. 128. See N. N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution, 1917, A Personal Record (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 77-78. 22Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, p. 437. Hoping to placate Paleologue the Foreign Minister asked for time to find other means of reassuring the Allies. 23paieologue, 3:255. 24warth, p. 46. This pledge was given on 17 March. 25sukhanov, p. 217. 26Frank A. Colder, Documents of Russian History, 1914-1917 (New York: The Century Company, 1927), p. 312. 27Buchanan, 2:90. 28wilson Papers, vol. 40, Enclosure to Lansing, 9 December 1916, p. 200. 29Browder and Kerensky, 2:1045. 30ibid. 3lGolder, pp. 325-326. 32ibid. , p. 326. Stiirmer became Prime Minister in 1915. Alexander Izvolski was Russian Minister from 1906 until 1910. 33ibid., pp. 327-328. 34De Robien, p. 24. 35warth, p. 47. 36Medlin and Parsons, p. 110. 37Buchanan, 2:108. 38Knox, 2:575-576. 39Francis, p. 99. 131 40ibid., p. 87. 41lbid., p. 100. 42u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Wilson to Lansing, 15 May 1917, p. 55. See also Papers of North Winship, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, California. Winship's reports often offered views quite different from those of Francis. 43constantine Nabokov, The Ordeal of a Diplomat (Salisbury, North Carolina: Documentary Publications, 1976), p. 117. 44Buchanan, 2:109. 45Knox, 2:576. 46Buchanan, 2:109. 47Knox, 2:577. 48Kerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty, p. 293. 49Knox, 2:577. 50Medlin and Parsons, p. 118. 5lKerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty, p. 305. 52Medlin and Parsons, p. 45. Kerensky was the sole connection between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet. 53Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, p. 421. 54Medlin and Parsons, p. 116. 55Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961), p. 264. 56Kerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty, pp. 293, 342. 57ibid., p. 342. 58Medlin and Parsons, p. 85. 59ibid. 132 60ibid. 61sukhanov, p. 241.

62Arthur S. Link, Wilson, Campaign for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 410. See Wilson Papers, vol. 42, House to Wilson, 20 April 1917, p. Ill, and Lansing Papers, Diary of Robert Lansing.

63Browder and Kerensky, 2:1083-1085. 64u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, vol. 1, supplement 2, Wilson to Lansing, 27 April 1917, pp. 36-37. 65charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1926), 459-460. 66wilson Papers, vol. 42, Memorandum by J. H. Whitehouse, 14 April 1917, p. 65. See Link, Woodrow Wilson, Revolution, War, and Peace, pp. 71-77. The President sought to disassociate American policy from that of Britain and France. 67George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1960), p. 18. Kennan suggests that "every element" in Wilson's first public statement on the Revolution reflected his "complete misunderstanding of the real situation in Russia" and reflected "generous ideals" not his knowledge of the world. See also E. D. Cronon, ed., The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels (Lincoln; University of Nebraska Press, 1963), p. 113. 68Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 12. The author writes that this ignorance was "in no way unnatural. . . . It had never occurred to most Americans that the political principles by which they themselves lived might have been historically conditioned and might not enjoy universal validity." 69Jane Addams, Peace and Bread in Time of War (New York; King's Crown Press, 1945), p. 64. 70wilson Papers, vol. 43, Wilson to House, 21 July 1917, p. 238. 133 "^iDavid Houston, Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, 1913-1920, vol. 1 (New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1926), 277.

^^The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p. 132. '73wilson Papers, vol. 42, Lansing to Wilson, enclosure from Francis, 10 April 1917, p. 37. ^4ibid., Memorandum of J. H. Whitehouse, 14 April 1917, p. 67. '75ibid. '76Gaddis, p. 61. "^"^Wilson Papers, vol. 42, Balfour to Wilson, 22 March 1917, p. 330. 785 Hansard, 91 (1917); 2086. '79ibid., 91:2086-2087. 80Golder, p. 324. 8lLloyd George, 3:507-508. 82wilson Papers, vol. 42, House to Wilson, 10 April 1917, p. 30. It was ironic that Wilson rejected Allied insistence that his government not take a similar action. 83Lloyd George, 3:508. 84winston Churchill, The World Crisis and the Aftermath, vol. 5 (London; Thornton Butterworth Limited, 1929), 72. 85Michael Kettle, The Allies and the Russian Collapse, March 1917-March 1918 (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1979), p. 13. 86jessup, 2:355. 87Kettle, p. 13. 88Gaddis, p. 61. 89wilson Papers, vol. 42, Spring Rice to Lloyd George, 26 April 1917, p. 141. 134 ^OGaddis, p. 61. See also Wilson Papers, vol. 42, Wilson to McCormick, 27 April 1917, p. 144. ^Iwilson Papers, vol. 42, House to Wilson, 10 April 1917, p. 30. ^2ibid., Lansing to Wilson, 11 April 1917, p. 36. ^3ibid., Wilson to Lansing, 12 April 1917, p. 43. ^4ibid., pp. 43-44. See Link, p. 396, and William A. Williams, pp. 86-87. ^5ibid., Lansing to Wilson, 12 April 1917, p. 45. The question of Harper's popularity was apparently Lansing's view. See also ibid., Lansing to Wilson, 30 April 1917, p. 164, Stanley Washburn, then correspondent for The Times (London), told Lansing that "while the new Government was endeavoring to impress the idea of liberalism in the treatment of Jews, there was never a more intense bitterness and hostility to the race than at present," especially among soldiers and workers. Washburn believed a Jewish member would seriously impair the Mission's usefulness. ^6ibid. On the margin of Lansing's letter, Wilson wrote two lists. The first; Gompers, Crane, Bertron, McCormick and Root. the second: Mott, Gompers, Crane, Colby, McCormick and Bertron. 97ibid., House to Wilson, 13 April 1917, p. 58. 98ibid. 99ibid., McAdoo to Wilson, 17 April 1917, p. 81. lOOibid. lOlibid. 102ibid., House to Wilson, 20 April 1917, p. 111. In is letter. House stated that he had been informed that Gompers was "persona non grata" with the Russian labor faction. See William A. Williams, p. 86. 103ibid., Wise to Wilson, 24 April 1917, pp. 124-125. 104ibid., p. 125. 105ibid., London to Wilson, 28 April 1917, p. 154. 135 106creel, p. 67. 107wilson Papers, vol. 42, House to Wilson, 2 May 1917, p. 194. 108ibid. 109Nabokov, p. 116. llOBuchanan, 2:114. lllBrowder and Kerensky, 2:1050. See also Nabokov, p. 119. 112Golder, p. 330. 113Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, p. 435. 114Kerensky, The Catastrophe, p. 132. 115Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, pp. 445- 447. See also Thomas Riha, A Russian European; Paul Miliukov on Russian Politics (Notre Dame; University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), pp. 318-322. 116paieologue, 3:295. 117ibid. 118De Robien, p. 50. 119w. H. Roobol, Tsereteli, A Democrat in the Russian Revolution (The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p. 85. 120De Robien, p. 50. 121paieologue, 3:297. 122warth, p. 51. Ribot was also Foreign Minister. 1235 Hansard, 92 (1917); 2035. 124Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, p. 440. 125Lockhart, Memoirs of a British Agent, p. 183. It should be noted that the "ignorance of the language" referred to by Lockhart could be applied to almost every Allied representative in Russia. 126sukhanov, p. 261. 136 127paieologue, 3:299. 128ibid.

129ibid., p. 300. See also Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, p. 440. 130ibid.

13lLloyd George, 4:136. See also Buchanan, 2:121. Buchanan writes that Henry Hyndman, leader of the British Socialist Party, later telegraphed Kerensky to "contradict most emphatically [the] lying statement of the I.L.P." 132sukhanov, p. 261. 133paieologue, 3:301. 134warth, p. 52. 135ibid. 136ibid., p. 53.

137sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan London Limited, 1973), p. 30. 138M. Philips Price, M^ Reminiscences of the Russian Revolution (London: George Allen and Univin, 1921), pp. 19-20. 139Buchanan, 2:117. 140Lockhart, Memoirs of a British Agent, p. 184. See also Buchanan, 2:132. 14lBuchanan, 2:132. 142papers of Charles Edward Russell, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 143Lockhart, Memoirs of a_ British Agent, p. 184. 144Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, p. 439. 145paieologue, 3:320. While Paleologue championed Miliukov's cause, Buchanan was becoming increasingly impressed by Kerensky. Miliukov would blame this development as a pivotal factor in his downfall. 137 146ibid. 147paieologue, 3:311. This was Thomas's second visit to Russia. 148Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, p. 439. 149paieologue, 3:312, 335-337. 150ibid. 151ibid., p. 337. Paleologue suggests that the intellectual training of the French Socialists made them "particularly responsive to the influence of oratory . . . Hence Kerensky's curious ascendancy over them." 152De Robien, p. 44. 153ibid. 154paieologue, 3:313. 155Roobol, p. 112. For more on Chernov and the Social Revolutionary Party see Oliver Radkey's The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism (New York; Columbia University Press, 1958), and The Sickle Under the Hammer (New York; Columbia University Press, 1963). 156paieologue, 3:314. 157ibid., p. 315. 158ibid. 159ibid. 160ibid., p. 317. 16lNorman Stone, The Eastern Front, 1914-1917 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1975), pp. 288-289. 162Kettle, p. 37. 163Knox, 2:606. 164Buchanan, 2:119. 165Kerensky, The Catastrophe, p. 134. 138 166Abraham, p. 176. See also Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, p. 445. Miliukov claimed that Kerensky's action was the result of the increasing influence of the Soviet. 167Kerensky, The Catastrophe, p. 134. 168Browder and Kerensky, 2:1045. 169ibid., 2:1097. 170Abraham, pp. 177-178. The decision to meet there was due to Guchkov's deteriorating health, brought about by a severe heart condition. I'^llbid. , p. 178. See also Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, p. 446. The Foreign Minister claimed that the words "guarantees and sanctions" were inserted as a result of Thomas's "insistent request." 172Buchanan, 2:123. 173Alexander Kerensky, Russia at History's Turning Point, p. 246. 174Buchanan, 2:123. 175Abraham, p. 178. See also Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, p. 448. 176Roobol, p. 113. 177u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 4 May 1917, p. 40. In reality, Lenin believed Bolshevik action at this time was premature. 178Buchanan, 2:124. 179paieologue, 3:325-326. 180Roobol, p. 113. 18lRex A. Wade, The Russian Search for Peace, February-October, 1917 (Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 41. 182Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, p. 448. 139 183Francis, p. 110. See also U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 4 May 1917, p. 40. 184Golder, p. 336. 185Browder and Kerensky, 2:100. 186Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, p. 449. 187Kerensky, Russia at History's Turning Point, p. 247. 188ibid. 189warth, p. 61. See also Roobol, p. 119. 190Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, p. 452. See also Riha, pp. 323-326. 191winship Papers, Winship to Lansing, 22 May 1917. CHAPTER IV TO KEEP THE EASTERN FRONT; HENDERSON, STEVENS, AND ROOT IN RUSSIA

Despite Allied hopes to the contrary, ministerial changes within the Provisional regime did little to strengthen the Russian war effort. The resignations of Miliukov and Guchkov had been followed by the creation of a coalition government which increasingly reflected an interest in a new war policy more harmonious with prevailing Russian attitudes. Faced with a deterioration of Russia's will to fight, her allies would desperately seek methods of regaining Russian participation. With this in mind, various missions would be dispatched to Russia as demonstrations of Allied support. The American Root and Stevens delegations as well as the arrival of sympathetic observers such as British Labour Party Secretary and member of the War Cabinet Arthur Henderson, would, however, have little effect on Russian opinion which was growing more hostile to the war. Allied objections to the proposed Socialist peace gathering at Stockholm would further intensify criteria of the war which many Russians now viewed as incompatible with Russia's revolutionary ideology. 140 141 The May coalition government was initially welcomed by the Russians and their allies, who believed that it offered the prospect of political stability necessary to prosecute the war. Actually, creation of the coalition had the opposite effect. With Guchkov and Miliukov no longer directing military and foreign affairs, the new government had the freedom to abandon the former war policy and adhere to new objectives which were more clearly in harmony with prevailing Russian attitudes.

According to the final statement of the First Provisional Government, Russia repudiated "encroachments on the freedom of other peoples, or, forceful seizures of their territories." At the same time, it pledged to continue its cooperation with the leading democracies to attain a lasting peace based on self-determination.1 On the day that it had joined the government, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet met with the ministers of the coalition to review the program of the regime. On 18 May, a new declaration outlining foreign policy was issued in which the government promised to adopt a goal of "a general peace which shall not tend toward either domination over other nations, or the seizure of their national possessions, or the violent usurpation of their territories—a peace without annexations or indemnities. . . ."2 Though it sounded an ominous 142 warning to the Allies, the declaration also pledged that the Russian army would continue the war and endeavor to strengthen its military capabilities.3 The task of continuing the war and directing foreign relations fell to Kerensky, now Secretary of War and Navy, and the new Foreign Minister, Michael Tereshchenko, a well-educated son of a wealthy Moscow family and a ballet connoisseur who had once considered becoming a concert pianist.4 Tereshchenko quickly ingratiated himself with Buchanan by his "tactful" manner.5

Kerensky, well aware of the emotional state of his people, realized that not only were the Russians physically exhausted by the three years of conflict, they also "revolted spiritually against further bloodshed. [They] sought, perhaps naively, but honestly and sincerely, a way out of the seemingly hopeless impasse into which all warring Europe had fallen."6 The new Minister of War, however, did not view the Soviet's call of 27 March for immediate peace to be realistic. Instead, Kerensky's primary goal was the restoration of the Russian army. To accomplish this task, Kerensky thought it imperative that a new offensive be launched. Here the War Minister gravely misinterpreted the situation. General Aleksei Brusilov reported that though the troops at first supported Kerensky, "another offensive and the maintenance of the 143 Alliance with the Entente . . . were not at all what the soldiers had in mind and were opposed to all their aspirations."7 while he agreed with Kerensky that a successful offensive might "bring everything right," British Military Attache Knox was equally certain that a failed campaign would be fatal for the Russian army.8

Belief in the positive effect of a new offensive was not the sole factor influencing Kerensky. Russia had pledged to support General Robert Nivelle's offensive along the French-Belgian border, which had begun the previous month. Many Russian leaders thought their country's failure to observe its obligations in this direction might impel her allies to offer Germany a separate peace at Russia's expense.9 Despite Russian assurances, it was unrealistic to expect that her army, in its deteriorated state, could tie-up German forces in the east.10 Even within Nivelle's government there had been doubt that the offensive would succeed.11 Paul Painleve, the French Minister of War, had openly opposed the plan. He unsuccessfully argued for the postponement of the campaign until American troops arrived and Russia recovered. British Field-Marshal William Robertson acknowledged that "most of the French Generals were equally disinclined to believe that the anticipated results would be attained."12 Marshal Foch, appointed 144 Chief of the French General Staff on 15 May, believed that Russia would be of little assistance in the war. The Russian army, he noted, had "fallen prey to revolutionary propaganda . . . [and now] seemed decided upon a purely passive attitude."13

From the outset, Nivelle's western offensive, which had begun 16 April as a joint Anglo-French operation, was an unmitigated disaster. The plan, which necessitated strict secrecy, was haphazardly discussed. German machine-gun emplacements, which should have bee neutralized prior to the advance, remained operational. Instead of the resounding victory for which the French had hoped, Paris now simply agreed to continue the offensive in order to exhaust the enemy.14 Though Painleve's proposal to await the restoration of Russian military power appeared to be sound, it would not be until July that Russian armies would be capable of launching an offensive. The absence of Russian military activity in the spring greatly benefited the Germans. General Ludendorff remembered: I had never been one to indulge in fruitless speculation, but I could not help considering what our position must inevitably have been had the Russians attacked in April and May and met with even minor successes. We should then . . . have had a desperate struggle. Our supply of munitions had diminished to an alarming extent. . . . During those two months of 1917 ... it was the Russian Revolution alone that saved us from serious trouble.15 145 The failure of Nivelle forced London and Paris to consider a second offensive to win the war by the close of 1917. With this in mind. Allied representatives increased their pressure on the Provisional Government to implement measures that could ensure a significant role for the Russian army.

Upon his assumption of the War Ministry, Kerensky immediately addressed the "sulking members of the commanding corps" and forbade the resignation of field officers.16 The decay of officer morale had been intensified by the publication of the Soviet's "Declaration of Soldiers' Rights," the codification of Order No. 1. The Declaration abolished corporal punishment "without exception" and prohibited "all punishments that offend the dignity and honor of the solider, as well as those that cause pain and are obviously detrimental to his health."17 General Alexeyev, the Supreme Commander of the Russian army, realized that the document would have disastrous consequences on his army; and, along with other high-ranking military leaders, met with representatives of both the coalition government and the Soviet to voice great concern. A successful conclusion to the war, warned the generals, could only be obtained if discipline were restored in'the ranks, an impossible undertaking should the recent pronouncements of the Petrograd Soviet be allowed to stand. 146 As the "Declaration of Soldiers' Rights" had already been published in Izvestia, there was little the government could do in response to the criticisms leveled by Alexeyev and his colleagues. Kerensky found himself in the difficult predicament of needing to appease both the General Staff and the Petrograd Soviet.18 in the end, he employed his considerable influence to force revision of the text, including restoration of Article No. 14, which allowed officers, in combat situations, "to take all measures" to punish insubordination ad dereliction of duty, and the revision of another. No. 18, which gave Russian commanders complete authority to appoint and dismiss officers.19 Though Kerensky had hoped that the modified Declaration would pacify a majority of the parties, subsequent events proved otherwise. Soon after publication of the revisions, the Bolsheviks launched a vitriolic campaign against the document, labeling it the "Declaration of the Deprivation of the Rights of the Soldier." The party organ, Pravda, was especially critical, charging that Kerensky had issued the Declaration in hopes of mounting a new military campaign.20 Ironically, the conservatives within the officer corps also objected, forcing Kerensky, on the advice of 147 Albert Thomas, to treat the officers who threatened to resign as deserters.21 Sukhanov decried the fact that Thomas, whom he called an "agent of Anglo-French financial interests," had begun "turning up in the Ex. Com., demanding blood, and [had] now entered into more and more intimate contact with the top leaders of the Soviet majority."22

De Robien was likewise alarmed by Thomas's increasing influence, warning that his methods were "not right for the country. One should not treat these people like friends, but one should talk to them like a master." De Robien admitted that this opinion was shared by few others but maintained that "only a surgical operation can save [Russia]: it is very dangerous but it is the only hope of salvation." The Russian Government, he charged, was "absolutely incapable of fulfilling any decision, including its pledges to the Allies." While the War Ministers had good intentions, the Frenchman wondered how he could promise to "re-establish iron discipline in the army ... if he himself has never submitted to any discipline?" Kerensky's "fine words" were not enough to give de Robien confidence.23 Even Ambassador Francis, who termed Kerensky's work as "valiant," considered the Minister "too soft to command an army."24 Nonetheless, Francis persjisted in requesting United States aid for Russia. The Ambassador held that his nation had a unique 148 responsibility to Russia, which "look[ed] to America for guidance and assistance and . . . leadership."25 Tereshchenko, whom Francis saw daily, and Kerensky had indicated that Russia's need was not for men but for money and supplies with which to feed and equip its forces. Francis, however, informed Russian officials that he would not recommend a loan unless they could provide "reliable assurance" that Russia would not make a separate peace but would instead vigorously continue the war.26 still, soon after she entered the war the United States, on Francis's recommendation, extended a credit of $100 million to Petrograd.27 Meanwhile Knox advised his government to curtail supplies to Russia "unless steps were taken to restore discipline."28 j. y. Simpson, a British journalist in Russia, admitted the situation was "disappointing" but urged the Allies to continue "that spirit of patience and restraint . . . which has already found many Russian hearts closer than ever to them."29 Russia's involvement, he suggested, would grow. This goal was a difficult one as "muddle and indiscipline" characterized Russian forces which by now more closely resembled a "poorly trained militia" than a regular army.3<^ Kerensky, argued that the newly signed Order No. 8 would do much to restore military capacity 149 and would result in a "healthy mood of patriotism at the front."31 still skeptical. Allied representatives urged the War Minister to do all he could to prepare the troops for the scheduled offensive.32 For this reason, Kerensky accepted the invitation of General Brusilov, Commander-in-Chief in the Southeast, to tour the front. Brusilov considered the visit to be a "last remedy," far from his earlier optimism in which he indicated Russia's armies were prepared for battle.33 Now, suggested the General, it was important that Kerensky "should be made acquainted with the spirit of the Army," and "remove any impression" that Brusilov and the other officers opposed the revolution.34

Kerensky departed Petrograd for the front on 12 May. Accompanying him were N. D. Sokolov, the autnor of Order No. 1, and Albert Thomas. Sokolov, who was greatly upset by the effects of the Order, hoped to aid in the restoration of confidence in the officer corps.35 Thomas, who continued to believe that Kerensky could salvage the Russian war effort, hoped to assist in preparations for the long promised offensive. Regarding Thomas, de Robien noted, "there are still some people who have illusions." De Robien saw little improvement and doubted whether Kerensky's efforts would succeed betore the government's overthrow. "Anarchy," he wrote, "[is] too attractive 150 to the Russian character. One must therefore have no illusions. It is certain that Russia does not want any more of the war."36 Kerensky remained confident that he could restore the spirit of the army. Failure, he believed, would be disastrous for Russia. "If inactivity at the front and the collapse of the army's strength—its discipline—continued, the Germans as well as the Allies would lose all respect for us and would completely disregard our legitimate interests in the future."37

Kerensky was enthusiastically received by the majority of Brusilov's troops. The War Minister made "superb speeches and [issued] heroic orders of the day in which he only [spoke] of discipline and imminent offensives."38 "i summon you to battle," he told the troops, "to feats of heroism—I summon you not to festivity, but to death; to sacrifice yourselves to save your country."39 The men pledged to do all that the War Minister asked. "Of course," admitted Kerensky, "the new mood would not last long." Still he hoped that "something of it remained."40 m reality, Kerensky's speeches were solely of "literary value."41 Growing disorder within the army had made it virtually impossible for the Minister of War to revive his nation's war effort. Pravda questioned whether the troops were willing to die in order that "English capitalists 151 (could) rob Mesopotamia and Palestine," and charged that the coalition's ministers were closely tied to capitalist interests.42

In his 26 May 1917 article for Nineteenth Century Simpson suggested that this "malignancy" was confined to the "more extreme sections" and was attributable to "German influence . . . and the influence of certain abnormal individuals who are a danger not only to Russia but to human society."43 Ribot reiterated his confidence in Russia which, he said, would never consider a separate peace. Along the front, however, exhausted Russian troops demanded peace, their cries echoed throughout the nation by the war-weary masses. The Provisional Government promised to convince its allies to hold a conference for the revision of war aims.

The Soviet, meanwhile, embarked on a policy of its own, calling for an international conference of socialists to mobilize opposition to the war. The movement for peace had also found adherents in the other belligerent nations. Unrest in Germany led to a series of workers' strikes in April; and in France, an uprising in the army in May had left that country all but defenseless.44 Though previous attempts to organize an international socialist meeting (at Zimmerwald in 1915 and at Kienthal the following year) had proved unsuccessful, the disturbances in Germany and France 152 suggested that such a conference might now succeed. The initial step in this direction was taken by Dutch socialists who, on their own initiative, chose Stockholm as the site for the proposed gathering.45 soon joined by colleagues from Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, the group, presided over by Hjalmar Branting, a leading Swedish socialist, invited all those affiliated with the International Socialist Bureau to the conference scheduled for 15 May to discuss possible methods of reaching a peace accord.

