Migrant Smuggling in

A Thematic Review of Literature

August 2012 1 Knowledge Product:

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A !ematic Review of Literature Printed: Bangkok, August 2012 Authorship: United Nations O!ce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Copyright © 2012, UNODC e-ISBN: 978-974-680-331-1

"is publication may be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form for educational or non-pro#t purposes without special permission from the copyright holder, provided acknowledgement of the source is made. UNODC would appreciate receiving a copy of any publication that uses this publication as a source. No use of this publication may be made for resale or any other commercial purpose whatsoever without prior permission in writing from the United Nations O!ce on Drugs and Crime. Applications for such permission, with a statement of purpose and intent of the reproduction, should be addressed to UNODC, Regional Centre for East Asia and the Paci#c.

Cover photo: Courtesy of CBSA. "e photo shows a ship that was used in a migrant smuggling operation from Asia to North America.

Product Feedback: Comments on the report are welcome and can be sent to: Coordination and Analysis Unit (CAU) Regional Centre for East Asia and the Paci#c United Nations Building, 3 rd Floor Rajdamnern Nok Avenue Bangkok 10200, "ailand Fax: +66 2 281 2129 E-mail: fo.@unodc.org Website: www.unodc.org/eastasiaandpaci#c/

UNODC gratefully acknowledges the #nancial contribution of the Government of Australia that enabled the research for and the production of this publication.

Disclaimers: "is report has not been formally edited. "e contents of this publication do not necessarily re$ect the views or policies of UNODC and neither do they imply any endorsement. "e designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNODC concerning the legal status of any country, territory or city or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. !,-./01()23--4,0-(,0(%5,/

A !ematic Review of Literature

A publication of the Coordination and Analysis Unit of the Regional Centre for East Asia and the Paci!c

United Nations O"ce on Drugs and Crime

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Acknowledgements ...... 1 Abbreviations and acronyms ...... 2 List of diagrams and tables ...... 5 Executive summary ...... 6 Policy recommendations for improving evidence-based knowledge ...... 11 Country situation overview ...... 12 Introducing the research methodology ...... 24 Chapter One: Cross-country #ndings by thematic issues ...... 31 Introduction ...... 31 How are migrant smuggling and tra"cking in persons conceptualized in the literature? ...... 32 What methodologies are being used in research on migrant smuggling and irregular migration? ..34 What information is available about stocks and $ows of irregular and smuggled migrants? ...... 37 What are the major routes involved in irregular migration and migrant smuggling? ...... 41 What is known about the pro#les and motives of migrant smugglers? ...... 41 What is known about the pro#le of irregular and smuggled migrants? ...... 44 What is known about the nature or characteristics of relationships between migrant smugglers and smuggled migrants? ...... 45 What is known about the organization of migrant smugglers? ...... 48 What is known about the modus operandi of smuggling? ...... 50 What is known about migrant smuggling fees and their mobilization? ...... 56 What is known about the human and social costs of migrant smuggling? ...... 59 Factors that fuel irregular migration and migrant smuggling ...... 62 Conclusion ...... 63 Chapter Two: Afghanistan ...... 69 Chapter !ree: ...... 83 Chapter Four: ...... 93 Chapter Five: India ...... 115 Chapter Six: ...... 131 Chapter Seven: Lao People’s Democratic Republic ...... 143 Chapter Eight: ...... 153 Chapter Nine: Maldives ...... 163 Chapter Ten: ...... 167 Chapter Eleven: Pakistan ...... 177 Chapter Twelve: Singapore ...... 191 Chapter !irteen: Sri Lanka ...... 197 Chapter Fourteen: !ailand ...... 203 Chapter Fifteen: Viet Nam ...... 215 Annexes ...... 223 Annex A: Complete list of databases, catalogues and websites searched ...... 225 Annex B: Table of criteria to use for initial bibliographic searches ...... 228 Annex C: Key words used in the annotated bibliography ...... 229

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"is publication was produced by the Regional Centre for East Asia and the Paci!c (RCEAP) of UNODC, under the supervision of Sebastian Baumeister, Coordination and Analysis Unit (CAU, UNODC).

Lead researcher: Fiona David (consultant).

Research conceptualization, coordination and report preparation: Sebastian Baumeister and Fiona David.

Report written by: Introducing the research methodology: Fiona David; Chapter One: Fiona David; Chapter Two: Fiona David, Kenneth Wright (consultant); Chapter "ree: Rebecca Powell (consultant); Chapter Four: Fiona David, Ken- neth Wright; Chapter Five: Rebecca Miller (consultant); Chapter Six: Katherine Rogers (consultant); Chapter Seven: Rebecca Powell; Chapter Eight: Katherine Rogers; Chapter Nine: Rebecca Miller; Chapter Ten: Ken- neth Wright; Chapter Eleven: Rebecca Miller; Chapter Twelve: Katherine Rogers; Chapter "irteen: Rebecca Miller; Chapter Fourteen: Rebecca Powell; Chapter Fifteen: Fiona David, Chapter Fifteen: Fiona David, Kenneth Wright; Executive summary and Country situation overview: Sebastian Baumeister.

Editorial and production team: Sebastian Baumeister, Julia Brown (UNODC intern), Fiona David, Karen Emmons (contractor, editing), Ajcharaporn Lorlamai (CAU, UNODC), Collin Piprell (contractor, editing), Siraphob Ruedeeniyomvuth (contractor, design), and Sanya Umasa (CAU, UNODC).

Particular appreciation and gratitude for support and advice go to Julia Brown, Elzbieta Gozdziak, Shawn Kelly (UNODC), Janet Smith from the Australian Institute of Criminology, Tun Nay Soe (UNODC), and to the sta# from the Library at the Australian National University.

"e publication also bene!ted from the work and expertise of UNODC sta# members around the world.

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ARCM Asian Research Center for Migration ARTWAC Action Research on Tra$cking in Women and Children ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BEFARE Basic Education for Awareness Reforms and Empowerment BEOE Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment

CASS Chinese Academy of Social Sciences CAU Coordination and Analysis Unit of RCEAP, UNODC CECC Congressional-Executive Commission on China CIA Central Intelligence Agency CIAO Columbia International A#airs Online CIS Commonwealth of Independent States COMCAD Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development CNY Chinese CRS Congressional Research Service CTV Canadian Television Network DGSN Direction Générale de la Sûreté Nationale (the Moroccan national security service) EBDM Enterprise for Business & Development Management ERTV Economic Rehabilitation of Tra$cked Victims EU European Union EUR Euro FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas FDI Foreign Direct Investment FIA Federal Investigation Agency FSA Foreign Service Agreements

GBP United Kingdom Pound GDP Gross Domestic Product

GMS Greater Mekong Subregion

HIV/AIDS Human Immunode!ciency Virus/Acquired Immunode!ciency Syndrome HRCP Human Rights Commission of Pakistan IBSS International Bibliography of the Social Sciences

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IDPs Internally Displaced Persons IIED International Institute for Environment and Development ILO International Labour Organization IMISCOE International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion INGO International Nongovernmental Organization IOM International Organization for Migration IPSR Institute for Population and Social Research ISS Institute of Social Sciences IVTS Informal Value Transfer Systems KWAT Kachin Women’s Association "ailand Lao PDR Lao People’s Democratic Republic LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam MAIS Multicultural Aust. & Immigration Studies

Migrant Smuggling Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing Protocol the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) MMK Myanmar Kyat MNA Mon News Agency

MYR Malaysia Ringgit MOU Memorandum of Understanding MPS Ministry of Public Security

MV Maritime Vehicle NARA National Alien Registration Authority NCRB National Crime Records Bureau NGO Nongovernmental Organization NHRC National Human Rights Commission NRM National Referral Mechanism NWFP North West Frontier Province OEC Overseas Employment Corporation OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OFPRA O$ce Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides (French O$ce for Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons)

RTWG Regional "ematic Working Group on International Migration Including Human Tra$cking RCEAP Regional Centre for East Asia and the Paci!c, UNODC

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SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

SEPOM Self-Empowerment Program for Migrant Women SGD Singapore Dollar

SIEV Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel THB "ai Baht TiP Tra$cking in Persons

Tra$cking in Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Tra$cking in Persons, especially Women Persons Protocol and Children, supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime UAE UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNAIDS United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNESCAP United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Paci!c UNFPA United Nations Population Fund UN.GIFT United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Tra$cking UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNIAP United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Tra$cking UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women UNODC United Nations O$ce on Drugs and Crime UNTOC United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime USD Dollar USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WVFT World Vision Foundation of "ailand YCOWA Yaung Chi Oo Workers’ Association

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Diagram 1: Search criteria for initial bibliographic and other searches ...... 26 Table 1: Relevance criteria for short listing and the creation of the annotated bibliography ...... 27 Table 2: Overview of topics covered by sources, by country ...... 32 Table 3: Socio-economic characteristics of smuggled migrants (Afghanistan) ...... 73 Table 4: Typology of participants in criminal networks facilitating migration (Afghanistan) ...... 77 Table 5: Indian deportees from other countries (January–May 2007) (Chennai airport) ...... 115 Table 6: Indian deportees from other countries (2005–2007) (Delhi airport)...... 116 Table 7: Cases registered under the Immoral Tra"c (P) Act in India ...... 120 Table 8: States of origin of smuggled migrants (India) ...... 121 Table 9: Fees charged by agents ...... 126 Table 10: Estimated irregular migrant population in Pakistan ...... 177 Table 11: Irregular Migrants: Success in Reaching Destination (Pakistan)...... 180 Table 12: Regional distribution of tra"cking victims (Pakistan) ...... 180 Table 13: General characteristics of smuggled migrants (Pakistan) ...... 183 Table 14: Organization of migrant smuggling in Pakistan ...... 184 Table 15: Costs for smuggling from Pakistan ...... 187

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Objective and methodology not only because migrant smuggling takes place within irregular migration but to learn more about "e Migrant Smuggling in Asia: A !ematic Review of the relationship between migrant smuggling, ir- Literature and the accompanying annotated bibliog- regular migration and human tra"cking. raphy o#er a consolidation of !ndings contained in research literature that analyses migrant smuggling in Asia either directly or indirectly. !e review of A highly fragmented information base: Knowl- the available body of empirical knowledge aimed edge gaps prevail to create an information base and identify the gaps in what is known about the smuggling of mi- Of the 154 documents reviewed, 75 of them pro- grants around and out of the region. vided information about migrant smuggling, 117 provided information about irregular migration and By consolidating the information currently accessi- 66 provided information about human tra$cking. ble on migrant smuggling, the !ematic Review of Keeping in mind that some countries within the Literature looks to stimulate and guide further re- research scope are major sources of migrant smug- search that will contribute to informing evidence- gling and irregular migration, these !gures illustrate based policies to prevent and combat the smuggling that migrant smuggling has not attracted a critical of migrants while upholding and protecting the amount of attention within the research commu- rights of those who are smuggled. nity.

"e United Nations O$ce on Drugs and Accurate data on the extent of migrant smuggling Crime (UNODC) conducted the research in sup- either rarely exists or could not be accessed by re- of the Bali Process, which is a regional, multilat- searchers. "e reviewed literature re&ects the pau- eral process to improve cooperation against migrant city of and/or shortcomings in o$cial quantitative smuggling, tra$cking in persons and related forms data in many countries and the di$culties in access- of transnational crime. ing data that would allow a better grasp of both the extent of irregular migration and to what extent ir- !e systematic search for research literature in regular migration is facilitated by migrant smugglers. English, French and German covered an eight-year period (1 January 2004 to 31 March 2011) and 14 !e available research literature on irregular mi- countries (Afghanistan, Cambodia, China, India, In- gration contributes only in a limited way to in- donesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Pa- creasing the understanding of migrant smuggling kistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, "ailand and Viet Nam). due to a lack of clarity with the terminology. Com- Primary research, such as the collection of statistics mon is the use of terms that are not further de!ned, from national authorities, was not part of the project. such as “illegal migrant”, “broker”, “agent” and “re- "e project began with a search of 44 databases, one cruiter”. "is ambiguity signi!cantly has limited the meta-library catalogue, three institution-speci!c li- capacity of the literature on irregular migration to brary catalogues and 39 websites of institutions that clarify to what extent migrant smugglers facilitate work on migrant smuggling. "is resulted in 845 doc- irregular migration and how. uments that were then closely reviewed against a set of further elaborated criteria. Ultimately, 154 documents !e available research on migrant smuggling only were critically reviewed and formed the basis of this focuses on a few types of $ows or on a few thematic report. Abstracts of those documents are provided in issues. "ere is some dedicated research on migrant Migrant Smuggling in Asia: An Annotated Bibliography. smuggling from Afghanistan and Pakistan (mainly to Europe and speci!cally the United Kingdom), on "e systematic search also included literature regard- smuggling from India (to the United Kingdom), on ing irregular migration and human tra$cking &ows smuggling from China to the United States and, to

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a lesser extent, to Europe; and on the organizational zens of the transit countries. Due to the porous bor- forms of smuggling. Yet amazingly, there is very lim- der with Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, ited research on migrant smuggling: from Sri Lanka; these two countries serve as the de-facto starting to the Maldives; to Singapore; to and through Indo- points for the smuggling of Afghans. Main destina- nesia and Malaysia; from China to destinations other tions are the , Europe, North America than the United States and European countries; from and Australia by land, sea and air. "e use of look- Viet Nam to countries other than the United King- alike documents and document swapping in transit dom; and on migrant smuggling within the Greater airports are common practices in migrant smuggling Mekong Subregion. "ere is very limited research on by air. "e smugglers o#er a range of services relative thematic aspects, such as to what extent does migrant to the purchasing power of their clients. For example, smuggling fuel human tra$cking and irregular mi- sea crossings to Oman or the United Arab Emirates gration or who are the migrant smugglers. Most of cost between USD 300 and USD 700; for migrant the thematic research questions that guided this lit- smuggling by land to Europe, fees range between erature review could only be answered partially or an USD 4,000 and USD 6,000, while air smuggling to answer was based upon a thin body of information. Europe can cost up to USD 24,000. Migrants going to the Middle East stay for a shorter period of time to work and then return to Afghanistan. Afghan mi- !e good news: High-quality research on migrant grants to Europe and Australia tend to stay long term smuggling is feasible in the destination; many negotiate and buy smug- gling services en route, stage by stage. Others resort A number of research studies signi#cantly con- to smuggling services that are pre-organized “full- tribute to increasing the knowledge about migrant package solutions”. smuggling. "ose studies used qualitative research methods, such as semi-structured interviews, obser- Pakistan vation and content analysis of documents. Other Pakistan is a major destination for irregular migrants research drew on quantitative data that was already from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. How- available or was generated for the purpose of the ever, with the exception of Afghan irregular migra- research, such as through household surveys (struc- tion, the reviewed literature did not further focus tured questionnaires). "e research drew upon a vari- on those &ows. Irregular migration of Pakistani ety of sources: smuggled migrants, migrant smugglers migrants is largely facilitated by smugglers. Routes or experts were interviewed; regularization statistics, and destination countries for smuggled Pakistanis deportation statistics or statistics such as the number are very similar to those for smuggled Afghan mi- of facilitated illegal entries were analysed; data from grants. Most often Pakistani irregular migrants travel criminal justice proceedings, such as !les from inves- temporarily for work to Saudi Arabia and United tigations and prosecutions containing interrogations Arab Emirates. Most are single men and on average and/or telephone interceptions, were examined. 30 years old. Countries in the European Union, in particular the United Kingdom, are popular destina- tions for those who can a#ord it. Pakistani irregu- Findings by country lar migrants are mostly from North Punjab, North- West Frontier Province, Karachi and a few districts Against this backdrop of an uneven, sketchy and in Southern Punjab. "e smuggling networks o#er a limited information base, the following part sum- range of services and operate in a highly professional marizes the main !ndings about migrant smuggling way. Corruption and the use of fraudulent docu- with regard to the 14 reviewed countries: ments are common methods in all forms of migrant smuggling out of Pakistan, whether by land, air or South-West Asia sea. "e use of guaranteed schemes in long-distance smuggling operations, such as to Europe, is an indi- Afghanistan cator of the level of professionalism, high pro!t mar- Irregular migration of Afghan citizens is largely or- gins and good success rates that smugglers enjoy; it ganized by Pakistani and Afghan smugglers, while also re&ects increased competition and the need for the actual smuggling services are carried out by citi- smugglers to maintain a good reputation. In the !rst

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half of the 2000s, migrant smuggling fees for a direct ils, for example, are smuggled via India to countries &ight to the United Kingdom were between USD in Europe. In addition to Greece, France, Italy and 13,000 and USD 14,000. More recent research indi- the United Kingdom, Canada is a common destina- cates fees of between USD 18,000 and USD 26,000 tion. Only media sources provide information about for indirect &ights to the United States via Bangkok. migrant smuggling via boat to Australia and Canada. Some media reports claimed that migrant smugglers West Asia charged up to USD 5,000 for a journey to Europe, Australia or Canada. Other media reports claimed India that Sri Lankans had paid as much as USD 50,000 Migrant smuggling from the states of Tamil Nadu and per person to be smuggled by boat to Canada. Punjab is extensive. It has also spread into the neigh- bouring states of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and South-East Asia Jammu and Kashmir. From the southern state of Tamil Nadu, irregular migrants leave mainly for the Middle Indonesia and Malaysia East and Asia and, to a lesser extent (around 25 per Irregular migration from Indonesia mirrors regular cent), to Europe. More than an estimated 20,000 mi- migration patterns, with Malaysia as the primary grants irregularly leave Punjab each year. Almost half country of destination. Malaysia is also a country of of the annual departures of Punjab migrants allegedly destination for irregular migrants from other coun- head to Europe, in particular the United Kingdom. tries, in particular . Research from 2009 "is re&ects that irregular migration largely mirrors and 2010 includes estimates of irregular migrants in patterns of regular migration &ows. Other destination Malaysia at between 600,000 to 1.9 million. Most countries include Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, of the irregular migrants are from Indonesia and Republic of Korea, Singapore, South , "ailand, Philippines, but they also come from Bangladesh, United Arab Emirates and the United States. Smug- Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Nepal and "ai- glers in Tamil Nadu and Punjab often operate under land. Migrants are predominantly smuggled by land the guise of travel or recruitment agencies. Indian and sea into Malaysia. Between Indonesia and Ma- smuggling networks are highly professional and real- laysia, there is a great deal of overlap between regular ize substantial pro!ts. "ey organize complex travel and irregular labour migration, migrant smuggling through various countries, obtain high-quality fraud- and human tra$cking. "e volume of Indonesian ulent documents, including genuine documents ob- victims of human tra$cking found in Malaysia il- tained on fraudulent grounds, and o#er money-back lustrates that irregular migration and irregular over- guarantees. Often legally residing in transit countries, staying leave migrants vulnerable to exploitation and Indian smugglers ensure the overall coordination of the human tra$cking. Even though the use of regular smuggling process in cooperation with non-Indians labour migration channels does not protect against who facilitate the actual smuggling work in the transit abuse, exploitation and human tra$cking, the re- countries. Reported fees range from USD 1,700 for viewed literature underscores that upon arrival, ir- destinations in the Middle East to USD 13,000 for regular migrants are more vulnerable to tra$cking Europe and even higher for North America. than regular migrants. Regarding irregular migration from Indonesia to Malaysia, the geographic proxim- Maldives and Sri Lanka ity, porous borders and well-established migration Empirically based research on migrant smuggling &ows are factors in its popularity; it is driven by regarding the Maldives and Sri Lanka is completely shortcomings in the regular labour migration sys- lacking. According to one source, there are some tem and is largely facilitated by migrant smugglers. 30,000 irregular migrants in the Maldives (an es- Avoiding the relatively high costs associated with timated 37.5 percent of all working migrants); an- regular labour migration is pointed out as a major other source reported that an estimated half of the reason for migrants to choose irregular channels. 35,000 Bangladeshis who entered the Maldives did so without authorization. Indonesia and Malaysia are also transit countries for smuggled migrants from the Middle East, South- Migrants from Sri Lanka resort to various, often West and West Asia wanting to reach Australia by complex and long routes to their destinations. Tam- sea. Migrants using this route claim to seek asylum

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or are refugees; insecurity and better economic pros- fraudulent documents is rare. "ere is petty corrup- pects are major driving factors. Other motivating tion among law enforcement o$cials at the borders, factors include family reuni!cation and the lengthy and bribes are a#ordable. Although further research wait for resettlement of refugees. Using Indonesia as is clearly needed, it appears that much — if not the point of embarkation, some transit migrants en- most — of the irregular migration involves migrant ter directly by air. Migrants are also smuggled into smugglers. Irregular migrants pay fees for placement Indonesia from Malaysia by land, sea and air — if in jobs in "ailand. Smuggled migrants generally direct entry into Indonesia is not an option. Cor- pay fees upfront; although in many situations, re- ruption in both Indonesia and Malaysia is frequent- cruiters or employers in "ailand cover the cost for ly cited as an important means to facilitate transit recruitment and transportation, which is then de- &ows. Smuggling fees vary and reach up to USD ducted from the migrants’ salaries. Cambodians are 20,000. Fully pre-arranged smuggling services from smuggled by Cambodians, Laotians by Laotians and the Middle East and West or South Asia through In- Myanmar migrants by Myanmar smugglers. Usually donesia to Australia are less expensive than the sum the mainly mono-ethnic smuggling networks extend of services paid for piece by piece. into "ailand, though they also involve "ai citizens who closely cooperate with "ai employers. Singapore Irregular migration to Singapore is estimated to be "e failure of formal migration systems in the region not signi!cant in numbers. "is is due to its geo- to meet the demand for migrant workers in "ailand graphic position and to the enforcement of strict is a major pull factor for irregular migrants. "ose migration policies that were put in place before systems are characterized as complicated, time con- migration to Singapore evolved. Research from the suming and expensive. In 2007, for example, "ai mid-2000s explains that Singapore was used as a employers requested 39,010 Cambodian workers transit point for migrant smuggling from Afghani- under a memorandum of understanding that governs stan, the Middle East and North Africa to Australia. the "ai-Cambodian cooperation in labour migra- Little information is provided about migrant smug- tion, but only 6,143 workers were placed. Informal gling from Malaysia to Singapore other than Bangla- recruitment and job placement systems are cheaper deshi, Chinese, Myanmar and Nepalese nationals are and faster. In Lao PDR, for example, migrants pay smuggled by boat. between USD 490 and USD 590 for formal labour migration services and less than USD 190 for irregu- Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and !ailand lar migration services. "ailand is the major destination for irregular mi- grants from Cambodia, Lao PDR and, most heav- Irregular migrants are vulnerable to abuse, exploita- ily, Myanmar. Various estimates over the past decade tion and human tra$cking because of their irregular indicate a steady increase of irregular migrants into status. It is not clear to what extent Cambodian, Lao "ailand. According to more recent estimates, some and Myanmar victims of human tra$cking in "ai- 2 million irregular Myanmar migrants (and around land were victims of a pre-organized human tra$ck- 140,000 Myanmar refugees) are in "ailand. Pov- ing process that started in their respective countries. erty, the lack of gainful employment and the pros- What is apparent from the literature is that the ir- pects of higher earnings to support families back regular status of migrants signi!cantly contributes home are signi!cantly motivating the decision to to migrants’ vulnerability to human tra$cking that irregularly migrate. Well-established social networks begins after they arrive in "ailand; in other words, that facilitate the process and stories of others’ suc- not all migrant victims of tra$cking are victims of cessful migration experiences are additional factors tra$cking that started in their home country. that encourage irregular migration from Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar. Myanmar migration is Viet Nam also partially motivated by political factors and in- More than an estimated 50,000 irregular - security. Borders in the Greater Mekong Subregion ese migrants are in the United Kingdom. Around can be crossed with ease. Migrants irregularly pass 100,000 irregular migrants live in other European through o$cial checkpoints and unauthorized bor- countries, in particular in the Czech Republic, Ger- der crossings with or without assistance. "e use of many and Poland. Additionally, more than 10,000

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irregular migrants were found in the Republic of Ko- nese irregular migrants: 250,000 irregular Chinese rea. Typically, smuggling routes transit China and/or migrants in Moscow in the mid-1990s, 72,000 in and Eastern Europe before reaching Central the Republic of Korea in 2002; 30,000–40,000 en- and Western Europe. Vietnamese smugglers rarely tered the United States annually from 2000 to 2005. outsource smuggling services to non-Vietnamese smugglers, although the research indicates that they Even though some of the researchers acknowledged cooperate with non-Vietnamese smugglers, such as the possibility of bias through the methodology Chinese and Czech nationals, in the smuggling of chosen, the research indicates that in general smug- Chinese citizens. More recent irregular migration glers do not engage in criminal activities other than from Viet Nam to Europe originated in North Viet migrant smuggling. Research carried out in Italy, Nam, in particular in the provinces of Hai Phong the Netherlands and United Kingdom found no and its neighbour Quang Ninh. Some Vietnamese evidence of Chinese smugglers engaged in human irregular migrants go to Canada or the United King- tra$cking, for instance. Nonetheless, the research dom to work in illegal cannabis cultivation opera- stresses that factors linked to irregular migration tions run by Vietnamese networks. However, the re- (fearing deportation, not able to report to the police search in the United Kingdom underscores that the when becoming a victim of crime), debts and the smugglers did not engage in the illegal cannabis cul- excessive working hours considerably raise the vul- tivation. Smugglers o#er end-to-end services from nerability of Chinese migrants to abuse, harsh and Viet Nam to the United Kingdom and frequently precarious living and working conditions, exploita- resort to fraudulent documents, including look-alike tion and human tra$cking. documents. Genuine documents are reportedly sold by Vietnamese migrants who have returned. Smug- Chinese irregular migrants pay the highest smuggling gling fees to the United Kingdom range from USD fees in comparison with other populations of irregu- 19,700 to USD 24,600. lar migrants. Recent !gures range from USD 18,500 to USD 31,300 for European destinations and from East Asia USD 60,000 to USD 70,000 for an arranged mar- riage into the United States. "e less a potential China migrant is personally connected to a smuggler, the Irregular Chinese migrants originate predominantly higher the fee. Mutual trust is paramount. Both mi- from the southern provinces of Fujian and Zhe- grants and smugglers screen each other; smugglers jiang, which have a history of outmigration. "e want to determine if the possible migrants can pay, north-eastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Hei- while migrants want to ensure that the smugglers will longjiang, however, have emerged more recently as deliver the agreed service. Guaranteed schemes, such sending regions also. Chinese irregular migrants are as only paying for successfully completed smuggling mainly driven by economic ambitions but in com- operations, are ways to attract migrants and build bination with other factors; networks, a history of a good reputation. "e smuggling of Chinese citi- migration, knowing somebody who migrated and zens is coordinated by a chain of Chinese smugglers the successful role models of returned migrants also based in China and transit countries in which they motivate the decision to migrate. Diaspora commu- legally reside. Chinese smugglers might outsource nities function as a pull factor. Destinations of irreg- smuggling services to other non-Chinese groups in ular Chinese migrants are neighbouring and Western transit countries. Together, they form a small, &ex- countries: (China), Japan, Lao PDR, ible network that changes according to business op- Myanmar, Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of portunities. Interaction between smugglers is mostly China and Viet Nam; European countries, with the one on one. "ere is no single mastermind who fully United Kingdom as the top destination; Canada and controls the smuggling process. the United States; and Australia and New Zealand. Central Asian and Eastern European countries serve as transit countries to Europe. Central America, Mexico and Canada are also transit countries for smuggling routes into the United States. "ere are only a few estimates regarding the numbers of Chi-

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1) Ensure adherence of all Bali Process member 5) Approach research on migrant smuggling not states to the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress in isolation but alongside a broader consid- and Punish Tra"cking in Persons, Espe- eration of related issues, such as protection cially Women and Children and the Proto- needs. col against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, both supplementing the United 6) Include irregular migration and migrant Nations Convention against Transnational smuggling questions in national data collec- Organized Crime, and their e%ective imple- tion systems and strengthen and harmonize mentation. "ese Protocols provide the !rst those systems. internationally accepted de!nitions of human tra$cking and migrant smuggling and are the 7) Encourage States to make use of the Voluntary primary international legal instruments address- Reporting System on Migrant Smuggling and ing these criminal activities. Related Conduct (VRS-MSRC) in support of the Bali Process. "e Co-Chairs’ Statement of 2) Ensure that e%orts to combat migrant smug- the Fourth Bali Process Ministerial Conference gling are comprehensive (addressing protec- on 30 March 2011 notes that, “Ministers agreed tion needs alongside criminal justice and to strengthen engagement on information and migration control imperatives), collaborative intelligence sharing, underscoring the high value (ideally regional) and consistent – as noted in and utility that would derive from enhanced in- the co-chairpersons’ statement from the Fourth formation sharing. In this regard, Ministers wel- Bali Process Regional Ministerial Conference on comed assistance from UNODC in establishing People Smuggling, Tra$cking in Persons and a voluntary reporting system on migrant smug- Related Transnational Crime. gling and related conduct in support of the Bali Process”. 3) Underpin the regional e%orts to combat mi- grant smuggling with a strong knowledge Developed in a consultative process with law base, drawing on relevant and reliable infor- enforcement and immigration o$cials from mation. Policy development and implementa- South-West, South, South-East and East Asia, tion both need to be based on evidence. the Paci!c, North America and Europe, the VRS-MSRC is an internet-based IT solution 4) Develop research projects that focus on: that facilitates the collection, sharing and use for analytical purposes of data on migrant smug- a) Identifying and analyzing sub-types of mi- gling and irregular migration. To be launched grant smuggling (typologies); in July 2012, the VRS-MSRC securely and in- b) Identifying and analyzing characteristics stantly provides state authorities with up-to-date of those involved in perpetuating migrant information at the click of a button. smuggling (the smugglers); c) Identifying and analyzing characteristics, motivations and experiences (positive and negative) of the customers of migrant smuggling (migrants); d) Clarifying the size of irregular migration &ows and to what extent they are facili- tated and motivated by migrant smuggler; e) Assessing the impact and e#ectiveness of responses to migrant smuggling.