Allied socialists reacted coolly to the proposal, and it became obvious that the support of Russian socialists would be necessary if the meeting was to succeed.46 m April, a Danish Social Democrat, Frederick Borgbjerg, visited Petrograd with an invitation for the Soviet. Though such a conference had been discussed by Russian socialists, the reality of such a meeting elicited a variety of responses. While Menshevik reaction was overwhelmingly favorable, that of the Bolsheviks was quite hostile.47 Faced with such discrepancy of opinion, the Soviet claimed complete credit for the conference, in effect virtually ignoring the efforts of Borgbjerg and his colleagues.48 The Stockholm meeting had appeared consistent with Kerensky's promise to obtain a revision of war aims and, in fact, the War Minister had represented the idea 153 in the Provisional Government. Now, however, Kerensky's commitment to the Allied military effort made it increasingly difficult for him to support the meeting. For Russia to emerge victorious at the war's conclusion, she would require the continued support of her allies, who now opposed the convention. In the Soviet's view, the Stockholm gathering required the participation of Allied socialists if it were to succeed.49 AS it was to be a "real peace conference," the Soviet, well aware of the importance of joint participation, requested the Allied governments to send socialist representatives to discuss the European situation.50 The Allied governments were in a difficult position. Aware of the socialists' "pacifist complexion," Lloyd George was also concerned about irritating the Soviet which he believed was the actual power broker in Russia.51 To avoid participation, London suggested to Paris and Rome that, due to the threat posed by enemy submarines, travel to the proposed meeting would be dangerous.52 In view of the Allied governments' decision, there was little chance that the Stockholm meeting could achieve its objectives. Nonetheless, socialists from smaller European nations began arriving in Petrograd to discuss the conference. Two of the most prominent, Belgians Hendrik 154 DeMan and Emile Vanderwelde, arrived on 18 May. During their five-week stay they were joined by Louis de Broukere, another Belgian, and they toured the country, frequently speaking to workers, soldiers, and politicians. Though they were received with courtesy, their views were clearly different from those held by the Russian socialists. Leon Trotsky, who returned to Russia aboard the same train as the Belgians, viewed DeMan as an agent of the Belgian government and Vanderwelde as "the least important of the leading group of International. . . . [DeMan] maneuvered his way among the various socialistic currents as his government did among the Great Powers."53 The purpose of the Belgians' visit, according to Trotsky, was to "invite the Russian revolution to take Czardom's place in the ranks of the Allies."54 Bolshevik principles were counter to those held by DeMan and Vanderwelde. Both were unimpressed by the Bolshevik leaders.55 Their purpose, however, was not to reconcile with Russia's left-wing socialists but to gain support for the Allied cause. Additionally, DeMan and Vanderwelde carried with them another task—to reject the invitation to the Stockholm meeting. The Belgian Government, like those of Britain, France and the United States, could not support any peace basea on the principle of no indemnities and no annexations. Modification of war 155 aims would only add confusion to the Allied cause.56 TO Allied socialists, a conference which included German representatives was inconsistent with their ardent opposition to Kaiserism, which DeMan viewed as "a present-day despotism that had its origins in the mad antagonisms of the class struggle."57 This conflict was more nationalistic than philosophical. "So long as German soldiers are in Belgium," argued Vanderwelde, "no talk of peace is possible."58

Western socialism, as reflected in the nationalistic and generally pro-war philosophies of the representatives of that ideology who made their way to Russia during these days, was profoundly different from the style espoused by their Russian colleagues. As Russian socialism became dominated by radical elements, these differences became the source of great irritation between the two factions. Russian radicals viewed those of the West as "counterfeit" socialists who were government agents of bourgeois financial interests.59 TO some extent this charge was valid. Vanderwelde and DeMan officially represented their government, which was much in favor of continuing the war. A similar goal was expressed by the Italian delegation. Led by Arturo Labriola, a former syndicalist who was now a monarchist member of the Italian Government, the four-man commission attempted to convince 156 the leaders of the Soviet to renew their support of the war.60

Despite these failures, the governments in Paris, London and Rome believed that Russia desired contact with western socialists. Tsereteli had urged an exchange of labor and socialist representatives between Petrograd and London, a suggestion that met with favor in Britain. Lloyd George's government, particularly impressed by Thomas's "success," dispatched Arthur Henderson, a member of the War Cabinet and Labour Party Secretary, on a mission similar to that of Thomas. Though he had "rendered very sincere service" as British Ambassador, Buchanan's friendship with the former regime made him the target of much Russian criticism. It was decided, therefore, in the guise that he might return to London for consultation, that his responsibilities would be assumed by Henderson. On 24 May, Buchanan received a telegram from Lord Robert Cecil, then in charge of the Foreign Office, notifying him that in order to clarify British interests and to gain support for the war, Henderson was being sent to Russia on a special mission. Cecil suggested that, after Henderson was settled, the Ambassador might come to Britain to discuss the Russian situation. Buchanan did not agree with the directive to return home, instead preferring to work under Henderson, whom he believed he could assist in a variety of ways.61 157 Buchanan wired Cecil that he would aid Henderson in whatever ways necessary and inquired as to whether he was being recalled. Cecil's reply, which reached the British Embassy on 29 May, indicated "there [was] no question of your being recalled. Your services have been and remain most highly valued ... we shall most certainly have you back in Petrograd."62

Upon his arrival on 2 June, Henderson was shocked to discover Buchanan had not been informed of his instructions. Henderson was therefore obliged bluntly to inform Buchanan of his own orders to assume diplomatic responsibilities in Petrograd.63 The following evening, Vanderwelde, Thomas, Prince Lvov, and Tereshchenko joined Buchanan and Henderson for dinner at the Embassy. This, and other events, convinced Henderson that his government had been mistaken in its assesment of its ambassador's relations with the new Russian regime.64 on 14 June, Henderson wrote Lloyd George urging that Buchanan be retained.65 He had "not received from any quarter the slightest hint of dissatisfaction with Sir George's work or attitude." Buchanan noted that the wire was "naturally an object of violent attacks on the part of the extremists, who, in their present temper, would probably treat in the same way any representative our country appointed who dared to do his duty."66 AS for 158 Henderson, Lloyd George wrote that he had the "good sense" to realize that he did not possess the qualities necessary to represent successfully Britain and the war effort in Russia. Still, he remained for six weeks, speaking before a number of groups in Petrograd and Moscow. Though he liked Kerensky, Tereshchenko, and, most of all, Tsereteli, Henderson generally did not enjoy his sojourn in Russia. He was especially disturbed by the Bolsheviks, who coincidentally did not like him, and believed that their possible ascendancy would certainly remove Russia from the war.67

Though his efforts to gain support for the war were for naught, Henderson addressed a variety of other issues while in Russia. One of these concerned the proposed visit of Ramsay MacDonald to Russia. The leader of the Independent Labour Party viewed the Revolution, and the Petrograd Soviet in particular, as purveyors of a new European order. This opportunity, however, was endangered by several possibilities; first. Allied demands that the Provisional Government "fight to a finish"; second, the growing influence of the Bolsheviks; and third, the possibility that the extremists might triumph and conclude a separate peace, a development which would render impossible a democratic understanding between the people of Europe.68 An influential Russian emigre, the socialist 159 David Soskice, urged MacDonald to go to Russia. The labor leader, however, thought that his government would "no more think of letting [him] go to Russia than a keeper would think of letting a lion have a constitutional out of his cage."69 AS it appeared unlikely that he would be allowed personally to represent his views in Russia, MacDonald agreed to Vanderwelde's request for a letter opposing a separate peace which might be presented to the Soviet leaders.70 The letter, which included numerous references to MacDonald's belief in European democracy, urged Russia not to withdraw from the war simply on the basis of her own interests; but to "act for European democracy as a whole." Earlier MacDonald had written Kerensky in a similar vein, noting that though he was "particularly gratified" by the "non-conquest and non-aggressive determination of the Russian democracy," a separate peace would leave Europe "more helpless than it is now in the hands of evil-doers."71 Developments in Russia finally forced Lloyd George's government to allow MacDonald to travel and consult with leaders of the Petrograd Soviet. In addition, MacDonald's delegation planned to stop in Stockholm to participate in discussions concerning the war. Both Henderson and Buchanan supported the visit, Buchanan suggesting that it "could not possibly do any harm, while the proceedings of the Russian extremists 160 might . . . serve as an object lesson to him [MacDonald]."72 MacDonald, along with Fred W. Jowett of the Independent Labour Party (ILP), E. C Fairchild and Albert Inkpin of the Socialist Party, George Roberts and William Carter, Labour Party members, and Julius West of the Fabian Society, reached Aberdeen on 10 June to prepare for the voyage to Russia. The crew of the ship that was to carry them, however, refused to sail. Their decision was the result of the personal antagonisms of "Captain" Tupper, a leader of the Seamen's and Firemen's Union. The Union had made numerous attempts to organize the patriotism of British workers, who they believed were being misled by their own leaders, such as those of the Independent Labour Party.

Tupper's animosity had resulted from the "ill-treatment" he had received at the ILP and Socialist Party convention held at Leeds the previous week. Here, Britain's minority socialists gathered to support overwhelmingly the idea of a general peace and to applaud the efforts of the Petrograd Soviet in that direction. During the meeting, Tupper raised the issue of compensation for the families of merchant seamen killed or injured as a result of German submarine attacks. Tupper was rudely interrupted by his opponents, who boisterously suggested 161 that British shipowners should assume the responsibility and criticized Tupper as not having the authority to speak for the sailors.73 Recognizing an opportunity for revenge, the "Captain" had informed the Aberdeen seamen of the hostility shown by the pacifist delegates at Leeds and maintained that their own union officials had been the victims of insults and ridicule. Though MacDonald and the ILP representatives eventually agreed that Germany should assume financial responsibility for the deaths of British sailors, striking seamen refused to heed Tupper's instructions to terminate the demonstration and forced cancellation of the journey.

As he had not been involved at Leeds, Julius West proceeded to Russia, as did the well-known suffragist, Emmeline Pankhurst. Subsequent efforts to gain the assistance of Lloyd George for MacDonald's Russian visit proved fruitless. The Prime Minister refused the plea of ILP Chairman Viscount Snowden for aid, as it was apparent that the sailor's opposition to the delegation remained. Lloyd George also rejected the suggestion that his government provide warships to transport the group, fearing that it could lead to a serious uprising aboard ship.74 This possibility was but one of Lloyd George's concerns. Political repercussions might also have arisen 162 had the government helped the group reach Petrograd. Public opinion was running against the visit. "The feeling throughout the country," recalled the Prime Minister, "was one of unqualified approval of the actions of the sailors."75

Britain's allies, fearing the negative effect the Stockholm conference could have on troop morale, had been alarmed by the government's decision to grant passports to MacDonald and his colleagues. Ribot's government had refused passports to French socialists, believing that "a French peace must not be the peace of the socialists, but the peace of victory."76 American reaction was similarly negative. In fact, the Wilson administration had been the first Allied government to refuse passports to socialist representatives—American Socialist Party members Morris Hillquit, Algernon Lee, and Victor Berger—to attend the conference in Stockholm.77 in a note of 19 May, Secretary Lansing called Hillquit a "natural intriguer" who was "utterly unreliable" and who, "in spite of his profession of sympathy with the cause which we support in the war . . . would favor any means to aid in forcing peace."78 Hillquit, recalled Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, had once told a socialist audience in New York that it made little.cifference whether the United States was governed by a president or a Kaiser. This, suggested the Senator, 163 n indicatei d the kind of people they are seeking to go to that mischievous conference."79 Those who had been chosen as representatives of the American Socialist Party did not accurately represent either the views of American socialists in particular or the American public as a whole. Although at their convention in St. Louis, the party had adopted a resolution condemning the war, it is questionable whether it reflected the attitudes of the majority of socialists in the United States.80 Samuel Gompers termed the meeting an example of "insidious pro-Kaiser propaganda," an opinion echoed by former left-wing socialist leader W. E. Walling.81 Charles Edward Russell, at one time a socialist candidate for the presidency who was to accompany the Root Mission to Russia, warned that the meeting was of "the most sinister nature" and was almost certainly pro-German in origin.82 Earlier, Russell and another prominent New York socialist, Meyer London (who had recently been reelected to Congress on the Socialist ticket), cabled Russian socialist N. C Chkheidze, urging Russians to reject a separate peace. The cable was signed by eleven American socialists.83 Joseph Patrick Tumulty, the President's private secretary, urged Wilson to ignore the demands for a separate peace then emanating from Russia, "the weakest link in the whole line of the Allied cause."84 Tumulty called for strong measures 164 and "daring diplomacy" to retard the peace movement.85 He acknowledged that while such a policy might have negative consequences, the risk was worth taking when compared to the consequences if the socialists won the day. On 23 May, Wilson's government issued a strong denunciation of the peace efforts by the European socialists and threatened to invoke the Logan Act to punish any American who attended the Stockholm conference.86 Lansing considered individual attempts to influence the actions of the belligerent nations as aiding and comforting the enemy.87 While the government's refusal to issue passports could be defended on the basis of "prudence, propriety, and even legality," it appeared that citizens of the democratic United States had been denied rights that citizens of autocratic Germany had not.88 The response was reactionary. The Nation editorialized, because the Stockholm meeting would have had little effect as it did not represent the majority of the socialists. As it was planned, few important leaders would be in attendance since the leading parties in Britain and France had clearly rejected the proposal. There was little use for the conference as the Allied governments were already considering means of concluding the war. 165 Hillquit, who considered their issuance a "mere formality," was "deeply disappointed" by the refusal to grant passports to socialists going to Sweden.89 in response, he went to Washington where he unsuccessfully argued his case. Despite attempts by leaders of the Stockholm Committee to convince Wilson that their ideals were similar to his own, the President refused to alter his decision.90

The plan to prevent the attendance of American socialists in Stockholm was not entirely successful. On 18 June, Max Goldfarb, Boris Reinstein, and D. Davidovitch arrived in Stockholm claiming to represent the American socialist community. Goldfarb and Reinstein stated they were members of the Socialist Labor Party while Davidovitch claimed to be a leader of the Socialist Territorialist Labor Jewish Party. Their legitimacy, however, was highly suspect. The United States Ambassador to Sweden, Ira Nelson Morris, cabled Lansing of his suspicions. Reinstein, Morris stated, had no passport while Goldfarb and Davidovitch were not American citizens.91 Lansing informed Morris that he might unofficially inform the Swedish press that the American Socialist Party had denied authorizing the three to speak for it. The Socialist Labor Party, to which Reinstein belonged, enjoyed no influence. "In the last election," cabled the Secretary, "the party 166 cast 13,000 votes out of a total of more than eighteen and a half million which shows of how little importance Reinstein's organization is."92 Russian socialists were unwilling to abandon the possibility of discussions with their western counterparts. In mid-July, the President of the Council of Workman's and Soldiers' Deputies, N. S. Chkheidze, invited representatives of the American Socialist Party to a conference in Petrograd. The party was prepared to accept the offer if Wilson's government allowed. When questioned as to his opinions on such a meeting, Francis urged that such a conference should be "checkmated if possible . . . because [Russian] Socialists [are] more bent on promulgating their doctrine than prosecuting [the] war to [a] successful finish."93

The State Department hoped for concerted action with its allies and instructed Francis discreetly to inquire as to the attitudes of the French and British ambassadors concerning the possible socialist meeting. Jules Cambon, the Secretary General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had told American Ambassador to France, William G. Sharp, that his government would allow only French representatives to attend the meeting if the topics to be discussed were previously arranged. Cambon intimated, however, that because of the chaotic state of 167 Russia's international affairs and the general belief that Germany was behind the idea, his government would probably refuse to grant official sanction for the attendance of French representatives to such a meeting, a position which would probably be taken by London.94

Britain's government was actually undecided concerning a socialist meeting. Initially, the War Cabinet had considered the Stockholm gathering a legitimate means of keeping Russia actively involved in the war.95 This view was primarily a result of false information provided by Arthur Henderson.96 while in Russia, Henderson had recognized the growing pessimism of that nation toward the war and believed that only a revision of war aims could reverse the trend. In this, Buchanan was in complete agreement.9 7 Henderson viewed the success of the Stockholm meeting as paramount if the Provisional Government was to continue to exist. Not only a Cabinet member but Secretary of the Labour Party as well, Henderson urged the party to support the Stockholm proposal, provided that the convention was strictly consultative in nature.98 The organization's executive committee decided, in principal, to support the meeting and scheduled a national convention for August to select representatives.^9

Oddly, there was some confusion as to whether the meeting was to be held in Petrograd or Stockholm. 168 "Department assumes that your reference to 'Stockholm conference' was intended for 'Petrograd conference,'" wired the State Department to Ambassador Walter Page in Britain. "The reference to Stockholm is correct," replied the Ambassador, "for that is where it is to be held."100 The majority of Lloyd George's Cabinet opposed the meeting and criticized Henderson for his support of the conference. Henderson was in an untenable position. On one hand, as Labour Party Secretary, his support of Stockholm was imperative; on the other, the government of which he was a member opposed the gathering.101 Fearing political repercussions, the government was reluctant to act, prompting growing criticism of the Prime Minister.102 Russian Charge Nabokov reported that Britain opposed the conference and requested permission to clarify his government's position. Tereshchenko replied that, while Russia could not prohibit the attendance of her socialists, his government did not view decisions reached at Stockholm as binding.103 The telegram was shown to Henderson whose refusal to modify his support for Stockholm ultimately forced his resignation from the government.104 In spite of the Henderson affair, Lloyd George's government had not yet reached a final decision. Its position was made more difficult by the French and American rejection of the meeting. Ultimately Britain followed the 169 lead of its allies and refused to allow British socialists to attend, holding that it was illegal for unauthorized British citizens to engage in discussions with the enemy.105

The opposition of its allies made the already difficult position of the Russian Government all the more precarious. It was further compromised by Nabokov's publication of Tereshchenko's note to the Allies, which created a furor in Petrograd.106 Kerensky sought desperately to disassociate his government from those who opposed Stockholm, claiming that the perception that it opposed the conference was totally false.107 Meanwhile he reiterated his promise to the Allies that any resolutions originating from the convention would have no effect on Russia's "vigorous" prosecution of the war.108 Kerensky and Tereshchenko suggested that the Wilson administration reconsider its earlier decision and allow American socialists and representatives of the Federation of Labor to attend the conference "to counteract or oppose the influence" of the German socialists in attendance.109 Washington, however, could not guarantee that its socialists, if allowed to attend, would not vote with those of Germany. Though the Stockholm Conference never took place, it was a manifestation of a greater problem. The desire 170 for immediate peace was gaining momentum in Russia and finding adherents in Europe and in the United States. Steps were needed that would strengthen the war effort, and, in particular, revive Russia's waning desire to fight.110 To many, a revision of war aims remained a necessity if this was to occur. "It seemed certain," wrote The Nation, "... that the principle of no annexation and and no punitive indemnity after the war [would have to] be accepted" if Russian involvement was to continue.Ill If these modifications were not made, the Russian Government would disintegrate, putting an end to "the hope of Europe."112

Despite the conference's cancellation, Stockholm was to become a gathering site for socialists from throughout the world.113 Further, Allied opposition to the meeting intensified the view then gaining popularity in Russia that Allied goals were incompatible with those of the Revolution.114 Clearly the Stockholm agenda differed from Allied goals for pursuing the war. The United States hoped to attain these by offering assistance to Russia. For this purpose, Wilson's government had organized two missions to Russia; a Railway Commission to improve the transportation system; and the Elihu Root Commission, dispatched to assist Russia in whatever way possible. 171 Russia's deplorable transportation system was a key to many aspects of the Russian condition. Troops, supplies, and foodstuffs could scarcely be transported to points where they were desperately needed. Although supplies were adequate, the distribution system was collapsing.115

Railway problems in Russia had existed for many years. The system was improperly designed, in many cases poorly constructed, and altogether inefficiently operated. Wartime demands had exacerbated these conditions. With the coming of the revolution, the system completely disintegrated. The Allies were well aware of this situation but their attempts to improve conditions came a year too late.116 In 1917, the most important rail system in Russia was the Trans-Siberian network, which consisted of six major lines. While each was operated separately, all fell under the supervision of the central railway administration headquartered in Petrograd. The six were the Chinese-Eastern, the Trans-Baikal, the Tomsk, the Perm, the Omsk, and the Northern lines. Additionally, the Amur line, which branched off the Chinese-Eastern at Nikolsk, served the Amur river region prior to its incorporation into the Trans-Baikal at Kataisk.117 The Chinese-Eastern was the second link of the Trans-Siberian system which 172 crossed the southern Urals from European Russia through Omsk and Irkutsk, then skirted Lake Baikal before branching off to Vladivostok.118 Much of the system had been constructed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with French funds.119 Though not all the lines were badly overused, inefficient administration, insufficient labor, and inadequate equipment had created a transportation nightmare that demanded an immediate remedy. On 31 March 1917, Ambassador Page cabled Secretary Lansing suggesting that a major problem confronting the new Russian regime was the operation of the Trans-Siberian Railway. He noted that American management would aid not only Russia's military efforts but also her industrial development following the war, an important consideration for future commercial relations between the two nations.120 Ten days later Lansing wired Francis asking him to inquire how the Provisional Government would receive a delegation of American railroad experts.121 Francis agreed with Page, believing the situation to be an "excellent opportunity which our ablest managers should be ambitious to embrace."122 when asked, Miliukov responded that such a mission would be welcome.123 The mission had also been unofficially recommended by Stanley Washburn upon his return from Russia in the spring. Britain and France 173 shared the United States concern and offered their support.124 Actually, such a delegation had long been under cabinet consideration where Secretary of Interior Lane was the most vocal advocate of the idea.125 The mission was to be headed by John F. Stevens, a prominent civil engineer who had served as chief engineer on the Panama Canal Project. He also had held administrative posts with numerous railroad corporations, among them; the New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railway, the Spokane, Portland, and Seattle Railway, the Oregon Trunk Railway, and the Pacific and Eastern Railway. Between 1911 and 1917 he operated a thriving consultancy firm based in New York City. In April, Stevens had been appointed to the Root Commission.126 At the request of several members of the National Defense Council, he had been released in order that he might lead the railroad mission to Russia. Stevens' selection as chairman of the group especially pleased Francis who "did not know of any other man [he] would have preferred."127 In addition to Stevens, the delegation consisted of Henry Miller, the Vice-President of the Wabash Railway, William L. Darling, formerly the Chief Engineer of the Northern Pacific Railway, John F. Greiner, Chief Consulting Engineer of the Baltimore and Ohio, and George Gibbs, formerly the Chief Mechanical Engineer of the Pennsylvania 174 Railroad.128 in addition, the eighteen-member mission included a number of secretaries and staff members. Stevens' delegation departed the United States a week earlier than Root's and arrived in Vladivostok in late May, where it was met by E. Francis Riggs, the Commercial Attache in Petrograd. Riggs carried with him a special greeting from Ambassador Francis: My dear Stevens: I was more than pleased when advised by the State Department that you had been designated to come to Russia as the head of a commission of experts whose mission is to relieve the congestion at Vladivostok and to improve generally the transportation facilities of the Siberian railway. My understanding is that you will be given absolute control at Vladivostok and I hope to have that control extended throughout the entire length of the Siberian railway. I have not asked the latter at this time because it is impolitic to do so. The railroad engineers of Russia are highly educated men and claim to be exceedingly practical. They are jealous to a degree of any reflection upon their ability and qualifications, and consequently must be handled diplomatically as I know you are capable of doing.129 At Vladivostok, the Mission found 750,000 tons of freight literally piled everywhere—on the docks, around the hills adjacent to the city, and even in vacant lots. Among the many boxes lay supplies desperately needed by Russian troops on the Galician front—munitions, barbed wire, rails, cars, motors, cotton, tallow oil, leather, and agricultural machinery.130 Much of this had been languishing more than two years. All had been paid for 175 with American and British loans.131 Stevens estimated that along the Trans-Siberian line, four million pounds of Siberian meat lay rotting because of the lack of transportation to move it westward.132

The problem was actually not at Vladivostok, where there was relatively little congestion, but along the 5,435 miles of track which snaked its way westward.133 The system had the capability of moving this freight but political and bureaucratic problems had prevented its shipment. The alarming accumulation of goods could have been prevented "had the Government possessed the executive ability [and] the loyalty and cooperation of the workers."134 Congestion allowed only 100 to 120 cars daily to depart from Vladivostok.135 Traffic on the Trans-Baikal and Chinese-Eastern lines was severely limited by the capacity of the Tomsk, which daily facilitated the passage of some fifteen trains from Chereskovskoe, one of Russia's major coal producing regions, to Petrograd. The Tomsk line could, therefore, accommodate only five or six trains daily from the Trans-Baikal.136 Another coal producing area along the route. Taiga, was some 950 miles closer to the capital than Chereskovskoe but was closed because of a labor dispute. If they had been operating, twenty freight trains could have made their way daily along the Trans-Siberian. 176 The Railway Mission suggested to Nikolai Nekrasov, the Minister of Ways and Communications, that the Taiga mines should be in operation. The Minister replied that his government lacked the authority to take such action. "It [is] the policy of free Russia to obtain by moral suasion, but moral suasion [is] inadequate to start the Taiga mines."137 Nekrasov's refusal to act was a consequence of his fear of the miners.138 other suggestions made by the Mission, such as the construction of a locomotive assembly plant near Vladivostok, met with more success.139

Aboard a special train staffed by a large number of Russian officials, the Americans began the tedious journey westward. Stopping at each terminal along the route, they were "on the face of things well received and cheered to the echo ... a distinctive Slavic custom."140 Darling described the Russians as "very good natured, kind, [and] frequently giving to beggars."141 The trip provided the opportunity to examine the Russian railway system. What the commission members discovered appalled them, "everywhere discontent, idleness, and insubordination dominated."142 Arriving in Petrograd, the Commission engaged in a series of meetings with members of the Russian Railway Technical Board. In many ways the organization typified 177 the problems then besetting Russia. Generally a remnant of Tsarist Russia, the Board consisted of some fifteen or twenty intellectuals "all highly educated from a technical standpoint, [but] with little or no practical experience in actual railway operation, and all equally impractical, at least from an American point of view."143 These discussions were often frustrating. "The Russians," recalled Darling, "believed the only help they needed was more locomotives and cars. The American members believed they should learn to use what they had more efficiently."144 "Those things which you propose [to] put into effect," one Russian told the Americans, "would better the service, move our trains, and result in economy, but what object is that to us? We have life positions, and if the railways make a profit, it goes to the Government, and if a deficit, the National Treasury makes it up."145 Soon after these discussions, Stevens became ill and for sometime was unable to participate in the affairs of the delegation.146 Meanwhile, its other members traveled to Moscow, then moved southward to the Donets coal region. The Americans found the same "apathy and apparent indifference" they had witnessed throughout their visit. "The attitude of all—high and low, was that . . . war had worn them out. There was no ambition or fighting spirit left, and they were simply waiting for what they knew 178 not."147 Stevens attributed the problem to the "deadly" effect of German propaganda. Darling believed that Lenin was a German agent. He claimed that in many ways Russia's transportation system was not as poor as many thought but that propaganda had convinced Russians of the "inadequacy" of their railroads.148

After sufficient recovery, Stevens went to visit General Brusilov at Mogilev, making the five-hundred mile journey to the Stavka, which was southwest of Petrograd behind the Galician front. Stevens found that the Russian Commander-in-Chief had abandoned all hope of victory. Discussions with the General Staff concerning transportation were similarly frustrating as none of the officers exhibited either knowledge or awareness of the situation. The officer charged with the responsibility of transport did not even know whether the line from Przemysl, the most important artery of supply to the front, was single or double track.149 As the Root Commission later discovered, the Russians were not hesitant in making demands. Some of these were "wholly impossible" while others reflected a basic ignorance of the situation. One was for the construction of a large repair shop at a point then some 100 miles inside Austrian lines!150 Stevens was denied permission to visit the front because the Russian leaders were concerned that such an event might jeopardize further American assistance. 179 Returning to Petrograd, the members of the Stevens Mission found that the Railway Technical Board had not implemented a single proposal in which they had previously agreed. The Americans appealed to Nekrasov but were told he lacked the authority to act.