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Against the backdrop of an uneven, sketchy and lim- gling by sea, in particular via Oman and the ited information base, the following part summarizes United Arab Emirates, with countries of Cen- the available information contained in the 14 coun- tral Asia as destination and transit countries; try chapters: c) North America and d) Australia, often via South-East Asia. South-West Asia t Smugglers also use air routes, for example to Europe. "e use of look-alike documents and Afghanistan document swapping in transit airports, such as "ere are only a few dedicated, empirically based re- Dubai, are common practices. search reports that contribute any understanding on t Pakistani and Afghan smugglers have the the smuggling of Afghan citizens. "e reviewed liter- prominent role in organizing the smuggling ature, however, does not include any comprehensive of Afghan migrants, while the actual smug- data on migrant smuggling or irregular migration. gling services are carried out by citizens of the transit countries. "e smugglers o#er a range According to the reviewed literature: t Irregular migration of Afghan citizens is of services in response to the demands and pur- chasing power of their clients. For example, sea largely facilitated by migrant smugglers – crossings to Oman or the United Arab Emirates with the exception of entering Pakistan and the cost between USD 300 and USD 700; for mi- Islamic Republic of Iran from Afghanistan due grant smuggling by land to Europe, fees range to the porous border with those countries. Mi- between USD 4,000 and USD 6,000, while grant smuggling networks are based in Pakistan air smuggling to Europe can cost up to USD and the Islamic Republic of Iran, which are the 24,000. countries from where the smuggling of Afghans to other countries initiates. t Afghan irregular migrants are economically better o% in comparison with the average Af- t !ere are various factors that make it di"cult ghan citizen and tend to be male and young to distinguish Afghan from Pakistani smug- (18–35 years old). "ey are mostly motivated gled migrants. Of the three million Afghan by economic reasons and concerns for their refugees who live in the neighbouring countries safety. Due to the higher costs involved, smug- of Afghanistan, an estimated 2.2 million live in gled migrants who choose Western destinations Pakistan. Before 2001, the use of fraudulent Pa- tend to be more highly educated than the av- kistani passports was common in the smuggling erage Afghan citizen. "ey intend to stay for of Afghan migrants, while after 2001, smugglers longer periods or forever, whereas migrants go- of Pakistani migrants to such destinations as Eu- ing to the Middle East tend to stay for a shorter rope also resorted to using Afghan passports. Al- period of time to work and then return to Af- though many smugglers who operate in Pakistan ghanistan. are Afghans, Pakistanis smuggle both Afghan and Pakistani migrants. t Afghan migrants to Europe and Australia ne- gotiate and buy smuggling services en route, t Main destinations are the Middle East, Eu- stage-by-stage. But they also resort to smug- rope, North America and Australia. "e routes gling services that are pre-organized “full-pack- are described as: a) if not already in the Islamic age solutions”. Republic of Iran, from Pakistan to Iran; then from Iran through Turkey, into Greece by land or by sea, with the United Kingdom as the top Pakistan destination in Europe, where, in 2008, 12,000 "e reviewed literature relates that modern migrant Afghan migrants applied for asylum; b) smug- smuggling of Pakistani citizens started in the 1960s

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when the United Kingdom introduced more restric- are common destinations for “circular” (tempo- tive immigration policies under the 1962 Common- rary) irregular migrants. wealth Immigration Act. Despite the long history of migrant smuggling, there are only a handful of t Pakistani irregular migrants are mostly from empirical research studies on the issue, and in par- North Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, ticular, on migrant smuggling from Pakistan to the Karachi and a few districts in Southern Pun- United Kingdom. jab. Most often they migrate temporarily for work in Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. According to the reviewed literature: Most are single men and on average 30 years old. t Pakistan is a major destination for irregular Almost three quarters of them were employed migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and before migrating. Myanmar. "e number of irregular Afghan mi- grants and refugees in Pakistan is estimated at t Even though the typical migrant is not from 2.2 million, although national statistics do not the poorest households, being smuggled still di#erentiate between irregular migrants and represents an enormous #nancial burden. refugees. "e number of irregular migrants from Funds to cover the fees are mobilized through Bangladesh in Pakistan is estimated at around savings, selling property or other possessions or 1 million and from Myanmar at 100,000. Ir- borrowing. Although largely motivated by eco- regular migrants from Nigeria and Somalia also nomic reasons, the freedoms of the West and in Pakistan are estimated at 2,000 persons each. adventure are other reasons given for irregularly With the exception of Afghan irregular migra- migrating. tion, the reviewed literature did not further fo- cus on those &ows. Pakistan functions as one of t !ose who can a%ord it are smuggled by air. the countries from where smuggling of Afghan Either they &y directly into a country of destina- citizens initiates. tion or they use indirect &ights involving stopo- vers at such airports as Bangkok ("ailand), t Irregular migration of Pakistani migrants is Casablanca (Morocco), Dhaka (Bangladesh), largely facilitated by smugglers. In the absence Istanbul (Turkey), Jeddah (Saudi Arabia), Jo- of comprehensive data, the research provided hannesburg (South Africa), Kampala (), indicators (although such estimates should be Kiev (Ukraine), Larnaca (Cyprus), Maputo treated with caution): a total of 66,594 Pakistan- (Mozambique), Port Louis (Mauritius), Moscow is were deported to Pakistan between 2005 and (Russia) or Riyadh (Saudi Arabia). Fees are high. 2008; 60,000 Pakistanis were deported home in In the !rst half of the 2000s, migrant smuggling 2003 and 2004; up to 500,000 migrants where fees for a direct &ight to the United Kingdom smuggled out of Pakistan, largely to the Mid- were between USD 13,000 and USD 14,000. dle East but also to the Islamic Republic of Iran, More recent research indicates between USD Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates during 18,000 and USD 26,000 for indirect &ights to the !rst half of 2000. the United States via Bangkok. t Smuggling of Afghans is very di"cult to dis- t !e smuggling networks o%er a wide range tinguish from the smuggling of Pakistanis. of services and operate in a highly profes- Routes and destination countries for smuggled sional way. Corruption and the use of fraudu- Pakistanis are very similar to those for smuggled lent documents are frequently used methods in Afghan migrants. Countries in the European all forms of migrant smuggling out of Pakistan, Union, in particular the United Kingdom, are whether by land, air or sea. "e use of guaran- popular destinations. Pakistanis are smuggled teed schemes in long-distance smuggling opera- by land through the Islamic Republic of Iran, tions, such as to Europe, is an indicator of the Greece and Turkey. "ere are references to the level of professionalism, high pro!t margins and mid-2000s and routes to Europe via Central good success rates reached that smugglers enjoy; Asia and to Russia via West and North Africa. it also re&ects increased competition and the Migrants are often smuggled by air, land and need for smugglers to maintain a good reputa- sea. "e United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia tion. In particular, the smuggling of Pakistanis

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by air illustrates the high levels of profession- Sweden and Switzerland. Commonwealth of In- alism because this method involves signi!cant dependent States countries are important transit investment (for fraudulent documents and cor- countries. Other destination countries include ruption) by smugglers while the fees are largely Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Republic of only collected in the case of success. Korea, Singapore, South Africa, "ailand, Unit- ed Arab Emirates and the United States.

South Asia t It is not clear to what extent migrant smug- glers participate in the movement out of India India because many migrants legally enter destina- India is a major source and destination country for tion countries and then become irregular. Fa- irregular migration. And yet only a few research cilitating the legal entry on fraudulent grounds, publications shed light on migrant smuggling from if arranged for !nancial or material bene!t, still India, while migrant smuggling into and through In- constitutes migrant smuggling. dia is not addressed at all. Very little is known about t Smuggling routes from India to Europe are irregular migration and migrant smuggling between relatively the best researched. By air and land, India and Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lan- migrants are smuggled through Russia, Ukraine ka. "e literature draws on scattered sources of data, and Central Europe into Western Europe. In the such as statistics on deported Indians recorded at air- past, migrants were smuggled by air, land and , and !eld research samples. sea through West and North Africa into Western Europe. Bangkok is reported to be a transit hub According to the reviewed literature: for migrant smuggling, in particular by air, to t Irregular migration from the states of Tamil countries in South-East and East Asia, Australia Nadu and Punjab is extensive. Irregular mi- and New Zealand. gration has spread to new areas in Punjab and Tamil Nadu and into the neighbouring states t Smugglers in Tamil Nadu and Punjab often of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and operate under the guise of travel or recruit- Kashmir, which until recently had not had large ment agencies. Although there are smugglers numbers of irregular migrants. who organize the actual travel, other smugglers specialize in recruiting clients. t From the southern state of Tamil Nadu, ir- regular migrants leave mainly for the Middle t Often legally residing in transit countries, East and Asia and, to a lesser extent (around Indian smugglers ensure the overall coordi- 25 per cent), to Europe. Migrants from Tamil nation of the smuggling process in coopera- Nadu are largely low-skilled labourers from rural tion with non-Indians who carry out the actual areas with high unemployment. smuggling work in the transit countries. Most Indian smugglers are male. t Irregular migrants from the north-western state of Punjab are typically young men from t Indian smuggling networks are highly pro- richer agricultural families. More than an esti- fessional and realize substantial pro#ts. mated 20,000 migrants irregularly leave Punjab "ey organize complex travel through various each year. countries, obtain high-quality fraudulent docu- ments, including genuine documents obtained t Almost half of the annual departures of Pun- on fraudulent grounds, and o#er money-back jab migrants allegedly head to Europe, in guarantees. particular the United Kingdom. "is re&ects that irregular migration largely mirrors patterns t Reported fees range from USD 1,700 for des- of regular migration &ows. Other important tinations in the Middle East to USD 13,000 destination and transit countries in Europe are to Europe and even higher for North Ameri- Austria, Belgium, Bosnia, Czech Republic, Fin- can destinations. Although migrants are not land, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, always from the poorest households, investing Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, in the smuggling of a family member is an enor-

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mous !nancial burden. Families sell possessions have paid as much as USD 50,000 per person to or borrow to cover the fees. be smuggled by boat to Canada. t Only one study o%ered evidence of smugglers intentionally involved in human tra"cking. More research is required. South-East Asia t Migrants are motivated by a combination Indonesia and Malaysia of factors. Unemployment and the prospect Even though signi!cant numbers of irregular In- of higher wages are important, but networks donesian migrants are believed to be in various and connections to relatives who work or once countries, the reviewed literature almost exclusively worked in destination countries are crucial. "e focused on irregular migration from Indonesia to decision to migrate is often a family one. Malaysia. Little information is available about other irregular migrations &ows into Malaysia. Addition- ally, even though the smuggling of migrants from the Maldives Middle East and West and South Asia through In- Hardly any information about migrant smuggling donesia and sometimes Malaysia has attracted much and Maldives was found. media attention, not one dedicated research report was found that looked at this issue. According to the reviewed literature: t About 30,000 irregular migrants are in the According to the reviewed literature: Maldives (an estimated 37.5 per cent of all t Irregular migration from Indonesia mirrors migrants working there). Another source re- regular migration patterns, with Malaysia as ported than that an estimated half of 35,000 the primary country of destination. Irregular Bangladeshis who entered the Maldives did so migrants from Indonesia either enter Malaysia without authorization. in an irregular way or they overstay their visa and become irregular. Similar patterns of visa overstay by Indonesian migrants are apparent in Sri Lanka Hong Kong (China), Macao (China), Japan and "ere is no dedicated empirical research on migrant the Republic of Korea. smuggling from Sri Lanka. "e information on regu- lar and irregular migration from Sri Lanka contrib- t Malaysia is also a country of destination for utes only sketchy details. irregular migrants from other countries, in particular Philippines. Research from 2009 According to the reviewed literature: and 2010 includes estimates of irregular mi- t Migrants from Sri Lanka resort to various, grants in Malaysia at between 600,000 and 1.9 often complex and long routes. In particular, million. Most of the irregular migrants are from Tamils are smuggled via India to destination Indonesia and Philippines, but they also come countries in Europe. In addition to Greece, from Bangladesh, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myan- France, Italy and the United Kingdom, Canada mar, Nepal and "ailand. is a common destination. Other routes to Eu- rope described: transiting !rst through the Unit t Migrants are predominantly smuggled by Arab Emirates to Kazakhstan by air and then land and sea into Malaysia. "e role of Indo- entering Russia, Belarus or Poland with the nesian smugglers ends with the transportation objective of reaching Western Europe by land. stage, at which point Malaysian agents assume Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were also mentioned responsibility for overseeing job placement. Ir- as transit countries. Only media sources provide regular migrants from Philippines are smuggled information about migrant smuggling via boat by sea. "e land border between "ailand and to Australia and Canada. Some media reports Malaysia is crossed by car, on foot or by river- claim that migrant smugglers charge up to USD boat. "e Golok River between "ailand and 5,000 for a journey to Europe, Australia or Can- Malaysia is a common crossing point because it ada. Other media reports claim that Sri Lankans is a !ve-minute boat ride. Malaysia is a transit

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country for migrant smuggling by boat to Sin- facilitated by migrant smugglers. "e litera- gapore. ture — due to lacking focus on migrant smug- gling — does not use clear terminology for mi- t Between Indonesia and Malaysia there is a grant smugglers. "e described processes make great deal of overlap between regular and ir- clear that brokers, recruiters or agents qualify as regular labour migration, migrant smuggling migrant smugglers because they facilitate travel and human tra"cking. Some Indonesian mi- and job placement in an irregular way for !nan- grants legally enter Malaysia and become ir- cial or material gain. "ese agents are usually regular by overstaying their visa; others enter part of networks that operate in Indonesia and through irregular channels. Most migrants, Malaysia. "e services they provide are seen as who were either irregular from the beginning or more trustworthy and less expensive and time became irregular in Malaysia, have resorted to consuming than migrating through formal re- the assistance of informal recruitment agencies cruitment agencies. Avoiding the relatively high or brokers – some of them unknowingly. Some costs associated with regular labour migration is migrants think they are legally migrating but pointed out as a major reason for migrants to in fact are given fraudulent or inaccurate docu- choose irregular channels. ments at some point in the process. t Recruiters, brokers or agents who facilitate ir- t !e volume of Indonesian victims of human regular migration to Malaysia are described as tra"cking found in Malaysia illustrates that respected #gures at the village level. Residing irregular migration and irregular overstay- in the home community of migrants, they are ing leave migrants vulnerable to exploitation known by the migrants, who trust them because and human tra"cking. Even though the use they have acquired a good reputation in facilitat- of regular labour migration channels does not ing irregular job placements. protect against abuse, exploitation and human tra$cking, the reviewed literature underscores t Depending on the distance, the price for be- that upon arrival, irregular migrants are more ing smuggled from Indonesia to Malaysia vulnerable to tra$cking than regular migrants. ranges from USD 25 to USD 200, according In addition, debts can result in increased vulner- to a source dating to the early 2000s. "e same abilities. Only one study provides information research compared those costs to regular migra- on a Filipino group who was involved in both tion costs, which at that time amounted to USD migrant smuggling and human tra$cking. 325. Migrants cover the costs by selling assets or borrowing from relatives or moneylenders. "e t Although most irregular Indonesian migrants smugglers are either paid up front or through are male, there is an increasing feminization monthly deductions from a migrant’s salary. of both regular and irregular migrants, with Some smugglers have direct connections with women coming in particular from rural areas Malaysian employers. in Java, Lombok and Sumatra. Indonesian mi- grants are driven by poverty and limited job op- t Smuggling services range from providing portunities. Regarding irregular migration from fraudulent documents to facilitating illegal Indonesia to Malaysia, the geographic proxim- entry and are provided by both formal and ity, porous borders and well-established migra- informal recruitment actors. In Indonesia, mi- tion &ows are factors in its popularity. Other grants are typically recruited in their village. "e migrants who are smuggled into Malaysia from recruiters or other agents arrange travel (includ- Bangladesh, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Nepal, Phil- ing illegal entry or seemingly legal entry based ippines and "ailand are motivated by econom- upon fraudulent means), irregular job placement ic factors, while migrants from Myanmar also and accommodation in Malaysia. "e agents of seek asylum. irregular migration are described as highly or- ganized and mimicking the services of licensed t Irregular labour migration from Indonesia agents, albeit in an irregular way. Recruiters in to Malaysia is driven by shortcomings in the villages may work for both licensed and unli- regular labour migration system and is largely censed agencies, and formal recruitment agen-

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cies can be involved migrant smuggling because than the sum of services paid for piece by piece. they also facilitate labour migration through ir- For example, accumulated fees for the full jour- regular means. ney from the country of origin via Malaysia and/ or Indonesia can reach up to USD 20,000 while t A well-developed industry in Indonesia fa- pre-arranged door-to-door services are available cilitates the procurement of fraudulent docu- for an estimated USD 12,000. One research ments. Genuine documents, including travel document noted that an estimated 60 percent of documents, identi!cation cards and birth certif- Afghan and Pakistani migrants resorted to pre- icates, are falsi!ed or are obtained on fraudulent arranged, end-to-end smuggling, while others grounds and/or through corruption to meet the made their own arrangements with smugglers o$cial requirements for regular labour migra- along the way. tion. t Indonesia and Malaysia are also transit coun- Singapore tries for irregular and smuggled migrants "ere is no dedicated research on migrant smuggling from the Middle East and West and South from, through or to Singapore. "e literature on ir- Asia wanting to reach Australia by sea. Mi- regular migration does not contribute a great deal of grants using this route claim to seek asylum information on the issue. or are refugees; insecurity and better economic prospects are major driving factors. Other mo- According to the reviewed literature: tivating factors include family reuni!cation and t Irregular migration to Singapore is estimated the lengthy wait for resettlement of refugees. to be not signi#cant in numbers. "is is due to its geographic position and to the enforcement t Before being smuggled by boat to Australia, of strict migration policies that were put in place transit migrants use di%erent routes and mi- before migration to Singapore evolved. grant smugglers, albeit to varying degrees. Us- ing Indonesia as the point of embarkation, some t Singapore is a destination and transit coun- transit migrants enter directly by air. Transit try. Research from the mid-2000s reports that migrants are also smuggled into Indonesia from Singapore was used as a transit point for migrant Malaysia by land, sea and air — if direct entry smuggling from Afghanistan, the Middle East into Indonesia is not an option. For example, and North Africa to Australia. Little informa- stricter visa regulations for ethnic Hazaras from tion is provided about migrant smuggling from Afghanistan into Indonesia led to a rerouting Malaysia to Singapore other than Bangladeshi, through Malaysia. Chinese, Myanmar and Nepalese nationals are smuggled by boat. t Corruption in both Indonesia and Malaysia is frequently cited as an important means t !ere is only anecdotal information about to facilitate transit $ows, such as protecting fees. A Malaysian smuggler was prosecuted in smuggling operations from disruption, mi- Singapore who had charged SGD 2,000 (USD grants from interception and smugglers from 1,200) for transportation by boat from Malaysia prosecution. "ere is also reference to the direct to Singapore. To protect smugglers from appre- involvement of some members of Indonesian hension by authorities, the passengers had been authorities in smuggling operations. forced to swim the last 2 kilometres to shore. t Transit migrant smuggling through Indone- sia and Malaysia from the Middle East, and Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and !ailand (as West and South Asia seems to be largely facili- a country of destination) tated by smugglers from the regions of origin. "ere is no dedicated research on migrant smuggling to Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar or "ailand. Viet t Smuggling fees vary and reach up to USD Nam is an exception. "e research has predominant- 20,000. Fully pre-arranged smuggling services ly focused on migrant smuggling from Viet Nam to from the Middle East and West and South Asia Europe, in particular to the United Kingdom. Spe- through Indonesia to Australia are less expensive ci!c and comprehensive data on migrant smuggling

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is lacking for all !ve countries. Although there is a and the prospects of higher earnings to support signi!cant body of research regarding irregular mi- families back home are signi!cantly motivating gration and human tra$cking to "ailand, the role the decision to irregularly migrate. Well-estab- of migrant smuggling in facilitating irregular migra- lished social networks that facilitate the process tion and/or contributing to human tra$cking in the and stories of others’ successful migration ex- Greater Mekong Subregion has not attracted signi!- periences are additional factors that encourage cant attention. "ere is a clear need to conduct inte- irregular migration from Cambodia, Lao PDR grated research on migrant smuggling, human traf- and Myanmar. In Lao PDR and Myanmar, the !cking and irregular migration. di$culties (time and costs involved) in obtain- ing travel documents also contribute to the deci- According to the reviewed literature: sion to irregularly migrate. t !ailand is a major country of destination for irregular migrants from Cambodia, Lao PDR t Cambodian, Lao and Myanmar irregular mi- and, most importantly, Myanmar. Various es- grants in !ailand are reported to work in sec- timates over the past decade indicate a steady in- tors with a demand for low-skilled workers, crease of irregular migrants in "ailand. "e vast such as #sheries, seafood processing, manu- majority — more than 80 percent — of Lao mi- facturing, agriculture and domestic work. Fe- grants go to "ailand, while a small number are male Lao migrants make up more than 50 per in Cambodia, China, Myanmar and Viet Nam. cent of the Lao irregular migrants and predomi- Cambodian irregular migrants where also found nantly work as domestic workers in "ailand. in the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Viet Nam. t Myanmar migration is partially motivated by political factors and insecurity in addition to t One indicator for the scale of irregular migra- the dominating economic push-and-pull fac- tion is regularization statistics. Under the "ai tors. Most Myanmar migrants come from rural Government’s 2004 irregular worker registra- areas. "ey include the ethnic groups of Araka- tion process, 1,280,000 irregular workers regis- nese, Burman, Indo-Myanmar, Kachin, Karen, tered from Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar. Kayah, Mon, Gurkha (Nepalese), Shan and Ta- Of them, 168,000 were from Cambodia and voyan. Most are single and aged between 12 and 181,614 from Lao PDR. 55 years, with low levels of education. t According to more recent estimates, some 2 mil- t Borders in the Greater Mekong Subregion are lion irregular Myanmar migrants and around porous and can be crossed with ease. Migrants 140,000 Myanmar refugees are in !ailand. In irregularly cross o$cial border checkpoints and addition to "ailand, other destination countries unauthorized border crossings with or without for Myanmar irregular migrants and refugees in- assistance. Border rivers are crossed in boats. clude Pakistan and Malaysia. Around 100,000 Migrants also legally cross borders but do not irregular migrants are in Pakistan and several meet other conditions for a regular stay in "ai- thousand refugees in Malaysia. Regarding My- land, thus becoming irregular. Migrants are also anmar migrants, the reviewed literature almost smuggled by sea from Myanmar to southern exclusively focuses on irregular migration &ows to "ailand (Ranong Province). "e use of fraudu- "ailand and provides only sketchy information lent documents is rare. "ere is petty corruption about transit smuggling through "ailand to Ma- among law enforcement o$cials at the borders, laysia, which is often reached by sea. and bribes are a#ordable. t Most Cambodian and Lao migrants — both t It is not clear to what extent irregular migra- regular and irregular — are young, poor and tion is facilitated by pro#t-seeking smugglers low-skilled. "ey are from rural areas and have due to the lack of a signi#cant research focus a low level of education. Typically, they range in on migrant smuggling. Information on Cam- age from 17 to 35 years. bodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar either directly or through indicators points out that those who t A variety of factors impact the decision to mi- facilitate the recruitment of workers, irregular grate. Poverty, the lack of gainful employment movements across the border and within "ai-

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land, the illegal stay and job placements do so their reputation is reliable. To be recommended for material or !nancial bene!t. While further by migrants who have already used their services research is clearly needed, it appears that much weighs heavily in gaining trust. —if not most — of the irregular migration in- volves migrant smugglers. t Agents of irregular migration often are mi- grants or former migrants who have worked t Irregular migrants pay fees for being recruited and lived in !ailand. Brokers and recruiters and placed into jobs in !ailand. Migrants pay who are known to the prospective migrants are fees up front. Alternatively, recruiters or employ- also reported to work as intermediaries for infor- ers in "ailand cover the cost for recruitment mal recruitment agencies, in particular in Cam- and transportation, which is then deducted bodia and Lao PDR. from the migrants’ salaries. Various fees cited in- clude: USD 97 for irregularly migrating to "ai- t Informal recruitment agencies and independ- land from Cambodia; USD30 to USD 150 paid ent agents cooperate with !ai employers with to Cambodian recruiters; a pro!t of USD 10 to a need for low-skilled labourers and seem also USD 15 per facilitated Cambodian-"ai bor- to have advantageous relationships with law der crossing in the Cambodian border town of enforcement o"cials. For example, informal Poipet; USD 140 to USD 186 for transporting recruitment agencies are well established in the migrants from Lao PDR into "ailand; USD 3 Lao PDR-"ailand border areas; the recruiters to USD 15 per person smuggled across the Lao- are based in Lao PDR and "ai counterparts "ai border; USD 2.50 per irregular migrant for set up the work opportunities. Myanmar labour bribing police o$cers at checkpoints along tran- recruiters are part of networks that operate on sit routes from Myanmar into "ailand; USD both sides of the Myanmar-"ailand border. In 315 to USD 472 for irregular migration from around 10 per cent of cases examined by an ILO Myanmar and job placement in "ailand; USD researcher, "ai law enforcement o$cers were 5 to USD 12.50 paid by "ai employers per re- involved in the job placement of Cambodian cruited . and Lao irregular migrants. t Cambodians are smuggled by Cambodians, t Informal recruitment agencies and agents of- Laotians by Laotians and Myanmar migrants fer in essence the same services as formal re- by Myanmar smugglers in cooperation with cruitment agencies. "is entails travel across !ai smugglers. Usually the mainly mono-eth- the border, information about work and living nic smuggling networks extend into "ailand. conditions, job placement, accommodations "ey involve "ai citizens who closely cooperate and transferring remittances. with "ai employers. t Migrants who have a personal relationship t Often referred to as brokers, recruiters, facili- with their smuggler have a better chance of tators and intermediaries, the smugglers are successfully migrating. "ose who resorted to likely to be known to migrants or to some- informal recruitment agencies are more vulner- body known by the migrants. "is is well doc- able to abuse and exploitation during their jour- umented for agents facilitating irregular migra- ney and at their "ai workplace. tion from Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar to "ailand. Recruiters recruit migrants or are t !e failure of migration policies and formal approached by migrants. Social networks, kin- migration systems in the region to meet the ship and friendships factor in heavily in facilitat- demand for unskilled and low-skilled mi- ing contacts to irregular migration agents in the grant workers in !ailand is an important recruitment phase. pull factor for irregular migrants. "e systems are characterized as overly complicated, ine$- t Social networks are reliable sources of infor- cient, time-consuming and expensive. In 2007, mation and encourage trust. Trust and reputa- for example, "ai employers requested 39,010 tion are important factors in choosing irregular Cambodian workers under a memorandum of migration agents who generate more business if understanding that governs the "ai-Cambo-

19 2*-.&"%#345--,*"-#*"#!6*&

dian cooperation in labour migration, but only human tra$cking that only starts in the country 6,143 workers were placed. Similar !gures were of destination, such as "ailand. "us, migrant found for Lao PDR. "ere are no legal labour smuggling is a signi!cant facilitator of irregular migration channels for seeking household migration, contributing to the pool of irregular employment in "ailand. Under the formal migrants vulnerable to human tra$cking. migration system, it is di$cult for migrants to change jobs. "is perceived lack of &exibility is another reason informal arrangements are more !ailand (as a country of origin) attractive. "ere is no dedicated research on migrant smuggling from "ailand. t Formal migration is not a guarantee against abuse, exploitation or becoming a victim of According to the reviewed literature: human tra"cking. Many Cambodian and Lao t Japan (more than 100,000 !ai irregular mi- migrants do not trust formal recruitment agen- grants), Malaysia (more than 100,000 !ai ir- cies. regular migrants) and the Republic of Korea (around 10,000 !ai irregular migrants) were t Informal recruitment and job placement sys- destination countries. tems are cheaper, faster and more e"cient. In Cambodia, formal recruitment agency costs are t Most irregular migrants entered the destina- reported to range between USD 409 and USD tion countries legally but then overstayed. 709 for job placement services, pre-departure "is practice was reported for Japan, Singapore training, medical exams, passport and visa fees and Taiwan Province of China. To what extent and travel costs. Irregular migration through a they were facilitated by migrant smugglers was smuggling network costs about USD 97 per mi- not clari!ed. grant. In Lao PDR, migrants pay between USD 490 and USD 590 for formal labour migration t Much of the overseas !ai migrant popula- services and less than USD 190 for irregular mi- tion is male and comes from poor areas in gration services. !ailand’s North and North-East. "ey are attracted by the prospects of higher earnings in t Irregular migrants are vulnerable to abuse, other countries of South-East and East Asia. exploitation and human tra"cking because of their irregular status. "ere is signi!cant overlap between irregular migration, migrant Viet Nam smuggling and human tra$cking in the Greater Only a few sources address migrant smuggling from Mekong Subregion. Cambodia, Lao PDR and Viet Nam, with an almost exclusive focus on migrant Myanmar are important sending countries of ir- smuggling to Europe, in particular the United King- regular migrants in "ailand. Many victims of dom. human tra$cking in "ailand are from Cambo- dia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar. According to the reviewed literature: t More than an estimated 150,000 irregular Vi- It is not clear to what extent Cambodian, Lao etnamese migrants are in Europe. Some 50,000 and Myanmar victims of human tra$cking in Vietnamese migrants are estimated to be legally "ailand were victims of a pre-organized human in the United Kingdom; recent research assumes tra$cking process that started in their respective that an even larger number of migrants are there countries. What is clear from the literature is that in an irregular situation. Around 100,000 irregu- the irregular status of migrants signi!cantly con- lar migrants live in other European countries, in tributes to migrants’ vulnerability to human traf- particular in the Czech Republic, Germany and !cking that begins after they arrive in "ailand; Poland. Additionally, more than 10,000 irregular in other words, not all migrant victims of tra$ck- migrants were found in the Republic of Korea. ing are victims of tra$cking that starts in their t Typically, smuggling routes transit China home country. "e outcome of irregular migra- and/or Russia and Eastern Europe before tion – the irregular status – seems to fuel a form of reaching Central and Western Europe. Mi-

20 !#70'4&%*8#9':*';#$<#=*%'.&%5.'

grants smuggled to the Czech Republic, for ex- who have returned. Smuggling fees to the Unit- ample, most frequently travelled to Russia by ed Kingdom range from USD 9,700 to USD plane, then travelled by truck across Ukraine to 24,600. Slovakia and !nally to the Czech Republic. t Vietnamese smugglers rarely outsource smug- East Asia gling services to non-Vietnamese smugglers. "e research also indicates that Vietnamese China smugglers cooperate with non-Vietnamese In comparison with the other reviewed countries, smugglers, such as Chinese and Czech smug- a relatively large body of research documents ad- glers, in the smuggling of Chinese citizens. dress migrant smuggling from China. "ese reports, however, almost exclusively focus on migrant smug- t More recent irregular migration from Viet gling from China to the United States or to Europe, Nam to Europe originates in North Viet Nam, whereas Chinese migrants live in nearly every coun- in particular in the provinces of Hai Phong try around the globe: for 2001, the ethnic Chinese and its neighbour Quang Ninh. Irregular mi- migrant community totalled an estimated 37.7 mil- grants are motivated by the prospects of higher lion people. earnings. According to the reviewed literature: t Some Vietnamese irregular migrants go to t !ere are no accurate estimates on the mag- Canada or the United Kingdom to work in il- nitude of irregular Chinese migration or mi- legal cannabis cultivation operations run by grant smuggling. Irregular migration is largely Vietnamese networks. Prospective migrants in facilitated by smugglers. Hai Phong province are well informed about t Irregular Chinese migrants originate pre- such work opportunity. dominantly from the southern provinces of t !ere is no evidence indicating that Vietnam- Fujian and , which have a history of ese migrant smugglers are involved in other outmigration. "e north-eastern provinces of criminal activities. "e research on migrant Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang, however, have smuggling to the United Kingdom underscores emerged as sending regions also. Most Chinese that those who are involved did not engage in irregular migrants in the United States and the the illegal cannabis cultivation. United Kingdom are from Fujian. Zhejiang Province is a major sending region of irregular t !ere is some evidence that migrant smug- migrants to continental Europe. glers have used violence to enforce smuggling agreements. Payments were either made in ad- t Chinese irregular migrants are mainly driven vance or upon arrival. Fees were mobilized by by economic ambitions, in combination with families. "e research explained that families other factors. Networks, a history of migra- known to smugglers can pay o# the smuggling tion, knowing somebody who migrated and fee over a longer period of time. the successful role models of returned migrants also motivate the decision to migrate. Diaspora t !e relationship between smugglers and mi- communities function as a pull factor. Irregular grants is characterized as a business relation- migration from rural areas is also motivated by ship in which both sides honour their agree- China’s dual social security system that treats ru- ment, with smugglers seeking out new clients ral residents less favourably than urban residents. in Viet Nam by exaggerating the wages and quality of life abroad. t Destinations of irregular Chinese migrants are neighbouring and Western countries: t Smugglers o%er end-to-end services from Viet Hong Kong (China), Japan, Lao PDR, My- Nam to the United Kingdom and frequently anmar, Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of resort to fraudulent documents, including China and Viet Nam; European countries, with look-alike documents. Genuine documents the United Kingdom as the top destination; are reportedly sold by Vietnamese migrants Canada and the United States; and Australia and

21 2*-.&"%#345--,*"-#*"#!6*&

New Zealand. Central Asian and Eastern Euro- t Chinese irregular migrants pay the high- pean countries serve as transit countries to Eu- est smuggling fees in comparison with other rope. Central America, Mexico and Canada are populations of irregular migrants. Recent !g- also transit countries for smuggling routes into ures range from USD 18,500 to USD 31,300 for the United States. European destinations and from USD 60,000 to USD 70,000 for an arranged marriage into t !ere are only a few estimates regarding the United States. "e less a potential migrant is the numbers of Chinese irregular migrants: personally connected to a smuggler, the higher 250,000 irregular Chinese migrants in Mos- the fee. In addition to savings, the money is bor- cow in the mid-1990s, 72,000 in the Republic rowed from friends, families or moneylenders. of Korea in 2002; 30,000–40,000 entered the Research in France found that most migrants United States annually from 2000 to 2005. had to borrow money, and the average period to t Chinese migrant smugglers do not engage in repay migration debt was two years. other criminal activities. Even though some of t !e relationship between migrants and smug- the researchers acknowledged the possibility of glers is a business relationship that usually bias through the methodology chosen, the re- ends with paying the fee soon after arrival. search indicates that in general smugglers do not engage in other criminal activities not related to t Mutual trust is paramount. Both migrants and migrant smuggling. Research carried out in Ita- smugglers screen each other; smugglers want to ly, the Netherlands and United Kingdom found determine if the possible migrants can pay, while no evidence of Chinese smugglers engaged in migrants want to ensure that the smugglers will human tra$cking. deliver the agreed service. Sophisticated pay- ment schemes help protect migrants against t Irregular channels increase Chinese migrants’ sham smugglers. vulnerability to abuse, exploitation and hu- man tra"cking. "e research stresses that fac- t Smugglers typically rely on a good reputation tors linked to irregular migration (fearing de- and thus “care” to deliver on their clients’ ex- portation, not able to report to the police when pectations. Guaranteed schemes, such as only becoming a victim of crime), debts and the ex- paying for successfully completed smuggling op- cessive working hours (which add to the sense erations, are ways to attract migrants and build of isolation and reinforce dependence on local a good reputation. Accordingly, violence against Chinese communities) raise the vulnerability of migrants appears exceptional, often only in the Chinese migrants to abuse, harsh and precarious context of enforcing payment. living and working conditions, exploitation and human tra$cking. t !e smuggling of Chinese citizens is coordi- nated by a chain of Chinese smugglers based t Chinese traditional organized crime syndi- in China and transit countries in which they cates appear not to be involved in migrant legally reside. Chinese smugglers might out- smuggling. Migrant smugglers appear devoid of source smuggling services to other non-Chinese previous involvement in other forms of crime. groups in transit countries. Recruiters in China "ere is a relative absence of violence within and put migrants in touch with organizers. Together, between migrant smuggling groups. they form a small, &exible network that changes according to business opportunities. Interaction t Smugglers are “ordinary” citizens who of- between smugglers is mostly one on one. "ere ten pursue other jobs in addition to migrant is no single mastermind who fully controls the smuggling. "ey are usually male, although smuggling process. women are also involved. "e most famous fe- male migrant smuggler is Jin Ping Chen, known t Recruiters either advertise their services and as Sister Ping, who was estimated to have smug- proactively seek new clients or they are ap- gled 150,000–175,000 Chinese migrants into proached by the migrants. Once agreement the United States before she was caught and has been reached, prepayments secure the pro- convicted. spective migrants’ commitment and cover the

22 !#70'4&%*8#9':*';#$<#=*%'.&%5.'

basic costs. Since the late 1990s, according to the research, some smuggling groups have not required any prepayment but advance all the costs and are only paid once the migrants have safely reached the destination. t Chinese smuggling networks act in a highly sophisticated way, orchestrating complex op- erations and movements across various coun- tries and by land, sea and air. "e smuggling networks are quick in adapting to changing visa regimes and counter-measures. For example, in response to US law enforcement crackdowns, smugglers changed from direct maritime smuggling into the United States to more complex routes, transiting through either Latin America or Canada. t When necessary and possible, migrant smug- glers use fraudulent documents and bribe of- #cials. One research publication concludes that the increased costs for bribing Chinese o$cials are an indicator of the success of Chinese coun- ter-measures.

23 2*-.&"%#345--,*"-#*"#!6*&

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Background synthesizing key !ndings from across the review of the literature. "e UNODC conducted the research in support of the Bali Process, which is a regional, multilateral Conceptual framework process to improve cooperation against migrant smuggling, tra$cking in persons and related "e research was conducted within the framework forms of transnational crime. In February 2002 established by the United Nations Convention initiated at the “Regional Ministerial Conference against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), on People Smuggling, Tra$cking in Persons supplemented by the Protocol against the Smuggling of and Related Transnational Crime” held in Bali, Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (Migrant Smuggling Indonesia, in 2011 the Bali Process brings together Protocol) and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and participants from more than 50 countries and several Punish Tra"cking in Persons, Especially Women and international organizations. Key activities under the Children (Tra$cking in Persons Protocol). As such, auspices of the Bali Process have included Ministerial migrant smuggling is understood to mean: meetings to discuss and address key challenges, and technical workshops on issues designed to improve the procurement, in order to obtain, directly the regional response to migrant smuggling and or indirectly, a !nancial or other material tra$cking in persons. "e Bali Process is co-chaired bene!t, of the illegal entry of a person into a by the Governments of Indonesia and Australia. State of which the person is not a national or permanent resident; UNODC undertook the research with the objective of improving the information position of the Bali and Process about migrant smuggling. "e research focused in particular on fourteen countries: enabling a person who is not a national or Afghanistan, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, permanent resident to remain in the State Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Maldives, Myanmar, concerned without complying with the Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, "ailand and Viet necessary requirements for legally remaining, Nam (the project countries). through any illegal means (see further, Articles 3(a) and 6(1)(c) of the Migrant Smuggling Research objectives Protocol).

"e research had three key objectives: Tra$cking in persons is understood to mean:

(1) identify existing knowledge about migrant the recruitment, transportation, transfer, smuggling with regard to the project countries; harbouring or receipt of persons, by means (2) summarize and synthesize existing knowledge of the threat or use of force or other forms of about migrant smuggling, thereby making it coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, easier for decision makers to access key data and of the abuse of power or of a position of information; and vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of (3) identify knowledge gaps, thereby making it payments or bene!ts to achieve the consent easier to clearly identify research priorities. of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. To achieve these objectives, a research project Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, was planned and carried out that involved several the exploitation of the of others stages including a systematic search for relevant or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced literature, its review, the preparation of an annotated labour or services, slavery or practices similar bibliography, and the preparation of this report to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs

24 !#70'4&%*8#9':*';#$<#=*%'.&%5.'

(see further, Article 3 of the Tra$cking in sources that were possibly relevant to the criteria, Persons Protocol). and t a close review of the sources identi!ed in the Where the person is under 18 years of age, no initial search, to identify which sources were deceptive means are required (see further, Article de!nitely within the criteria. 3(c) and (d) of the Tra$cking in Persons Protocol). As it was considered likely that the literature review Research methodology would generate many results, a decision was taken to use a bibliographic database program, to record the "e research drew heavily on the research results of searches. "is allowed relatively quick and methodology documented in Gozdziak and Bump accurate capture and recording of bibliographic data (2008), a study that involved a systematic review of through direct export, thereby minimising the need the existing literature on tra$cking in persons. To for manual data entry. ensure the research was conducted systematically, the research team developed a Research Protocol that A list of bibliographic databases, libraries and provided detailed guidance on all of the various steps websites to search was developed, in consultation in the process, including: with senior reference librarians from the Australian National University and the Australian Institute of t the list of bibliographic databases, libraries and Criminology. "e intention was to allow maximum websites to search; coverage of as many sources as possible, with minimal t criteria for the initial searches; duplication. "e resulting list includes 44 databases, t criteria against which to assess relevance for one meta-library catalogue, three institution speci!c inclusion in the annotated bibliography; library catalogues, and 39 websites covering the t data storage; major institutions and organisations globally that t categories of analysis for the annotated work on migrant smuggling. "e full list is at Annex bibliography; and A. t categories of analysis for the thematic review. Initial search "is Research Protocol was updated from time to time when necessary. "e !rst stage of the bibliographic search was conducted, with the various databases and websites Consistent with the methodology detailed in divided between four researchers. Two researchers Gozdziak and Bump (2008), a decision was taken focused on !nding research literature in the English at an early stage to focus on identifying empirically- language. One researcher focused on locating based literature (that is, studies that base their research literature in the French language, and !ndings on direct or indirect observations to analyse a one in German. During this stage, the researchers problem or test a hypothesis and reach a conclusion). focused on identifying sources that were possibly Studies that were, for example, literature reviews or within criteria, based on a quick scan of the title political commentary were excluded. "is decision and abstract. re&ected the project’s objectives, which were to identify actual knowledge about migrant smuggling, In this !rst stage, the search criteria were fairly broad rather than untested points of view or political (see Diagram 1). "is was in an e#ort to overcome opinions. In practice, this approach had some the initial challenge that, for example, information strengths and weakness (see below, Lessons learned about smuggling practices from Indonesia might well and limitations). be located in a report that appeared to be about the working conditions of domestic workers in Lebanon. "e literature search involved two main stages: Broadly, the search criteria covered migrant smuggling, irregular migration and tra$cking in persons but t an initial search of all of the nominated databases, there were di#erent date ranges for these, as noted in catalogues and websites to identify a library of Diagram 1.

25 2*-.&"%#345--,*"-#*"#!6*&

H,/-./2("I()7/.;G(;.,17.,/(98.(,0,1,/4(6,64,8-./DG,;(/0>(81G7.(57/.;G75

Migrant smuggling: t title, subject or key words include migrant smuggling (possible variants: people smuggling, human smuggling, alien smuggling, smuggling of migrants, etc.); t published after 1 January 2004; and t the content of the document results from empirical research.

Irregular migration: t title, subject or key words include irregular migration (possible variants: irregular migrants/immi- grants, illegal migration/migrants/ immigrants); t title, subject or key words include: Asia, Afghanistan, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Lao, Myanmar, Malaysia, Maldives, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, "ailand, and/or Viet Nam; t published after 1 January 2004; and t the content of the document results from empirical research.

Tra$cking in persons: t title, subject or key words include tra$cking in persons (possible variants: people or human traf- !cking, slavery); t title, subject or key words include: Asia, Afghanistan, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Lao, Myanmar, Malaysia, Maldives, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, "ailand, and/or Viet Nam; t published after 1 January 2008; and t the content of the document results from empirical research.

"ese criteria were summarized in tabular form to Close review, allocation of key words and assist the researchers to systemize their searches (see preparation of annotated bibliography Annex B). Each of the 300 sources on the initial short list were "e researchers submitted their results to a lead located and read by the research team, and assessed researcher, who did some manual checking and also for relevance against the criteria in Table 1. As a ran some test searches on various databases, to see result of this process, 189 sources were notionally if any gaps in their searches could be identi!ed. determined to be relevant to the project’s criteria. Further to some gaps identi!ed, additional searches "e researchers then allocated key words for each were done, including in Trove (National Library of of these sources within the bibliographic database Australia), Google Scholar (as this captures most that re&ected the criteria, thereby creating a library research material available), and on the International within which key sources could be located quickly Organization for Migration (IOM), International and easily (for the full list of key words, see Annex Labour Organization (ILO) and International C). "e researchers prepared a critical review for Centre for Migration Policy Development websites. each of the sources considered relevant, re&ecting the "e research results were then compiled, and further criteria outlined in the Research Protocol. duplicates were identi!ed and deleted. "e lead researcher and a second member of the "e resulting dataset included 845 sources, around research team checked the initial set of 189 critical 300 of which were notionally allocated for potential reviews, which together constituted a draft annotated inclusion in the annotated bibliography. "ese bibliography. "is process identi!ed some further 300 sources were then divided between the four duplication and also the inclusion of some sources researchers by country, so that each source could be that were not based on empirical research. For a closely reviewed for relevance against the criteria for number of sources, it was unclear whether the source inclusion in the annotated bibliography. was based on empirical research (for example, in

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dŚĂŝůĂŶĚ

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several cases, a footnote or other citation would refer t What are the factors that are thought to fuel to ‘interviews’ but no further information about irregular migration and migrant smuggling? the research process was provided). At this point, it was decided to be more inclusive than exclusive, so "e country chapters focused on examining the borderline sources were included. content of the sources in the library that related to these particular countries, from the perspective of "is process resulted in a !nal set of 154 sources, answering the following questions: each of which met the research criteria noted in Table 1, to varying degrees. Of these 154 sources, t What information is available that helps to 66 provided information about tra$cking &ows, 75 quantify the size of irregular migration, migrant of these sources provided information about migrant smuggling and tra$cking in persons? smuggling, and 117 provided information about t What are the main routes used in irregular irregular migration (see Table 2). Note that some migration and migrant smuggling? sources provide information about more than one of t What is known about the pro!le of migrant these criteria. Each of these sources is written up in smugglers? the annotated bibliography in this report. t What is known about the pro!le of irregular and smuggled migrants? !ematic reviews t What is known about the nature or characteristics of relationships between migrant smugglers and "e research team used the 154 sources identi!ed smuggled migrants? as the basis of the regional chapter, and the country t What is known about the organization of chapters that appear in this report. "ese reports migrant smugglers? analyse the information that is available in these t What is known about the modus operandi of sources by theme. "e regional chapter focused on migrant smuggling? examining the content of the entire library from the t What is known about the fees charged for perspective of the following questions: migrant smuggling and methods of payment? t What is known about the human and social t How are migrant smuggling, tra$cking in costs of migrant smuggling? persons and irregular migration conceptualized t What are the factors that are thought to fuel in the literature? Are these concepts in line irregular migration and smuggling? with the de!nitions of these terms found under UNTOC and the Protocols? "e regional chapter and the country chapters also t What methodologies are being used in research identify critical gaps in the existing knowledge base. on migrant smuggling and irregular migration? t What information is available about stocks and Lessons learned and limitations &ows of irregular and smuggled migrants? t What is known about the pro!le of migrant "e initial database and website searches were smugglers? undertaken by four researchers, coordinated by a t What is known about the pro!le of irregular and !fth person — the research team leader. smuggled migrants? t What is known about the nature or characteristics "e methodology used, a systematic literature of relationships between migrant smugglers and review, was appropriate given the project’s objectives smuggled migrants? of completely mapping out the state of current t How are those involved in migrant smuggling knowledge on migrant smuggling. However, organized? For example, do they operate alone, this methodology was also time consuming. For in small groups or loose networks? example, more time than planned was used by trying t What is the modus operandi of migrant to consolidate the various bibliographic databases smuggling? compiled by the individual researchers into a single t What is known about migrant smuggling fees central database. and their mobilization? t What is known about the human and social A review of the sources initially included in the costs of migrant smuggling? annotated bibliography con!rmed the challenge

28 !#70'4&%*8#9':*';#$<#=*%'.&%5.'

of drawing the line between empirical and non- References empirically based research. As a result, a number of non-empirical sources were initially included. It is Gozdziak, E., and Bump, M. (2008). Data and likely this was mostly remedied by the subsequent Research on Human Tra"cking: manual checking of individual sources by the Bibliography of Research-Based Literature. research team. However, it is also the case that it was Institute for the Study of International very di$cult or impossible to judge whether or not Migration, Walsh School of Foreign Service, some sources re&ected a research process. As such, it Georgetown University. is likely that some non-empirical sources have been included in the !nal data-set, and some empirically- based sources may have been excluded.

It was not possible in the time available to cross-check the entire set of sources that were initially identi!ed and reviewed by the researchers and rejected as being outside of criteria. Given the volume of material that was being reviewed, it is highly likely that there were at least some sources that were discarded as not relevant, that probably should have been included.