Finally, Stevens met with Kerensky. "In "plain words" the American engineer warned that should the Provisional Government continue to ignore the American delegation, a serious breach with Wilson's government could result.151 The Russian Minister ordered that the Commission's suggestions be immediately effected, encouraging hope that his country's transportation problems could at least be partially alleviated and Allied aid could be efficiently provided.152 what was needed most, said Darling, was a "single strong hand," perhaps a military dictatorship, which he believed would occur.153 There were only two supply lines into Russia. The first from Vladivostok westward, was a lengthy journey beset by numerous problems which the American railroad experts had observed, while the other originated in Archangel, a White Sea port generally frozen seven months of the year. Construction had begun on a railroad from Petrograd to Murmansk, a port which, while situated on the Arctic Ocean, was open all year. Stevens asked Nekrasov's 180 permission to send an American engineer on this project, but his request was denied. "The best talent in Russia [is] on the job," responded the Minister irritably; "it [has] been criticized enough." Nekrasov's response was understandable. The Murmansk project had been demanded by Britain. A Canadian firm had begun construction but had "fallen down to such an extent" that Russia was forced to take over the work.154 The route which remained unfinished offered a shorter supply line into Russia. Darling, traveling with Colonel Battine of the British General Staff and Major du Cassell of the French General Staff, was sent north to reconnoiter. He reported that completion would take more than a year and a "fabulous" amount of capital. The Murmansk line, therefore, did not offer a feasible solution to Russia's transportation woes.155

The Mission ma^g various suggestions to improve Russia's railroads. Among these were the modification of operating methods on the Trans-Siberian system, the abandonment of specified local mines in favor of others in order to alleviate congestion on the Tomsk line, the persuasion of workers that they must do a full day's labor in order that engines and cars might be placed in immediate operation, and construction of cleaning and watering stations. From America, recommended aid included the acquisition of locomotives, cars, and spare parts, and 181 the recruitment of experts to teach Russian railroadmen new methods of operation. Stevens cabled Washington to dispatch immediately a contingent of railroad men to Russia. Deteriorating conditions in Russia had much to do with the urgency of the request, "We have practically lost five months on account of changes in Ministry and other dealings. Our government at Washington is also very slow in getting action and redeeming our promises."156 There had been prior agreement that American locomotive manufacturers would give precedence to Russian demands, but these promises never materialized.157 Darling attributed this failure to the instability of the Russian political situation.158 In July, Darling, Gibbs and Greiner, "having done all that they could do . . . with wonderful patience," indicated their desire to return to the United States.159 Darling and Greiner left Russia on 1 October bound for the United States via Shanghai. Gibbs returned by way of Vladivostok, noting before departing that the assembly plant there was nearly complete.160 with the departure of these engineers, only Stevens and Henry Milko, aided by a small staff, were left to carry on the now exceedingly difficult mission.161 182 Stevens and Miller concentrated on improving the Trans-Siberian line, making it the primary artery into Russia. In order to facilitate these desperately needed improvements, the Americans were provided a special line to evaluate the situation.

Prior to his departure from Petrograd, Stevens received a request from the Russian Railway Ministry for "a lot" of American railway specialists to aid in the operation of the Russian railroad. Endorsed by Stevens, this appeal was immediately forwarded by Francis to Washington. The Ambassador warned that the transportation crisis was worsening and pleaded that Washington send the "biggest railway men available."162 The request was quickly approved.163 The group was to consist of 250 such men accompanied by thirty employees of the Baldwin Locomotive Company, who were to be responsible for assembling a number of that company's locomotives then enroute to Russia.164 The "quasi-military" contingent, its members uniformed and assigned military rank, left San Francisco in late August bound for Vladivostok.165 Meanwhile, the train carrying the remnants of the American Railway Commission was slowly making its way eastward across Siberia. Primarily traveling by daylight, commission personnel carefully examined the lines and their facilities. As most of the coal mines along the route were 183 no longer functioning, close attention was given to fuel considerations. After some fifty days, the delegation concluded its inspection. Generally, Stevens was pleased with what he encountered, finding the line in acceptable working condition with ample locomotives and an absence of congestion.166 Remaining problems could easily be solved as the Commission "had lined up matters in such shape that, if plans were carried into effect, the railway would again become a growing concern."167 "By dint of constant urging and marvelous patience," wrote Stevens, "success to a limited extent seemed in sight."168 His prediction, however, was soon to be tragically proved incorrect. Shortly after the departure of the railway engineers, the Elihu Root Commission left the United States, arriving in Vladivostok on 3 June. From its conception, the delegation had been the subject of controversy, especially its membership and Root's selection as its leader. Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, opposed Root as too conservative and warned: . . . as soon as the name of Root is mentioned, the Russians living in New York will send word to Russia that Root is 'a little brother to the rich' and is in sympathy with government controlled by those who enjoy special privilege. Before Root arrives in Russia these reports unjust to him, will close the ears of Russian revolutionists to his arguments and appeals. He will not have a chance to do the things he sincerely wants to do.169 184 Daniels' criticism was rebuked by Lansing and the remainder of the cabinet.170

Outside the cabinet, however, many agreed with Daniels that the Missourian was too representative of American business interests.171 Albert Rhys Williams, an American journalist in Russia, described Root as a "corporation lawyer . . . about as provincial as Ambassador Francis in his outlook toward the Russians."172 Root's selection was also criticized by Samuel Untermeyer, a senior member of the New York law firm of Guggenheim, Untermeyer, and Marshall, which provided legal counsel for a number of major corporations. Addressing a gathering of the Jewish League of American Patriots in New York City, he charged that throughout his career. Root had lacked sympathy and sensitivity for Jewish problems and aspirations and had shown himself to be "incredibly narrow and provincial in his conception of the Jew."173 Many, however, held Root in high esteem. An experienced statesman, politician, and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1912, Root had been selected over a number of other well-known Americans, including Theodore Roosevelt. William Howard Taft was "delighted that [Wilson] had been wise enough to select the best man . . . for the enormously important task of reorganization ... [a job] for which no man in the world . . . had more preparation by actual 185 experience." Root's selection, wrote the former President, meant "everything for the country."174 chief of Staff Hugh L. Scott, who would accompany the Mission, wrote of Root, "The most foreseeing and sagacious man I had ever met; and I hereby classify him—in my mind—as the foremost citizen of the Republic."175 The Nation held that Root's "wide knowledge, experience and judgment" made him a superb choice to lead the Mission.176

Wilson had instructed Secretary Lansing that if Root demonstrated sympathy for the revolution, he was to be appointed to lead the delegation.177 The Secretary evidently believed this to be the case. Many who criticized Lansing for his "dullness" and slowness of mind viewed his support of Root to be a reflection of sympathetic conservation.178 while it was true that he held little knowledge of Russia, many of his supporters believed Lansing's experience in international affairs gave him "powers of insight that might have been envied by the more boisterous natures with which wartime Washington then abounded."179 Despite these claims, Lansing, like others in the administration, was unable to offer a successful policy regarding Russia. Regardless of the administration's claims to the contrary, the seventy-two-year-old Root, armed with 250 cigars, a variety of novels and "two cases of Haig and 186 Haig," was hardly the man to ingratiate himself with the Russian masses and assure them of his government's good intentions.180 He had little enthusiasm for appointment and even less optimism. "You have no idea how I hate it [going to Russia]," he wrote Taft, "but it is just like our boys going into the war: there can be no question about doing it."181 It was unclear as to why he was selected. While he enjoyed the support of Wilson, Lansing, McAdoo and others. Root's appointment may have been based on other considerations. Some Republicans viewed it as a "simple gesture of non-partisanship" on the part of the President.182 Those closer to the President suspected that it was a means of avoiding naming Root to a more important post.183 There are indications that Wilson was not concerned whether the delegation was successful. "Wilson didn't want us to accomplish anything," Root would bitterly recall. "It was a grandstand play. He wanted to show his sympathy for the Russian Revolution. When we delivered his message and made our speeches, he was satisfied, that's all he wanted."184 Despite Lansing's claim that the Mission was to aid Russia in whatever way needed, it may well have been intended as a reflection of American, and more particularly Wilsonian, philosophy.185 For this reason, far more 187 attention was devoted to selecting those representatives who reflected American ideals than to the choice of experts who could better assess conditions.186

Root was not consulted as to the membership of his delegation and offered no suggestions of his own. He would ask, however, that an old friend, T. Bentley Mott, be detailed as his military aide. The fifty-two-year-old Mott, who once had been attached to the American Embassy in Paris, was involved in banking in France at the time of his appointment.

While he had sought suggestions, Wilson reserved for himself the right to make the final selections as to who would accompany Root. This was perhaps a product of his stormy relationship with Secretary Lansing. The President may have lacked faith in the Secretary's diplomatic ability.187 others have suggested that it may have resulted from Wilson's "innate secretiveness" and "tendency to act on his own."188 The President had often consulted Charles Crane on questions involving Russia and had, in 1913, offered the ambassadorship in Russia to the fifty-nine-year-old industrialist. Citing the recent death of his father, however, the Chicagoan had rejected the appointment. Crane had been a Ltaunch supporter of Wilson's presidential aspirations in 1912, having served as 188 Vice-chairman of Wilson's Finance Committee. His $40,000 contribution was the largest given Wilson during the campaign.189 A very successful businessman. Crane headed a company in Chicago which manufactured fittings and valves, served as a director of the National Bank of the Republic in Chicago, and was a major stockholder in the Westinghouse Company at the time of his appointment to the Root Commission.190 To represent American workers, the President chose James H. Duncan, who had been Vice-President of the American Federation of Labor since 1894. Born in Aberdeen, Scotland, in 1839, Duncan had led a strike for the eight-hour day in the granite-cutting industry. His selection had been based on the nomination of Samuel Gompers who, like Duncan, exhibited little sympathy for the socialism of the Russian workers.191 American socialists had been outraged by the selection of Root to lead the delegation to Russia. Hoping to assuage their feelings, Wilson chose Charles Edward Russell, a well-known journalist, author, and politician, to represent the views of American socialism. The selection of Russell, who had split with other members of the American Socialist Party in endorsing the war, further incensed the socialists. While he was in Russia, in fact, Russell would be expelled from the Party as a 189 result of his support of the war and his misrepresentation of the American socialist view.192

To represent this country's business interests, Wilson chose Samuel Bertron, a new York banker who was also a Wall Street financier, and Cyrus McCormick, a director of the Chicago and Northwest Railroad Company and of the National City Bank of New York City, which coincidentally had a branch in Petrograd. McCormick was well aware of the tremendous commercial potential of Russia as his International Harvester Company was already heavily involved there.193 There had been heated debate as to whether a Jew should be included on the Mission. Lansing had cabled Petrograd to ascertain Francis' views. The Ambassador reported that a Jewish representative would be welcome and a prominent New York businessman, Eugene Meyer, was invited to accompany the Commission.194 Reports of widespread anti-Semitism in Russia later convinced the Wilson administration to rescind its invitation to Meyer, an action which provoked a storm of anger in both the United States and Russia. Ultimately, it was decided that John R. Mott, the Executive Secretary of the Young Men's Christian Association, might best represent America's humanitarian interests. 190 To represent the United States military, Wilson chose Major-General Hugh Scott, the Chief of Staff, and Rear Admiral James H. Glennon. Scott, then sixty, belonged to a bygone era. He had spent much of his army career on the western frontier, serving on the Sioux, Nez Perce, and Cheyenne expeditions and had investigated the Ghost Dance disturbances in 1890. The author of several books on the Plains Indians, Scott had come east in 1906 to take command of West Point before being named Chief of Staff in 1914. The General had very possibly been chosen to represent the army as an alternative to retirement.195 Admiral Glennon, an expert in naval ordnance, was to have some success in his discussions with Russian naval representatives.196

With the exception of Crane, few of these men enjoyed substantive knowledge of Russia. Most had not visited the country and were unsure of what they would discover on their arrival. Only the Commission's Secretary, Basil Miles, Colonel William V. Judson, Samuel Harper, and Crane had experience in Russia. Miles's previous sojourn in Russia had been as personal secretary to George von Lengerke Meyer, Roosevelt's Ambassador to Russia. He was assigned to the Mission as its Secretary.197 Harper had been considered as an official member of the Mission until it was decided that he might better 191 serve in an unofficial capacity. He would thus be able to contact those whom it might be "embarrassing" for the Mission to receive officially.198

By training as a military engineer whose specialty was river and harbor improvement. Colonel Judson had served in this capacity on projects to improve the harbor of Galveston, Texas, and the Mississippi River. In 1905, he had spent five months in Russia as an observer in the Russo-Japanese War.199 Though he returned to Russia as a member of the Root Commission, he was detached from the Mission and appointed Military Attache to the American Embassy in Petrograd and head of the American Military Mission to Russia.200

Upon their arrival at Vladivostok, the Mission boarded the former Tsar's luxurious train and began the ten-day journey westward to the capital. Along the route. Root exhorted the Russians to support their new government and the war. Scott recalled that while the Russians courteously listened, they "wanted none of our form of government. . . . What seemed uppermost in the minds of everybody was freedom; freedom to do anything and everything they pleased."201 After reaching Petrograd, the delegation was taken to the Winter Palace, a "damp gloomy structure."202 Root and Scott were given suites formerly occupied by Catherine 192 the Great while the other members were lodged at the other end of the vast palace. That evening, the Commission was formally received by the Provisional Government, and Francis' lengthy introduction drew a largely courteous response from the audience. Root's address which followed was limited to general remarks on the friendship of the two countries. It was a speech which made it apparent that Root lacked understanding of the prevailing sentiment in Russia. One Russian sarcastically suggested that someone should "tell these Americans we are tired of the war."203 "Root . . . seemed intent," wrote Albert Rhys Williams, "only on urging [the Russians] to go out and fight and keep the Tsar's commitments."204 ^he evening concluded with the elegant reply of Foreign Minister Tereshchenko, noteworthy because it concluded with what was "perhaps the last pro-American declaration by a democratic Russian Minister."205 The Foreign Minister claimed that his country had no desire for political, financial, or economic domination of others.206 Though conditions in Russia had worsened. Root was optimistic. On 17 June he cabled Lansing that the Provisional Government was secure and that the regime was "confident of pulling the country through."207 scott did not share Root's opinion, finding Kerensky "a bit too 193 radically inclined . . . the same radicalism pervading the entire government to a dangerous degree."208

The members of the delegation next met with their Russian counterparts to ascertain their specific needs. Consequently Scott met with members of the Russian General Staff and inspected the front while Admiral Glennon visited the Baltic and Black Sea fleets and traveled to Archangel. Mott met with various religious leaders, among them V. N. Lvov, the High Procurator of the Holy Synod, who told Mott that he believed for the first time all Russians, even Jews, were enjoying religious freedom as a result of the new spirit of democracy that was sweeping Russia.209 Coincidentally, Russell and Duncan eagerly met with representatives of a number of socialist groups. The most radical Russian workers, however, viewed the Americans as apologists for capitalism. While his colleagues busied themselves with their own responsibilities. Root delivered numerous speeches, urging the Russians to support the war. Russian newspapers gave slight mention to these efforts, convincing Root that only a major propaganda campaign could win support for the war. On 22 June, a conference of Allied representatives met at the British Embassy in Petrograd to discuss how best to ensure Russia's continued participation in the war. By 194 this time, supply shortages had become critical because of transportation problems and the destruction of Allied merchant ships by German submarines.210 without Allied supplies, Russia would be forced to depend to a greater degree on its own industries and find methods of increasing production.211

The Allied representatives recommended that the Provisional Government improve transportation by enlarging existing repair shops, reopening those that had been closed, and constructing additional shops at important points along the rail system. After Petrograd determined Russia's requirements, the Allies would meet any deficiencies in skilled labor and material. The diplomats also recommended the reduction of the price of raw materials and the improvement of methods to resolve labor disputes. These suggestions, they hoped, would increase Russian industrial productivity.212 To ascertain Russian military needs, Scott and Glennon met with representatives of the Russian army and navy. Admiral Glennon found the naval situation to be "very unsettled," a condition he attributed to the effort of agitators "well supplied with German money."213 while at the Black Sea Fleet's base at Sebastopol, Glennon was able to convince the Russian sailors to release Admiral Kolchak.214 Later, the delegation crossed the Baltic to 195 Helsingfors, the Finnish capital. Here, conditions were particularly bad. Earlier, 400 sailors had gone on a rampage, indiscriminate[ly] killing officers. Many were killed in their beds, others were shot on the ice while trying to escape, some were tortured and beaten to death, and a large number were stripped of their clothing and confined in the bare hold of the ship.215

The Admiral reported that though the loyalty of many sailors was suspect, those involved in "steady dangerous work" were dependable.216 Glennon recommended that the United States extend a loan of $250 million to meet expenditures which he believed the Russian navy required immediately. Among these costs were $18,650,000 for the purchase of unarmed vessels, $8,160,000 to arm them, $9,280,000 to arm ships then under construction in Russia, and $12,753,600 for equipment.217 with T^erican funds, Glennon calculated the Russians could purchase destroyers, their greatest need, and patrol boats, which ranked a close second.218 General Scott also found conditions appalling and the Russian army, "crude in the extreme . . . and far behind ours in every particular." "Russia was evidently tired of the war," recalled Scott, who did what he could to keep Russia in the war and prevent the release of two hundred enemy divisions from the Russian front for the reinforcement of the western front, which he considered would be a "calamity of the first order."219 196 On 18 June, he met with Russian officials at the War Office to discuss how the United States could assist Russia. The discussions always centered on two points, an American loan and improvements in transportation.220 scott asked whether Russia would continue in the war if she were extended American monetary aid. His question was like a "bomb-shell." Momentarily, the Russians were speechless. Finally, they pledged to fight. "If that is true," Scott replied, "then I would like to see you do it."221

Russia's most pressing need, however, continued to be improved transportation. The Russians had placed a large order for American railroad equipment. The five hundred locomotives and ten thousand freight cars expected in July, however, would not reach Russia until December.222 Without the ability to transport them, American military supplies would be of little benefit. With American rail equipment, six hundred cars per day could travel from Vladivostok carrying much needed supplies. Presently, only one hundred and fifty were traveling westward.223 In addition to its need for railroad equipment, the Russian army was desperately short of rifles. Russian irritation was obvious. Of 3,300,000 American rifles ordered by the War Ministry, only 400,000 had been delivered.224 other shipments were similarly behind schedule. The Russians had ordered; 5,500 Colt machine 197 guns, of which 2,500 had yet to arrive; 4,500 Maxim machine guns, of which 4,200 had not yet reached Russia; and 100 eight-inch howitzers and 1,000 37mm guns, all yet to be received. Orders for shells were in a similar state. Of an initial order of 4,500,000 cartridges for 37mm guns, 1,900,000 had been received. None of the second order of 1,900,000 had been received, nor had shells for the howitzers reached Russia.225 An additional problem was how to transport these shipments to Russia. As ship space was in great demand, private American companies indicated that if the Provisional Government was "willing to pay their price," they would gladly provide tonnage to both Archangel and Vladivostok.226

American aid, reiterated Scott, would depend on Russia's decision to mount an offensive. Kerensky promised that the advance would occur within ten days, a pledge Scott viewed as encouraging.227

Scott recommended that his government do all in its power to maintain Russia. If she reached a separate peace, "no one can predict how long it will take to conquer Germany, and there arises a clear possibility that it cannot be done at all."228 such a development would also have a significant effect on future commercial possibilities. As the Russians "never nourish hatred long," German political and commercial influence might 198 quickly develop to "hopeless proportions."229 Thus Scott believed it worth a "great sum" to keep Russia even passively engaged in the war, "for the dangers attending her withdrawal are too great for any haggling to be admitted."

Scott cautioned that great care should be used in aiding Russia. "If Russia is wobbling, we of course would not send [this aid] but keep [it] for ourselves." He did not consider this a possibility as the chances are that the populace will . . . [settle] down to a sober contemplation of the duties they have espoused. . . . The Russians have too often proved their heroic patience under suffering and disaster . . . are sober-minded and earnest people . . . now is a dream from which they must awaken soon; events compel it.230 Without American assistance, deteriorating economic conditions, famine, and the transportation crisis would force Russia from the war. Scott was certain that Berlin would then quickly take advantage of Russia's difficult predicament by offering her financial assistance and supplies which she sorely lacked.231 Scott recommended the expenditure of $92,460,000 for military materiel requested from the United States and an additional $15,234,000 for technical equipment.232

Loans to Russia were made a necessity by several factors, the destruction and displacement caused by the war, the loss of manpower, and the deterioration of Russian 199 commerce. Another important factor was the deterioration of public confidence in the Provisional Government which made it a near impossibility to raise funds internally.233 Efforts to raise added capital through a "Liberty Loan" had proved largely unsuccessful. Of three billion rubles which had been underwritten, much less than 2,500,000,000 of this had been assumed by the people. Among the population of 160 million there had been 500,000 subscribers.234 Consequently, the Russian Minister of Finance estimated that Russia would require $1,276,000,000 from the United States.235 TO the Commission's financial experts, Samuel Bertron and Cyrus McCormick, it was apparent that unless confidence was restored, the government would need to resort to a forced loan and further inflation of the ruble, which dramatically depreciated in value in the foreign markets. Artificial means to restore financial soundness would not succeed. Only confidence of the people within Russia, in its government and its future can be the basis of much needed recuperation . . . followed by normal exports and the infusion of foreign capital for . . . developing the enormous . . . resources of Russia . . . and then only by the passage of wise laws encouraging investment of foreign capital in Russia.236

Interestingly, a private meeting of Russian Jewish bankers had recently been held in Petrograd, in which the proposal had been offered that each contribute twenty-five percent 200 of his wealth to the government. It was calculated that if this were done, Russia's total debt would be liquidated, its credit restored, and the value of the ruble would in­ crease. 237 Though there was some interest in the proposal, little was done because of a lack of general support.