It was not anticipated in the research methodology that most empirically-based sources would nonetheless include information that drew primarily on the existing literature. As such, it was often the case that while the research !ndings in the source itself were empirically based, the particular section of the source that discussed a relevant topic (such as ‘pro!le of smugglers’) was in fact based on a review of the literature.

Structure of the report

"is report is divided into two publications.

"e !rst publication contains the !ematic Review of Literature and is structured into 15 chapters. Chapter One “Cross-country #ndings by thematic issues” draws on all of the literature identi!ed in the review. As there are so many disparate sources, this chapter is necessarily broad, providing illustrative examples of key points noted in the literature. "e other 14 chapters are country chapters that review in-depth the identi!ed literature for each of the 14 countries, by reference to key themes.

"e second publication contains the Annotated Bibliography. "is includes a summary of each of the sources identi!ed by the research, and a set of key words for each source. It is hoped that this will make the task of identifying relevant literature on particular aspects of migrant smuggling more e$cient.

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Introduction in the literature? Are these concepts in line with the de!nitions of these terms found under "is project sought to better understand the state UNTOC and the Protocols? of knowledge about migrant smuggling in Asia. t What methodologies are being used in research For present purposes, Asia was de!ned to include on migrant smuggling and irregular migration? fourteen countries: Afghanistan, Cambodia, China, t What information is available about stocks and India, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Maldives, &ows of irregular and smuggled migrants? Myanmar, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, "ailand t What are the major routes involved in irregular and Viet Nam. In particular, this project sought to migration and migrant smuggling? understand two key questions: t What is known about the pro!le of migrant smugglers? t What information do we already have from t What is known about the pro!le of irregular and existing research that sheds light on the smuggled migrants? incidence, nature and mechanics of migrant t What is known about the nature or characteristics smuggling? of relationships between migrant smugglers and t What are the critical gaps that should be !lled smuggled migrants? by future research? t How are those involved in migrant smuggling organized? For example, do they operate alone, Answering these questions, even for fourteen in small groups or loose networks? countries is an ambitious undertaking. It requires t What is the modus operandi of migrant an examination not only of the literature on migrant smuggling? smuggling as it relates to each of the fourteen t What is known about migrant smuggling fees countries but also of the literature on related issues, and their mobilization? such as tra$cking in persons and irregular migration. t What is known about the human and social It also requires an examination of the literature about costs of migrant smuggling? transit and destination countries. "is is precisely t What are the factors that are thought to fuel what was undertaken for this project. irregular migration and migrant smuggling?

"e research methodology followed by this project, "e literature on each point is summarized in this a systematic literature review, is described in the chapter. preceding chapter in this report. "is review identi!ed 154 sources that shed light on the topics Limitations under examination. "is chapter is based on an examination of each of these 154 sources from the "e sources relied upon in drafting this chapter are perspective of answering the following questions: disparate. In addition to covering a wide range of topics, there is considerable variation in their length t How are migrant smuggling, tra$cking in and depth of focus. For example, the shortest source persons and irregular migration conceptualized identi!ed in the review is four pages in length,

31 2*-.&"%#345--,*"-#*"#!6*&

while the longest is several hundred pages. While very di$cult to draw too many conclusions from all sources included in the literature review were these sources with regard to migrant smuggling. assessed as being empirically-based, there is still room for considerable variation within this category. For example, some sources provide little or almost How are migrant smuggling and tra"cking in no information about their research methodology, persons conceptualized in the literature? referring only to ‘interviews’, sometimes with unspeci!ed persons about unspeci!ed matters. In Of the sources included in this review (n = 154), 66 contrast, other sources provided a detailed write provided information about ‘tra$cking &ows’, 75 up of their methodology and include copies of the provided information about ‘migrant smuggling’, research instruments that were used, a practice that and 117 addressed ‘irregular migration’ (some allows a greater degree of scrutiny of their method sources covered more than one category). For the and validity of their !ndings. breakdown of topic focus by country, see Table 2. "e discussion that follows considers the issue of how "ere are clear gaps in the coverage of some topics for these categories are conceptualized in the literature. some countries. For example, there are a large number How are these terms de!ned? Are these terms being of sources in the library that relate to tra$cking in used consistently? Is there a degree of conceptual persons in the Mekong sub-region (particularly clarity in how these terms are used? Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, "ailand and Viet Nam, with less information focused on China) and A close reading of the sources that directly address relatively few that are speci!c to migrant smuggling migrant smuggling and/or tra$cking in persons in that sub-region (see Table 2). Further, there are con!rms that the majority made explicit reference to a large number of sources that provide information de!nitions of these terms in the Migrant Smuggling about irregular migration. However, in many Protocol and/or the Tra$cking in Persons Protocol. instances, the discussion is very general and makes Within the tra$cking sources, only one source no distinction between irregular migration that is (Phetsiriseng, 2003) referred to an older de!nition of facilitated by a third party and irregular migration tra$cking in persons. However, it appears that the that might be entirely self-directed. As such, it is research undertaken for this source was conducted

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32 !#70'4&%*8#9':*';#$<#=*%'.&%5.'

before Tra$cking in Persons Protocol entered into result that the research !ndings could be readily force. One source referred to the de!nition of severe interpreted (see for example, Basic Education for tra$cking in persons taken from United States law Awareness Reforms and Empowerment (BEFARE), (Blackburn et al., 2010). Several sources referred in 2009). However, in a number of sources, key terms addition to national legal de!nitions of tra$cking in such as ‘illegal migrant’ and ‘illegal worker’ were left persons in the countries being studies (for example, unde!ned and appeared to be used interchangeably, the national laws of Pakistan). even though they are not necessarily synonymous. In a number of sources, it was di$cult to work As de!ned in the Migrant Smuggling Protocol, the out if the irregularity being discussed related to concept of migrant smuggling potentially applies movement across borders, residence, employment or to both those who facilitate illegal entry for pro!t possibly all of the above. Furthermore, a number of but also those who facilitate illegal stay or residence sources referred broadly to the involvement of paid for pro!t. For the most part, the literature equates intermediaries (e.g.: agents, recruiters, facilitators, migrant smuggling with those who facilitate illegal brokers) but it was often unclear whether these entry, and focuses less on those who facilitate intermediaries played a role in relation to the irregular stay. irregular movement, stay, employment or all of the above. "is lack of clarity limited the capacity of the While there was a high degree of reference in the literature to provide information about the extent to tra$cking sources to the de!nition of tra$cking which migrant smuggling facilitates irregular entry in persons found in the Tra$cking in Persons or stay. Protocol, there was some variation in how it was interpreted. For example, one study described itself As noted in the literature reviewed, there are many as focused on tra$cking in persons but appeared to challenges associated with attempting to use legally focus primarily on facilitated migration, probably based, dualist categories of analysis such as illegal/ more accurately described as migrant smuggling or legal or irregular/regular migration in research. irregular migration. Another study referenced the "ese categories potentially cover so many di#erent Tra$cking in Persons Protocol but appeared to practices and situations, and migrants tend to move misunderstand its operation in practice. in and out of these categories. Illegality can occur if the relevant processes are not followed in the sending Migrant smuggling is a form of facilitated irregular country, but it can also refer to migrants whose status migration. As such, it is reasonable to expect that is illegal from the perspective of the destination information about migrant smuggling practices country, either because the migrant has not complied might be found in sources that examine irregular with the entry requirements or conditions attached migration. However, a close examination of the to residency and employment. Ahmad (2008c) sources included in this review suggests that this notes that in some cities such as Karachi, the rural- is not necessarily the case. While the literature on urban movement also produces a kind of illegality irregular migration certainly provides valuable from living in unauthorized settlements. Similar context and background information within which forms of ‘illegal’ or unauthorized movements were discussions of migrant smuggling must be situated, also referred to in the literature about China, where in many instances the issue of whether or not any rural-urban migration is subject to regulation. As part of the migrants entry or stay was facilitated by a such, the status of being ‘illegal’ or irregular is not third party for pro!t was simply not examined. As a !xed but changes over time and is contingent on result, these sources provided less information about circumstances. migrant smuggling than might be expected. Furthermore, the lines between what is legal and what A number of the studies reviewed referred fairly is illegal might be unclear even to those most directly broadly to practices such as irregular or illegal involved in the migration process. For example, migration, often in the context of discussions several studies noted that even when migrants try to about labour migration. In some instances, very follow legal migration processes (particularly those clear de!nitions of key terms were provided, and involved in giving e#ect to bilateral labour migration sub-categories of analysis were identi!ed, with the agreements) it can be very di$cult to avoid a range

33 2*-.&"%#345--,*"-#*"#!6*&

of illegal practices. "is might result from having to lived experience of being an irregular migrant. His pay bribes to corrupt o$cials in the country of origin, research suggests that whereas earlier waves of (what or using a licensed recruitment agent who then we might now call irregular) migrants were able to outsources the migration process to third parties. As move upwards socially and economically, and were a result, the reality is that even migrants who attempt often accompanied by their families, today’s irregular to follow legal processes might end up engaging in migrants are entrapped in situations characterised by some illegal practices (see for example, Silvey, 2007; survival, a cycle of debt, uncertainty and separation Rudnyckyj, 2004; Chantavanich, 2008). from family. Due to the precariousness of their situation: While there are many challenges associated with using legalistic, dualistic categories in an analysis of the "e pressure on them to utilize every minute complexities of migration, it is necessary if an e#ort they have on Western soil is immense. is to be made to understand migrant smuggling. By (Ahmad, 2008a, p. 310) de!nition, migrant smuggling involves an element of illegality (more speci!cally, facilitated illegal entry As a result of their irregular situations, these or stay). As such, research that seeks to examine migrants tend to only !nd work in businesses that migrant smuggling must also seek to engage with the are vulnerable to failure, so they spend any spare issue of the line between legality and illegality. time !nding their next job. Consequently, they are tired, sleep deprived and working anti-social hours. Ahmad described a bleak situation of almost entirely What methodologies are being used in research male “uninvited guest-workers” who “walk to work on migrant smuggling and irregular migration? from lonely single beds in grotty rented rooms” and spend thousands of hours interacting with “nameless, "e majority of the sources included in this literature faceless people they will never know” in insecure review (95) are based on qualitative research service positions in ethnic enclaves. (Ahmad, 2008a, methods, particularly semi-structured interviews, p. 314) ethnographic and other #eld observations and to a lesser extent, content analysis of documents. A smaller Several studies that sought to understand either the but nonetheless signi!cant number of sources people or processes involved in smuggling migrants included in this review are based on mixed research relied on data from criminal justice processes methods (49). For example, a number of sources (for example, case !les from investigations and relied on data obtained through household surveys prosecutions). Research of this nature enables the or questionnaires, alongside data obtained from development of typologies (or sub-categories) of semi-structured interviews. Only a small number migrant smuggling, re&ecting the considerable of the sources included in this review are based on variation in the organization of migrant smuggling, exclusively quantitative research methods (6) (see for the services that are on o#er, and the di#erent example: Akee, 2010; Gupta, 2009; Sarkar, 2008). motivations that clients have for migrating.

"e di#erent studies relied on a variety of data sources, For example, Neske (2006) undertook expert re&ecting their di#erent objectives. Studies that interviews and systematically examined the content sought to understand either the migrant experience of judicial dossiers for 51 migrant smuggling cases or motivations for migration focused primarily on that were prosecuted in Germany. "ese dossiers obtaining data from migrants themselves. Studies of included not only the police reports and judgements this nature can help to shed light on the reality of of the court but also records from interrogations of the lived experience of being a smuggled migrant, smugglers and smuggled migrants, and translated an experience that can be hidden behind stories of telephone interceptions. Collectively, these 51 apparent !nancial success. For example, Ahmad dossiers provided data about several hundred interviewed both smuggled and non-smuggled smugglers and 20,000 migrants. Neske examined irregular Pakistani migrants in the UK to understand the !les from the perspective of collecting data on their contemporary living and working experiences. 44 variables, covering the initiating and steps in His study allows the reader to vividly understand the the smuggling process, modes of transport, role

34 !#70'4&%*8#9':*';#$<#=*%'.&%5.'

of document fraud, method of payment and fees those being smuggled: they are typically paid, the in&uence of ethnic groups and whether members of the middle class with a high the smugglers had any connection to other criminal level of education, and they tend to &ee in !elds. "e combination of elements led to the the early stages of war breaking out when identi!cation of three main typologies (with various it is still possible to liquidate their assets. sub-categories) of migrant smuggling, each of which Family, relatives and acquaintances play a involves distinct forms of organization, migrants and signi!cant role in the smuggling process, risk. "e three typologies are (see Neske, 2006, pp. and trust as a means of coordination is 138–152): vital. Fees however, are still charged for this kind of smuggling. t “Individual smuggling with a high degree of self- t In “large scale stage to stage smuggling to responsibility”: In these cases, individuals travel bring individuals at a later date”, the same on their own, mostly legally and by public ethnic background is shared by smugglers transport. At a certain point in their journey, and migrants but some stages and services they cannot proceed without assistance so they are outsourced to “fellow countrymen”, may engage the services of a local smuggler who who act as “stage coordinators”. "e guides them across the border on foot, or get group that uses this service tends to assistance to remain undetected from a taxi be young men who are expected in the driver or other service provider. "is type of country of destination, and the people smuggling is described as “poverty smuggling” commissioning the smuggling are the as it is carried out by those who have no !nancial migrants themselves. Pro!t, rather or logistical options to try another way. than family or kinship, is the dominant motivator of this kind of smuggling. t “Visa smuggling as a pure service”: In this category, "ose involved in the process may be migrants seek the assistance of a service provider recent migrants themselves. (“travel agents”) to get a visa through fraudulent means (for example, the service provider takes t In “large scale migration with pioneers care of the “cover” for the journey, such as sent ahead”, the people commissioning issuing a fraudulent business invitation). In this the migration are not the migrants category, visas are obtained at the start of the themselves but their family or village, journey, and migrants then travel independently. typically su#ering poor living conditions, without any members as yet in the t “Pre-organized stage-to-stage smuggling”: In this West. Migrants in this group are almost category, migrants conduct almost the entire exclusively individual travellers, with a journey accompanied by smugglers. "e routes low level of education, a low social status may be the same as those used in the other and they come from an “underprivileged categories but the organization is di#erent, with background”. People smuggled in this way various “stage coordinators” used along the entire know they have to work in the destination route. "ere are di#erent sub-types within this country to pay o# debts but typically, the category, largely re&ecting the motivation and conditions under which they have to work intention of the smuggled migrants. "ese are: are not known to them. "ese “pioneer” t In “stage to stage smuggling from crisis migrants do not have connections in the areas”, the smuggler and migrants destination country so are perhaps the typically come not only from the same most vulnerable to exploitation, as they country, but the same region in that do not have an existing social network to country, and relatives or family members rely on for support in their destination. may have in&uential positions among the smugglers. "e fact that these Signi!cantly, Neske began this study intending journeys involve travel over thousands of to draw on data obtained through interviews with kilometres (not simply getting to a refugee smuggled migrants but abandoned this approach. camp) re&ects the speci!c situation of He notes that:

35 2*-.&"%#345--,*"-#*"#!6*&

With respect to the internal organization of people, and other practices that were organized of smugglers – both with regard to the by third-parties either for humanitarian reasons or individual stages as well as to a potential level pro!t. "is signi!cantly limited the capacity of above them – it became apparent, however, the existing body of literature to provide relevant after two interviews conducted with great information about the individuals involved in the e#ort that the knowledge of the migrants is operation of, and the impact of, migrant smuggling generally very small. (Neske, 2006, p. 131) practices.

Neske further quotes Sciortino who has observed From the literature reviewed, it is clear that that asking a “person who has been smuggled into geography and local context play an important role the country about the organization of the smuggling in determining particular research methods and data process would be like asking a customer in a sources. For example, while it might be possible to supermarket about the organizational structure of replicate the kind of study undertaken by Neske in the store” (Neske, 2006, p. 131). countries with a strong and well-organized criminal justice system (primarily destination countries), Research that focuses on developing categories it probably would not be feasible to undertake and sub-categories of migrant smuggling has many such a study in a context that did not match these practical applications. Firstly, it may allow policies conditions (primarily source and transit countries). and resources to be targeted with more precision. For example, Silvey (2007) spent time in Terminal For example, the response required to target those 3 in Jakarta, Indonesia, an airport terminal that is who opportunistically transport a person across speci!cally designed and designated for migrant a border in a taxi or on a motorbike may be very workers departing from and returning to Indonesia. di#erent to the strategies required to target those She observed the process of returning migrants who involved in providing large scale stage to stage were being interviewed by government o$cials smuggling. Secondly, the development of typologies about their earnings and their experience overseas, (or sub-categories) may help to shift the debate among other things. Answers were recorded on a from a point where ‘migrant smuggling’ is discussed standardized form, which might be thought of as as if all forms of migrant smuggling are the same, a potential source of key data about the migration to a point where the di#erent sub-categories can be experience. However, according to Silvey, there individually examined and assessed. "is may even were many irregularities in how the forms were help to build consensus on issues such as the need completed. for a greater law enforcement response to the more predatory forms of migrant smuggling. As Uehling In contexts where government data holdings may has noted: be limited or constrained, researchers may need to seek data from a broader range of sources. "is is [T]here are important distinctions to be re&ected in the reviewed literature, much of which drawn between the activities of internationally is based on data obtained directly from migrants and organized criminal gangs and the scores others involved in the migration process, as well as of micro-practices that comprise human o$cially-provided data. smuggling, that while often illegal in the formal sense, are not in fact driven by the A small number of studies draw on data obtained structural logic of a uni!ed purpose. (Uehling, from migration facilitators, recruiters, agents and 2008, p. 855) ‘smugglers’ obtained through direct interviews and observations (see for example, Koser, 2008; Unfortunately, in some of the research reviewed for UNODC, 2011; Zhang & Chin, 2004; Zhang et this study, very little or no attempt was made to al., 2007; Zhang, 2008). It appears that researchers di#erentiate between the multiple di#erent ‘micro- have had some success in obtaining data from practices’ that fall within the larger categories of migrant smugglers themselves. For example, Koser ‘migrant smuggling’ or ‘irregular migration’. As such, sought to interview migrant smugglers, in order to it was often di$cult or impossible to di#erentiate better understand the !nancial aspects of the trade. between what were in fact self-managed movements He notes that:

36 !#70'4&%*8#9':*';#$<#=*%'.&%5.'

[I]t was relatively easy to identify smugglers from regularization process such as amnesties for – in some cases they advertised their services irregular migrant workers (see for example, Scior- quite openly. In addition, most smugglers I tino & Punpuing, 2009; Martin, 2009). "is data is approached did not seem reluctant to admit only available in certain countries. Of the fourteen that they provided migration services. On the countries covered by this study, it was noted that other hand, only !ve were willing to provide Malaysia and "ailand have had various amnesties any detailed information about how they and registration processes for irregular migrants, over operated. (Koser, 2008, p. 9) periods of more than 10 years. Data obtained from amnesties contributes to understanding the stocks While a number were approached and refused, Koser of irregular migrants present in these countries. (2008) was able to interview !ve smugglers and !ve However, this data has limitations, typically re&ecting more agents variously involved in the process, such the various government restrictions on who is and as forgers and intermediaries. who not permitted to be regularized. Further, data from amnesties can become out of date quickly, Other researchers appear to have had a high level as amnesty programs may “form an incentive for of success not only in identifying smugglers but new migrants to come in the same way, hoping or in obtaining detailed, lengthy interviews with believing they will gain legal status in the future” signi!cant numbers of migrant smugglers. For (Heckmann, 2004, p. 1106). example, data for a study on the gendered nature of migrant smuggling included interviews with 129 "e actual process of a country engaging in a smugglers (Zhang et al., 2007). Interviews were regularisation process can also provide valuable conducted in three primary sites: New York City, Los opportunities for researchers to collect primary data Angeles and Fuzhou (China). As noted in the study: from hard to !nd populations, such as irregular and smuggled migrants. For example, in 2005, Research participants were recruited through researchers approached irregular migrants who our personal contacts and those of our research turned up at the "ai Department of Labour to assistants. (Zhang et al., p. 706) register under a regularization process, and requested interviews ("ongyou & Ayuwat, 2005). "rough "e authors note that all interviews were conducted this approach, the researchers were able to recruit in the native language of the participants, and ranged 276 (previously irregular) migrants to participate in from formal interviews to informal interviews over their study, and thereby access data from a relatively dinner tables or other social gatherings “where large sample of an otherwise hidden population. formal inquiries into the smuggling business were neither feasible nor socially acceptable” (Zhang et al., 2007, p. 706). "e authors note that in all cases, What information is available about stocks and the participants were informed of the identity of $ows of irregular and smuggled migrants? the interviewers and no deception was used. "e authors noted that: "ere are major challenges associated with estimating the stocks and &ows of hidden populations, such as Because of the pervasive fear of detection irregular and smuggled migrants. "ese challenges by law enforcement agencies and suspicion are not speci!c to the Asian context. As noted by of our research purposes, we encountered Battistella: many di$culties in persuading prospective research participants to come forward. Still, Virtually every research paper on irregular we collected more !rsthand data with far migration deplores the lack of reliable data on greater speci!city on the organizational and the subject since, by its very nature, it eludes operational characteristics of Chinese human established data collecting systems. Accurate smuggling that any previous researchers statistics are rarely available and, at best, one procured. (Zhang et al., 2007, p. 706) generally has to make do with estimates, and at worst with wild guesswork. "e data are often A number of the studies examined relied on data in&uenced by the methodology utilized and

37 2*-.&"%#345--,*"-#*"#!6*&

sometimes by the agenda of those reporting UNHCR to build a better statistical pro!le of Afghan on the subject. (IOM, 2008, p. 207) migrants living in Pakistan. In contrast, similarly reliable information is simply not available for the With these challenges in mind, it is not surprising other large populations of irregular migrants living that the literature reviewed for this project does not in Pakistan. As such, it is necessary to refer instead to contain accurate estimates of key statistical indicators smaller-scale estimates of the numbers, for example, of irregular migration or migrant smuggling. "e of Bengalis and Myanmar living in individual cities nature of the information that is available is discussed such as Karachi. While statistics about stocks of below. irregular migrants living in Pakistan are presented in various reports, according to BEFARE, Stocks and "ows of irregular migrants [t]he only baseline for the illegal migrant In some of the fourteen project countries, there population [in Pakistan] is the Shigri report are pockets of key, national level quantitative data, that is based on a survey of illegal migrants typically from a national census (such as the census in Karachi conducted in 1998. However, the of Afghans conducted in Pakistan, discussed below) methodology and approach of the report is or regularisation processes (such as those periodically unavailable. (BEFARE, 2009, p. 28) conducted in both Malaysia and "ailand), that is relevant to estimating the stocks of irregular migrants Further, existing estimates do not di#erentiate living in that country. between “actual migrants” and “o#spring of migrants” living in Pakistan (BEFARE, 2009, p. 43). "is For example, "ailand has engaged in various impacts on the capacity of the data to shed light on registration and other regularization programs actual movements of migrants (&ows). "e reasons for for irregular migrant workers, since 1992. In the this lack of data are complex. According to BEFARE 2004 regularization process, approximately 1.3 (2009), it re&ects the lack of a central government million (previously irregular) migrant workers and agency tasked with this responsibility but also the their dependents signed up for an identity card, fact that civil society organizations have not begun the !rst step in the regularization process (Sciorti- to focus on irregular migration issues. BEFARE no & Punpuing, 2009). While this data provides notes that while there are around 20 civil society valuable insight into the size of the irregular migrant organizations focused on anti-tra$cking in persons population in "ailand, it must also be viewed with activities, far smaller numbers (5) have a focus on caution. Firstly, as noted in several of the studies irregular migration and/or migrant smuggling. reviewed, not all migrants were either willing or able to participate in the various regularization processes Overall, a review of the existing literature suggests (for example, because of fees or other practical a severe lack of quantitative data about irregular barriers). Secondly, as noted above, data from migration stocks and &ows in relation to all countries regularization processes can become rapidly out of studied, but particularly Afghanistan, Cambodia, date (Heckmann, 2004). China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, Singapore, "ailand and Viet Nam. While "e literature on Pakistan also includes some data on there are certainly di$culties in estimating stocks and stocks of irregular migrants located in that country &ows of irregular migrants (an issue discussed further but it is apparently variable in currency, quality and below), the existing research suggests that in most coverage. In Pakistan, there is recent, reliable data contexts, it should be possible, with su$cient time, about the size and characteristics of the Afghan e#ort and resources, to develop at least “approximate populating living in Pakistan. In 2005, the Pakistan data” that can help inform policy and responses government and UNHCR undertook a census of (Mehdi, 2010, p. 2). "is would likely need to Afghan nationals in that country. "is census, which involve a mix of both qualitative and quantitative identi!ed a population of 3 million Afghans living in approaches, such as the ethno-survey approach (see Pakistan, was followed by a registration process, in further, Massey & Capoferro, 2004). "ere would which more than 2 million Afghans were registered. also seem to be opportunities to link together According to BEFARE, this data allowed the data from source countries with data from major

38 !#70'4&%*8#9':*';#$<#=*%'.&%5.'