Bertron and McCormick agreed that Allied assistance to Russia was imperative. A comprehensive plan for financing Russia following the war should also be considered for, if allowed, Germany would involve itself in Russia's financial affairs resulting in "very great profit to herself . . and a disastrous effect upon the freedom of Russia and upon the vast interests of the Allies present and future."238 The Commission also requested funds to "educate" the Russians concerning Allied aims and to demonstrate that the preservation of Russia's newly won freedom could be realized only through the destruction of Germany. "If we are going to hold the Russian people," wrote Root, "we must meet [German] propaganda, not only on terms of equality, but drown it out in the same way the British have drenched the German trenches with high explosive shells." On 17 June, Root cabled Washington that the Russian army was being inundated by an extensive German propaganda campaign. He requested $100,000 to finance a counterpropaganda effort. The "extensive educational 201 campaign," he suggested, should be supervised by Francis and might ultimately entail the expenditure of five million dollars, an amount far less than the cost of maintaining large numbers of American troops in Russia.239 "Very desirable indeed," cabled Root, to send . . . immediately as many moving pictures as possible showing American preparation for the war, battleships, troops, machinery, factories making munitions, and other things to carry . . . [to show] that America is doing something. These poor fellows have been told that no one is really fighting except Russian soldiers, and they believe it."240 To counter that opinion. Root suggested the United States dispatch troops to Russia as "evidence of our practical cooperation."241 Root also recommended that YMCA reading rooms be established along the front to distribute information. Though the Russians were "sincere, kindly, good people, [they were] confused and dazed . . . [and an] infant class in the art of being free," who needed to be provided "Kindergarten material."242

Lansing, employing his usual careful consideration, did not respond for ten days.243 Meanwhile, Root, Francis, and Bertron had personally guaranteed $30,000 to the Petrograd branch of the National City Bank in order to print and distribute speeches of Wilson and Root.244 Bertron and Root pressured their government to allocate the requested sum for propaganda, as the Germans were spending 202 "at least a million dollars" per month to "capture the minds of the Russian people."245 ultimately, Wilson approved in principle the propaganda campaign and authorized the $30,000 already expended. There was no mention of the remainder in question.246 on the day of his departure. Root wrote to his wife, "we all feel that we have accomplished far more than we dared hope and we leave this government and the army much stronger in morale and effectiveness than when we came."247 Later, Raymond Robins, of the Red Cross Delegation, offered a much different view. "Root," he wrote, "... was as welcome as the smallpox and occasioned as much enthusiasm as would be aroused by an Orangeman leading a popular parade in Dublin."248

In its final report, the Commission stated that the Provisional Government was intent on remaining active in the war and had no intention of reaching a separate peace. The delegation applauded Kerensky's efforts toward improving discipline and morale and unanimously agreed that the Russian people would be able to prosecute the war successfully. The problems in which Russia was mired, suggested the report, were the natural and inevitable results of the conditions under which the people were held before the Revolution, the misgovernment of the Bureaucracy, and the astounding suddenness with which the country had been deprived of its accustomed government.249 203 The delegation had "little doubt" that Russia would be successful in her efforts to "establish and maintain . . . free self-government," and viewed American aid as a well-invested necessity to help Russia achieve three basic goals: 1) to encourage the faith of the people in the successful creation of self-government; 2) to improve confidence in the Provisional Government; and, 3) to convince the country that a successful military effort was the only means of safeguarding its freedom.250 The Mission recommended that the Wilson administration provide Russia substantial assistance to keep Russian armies in the field. The delegation even claimed that the restoration of the Russian army to its former strength was a "real possibility."251 This would, of course, be of great advantage and would "justify the expenditures of the largest sums . . . [for] that purpose."252 At the same time that the Root Mission arrived in Russia, a Russian delegation, headed by Assistant Minister of Commerce and Industry Boris Bakhmetev, reached the United States. Bakhmetev's instructions included representing the Provisional Government diplomatically in Washington—that post had been vacated 20 April by the former Ambassador George Bakhmetev, who was not a relative of the new envoy. The official purpose of the delegation was to express gratitude for America's recognition of the 204 Provisional Government.253 upon reaching the American capital, Bakhmetev pledged that his country would continue the war until the destruction of Germany was accomplished.254 Congressional reaction was positive and a resolution of good wishes was passed unanimously.255

Shortly afterwards, Bakhmetev addressed the real purpose of his visit, negotiating loans with Washington and directing the large Russian contingent, which consisted primarily of technical and financial experts, military representatives, and purchasing agents charged with the expenditure of the $100 million credit previously granted by the United States.256 That initial amount grew astronomically, so much that by the November uprising, Wilson's government had authorized nearly a half-billion dollars in credit. Of this, less than half was actually spent.257 It was evident that the Provisional Government, now threatened not only by the Central Powers externally but also by growing opposition internally, required aid if the government was to continue. This became increasingly clear to Allied observers, who continued their search for a means of preserving Petrograd's participation in the war. The effort would grow increasingly frustrating as conditions within Russia deteriorated during the summer of 1917. The Allied governments would desperately endeavor 205 to find ways to assist Russia financially, materially, philosophically, and technologically. At the same time, their representatives would become even more entangled in the web of political confusion within Russia. The general failure of the Allied efforts successfully to resuscitate the lagging Russian enthusiasm for the war was attributable to a variety of factors. Allied opposition to the Stockholm Conference had lent credence to the growing belief that Russia's partners were only concerned with the spoils they could attain from the war and had little sympathy for Russian interests. Public disillusionment with the Provisional Government was likewise on the rise. Order had ceased to exist within the army. The regime's inability to provide necessities and lower food prices caused many to lose what little faith in the government remained.258

Allied governments, uncertain how to renew the Russian effort, failed to act decisively on suggestions offered by their representatives in Russia. This was particularly obvious in the impact of the Root Mission whose leader ultimately doubted whether the Wilson administration actually wanted to succeed. 206

Notes iBrowder and Kerensky, 3:1250. 2lbid., 3:1277. 3lbid. 4Miliukov, Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, p. 442. See also Buchanan, 2:128. In the new government, Lvov remained as Prime Minister while Kerensky and Tereshchenko became Minister of War and Foreign Affairs, respectively. 5Buchanan, 2:125. 6Kerensky, The Catastrophe, pp. 169-170. 7A. A. Brusilov, A Soldier's Note-Book, 1914-1918 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971), p. 304. 8Knox, 2:609. Knox believed if the offensive was unsuccessful, Russia's army could continue to exist a maxi­ mum two more months. 9Abraham, p. 192. lOsir Llewellyn Woodward, Great Britain and the War of 1914-1918 (London; McKuen and Company, Ltd., 1967), pp. 269-270. llsir William Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen, 1914-1918 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926), p. 226. 12ibid. 13Marshal Foch, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch (Garden City, New York; Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1931), p. 223. 14ibid., p. 277. 15Ludendorff, 2:29. 16Kerensky, The Catastrophe, p. 186. 17Browder and Kerensky, 2:879. 207 18Abraham, p. 196. 19Browder and Kerensky, 2:882. Officially, this declaration was known as Order No. 8, "On the Rights of Servicemen." 20Browder and Kerensky, 2:885. 2lAbraham, p. 196. 22sukhanov, p. 361. 23De Robien, pp. 58-59. 24Francis, p. 103. 25ibid., p. 116. 26u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 21 April 1917, p. 28. 27Francis, p. 124. The condition was that the cre­ dit be spent in America. 28Knox, 2:611. 29j. Y. Simpson, "After the 'Great Days' in Russia," Nineteenth Century 82 (July-December 1917):147. 30Brusilov, p. 310. See also Kerensky, The Catastrophe, p. 168. 3lKerensky, Russia at History's Turning Point, p. 274. 32Knox, 2:618. 33The Spectator, 7 April 1917, p. 401. Brusilov made these remarks a few weeks previously. 34Brusilov, p. 310. 35Abraham, p. 198. 36De Robien, pp. 59-60. 37Kerensky, Russia at History's Turning Point, p. 271. 208 38De Robien, p. 63. See also Brusilov, p. 310. 39Kerensky, Russia at History's Turning Point, p. 277.

40Kerensky, The Catastrophe, p. 197. 4lDe Robien, p. 63. 42Knox, 2:621. 43The Spectator, 26 May 1917, p. 579. 44ibid., p. 578. The author suggests French unrest was due to the failure of Nivelle's offensive. 45Hendrik Willem Van Loon, "The Neutrals and the Allied Cause," The Century, August 1917, p. 615. 46Lloyd George, 4:137. The author suggests that a majority of socialists in the Allied nations supported the war. 47warth, p. 67. The Bolsheviks labeled Borgbjerg a German agent. 48Golder, pp. 339-340. 49sukhanov, p. 366. Not all members of the Soviet desired the participation of the Allied Socialists. Sukhanov viewed the desire of the French Socialists attend as "an effort to confine the mighty Russian Revolution within definite limits [to] keep it from any radical measures and within the sphere of Entente influence." 50"The Russian Problem," The Nation, 17 May 1917, p. 593. 5lLloyd George, 4:137-138. The Prime Minister also feared alienating the moderate elements in Russia. 52ibid., p. 138. 53Leon Trotsky, M^ Life (New York; Pathfinder Press, Inc., 1970), p. 236. 54ibid. 209 55Emile Vanderwelde, Souvenirs d'un Militant Socialiste (Paris; Les Editions Denoel, 1939), pp. 230-231, See also Peter Dodge, Beyond Marxism; The Faith and Works of Hendrik DeMan (The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), p. 45. Neither man liked Trotsky. 56Dodge, p. 42. 57ibid., p. 43. 58Angelica Balabanoff, M^ Life as a Rebel (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938), p. 134. 59sukhanov, p. 361. Vanderwelde was Belgium's Minister of State. 60Balabanoff, p. 154. 6lBuchanan, 2:143. 62ibid., p. 144. 63Margaret Hamilton, Arthur Henderson, A Biography (London: William Heinemann, 1938), p. 125. Henderson had requested that Buchanan be informed that he was being replaced. 64 Ibid., p. 126. 65Buchanan, 2:146. See also Bernard Pares, "Sir George Buchanan in Russia," Slavonic Review 3 (March 1925) 576-586. Pares asserts that the British Government never fully appreciated the quality of Buchanan's statesmanship. 66Hamilton, p. 127. 67ibid., p. 130. See Warth, p. 71. To many in Russia, Henderson, like Buchanan, appeared as a representative of capitalism. 68David Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977), p. 208. 69 Ibid., p. 209. 70ibid., pp. 210-211. As a result of his letter to the Soviet warning of the interst of O'Grady, Sanders and Thorne, MacDonald was losing popularity among some influential politicians. 210 71lbid., p. 210. 72Buchanan, 2:147. 73Lord Elton, The Life of James Ramsay MacDonald (London; Collins Publishers, 1939), p. 316. ^4Lloyd George, 4:146. 75ibid. 76De Robien, p. 65. 77u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, vol. 1, supplement 2, Lansing to Page, 22 May 1917, p. 739. '^8wilson Papers, vol. 42, Lansing to Wilson, 19 May 1917, p. 350. ^^Lansing Papers, 28 May 1917, Lodge to Lansing. 80The Nation, 19 April 1917, p. 449. 81u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, vol. 1, supplement 2, Sharp to Lansing, 26 July 1917, p. 150. 82wilson Papers, vol. 42, Russell to Lansing, 15 May 1917, p. 351. 83Norma Fain Pratt, Morris Hillquit, A Political History of An American Jewish Socialist (Westport, Connecticut; Greenwood Press, 1979), p. 135. 84wilson Papers, vol. 42, Tumulty to Wilson, 21 May 1917, p. 361. 85The Nation, 26 April 1917, p. 482. 86The Logan Act of 1799 prohibited interaction between an American citizen and a foreign government or agent or officer thereof. 87Lansing Papers, Lansing to Lodge, 28 May 1917. 88"The Socialist Passports," The Nation, 31 May 1917, p. 650. 211 89Morris Hillquit, Love Leaves from a Busy Life (New York; The Macmillan Company, 1934), pp. 155-157. 90u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, vol. 1, supplement 2, Morris to Lansing, 18 June 1917, p. 744. Morris suggested that the three men were Russians. lllbid., Lansing to Morris, 22 June 1917, p. 745. 92ibid.

93ibid., Francis to Lansing, 20 July 1917, p. 747. 94ibid., Sharp to Lansing, 22 July 1917, p. 749. ^5v. H. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 1914-1916 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 98. ^6Hamilton, pp. 120-162. Here the author provides a detailed examination of Henderson's activities. 97Buchanan, 2:151. 98Arno J. Mayer, Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1959), p. 217. 99u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, vol. 1, supplement 2, Page to Lansing, 27 July 1917, p. 749. lOOibid., Polk to Page, 28 July 1917, and Page to Polk, 30 July 1917, p. 749. IOI5 Hansard, 92 (1917): 864. See also Stephen Graubard, British Labour and the Russian Revolution, 1917- 1924 (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 30-34. 102peter Eraser, Lord Esher (London: Hart-Davis MacGibbon, 1973), p. 364. 103Nabokov, pp. 134-139. The author offers details of the episode from the Russian perspective. 104ibid. See also 5 Hansard, 92 (1917): 866-867.

105ibid., p. 867. 212 106Nabokov, pp. 151-156. The publication of Tereshchenko's clarification was intended to placate Allied fears.

107u.s. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, vol. 1, supplement 2, Francis to Lansing, 16 August 1917, p. 753. 108ibid. 109ibid.

llONew Republic, 19 May 1917, pp. 22-27. lll"The Russian Outlook," The Nation, 26 April 1917, p. 482. 112stephen Graham, "Inside Russia," The Century, 17 July 1917, p. 467. 113Hillquit, p. 158. 114see Merle Fainsod, International Socialism and the World War (New York; Octagon Books, 1935), pp. 145-146. This pro-socialist author suggests that "by failing to support the meeting, the Provisional Government," indirectly at least, "opened the door for the Bolshivik seizure of power in November." 115papers of John F. Stevens, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, California, "Collections of Fisher's Monograph." 116ibid., Notes of the Stevens Mission. 117ibid., Folder 1. Stevens provides a brief history of the system. 118ibid., Notes of the Stevens Mission. 119ibid., Folder 1. 120u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 3, Page to Lansing, 31 March 1917, p. 184. 121ibid., Lansing to Francis, 2 April 1917, p. 184. 122ibid., vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 21 April 1917, p. 28. 213 123ibid., vol. 3, Francis to Lansing, 9 April 1917, p. 184.

124ibid., Baker to Lansing, 31 March 1917, p. 183. See Stevens Papers, Folder 1. Stevens gives Washburn the credit and suggests that Daniel Willard of the Advisory Committee of National Defense was a chief supporter. See also Lansing, p. 334.

125wilson Papers, vol. 42, Wilson to Lansing, 19 April 1917, p. 95. 126Francis, p. 130. The Ambassador knew Stevens personally and "esteemed him highly." See also U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 3, Lansing to Francis, 3 May 1917, p. 189. 127stevens Papers, Folder 1. 128stevens Papers, "Letter from F. A. Colder," 5 June 1917, Folder 3. 129Francis, pp. 130-131. See also U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 3, Francis to Lansing, 21 April 1917, p. 187, and Francis to Lansing, 29 April 1917, pp. 188-189. Britain suggested turning the entire system over to American management, an idea not well received in Petrograd. 130stevens Papers, Folder 1. 131ibid., "Notes of the Stevens Mission." 132ibid., Folder 1. 133ibid. See also Papers of William Darling, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, California, pp. 44-45. 134ibid., "Notes o the Stevens Mission." 135ibid., File 1. 136ibid. 137j, E. Greiner, "The American Railway Commission in Russia," Railway Review, 3 August 1918, p. 5. Included in the Stevens Papers. 214 138stevens Papers, Folder 1, Stevens correction of H. H. Fisher's Manuscript, "The American Railway Mission to Russia." 139Francis, p. 131. 140stevens Papers, "Notes of the Stevens Mission." 14lDarlinq Papers, p. 32. 142ibid. 143stevens Papers, "Notes on the Stevens Mission." 144Darlinq Papers, p. 19. 145stevens Papers, "Notes on the Stevens Mission." 146ibid. Here it is reported that Stevens' illness lasted two weeks. Francis (p. 131), however, states that the engineer's illness was of two months duration. See also Darling Papers. Darling often suggests that Stevens, perhaps suffering from dysentery, remained in poor health for the entire journey. 147ibid. 148Darling Papers, pp. 28, 53. 149ibid., p. 53. 150ibid. Among the Russian "requests" were the immediate shipments of locomotives and the construction of such repair facilities. 151ibid. 152Thompson Papers, "Telegram to Lansing, 14 August 1917." 153Darling Papers, pp. 32, 40. 154ibid., p. 20. 155ibid., p. 32. 156ibid., p. 39. 215 157u.s. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 3, Lansing to Francis, 16 April 1917, p. 185. See also Papers of Elihu Root, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C, "Report^o General Scott."

158Darlinq Papers, p. 39. 159ibid. 160stevens Papers, Folder 1. 16lFrancis, p. 131. It should be noted that Francis's statement that Darling and Greiner departed via Sweden is incorrect.

162u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 3, Francis to Lansing, 28 September 1917, pp. 191-200. 163ibid., Lansing to Francis, 5 October 1917, pp. 201-202. ^^

164ibid., Lansing to Francis, 21 August 1917, p. 198. 165Darlinq Papers, p. 40. 166Francis Papers, "Letter to Francis from Henry Miller, 17 October 1917." 167stevens Papers, "Notes of the Stevens Mission." 168ibid. 169Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era, Years of War and After, 1917-1923 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1946), p. 58. 170ibid., pp. 57-58. 171creel, p. 67. 172Albert Rhys Williams, Journey into Revolution, Petrograd, 1917-1918 (Chicago; Quadrangle Books, 1969), p. 311. See also William A. Williams, p. 87. 173New York Times, 4 May 1917, p. 7. See also Jessup, 2:357. Actually Untermeyer's views probably did not reflect those held by most American Jews. While Secretary of State, Root had, in fact, shown sympathy for Moroccan and Russian Jews. 216 l"74Root Papers, container 166.

l'75General Hugh L. Scott, Some Memories of a Soldier (New York: The Century Company, 1928), p. 593. l'76The Nation, 3 May 1917, p. 516. I'^'^Jessup, 2:357. 178creel, pp. 67-68.

179Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, pp. 30-31. 180jessup, 2:360. See also William A. Williams, p. 87, and Warth, p. 99. 181ibid., p. 356. 182ibid., p. 358. 183warth, p. 98. 184jessup, 2:356. 185Lansing, p. 334. 186Gaddis, p. 61. 187Link, p. 16. 188Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 30. 189wilson Papers, vol. 24, Van Hise to Wilson, 16 July 1912, p. 554n. 2. 190jessup, 2:358. 191ibid., p. 356, and William A. Williams, p. 87. Jessup lists Duncan's age as 74. 192pratt, p. 135. This was done on Hillquit's urging. See also Ronald Radosh, "American Labor and the Root Commission," Studies in the Left 1 (1962): 89-93. 1^3wiliiam A. Williams, p. 87. McCormick's Russian Factory manufactured reapers. 194u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 19 April 1917, p. 107. See also ibid., Lansing to Wilson, 30 April 1917, p. 164. 217 1^5jesgup^ 2;358.

196ibid. l^'^William A. Williams, p. 87. 1^8Harper, p. 99. See also U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Lansing to Wilson, 12 April 1917, p. 45. l^^Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 41. 200ibid., pp. 41-42. While in Russia, Judson was promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General. 201scott, p. 576. 202ibid., p. 577. 203warth, p. 102. 204Aibert Rhys Williams, p. 34. Williams suggests that Root's speech was the "worst blunder he made while in Russia. " 205Laserson, p. 418. 206ibid. 207Root Papers, 17 June 1917, container 136. 208scott, pp. 579-580. 209Basil Mathews, John R Mott, World Citizen (New York; Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1934), p. 249. 210wilson Papers, vol. 42, Page to Lansing and Wilson, 20 June 1917, p. 546, and ibid., vol. 43, Page to Wilson, 29 June 1917, pp. 46-48. See also U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, vol. 1, supplement 2, Crawford to Polk, 1 June 1917, pp. 600-601. Includes details of shipping and transportation problems. 21lRoot Papers, "Conference of the Subcommittee Representing the Allies to Prepare an Unofficial Memorandum of Subjects to be Discussed by Mr. Henderson and Mr. Root with the russian Government," container 192.

212ibid. 218 213u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 24 June 1917, p. 125. See Root Papers, "Report of Rear Admiral Glennon's movement in Russia, and naval information," container 192. 214Daniels, p. 60. The drama of the episode apparently grew with repetition. While Glennon makes no mention of the incident in his report, Daniels suggests that the Admiral saved the life of Kolchak. 215Root Papers, "Glennon Report." 216ibid. 217ibid. 218ibid. 219scott, pp. 579, 581. 220ibid. See also Root Papers, "Transcript of Proceedings of Conference Between General Manikovsky, Assistant to the Minister of War, and Officers, and General Scott, Chief of Staff, and Officers," container 192. 221ibid., p. 582. 222Root Papers, "Transcript of Manikovsky and Scott Conference," container 192. 223ibid. 224ibid. This order had been placed in 1915. 225ibid. These had been ordered the preceding year. 226ibid. Scott advised that private offers could not be met. This was due not only to demand but also resulted from the destruction caused by German submarines. 227ibid. Though it was requested, Russian experts never provided a complete statement of supplies on hand and future requirements. 228Root Papers, "Report of General Scott," container 136. 229ibid. 219 230ibid. 231ibid.

232it>id. Appendix 1, "Chief Artillery Administration. List of Orders to be Placed in America and Delivered in Russia before the 1st of January, 1918." 233ibid., "Financial Memorandum by Samuel Bertron and Cyrus McCormick," container 192. 234ibid. See also Browder and Kerensky, 2:485-492. 235ibid.

236ibid. Bertron and McCormick state that the value of the ruble was only 22<;: against the par value of over 510. 237ibid. 238ibid. See also William A. Williams, pp. 82-83. 239ibid., "Publicity Recommendations," container 192. 240u^S^ Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Root to Lansing, 2 July 1917, p. 128. See also Root Papers, "Publicity Recommendations," container 136. It was also suggested that funds should be spent on posters, newspapers, pamphlets, leaflets, and the salaries for lecturers. 24lRoot Papers, "Publicity Recommendations," container 192. 242 Ibid. 243wilson Papers, vol. 43, Lansing to Root, 26 June 1917, p. 1581. See Jessup, 2:367. Root was always of the opinion that Wilson never read the Mission's dispatches. 244jesgup^ 2:365. The British propaganda section had agreed to finance these efforts, but Root was embarrassed that they would have to make this effort for his government. 245ibid. 220 246ibid., p. 367. Wilson's cable reached Petrograd some days after the Mission had departed. 247ibid. 248ibid., p. 366.