destination countries (for example apprehension and would be a useful baseline indicator of migrant deportation data). smuggling &ows from that country. However, that baseline is currently not available due to a lack of In a small number of the countries studied, namely reliable data. India and "ailand, researchers have sought to !ll the gap in information about irregular migration A number of the studies reviewed note the numerous &ows (and more speci!cally incidence of migrant di$culties associated with quantifying stocks and smuggling) by drawing on supplementary data such &ows of irregular migrants. One fundamental as data from interceptions of irregular migrants, challenge relates to the di$culties of identifying deportation proceedings, and !eld data. For example, precisely who is irregular and who is not, and for in one study, the researcher examined data about what purpose. As noted by IOM in the World deportations of Indian nationals through Chennai Migration Report, the legal frameworks that govern airport (Saha, 2009). "is did not indicate the immigration, residence and employment of migrants incidence of irregular migration but it does provide are typically intricate. "is means that in practice, useful information about the origin of smuggled there may not be clearly de!ned dichotomies of migrants within India, and preferred routes and ‘legal/illegal’, ‘regular/irregular’. "e report notes destination countries (see further, India country the complex situation in the UK, where there are 80 study, this volume). Similarly, in "ailand, there di#erent types of entry and immigration statuses, are several recent studies that draw on data from a and each type of immigration status is associated range of government sources, alongside a review of with speci!c conditions (for example, students can the existing research literature (see for example, Sci- work 20 hours per week but no more, etc.). ortino & Punpuing, 2009). "e complexity of these rules and conditions Several studies noted that similar research, drawing on means that there are a potentially signi!cant deportation data, could be undertaken in other contexts. number of migrants who are legally resident For example, Azam notes that in the absence of good (i.e. with “leave to remain in the U.K.”), but data about the size of irregular migration originating working beyond the employment restrictions from Pakistan, it would be useful to have a close look attached to their immigration status. (IOM, at statistics on deportation of Pakistani nationals. 2008, p. 202) According to Azam, the relevant Pakistani department provides some deportation statistics however they are "e IOM (2002) suggests it is useful to bring in fairly opaque. Azam recommends that: the notion of semi-compliance, and to distinguish between three levels of compliance. Compliant Arrangements need to be worked out with [the migrants are legally resident and working in full Federal Investigation Agency] for collection compliance with the employment restrictions and reporting of the data on deportees and attached to their immigration status. Non-compliant interceptions on more meaningful indicators, migrants are those without the right to reside in the nationality (for interceptions only), gender, age host country. Semi-compliance indicates a situation groups, promised job abroad (for interceptions where migrants are legally residing but working and deportees arrested at the border of in violation of some or all of the employment destination country), reason for deportation, restrictions attached to their immigration status. and any adverse conditions of employment "is level of disaggregation is not yet being made in abroad (for deportees who had been working the literature for the fourteen project countries. abroad). [the Federal Investigation Agency] should also be able to distinguish and report In addition to the conceptual problems involved on the tra$cked victims, people smuggled and in measuring irregular migration, there are various other illegal migrants among those intercepted challenges related to data. Heckmann (2004) provides and deported. (Azam, 2009, p. 55) a valuable overview of the various forms of data that are available to assist those wanting to understand BEFARE (2009, p. 83) notes that the number of the scale of irregular migration (and the subset of “Pakistani smuggled persons deported per year” migrant smuggling). For example, he notes that

39 2*-.&"%#345--,*"-#*"#!6*&

census data and data from regularization processes Zhang (2007) notes that it is estimated that some (such as amnesties) provide some guidance on stocks 30 – 40,000 Chinese migrants are smuggled into the of irregular migrants in a country. Comparisons of United States each year. In the literature examined, changes in stocks of irregular migrants over time can various estimates of incidence of smuggling of allow for estimates of $ows. In addition, other data, Chinese nationals were also noted for the Netherlands such as criminal justice data from apprehensions and and Germany (see for example, Neske, 2007; deportations, and even data from asylum applications Soudijn, 2006). While important, these estimates can provide useful indicators of the size of $ows of are one part of a much larger picture. As noted in irregular migration. However, the existence of such the literature, Chinese nationals are smuggled to data depends largely on nationally and historically many countries throughout the world, through a speci!c conditions. In short, some countries will variety of routes. For example, the literature notes have some or all of this data, and others will have very large stocks of Chinese irregular migrants living little. For example, in the German context, there are in the Republic of Korea and Russia. However, strong entry and exit procedures, and there is reliable estimates of the incidence of migrant smuggling to data on apprehensions, asylum applications, and these countries from China were not found in the criminal o#ences. "ese indicate trends in irregular literature reviewed. migration, and allow for the estimation of the size of irregular populations and migrant smuggling In a number of the countries studied for this project, (Heckmann, 2004). "ese conditions are simply there was simply no information available in the not present in the majority of countries covered by reviewed literature with regard to estimated incidence this study. of migrant smuggling (Afghanistan, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Maldives, Singapore, A lack of data can re&ect a lack of systems and Sri Lanka, "ailand, Viet Nam). In some contexts, processes but it may also re&ect deeper attitudes this re&ects the many di$culties of quantifying a and beliefs about irregular migration and migrant phenomenon that may be hidden, tolerated or even smuggling. For example, Hugo and Stahl (2004) venerated, and inter-mingled with other migration noted that the movement of workers from Indonesia practices such as asylum seeking and tra$cking in to Malaysia is the largest undocumented &ow in persons. For example, Koser (2008) notes a number the region. Rather than being hidden, the origins of reasons why it is di$cult to even ‘guestimate’ of the workers are well known, as are the departure the number of Afghans who have been smuggled points, routes and operators. Local o$cials generally either from Afghanistan, or more commonly from assume that labour migration is the only way for the Pakistan (see further, country study, Afghanistan this local population to earn an income so they are not volume). However, in a number of the countries highly motivated to intervene. A similar culture of studied (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, "ailand) tolerance has been noted in other countries. the reviewed research simply does not di#erentiate between irregular migration and migrant smuggling Incidence of migrant smuggling as distinct categories. Similarly, while there is signi!cant research on migration (regular and It is important for policy makers to have an insight irregular) involving Indonesia and Malaysia, this has into how much irregular migration is entirely self- yet to focus explicitly on the issue of incidence of managed and self-directed and how much of it is migrant smuggling. facilitated by third parties for pro!t. A review of the literature con!rms that this information is not Having noted the dearth of information about presently available for any of the fourteen countries incidence of migrant smuggling from most if not all studied. "is is a major gap in the research literature. of the fourteen project countries, it should be noted that this study did not seek to locate and examine "e data that is available tends to involve estimates government data (for example, annual reports of of annual incidence of migrant smuggling in immigration departments or similar government particular destination countries, such as the United statistics). It is likely that for some countries, a States, the UK and certain countries in the European review of existing data holdings would help to !ll Union (EU). For example, with regard to China, some of the gaps noted above. If such data does

40 !#70'4&%*8#9':*';#$<#=*%'.&%5.'

exist, the question becomes why is this data not of kilometres out of their way, to maximise their !nding its way into the research-based literature? It prospects of success. For example, while a prospective is possible that the answer re&ects either restrictions migrant living in Fujian Province in China might on access to this information for external researchers, have di$culty getting a visa to enter the United or perhaps a lack of research focus on this issue. States if they apply at home, they may have more success if they travel to Indonesia, establish a false identity and business history in Indonesia, and What are the major routes involved in irregular then apply for a tourist visa from Indonesia, having migration and migrant smuggling? established the existence of substantial property and business holdings in Indonesia. As noted by Battistella, any e#ort to identify the major routes used in irregular migration (and migrant smuggling) is quickly challenged by the reality that What is known about the pro#les and motives of there are so many di#erent routes and possibilities: migrant smugglers?

Maps that try to depict such routes often "ere were very few sources in the literature reviewed appear as an intricate web of arrows and dots, that provided empirically-based information about with limited explanatory power. (IOM, 2008, the pro!le of migrant smugglers through reference, p. 209) for example, to demographic and social variables. "e research that is available focuses on those involved "is section does not endeavour to identify in smuggling of Chinese nationals to the United the major routes followed by either irregular or States (Zhang & Chin, 2004; Zhang et al., 2007; smuggled migrants from, through or to the fourteen Zhang, 2008) and to the Netherlands (Soudijn, countries examined in this review. Instead the 2006; Soudijn & Kleemans, 2009); the smuggling of reader is referred to the individual country chapters migrants to Germany (Neske, 2007); from India to which examine this issue in a more geographically Europe (Saha, 2007, 2009; UNODC, 2009); from speci!c context. Pakistan to Europe (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), 2010), and through the West From a review of the existing literature, it is clear that African route to Europe (UNODC, 2011). Key the routes used in migrant smuggling do not necessarily data used in these studies includes interviews with follow a geographically logical path (see for example, migrant smugglers and criminal justice data. Monzini, 2004). For example, a migrant might be smuggled from Sri Lanka through West Africa Information about the pro!le of those involved to Europe, or from China to the United States via in smuggling migrants to, from or through other Indonesia. "ese apparently convoluted routes re&ect countries covered by this study (Afghanistan, what might perhaps be described as the path of least Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Maldives, resistance, or perhaps the path of opportunity. Routes Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Sri Lanka, "ailand are heavily in&uenced by: the legal environment (for and Viet Nam) is entirely lacking. As a result, there example, the entry restrictions of the various countries is almost no information available about the pro!le of destination di#er by point of departure or nationality of those involved in some highly signi!cant migrant of applicant); the strength of border control measures smuggling routes. and the shifting changes in this capacity; the location and existence of key collaborators (for example, "e research that is available provides invaluable corrupt o$cials in particular airports or producers of information about the pro!le and motives of high quality documents living in particular cities) and migrant smugglers but only in some contexts and geography (for example, the sea route to Italy, Spain locations. For example, the research of Zhang and and Greece provides potential points of entry to the Chin provides considerable insight into the pro!les borders of the EU). of those involved in smuggling Chinese nationals into the United States. "eir research was based "e literature reviewed for this chapter gives many on, among other sources, interviews with 129 examples of migrants who travel many thousands migrant smugglers both in the United States and in

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China, with participants identi!ed initially through were ‘transporters’, 2 were ‘passport falsi!ers’, 10 personal networks and then through snowball were ‘enforcers’, 3 were ‘corrupt o$cials’, 43 were sampling techniques (Zhang & Chin, 2004; Zhang, ‘supporting personnel’, and 10 had unknown roles 2008). "eir research suggests that the migrant due to limitations of the !les. Soudijn observed smugglers were ordinary citizens (primarily men that smugglers had niche roles held for long periods but also women), whose contacts and connections of time. Zhang and Chin (2004) observed similar provided them with an opportunity to pro!t from niche roles, held for long periods of time. "is migrant smuggling. Migrant smugglers come from suggests the need for research to focus not just on diverse backgrounds but tend to work in sectors that the pro!le of ‘migrant smugglers’ but also on the suggest a level of comfort with risk and enterprise; pro!le of the various service providers. For example, they may be small business owners, independent a person involved in falsifying passports may have a contractors, or commission based employees, who very di#erent pro!le to a person who simply drives engage in aspects of migrant smuggling as a side-line migrants across a border. (Zhang & Chin, 2004). It is clear that social networks play a signi!cant role "e research of Soudijn (2006) on those involved in in the migrant smuggling process, and this impacts smuggling of Chinese nationals into the Netherlands on the pro!le of both smugglers and smuggled provides an interesting contrast, both from the migrants. However, the research suggests that the perspective of its data set and its !ndings. "is study nature and strength of these social relationships was based primarily on an examination of court !les varies considerably. For example, drawing on data (88 cases involving 172 individuals) rather than from the German context, Neske noted that where interviews with smugglers. As noted by Soudijn, smuggling involves ‘stage to stage’ smuggling of data in court !les relates primarily to the needs of whole families from crisis areas, the role of immediate the criminal justice process, so it has strengths and family networks is emphasized: weaknesses. From a review of these !les, Soudijn was able to identify the sex, age, nationality, ethnicity Both groups [smugglers and migrants] not and country of residence of the defendants but not only possess the same ethnic background and, other variables, such as marital status, educational as a rule, come from the same region, but background or employment status. Nonetheless, relatives or family members frequently take the !ndings on these points are important. For the in&uential positions among the smugglers. example, Soudijn noted that of 172 defendants (Neske, 2006, p. 147) involved in smuggling Chinese nationals into the Netherlands, 44 were non-ethnic Chinese (of which "e connections are less immediate in other forms 32 are categorized as European, and 12 as Asian). of smuggling, such as stage-to-stage smuggling of "erefore, about a quarter of the smugglers involved individuals, primarily young men, for employment in smuggling Chinese customers were not themselves within pre-existing social networks. In these Chinese, suggesting the limits of ethnically-based instances, the smugglers and the migrant might be conceptions of organized crime. Soudijn also noted from the same ethnic background but there are no that about 13% of the smugglers in his sample personal or familial relationships. "e smugglers were ethnic Chinese women. While these women have typically lived abroad for a long time, so they constituted a minority, some held signi!cant roles, have the networks and connections needed to with !ve of them described as organizers of large facilitate the various phases of migration between the scale-transport. country of origin and destination.

In seeking to understand the pro!le of migrant Key forms of social networks include family links smugglers, it is important to be mindful that many but also those that result from shared ethnic and di#erent roles and responsibilities might be captured linguistic backgrounds. "is is not to suggest within the umbrella category of ‘migrant smuggler’. that all smuggling crimes are facilitated by ‘co- For example, Soudijn (2006) identi!ed that of 172 ethnic’ smuggler-migrant relationships. As noted defendants prosecuted for migrant smuggling in by Soudijn and Kleemans (2009), a key risk of the the Netherlands, 22 of these were ‘organizers’, 88 ‘ethnic organised crime’ model is that characteristics

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of ethnic homogeneity and closure are emphasised, creating opportunities for locals living along key while other factors such as ethnic heterogeneity routes or border crossings to engage in the many and inter-ethnic cooperation are neglected. "ey and varied micro-practices associated with migrant argue that ideas of ‘ethnic specialization’ tend to smuggling. For example, in the West African identify particular ethnic groups with particular context: crimes. Based on an analysis of Chinese organised crime, Soudijn and Kleemans argue that a focus on Others who help migrants with border social networks and situational context would o#er crossing and other logistical requirements in improved insights into the operations of organised return for payment are local residents who criminal groups. "eir analysis closely resonates may be accustomed to making money from with the analysis by Zhang and Chin (2004). any source available, quite often in violation of the law. (UNODC, 2011, p. 30) "ere is some research that notes the relevance of prior experience of the migration process to "is includes the former nomads in the Sahara who becoming a smuggler, even if this experience is as have lost livestock in the great droughts of the 1970s an ‘unsuccessful’ migrant. In other words, those and never recovered their old way of life. "ey now involved in migrant smuggling may themselves have have developed other ways of making a living, most had experience as smuggled migrants. For example, notably, through transportation. research in the West African context notes that: "us equipped, former nomads live by … a signi!cant number of the people who transporting over long distances any make money from irregular migrants are merchandise o#ered to them, including themselves irregular migrants, but ones who people. In many cases they work with have been in a single location long enough to police and border o$cials who are prepared acquire substantial local knowledge. Some of to facilitate their movements in return for the most experienced migrants are those who payment. Formally speaking, this constitutes have been intercepted by the authorities in the illegal practice of bribery and corruption the course of an earlier journey and forcibly with a view to evading State laws regarding returned to West Africa, from where they the transport of people or goods across have recommenced their journey, sometimes frontiers – smuggling. (UNODC, 2011, p. as many as three or four times. In this way, 30) they have built up expertise over a period of sometimes several years, and they may turn "e reviewed research on the pro!le of migrant this expertise to pro!t by o#ering services to smugglers, along with the reviewed research on novice migrants. (UNODC, 2011, p. 30) the relationship between migrants and smugglers, suggests that at least in some contexts, there may be Similar observations are made in relation to the little social stigma associated with being a migrant way smugglers start their businesses in the Afghan- smuggler. For example, in research on the Afghan Pakistan context (UNODC, 2010), and also in and Pakistan context, UNODC (2010) notes that relation to the Chinese migrant smugglers studied according to those interviewed, being a migrant in Fujian, China and the United States. For smuggler is perceived as being less morally bad example, Zhang (2008) notes that around one third than being involved in drugs. In some contexts, of the sample of smugglers he interviewed entered migrant smugglers may even be regarded highly. For the smuggling business through ‘knowing others example, Zhang and Chin (2004) have noted that already working in that business’. "is included some Chinese human smugglers are highly regarded participants who initially became acquainted with as trusted !gures in the community. Furthermore, smugglers through their own experiences of being Zhang and Chin noted that the smugglers they smuggled. interviewed did not perceive themselves as criminal, even though they knew their work was illegal. "ey "e research con!rms that grey or black-market saw themselves as business people who helped others economies may spring up around border areas, and worked with their friends.

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What is known about the pro#le of irregular and Mekong Subregion (GMS), where porous land- smuggled migrants? borders make irregular migration relatively easy. For example, in 2004, "ongyou and Ayuwat (2005) "e literature review identi!ed a large number of conducted a survey of Lao (initially irregular) sources that provide information about the pro!le migrant workers who attended a labour registration of irregular and smuggled migrants. For example, process in "ailand. Of the 276 Lao workers a search within the 154 sources in this project’s recruited for the survey, the majority of workers in bibliographic database on ‘pro!le of smuggled the sample were women (73% or 202 of 276). Most migrants’ generates 29 hits, and a search on ‘pro!le of the women were young, with 58% being under of irregular migrants’ generates 39 hits. 24 years of age, and a third being under 20 years of age. "e youngest respondent was 14 years of age, "e research suggests that it is most useful to which is just below the legal minimum working age examine the pro!le of irregular and smuggled in "ailand (15 years). "e major factor that caused migrants locally rather than globally, and to look them to migrate was poverty. beyond mere demographic factors. "e categories of irregular and smuggled migrants are umbrella In contrast to the situation in the GMS, it appears terms that cover various large and potential disparate that the pro!le of irregular and smuggled migrants groups of individuals, even within a single country originating in South Asia is predominantly male. or ethnic group. For example, Clarke discussed the For example, Ahmad (2008c) notes that labour situation of Myanmar ‘illegal migrants’ in "ailand. migration &ows from (and also within) Pakistan He notes that the signi!cant numbers of Myanmar almost exclusively involve young men. As a result, migrants living irregularly in "ailand have some considerations of masculinity and male agency are common characteristics: for example, they have important to ‘making sense’ of migration. To examine to remain invisible to survive, as coming to the this issue, Ahmad conducted interviews with 60 attention of the authorities may result in deportation Pakistani migrants in London, Italy and Pakistan. He or prosecution. However, beyond this, there are concluded that for young men in Pakistan today, the signi!cant di#erences in the characteristics of the desire to migrate (legally or irregularly) is not simply various populations of Myanmar irregular migrants about economics. Migration, regular or irregular, living throughout "ailand: is imbued with a certain ‘masculine glamour’, with returnees having a higher social status than when For example, in Mae Sot, illegal Burmese they left. To be excluded from the ranks of returnees migrants outnumber "ais by a ratio of 3:1, restricts access to a bride and extends the wait for whereas in Phuket "ais outnumber Burmese a suitable match. With increased restrictions on 4:1 (Clarke, 2009, p.1070) opportunities for regular migration, and the growth in the smuggling industry, irregular migration is Further, Clarke (2009) suggests that Mae Sot has the viewed by young Pakistani men as a commodity largest number of migrants who arrive without any that can and must be purchased at almost any cost. support network, compared to Ranong which has According to Ahmad: the largest number of migrants who travelled with family members. Further, the majority of migrant Migration … is no longer simply a means workers in Ranong have worked in other areas of to accumulate capital and consume; it is "ailand previously, whereas those in Mae Sot have an end in itself, the realization of which not. Most migrant workers in Ranong are employed requires considerable levels of accumulation in the !shing industry, while the most common and signi!cant levels of material investment occupation in Mae Sot is factory work. and risk. For certain constellations of young Pakistani men who now live above subsistence, In terms of the gender and age pro!le of irregular and migration is itself the ultimate product and smuggled migrants, it appears that in some contexts, status symbol. (Ahmad, 2008c, p. 141) both men and women are migrating irregularly, either facilitated by smugglers or independently. While economics is not the only consideration, "is appears to be the situation across the Greater the literature certainly provides many examples of

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contexts where irregular and smuggled migrants are decisions and follow di#erent paths to those driven motivated by economic considerations and by the by ambition or a desire to escape con$ict. For those apparent successes of those who have migrated before driven by poverty: them. For example, Saha undertook !eld visits to certain villages and districts within India from which Being smuggled closer to home is the cheapest large number of Indian deportees had originated option and safer for those who have limited from. He noted that it is di$cult to specify reasons capacity to repay loans and risk dealing with why certain districts reported large cases of irregular !nancial shocks. Once a family or friend migration, whereas others did not. However, he establishes the route, a revolving door opens concluded that high unemployment and “the general and that opportunity can be maximised time attitude of youth from the area, that migration to the and time again. "e poorest of economic other countries is perhaps the best alternative” were migrants will be attracted to the prospect of critical factors (Saha, 2009, p. 27). He noted the a wage in their neighbouring countries or situation of two brothers from a district, who had the the labour-importing economies of the Gulf. same level of high school education. One managed to (UNODC, 2010, p. 8) migrate irregularly to the UK and was earning about USD 1,000 per month, whereas his brother stayed "ese migrants favour the cheap ‘no frills’ routes behind and was earning about USD 50 a month overland or sea. "ey travel by foot or bus. In in a local petrol station, and even then, this work contrast: was hard to !nd. Saha noted that in the villages he visited, remittances had led to improvements in the Migrants motivated by ambition – rather status of the families of migrants in just a few years. than absolute poverty – tend to invest more Further, some irregular migrants also learnt valuable in !nding a smuggler with a good reputation. skills while they are overseas, training as plumbers (UNODC, 2010, p. 9) or carpenters. Accordingly, irregular migration was viewed as a legitimate pathway: Finally, movement motivated by fear involves an entirely di#erent cost-bene!t calculation: "us, the phenomenon of irregular migration was not considered to be a stigma amongst First, it encourages migrants to liquidate their the families of the migrants, provided it assets, which along with insecurity makes it was successful. "e social structure of the unlikely that they will return, at least not for village, which had been traditionally based any length of time. Second, there is a greater on caste, landholding, family background and probability that the whole family will seek to educational achievements, has now changed move, rather than individuals, and that they into one which distinguishes between families will do so simultaneously. "ey therefore having members in other countries and tend to gravitate towards more sophisticated families which do not. (Saha, 2009, pp. 27– criminal providers, for example those who 28) can arrange good fraudulent documents and air travel to !nal destinations. "ird, as a It is clear from the research that populations of result of these two tendencies, migrants are on irregular and smuggled migrants may include those average willing and able to pay higher prices. seeking better economic opportunities but also those (UNODC, 2010, p. 10) seeking to escape persecution (see for example, Pro Asyl, 2007). "e research suggests that the factors that motivate migrants to engage in irregular What is known about the nature or characteristics migration (whether facilitated by a smuggler or of relationships between migrant smugglers and not) will likely have a signi!cant impact on their smuggled migrants? ‘choice’ of service providers, routes, modalities and destinations. For example, research about migrant "e literature review identi!ed a relatively small smuggling in the Afghan-Pakistan context suggests number of studies that directly examined the that migrants driven by poverty make very di#erent characteristics of the relationships between migrant

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smugglers and smuggled migrants (see for example, "e research con!rmed that the “same close relatives Zhang, 2008). However, a review of the literature and friends who were the agents who assisted covering factors such as the pro!le of migrant them in travelling across the border, also assisted smugglers, and the organization of smuggling also in transferring remittances and in arranging for provides relevant insights on this point. return travel” ("ongyou & Ayuwat, 2005, pp. 11–12). Migrants also look to people in these "e research suggests that social networks are critical same social networks for support and assistance to the migrant smuggling process. However, there in times of trouble. "is study did not examine can be considerable variation in the nature and level !nancial transactions that took place within these of connections within these social networks, with relationships. However, it seems reasonable to relationships between immediate family members at assume that at least some of the local Lao agents one end of the spectrum, and third parties introduced would have been paid a commission for at least some by friends or acquaintances met along the migration of the services provided, thereby potentially bringing route at the other end. Similarly, it appears that them within the technical de!nition of migrant there is considerable variation in the quality of smuggling. these relationships, with some exhibiting positive characteristics (such as trust, mutual support, care "e research suggests that in some contexts, and respect) while others exhibit more negative prospective migrants and their families may take characteristics (such as a propensity to abuse and a degree of comfort from working through their exploit) (see generally, Heckmann, 2004). locally established social networks. However, in reality, the networks they rely upon are unable to In some contexts, it appears that the line between provide protection from harm or exploitation. For social networks (that is, the links that are maintained example, Rudnyckyj notes that local ‘brokers’ are between people who migrate and residents, relatives crucial to facilitating transnational labour migration and friends in the country of origin) and paid from Indonesia: intermediaries (who may or may not be appropriately characterized as migrant smugglers) are blurred. "is is a local patronage !gure who is usually Where the distances between the country of origin respected in a community, such as a village and destination are short, these relationships may head, a successful local businessman or even remain relevant throughout the whole migration a religious leader. (Rudnyckyj, 2004, p. 414) experience and have certain protective characteristics. For example, "ongyou and Ayuwat examined the Brokers may also provide small loans to migrants, social networks that were involved in the irregular and put them in contact with recruitment companies migration and employment of Lao workers in in Jakarta. While in theory there are regular labour "ailand. For the migrant workers interviewed for migration channels from Indonesia, in practice the this study, their social networks had helped them lines between ‘illegal’ and ‘legal’ labour recruitment travel, !nd a job and enter "ailand illegally. As are very blurred (see for example, Silvey, 2007). noted by "ongyou and Ayuwat: In that sense, the local broker may (knowingly or unknowingly) be connecting the migrant to In some instances, it is often relatives and intermediaries involved in various illegal and highly neighbours who work as job placement exploitative practices (see for example, Human agents for agents in "ailand. Because of Rights Watch, 2004). Rudnyckyj notes that while the dangers involved in illegal migration, in some ways the initial relationship between the agents usually depend on social networks to migrants and brokers re&ect traditional notions recruit new workers. It is easier for women of patron-client relationship, there are important and their families to make decisions regarding di#erences: migration, if these are based on face-to-face relationships. "is re&ects the nature of ethnic … if there is a problem these brokers may not Lao village social relations that are based on be as accountable as patrons in conventional merit, clientage and personal relationships. localized relations of reciprocity. Asep, a local ("ongyou & Ayuwat, 2005, p. 8) NGO activist with the group Cianjur Watch