249Root Papers, "Report of the Special Diplomatic Mission to Russia, June-July 1917," container 192. The report described the Russians as possessing "natural self-control and kindly consideration and respect for the rights of others," and noted, "They are naturally law abiding and . . . have an extraordinary capacity for united action." 250ibid. 251u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Report of the special diplomatic mission to Russia to the Secretary of State, p. 145. 252ibid. 253ibid., Onou to Lansing, 9 May 1917, pp. 154-155. See Linda Killeen, "The Search for a Democratic Russia, Bakhmetev and the United States," Diplomatic History 2 (Summer 1978); 237-256. 254u^S. Congress, House, 65th Cong., 1st sess., 23 June 1917, Congressional Record 55: 4136-4137. Upon reaching the capital, the Russian delegation was paraded through the streets to the enthusiastic applause of the Washingtonians. 255ibid., pp. 4264-4265. 256Frederick Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917; A Study in Diplomatic History, International Law and Public Opinion (London: Martin Lawrence, Ltd., 1928), pp. 47-48. 257warth, p. 108. 258Lincoln, Passage Through Armageddon, p. 374. CHAPTER V PARTICIPATION WANES; KERENSKY AND THE JULY OFFENSIVE

While its efficiency was clearly suspect, its sheer numbers made the Russian army a continuing force on the Eastern front.1 As the possibility of a separate peace had apparently evaporated, Russia's cobelligerents viewed the situation on the Eastern front with new optimism. These factors, combined with Kerensky's convincing promises to restore fully his nation's military effort, created an illusion which Russia's allies, determined to find some hopeful sign, were quick to embrace. Russia's military capability, the strength of her government, and Allied expectations were soon to be tested on the field of battle; and Kerensky's much heralded July offensive, promised by the Provisional Government, would demonstrate once again that the regime lacked adequate support and ability to maintain the war effort. The growing power of the Petrograd Soviet had placed the Provisional Government in a difficult position. "The most curious part of the situation," remembered Kerensky, 221 222 was that we . . . were represented by the demagogues of the Left as the 'mercenaries of English capitalism,' and were considered to be 'insufficiently independent' of the Allies. . . . Yet at the same time in Paris and in London we had to wage a bitter struggle . . . for the . . . diplomatic policy of free Russia ... to obtain the necessary diplomatic support which would enable us to get the armies back to military trim.2

Many Russians were convinced that their allies were concerned only with their own interests and were unsympathetic concerning the difficulties Russia faced, a charge which Lansing flatly denied. "It is," said the Secretary, "ridiculous to say that the American people could view with indifference any misfortune or dismemberment of Russia."3 in reality, the Allied representatives did not seem to comprehend fully the complexities of Russian politics. They "... did not even understand that the Soviet . . . held the real political power in Russia and exercised what little control there was over the army—they all seemed to miss the fact."4 The Allies, Kerensky bitterly recalled, would do all they could to keep the Russian armies at the front, and they would listen to the diplomatic battle of the inexperienced ministers ... in essence they would wage war on their own . . . without any regard for [Russia's] needs. The Allies regarded the Russian leaders as "pleasant: simpletons" whose sole concern was to "pull the Allied 223 chestnut out of the fire . . . for the sake of their revolutionary ideals."5

By early summer, the Allies "no longer considered themselves bound by any obligations to Russia after the Revolution."6 Negotiations between London, Paris, and later Rome, and Vienna concerning a possible separate peace had been conducted without Russian knowledge. Kerensky, in fact, did not learn of these discussions until 1920.^ Italy's refusal to relinquish territory she had been guaranteed for participating in the war prevented the conclusion of peace.8 Allied concern was the defeat of Germany, even if it meant the abandonment of Russian interests. Conversely, continued Russian participation, even half-heartedly, would greatly benefit the Allies.9 "Our object," suggested Alfred Knox, "must be to keep at all events some Russian troops on the line to prevent all German troops from going west."10 Kerensky also believed the continuation of the war to be imperative. Liberty and democracy could be guaranteed only if the war ended with Russia victorious.H Allied aid was a necessity if Russia was to succeed militarily. Allied aid, however, could not be expected if the Provisional Government could not demonstrate its ability to remain actively engaged in the war. In 1915, 224 the French and British Governments had agreed to bear jointly the burden of assisting Russia, an arrangement that immediately broke down. Paris had limited its aid to Russian expenditures in France, while London had provided funds for Russian expenditures in the remainder of the world.12 Although American involvement introduced another source of aid, the Allies came to regard its promise as a means of keeping Russia militarily active. "The reason the Allied generals and ambassadors . . . played ... an important role," remembered Raymond Robins, "was that the Allies were financing the Provisional Government and were, therefore, in a very real sense, Kerensky's boys. Unless he did what they wanted, they could at any time withhold funds . . . and his government would collapse."13

Little popular support for the war could be expected without a revision of war aims. "The secret treaties are the nub of the situation." Kerensky told Lincoln Steffens of McClure's. "Ever since the Russian workers, peasants, and soldiers learned from the Germans at the front that there were secret treaties, showing that we, the allies, also were out for conquest, they won't fight."14 If these agreements were abrogated, Kerensky believed that he might be able to convince his people to resume their war efforts. He suggested that President Wilson summon a public conference, "in some conspicuous 225 place" for this purpose. This meeting, Kerensky warned, had to be "so open, so conspicuous, the voice of the allies must be so loud and clear that it will carry to the remotest village in Russia. "15

Steffens was persuaded by Ambassador Francis and Charles Crane to return to Washington with Kerensky's message. On 26 June, the journalist was received at the White House by a "silent and thoughtful" Wilson, who listened intently.16 "Kerenski," said Steffens, says . . . that he cannot make war, that he is only in the seat of power; he is not the actual ruling government. . . . Kerenski asks you, to clear away [the] suspicion of loot and conquest so conspicuously and so clearly that the sight and the sound of it will reach to the uttermost village of Russia and be known to every peasant, soldier, sailor, and worker throughout Russia and all over Asia.17 Wilson, however, claimed ignorance of the treaties. I know nothing of those secret treaties. . . . That makes it difficult for me to do what Kerenski and Governor Francis ask. If we had such a treaty ourselves, if we were a party to their making, then I could say to our Allies, 'Let us abrogate our treaties.' That would be easy, human, diplomatic, polite. But having no such treaty and having no knowledge of those treaties, I would have to say, 'Here, gentlemen, do you meet openly before the world and tear up those secret treaties of yours!'—No, that is hard. That I cannot very well do.18

Two years later, Wilson claimed before a Senate committee that he first learned of the treaties while attending the Paris peace conference. Steffens maintained that while the 226 President may not have been officially informed of their existence, he was aware of them and had not been surprised by their mention.19

On the same day Steffens met with Wilson, 26 June, Kerensky left for the southwestern front to prepare for the long-awaited offensive. The Minister of War realized that in order for Russia to survive, "it was necessary to restore the army's will to die."20 The offensive. General Lavr Kornilov told Knox, would be Russia's "last chance."21

Prospects for success were doubtful. At Kiev, troops desperately needed at the front were stranded at the railway station.22 Further, significant changes in the Russian command troubled many observers. From London, Nabokov charged that Kerensky treated the Russian generals with "contempt, constantly dismissing them or sending them from one command to another."23 Brusilov and Deniken were chosen to replace Alexeyev and Gurko, both of whom had grown increasingly critical of Kerensky. Gurko, the commander-in-chief of the western front, had particular problems with Kerensky, and had resigned on 28 May in protest of the "Declaration of the Rights of Soldiers." On 8 June, he was reassigned to command a division in Kazan. The removal of Alexeyev was especially noteworthy, as he was, according to Knox, the only Russian officer who had influence with his troops.24 Even Brusilov admitted 227 that the war was over for Russia, as there was no means of enticing the troops to battle.25 while Kerensky and "others of the uninitiated might cherish the illusion" that the troops could be moved to action, Brusilov would later claim that he knew this to be impossible.26 uig invitation to Kerensky to visit the front was to allow the Minister to witness the poor state of affairs and "clear [himself] and [his] officers of the charge of being unwilling to serve the Revolution."27 Knox, remembering Brusilov's attitude quite differently, recalled that the new Commander-in-Chief had boasted that he would "lead all the armies of Russia to victory."28

Like Kerensky, Brusilov employed emotional speeches to convince his men to fight, a technique which often alienated his fellow officers, who disliked his "political gymnastics."29 Those officers viewed him as an opportunist who believed that his course was the only one with a chance of restoring military order and discipline.30 Arriving in the southwestern sector, Kerensky met with Allied military attaches. Knox promised that British troops in France would provide support for the Russian offensive. This pledge, for reasons unknown to Kerensky, never materialized.31 The majority of the materiel to be used in the offensive originated in Britain and France. Unfortunately much of it proved to be defective.32 228 Kerensky toured the front, exhorting his troops, but was unsure whether they would advance; High tension, determination, and, at times, a feeling of impending triumph! . . . Both officers and men were now going into battle not with the old emotions. We felt clearly their effort to overcome something in themselves, to free themselves from sensations unusual on the eve of battle. There was more depth, more spirituality, but less of concentrated harmony. The troops seemed to feel that the dent on their insides had not quite been removed. To the very last moment the officers did not know whether the soldiers would follow them in the attack.33

Russian artillery began bombarding enemy positions on 29 June and the offensive began in earnest on 1 July. There were few dependable units; some even bordered on mutiny. "To be sure," Kerensky observed, "not everything was quite in order in the spirit of the seventh and eleventh armies which had been designated for the offensive."34 The troops did in fact advance, easily overrunning the positions of the demoralized Austrians. The Allies believed the success of the offensive was a portent of things to come.35 Kerensky was elated, declaring the offensive "the greatest triumph of the revolution," and boasting of his army's great enthusiasm.36 in recognition of their heroism, the Minister of War requested that he be allowed to award with red banners those who began the offensive.37 229 For the moment. Allied faith in Kerensky appeared to have been well placed.38 "The credit for the renewal of the fighting on the Russian front is his and his alone," claimed one western correspondent; "... its successful prosecution is a tribute to his personal inspiration."39 Another declared the Russian campaign to be a "great triumph ... a triumph of loyalty and true patriotism."40 V. D. Nabokov admitted that Kerensky had "exhibited an honest patriotic enthusiasm."41

Already, however, there were indications that Russian success would be short-lived.42 Following the capture of Koniuchy, the troops consumed a large cache of wine and liquor abandoned by the Austrians. The drunken soldiers, reported Robert Wilton, correspondent of The Times (London), would have been easily overrun should the enemy have chosen to counterattack. At Bzhezany, pockets of troops, refusing to heed the orders of their officers, had mutinied.43

The initial success of the Russian offensive had surprised many people. Said de Robien, There is something immoral about the victory of this disorganized, louse-ridden army, led by a petty little Socialist lawyer . . . all our ideas about discipline . . . are contradicted by this herd, in which each man does as he pleases, where officers are murdered, where each company has a Soviet of delegates, and where even the plans of the campaign are argued about.44 230 The Frenchman correctly warned that Russian success would not last. "We shall have a terrible awakening when the tovariches have to face Germans with their machine-guns and their heavy cannons instead of the Austrians who have decidedly had enough of it."45 Poor discipline, war-weariness, enemy propaganda, and a German counterattack soon halted the Russian advance. The campaign, which had previously been characterized as "determined" and "remarkable" was not referred to as the "spasmodic offensive of Kerensky."46 Knox reported that further progress could not be expected and that the Russian army was "irretrievably lost as a fighting organization. "47 Discussions with General Ignatiev at the headquarters of the 1st Guard Infantry Division at Kozowa confirmed this impression. Kerensky was outraged by Knox's attitude and demanded his recall from the front.48

Meanwhile, from Rumania to the Baltic, the disintegration of the Russian campaign continued. A variety of reasons were offered for the catastrophe. Shipments of weapons from Britain, France, and the United States had proven to be defective. Kerensky noted that thirty-five percent of them had not survived two days of moderate use.49 The exhausted soldiers had become attentive and willing adherents of those voices who called on them to lay down their arms.50 Neither the Petrograd 231 Soviet's appeal to the troops to fight courageously nor Kerensky's exhortations had been able to reverse the trend of defeat and resignation.51

The most insurmountable problem remained the lack of military discipline. Initially, this crisis had not been recognized by many Allied observers. The Root Commission had noted that, although many had deserted, large numbers of Russian troops were returning to their units. A return to full military capability was possible, argued Scott, if the Provisional Government could restore its authority. The General reported that the regime was apparently succeeding in its efforts and, "barring any new influences," would continue to increase in strength.52 Addressing a large audience of troops at Perm, Root hailed the reemergence of the Russian war machine. "God be praised," he declared, you are now acquiring that discipline and capacity to work together for victory. . . . God sent a great man to be your leader in Kerensky, and under his leadership, under his appeals to the soldiers at the front, discipline has been restored.53 Discipline had not been restored. "You have taken the ground from under our feet," complained General Avraam Dragomirov to the government. "Will you kindly restore it?"54 Even Scott had to admit that problems remained. "Argument, eloquence and persuasion were tried but they dare not employ force. To have done so would have added 232 bloodshed to confusion and replaced indifference with hatred."55

The Petrograd Soviet, too, was alarmed by the breakdown along the front. Izvestia denounced the "dark instincts of the irresponsible masses of soldiers," whom it accused of pushing Russian democracy "into the abyss."56 The Soviet was especially critical of the Bolsheviks, whom they charged were undermining governmental authority.

"It is time for us to come to our senses," wrote Brusilov to Kerensky on 11 July, "... it is necessary to restore iron discipline, in the fullest sense of the term." With any delay, he warned, "The Army will perish, Russia will perish, and we will sink into infamy."57 General Knox asked Assistant Minister of War G. Y. Yakubovich what would happen if the death penalty was not restored and was told that the army would be finished by October and would simply "sit in the trenches."58 Brusilov's demand became law on 12 July, a decision Kerensky admitted to be "painful" but necessary. The government's position, he claimed, was clear, "either to sacrifice the army to cowards and traitors or to restore the only penalty that [would] frighten them."59 AS early as April, Knox had stated that "it was obvious that the Russian soldier would never attack unless tae death penalty was again established."60 233 Though it had supported the July offensive, the Petrograd Soviet violently opposed the restoration of capital punishment in the army, claiming it had "a degrading effect on the population, and especially on those unfortunate sons of the people who are forced, either directly or indirectly, to participate with its implementation."61 The government, the Soviet charged, would be using the death penalty as a means of restoring the authority and prestige of the officers. Moreover, it would be the initial step of a conspiracy to subjugate the entire population. Capital punishment, it argued further, was inconsistent with the principles of democracy that formed the foundation of the new Russia. Rather than such "brutal measures," other solutions could be employed to counteract military disorganization. "A consistent process of democratizing the army and inspiring it with the awareness that it is defending its native land and the revolution" would better serve as a means of restoring order, suggested the Soviet in an official protest of the government's action.62

Though he hoped that the restoration of the death penalty would "frighten" his troops into obedience, Kerensky did not fully comprehend the growing influence of the Bolsheviks and other factions who diligently opposed the war. The desire for peace continued to find adherents 234 in Russia, a fact of which Allied representatives were fully cognizant. Buchanan urged that nothing be done that the Russian pacifists could employ as evidence that the war was being prolonged to promote imperialist aims. The Ambassador suggested that it would be wise to agree to Tereshchenko's proposal of the previous month for a conference to discuss war aims. "To postpone the discussion of war aims will but discourage Russia from continuing her active participation in the war."63 Petrograd, claimed Buchanan, did not expect the Allies to obligate themselves to any specific peace terms. These would depend on the course of the war, and, therefore, could not be precisely defined while the war continued.64

On 3 July, members of the First Machine Gun Regiment in Petrograd, incited by a small group of anarchists and Bolsheviks, prepared to disobey orders calling them to the front. The soldiers were soon joined by large numbers of metal workers and laborers from factories throughout the capital. By late evening, tens of thousands of workers and soldiers joined in a demand for the immediate expulsion of all capitalist ministers who were in the government. Bolsheviks loyal to Lenin desperately tried to dissuade the group, believing, as did their leaders yet to arrive in Petrograd, that a revolution at that time was premature.65 The unruly 235 crowd, however, had grown far too large and many within it had armed themselves.66

Allied assistance, and more importantly, the future of the Russian democracy, depended on the government's ability to restore the capability of its military forces. On 16 July, Kerensky and Tereshchenko met with a group of Russia's senior generals at the Stavka to discuss possible solutions. In addition to Brusilov and Alexeyev, Generals Deniken (of the western front) and Klembovsky (of the northern front) personally attended while Shcherbachev and Kornilov expounded their views in lengthy cables. All agreed that the restoration of officer authority offered the only solution to the crisis. The restoration of the death penalty throughout the army must follow. Given the disintegration of Russia's forces, how could the judicial process be implemented? If all the guilty were arrested, warned Klembovsky, "half the army would end up in Siberia."76 if applied consistently, the government would be forced to execute entire divisions. The meeting adjourned with serious problems left unresolved. Faced with the renewed Austro-German effort along the eastern front and the breakdown of her military, economic, social, and political systems, Russia desperately sought a solution to her worsening predicament. Many Russians, monarchists, bourgeoisie, and military leaders 238 alike, were frustrated by their government's indecisiveness Russia, they believed, needed strong leadership, a "hero ... on a white horse," to reestablish order.77 m short, Russia needed someone to do something. Political inaction, the the government's fear that any action might culminate in the destruction of Russia, had ironically led the nation to the edge of that very precipice. It was not surprising that many embraced the dashing son of a Siberian Cossack, General Lavr Kornilov, as the man who held the promise for the salvation of Russia. Captured by the Austrians in 1915, Kornilov had made a daring escape after nearly a year in captivity. Returning home to a hero's welcome, he was appointed to lead the Russian army in the July offensive. Though initially successful, the army was forced to abandon its positions because of a combined Austro-German counteroffensive. As the army retreated, many soldiers committed acts of violence and barbarity, pillaging and robbing houses and farms in their path. "There were cases," recalled Wilton of The Times, "of families being bayoneted and women and children violated."78 Kornilov, outraged by the Provisional Government's unwillingness to restore order among the troops, took matters in his own hands. "I consider the voluntary retreat of units from the positions as equated with treason and treachery," he cabled 239 his officers, instructing them that "in such cases . . . [they should] without hesitation, turn the fire of machine guns and artillery against the traitors."79 Those who failed to carry out the order were relieved of command and arrested.

The commanders unanimously agreed that the situation indeed called for "the most extreme measures" in order to save Russia from those "who by their weakness are destroying and betraying the Revolution."80 Among other things, they demanded that the Declaration of Soldiers' Rights, which Kerensky had "frivolously accepted and endorsed" be immediately rescinded.81 Determined to restore discipline, and without government approval, Kornilov ordered deserters arrested and executed. Those caught would serve as a dramatic warning to others contemplating desertion. Their bodies were exhibited along crossroads, notices of their crimes attached to their corpses.82 Repeatedly, Kornilov attempted to rouse the government to establish courts martial authorized to pronounce the death sentence; An army of maddened, benighted people whom the authorities have done nothing to protect against systematic disintegration and debauchery and who have lost all traces of dignity is in full retreat. The fields which we dare not even call battle-fields, are the scene of unrelieved horror, shame and humiliation the likes of which the 240 Russian army has never known. . . . The extreme leniency of the government's measures has undermined discipline, and is responsible for the uncontrolled anarchic cruelty of the masses who have thrown off all restraint. this elemental cruelty expresses itself in acts of violence, looting and murder. . . . The death penalty will save many innocent lives at the cost of those of a few cowards and traitors.83

Kerensky was convinced by his 16 July meeting at the Stavka that the military situation could not improve while Brusilov was in command.84 Consequently, on 18 July, Kornilov was appointed supreme commander, an act which Francis viewed as reassuring.85 sir William Robertson informed Lloyd George that the appointment would restore both military discipline and Russia's will to fight.86 Under Kornilov, Russian fortunes appeared to improve. The general had proved to be "a great leader of men . . . one of the greatest military commanders of his time."87

Kornilov even went so far as to express his intentions to mount a new offensive, but the success of such an endeavor was dependent on the restoration of military and political order. His discussions with the Provisional Government, and with Kerensky in particular, convinced him that the regime lacked the necessary resolve in this direction.88 Relations between the Minister of War and Kornilov grew increasingly strained in the weeks following the General's promotion.89 Kornilov's 241 appointment aptatement of officers who "belonged to the oldest J-OJ^s" especially antagonized Kerensky, who by then h^e Prime Minister.90

Korni'ld riot tolerate the interference of the government Soviet, one condition on which his acceptance ofipi^eme command was hinged. Further, he demanded t'^tion of the Russian offensive on all fronts an'estoration of the death penalty. He would, he Petrograd, be responsible only to his own consciencto the people directly.91 Outraged by Kornilov's u]m, Kerensky called for the General's immediate dis and prosecution. As Kerensky was in the process cing a new coalition and thus was in a precarious pc politically, these threats never materialized.

Frust3y the government's inaction, Kornilov twice journeyietrograd to plead for the authority to take whatever1 he thought necessary to restore order. Though he argit his government supported efforts to end confusion; army, Kerensky was hesitant to give the general siad authority and prophetically cautioned thate who attempted to establish a "personal dict[p in Russia would find himself the next day helpljangling in space, without railroads, without telegrid without an army."^2 242 Kornilov was recalcitrant. "Well what of it? Many will perish but the rest will finally get to take the army into their hands."93

The conflict between the Prime Minister and the General mirrored, to a great extent, the major problem that had befallen the government, that of indecisiveness. Kerensky was irritated by Kornilov's aggressiveness. "Proposals," the Prime Minister wrote, "became demands presented to the Provisional Government by General Kornilov ... he specially insisted on reprisals, such as [the] death penalty, revolutionary tribunals in the rear, etc."94 While a segment of the government agreed with Kornilov that "only harsh measures, unwaveringly enforced" could save Russia, the majority believed that the General's demands should "serve only as material for free discussion."95 The primary reason for the coalition's failure to act was fear—fear that hasty measures would cause further unrest. The government planned to institute its program gradually, a decision which lacked unanimous support. A number of important leaders publicly offered their support to Kornilov's efforts to rebuild the army and save the nation. On 14 August, the General arrived in Moscow to address a conference called a month earlier by Kerensky.96 From Moscow, American Consul Madden Summers described Kornilov's arrival as the only one that "appeared to 243 interest the public. He was preceded through the main streets by an escort of twenty or thirty automobiles full of picturesque Cossacks and officers of the St. George Cavaliers. He was applauded everywhere."97 introduced by the Prime Minister as the "first soldier of the revolution," Kornilov urged that measures be implemented immediately to save Russia. "I believe in a happy future for Russia and the complete restoration of the army's fighting strength, but we have no time to lose. We need to act decisively. We need to enforce the necessary measures with clarity and resolution."98

Following his speech, which de Robien described as "lamentable" and mediocre, Kornilov left Moscow without speaking to the Prime Minister.99 The two men would never see one another again. Despite de Robien's assessment, many observers believed that the rift between Kerensky and Kornilov had been solved. This view formed the basis of a report from Francis to the State Department. Tereshchenko, similarly pleased, noted that there was "no possibility of a rupture."100 Buchanan noted that while there was "little lost between the two men, for the moment, at any rate, neither can get along without the other."101 Kornilov had hoped to persuade the government to adopt his views. This had not been accomplished. Further, news from the front was extremely discouraging. Russian 244 positions continued to be overrun. Eastern Galicia and Bukovina had fallen, and Tarnopol had been lost.102 in the northwest, the fall of Riga on 20 August posed the most serious danger yet faced, as Petrograd was left open to attack. Most radical elements, reported Summers, believed that the Twelfth Army under General D. P. Parsky, had done all it could to defend the Latvian city.103 m reality, the Army had offered only token resistance before abandoning its positions in terror.104 "The infantry displayed hardly any cohesion," charged Kornilov, "but fled in disarray leaving their guns behind them and being taken prisoners in large numbers."105 The explosion of Russia's large ammunition dump at Kazan was further proof to Kornilov that the time for action was past due.106 Kerensky no longer appeared able to guarantee Russia's allies that his government's war effort could continue. This was evident to T^bassador Buchanan, who cabled London he did not regard the Russian Prime Minister as an "ideal" leader and despite "the services which he [had] rendered in the past" he believed Kerensky had "almost played his part."107 Professor Harper, then in Russia, urged patience.

It is taking sometime for Kerensky to resolve to use the full authority which he proclaims to enjoy. At times he seems to go backward a bit, giving into a demand from the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council ... we have to recognize that it is hard 245 for him to break with his own group, especially when the other side will not give him the fullest support.108

While his faith in Kerensky had been shaken, Buchanan saw little benefit in the downfall of the Prime Minister. It would, he reported, be fatal . . . and would . . . lead to civil war and entail irreparable disaster. . . . I do not see who is to replace [Kerensky] with advantage, nor do I believe that a . . . cadet in [the] Octobrist Government would do any better than the present one.109 Ambassador Francis saw little to be gained from Allied intervention in the Kornilov-Kerensky dispute: I argued that should Korniloff be successful it would not mean a restoration of the Monarch, but merely a new administration and a more vigorous prosecution of the war. If, on the other hand . . . Russia should be forced out of the war through Kerensky's failure to restore discipline in the army. Allied diplomats would receive and deserve severe censure for having aided Kerensky to eliminate Korniloff. If, on the contrary, we were to support Korniloff and he should fail we would obviously find ourselves in an impossible situation with relation to the Kerensky Government.HO Unlike the American diplomat, Knox and de Robien openly supported Kornilov. Appearing before a meeting of the War Cabinet in early September, Knox warned of the possibility of a separate Russian peace. He urged the dispatch of a joint Allied note to Petrograd asking, among other things, that Kornilov be given a "free hand" to reestablish order.Ill 246 By now, Kornilov's confidence in Kerensky was all but gone. "I do not trust any longer Kerensky and the Provisional Government," the General told Deputy Minister of War Boris Savinkov. "The latter has not the strength to stand on the ground of firm authority which alone can save the country. As for Kerensky, he is not only weak and vacillating, but even insincere."112 After lengthy argument in which Savinkov gave Kerensky's pledge that the Provisional Government would adopt stricter measures, Kornilov agreed to support the Prime Minister "in every way."113

Shortly after Savinkov's departure from the Stavka, Kornilov had a mysterious visit from Vladimir Lvov, the Director General of the Holy Synod.114 As Lvov carried no written authorization from Kerensky, all staff members exercised care to speak in general terms only.115 Kornilov respected his demand for government action against the Bolsheviks and even offered Kerensky and Savinkov "asylum" should the much rumored Bolshevik coup occur. This invitation never reached Petrograd. On 26 August, Lvov arrived at the Winter Palace "strangely agitated," and "incoherently" spoke of Kerensky's dangerous situation.116 Kornilov, he said, would not protect the government in the event of a Bolshevik uprising; and he now demanded the immediate 247 transfer of all political authority to himself and a declaration of martial law throughout Russia. According to his plan, Kerensky and Savinkov were to be appointed Ministers of Justice and War, respectively. Incredulous, Kerensky realized that Lvov was serious. As a test, he had Lvov write down Kornilov's demands. He wrote without hesitation. Convinced of the legitimacy of the warnings, the Prime Minister considered how he could best convince the Provisional Government of the gravity of the situation. To this end, Kerensky formulated an ingenious plan. He would get Kornilov to implicate himself by way of a direct telegraph message.117 In the communication that followed, the General acknowledged that he had authorized Lvov to speak for him.119 With this evidence of Kornilov's treason, Kerensky went to the Malachite Chamber where the Cabinet was then in session. Charging that the "uprising ... be crushed," he demanded to be invested with full powers, an action taken after brief discussion. Kerensky informed the country of the Kornilov revolt on 29 August and called for the General to surrender his post to General Klembovsky, then Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front. Klembovsky refused the post on the grounds that at that time such a change in command would be catastrophic.119 248 Kerensky's actions precipitated the long expected uprising and created a reaction that would greatly strengthen those forces intent on bringing his regime to its knees. Declaring Kerensky's action to be a "great provocation," Kornilov charged that the Provisional Government was acting "in complete harmony with the plans of the German general staff . . . killing the army and the very foundation of the country."120 He preferred "to die on the battlefield of honor, [rather than] . . . betray Russia into the hands of her ancient enemy, the German race, and . . . turn the Russian people into slaves."121

The continued existence of the Provisional Government was indeed jeopardized. Prince G. N. Trubetskoi, the Ministry's representative at the Stavka, gave little hope for its survival.122 Tereshchenko admitted to Ambassador Buchanan that the coup could well provoke a Bolshevik rebellion and urged Allied representatives to seek safe haven in Moscow or in Finland.123 Information reaching the west suggested that Kornilov enjoyed wide support.124 This, however, was untrue, as virtually the entire army and great numbers of workers vehemently opposed the General. Though the Allied governments officially maintained an attitude of "strict neutrality," their representatives and the tone of their media left little doubt where their loyalties lay.125 249 The Allied representatives, desperately seeking someone who could restore Russian military capabilities, viewed Kornilov as the salvation of Russia. Buchanan abandoned Kerensky in favor of Kornilov and suggested that little could be done but "await events and . . . trust that Korniloff will be strong enough to overcome all resistance in the course of a few days."126 oe Robien was even more forthright, "I believe . . that if Kornilov holds firm he will succeed, and I look forward to seeing him make a clean sweep of all that rabble and, I hope, hanging them."127 While Buchanan was hesitant actively to involve himself in the coup, other Allied statesmen were not so reluctant. Fyodor Aladin, who was to become Foreign Minister if the uprising was successful, returned to Russia with the assistance of the Royal Navy. With him, he carried a message of personal support for Kornilov from Lord Milner of the British War Cabinet and a large sum of money.128 General Knox went so far as to arrange for a squadron of British armored cars, whose personnel was outfitted in Russian uniforms, to support Kornilov's advance on the capital.129 Without adequate military support to protect Petrograd, the Soviet took the lead in the defense of the capital, establishing the Committee for the People's Struggle Against Counterrevolution for its defense.130 The 250 Committee's decision to arm workers reestablished the Red Guard, a body which had been outlawed following the July uprising. The uprising was soon crushed. Workers loyal to the revolution prevented trains carrying Kornilov's troops, under the command of General Krymov, from reaching Petrograd. Left with little alternative but surrender, Krymov shot himself through the heart. Soon afterwards, Kornilov was himself arrested and, along with the remnants of troops still loyal to him, imprisoned in the former monastery at Bykhov.