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remarked that “after a broker lends the money and reputation are the key to the migrant smuggling and sends them to Jakarta, that’s it. If there business, and violence is not part of the modus is a problem they do not know what to do … operandi. While smuggled migrants who arrive in (Rudnyckyj, 2004, p. 415) the Netherlands will undoubtedly be working very hard, the smugglers themselves are not involved in "us, while prospective Indonesian migrants and any exploitation. their family may assume that local brokers will ensure their security, in reality, “the brokers’ ability "e literature also notes that in some contexts, to do so is by no means certain” (Rudnyckyj, 2004, various !nancial ‘guarantees’ and other practices p. 415). have developed that can help shift some of the risk of failure back onto the smuggler. It is possible that this "e research suggests that trust and reputation results in a higher level of protection for smuggled are important to the migrant smuggling business migrants in the process. For example, in the context model in many, if not all contexts. "e research of migrant smuggling from Pakistan to the UK, suggests this impacts on the characteristics of the Koser notes that: relationships between smugglers and their clients. In some contexts, it appears that this results in … prospective migrants and their households relationships between smugglers and migrants that reduced their risks by depositing payments are quite positive, in the sense that there is a shared with a third party, and in e#ect negotiating interest both in the migration project but also in the a ‘money back guarantee’ with smugglers. migrant’s safety. In these contexts, the communities (Koser, 2008, p. 19) and migrants involved may not view smugglers as criminals but as legitimate service providers who Similarly, research in the Indian context notes provide opportunity. For example, in the US that when a migrant fails to reach their intended context, Zhang and Chin noted that: destination country, they can and do, contact local sub-agents for a full refund of the money paid by … both immigrants and smugglers considered him (UNODC, 2009). A failure to repay the money transnational human smuggling more of a owing may lead to involvement of the police: “good deed” that a crime. (Zhang & Chin, 2004, p. 10) "e sub-agent in such a situation informs the migrant that the money paid by him had to In the context of smuggling between China to be paid to the agent and he is no longer in Taiwan Province of China, Chin notes that: possession of that money. In some situations the money is paid directly by the migrant to … snakeheads are highly respected by local the agent. If repeated requests made by the residents because they have assisted their migrant for the refund of money yield no fellow villagers to become wealthy by joining results, he may threaten to report the matter to the illegal migration waves !nding jobs in the police. "e sub-agent in such a situation Taiwan. (Chin, 2008, p. 103) pursues with the agent and in 80 per cent of cases the money is refunded, deducting the In the context of migrant smuggling from China to costs already incurred in sending the migrant the Netherlands, Soudijn and Kleemans suggest that to the transit country etc. In situations where migrant smuggling can be characterized as a form all negotiations between the migrant and the of “co-production”, where it is the combined e#orts sub-agent fail, a compliant is usually !led of the migrants, their social environment and the with the police. (UNODC, 2009, p. 57) smugglers who seek to circumvent migration laws (Soudijn & Kleemans, 2009, p. 462). "e authors While the literature does suggest the existence of note that in the Dutch context, those involved in what might be described as positive or relatively investigating migrant smuggling may commence equal relationships between smugglers and migrants, an investigation expecting to uncover a cesspool of there are also numerous examples in the literature of abuse but typically !nd nothing of the sort. Trust smuggler-migrant relationships that are characterized

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by severe power imbalances, and abuses of that organizers can be removed, the entire organization power. In the most extreme instances, the migrants will likely collapse. become themselves no longer willing participants in the ‘co-production’ that is migrant smuggling "e research of Zhang and Chin casts doubt on the but themselves victims of various crime ranging relevance of the traditional organized crime model from theft, kidnapping, extortion even slavery. For to migrant smuggling, at least in the context of example, in the Indian context, Saha (2007) notes smuggling between China and the United States. examples where smugglers vanished with their According to their !ndings, those involved in clients’ passports and money, or abandoned them smuggling large numbers of Chinese nationals into in the forest. In the China-Myanmar context, the the United States did not match traditional notions literature notes many examples of Myanmar women of ‘organized crime’. For example, while some of who, upon crossing the border into China with their their sample of migrant smugglers operated in broker, are handed to another broker for transfer small groups, forty percent of their sample did not to highly exploitative situations within China such consider themselves to be part of an organization or as and (see group: for example, KWAT, 2008). "ese situations are discussed further below under the section on human "ese subjects had no problem saying they were and social costs of migrant smuggling. working with friends or business associates, but they did not think their social circle possessed any qualities of an organization. What is known about the organization of migrant "ey were more likely to consider themselves smugglers? as free agents. (Zhang & Chin, 2004, p. 7)

"e literature review identi!ed more than 30 studies Even though the researchers talked to some successful that provide commentary on how migrant smuggling smugglers, none of them considered themselves is organized within certain markets and along certain as occupying a central or dominant position in routes. However, there is considerable variation in the various smuggling networks. "ey described the depth of inquiry within the various sources. As themselves as working with their friends: suggested by Heckmann, some of the literature on smuggling uses vague terms rather loosely: No one was found who had absolute control over an entire smuggling operation. … smuggling industry, networks of smugglers, Organizations appeared to possess multiple migrant merchants, mom-and-pop smugglers, layers, with the inner core consisting of only a organized crime, or crime that is organized, to few close associates; these associates each had name a few. (Heckmann, 2004, p. 1115) their own network of contacts, who in turn might have further contacts. (Zhang & Chin, "ere are a small number of studies that have 2004, p. 8) examined these issues very closely, and with great precision. In particular, a small number of studies As such, there were no central ‘organized crime groups’ have sought to examine whether the organization but rather a series of networks, who worked together of migrant smuggling matches traditional thinking from time to time, as needed. "is research suggests around ‘organized crime’ (see in particular, Zhang & that the ‘enterprise model’ of criminal organization Chin, 2004; Zhang, 2008; Neske, 2006; Heckmann, best describes Chinese human smuggling operations. 2005; Soudijn, 2008). While there are various "at is: descriptions of ‘organized crime’, this concept has traditionally been associated with criminal "is model describes &exible and adaptive organizations that exhibit certain characteristics: the networks that expand or contract as needed existence of some form of central control, a hierarchy to deal with the uncertainties of the criminal with leaders and followers, and the use of violence, enterprise. "e participants are organized to name a few. If this model is considered from a law only for the purpose of carrying out the illicit enforcement perspective, it follows that if the central activities. (Zhang & Chin, 2004, p. 12)

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Findings about the organization of migrant highly organized forms of crime. As noted by Zhang smuggling may have signi!cant implications for and Chin, it is possible that their sample, based on law enforcement. For example, UNODC (2010) !eld interviews with smugglers identi!ed through has noted that in the Afghan-Pakistan context, the personal networks and snowball sampling, did not smuggling routes used by the masses (as opposed identify the “more organized and closely guarded to more expensive, end-to-end smuggling) involve groups” (Zhang & Chin, 2004, p. 11). nodes connected by $exible networks. As a result, there may be no single centre of gravity that could "e research of Neske (2006) and Heckmann be knocked out by law enforcement. (2005) in the German context also focuses on the organization of migrant smuggling. "rough the Some of the research does suggest that the development of key typologies of migrant smuggling organization of migrant smuggling may align more (discussed above), their research sheds light on the closely to traditional understandings of organized di#erent forms of social organization that sit behind crime than is suggested by the research of Zhang and the various migrant smuggling services. For example, Chin. For example, Soudijn undertook an analysis where the service merely involves the provision of a of information obtained through wiretaps in the case fraudulently obtained visa, the ‘organization’ may !les of migrant smugglers. From this, he was able to include for example, just one person in the country discern separate smuggling groups that had a level of of origin (the focal point) and one in the country continuity. A key characteristic of these groups was of destination (who is responsible for issuing a that an organizer managed the money: fraudulent letter of invitation). As Heckmann notes:

"e organizer pays the other suspects for A network of two individuals or a small certain services and can therefore be placed organizing unit is enough for the purpose. as the top of the organization. "is in turn (Heckmann, 2005, p. 5) leads to the assumption that the organizer issues orders to other suspects, who are given In contrast, where the service involves bringing a speci!c tasks to perform. (Soudijn, 2006, p. person from (for example) Afghanistan to Germany, 81) the organizational structure that sits behind this operation is quite di#erent. "eir research suggests "is case analysis also suggested that violence did that: occur in the smuggling world, and some involved in the smuggling groups did consider that these groups … it is not one large organization who involved a hierarchical command structure. Soudijn does these operations, but a network of concluded that: organisations, an inter-organisational network. (Heckmann, 2005, p. 8) All things considered, the evidence strongly suggests a hierarchical structure. "ere are Zhang has examined the nature of the relationships smuggling groups that operate with a !xed between migrant smugglers that allow these networks complement of personnel for long periods of to function. He notes that like other entrepreneurs, time, maintain a division of tasks, clustered migrant smugglers use their network of social contacts by ethnicity, geographically limited to one and personal resources to engage in pro!t-seeking speci!c location and do not avoid using activity. He describes human smuggling operations violence. (Soudijn, 2006, p. 83) as operations among peers, noting that these require minimal organization structure and limited hierarchy. Soudijn notes that his !ndings, like those of Zhang However, unlike peer groups that might be involved and Chin, may be in&uenced by his data. Whereas the in legal activities, they rarely engage in teamwork. research of Zhang and Chin was based on interviews Factors such as the constant fear of arrest and the with smugglers identi!ed through personal networks hazardous business environment have the result that: and snowball sampling, the research of Soudijn was based on analysis of police records including wiretaps, "eir relations with each other are usually which are mostly likely to reveal information about secretive and entail mostly one-on-one,

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or dyadic, transactions. Each individual various factors such as: the distances travelled, snakehead develops and maintains an the varying levels of di$culty in accessing certain additional circle of contacts and resources that countries, the geography (whether there are land are also clandestine in nature and dyadic in or sea borders) and the type of smuggling service format. (Zhang, 2008, p. 144) being provided (for example, whether the migrant’s journey is largely self-directed with particular "is organizational structure has a number of services purchased en route, or fully covered end advantages: for example, direct communications to end). ensure clarity of agreement; small group interactions expedite information gathering, improve Recruitment of customers communication and facilitate decision making; and it ensures maximum security with minimal exposure "e research con!rms that prospective migrants and to law enforcement (Zhang, 2008). smugglers come together in many di#erent ways. Some prospective migrants actively seek out the In summary, the detailed research on the services of smugglers. For example, a migrant who is organization of o#ending is limited to just a few organizing their own travel step by step will simply markets and locations (primarily the smuggling of ask around in the cities and towns along the route, Chinese nationals into the US and to or through and !nd service providers as they go. Depending the Netherlands; and the smuggling of any foreign on the location and context, this may be relatively nationals into Germany) (see in particular, Zhang & straightforward. For example, research in the Chin, 2004; Zhang, 2008; Neske, 2006; Heckmann, African context notes that communities of migrants 2005; Soudijn, 2008). However, these particular (in various stages of their journeys) have sprung studies are extensive and they examine the conditions up in every town on the main migration routes, in signi!cant markets and countries of destination. especially in North Africa, and these are serviced by Considered together, these studies con!rm that local smugglers: there is variety in the organization of o#ending, some of which is organized in unique ways. Some [C]onnection men in North African ports, migrant smuggling is carried out by what can safely passeurs in Agadez and Gao and burgers be described as organized criminal groups, in the in Kano are often former migrants who sense that these groups have continuity, clear roles have discovered that they can make a good and responsibilities, they are centrally organized living as professional smugglers of migrants. with a structure of command and control, and they (UNODC, 2011, p. 32) may have recourse to violence (see for example, the research of Soudijn, 2006). However, some migrant "e West Africa/North African route is used smuggling services, including those involving primarily by African migrants but during certain complex travel across long distances, are provided not periods of time, it has also been used by migrants by groups but by individuals operating as free agents from South Asia, particularly Bangladesh, India, in niche roles across loosely a$liated peer networks Sri Lanka and Pakistan (UNODC, 2011; Monzini, (see for example, Zhang, 2008). By engaging in one- 2004). on-one transactions, those involved in the network can ensure clear communication, provide their niche "e various studies of Zhang and Chin, which service and access the services of other niche service examined the smuggling of Chinese nationals into providers, while still insulating themselves from law the United States, suggests that most smugglers and enforcement. their prospective clients !nd each other through their mutual social circles. As noted above, transactions are mostly one-on-one, with the result being: What is known about the modus operandi of smuggling? … [T]he majority of prospective clients know only the recruiters, and few know all "ere is considerable diversity in the modus operandi the snakeheads in a smuggling organization. of migrant smuggling. "ese di#erences re&ect (Zhang, 2008, p. 43)

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In the Fujian context, the recruitment process may party would issue a receipt to the potential migrant be self-initiated by the prospective migrant, or they or his family. "e money would only be released may be recruited by friends and acquaintances: to the smuggler once the family had con!rmed that the migrant had reached their destination, normally In some cases, prospective clients are having received a phone call from the migrant. approached by relatives or friends who happen to know people in the smuggling business and According to Zhang (2008), prospective migrants want to make money by making referrals. In in Fujian pay a down-payment (which secures other cases, eager clients look for contacts commitment but also covers some up front costs), and who can include them in a smuggling trip. then the remainder is paid once their clients get to the (Zhang, 2008, p. 44) United States. However, this step only occurs after the smuggler has agreed to take on the migrant. Zhang As noted by Zhang (2008), without formal channels notes that the recruitment process involves a two-way for advertising or regular meeting places, smugglers assessment, !rst of the smugglers competence, but must rely on their good reputation spread by word of second, by the smuggler of the client’s capacity to pay. mouth. For example, Zhang quotes a smuggler, who One snakehead in Fuzhou explained as follows: noted how quickly his reputation grew: "ere are two basic rules in this game. Clients "e !rst group of clients that I was involved must have money or no smuggler will take with went to the US by boat. "e second them. "en the smuggler must have a success group got there by plane will all legitimate record or he will never get any clients. In most travel documents. Because these two groups cases, all parties know each other through all arrived in the US safely, many people came friends and relatives, making it easy to build a looking for me. "is last time, for instance, mutual trust. (Zhang, 2008, p. 47) I was prepared to refer only one person; but several of his relatives and friends showed According to Zhang (2008), smugglers are more up at the meeting place, expecting me to careful screeners than prospective migrants, as there introduce them to my (snakehead) partner. are always more clients than smugglers. Having said (Zhang, 2008, p. 45) this, Zhang notes that there are di#erences within the smuggling market. For example, those involved According to Zhang, a good reputation is a vital asset in smuggling by boat want to !ll it to capacity, so that snakeheads are most eager to acquire and maintain. are more likely to take on clients without adequate !nancial means. According to this research, problems Methods of payment with smugglers securing payment upon completion of the smuggling process are infrequent, with most clients Just as the methods of recruitment will vary, the way paying willingly and gladly. Where there are problems, that fees are paid by migrants to smugglers will also the snakeheads usually resort to hiring what Zhang vary. However, the literature suggests that various describes as Chinatown gangsters. Also, pressure can local systems have developed which are intended to be exerted on the migrant’s family back home. provide a level of protection for both the migrant and the smuggler. In short, these systems are intended While systems have evolved which help protect the to protect the migrant from losing their investment, migrant’s investment in the smuggling process, the while ensuring that smugglers also get paid for their literature also notes numerous examples of various work. For example, Koser (2008) examined the migration scams, where migrants are defrauded and !nancial aspects of smuggling from Pakistan to the their smuggling fees are stolen (see for example Saha, UK. He noted that when asked how payment to 2007). smugglers was made, the thirty households studied reported a very similar method: namely, payment Transportation was made in full in advance. However, payments are made not directly to the smuggler but to a third party Migrant smugglers can use any form of transportation (such as a money changer or jeweller). "e third to move migrants from one place to another. At one

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end of the spectrum, migrants might be lead on foot a deported Pakistan migrant recounted the following through unsupervised border areas or even just given story about travel through Islamic Republic of Iran: instructions about the directions in which to run (see for example, the case studies in HRCP, 2010). I travelled from Gujrat to Karachi by bus and At the other end of the spectrum, smuggled migrants from there to Mand. Crossing into Iran was travel in comfort as passengers in private vehicles or easy. In Iran we were received by a man called on commercial airlines. In short journeys, migrants Malik Shiraz. He guided us to our !rst stop may travel on only one form of transportation. In in Iran. longer journeys, migrants may travel on many forms of transportation, across the di#erent sectors in the "en one night we were told to run fast through journey. a hilly area and cross two mountains before dawn. We managed to reach the second stop. From the reviewed literature, it appears that the "ere we were kept for three days. Afterwards particular method of transportation used in migrant we were told that we would proceed further smuggling will likely re&ect a number of factors such in a container. In the container we literally sat as: fees paid (with safer, more successful and more on one another. Some of us were very young. comfortable transportation methods commanding One boy appeared to be no more than 14 higher fees), the local topography and location of years old. borders, and the speci!c strengths and weaknesses of local immigration control. In several geographic After an arduous journey in a container contexts, borders can be crossed quickly and easily for 8-10 hours we were told to rest near a with migrants led by smugglers on foot, by local mountain. "e next day we were to start on motorbike taxi or by boat. For example, Santhiago the most dangerous part of our journey. We notes that agents take advantage of the shared land were told to run as fast as we could through the border between Malaysia and "ailand: mountains. It was a cold day when we started this trek. While climbing the mountain a boy Malaysians and "ai nationals trade daily fell down hundreds of feet below and died in Golok, a market place located in South instantly. "e agent told us not to waste time "ailand. "e market place in Golok is over his burial and to save ourselves instead. separated by a river. "e journey across the (HRCP, 2010, pp. 15–16) river takes less than !ve minutes. (Santhiago, 2005, p. 16) "e budget of a migrant will have a considerable bearing on the modes of transport used. For example, "rough this method, agents on the "ai side of the the research in the Afghan-Pakistan context notes river o#er to take people irregularly into Malaysia. that the overland route to Europe, via Turkey, Greece Similar ease of passage has also been noted in relation or the Balkans, and the sea route to the Gulf are ‘for to other border zones in South East Asia, particularly the masses’. "is type of service is the cheapest, the between Lao PDR and "ailand, Cambodia and most &exible and it requires no documentation. In "ailand (Sciortino & Punpuing, 2009), certain contrast, a small proportion of migrants have their areas of shared land borders between Indonesia and entire journey planned from beginning to end, Malaysia (see for example, Santhiago, 2005; Ford, these tend to be those migrants who travel by air 2006), and the border region between Myanmar (UNODC, 2010). Research in the West African and "ailand at Mae Sot (Arnold & Hewison, 2005; context also shows how some full package services Clarke, 2009). use multiple forms of transport:

"e literature also notes there is a land border that By the middle of the last decade, Asian can be crossed on foot between Pakistan and Islamic migrants who had contracted for full-package Republic of Iran, as part of a longer route to Europe. services, having arrived in West Africa, could "e research suggests that this route is di$cult and travel relatively fast and comfortably in saloon dangerous. "e dangers are illustrated by the various cars from Gao to North Africa, and some are case studies documented by the HRCP. For example, known to have proceeded from there by sea

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to Spain, completing their journeys in weeks ships. While this method of smuggling has result- rather than months. (UNODC, 2011, p. 31) ed in some migrants successfully reaching their in- tended destination, it also has many dangers. For "ese were described as being journeys coordinated example, Li et al. (2004), examined the situation of by sophisticated criminal networks, with migrant 18 Chinese migrants who were smuggled in a ship- paying EUR 12,000 to EUR 18,000 (USD 15,500 ping container that travelled by sea from Hong Kong to USD 23,400) in advance for what were full- (China) to the United States. "ree of the 18 mi- package (beginning to end) smuggling contracts. grants arrived dead and a fourth man died a month later. "e description of this journey by the survivors "e method of travel has implications for safety and graphically illustrates the conditions of travel. For comfort. Journeys by sea have inherent dangers and example, while the men had left Hong Kong (China) depending on the locations, they can also be lengthy. with supplies of food and water, because of the lack Sometimes the modus operandi used involves of light inside the container, they found it di$cult generating a rescue at sea situation using ‘disposable’ to di#erentiate between containers for urine and for vessels (see for example, Monzini, 2004). "e literature water, so the water got contaminated. One migrant notes many instances of migrants who have perished began the journey with a ‘cold’, and soon this rapidly at sea in the smuggling process (see for example, spread to the others. "is illness spread quickly in Gibbings, 2010; Monzini, 2004; Sein, 2008). the con!ned conditions, such that soon the migrants were vomiting and could not hold down any food. Migrants can also be transported concealed in After some time they started to bang on the hold but containers, on any form of transport: for example, in the crew, fearing pirates, locked down and called the the boots of cars or in the baggage compartment of authorities, who met them on arrival only to !nd 3 a bus (Santhiago, 2005), and on board small !shing migrants had already died. "is journey took ap- boats. "e following interview with a migrant in proximately 16 days. Lombok (Indonesia) helps describe the reality of these methods of transport: Other resources involved in migrant smuggling

CH: How much did you have to pay "e literature provides some information about what the smuggler? happens at the various stops along the way, in smug- B: US$ 400 each person. US$ 1200 gling processes. For example, drawing on an analysis for the family. Just from Malaysia to of judicial records of smuggling cases, Leman and Indonesia. Janssens have examined the role of safe-houses in mi- CH: From Iran to Malaysia? grant smuggling: B & I: B thinks US$ 400. CH: How long were you in Malaysia? … safe houses are places where a variety of B: Two days. activities can be carried out: !nancial transac- CH: In a city? tions, preparation of passport photos, transfer B & I: Yes, but B does not go outside of the victims between two collaborating net- the hotel. works, or simply hiding people during tran- CH: How did you come from sit. Safe houses may also be places where in Malaysia to Indonesia? which to make contact with the family in the B: By boat. It was dirty and the country of origin, or a place for illegal em- conditions were very bad. ployment in order to pay part of the smug- CH: Was it small or big? gling fee. Where prostitution is involved, safe B: Very small, a boat for about 10 houses can be used to supervise the women, persons. And they closed the deck from where they are ferried to and from the area with wood. (Hunter, 2004, p. prostitution bars. (Leman & Janssens, 2007, 115). p. 1386)

Migrants are also smuggled by sea in shipping con- "ey also noted that safe houses are not ‘safe’ for tainers or as stowaways in the hold of large carrier anyone except perhaps the smugglers: “Most com-

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monly it becomes a place of ‘stowing away’ and of Role of documents control – from the social to the physically violent.” (Leman & Janssens, 2007, p. 1386). "e use of fraudulent, or genuine but fraudulently- obtained documents is critical to some but not Long journeys may require a large number of all forms of migrant smuggling. If migrants are collaborators along the route. According to Zhang, moved entirely clandestinely, they do not require the importance of the role of collaborators in transit documentation on their arrival. For example, Zhang countries cannot be overstated. In interviews, it quotes a smuggler who noted that: appeared that collaborators frequently provided a range of support and services, whether this was You don’t need a visa to go to America. I have sourcing travel documents that allowed the irregular many friends who arrived on container ships. migrant to continue their journey or basic logistical No, they don’t hide in any containers. "ey support (vehicles, houses, local knowledge). For passed as crews. "ey usually come in groups example, Zhang notes the example of Chinese of !ve or ten. When night fell, these clients migrants who were smuggled via Indonesia (as would congregate at a meeting place and get business people) to the United States. Once transported by small boats to a dock alongside the Chinese migrants arrived in Indonesia, local the container ship. After their secret signals collaborators would then help by creating new matched, the container ship would lower its identity documents in Indonesia, and proof of bridge and the clients just walked up onto the ownership of businesses and properties in Jakarta. deck. "en the crew would tell them which "is would allow them to pass themselves o# as rooms they were assigned to. (Zhang, 2008, successful Indonesian-Chinese business people, p. 61) wanting to enter the US on a tourist visa. Similarly, if the modus operandi is to rely on border As noted above, collaborators can include migrants guards who can be bribed, or to entirely evade border who have themselves at various points been checks, there may be no need for any documentation. stranded along the route. As noted by Zhang and As noted by Neske, the smuggling method may be Chin, in the Chinese context, these migrants face largely determined by the origin of the smuggler and two choices: return home and face possible !nes the smuggled: and jail time, or try to settle in the transit country and make a living. "ey note the role that these Smugglers who have clients from countries stranded migrants may themselves have on the with no possibility of entering the West with migrant smuggling process: (genuine or fake) tourist visas cannot use this channel for their smuggling operation. On [A]s tens of thousands leave China each year the other hand, certain methods of “covered” en route to developed countries around the smuggling (e.g. the improper use of so-called world, the exodus fuels the growth of overseas “jeans passports” – refugee identi!cation Chinese settlements along their migration cards according to the Geneva Convention) routes. "ese settlements in turn provide are specially bound to countries of origin an excellent cover and infrastructure and with refugee migration and from those the act as a way station for future smuggling destination countries cannot be entered with operations. "e US intelligence community visas. (Neske, 2006, p. 153) has long known that the existence of these communities provide an "e role of fraudulent or fraudulently obtained opportunity for “pay as you go” schemes, documents is critical for any migrant smuggling that allowing migrating Chinese nationals to work relies on the migrant being permitted entry through o# part of their smuggling fees at each stage of a heavily scrutinized border point such as an airport. the trip. (Zhang, 2008, p. 70) Neske (2006) notes that in the German context, ‘visa smuggling’ is itself a service. In this modus Zhang (2008, p. 70) notes that “no research has been operandi, the migrant approaches an agent, who done on this pay as you go scheme.” helps to secure the necessary documentation that

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would allow a person to successfully apply for and get From the perspective of smugglees who a visa to enter their country of choice: the result is a have got as far as the UK (and spent many genuine visa, fraudulently obtained. For example, in thousands of pounds in so doing), the added some contexts, visas are available to attend business investments appear worth making, if only meetings or cultural exchanges, so the agent would to ensure that what has been paid to agents work to secure fraudulent invitations and other can be recuperated. Yet with each thousand documentation that would allow the migrant to get pounds that they spend, their sentence to a the visa. "e literature also notes other examples life of spatial-temporal imprisonment gets where agents secure the necessary documentation to longer. (Ahmad, 2008a, p. 312) prove that a person is a successful business who owns property in the country of origin (or transit), so that "e literature reviewed provided relatively scant they have a better chance of being granted a visa (see information about the operations of regularization for example Zhang, 2008) or to prove that a person businesses in other contexts. has the necessary quali!cations to get a particular working visa. Services that involve securing visas Role of corruption through fraudulent marriages potentially also fall into this category (see for example, Chin, 2008; In the literature reviewed, a number of sources Zhang, 2008). referred to instances of corrupt practices that had facilitated migrant smuggling. However, the actual "e role of falsi!ed documents is also important in role of corruption in facilitating migrant smuggling some contexts. For example, Soudijn notes that: was examined in any depth in only a few studies. From the reviewed literature, it appears that False or falsi!ed passports were discovered corruption might involve a variety of actors such as in nearly every attempt at Chinese human customs, immigration and police o$cials but also smuggling through Schipol [airport]. Forged airline and airport sta#. Corrupt practices might be documents were also found in all the major fairly simple (for example, payment of a small bribe investigations in which police searched to a border guard) or more complex and on-going premises. It was only in cases where the (for example, the provision of advice on how to smuggling was done by road that it was successfully manipulate the system by immigration unusual to !nd documents, but that does not o$cials, and approval of visas that should not be mean that forged documents were not used approved). somewhere en route. (Soudijn, 2006, p. 64) In his research on the smuggling of Chinese In the context of smuggling Chinese nationals into nationals into the Netherlands, Soudijn sought the Netherlands, the most popular documents that to identify the role of corrupt practices in that document vendors use as those of Asian nationalities process. His examination of Dutch case !les that are exempt from visa restrictions to travel to suggested that for the most part, the corruption the West: Japan, Taiwan Province of China and the in these cases had taken part in China, with the Republic of Korea. "ese may be entirely forged result that there was relatively limited information or they may be genuine documents (such as those about this in the case !les. However, the case !les reported lost or stolen) that have been altered. also provided information about corruption closer to the Netherlands involving, for example, Dutch Fraudulent documents can also play a signi!cant role personnel at the Dutch Embassy in China, corrupt in the country of destination, through the various o$cials at key airports and in positions of authority services provided by ‘regularization businesses’. For as immigration o$cials both along the various routes example, in a study of Pakistani irregular migrants and in the Netherlands. It seems that corrupt o$cials working in the UK, Ahmad notes that these can play a variety of roles in the migrant smuggling providers o#er either fraudulent documents that process, not only by facilitating entry personally but facilitate employment, or genuine or fraudulent also by providing valuable advice about detection ways to regularize their stay in the UK. As Ahmed procedures. For example, Soudijn notes that in one notes: case, the organizer was working with a highly placed