Though Kerensky emerged from the Kornilov rebellion with complete political control of Russian affairs, the crisis profoundly affected the future of his government. While he had repulsed the threat, Kerensky had at the same time strengthened the very forces that would soon destroy his government.131 Furthermore, the uprising had done little to improve Allied confidence in the Petrograd regime.132 The conflict between the two Russian leaders had placed the Allies in a difficult position. Buchanan had hoped that a reconciliation between Kerensky and Kornilov could be undertaken as offering the best hope for Russia's future.133 William Boyce Thompson had not expected much from the confrontation, insisting that the two sides would most certainly reach a compromise.134 some believed that 251 the General lacked the freedom to make such an agreement. Buchanan maintained that Kornilov would have cooperated with Kerensky but suspected that many of those who supported him were using the General as a tool to overthrow the Provisional Government.135

Buchanan's opinion of Kerensky continued to decline. [Kerensky*s] policy . . . has been weak and vacillating, fear of the Soviet seems to paralyze his every action; he had the chance after the July rising to suppress the Bolsheviks once and for all—and he refused to use it; and now, instead of endeavoring to come to an understanding with him, he dismissed the one strong man capable of restoring discipline in the army.136

Knox admitted that he, too, had no faith in the Russian Prime Minister, who, he said, was "afraid of shedding blood and [was] allowing matters to drift towards anarchy."137 Francis would later claim that had Lenin and Trotsky been arrested, tried, and executed, the Bolshevik revolution would never have occurred, sparing Russia a "reign of terror, and the loss from famine and murder of millions of her sons and daughters."138 The Ambassador believed that the Kerensky regime had been strengthened by the crisis but conceded that the immediate restoration of military discipline was a necessity if Russia was to continue in the war.139 He hoped, however, that Kerensky might have gained a valuable lesson by the experience.140 252 Though Lloyd George personally believed Kornilov to be the "best man in sight," he was hesitant to adopt a policy of visible support for the General.141 The British War Cabinet shared this view and agreed to accept Buchanan's assessment of the situation. London believed that British support could have a disastrous effect, especially if members of the anti-war movement could charge that Britain was supporting the mass execution of Russian troops.142

Deterioration of the military situation and the government's failure to restore order had resulted in Allied pressure on Kerensky to adopt Kornilov's program. Major-General Charles Barter, British military observer at the Stavka, urged his government and those of the other Allies to force the acceptance of Kornilov's program, "if only in the interests of the Allies themselves, as the continuation of the war would otherwise be impossible."143 The only means of suppressing the extreme left was through a powerful government. Barter did not preclude the possibility of Kerensky's participation in a new regime. "I am persuaded . . . that Kornilov is the only horse to back to win, with Kerensky for a place in his Government."144 still hesitant to embrace Kornilov openly, Britain continued to pressure Kerensky to come to terms with his rebellious general. A note presented to the 253 Russian Government indicated Allied concerns. "The Allied powers," it stated, "cannot help being extremely preoccupied by the Russian situation" and admitted that "recent events [had] thrown doubts on the power of resistance of Russia and on her ability to continue the struggle."145 From the American Consulate in Harbin, China, C K. Mosser wrote Francis to indicate his notion that Russia would emerge from the crisis stronger than ever.146 Some believed that Allied support of Kerensky should continue.147 The New Republic criticized those who had abandoned the Prime Minister.148 From Petrograd, French diplomat Ferdinand Grenard wrote that the Allies had little sympathy for the Russian situation but were, instead, motivated solely by self-interest. Allied governments, opined the Frenchman, were: . . . blinded by their desire to keep Russia in the war at all costs. . . . They could not understand that in keeping Russia in the war, they had to accept the inevitable concomitant of internal strife in the instability of the transitional period. In badgering Kerensky with continual requests—almost demands—for the resumption of normal order in the country, they took no account of the circumstances in which he had to work, and in fact only contributed to the chaos with which he was trying to deal.149 Ambassador Bakhmetev repeatedly complained that the United States Government, and especially Secretary Lansing, had little understanding of Russia's attitudes.150 Britain's Acting Consul in Moscow, Robert Bruce Lockhart, held that 254 there was, in fact, little that could be done to prod Russia to action. The only appeal that might succeed was one of sentiment—the necessity of saving the revolution from the Germans.151 "it was clear," recalled Lloyd George, "that Russia as a fighting force was falling to pieces."152 The Prime Minister doubted that even a military dictatorship could benefit the Allied cause. Accounts of those fleeing Russia appeared to substantiate the view that anarchy had gripped the country and made her continued military participation undependable.153 Few, however, wanted to contemplate the possibilities of a radical takeover. As a result of their intent to export the revolution abroad, the Bolsheviks enjoyed almost no support in Allied government circles. Arthur Henderson and Lockhart were among the few Englishmen who favored contact with Lenin's group.154 Raymond Robins would say of Trotsky, "[he] was a poor kind [of] son-of-a-bitch but the greatest Jew since Christ."155 The Red Cross Mission of Robins and his colleagues would be among the last Allied efforts to aid the faltering Kerensky government. Organized in June, the delegation arrived in Russia in August, headed by Dr. Frank Billings, a well-known physician from Chicago. In early September, claiming ill health, Billings returned to the United States. Probably the physician's departure, however. 255 was more attributable to his poor relations with William Boyce Thompson, a prosperous businessman with extremely conservative political views.156 Robins, a loyal supporter of Theodore Roosevelt, would serve as Thompson's assistant after Billing's departure and would later succeed him. Despite the "decidedly progressive" tendencies of Robins, the two would quickly become "kindred spirits."157 The mission was primarily funded by private sources, including substantial donations from Thompson, an arrangement which Samuel Harper viewed as a significant error in judgment. Thompson's interest stemmed from his abiding faith in Russia, which he believed still remained an active factor in the war. If Russia could continue her involvement, Germany would be defeated.158 with this in mind, Thompson had pleaded for an opportunity to go to Russia. As his friendships ran deep in the administration, his request had been quickly granted. Wilson hoped the businessman might unofficially represent the "fraternal interest" of the United States.159 The actual purpose of the delegation was far from fraternal. Though supposedly nonpolitical in nature, its members were to receive military commissions as well as rank.160 Further, the mission was not funded by the Red Cross, instead meeting its expenses from private contributors.161 The Red Cross exercised no authority over its activities which were 256 instead directed by the War Department. Billing's leadership and the Red Cross "complexion" were but disguises for its real purpose, which was, as Henry P. Davison, the Chairman of the Red Cross War Council, observed, far more political.162

This did not become manifest until after the delegation's arrival in Russia, though many, including Billings, continued to view its primary mission as one of relief.163 ironically, the group achieved some success in this direction, working closely with other relief agencies such as the Sanitary Department of the Russian army and the Russian Red Cross to improve medical care and sanitation and to increase supplies of food and clothing. Achieving these goals was hindered by the deterioration of discipline at the front, where soldiers' committees discussed not only strategy but sanitation and medical care as well.164 Various diseases, such as dysentery, cholera, and typhoid, the presence of vermin, and shortages of medical supplies and inadequate medical care increased the restlessness of the Russian troops.165

On 22 October 1917, a report from the delegation reached Washington stating that many Russians doubted the altruism of the mission, believing instead that the United States in particular, and the Allies in general, were only in the war for "big profit."166 Even members of the 257 delegation questioned Thompson's motives. Major Orrin Wightman charged that the mission was a "cloak for a deliberate effort on WB's part to make commercial contacts in Russia and secure concessions," a charge which Robins labeled "an abominable libel."167 "The fact was," remembered Robins, " . . . WB displayed a fine sense of honor while he was in Russia." He was offered all the concessions he might have desired by the Kerensky government and by individuals, "and refused everything."168

Though clearly interested in the financial and commercial possibilities offered by Russia, Thompson was more concerned with the continued existence of its government and "thought the Russian people wanted what . . . Kerensky wanted to give them and he [Thompson] wanted to help them get it."169 on 17 October 1917, Thompson wired his wife of his admiration for the Russian Prime Minister, "a true patriot, a mere boy of 34 years of age—practically a doomed man, with only one kidney—now making a heroic fight to save Russia from an inglorious peace."170 Thompson believed that a separate peace would be suicidal and was determined to do whatever was necessary to strengthen Russian resolve—this was his real reason for making the journey. American correspondent Bessie Beatty remembered Thompson as a pragmatist "with a million dollars 258 in gold."171 Much of that sum was spent on propaganda efforts similar to those recommended by the Root Mission. Determined to "fight fire with fire," Thompson requested his government to send newspapers, literature, and movies to combat German propaganda.172 in addition, he sponsored numerous speeches by members of his delegation, which made little impression, since no member knew the Russian language.173 T. D. Thacher admitted that though many members of the group diligently worked to learn the language, "none [did] with any success, and all with a great waste of time."174 Thompson refused to learn Russian at all—which sometimes led to humorous episodes: For the Russians [Thompson] invented a phrase of his own which they, not knowing English, no doubt put down to a mispronounciation of their usual form of greeting. His expression was; 'Grass whiskers, tovarish!' He boasted no other familiarity with the Russian language.175 Despite these problems, Francis claimed that the mission was "making a good impression," an assessment which may have been overly generous.176 The goal of the propaganda campaign was sixfold: 1) The continuation of the war; 2) The establishment of the principles of civil order and civil liberty; 3) the maintenance of discipline in the army and at the rear; 4) preparation for the elections of the Constituent Assembly; 5) formation of party programs; and, 6) contest against the campaign of the extremists.177 259 One of the mission's members, F. M. Corse, worked closely with British and French representatives to implement this campaign. The Russians, he believed, were extremely interested in western news. He requested that "250 to 500 words of well-selected and compact news" be sent in order to present "America and American things" to the Russians.178 These dispatches, which he suggested might be supplied on a daily basis by Harper, would then be added to those which were then being sent by the British and French publicity departments.

On reaching Petrograd, Thompson had become even more convinced that the Provisional Government must be supported. So strong was this view that at his first meeting with Kerensky. Thompson personally subscribed for a half-million rubles of the new government loan.179 According to Robins, the propaganda campaign would cost an estimated one million dollars initially and three million dollars per month for the first six months.180 After discussing the campaign with Kerensky, Thompson spoke with Madame Catherine Breshkovskaya, the "little grandmother of the revolution," who had made herself known through her revolutionary campaigns against Tsarism, and who now supported Kerensky and the Russian war effort. "They are so dark, my people. They have been so oppressed, so beaten, so broken. They need so the education. Your America—it must help us."181 260 Moved by the emotional plea, and certain that the Wilson administration would support so worthy a cause, Thompson arranged with J. P. Morgan and Company to advance one million dollars of his own fortune, most of which he personally delivered to the Winter Palace, to begin Breshkovskaya's "Committee on Civic Education," and generally to support the Kerensky regime.182 Albert Rhys Williams, th American socialist then in Petrograd, charged that Breshkovskaya had sold Thompson and Robins a "bill of goods" and that she was "hopelessly out of step with the Revolution." Her background, according to Williams, was enough to make Thompson "romanticize her."183 Francis reported on 26 October that Thompson had not informed him as to how the money was to be spent and suggested that such expenditures might be "improper or even injudicious."184 Used to publish textbooks, print newspapers, pay lecturers, and organize Soldiers' Clubs, the fund quickly began to disappear; and, in late August, Thompson requested that Davison approach his government concerning the appropriation of three million dollars per month for propaganda purposes.185 The request was denied. In late September, Davison saw the President, who questioned the sanity of Thompson's request. Davison was said to have replied that Thompson was "a big man, doing things in a big way."186 261 Meanwhile, H. G. Hutchins of the New York Bank of Commerce arrived in Washington, having been asked by Thompson to win support for the publicity campaign. After attempts to see Wilson failed, Hutchins approached George Creel, head of the Committee on Public Information, whose members included the Secretaries of War, Navy, and State. With Creel's influence, Hutchins was granted an interview with Wilson on 23 October.187 Though the President listened politely, it was clear that he had no intention of authorizing Thompson's request. He had, in fact, already decided, at Creel's suggestion, to send Edgar Sisson, editor of the Cosmopolitan, to Russia to assess the situation. He had sailed for Russia that same day.188 Sisson was instructed to "organize . . . the practicable portion" of the root Commission's recommendations concerning America's "purpose and effort" and to "participate in all movements to support Russian morale and from the Russian base do whatever was possible to weaken the German morale."189 The Root Commission had suggested an expenditure of $5i million to finance its recommendation, a sum which Sisson described as "not . . . a big sum in a day of war credits advanced in the billions, yet a vast amount when expressed in terms of printing, circulation, cables, wireless, service, office cost, and travel."190 For Russia, Sisson carried with him only 262 $250,000, a sum far less than that requested by Root, Davison, or Thompson.191

A variety of factors were responsible for the American Government's hesitancy to respond as Root and Thompson had suggested. Creel viewed Thompson's actions in Petrograd as those of a "roaring radical," and believed that the tycoon was not the man "to preach the American gospel."192 in fact, Thompson was known in Russia as the "American Tsar."193 Wilson was also upset by the businessman's activities. Sisson carried a letter from the President which, while praising Thompson's "generosity" and "practical expressions of sympathy," at the same time implied that such efforts be curtailed.194 Creel was also concerned by the administration of the propaganda campaign and believed that the only way to prevent corruption was through the creation of a bureaucratic framework of inspectors.195 Wilson, concerned that America's interests would be truthfully conveyed, warned Sisson: We want nothing for ourselves and the very unselfishness carries with it an obligation of open dealing. Wherever the fundamental principles of Russian freedom are at stake, we stand ready to render such aid as lies in our power, but I want this helpfulness based upon request and not upon offer. Guard particularly against an effect of officious intrusion or meddling, and try to express the disinterested friendship that is our sole impulse.196 263 Though Sisson did not reach Russia until 25 November after Kerensky's downfall through the Bolshevik coup, his mission would have made little difference. The unwillingness of the Wilson administration to respond to those needs so obvious to the Root and Red Cross Missions had rendered additional aid ineffectual. Thompson was frustrated by his government's decision and even considered utilizing his own fortune to support Kerensky, but for all practical purposes the campaign was finished.197 "The War," Robins wrote on 22 October, "is dead in the heart of the Russian soldier."198

Despite the gravity of the situation, Thompson and Robins made a final effort to save the Russian democracy. Realizing that the Soviet had become the preeminent political voice in Russia, they hoped to convince Kerensky to cooperate with that body and authorize the distribution of land to the peasants.199 On 3 November, the Allied military attaches and David Soskice, Kerensky's representative, were informed of the proposal in Thompson's room at the Hotel Europe. The meeting proved a disaster. While the American attache, William Judson, appeared to be impressed by the plan, his British counterpart was outraged. Knox did not believe the extremists could be controlled and believed the distribution of land could set a dangerous precedent.200 264 "Distribute the land in Russia today, and in two years we will be distributing it in England."201 Joined by the French attache. General Henri Niessel, Knox vehemently attacked the Kerensky regime, suggesting that Thompson's money could have been better spent on Kornilov, whose military dictatorship was all that could have saved Russia.202 Knox declared that the solution to Russia's plight was to execute the troublemakers. The outburst provoked an equally emotional response from the Russian representatives, Soskice and General Constantine Neslukovsky, both of whom angrily left the room.

The episode offered additional evidence of Allied frustration with the Kerensky government. Three weeks later, Thompson departed for home, leaving in his place Raymond Robins. The Red Cross delegation would be one of the final American missions to Russia. The other, the party of American railway experts headed by Stevens, continued in its desperate attempt to restore Russia's transportation system. This effort, like those preceding it, would also prove futile. Kerensky, once viewed as the "Savior of Russia," was now viewed with distrust and suspicion.203 Russia had reached its limit; Bolshevik promises of land, peace, and bread—those dreams suggested by Lenin on his return from exile—no longer fell on deaf ears.204 The ominous quiet which had descended over Russia 265 was soon to give birth to a new and even more dramatic development, the Bolshevik Revolution.205

Once again, Russia's allies had failed fully to comprehend the complexity of conditions within that country. Unable to develop a single viable policy, they had sought any method of assuring that the Eastern front would remain active. These approaches had often been inconsistent. Some Allied representatives, for example, had urged their governments to abandon Kerensky in favor of General Kornilov, while others continued to support the beleaguered minister. The suggestions of the Red Cross Mission, like those made by the Root delegation, had been ignored. Indeed, it appeared that while the Allies were desperate in their desire to maintain Russia in the war, they were unwilling and, more probably, unable to establish a consistent, widely supported, and worthwhile policy regarding Russia. 266 Notes Iwarth, p. 94. 2Kerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty, p. 338. 3u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, vol. 1, supplement 2, 9 June 1917, Lansing to Francis, p. 89. See Abraham, p. 240. Lansing blamed such rumors on German propaganda. See also Nabokov, p. 128, and Kerensky, The Catastrophe, pp. 209-210. 4jessup, 2:355. 5Kerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty, p. 338, 344. 6Kerensky, The Catastrophe, p. 207. See Paleologue, 3:335-336. Paleologue believed that as the Russian military effort was on the verge of paralysis, and as Russia had not fulfilled her obligations, there was little reason to fulfill Allied promises to her. 7Kerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty, pp. 338-339. See also Warth, p. 94. 8Kerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty, p. 338. For additional information on these negotiations see Lloyd George, 4:218-261. 9Root Papers, "Scott Report." lOKnox, 2:617. llKerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty, p. 339. 12Root Papers, container 136. 13Thompson Papers, container 21. 14Lincoln Steffens, The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1931), p. 765. 15ibid. 16ibid., p. 770. 17lbid. ISibid., pp. 770-772. 267 20Kerensky, The Catastrophe, p. 195. 2lLloyd George, 5:90. 22Knox, 2:627. See Nabokov, p. 120. 23Nabokov, p. 119. The Russian blamed Kerensky for deterioration of order within the military. 24ibid., p. 628. 25Brusilov, p. 310. 26ibid., p. 311. 27ibid. 28Knox, 2:628. 29ibid. 30ibid., p. 629. 3lKerensky, The Catastrophe, p. 217. 32ibid., p. 221. 33ibid., p. 219. 34ibid., p. 218. 35The Spectator, 7 July 1917, p. 5. 36Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, vol. 1, p. 354. 37The Spectator, 7 July 1917, p. 5. 38Browder and Kerensky, 2:943. 39j. B. W. Gardiner, "Military Events of the Month," The New York Times Current History of the European War 12 (New York: New York Times Company, 1917), p. 227. 40The Spectator, 7 July 1917, p. 5. 4lMedlin and Parsons, p. 78. 42Brusilov, p. 313. 268 43Robert Wilton, Russia's Agony, (London: Edward Arnold, 1918), p. 263. 44De Robien, pp. 80-81. 45ibid., p. 81. 46Gardiner, pp. 227, 398. See also Kerensky, The Catastrophe, p. 291. Kerensky claimed that the "decisive strategic consequence of the revolution on active operations by the Russian army could not in any way be minimized by our retreat." 47Knox, 2:648. 48Kerensky, Russia and History's Turning Point, p. 286. 49ibid. 50Leslie Urquhart, "Some Russian Realities," Nineteenth Century 82 (December 1917): 1102-1104. Urquhart would later serve as a member of a British economic delegation to Russia. 5lBrowder and Kerensky, 2:944. 52Root Papers, container 135. 53ibid., "Address of Ambassador Root Before a Large Group of Soldiers at Perm, July 15, 1917." 54A. Bruce Lincoln, Passage Through Armageddon (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1986), p. 405. 55Root Papers, container 136. 56Browder and Kerensky, 2:955. 57Lincoln, p. 411. 58Knox, 2:653-654. 59Browder and Kerensky, 2:982. For complete details of the law, which was extended to the Navy on 30 July, see ibid., 2:982-984. 60Knox, 2:602. 6lBrowder and Kerensky, 2:985. 269 62ibid., 2:985-986. 63Buchanan, 2:151. 64ibid.

65Francis, p. 136. The Ambassador held a different view, suggesting instead that Lenin and Trotsky were behind the demonstration from the beginning.

66Browder and Kerensky, 3:1335. 67sukhanov, pp. 442-447. The crowd threatened even Trotsky.

68Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, 2:40. 69De Robien, p. 87. "^OFrancis, p. 138. 7lBuchanan, 2:155. 72ibid. 73Harper, p. 103. 74Lloyd George, 4:155. 75ibid., p. 333. 76Lincoln, p. 411. 77Kerensky, The Catastrophe, p. 290. 78wilton, p. 273. 79ibid. 80Kerensky, The Catastrophe, p. 293. 8lGeorge Katkov, Russia 1917, The Kornilov Affair: Kerensky and the Breakup of the Soviet Army (London: Longman Group, Ltd., 1980), p. 53. 82ibid., p. 31. 83ibid. 270 84Kerensky, The Prelude to Bolshevism: The Kornilov Rebellion (London: Unwin, 1919), p. 11, 19. According to Kerensky, Brusilov was "at a loss what to do next."

85Francis, p. 143. 86Lloyd George, 5:99. 87wilton, p. 276.