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Customs o$cial at the airport in Paris, who had distorting o$cial labour migration channels, with been appointed to prevent irregular migration to the the result that the lines between regular and irregular United States and Canada: migration for work become di$cult to locate. For example, in the Indonesian context, private By virtue of his position, he consulted regularly recruitment companies control most aspects of the with embassy personnel and the US customs formal labour migration process. In the context of authorities. He even had the right to deny research about the migration of domestic workers migrants permission to continue their journey from Indonesia to Malaysia, Human Rights Watch if he had any doubts. "is made him ideally (2004) noted a variety of practices through which suitable for the purposes of the organizer, whose both licensed and unlicensed agents extort money, clients were en route to the United States. He falsify travel documents and mislead women and was able to give detailed advice. For example, girls about their travel arrangements. Similarly, it was better to smuggle no more than one or Silvey noted the pervasive nature of ‘rent-seeking’ two people at a time because that would be less from prospective migrants in the Indonesian context, conspicuous. (Soudijn, 2006, p. 69) where corrupt practices in&uence every aspect of the migration process: In another example, a corrupt member of the Dutch Aliens Police provided smugglers with information It was almost impossible for potential migrants about internal procedures, and approved residence to know the di#erence between a formal, permits that would otherwise have been turned “legal” broker and the many illegal unlicensed down (Soudijn, 2006). free agents operating throughout the countryside…. Finally, even when migrants "e research of Zhang also examines the role of did register all of their information accurately corruption in the smuggling of migrants from China and formally (a very di$cult, expensive, to the United States. For example, Zhang quotes time-consuming and detailed series of tasks), one smuggler in Fuzhou who explains how she used there were no guarantees that government her o$cial contacts at the airport: o$cials would treat them fairly. Rather, the rent seeking behaviour of government o$cials "e soldiers who inspect travel documents are was rife at every step of the migration journey, rotated frequently, but not their supervisors. and a completely formal set of papers did not We have people who are in charge of bribing protect migrants from those o$cials working these supervisors (or maiguan)… When it through formal channels to pro!t from them. comes to helping my clients through security, (Silvey, 2007, p. 274) these contacts usually ask their subordinates for a favour to take care of a few “friends” of theirs who are on a business trip to the US or What is known about migrant smuggling fees and some other country. Most soldiers know what their mobilization? that favour implies. Even the slow ones will get the idea once they see stacks of cash being "e literature reviewed contained numerous slipped into their pockets by their supervisors examples of the speci!c fees charged for particular or other mutual friends after the favour has smuggling services. Given the large number of been provided. To these soldiers, tens of micro-practices and services that potentially fall thousands of yuan in a day’s work is a fortune. within the category of migrant smuggling, it is no Knowing they won’t be manning the booth surprise that there is considerable variation in these for long, because of frequent rotations, it fees. Migrant smuggling services can range from a becomes a race against time to make as much short motorbike ride of a few kilometres to avoid money and as quickly as possible. (Zhang, checkpoints (a service that reportedly costs USD 2008, p. 122) 38 in the Myanmar-"ai context, (Leiter, Suwan- vanichkij, Tamm, Iacopino, & Beyrer, 2006), to A small number of the studies examined in this ‘fully covered’ contracts for smuggling from a source review noted the role that corruption can play in country such as China, to a destination country such

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as the United States. In his research into the business in the literature reviewed noted that competition side of human smuggling from China to the US, in certain sectors of the market (particularly where Zhang collected information about smuggling fees there are many customers and many providers) charged from 81 participants, and the fees charged can drive prices down. Similarly, other factors can ranged from USD 1,000 to USD 70,000 with a drive prices up. According to Koser (2008), in the median of USD 50,000 (Zhang, 2008). Pakistan context, smuggling costs had increased in the past four to !ve years, partly because there was While many studies cite the fees that migrants have a reduced demand (as many of the Afghan refugees actually paid for various smuggling services or routes, in Pakistan who had been an important client base very few studies have systematically examined the had repatriated), but also because smuggling was factors that determine fees. In one such study, Petros becoming more risky and di$cult due to tightening (2005) examined the reported costs and routes policies in both Europe and Pakistan. involved in both migrant smuggling and tra$cking in persons on a global scale, by reference to 538 "e research of Koser helps to explain the economic cases of human smuggling and tra$cking reported considerations that drive migrant smuggling. Having in various secondary sources (the Migration News examined both the fees paid by migrants and the Sheet, a monthly bulletin of the Migration Policy disbursements made by smugglers along the way, he Group, conference papers and reports and media concluded that all involved — the smugglers, the sources). While noting a number of limitations of smuggled migrants and their families — stood to this methodology, the research suggested that there pro!t from engaging in migrant smuggling: are !ve main determinants of cost: distance travelled, the mode of transport, the number and characteristics In this case study, smuggling appeared to pay of people being moved, and a set of less easily for migrants, smugglers, and the migrants’ categorized circumstantial factors. Within this last households. While far more detailed category, Petros noted that, for example, fees appear information in the experiences of the migrants to increase when additional services are provided by in the UK would be required to fully make this smugglers, particularly travel documents, but also assertion from their perspective, what can be other services such as food or accommodation. ascertained from the available data is that 43 of the 50 migrants covered by the household Koser has conducted research that involved surveys had apparently found employment in ‘following the money’ paid for smuggling services the UK and that 35 of them were apparently between Pakistan and the UK. His research suggests earning enough money to send home that the fees charged for migrant smuggling re&ect remittances on a fairly regular basis. Where various factors such as the di$culty in organization migration was successful, smuggling also (for example, whether high quality travel documents clearly paid for smugglers – a smuggler could are required and whether bribery is involved), the expect to earn in the region of US$7000 for route used, the !nal destination and the number of arranging a direct &ight between Pakistan migrants being smuggled. In this study, smuggling and the UK – and for intermediaries who by direct &ight to the country of destination was were being paid the equivalent of between the most expensive option (up to USD 20,000 US$1000 and US $3000 for their services. for migrants travelling from Pakistan to the US or Finally, the analysis also shows how migrant Canada). However, it was also the option most smuggling paid for the families of migrants likely to succeed. Other options included taking a who had invested in the business, on average &ight to a transit country, and then either securing doubling their household income after just documentation in that country for an onward visa; two years. (Koser, 2008, p. 21) or completing the journey overland. "ese options were cheaper than direct &ights. Research on migrant smuggling in the Indian context suggests there are two primary factors that Like any market, fees for migrant smuggling may go in&uence the cost of smuggling fees: the level of up or down according to the principles of supply and di$culty involved in the smuggling process, and the demand. For example, Koser and several other sources level of risk for the smuggler. "at is, as smuggling

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gets more di$cult (with more barriers imposed that those who invest the largest sums of money in in the migration process), it gets more expensive. the smuggling business also make the most: Furthermore, there may be limits to the amount of risk that smugglers are prepared to take on. Based on reported earnings, pro!ts among According to Saha (2009), migrant smugglers would the subjects in this study were substantial – a prefer to smuggle smaller numbers of individuals median of $10,000, and up to $40,000 per under optimum conditions, having a high success client. Some snakeheads claimed to have made rate and remaining undetected. As a result, there are two million US dollars a year. However, a few actually more clients than smugglers willing to take subjects reported that they had not made any them on. "is has the result of pushing up prices. money from smuggling. "e median annual income for the subjects in this study was "e research of Zhang sheds light not only on the fees $50,000, which was also the most frequently likely to be charged for smuggling between China quoted !gure. (Zhang, 2008, p. 97) and the United States, but also on the level of pro!t involved in these transactions. For example, Zhang "ose who invested in substantial capital such asked migrant smugglers questions about, among as leasing boats involved the highest up front other things, fees charged for migrant smuggling investment but also received substantial returns. services and how much money they actually made per client. Zhang noted this information was According to the reviewed literature, fees for migrant di$cult to obtain: smuggling services are mobilized either by migrants themselves but also by their families. For example, As expected, these questions numbered in Koser’s study, the money to pay smugglers was amongst the most di$cult areas of inquiry mobilized most commonly from savings, or by sale of in this study, for obvious reasons. Many a signi!cant asset such as property, land or jewellery subjects declined to report the amount of in Pakistan. Loans from friends and money lenders money they invested or what they made from were less common in that particular sample (Koser, the smuggling business; others skirted direct 2008). "e literature gives many other examples of questions but hinted at how much money migrants who mobilized fees through, for example, they made, or told how much money their the family selling land or other property such as a partners or other snakeheads had made. business, or loans from money-lenders. (Zhang, 2008, p. 94) It is unclear from the literature the extent to which From the smugglers who were willing to answer these those involved in migrant smuggling are also questions, Zhang (2008) obtained the following involved in loaning money to migrants, for example, results: through repayment plans. It is likely that this factor varies by location and market. For example, t Based on data from 81 smugglers, smuggling the research of Zhang (2008) on those involved in fees charged ranged from USD 1,000 to USD smuggling Chinese into the US suggests that this 70,000 (with a median of USD 50,000) (n = 81) kind of arrangement is exceptional and uncommon. t Based on data from 69 smugglers, pro!t per As mentioned above, the smugglers interviewed by client ranged from USD 117 to USD 40,000. Zhang noted the importance of careful screening processes to ascertain their client’s ability to pay In terms of the expenses that migrant smugglers smuggling fees. As such, clients of these smugglers themselves had to cover from their fees, sourcing a appeared to be a relatively privileged group, with passport was the most expensive (USD 10 to USD either substantial individual or family savings, or 25,000), whereas fees paid for client recruitment access to a loan from a local money-lender in China. and debt collection were the smallest expenses (from According to Zhang, none of the snakeheads in his USD 500). sample would consider accepting payment through an extended series of instalments, or a promise to From his examination of the investments made by repay through work in the United States. Zhang the various smugglers interviewed, Zhang concluded notes that:

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… human smuggling is an enterprise in which noted by Koser (2008), research that examines the participating individuals realize their pro!ts !nancing of migrant smuggling can help to better by completing speci!c tasks. Smugglers have inform the development of policies that might help expenses to cover and expect to make a pro!t shift migrant smuggling from being a “low risk, high at the end of an operation. Snakeheads are not return” business practice to a “high risk, low return” philanthropists, as they sometimes purport practice. to be, nor are they money lenders. Long- term payment plans, if they do exist, are the exception rather than the norm. (Zhang, What is known about the human and social costs 2008, p. 90) of migrant smuggling?

Research in other contexts suggests that at least some "ere is considerable information in the literature involved in migrant smuggling are also involved reviewed about the potential risks and di$culties in money lending, or plans where migrants repay that &ow from being an ‘illegal’ or irregular migrant. smuggling fees through work in the destination country. For example, a signi!cant number of sources in the For example, research in the West African context literature examine the di$culties faced by the large suggests that a certain gender disparity exists in the numbers of Myanmar irregular migrant workers !nancial arrangements that are made for full package living and working in "ailand (see for example, smuggling contracts. In particular, female clients are Human Rights Watch, 2010). However, much not being required to pay up front but knowing they of this literature does not di#erentiate between will have to work for 2 years to pay o# debt through sex irregular migration that is facilitated for pro!t and work. "eir debt and eventual payment is much higher that which is self-directed. As a result, it is di$cult than that charged to men, which is required to be paid to di#erentiate between risk that results from being up front. Research in the Pakistan context also notes irregular, and risk that results from involvement in examples of migrants who have paid some smuggling migrant smuggling. fees upfront, on the promise of repaying a greater amount through work in the destination country. For "e literature that examines the human and social example, a deported Pakistani migrant reported the costs (and bene!ts) of irregular migration that is following story to the HRCP: facilitated by migrant smuggling is restricted to a few geographic contexts: with detailed research on the I am 42 years old and have four daughters. smuggling of Chinese nationals to the United States "ey are of marriageable age now… I was and the Netherlands, and Pakistani nationals to the very worried about the marriage of my UK. "e research in other geographic contexts is daughters. I knew I could not a#ord the patchy, with bits and pieces of relevant information required dowry. As I knew many young men about risks and costs of migrant smuggling appearing were going to Europe for jobs, I decided to in a variety of sources. try my luck and contacted [the agent]…. [he] told me he knew I was a poor person so From the sources that do address this issue, it is he would charge Rs50,000 as advance and clear that migrant smuggling can be a risky business. will charge Rs 700,000 when I had reached "e risks for smuggled migrants may result from Greece. "e only property I had was a factors including: the mode of transportation cow. I sold it and paid 50,000 to the agent. used; the method of concealment used; the risk of (HRCP, 2010, pp. 13–14) interception by law enforcement authorities; the potential for the use of violence by smugglers; the Research in the UK suggests that migrants smuggled possibility of being lost or abandoned by smugglers from Viet Nam may be operating under plans to at in the smuggling process; and the consequences of least partially pay o# smuggling fees through work in having taken on a large debt that has to be repaid. cannabis cultivation (Silverstone & Savage, 2010). However, just as important, there is information in the literature to suggest that not all forms of migrant "ere would appear to be a need for further research smuggling are physically or even economically risky. on the !nancial aspects of migrant smuggling. As On the contrary, certain forms of migrant smuggling

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involve very limited physical risk (apart from the risk involved in the smuggling process. For example, of interception) and may have signi!cant economic research in the West African context notes that: bene!ts. "e literature on these costs and bene!ts is discussed below. Over the years, as entry into EU from Africa by sea became more di$cult, South Asian Costs of human smuggling migrants have been reduced to the condition of hostages; they could be kept con!ned for As noted in the literature, there are a variety of risks months, on the verge of starvation, while inherent in certain methods of transport, particularly those in control of their fate bargained over passage by sea. "ere have been numerous well- payment. (UNODC, 2011, p. 44) publicized maritime disasters involving the death of smuggled migrants either as a result of ships sinking, "is research suggests the relevance of factors such or migrants drowning in an e#ort to reach the shore as the migrant’s lack of social connections along the (see for example: Sein, 2008; Gibbings, 2010). It is route, their lack of access to further funding and also likely there have been many deaths that have the changing border control situation as factors that gone unreported (see for example, Pro Asyl, 2007). in&uence their vulnerability:

"e research suggests that the risk of death by Being dependent on the ongoing interest of drowning is greatest in certain sectors of the their original South Asian smuggler, South smuggling market. For example, Monzini notes Asian migrants travelling through West and that the maritime route to Italy from North Africa, North Africa are in an extremely vulnerable services those who cannot a#ord to pay the smuggling position, without passports, without fees involved in safer forms of travel (which typically knowledge of the area and without a social involves bribing o$cials or securing fraudulent network of countrymen along the route to documents). Also, this route services large numbers protect or assist them. Moreover, as all their of people who are escaping con&ict situations. As a money has already been used for the full- result, certain risky practices have developed, such package fee, they do not have the means to as the practice of using ‘disposable boats’ in ‘open pay for extra services needed along the way. landings’ (in which no e#ort is made to conceal the Some are reduced to drinking their own landing as the occupants of the boats are likely to be urine. (UNODC, 2011, p. 44) accepted as refugees). "e potential for disaster in such practices is high. Research on tra$cking in persons in the Afghan context noted a strong overlap between migrant "e research con!rms that there are many risks smuggling, tra$cking in persons and other crimes associated with concealment in the migration such as kidnapping. For example, Kaya included process. As discussed above, the research of Li et al. several case studies in her study of tra$cking in (2004), relays the experience of 18 Chinese migrants persons in Afghanistan: smuggled in a shipping container for 16 days. "ree migrants died during this journey and a fourth I had a few relatives in Iran and all of them migrant died a few months later. crossed the border illegally. I decided to follow them as there was no work for me in "e research suggests that in some consequences, Afghanistan. I found a smuggler and he took smuggled migrants may be exposed to serious risk, me to Iran, after crossing the border. I was including the risk of being shot or tortured, if they are then handed to another man and was forced intercepted by law enforcement in certain countries to work for him. I was never paid and not (see for example, Pro Asyl, 2007; HRCP, 2010). allowed to go out of the work area. After "is is in addition to the risks that some migrants some time I found a chance to run away and may be exposed to from the smugglers themselves. reached Meshed to search for my relatives. However, I was caught by the police and Research in some contexts also documents allegations deported back to Afghanistan. (Kaya, 2008, of violence and other forms of abuse by those p. 32)

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Some of the literature on tra$cking in persons fees after two years, and thereafter remittances also suggests there may be a link between being in on average more than doubled house-hold an irregular migration situation in the country of incomes at home. (Koser, 2008, p. 3) destination, having a debt that results from engaging various intermediaries in the migration process (some "e economic logic of engaging a migrant smuggler is of whom might also be described as smugglers), and also suggested by the reviewed research on smuggling vulnerability to exploitation (see for example, Neske, between China and the United States. Zhang notes 2006; David, 2010). how local lenders are very ready to lend money to fund the purchase of smuggling services. As noted "e research suggests that even ‘successful’ migrant by a government o$cial in Fujian: smuggling may result in certain economic, social and physical costs for the migrants themselves. For If you want to open a business, say, in buying example, drawing on interviews with Pakistani and selling fresh fruits in China and want to migrants in the UK, Ahmad (2008a) paints a bleak raise some seed money, nobody will give you picture of the lived experience of smuggled migrants. a penny because they don’t know whether He describes a situation where the smuggled migrants you will make it or not. Such lending will were trapped in a cycle of debt that consisted not only never happen because people have no faith in of the initial smuggling fees, but other fees for other these kinds of ventures in China. But if you services that were purchased in the UK. "ese include tell them you want to go to the US and want in particular regularization services (that is, fraudulent to borrow money to pay for the trip, most documents that facilitate employment or genuine or are willing to lend you the money because fraudulent ways to regularize their stay in the UK). It everyone who gets to the US will !nd a job was di$cult for the smuggled migrants to move ahead and work hard to send money home. (Zhang, in this situation because the work was low paid and 2008, p. 48) insecure, in businesses that were liable to fail (catering and small sector retailing). Migrants in this study "e research suggests that in some contexts, there were occasionally able to remit money back home may be little or no connection between the criminal but it certainly was not the norm. Moreover, their life victimization of migrants and the migrant smuggling in the UK appeared to be characterized by excessive process. For example, Soudijn notes: hours of work, little or no time for meaningful social interaction and no real prospect of either going back Often an investigating team [in the home (as businesses had been sold, and costs had been Netherlands] started out with the assumption incurred that had to be paid) or going forward. they would discover a cesspool of abuse, but this was never the case. In general, smuggled Bene#ts of human smuggling persons worked very hard in the illegal labour sector, which could sometimes be described as Having noted the literature that examines the many exploitation. However, there was no evidence risks and costs involved in migrant smuggling, that the smugglers were directly involved in it is important to acknowledge that some of the such exploitation. (Soudijn & Kleemans, literature presents a very di#erent picture. From an 2009, p. 446) economic perspective, some of the research suggests that the decision to pay signi!cant fees to a migrant As noted above in the section of this chapter smuggler is an entirely rational economic decision. discussing the relationships between smugglers and For example, drawing on empirical research in migrants, Zhang (2008) has noted similar !ndings Afghanistan and Pakistan, Koser ‘followed the in the context of the smuggling of Chinese nationals money’ for 50 migrants smuggled to the UK. In his to the United States. He emphasizes that, based study, most migrants found work quickly and started on his interviews with migrant smugglers both in remitting soon after their arrival: China and the United States, violence is not part of their modus operandi. Instead, reputation and On average remittances were at a su$cient trust are the factors upon which the business model level to repay the initial outlay on smugglers depends.

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"e considerable divergence of !ndings about the "e literature suggests the relevance of examining human and social costs (and bene!ts) may re&ect the cost, speed and e#ectiveness of existing disaggregation within the migrant smuggling market, migration channels, which may themselves indirectly where, for example, customers in the lowest end of contribute to irregular migration and migrant the market are subjected to the highest risk. It may smuggling. For example, the literature notes that also be that migrant smuggling practices are simply in several geographic contexts, informal recruitment riskier in some geographic contexts than others. channels for employment in a particular country (which may or may not also involve elements of irregular migration) may be faster, cheaper and even Factors that fuel irregular migration and migrant safer than formal recruitment channels established smuggling under bilateral labour agreements (see for example: Arif, 2009; Chantavanich, 2008; Crinis, 2005; "e literature reviewed clearly identi!ed the potential Phetsiriseng, 2007). "is situation can re&ect a for better economic opportunities as the most variety of factors such as unnecessarily complex and signi!cant factor that fuels irregular migration and bureaucratic systems being relied upon to facilitate migrant smuggling. As noted by Battistella, although labour migration, excessive over-charging by private irregular border crossings attract the most attention, agents in the recruitment process (even despite o$cial in reality most irregular migration occurs through ceilings on fees), corruption in the process leading to the lawful entry of persons who drift into irregularity hidden fees and charges, and widespread acceptance by violating the terms of their admission through of practices that have the result of e#ectively tying overstaying and / or working without authorization. individual workers to particular employers (e.g.: He argues that: withholding of passports and sponsorship systems).

It may, therefore, be argued that the possibility In some contexts, there may be so many restrictions of !nding work is the ultimate determinant of on applying for a passport that it is simply quicker irregular migration. (IOM, 2008, p. 221) and cheaper to migrate without travel documents (see for example, Mon, 2005; Gembicka, 2006). In A small number of the studies reviewed pointed to other contexts, the policies that have been developed other non-economic pull factors associated with to allow irregular migrant workers to access irregular migration (and use of migrant smugglers) regularization programs are simply unrealistic (see including a desire to reunite with family members in for example, Human Rights Watch, 2010). a context where this was not possible through legal channels (see for example Gibbings, 2010), a desire "e literature also identi!ed the paradoxical to participate in the ‘masculine glamour’ of migrant relationship between increasingly restrictive smuggling, or a desire to be part of the transnational migration policies and what appears to be a rising economy in a context where to ‘stay at home’ was to be demand for smuggling services: left out (see Ahmad, 2008c; Chu, 2006; Saha, 2007). "e great paradox of enhanced migration In many geographic contexts, these pull factors co- controls is that they increase the need exist with other push factors such as a need to escape for irregular migrants to have recourse to harsh, oppressive and desperate circumstances (see professional smugglers and criminals. As for example Kim, Yun, Park, & Williams, 2009; with any illicit market, the more rigorous Leiter et al., 2006; Pangsapa, 2007; Mon, 2005; the o$cial controls, the greater the pro!t to Kachin Women’s Association "ailand (KWAT), be made by those who are prepared to take 2008); a need to escape con&ict and / or persecution the risks necessary to evade the controls. (see for example, Tenaganita, 2008; Hunter, 2004; (UNODC, 2011, p. 30) Human Rights Watch, 2010; UNODC, 2010); lengthy delays in refugee resettlement programs (see Several of the sources reviewed noted that as for example Ferguson, 2010); or State policies that migration policies change or law enforcement have lead to a loss of traditional livelihoods (see for resources are redirected, those involved in migrant example, Asian Development Bank, 2009). smuggling shift their modus operandi (see for

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example, Monzini, 2004). "is results in what has source countries of migrant smuggling in the world been described as a kind of “arms race” (Heckmann, (Afghanistan, China, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) and 2004, p.1121). Heckmann notes that both sides in several major transit countries (Indonesia, India, the race have di#erent responses they can draw upon: Malaysia, Pakistan). It seems that as a topic, migrant smuggling is severely under-researched. "e state’s and law enforcement’s actions and measures generally include: an increase "e quality of some of the reviewed research that in !nancial means and personnel for was reviewed was very high. In particular, very high border control; an increase in material and quality research had been conducted on the pro!le technological resources; changes in legislation of migrant smugglers, the organization of migrant and administrative rules; and cooperation with smuggling and the !nancial aspects of the smuggling other states and training of their personnel. business in some locations and contexts. Some of (Heckmann, 2004, p. 1121) this research has involved data collection both in the country of origin and destination. As a result, there In response, the smugglers have a di#erent set of are pockets of very valuable information to be found responses and reactions to draw upon: in the reviewed literature. However, equivalent research has simply not been undertaken in other … changes of routes; increase in technological locations or contexts. Accordingly, it is di$cult to sophistication; professionalization and know if the !ndings that emerge from the reviewed specialization; increase of juridical research are applicable generally, or if they are speci!c sophistication; development of marketing to certain locations and contexts. strategies such as more systematic recruitment and improvement of “services”; guaranteed For most of the countries covered by this review, the smuggling and special fees for certain groups; size of the migrant smuggling problem is unknown. and attempts to corrupt state o$cials. "is is the case even in contexts where researchers (Heckmann, 2004, p. 1121) have, for many years, engaged with in-depth research on irregular migration. In these countries, researchers Given the risk involved in some forms of migrant have not yet begun to delve into the question of smuggling, the great challenge for policy makers is how much irregular migration is facilitated by to ensure that this arms race has the intended result intermediaries for pro!t. "is suggests the need for of preventing and combating migrant smuggling, research to consider adding ‘migrant smuggling’ as while protecting the rights of smuggled migrants a key category of analysis in future studies, whether (including those who may be refugees or have on irregular migration, labour migration or refugee other status related claims). "is is, after all, the movements. overarching objective of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol, as expressed in Article 2 of that treaty. For most of the countries covered by this review, very limited or no information was available about the pro!le of those involved in migrant smuggling, Conclusion how migrant smuggling is organized, or the !nancial aspects of migrant smuggling. "ere is a need for A systematic search of multiple bibliographic further research on these issues, ideally drawing on databases, library catalogues and websites data from migrant smugglers themselves (as per the undertaken by a team of four researchers identi!ed research of Zhang & Chin) and criminal justice just 154 empirically-based sources that met the holdings (as per the research of Neske, Heckmann research criteria which focused primarily on migrant & Rühl). smuggling and irregular migration, and to a certain extent on tra$cking in persons. Of these 154 For most of the countries covered by this review, sources, only 75 sources provided information about information is not available that would allow policy migrant smuggling practices. "is is remarkable, makers to begin to distinguish between the range considering that the present study covers not one but of micro-practices that together constitute ‘migrant fourteen countries, including several of the largest smuggling’. "is prevents meaningful discussions

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about suitable responses to the various sub-types Ahmad, A. N. (2008c). "e romantic appeal of il- of migrant smuggling. "is suggests the need for legal migration: Gender, masculinity and further research that seeks to identify common human smuggling from Pakistan. In: M. typologies of migrant smuggling, as per the research Schrover et al. (eds.), Illegal migration and of Neske, followed by research that seeks to better gender in a global and historical perspective. understand practices and key actors within those IMISCOE research: Amsterdam University individual typologies. Press.