88Kerensky, The Catastrophe, p. 295, and Prelude to Bolshevism, pp. 14-17. According to Kerensky, Kornilov had "two programs—one for presenting to the Provisional Government and another for daily practice." 89Medlin and Parsons, p. 81. 90Kerensky, Prelude to Bolshevism, p. 14. See also U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, vol. 2, Winship to Lansing, 24 July 1917, p. 168. Winship was hopeful that Kerensky would regain order. See also Winship Papers, Report to State Department, July 1917. 9lLincoln, p. 414. See also Katkov, The Kornilov Affair, p. 51. 92Kerensky, Prelude to Bolshevism, pp. 26, 309. To Kerensky's surprise, this prophecy would be applied to him two months later. 93ibid. 94ibid., p. 26. 95Katkov, The Kornilov Affair, p. 51. See also Kerensky, Prelude to Bolshevism, p. 27, and Knox, 2:575. Knox was especially frustrated by the majority's position. ^6Lincoln, pp. 414-415. While in Moscow, Kornilov was visited by Miliukov, Generals Alexeyev and Kaledin, and industrialist Aleksei Putilov. 97Francis, p. 153. 98Katkov, The Kornilov Affair, p. 173. 99De Robien, pp. 99-100. 271 lOOu.s. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, Francis to Lansing, 27 August 1917, p. 179, and Bakhmetev to Lansing, 19 August 1917, p. 180. See also Francis, p. 155. Francis reported that little was accomplished at the conference, "each side . . . feebly declaring what a terrible state the country was in without giving the sick man any medicine." lOlBuchanan, 2:173. 102stone, p. 282, and Lincoln, p. 417. 103u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Summers to Lansing, 8 September 1917, pp. 182-186. Summers reported that the fall of both Riga and Tarnopol had been accepted by the Russians as "events that could not be averted and cannot be mended." 104Katkov, The Kornilov Affair, p. 174. Kornilov ordered Parsky and the Army's Commission, Vladimir Voytinsky, be charged with submitting false reports. 105wilton, p. 295. See also Abraham, p. 264. 106wilton, pp. 291-294. See also Browder and Kerensky, 3:1574, and Katkov, pp. 174-175. The explosion, which destroyed nearly a million artillery shells and 12,000 machine guns, was widely believed to have been the work of German agents. 107Buchanan, 2:172. 108Harper, p. 104. 109Buchanan, 2:173. llOFrancis, pp. 157-158. lllKnox, 2:673, 677. Tereschenko had promised that Kornilov would be allowed to restore order. See also Lloyd George, 5:49, and Kettle, p. 81. 112Browder and Kerensky, 3:1557. For more details concerning Savinkov, see Lincoln, pp. 413-414. 113Browder and Kerensky, 3:1558. For Kerensky's perspective, see Kerensky, Prelude to Bolshevism, pp. 212-214. Savinkov had apparently shown Kornilov the final draft of a law which would extend the death penalty beyond the front. 272 114Browder and Kerensky, 3:1558-1568. For more on Lvov's involvement in the affair, see Buchanan, 2:185. 115Lincoln, pp. 420-422. See Katkov, Chapter 6. 116Kerensky, Russia and History's Turning Point, p. 344. See also Prelude to Bolshevism, pp. 162-168. 117Kerensky, Russia and History's Turning Point, p. 345. See also U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 10 September 1917, pp. 186-187. Francis indicated it was unclear which side Savinkov favored. 118Browder and Kerensky, 3:1571. This includes transcripts of the conversation. 119wilton, p. 297. It should be noted that Generals Deniken, Baluiev, and Shcherbachev were in complete agreement with the measures proposed by Kornilov. 120Browder and Kerensky, 3:1573. 121ibid. 122ibid., p. 1574. 123Buchan, 2:181. There was simply not enough time for the diplomats to evacuate Petrograd. 124Kettle, p. 87. See de Robien, pp. 108-109. De Robien was one who believed that Kornilov enjoyed wide support. 125warth, p. 123. 126Buchanan, 2:182. 127De Robien, p. 108. 128warth, pp. 123-124. See also Kerensky, The Catastrophe, p. 315. 129warth, pp. 123-124. 130Kerensky, Russia and History's Turning Point, p. 351. 131u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 29 September 1917, p. 200. 273 132ibid., Bakhmetev to Lansing, 13 September 1917, 193. 133Buchanan, 2:185. See also U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing 134irhompson Papers, Container 14. 135Buchanan, 2:175-176, 185. The British Ambassador had been approached by a Russian friend, a director of a major Petrograd bank, who represented a group who wished to aid Kornilov. They hoped Britain would provide armored cars. See also Kettle, p. 87-88, and Warth, pp. 123-124. Though Buchanan claimed to have rejected the proposal, there was evidence that Knox arranged for such support. 136Buchanan, 2:175-176, 185. 137Lloyd George, 5:104. 138Francis, p. 141. See also William A. Williams, p. 82. 139u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 12 September 1917, p. 189. According to Francis, the American Military Attache, Brigadier-General William Judson was "greatly disappointed by the Kornilov failure." The Naval Attache, Captain Walter Crosley, shared his disappointment. 140ibid., Francis to Lansing, 13 September 1917, p. 110 14lLloyd George, 5:101. 142Kettle, p. 63. 143ibid., p. 85. 144ibid., pp. 85-86.

145Q.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 27 September 1917, pp. 196-197. 146Francis Papers, reel 5. 147The Nation, 4 October 1917, p. 358. 274 148The New Republic, 15 September 1917, p. 168. 149Kerensky, Russia and History's Turning Point, p. 386.

150christopher Lasch, The American Liberals and the Russian Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 99. 15lLockhart, Memoirs of a British Agent, p. 198. 152Lloyd George, 5:102. 153u.s. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Lansing to Francis, 28 September 1917, p. 198. 154Lockhart, Memoirs of a British Agent, p. 198. 155Lockhart, The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, vol. 1, p. 33. See also Francis, p. 214. Here Robins' contact with the Bolsheviks is examined. Hamilton, pp. 310-313, includes an account of Henderson's later views of the Bolsheviks. 156Herman Hagedorn, The Magnate; William Boyce Thompson and His Time (New York; John Day Company, 19 35). This work is a detailed account of Thompson's life. See Thompson Papers, container 21. Billings apparently believed that Thompson used his wealth to accumulate power. Cornelius Kelleher, Thompson's private secretary, disagreed, describing their relations as "suave, pleasant, polite." See also William A. Williams, p. 89. Theodore Roosevelt, was apparently Wilson's first choice to head the Red Cross Mission. 157william Hard, Raymond Robins Own Story (New York; Harper, 1920). See Francis Papers, Francis to Lansing, 21 October 1917, and Thompson Papers, container 21. 158Thompson Papers, container 18. Kelleher claimed that Thompson financed the entire operation. Some members, such as those in the military. Major Orrin Wightman and Lieutenant Herbert Magnuson, were paid by the government. 159Hagedorn, p. 181. 160Thompson Papers, Wilson to Thompson, 24 October 1917, container 21. 275 161lbid., Kelleher to Hagedorn, 4 February 1931, container 18.

162ibid., Kelleher to Hagedorn, 21 April 1931. 163ibid. See also Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 55, and Gaddis, p. 63. The Red Cross Mission was to gather information and assist the Russian war effort through propaganda campaigns.

164Thompson Papers, "Red Cross Commission Report," container 21. 165ibid. 166ibid. See William A. Williams, pp. 88-89. 167Thompson Papers, Robins to Hagedorn, 20 June 1931, container 21. 168ibid. 169ibid., "Bessie Beatty." 170ibid., Thompson to Gertrude Thompson, 17 October 1917. 171ibid., "Bessie Beatty." Kelleher claimed that Thompson "dropped in Russia about two million dollars." In addition, Thompson subsidized the Russian Daily News, an English language newspaper published in Petrograd. 172ibid., Kelleher to Hagedorn, 29 April 1931. Among the works requested were 0'Henry's short stories, Wharton's novels, Roosevelt's "Winning of the West" and various college texts on philosophy, psychology, and economics. 173ibid. 174ibid., Thacher to Hagedorn, 29 April 1917. 175ibid. "Grass Whiskers" was probably his anglicized version of the traditional Russian greeting, "Zdravstvieti, Tovarish" (How do you do. Comrade!). 176Francis Papers, Francis to Jane Francis, 8 August 1917. 276 177ibid., "Exhibit No. 11," container 21. See also ibid.. Corse to Francis, 21 November 1917. Corse grew increasingly frustrated by Washington's unwillingness to fund a large-scale publicity campaign. 178 Ibid. I'^^Hagedorn, p. 192. See Francis Papers, reel 5, and William A. Williams, p. 88. 180warth, p. 144.

18lThompson Papers, "Bessie Beatty," container 21. 182ibid., Robins to Hagedorn, 1 January 1932. See also ibid., "Bessie Beatty." 183Albert Rhys Williams, p. 24. 184Francis Papers, Francis to Lansing, 26 October 1917. 185Thompson Papers, Kelleher to Hagedorn, 18 February 1931. For more on Davison, see William A. Williams, pp. 88-89. 186Thompson Papers, Wallace to Hagedorn, 21 August 1931. For a slightly different version see Hagedorn, p. 219. 187wilson Papers, vol. 44, Creel to Wilson, 22 October 1917, p. 176. 188ibid., Creel to Wilson, 24 October 1928, p. 434. See also Creel, p. 176. 189Edgar Sisson, One Hundred Red Days: A Personal Chronicle of the Bolshevik Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931), p. 3. For an overview of the delegation's work following 1917, see Claude Fike, "The Influence of the Creel Committee and the American Red Cross on Russian-American Relations, 1917-1919," Journal of Modern History 31 (June 1959): 93-109. 190sisson, One Hundred Red Days, p. 5. The final accounting of 1919 showed a total appropriation of $6,850,000 against which the Committee had a credit of $2,825,670 for earnings from expositions and films. The Committee returned $2,385,397 to the Treasury. 277 ,^.,, ^^•'•Thompson Papers, Wallace to Hagedorn, 21 August 1931, container 21. ^ f ^

192creel, p. 176. See Kettle, p. 161. ^^3sisson, p. 39. 194ibid., p. 7.

Thompson Papers, Wilson to Thompson, container 21.

Wilson Papers, vol. 44, Wilson to Sisson, 24 October 1917, pp. 435-436. See also Creel, p. 176, and Sisson, p. 9.

1^"^Thompson Papers, Wallace to Hagedorn, 21 August 1931, container 21. 198Hard, p. 46. 199Albert Rhys Williams, p. 23. John Reed and Williams sarcastically referred to Robins' and Thompson's plan as the "cure-all." See ibid., p. 34. See also Thompson Papers, container 21. 200Knox, 2:727. 201warth, p. 148. 202Hagedorn, pp. 234-237. The author provides a detailed account of this dramatic meeting, as does Hard, pp. 49-52. 203Meriel Buchanan, The City of Trouble (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1918), p. 170. The British Ambassador's daughter reported that there were numerous rumors in Petrograd concerning Kerensky's lavish life-style. 204paul Miliukov, Russia To-Day and To-Morrow (New York; The Macmillan Company, 1922), p. 132. 205De Robien, pp. 130-135. The French diplomat repeatedly noted the eerie quiet of Russia at this time. CHAPTER VI THE FINAL FRUSTRATION: THE BOLSHEVIK UPRISING

Although Kerensky's government had overcome the Kornilov threat, the uprising had been a clear indication to most observers that the regime was near its end. Repeated Allied exhortations, financial and military support, and goodwill missions had not been sufficient to maintain the government. The fall of the Provisional Government in November 1917 would introduce a new faction with which Allied diplomats were forced to contend. This factor—the rise of the Bolshevik government avowedly determined to end Russian military involvement in the European war and, in so doing, abandon the Eastern front-- marked the end of what had been a successful albeit frustrating period for Allied diplomacy. The Eastern front, after all, had been maintained; and at least a semblance of Russian military presence had remained. This situation, however, would change with the advent of Lenin and Trotsky's regime and its negotiations at Brest-Litovsk.

278 279 By early fall 1917, many Russians no longer desired war for any objective and had lost faith in the Kerensky regime. Allied confidence in the Russian leader had been diminishing for several months. "The failure of Korniloff's attempted coup d'etat," wrote Buchanan, "had destroyed my last hopes of an improvement in the situation either at the front or in the rear."l It seemed, in fact, impossible that Russia could continue in the war. Not only had supply problems become critical, but recent events had strengthened political opposition and had restored the Soviet's "waning influence."2 Now the political master of Russia, this body had refused to recognize Kerensky's new coalition. Instead, it called for a congress to decide the composition of a new regime. It was unclear whether Kerensky could be included in this new government. "The parties on the left are wary of him because he has given himself the air of a dictator since the Kornilov affair, and the parties of order have long ago lost faith in him and accuse him of talking too much and doing too little."3 To win their confidence, Tereshchenko assured Russia's allies that his nation was unified in its support of the war effort. Russia, he promised, would prosecute the war "at any cost" and would employ "renewed energy" to rebuild her military.4 280 British and French diplomats, having heard such pronouncements before, were loathe to believe them. Buchanan reported that a Bolshevik regime in Russia was a distinct possibility. De Robien even implied that such a denouncement might be in his nation's interests. It is perhaps best that the crisis should come to a head as soon as possible and that the abscess should burst, as it is inevitable anyway . . . and so much the worse for Russia; if we set about it in the right way, we could still score an advantage for France by making a place that would repay her for her sacrifices. 5 Paris and London, which had seemed to be ardent supporters of the revolution some months before, no longer exhibited the same enthusiasm. What had once promised to renew Russia's sacrifice at the front now threatened to end it entirely, and to these governments, democratic ideals became secondary to the primary goal—that of defeating the Germans. "These damn Russians have no right to have a revolution in time of war," complained one Englishman in Petrograd.6 Lansing believed that Kerensky had "compromised too much" with Russian radicals.7 Stanley Washburn warned that there existed "no real State and no real Authority" in Russia and reported the situation there to be "nebulous and extremely misty."8 Despite these warnings, Wilson chose to accept the optimistic impressions offered by the returning Root Commission.9 Lansing was "astounded at their optimism," 281 noting that he "could not see upon what it is founded."10 When he expressed his fear that Kerensky lacked the strength necessary to implement his promised programs, he was told by members of the delegation that "everything would come out all right and that Russia would continue the war . . . with even greater vigor than under the Tsar."ll Though Lansing's skepticism remained, he admitted that his fears could be incorrect. "As long as there is a chance that . . . [Root] is right and I am wrong, I feel that we should do all that we can do to strengthen morally, and materially the existing government."12 Others in the administration agreed, believing that the United States should provide Russia any aid "that can bear early fruit."13 there was "no practical course" other than to provide any assistance to help Kerensky "bring order from disorder."14 if Root was wrong, said Lansing, nothing we can do will stay the current which is toward a period of disorder and national impotency. All our efforts will amount to nothing; they will simply be chips swept along by the tide to be swallowed up in the calamity which seems to be in store for Russia.15 Lansing suggested that American policy should be predicated on the view that conditions in Russia would deteriorate. The only safe course was to prepare for the possibility that Russia would abandon the conflict. 282 The tone of Francis' reports, however, still optimistically conveyed his faith in the Kerensky regime. He repeatedly requested assistance of all types for Russia. "[I] still think Russia will pay all obligations on time but her continuing war is of no more importance to us as abandoning [her] now would damage us so enormously it would require untold billions and many generations to repair."16 London and Paris doubted the wisdom of pouring additional supplies into Russia if she were going to abandon the fight. As a last resort, the British War Cabinet instructed Buchanan to discuss with the other ambassadors the military and internal situation in Russia. Meeting with Ambassadors Francis, Noulens, and Carlotti, he suggested a note expressing Allied desire for the restoration of the Russian military effort. "We emphasized," recalled Buchanan, the necessity of [Russia's] reorganizing all [her] military and economic forces by the adoption of rigorous measures for the maintenance of internal order for increasing the output of factories, for improving the transport services, and for reestablishing strict discipline in the army.17 On 9 October, the Allied diplomatic corps, nervously explained the purpose of their visit. As he had not yet received instructions from Washington, Francis did not accompany the delegation.18 283 Buchanan, the senior member of the Allied diplomatic corps, nervously explained the purpose of their visit.19 The harsh note, the original of which Buchanan had revised, was read in French; It behooves the Russian government to show by acts its resolve to employ all proper means to revive discipline and true military spirit among the fighting troops at the same time that it will insure the operation of the public services and the reestablishment of order at the front and at the rear. If these steps were not taken: . . . The Allied governments might soon find themselves confronted by a trend of opinion which would put on trial the responsibility concerning the utility of the considerable sacrifices in arms, munitions, material of every kind accorded without counting to Russia, while they would be reproached, with not having reserved them for the western front, where the wish to conquer appears without faltering.20

Outraged by the Allied ultimatum, Kerensky replied in Russian that the war was . . . a war of nations, and not of Governments, and the Russian people had in the course of it made untold sacrifices. The Imperial regime had left the country in a deplorable state of disorganization, and it would have been better had the Allies shown less consideration for the feelings of the Emperor's Government and had called it oftener to account for its shortcomings. . . . Russia [he promised] was determined on carrying on the war to the end. ... He concluded by reminding [the Ambassadors] that Russia was still a great Power.21

Later the Russian leader asserted that his response should have been stronger and that he should have withdrawn Russia from the alliance and made the announcement: 284 The attitude of the French, English and Italian Governments to the Government of Free Russia is such that we cannot remain m Alliance with them. We shall continue the war exclusively in the name of the defense of Russia, in the name of an equitable, democratic general peace; in our dealings with the other States who are fighting Germany. We are henceforth as free as the United States of America. . . . We are only collaborators, not Allies.22

Following the dramatic confrontation, Kerensky hurried to the American Embassy to thank Francis for not being a party to the Ambassadors' visit.23 Francis was not in the building, having gone to the Winter Palace to see Kerensky. Though Francis continued to report that conditions in Russia were improving, in reality, they were not. The Russian army, suggested Charles Russell of the Root Commission, had become "nothing but a reflex of the Russian people. . . . [If] the Russian army hangs back and does not want to fight any more it is because the Russian people have no heart in the war."24 Actually, not all Russians opposed the war. In fact, many of her prominent citizens favored its continuation. Russia's new Minister of War, Alexander Verkhovsky promised that Russia's army would be restored and prepared for battle by the spring.25 Francis's appraisal of the Russian situation was erroneous. Though he had informed the State Department of the possibility of a Bolshevik coup, he believed that 285 such an uprising would fail, as the Bolsheviks would be poorly supported.26 By the end of October, the Ambassador reported that a Bolshevik coup would probably never occur, encouraging the opinion in Washington that Russia was recovering militarily.27 British and French observers were not as optimistic, many believing a Bolshevik rebellion to be imminent.28 Interviews with Kerensky conveyed the impression that a war-weary Russia was preparing for a separate peace.29 Lansing instructed Francis to ascertain the accuracy of the reports. If they were true, Washington "would find it difficult to justify financial support to another country associated with it in this war . . . which was nevertheless supine and inactive."30 Francis assured Lansing that Kerensky had no intention of withdrawing his nation and implied that Russia could be rehabilitated. "We cannot decline to extend or fail in any way to encourage Russia to continue war as her withdrawing therefrom would prolong the struggle five years or more and entail upon us incalculable sacrifice and loss."31 Buchanan offered his own solution, suggesting a discussion of peace terms which, while not binding, would "humour the Socialists."32 Buchanan's proposal was based on two considerations: first, in order to prevenc Russian resources from being seized by Germany it was imperative 286 that Russia remain in the war, even in a passive role; and second, if the Allies appeared unwilling to discuss a peace settlement, there was danger of alienating the moderate socialists and strengthening the Bolsheviks.33 Francis offered a more direct solution, suggesting the dispatch American troops to Russia; What would you think of our sending two or more army divisions via Vladivostok or Sweden to her aid if I could get the consent of [the] Russian Government therefore or even induce [the] Government to make such a request? [The] moral effect of American troops on [the] Russian front [would] be more beneficial [than] the material assistance so rendered as millions of sensible Russians only need encouragement to organize.34 The presence of American troops, he argued, would discourage peace advocates who might claim that even Russia's allies lacked faith in her ability to continue the war. The faith of the Allies, however, was already shaken. General William Judson, the United States' Military Attache, reported that the political power of the Provisional Government was disintegrating.35 Only a massive infusion of monetary aid to facilitate a propaganda campaign "on an enormous and effective scale" could, he cabled, prevent a Bolshevik takeover. Judson urged that three million dollars per month be set aside for these efforts. As before, Wilson's government refused to fund such an effort.36 287 The long anticipated Bolshevik uprising occurred during the first week in November. Its cause, Francis wrote his son. Perry, was the suppression of four Bolshevik newspapers which had been advocating a separate peace and supporting extremist ideology.37 in a meeting on 6 November, Tereshchenko assured Francis that his government would have little difficulty suppressing the rebellion and admitted, "I hope it will take place whether we can or not—I am tired of this uncertainty and suspense."38 Kerensky believed that a Bolshevik provocation would provide him justification to deal his opponents a fatal blow. "I only wish they would come out," he told Buchanan, "and I will put them down."39 "Kerenski and Tereshchenko," recalled Knox, "pretended only to fear that the rising might not be attempted and that they might therefore be deprived of the opportunity of annihilating the movement once and for all."40 After meeting with the Russian Foreign Minister, Francis ordered that he be driven past the Russian troops gathered outside the Ministry as a show of support for the embattled regime.41 For all intents, however, Kerensky's government was already doomed. "Unless Kerensky was prepared to throw in his lot unreservedly with those of his colleagues who advocate a firm, continuous policy," Buchanan cabled London, "the sooner he goes the better."42 288 It was unclear whether another government could last. "The Government is but a Government in name. . . . Even if they have to make way for the Bolsheviks, the latter would not be able to hold out long, and would sooner or later provoke a counterrevolution."43

November 7 was the day of the Bolshevik coup. That morning Sheldon Whitehouse, Secretary at the United States Embassy, informed Francis that Kerensky had commandeered his Ford, which bore an American flag, in order to go to the front to organize support.44 The Prime Minister pledged to return with 3,000 to 5,000 Cossacks to crush the revolt.45

No one had assumed leadership in Kerensky's absence. Few seemed to comprehend fully what was occurring in Petrograd throughout the day, as Red Guards occupied the major buildings, bridges and intersections and the city went about its daily routine. The fall of the Winter Palace and the arrest of the Ministers of the Provisional Government that night brought the advent of a regime in Russia. Though Francis reported the Bolsheviks to be in controls of the capital and Madden Summers reported a similar situation in Moscow, in reality anarchy reigned over much of the nation. "Things were pretty lively in Petrograd,'- remembered Orrin Wightman; "everyone had a sense of living on a volcano."46 289 While Thompson and the members of the Red Cross Mission had not been surprised by the outbreak of revolutionary activity, the consensus among the group was that a successful coup would be catastrophic for the Allied war effort as Russia would certainly withdraw from participation.47 Consequently, Thompson continued his desperate efforts to save Kerensky's government. "Thompson," recalled Robins, believed "it was essential to support Kerensky at least until it was too late in the year for a new German drive on Paris made formidable by the release of the German division in the eastern front."48 A similar view was offered by Scott in the Root Commission's report. It was, opined the General, worth a "great sum of money to keep Russia even passively in the war till next spring ... if there is a chance of accomplishing it this chance must be taken and the money risked."49

Such statements were clearly unpopular among the Soviets and, in the case of Thompson and Robins, may even have endangered lives. Well aware of the possible consequences of his actions, Thompson had told Robins that, in the event the propaganda campaign failed, "... You get shot," to which Robins said, "If I get shot, you get hung." Thompson replied, "I wouldn't be surprised if you are damned right."50 This was in spite of the fact that many considered Thompson in sympathy with the 290 Bolsehviks, a charge that Thompson's colleague, Thomas Chacher, labeled as "outrageous."51 Judson noted the Red Cross leader had done all he could to keep Russia in the war and postpone or prevent her from reaching a separate peace.52

Members of the Red Cross delegation admitted that they had expected to become victims of the violence sweeping Russia. All predicted that their headquarters at the Hotel Europe would be plundered and the members murdered.53 Thacher claimed that the Mission's salvation could be attributed to the very turmoil that would cost the lives of so many others. If it hadn't been Russia, everybody in the Red Cross Mission, beginning with WB, would have been shot when the Bolsheviks came in. They had been fighting Lenin and Trotsky tooth and nail, calling them paid German agents. Robins had said it loudly and repeatedly. . . . Possibly the Bolsheviks were too amazed at their sudden accession to power to think of killing anybody.54

Francis cabled Washington that the "Red Cross Mission manifested surprising nervousness from [the] beginning of [the] revolution."55 Robins, however, contended that it had been the Ambassador who had exhibited fear: The only nervous person I had much to do with in that troubled hour in the Russian land was the "Honorable Stuffed Shirt Francis,' who had me come and stay all night at the embassy and hold his hand until he went to sleep after several strong highballs to compose his wearied mind after a hard struggle at the bridge table.56 291 Though Francis reported that the Provisional Government "may have been deposed," he believed that the new government under Lenin would not last.57 "situation here undermined," the Ambassador cabled on 7 November, "but Bolshevik Government cannot survive and I think will collapse within [a] few days."58 Francis naively thought that even if the Bolsheviks remained in power they would desire Allied assistance. "Whether [the Bolsheviks] survived or not, there would be some government in Russia . . . which was our ally in the war [and] would accept gladly, whatever assistance we could render in its transportation."59 with this in mind, he recommended that the railroad experts called for by the Stevens' delegation continue on to Russia.60

Stevens, planning his imminent departure for the United States, was asked by Francis to reconsider as his "services [were] never so much needed . . . and [he] never had better opportunity to serve [Russia] and [the United States]."61 Later Stevens would complain that Kerensky, whom Francis had claimed "would come back stronger than ever" was, with the Ambassador's assistance, "flying in disguise from Petrograd."62

Acting on Francis' request, Stevens left Petrograd to meet the Russian Railway Service Corps, under the command of Colonel George Emerson, which as scheduled to 292 arrive at Vladivostok on 25 November. Its arrival was delayed until 14 December, by which time officials at Vladivostok informed Stevens that they could not guarantee the safety of the American engineers.63 Consequently, Stevens advised Emerson not to land, but instead to proceed to Japan until the United States might "return to Russia with 5,000 troops and a man-of-war as [it was] time to put the fear of God in these people."64

Later, Emerson and ten engineers would attempt to make their way to Russia to improve transportation so that supplies might be gathered at Murmansk and Archangel to prevent their capture by the Germans. They were, however, prevented from reaching their destination by the hostilities along the Trans-Siberian systems. Francis cabled Washington on 9 November that all members of the government, with the exception of Kerensky, were being held in the Peter and Paul Fortress. Despite this, he reported to Lansing the next afternoon that troops loyal to Kerensky were approaching the city and in his "estimate" the Bolsheviks were defeated.65 while the Ambassador's assessment might have appeared foolish, it is worthwhile to note that a similar opinion was held by the British Foreign Office. On 12 November, an official of that agency wrote, "it is still too soon to speculate on the immediate future of Russia though it may be taken that 293 the Bolshevik Government is probably already on its last legs."66 ^his was attributed to the fact that Bolshevik support was limited to only a few cities, where it was controlled by "fanatical but not always dishonest intellectuals."67 Russia, stated the report, would soon be liberated by Kerensky's forces. That same day, the United States Ambassador to Sweden, Ira Morris, confirmed that Kerensky's forces were meeting great success and that the Bolsheviks had been defeated.68 Actually, no one knew Kerensky's whereabouts or the number of troops he had assembled to recapture the government.69 on 16 November, Francis reported that the Prime Minister's forces had suffered defeat at Gatchina, almost thirty miles from Petrograd, and that Kerensky was on the run.70 According to Buchanan, the Russian leader escaped the country disguised as a sailor.71 The Second Congress of Soviets elected the first Bolshevik government on 9 November. This regime, the Council of People's Commissars, was headed by Lenin and included Leon Trotsky as Commissar of Foreign Affairs. The new regime immediately issued the Decree on Peace, the embodiment of Lenin's call for peace without annexations or indemnities.72 The Allied governments were now faced with a most difficult decision regarding their relations with Russia. Summers described the gravity of the situation: 294 There is strong feeling amongst the working class against the Allies . . . and if the movement is not put down immediately peace may be made with Germany. Even if this be not done Russian troops cannot continue the campaign as they have no feed, no discipline and are weary of the war. The difficulties of transport and pressure on the western front will prevent German military advance into . . . Russia this winter but the general disorganization now existing will permit almost unhindered operations by German espionage and propaganda. Our immediate problem is to counteract their work in every way possible. For this purpose as well as to lend moral support to the better elements in Russia, which will regain the upper hand, every effort must be made to maintain every American agency in Russia.73

Summers, an "experienced and capable officer," was vehemently opposed to Bolshevism. This attitude was probably a consequence of the ruthlessness of the Bolshevik takeover in Moscow, an event which he, of course, witnessed.74 Buchanan saw little hope that Russia could be saved. Kerensky has failed us, as he did at the time of the July rising and of the Kornilov affair. His only chance of success was to make a dash for Petrograd with such troops as he could get hold of, but he wasted time in parleying, issued orders and counterorders which indisposed the troops and only moved when it was too late.75

In hopes of accelerating the Bolshevik downfall, Francis proposed that a meeting of Allied representatives be convened to discuss war aims.76 Buchanan gave his support to the idea. De Robien agreed as well, believing 295 the action to be past due.77 Colonel House, anticipating Germany would reject any Allied peace offer, thought that such a rejection would strengthen Russian resolve against a separate peace. The American Ambassador was even more optimistic and still had "not absolutely lost hope" of continued Russian participation in the war.78

On the afternoon of 29 November, Trotsky, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, announced to the Allies that hostilities along the eastern front had been suspended and that preliminary negotiations with Germany for a "democratic peace without annexations and contributions" had been scheduled for 2 December. Though invited by Trotsky to participate in these discussions, the Allies warned that violations of the September 1914 agreement would be met with the "greatest consequences."79 in Washington, Bakhmetev urged the United States Government not to respond to the Bolshevik invitation, as an Allied refusal for an opportunity for peace would only strengthen the Bolshevik position.80 it was imperative not to provide the Bolsheviks any opportunity to accuse the Allies of obstructing peace efforts. Meanwhile the Allies were attempting to draft a statement clarifying their war aims. Ultimately, the creation of a single declaration proved impossible and it was decided that each nation would offer its own. The 296 substance of each note, however, was to be the same. The Allies would be willing to reconsider their war aims as soon as Russia was politically stable.81 when Russia had a government agreeable to the entire nation, the Allies would be willing not only to consider a modification of peace terms but perhaps recognize that nation as well. It was hoped that such friendly promises would strengthen the Allied cause. Trotsky's publication of the secret Allied treaties and agreements made by the Tsarist regime early in the war, however, negated any beneficial influence these promises might have had.82 These documents, which had promised Russia substantial territorial enrichment, further antagonized the Russian masses. Faced with an apparently untenable Russian situation, Knox suggested that, as it was impossible to force Russia to fight, it would be wise for the Allies to reconsider their Russian policies in order to salvage relations with that nation following the war. "There seemed," recorded the Attache, "... to be argument in favor of making a virtue of necessity, and of leaving Russia, after issuing a magnanimous note to the Russian people relieving them of the promise made on their behalf by the Emperor's Government on September 5th, 1914. "83 Buchanan concurred, noting that developments in Russia required a modification of Allied policy: 297 In my opinion the only safe course left to us is to give Russia back her word and tell her people that, realizing how worn out they are by the war and the disorganization inseparable from a great revolution, we leave it to them to decide whether they will purchase peace on Germany's terms or fight on with the Allies, who are determined not to lay down their arms till binding guarantees for the world's peace have been secured.84

The Americans, Judson and Robins, were of the impression that the Bolsheviks would realize the impossibility of negotiating with the Germans and would eventually turn to the Allies for assistance.85 Thompson's pledge to continue Red Cross supplies to Russia was, in fact, an attempt to keep these lines open.86 From the outset, the German plans were to "unleash revolution in Russia in order to force her into peace, and as soon as this peace [was] made, to work for the reestablishment of authority in order to profit by the peace."87 Buchanan blamed German intrigue for much of the Russian turmoil. "There is evidence to show that Germany is trying to make an irreparable break between us and Russia, so as to pave the way for the German protectorate which she hopes eventually to establish over the latter."88 To preclude this possibility, he reiterated his hope that Russia would be released from her former obligations. The confusion then sweeping Russia was reflected in Allied diplomatic activity in that country. Two American 298 military representatives were in Russia at the same time, one at the Stavka, the other at Petrograd. Each issued a pronouncement, which directly contradicted that issued by the other. While both claimed to speak under Washington's authority, one stated that the United States would never recognize the Bolshevik government while the other assured Russia of American sympathy. Such muddled diplomacy did little to further the Allied cause. This was especially galling to de Robien who sarcastically observed: "What a bear-garden! and what it must be like with the rest of the Allies. Judging by what happens in one mission alone, I can only leave the rest to the imagination."89 The Frenchman was appalled by the ineptitude of western diplomacy. "The Allies have contrived to give the impression of complete confusion. The communications and moves of the Ambassadors and the Military Missions succeed and contradict each other. It's deplorable."90 Buchanan alluded to the problem in a press interview held 10 December. While suggesting that the Allies were ready to discuss a settlement with Germany, he noted that there first had to be agreement among the Allies themselves. The possibility of such cooperation was being slowly eroded by events within Russia which also threatened relations between the west and the new Russian regime. Conditions for Allied residents within Russia had become 299 quite desperate. British citizens were particularly targeted, being singled out for attack, arrest, and, at the very least, regarded with suspicion. There was fear that they would not be allowed to return to Britain. Surprisingly, Buchanan admitted that there was some justification for the Bolshevik action. There is, after all, something in Trotsky's argument that if we claim the right to arrest Russians for making pacifist propaganda in a country bent on continuing the war, he has an equal right to arrest British subjects who are conducting a war propaganda in a country bent on peace.91 There appeared to be little possibility of improved relations with the Bolshevik government. The new French Premier, Georges Clemenceau, instructed the French Military Attache, General Henri Bertholt, to demand that the Russian army remain at the front. Further, Clemenceau indicated that his government would not recognize a Russia which entered into an agreement with Germany.92 judson, meanwhile, transmitted Washington's decision to curtail all shipments of military supplies to Russia until a government acceptable to the United States was established.^3 izvestia responded immediately and sharply—stating that the new Russian Government did not need Allied recognition to exist.94 Such recriminations did little to alter the status quo. Russia was no longer a partner in the war against the 300 Central Powers. "Every day that we keep Russia in the war against her will," cautioned Buchanan, "does but embitter her people against us."95

Peace negotiations between Russia and Germany began at Brest-Litovsk on 22 December 1917 and continued until 10 February 1918, when the Bolsheviks broke off discussions and implemented Trotsky's program of "No Peace and No War."96 Though the Russian delegates had not believed Berlin would resume hostilities, they were informed by General Max von Hoffman on 18 February that the war was to be resumed.97 This threat convinced the Bolshevik Central Committee to reconsider its objections to German terms. Russia, they indicated, was willing to sign the treaty. The price, however, was now higher. The German advance continued and the Russian capital was declared to be in a state of siege. As the situation grew more desperate, the Bolshevik Central Committee discussed its options, even considering the possibility of Allied assistance. Though relations between Russia and her former allies were not conducive to long-term cooperation, the idea of a renewed and temporary effort against Germany found adherents in Britain and France, as well as in Russia.98 on 22 February, Trotsky revealed that his government had received offers of aid from Britain and France. Although the Commissar wanted to accept the offer, 301 he was opposed by N. I. Bukharin, who argued that it was "inadmissible ... to enter into any arrangements with the imperialists."99 Lenin, absent during the discussion, sent a note favoring acceptance of the "assistance of the brigands of French imperialism against the German brigands."100 The United States Government implied that cooperation with the Bolsheviks would be inconsistent with the Wilsonian principle of self-determination.101 There were exceptions to that ethic, however. Having recently arrived in Russia, Edgar Sisson saw in Russo-German tensions an opportunity to strengthen the Allied cause. He hoped to employ Wilson's anti-imperialist statements for propaganda purposes in both Russia and Germany.102 In addition, the White House received similar requests from the members of the diplomatic community. Bakhmetev urged that Wilson offer a friendly appeal to Russia, a suggestion echoed by Ambassador Francis.103 The American Ambassador believed that recent German actions had convinced many in Russia that a separate peace was not in their favor and had led to a reconsideration of their war effort. "They possibly will struggle for a democratic peace, for the fruits of the revolution if appealed to by a country whose unselfish motives they recognize as they do ours."104 The British Government was of a like mind. Arthur Balfour 302 suggested that "such a statement . . . [made] in general accordance with the lines of the President's previous speeches . . . might appear a desirable course."105 Wilson soon acquiesced to these requests. Speaking before a joint session of Congress on 8 January, Wilson addressed the Russians, then "prostrate and all but helpless . . . before the growing power of Germany. . . . Their power, apparently, is shattered. . . . Yet their soul is not subservient."106

By and large, the presidential address was received warmly throughout the world. Its tone was unmistakable. In Russia the reaction was favorable. Even Lenin found little to criticize. Rhetoric was not what Russia required, however. Before departing for Brest-Litovsk, Trotsky tried once a gain to obtain an Allied promise of aid. The Allies, believing that Bolshevik rule would be only temporary, refused to offer definite assurances for assistance. The Allied hesitation confirmed for Trotsky what he had already surmised—that the Allies were secretly negotiating with Berlin. Britain, he charged, was "ready to compromise with Germany at the expense of russia."107 There was some truth to this claim. The Allied governments shared Berlin's distaste for Bolshevism. Nonetheless, Lenin's regime had dispatched Lev Kamenev and Ivan Zalkind to Britain in hopes of convincing 303 the Allies to aid in the defense of Russia. The Bolshevik representatives were afforded a less than favorable welcome on their arrival in Aberdeen, Scotland, on 23 February. Each was thoroughly searched and his bags confiscated.108 Though he spoke with a number of leaders, Kamenev failed to convince the British Government to offer aid and left for Russia frustrated and angry.109 Regardless of the fact that their governments had not offered it. Allied Ambassadors in Petrograd had agreed "in principle" to offer assistance, even agreeing to aid in the defense of the Russian capital. Before such help could arrive, however, German troops, meeting little opposition, closed in on Petrograd. The threatening conditions forced the Allied diplomats to abandon the city. Francis needed little coaxing. On 27 February, the Ambassador and his staff made their way to Vologda, "the junction of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Moscow-Archangel Railway . . . that [was] 350 miles farther away from the Germans. "HO Though the other missions elected to leave Russia through Finland, none except the British succeeded in crossing the Finnish battle lines. The rest were forced to join Francis' group

at Vologda. In order to present Berlin's demands for peace, the German advance was stopped only eighty miles from the 304 Russian capital. For the new Bolshevik regime there seemed to be little alternative to argument with the German demands. "It is a question," said Lenin, "of signing the German terms now or signing the death sentence of the Soviet government three weeks later. "HI With the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty on 3 March 1918, Russia officially abandoned the war.112 The Allies had made valiant efforts to keep Russia involved—perhaps not always with altruistic intent, but nevertheless costly in terms of money and material. The treaty, however, may have been a greater loss for Russia than for her allies, as it claimed one-third of her population, one-half of her industry, one-third of her territory, and some of her wealthiest provinces. Though some decried the harshness of the treaty, others claimed it was the best Russia deserved. The Spectator blamed the "cowardly and treacherous" Bolsheviks for Russia's humiliation.113 While many scholars have viewed Allied diplomatic policy regarding Russia in 1917 as a failure, its primary goal—the maintenance of the Eastern front—was achieved. Even the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk did not free Germany to turn her full attention to the West, as the occupation prevented her from reinforcing that front. Thus, even in a peace the Allies did not want, Russia, because of German desire for Eastern expansion, still indirectly contributed to the Allied cause. 305 The dream of a Russian democracy, which had burned so brightly a scant seven months before, now lay in ruins, trampled by the worn boots of soldiers, workers, and peasants who had grown tired of its policies. Its death had been slow and agonizing. Given the internal problems of the nation, in company with the external pressures applied by the Allies, the outcome could not have been different. Despite their claims to the contrary. Allied concerns had been not so much for the future of Russia as for their own. They had convinced Russia to engage the Central Powers in eastern Europe while they defeated the Germans in the west. The Russians, however, sought a new and stable government above all else—a goal achieved perhaps in part. The Allies had made extravagant promises to achieve victory in the west and the possibility of future gain—and were willing to offer significant incentives to whichever government controlled Russia. The Russians were, at best, confused by their struggle to reach their own goals, democracy and an acceptable and speedy peace which they sought simultaneously. Notwithstanding these serious developments and disappointments, the Allies were able in the months ahead to conclude the war against the Central Powers victoriously. The "war to end all wars" was finally over as quiet enveloped the battlefields of Europe, and new problems related to the peace and to the 306 future came to occupy the minds and energies of diplomats and statesmen.

So, too, a chaotic and often frustrating period in diplomatic history came to a close. Allied relations with Russia during the extraordinary months of 1917 and early 1918 have been the subject of intensive analyses by scholars of many countries. These studies have offered a variety of interpretations of the period, ranging from Arthur Link's position that Allied, particularly American, diplomacy was based on an idealistic view of the world to the notion held by Robert Warth, W. Bruce Lincoln and others that ineptitude on the part of Allied diplomats was responsible for the failure to keep Russia in the war. The claim that Allied, and especially American, diplomacy was motivated to a large extent by altruistic idealism did not recognize the presence of strong commercial interests and plans for after the war. Thus, when the liberal-capitalist idealism for which Wilson was well-known conflicted with military, economic, or political considerations, present or future, it sometimes happened that such ideology was forsworn, even at the expense of those higher moral and ethical considerations which the United States President championed. While there can be little argument that most Allied ambassadors lacked the ability, temperament, and, in some 307 cases, experience to respond adequately to rapidly changing conditions in Russia, it is well demonstrated that there was little chance that any Allied representatives could have kept Russia in the war. Delegations whose members held political views which were thought to be compatible with those then prevailing in the country were dispatched to Russia by each of the Allies; and they, too, met with little success in maintaining her full participation. Nonetheless it must be remembered that many of these missions, particularly those from the United States did not appear to enjoy the full support of their governments. Their proposals were not implemented, it is impossible to assess their impact. A more subtle shortcoming in previous analyses of the efforts of the Allies to maintain Russia's military participation has been their conclusion that clear and easily understood policy guided diplomats' actions. Although it confirms that keeping Russia in the war was a continuing primary goal, recently available material provides incontrovertible evidence that policy both within the government of each ally and among the members of the Alliance regarding that objective was consistently either confused, outdated, or non-existent as a result of combinations of poor communication, variations in popular support, often-contradictory political pressures in Allied 308 capitals, and rapidly changing conditions in Russia. The absence of precise, current national and Allied policy forced diplomats, even in dealing with problems of relationships with the Provisional Government and in responding to questions regarding war aims, to respond out of their own perspectives as often as from instructions from their governments. Their resulting actions not only exaggerated their own inadequacies, but added to the already chaotic diplomatic situation in Petrograd.

The efforts of the Allies to keep Russia in the war, although extensive and determined, came during a turbulent and stressful period of her history. These attempts were made more difficult by conditions at the time, including the lack of consistent actions by the Allies themselves and a revolution which brought major changes in Russia's internal government and her leadership with an attendant wide range of economic and social problems. The Allies' undertaking, while it did not keep Russia in the war until victory, did help to delay Russia's decision to make a separate peace and thus to keep the Central Power occupied on the Eastern front. No doubt even this aided the Allies in their achievement of final victory. 309 Notes iBuchanan, 2:187.

2wilson Papers, vol. 43, from the British Embassy Enclosure, 5 August 1917, p. 371. See also Kerensky, The Prelude to Bolshevism, p. 138. 3DeRobien, pp. 116-117. 4u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Bakhmetev to Lansing, 13 September 1917, p. 193. 5De Robien, p. 117. 6warth, p. 139. 7Lansing, p. 337. 8lbid. Washburn believed that Russia would ultimately have a "good government and a decent constitution," if the Allies were patient. 9wilson Papers, vol. 43, Wilson to Lansing, 14 August 1917, p. 46. lOLansing, p. 337. See Root Papers, "Report of the Root Commission." lllbid. 12ibid., p. 338. 13Francis Papers, "Telegram of 1 November from Department of State." 14Lansing Papers, "Diary of Robert Lansing." 15ibid. 16Francis Papers, Francis to Lansing, 2 November 1917. Francis recommended the extension of an additional credit of one hundred million dollars. 17Buchanan, 2:191. 18Francis Papers, reel 5. Tne Ambassador boasted that he often made decisions on his own, without consultation or instruction. 310 llKerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty, p. 358. 20Buchanan, 2:192-193. 2lKerensky, The Crucifixion of Librty, p. 360. 22ibid. 23u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 9 October 1917, p. 209. 24wilson Papers, vol. 44, Russell to Wilson, 7 Novembsre 1917, p. 557. 25Knox, 2:696. 26u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 9 October 1917, p. 209. 27ibid., Francis to Lansing, 30 Octobr 1917, p. 216. 28Knox , 2:706. 29u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 10 November 1917, pp. 221-222. 30ibid., Lansing to Francis, 2 November 1917, p. 218. 31ibid., Francis to Lansing, 6 November 1917, p. 221. 32Buchanan, 2:199. 33ibid. 34Francis Papers, Francis to Lansing, 6 November 1917. 35u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Judson to War College Staff, 7 October 1917, p. 204. 36Thompson Papers, Thacher to Wardwell, 29 May 1920, container 21. 311 37Francis Papers, Francis to Perry Francis, 6 November 1917. See also Buchanan, 2:205. Buchanan also credits this as the immediate cause of the rising and suggests that Kerensky realized this might be the consequence of the action. For other details see K. W. B. Middleton, Britain and Russia (London: Hutchins and Company, n.d.), p. 107.

38Francis, p. 178. 39Buchanan, 2:201. 40Knox, 2:703-704. 4lFrancis, p. 179. 42Buchanan, 2:204. 43ibid. See also U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 11 November 1917, p. 207. Francis likewise believed that the Bolsheviks could not last. 44u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 9 December 1917, pp. 292-295. Here the Ambassador finally provides details of the stormy days of early November. See also Buchanan, 2:205. 45Francis, p. 180. See also Francis Papers, Francis to Summers, 8 November 1917. 46Thompson Papers, Wightman to Hagedorn, 8 May 1931, container 21. See also U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 8 November 1917, p. 224; Summers to Lansing, 8 November 1917, p. 224; Francis to Lansing, 9 November 1917, p. 227, and Morris to Lansing, 17 November 1917, p. 235. 47ibid., Thacher to Wardwell, 29 May 1920. 48ibid., Robins to Hagedorn, 31 January 1931. 49Root Papers, "Report of General Scott," pp. 30, 192. 50Thompson Papers, Robins to Hagedorn, 31 January 1931, and Wightman to Hagedorn, 31 May 1931, container 21. 51ibid., Thacher to Wardwell, 29 May 1920. 312 52ibid.

53ibid., Robins to Hagedorn, 22 May 1928. 54ibid., Thacher to Hagedorn, 13 March 1931. 55u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 9 December 1917, p. 294. 56Thompson Papers, Robins to Hagedorn, 24 November 1931, container 18. 57u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 7 November 1917, pp. 205-206. 58ibid., Francis to Lansing, 11 November 1917, p. 207. 59Francis , p. 132. 60u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 7 November 917, pp. 205-206. 61ibid., Francis to Lansing, 11 November 1917, p. 207. 62stevens Papers, Notes of the Stevens Mission. 63ibid., Folder 1. 64ibid., Folder 3. See also Francis Papers, Francis to Lansing, 6 November 1917. 65u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 10 November 1917, p. 228. 66Richard Ullman, Intervention and the War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 3. 67ibid. 68u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Morris to Lansing, 12 November 1917, p. 230. 313 69ibid., Francis to Lansing, 12 November 1917, p. 231, and Morris to Lansing, 14 November 1917, p. 232. Estimates of Kerensky's forces ranged from 5,000 to 100,000.

"^Oibid., Francis to Lansing, 16 November 1917, p. 234. 7lBuchanan, 2:213-214. 72james Bunyan, and H. H. Fisher, eds.. The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918 (Stanford, California; Stanford University Press, 1934), p. 133. For additional information on the Bolshevik takeover see Marc Ferro, October 1917 (London; Routledge and Kegan Paul), and Robert V. Daniels, Red October, The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967). 73u.S. Deaprtment of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Summers to Lansing, 17 November 1917, pp. 234-235. 74Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 44. 75Buchanan, 2:212-213. 76u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 20 November 1917, p. 238. 77De Robien, p. 162. 78u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 28 November 1917, p. 252. 79Bunyan, and Fisher, p. 245. The threat was interpreted to mean an attack by Japan along Russia's Pacific coast. 80u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Bakhmetev to Lansing, n.d., pp. 254-255. 8lBuchanan, 2:221. 82De Robien, p. 151. 83Knox, 2:727. 84Buchanan, 2:225. 314 85Thompson Papers, container 21. 86ibid., Thompson's Statement to the Press, 27 November 1917.

87De Robien, pp. 157-158. 88Buchanan, 2:225-226. 89De Robien, p. 159. 90ibid., p. 158. ^iBuchanan, 2:228. 92Bunyan and Fisher, p. 248. ^3ibid., p. 250. 94ibid., p. 251. 95Buchanan, 2:226. ^6Bunyan and Fisher, p. 510. 97ibid., p. 511. 98ibid., p. 515. On 10 February, Russia annulled Allied loans made to Russia prior to the Bolshevik Revolution. 99Trotsky, M^ Life, p. 389. lOOibid. lOlsisson, pp. 101-102. Although he did not like them, Sisson worked with the Bolsheviks. See also Hard, pp. 85-86. Robins gave the Bolsheviks funds for propaganda. 102ibid., p. 217. 103u.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, Francis to Lansing, 3 January 1918, p. 422. 104ibid., p. 424. 105wilson Papers, vol. 45, Balfour to Wilson, 5 January 1918, p. 487. 315 106ibid., pp. 535-536. In the address, Wilson mistakenly stated that negotiations at Brest-Litovsk had broken off. In the same address, the President introduced the Fourteen Points. 107Bunyan and Fisher, p. 506. 1085 Hansard, 102 (1918): 1475-1482. Ramsay MacDonald was extremely critical of the treatment afforded Kamenev and Zalkind. 109Bunyan and Fisher, p. 515. llOprancis, p.234. lllBunyan and Fisher, p. 519. 112Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, pp. 364-376. For greater detail on events leading to the treaty, see John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk, The Forgotten Peace, March 1918 (London; Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1956). 113The Spectator, 23 March 1918, p. 306. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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