While information is available in a variety of Akee, R. K. Q., Basu, A. K., Chau, N. H. and contexts about the human and social costs of Khamis, M. (2010). Ethnic fragmentation, migrant smuggling, there is also information that con$ict, displaced persons and human tra"ck- suggests that in some contexts, migrant smuggling ing: An empirical analysis. Bonn: Institute for may have considerable bene!ts both for the migrants the Study of Labor. themselves, their families and those involved in their smuggling. "is suggests the need for further research Arnold, D. and Hewison, K. (2005). Exploitation to truly understand the human, social and economic in global supply chains: Burmese workers in consequences of migrant smuggling. Information Mae Sot. In: Journal of Contemporary Asia, about what fuels migrant smuggling should help to 35(3), pp. 319–340. inform more considered responses to the problem. Basic Education for Awareness Reforms and Em- "e reviewed research suggests a fairly direct link powerment (BEFARE). (2009). Baseline study between government action (as expressed through on illegal migration, human smuggling and traf- laws, policies and related practices) and the actions #cking in Pakistan. of migrant smugglers (as expressed through routes used, modus operandi and fees charged). Blackburn, A. G., Taylor, R. W. and Davis, J. E. With this in mind, it is relevant to note that the (2010). Understanding the complexities research documents numerous instances of policy of and child sexual ex- inconsistency, incoherence and failure, particularly ploitation: The case of Southeast Asia. In: with regard to the actual operation of migration Women and Criminal Justice, 20(1-2), pp. systems (for example, the issue of passports and 105–126. other travel documents), and the laws, policies and procedures regarding asylum-seeking and Chantavanich, S. (2008). !e Mekong challenge: An labour migration. If migrant smugglers respond honest broker – Improving cross-border recruit- to weaknesses in the government system, then an ment practices for the bene#t of government important part of preventing migrant smuggling workers and employers. Bangkok: International is a focus on the system itself. "ere is a need Labour Organization. for far greater research to examine the e$ciency and e#ectiveness of the very systems that have Chin, J. (2008). Human smuggling and tra$cking been established to regulate migration broadly, in the Taiwan strait: Security predicament or but also as they speci!cally relate to asylum and political dilemma? In: M. A. W. Curley (ed.). labour migration processes. Research on these Security and migration in Asia. New York: issues needs to examine implications for migrant Routledge. smuggling. Clarke, M. (2009). Over the border and under the radar: Can illegal migrants be active citizens? References In: Development in Practice, 19(8), pp. 1064– 1078. Ahmad, A. N. (2008a). Dead men working: Time and space in London’s (‘illegal’) migrant econ- David, F. (2010). Labour tra$cking. In: Research omy. In: Work, Employment and Society, 22(2), and Public Policy Series (Vol. 108). Canberra: pp. 301–318. Australian Institute of Criminology.

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Ford, M. (2006). After Nunukan: "e regulation border. Chiang Mai: Kachin Women’s Asso- of Indonesian migration to Malaysia. In: A. ciation "ailand. Kaur and I. Metcalfe (eds.), Mobility, labour migration and border controls in Asia. New Kim, E., Yun, M., Park, M. and Williams, H. (2009). York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 228–247. Cross-border North Korean women tra$ck- ing and victimization between Gupta, J., Raj, A., Decker, M. R., Reed, E. and Sil- and China: An ethnographic case study. In: verman, J. G. (2009). HIV vulnerabilities of International Journal of Law, Crime and Jus- sex-tra$cked Indian women and girls. In: In- tice, 37(4), pp. 154–169. ternational Journal of Gynaecology and Obstet- rics, 107(1), pp. 30–34. Koser, K. (2008). Why migrant smuggling pays. In: Heckmann, F. (2004). Illegal migration: What can International Migration, 46(2), pp. 3–26. we know and what can we explain? "e case of Germany. In: International Migration Re- Li, M. K., Beck, M. A., Shi, Q. and Harru#, R. C. view, 38(3), pp. 1103–1125. (2004). Unexpected hazard of illegal immigra- tion: Outbreak of viral myocarditis exacerbated Heckmann, F. (2005). !e social organisation of hu- by con!nement and deprivation in a shipboard man smuggling. Warsaw: Centre for Interna- cargo container. In: American Journal of Foren- tional Relations. sic Medicine and Pathology, 25(2), pp. 117–124.

Hugo, G. and Stahl, C. (2004). Labour export strategies Leiter, K., Suwanvanichkij, V., Tamm, I., Iacopino, in Asia. In: D. S. Massey and J. E. Taylor (eds.), V. and Beyrer, C. (2006). Human rights abus- International migration, prospects and policies in a es and vulnerability to HIV/AIDS: "e expe- global market. New York: Oxford University Press. riences of Burmese women in "ailand. In: Health and Human Rights, 9(2), pp. 88–111. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. (2010). Human tra"cking through Quetta: A report by Leman, J. and Janssens, S. (2007). "e various ‘safe’- Balochistan Chapter. Lahore: Human Rights house pro!les in East-European human smug- Commission of Pakistan. gling and tra$cking. In: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 33(8), pp. 1377–1388. Human Rights Watch. (2004). Help wanted: Abuses against female migrant domestic workers in In- Massey, D. S., & Capoferro, C. (2004). Measuring donesia and Malaysia (Vol. 16, No. 9 (B), p. Undocumented Migration. International Mi- 112). New York: Human Rights Watch. gration Review, 38(3), 1075-1102.

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Hunter, C. (2004). "e ‘people in between’: Indone- Mehdi, S. S. (2010). Illegal migration, human smug- sia and the failed asylum seekers to Australia. gling and tra"cking: From Bangladesh to Paki- In: Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Af- stan and beyond. Geneva: International Orga- fairs, 38(2), pp. 101–127. nization for Migration.

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Neske, M. (2006). Human smuggling to and Bhutan and Bangladesh. In: !e Journal of through Germany. In: International Migrati- Health and Popular Nutrition, 26(2), pp. on, 44(4), pp. 121–163. 223–231.

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Phetsiriseng, I. (2003). Lao PDR preliminary assess- Silvey, R. (2007). Unequal borders: Indonesian ment of illegal labour migration and tra$ck- transnational migrants at immigration con- ing in children and women for labour exploi- trol. In: Geopolitics, 12(2), pp. 265–279. tation. In: ILO Mekong Sub-Regional Project to Combat Tra"cking in Children and Women. Silverstone, D. and Savage, S. (2010). Farmers, fac- Bangkok: International Labour Organization. tories and funds: Organised crime and illicit drugs cultivation within the British Vietnam- Pro Asyl. (2007). !e truth may be bitter, but it must ese community. In: Global Crime, 11(1), pp. be told: !e situation of refugees in the Aegean 16–33. and the practices of the Greek Coast Guard. Frankfurt: Pro Asyl. Soudijn, M. R. J. and Kleemans, E. R. (2009). Chi- nese organized crime and situational context: Rudnyckyj, D. (2004). Technologies of servitude: Comparing human smuggling and synthetic Governmentality and Indonesian transna- drugs tra$cking. In: Crime, Law and Social tional labor migration. In: Anthropological Change, 52(5), pp. 457–474. Quarterly, 77(3), pp. 407–434. Soudijn, M. R. J. (2006). Chinese human smuggling Saha, K. C. (2007). Smuggling of Indian citizens: in transit (!rst edition). Den Haag: Boom Ju- Preliminary !ndings. In: Journal of Immigrant ridische Uitgevers. and Refugee Services, 5(1), pp. 55–69. Tenaganita. (2008). !e revolving door: Modern day Saha, K. C. (2009). Smuggling of migrants from In- slavery refugees. Kuala Lumpur: Tenaganita dia to Europe and in particular to the UK. SDN BHD. A study on Tamil Nadu. New Delhi: United Nations O$ce on Drugs and Crime. "ongyou, M. and Ayuwat, D. (2005). Social net- work of Laotian migrant workers in "ailand. Santhiago, A. (2005). Human smuggling, migra- In: Working Paper Series (80). tion and human rights: A Malaysian perspec- tive. [Paper presented at the Review Meet- Uehling, G. L. (2008). "e international smuggling ing Migration: Human rights protection of children: Coyotes, snakeheads and the poli- of smuggled persons, Geneva, 25–26 July tics of compassion. In: Anthropological Quar- 2005.] terly, 81(4), pp. 833–871.

Sarkar, K., Bal, B., Mukherjee, R., Chakraborty, S., United Nations O$ce on Drugs and Crime. Saha, S., Ghosh, A. and Parsons, S. (2008). (2009). Smuggling of migrants from India Sex-tra$cking, violence, negotiating skill to Europe and in particular the UK: A study and HIV infection in brothel-based sex on Punjab and Haryana. New Delhi: UN- workers of eastern India, adjoining Nepal, ODC.

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1) Quantitative assessments and $ows of irregular of published literature on irregular migration con- migration, migrant smuggling, and tra"cking in cerning these countries and a lack of primary data persons (Koser, 2008).

a) Estimated numbers and major routes: Ir- According to the UNODC, Pakistan and Islamic regular migration from, to and through Af- Republic of Iran act as the de facto exit points for ghanistan most Afghans (UNODC, 2010). Kaya (2008) notes that although Afghanistan shares long borders with According to Kaya, the Afghan refugee &ow began Pakistan (2,430 km) and Islamic Republic of Iran in April 1978 and reached its peak in 1981, when an (936 km), are only three o$cial border crossings estimated 4,700 Afghans crossed the Pakistan border with Pakistan (Torkham, Ghulam, and Spin Bol- each day. Kaya notes that these refugee &ows ebbed dak), and two o$cial border crossings with Islamic and surged as a direct response to Soviet military of- Republic of Iran (Milak and Islam Qala). fensives. By 1989, the number of Afghan refugees was estimated at 3.2 million in Pakistan and 2.2 mil- UNODC identi!ed the following regions as main lion in Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, hun- destination regions for irregular migrants from Af- dreds of thousands of Afghans resettled in commu- ghanistan (and Pakistan): the Persian Gulf and the nities scattered throughout the world. "e out&ow Middle East, the EU, North America and Australia of Afghan refugees continued during the civil war (UNODC, 2010). and the Taliban regime. Although many returned after the fall of the Taliban regime, there are still Research in Commonwealth of Independent States approximately 3 million refugees in Afghanistan’s (CIS) countries revealed that Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, neighbouring countries. Pakistan currently hosts an and Kyrgyzstan are transit as well as host countries estimated 2.2 million irregular migrants from Af- for irregular migrants from Afghanistan (Gembicka, ghanistan. In addition to the refugees, there are hun- 2006). Tajikistan, for example, hosts approximately dreds of thousands of Internally Displaced Persons 3,000 Afghan refugees1 and its porous borders, spe- (IDPs) in Afghanistan. Current data indicate that ci!cally with Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbeki- more than 153,000 individuals within Afghanistan stan, o#er many possibilities for irregular migration. live in camps or camp-like situations. Most of these "e following areas for irregular border crossings in persons have been displaced as a result of insecurity Tajikistan were identi!ed by Gembicka (2006): (1) or natural disasters and live in poor or extremely Soghd province, (2) Tursanzade and Shaartuz dis- poor conditions (Kaya, 2008).

1 Afghan refugees have been in Tajikistan for more than a decade. "ey Concerning the size of irregular migration from Af- live in Dushanbe and Khujand where they are mostly engaged in ghanistan and major routes used, the reviewed litera- !ne trade and business. NGOs in the region furthermore report of a ture provides little information. As Koser noted in second group of irregular migrants that frequently cross the Afghan- Tajik border. "ese migrants usually arrive with the purpose of doing the context of research on migrant smuggling from business and visiting relatives who received refugee status in Tajikistan Afghanistan and Pakistan to the UK, there is a lack (Gembicka, 2006, p. 54).

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tricts, (3) Shurabad district, and (4) Gorny-Badak- been represented in the annually published ‘top ten shan and Jirgital district Reports from Kazakhstan source country list’ of the German Federal Police. also indicate that irregular migrants from Afghani- Belarus, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic are also stan transit through the country in order to cross host countries to irregular migrants from Afghani- into the Russian Federation. Furthermore, reports stan (Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, 2008). indicate increasing numbers of irregular migrants entering Turkmenistan through Herat province in b) Estimated numbers and major routes: Mi- Afghanistan. grant smuggling from, to and through Af- ghanistan Research on irregular migration in Greece revealed that many irregular Afghan migrants seek to enter No accurate estimates exist on the scope and mag- the EU by attempting to reach one of the Greek nitude of migrant smuggling from Afghanistan. As islands in the Mediterranean o# the Turkish coast noted by Koser (2008), in practice it can be very or by crossing the land-border in the Evros region di$cult to disentangle discussions about smuggling between Turkey and Greece (Asian Development of migrants from Afghanistan and Pakistan, from Bank, 2009). discussions about tra$cking in persons. Within this nexus, migrant smuggling is perceived as being the UNODC has identi!ed the UK as a top destination less serious issue, with the result that there is very country in Europe for irregular Afghan migrants, little information available. Koser also notes that it is who already have a signi!cant diaspora in the coun- in practice very di$cult to distinguish the smuggling try (UNODC, 2010). According to UNODC, Af- of Afghans from Pakistan to the West from that of ghan migrants, taking the overland route through Pakistanis: continental Europe, are acutely aware that they only get one chance to claim asylum. As noted by UNO- First, where is contemporary smuggling di- DC, rectly from Afghanistan, a signi!cant propor- tion goes via Pakistan as a transit country. If they were loosely connected to the diaspora Second, the majority of Afghans who have they would presumably be satis!ed claiming been smuggled to the West in the last 20 years asylum at the !rst possible opportunity. In- lived in refugee camps in Pakistan and began stead, they cross multiple continental borders their journeys there. "ird, and especially to wait in France to get to the UK. (UNO- during the Taliban period (1995–2001), most DC, 2010, p. 14) Afghans were smuggled out of Pakistan with Pakistani passports, as there were no Afghan In 2008, Afghans lodged over 12,000 asylum claims passports. Fourth, and in contrast, since the in the UK, and a further 2,000 claims were made by fall of the Taliban and the commencement of Afghans in the !rst six month of 2009 (UNODC, the ‘war on terror’, many Pakistanis have been 2010). smuggled out of Pakistan with Afghan pass- ports, anticipating sympathy towards Afghan According to Bilecen (2009), the Netherlands also re- refugees in the West. Fifth, many smugglers ceives a large number of irregular migrants from Af- operating in Pakistan are Afghan nationals, ghanistan, which in the year 2000 was in the top !ve who move both Afghans and Pakistanis. Fi- sending countries of asylum seekers to the EU. "e nally, Pakistani smugglers also move both route from Afghanistan to Germany was identi!ed Afghans and Pakistanis, though generally pre- as a major route in the 1990s by Petros (2005); how- ferring Afghans who tend to be able to pay ever, datasets of the German Federal Police (Neske, higher prices. (Koser, 2008, p. 7) 2006, 2007; Neske, Heckmann, & Rühl, 2004.) suggest that the number of Afghan migrants enter- As Koser notes, “Nobody is willing to even ‘guesti- ing Germany irregularly dropped in the past decade. mate’ how many Afghans have been smuggled out of In 2001, a total of 2,075 irregular migrants from Pakistan in the last 20 years.” However, most sources Afghanistan were recorded; this number dropped to agree that smuggling of Afghans was more proli!c 610 by 2003. Since 2004, Afghanistan has no longer before 2002 than it is now, re&ecting the large scale

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repatriation of Afghan nationals from Pakistan back "e U.S. Department of State’s Tra"cking in Persons to Afghanistan (Koser, 2008, p. 8). Report considers Afghanistan as a source, transit, and destination country for tra$cking in persons, "e reviewed literature provides some information speci!cally for forced labour and forced prostitu- concerning major routes in use. According to UNO- tion. Internal tra$cking is more prevalent than in- DC, most migrants from Afghanistan and Pakistan ternational tra$cking, with the majority of victims transit !rst via Islamic Republic of Iran, and then being children. "e report notes that Afghanistan split into two general trajectories, taking either: has no formal procedure to identify victims of traf- !cking. For the period of 2008–2009, the Ministry 1. the land bridge to Europe, via Turkey and of Interior identi!ed 360 victims of tra$cking for Greece, or the Balkans; sexual exploitation. Afghan nationals are reported to 2. the sea bridge to the Persian Gulf, via Oman be tra$cked to Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, or the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (UNO- India, Greece, and possibly South-East Asian coun- DC, 2010). tries, while Afghanistan serves as a destination coun- try for victims from Islamic Republic of Iran, Tajiki- UNODC suggests that those who travel to the Per- stan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, India, Uganda, and sian Gulf have short-term employment in mind, China. In addition, it serves as a transit country for whereas those who travel to Western Europe are more Iranian victims en route to Pakistan (U.S. Depart- likely to stay for the longer term (UNODC, 2010). ment of State, 2010).

As noted previously, according to UNODC (2010), Research undertaken by Kaya (2008) suggests that the UK is considered a top destination in Europe. tra$cking involves the victimization of Afghan na- Afghan migrants are usually smuggled overland to tionals in Afghanistan, but also foreign nationals. Europe, where they cross multiple continental bor- "is study drew on data from interviews with vic- ders to get to France, and !nally cross into the UK. tims of tra$cking (N= 20), along with an analysis of Afghan migrants also played a signi!cant role in data about 115 victims of tra$cking assisted by the cross-Mediterranean &ows to Italy (Monzini, 2004). IOM. All of the 20 victims of tra$cking interviewed by the researchers were Afghan nationals, who origi- Based on datasets published by the German Federal nated from Herat, Faryab, Kabul and Nangarhar Police, the number of smuggled Afghan migrants and were predominantly of Tajik and Uzbek ethnic- into and through Germany dropped after the year ity. "at dataset from IOM revealed quite a di#er- 2000 (Neske, 2007). In 2001, a total number of ent composition, with most victims of tra$cking 1,298 smuggled migrants was recorded by the Fed- being foreign nationals. Within this dataset, most eral Police, which dropped to 486 in 2002 and !- victims assisted by IOM came from China2 (79%), nally down to less than 97 in 2003. Islamic Republic of Iran (6%) and Pakistan (4%), while Afghan victims (12%) came from 12 di#erent Central Asian countries (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Ka- locations including Kabul, Kapisa, Kunduz, Ghazni, zakhstan) although mainly transit countries, have Kunar, Nangarhar, Lagman, Panjsher and Wardak increasingly become countries of destination for provinces as well as Peshawar, Pakistan. smuggled migrants from Afghanistan, due to higher standards of living when compared to Afghanistan d) Cross-over or overlap, if any, between popu- (Gembicka, 2006). lations or routes

c) Estimated numbers and major routes: Traf- "e literature at hand provides some discussion on #cking in persons from, within, to and possible linkages between migrant smuggling and through Afghanistan tra$cking in persons. For example, Koser (2008) notes there is a complicated nexus between migrant No accurate estimates exist on the scope and mag- smuggling and tra$cking in persons. Koser notes nitude of tra$cking in persons from, within, to and 2 Chinese women who were mostly tra$cked from the east coast, in- through Afghanistan. "e reviewed literature pro- cluding Shanghai, Liaoning, Fujian, Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces vides only limited insight on major routes. (Kaya, 2008, p. 13).

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that his !eld data and press reports suggest there is out, especially when migrants become further and international tra$cking of young men to Islamic Re- further away from their point of origin. public of Iran and Pakistan for forced labour, and of young women to Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan to work in prostitution Geographically, 2) Pro#les of migrant smugglers these &ows overlap with the &ows of irregular and smuggled migrants. a) Socio-economic characteristics

Research on these overlaps is potentially di$cult, "e literature at hand provides very limited infor- given low levels of knowledge about the distinc- mation on the socio-economic characteristics of tion between migrant smuggling and tra$cking Afghan migrant smugglers. All smuggled migrants in persons. During her research on tra$cking in interviewed by Kaya regardless of which part of persons in Afghanistan, Kaya (2008) found that Afghanistan they originated from, were smuggled most people in Afghanistan could not distinguish into Islamic Republic of Iran by members of the tra$cking in persons from cases of smuggling and Baluchi community, an ethnic group that inhab- kidnapping, which makes research extremely di$- its both sides of the Afghan-Iranian border (Kaya, cult. Kaya sought to interview 90 victims of traf- 2008). "ose heading towards Europe were then !cking, identi!ed through community networks handed to Kurds, an ethnic group living on both and snowball sampling. In the end, only 20 of the sides of the Iranian-Turkish border. Neske (2006), 90 people identi!ed were victims of tra$cking, with Heckmann (2004) and Heckmann (2005) high- the balance being either victims of kidnapping or light a group of Afghan university graduates op- smuggled migrants. Kaya conducted some analysis erating as migrant smugglers in Hamburg (Ger- of the smuggled migrants in this sample, noting many). Koser (2008) notes that many smugglers that within this fairly limited dataset, the smuggled operating in Pakistan are in fact Afghan nationals. migrants appear to be predominantly males, better educated and !nancially better-o# than average Af- a) Motivation ghans. "is study, however, notes the potential for smuggling to deteriorate into tra$cking, presenting "ere is no detailed information about the motiva- a case of a migrant smuggled into Islamic Republic tion of Afghan migrant smugglers provided by re- of Iran, who was subsequently forced to work for a viewed literature. UNODC suggests that the motive third person. Kaya concludes that smuggling often for Afghans to engage in migrant smuggling is mon- takes place under harsh conditions, which increases etary gain (UNODC, 2010). the vulnerability of the migrants. "us, migrants paying for smuggling services may end up being ex- ploited in the process. 3) Pro#les of irregular migrants and smuggled migrants Research by UNODC (2010), with a speci!c focus on migrant smuggling, found that people involved a) Geographical and socio-economic charac- in the migrant smuggling industry seek to distin- teristics guish themselves from human tra$ckers. Tra$ck- ers are considered negative for business, as migrant "e literature reviewed indicates that smuggled mi- smuggling in Afghanistan (and Pakistan) relies on grants from Afghanistan are predominantly male. the smuggler’s and/or recruiter’s good reputation in In addition, there appears to be some correlation order to attract prospective migrants. "us, it seems between socio-economic di#erences among popu- that incidents of tra$cking in persons diminish the lations of smuggled migrants, certain countries or demand for smugglers’ services, which in turn pro- regions of destination, and the smuggling method vides a strong incentive for smugglers to ensure mi- employed. grants are provided with good services in terms of success and quality. However, the study acknowledg- According to Gembicka (2006), there is a general es that the possibility of overlap or feed-through of prevalence of men among irregular migrants travel- smuggling into tra$cking networks cannot be ruled ling to and through the Commonwealth of Indepen-

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dent States (CIS) countries. Female irregular migrants Research undertaken by UNODC in Afghanistan (and mostly arrive from Afghanistan together with their Pakistan), suggests that the vast majority of smuggled families. Similarly, Kaya claims that predominantly migrants (more than 90%) are men and that a majority male adults opt to use smuggling services in order to of these are between 18 and 35 years old (UNODC, !nd better employment opportunities. Comparing 2010). Furthermore, UNODC notes that it is possible migrant smuggling, tra$cking and kidnapping in to disaggregate the socio-economic characteristics of Afghanistan, Kaya found that most cases of migrant smuggled migrants, alongside the method of smuggling smuggling appear to involve men, while victims of used, and the country of destination (see Table 3). For kidnapping appear to be mostly women and chil- example, the overland and sea route is the cheapest, dren. Furthermore, smuggled migrants in this study but also potentially the most lengthy, and potentially (N=19) seem to have a higher level of education (2 the highest risk route, so it is therefore mainly used by university graduates, 3 secondary school graduates lower income migrants. In contrast, the air routes to and only 8 with an education level below grade 6), Europe (which are more complex but likely to be more compared to the other populations. "us, Kaya sug- successful with less personal risk) are more expensive, gests that migrants who use the service of smugglers and therefore undertaken by middle and high income are slightly better educated than average Afghans. In migrants with higher levels of education. addition, it was found that smuggled migrants were !nancially better o# compared to the countries na- a) Motivation tional average; nine (47%) subjects had a monthly family income of below AFN 5,000 (USD 107) and "e literature suggests that the main drivers for !ve (26%) had between AFN 5,000 and AFN 12,500 smuggled migrants leaving Afghanistan are of socio- (USD 107 and USD 267), while three persons (16%) economic nature, mainly related to poverty and se- earned between AFN 12,500 and AFN 25,000 (USD curity issues. Based on research in Afghanistan, Kaya 267 and USD 535) and two (11%) earned more than (2008) observed that migrant smuggling mainly oc- AFN 25,000 per month (USD 535) (Kaya, 2008). curs for economic reasons. Many people are forced

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to search for work elsewhere, due to scarce and t Education: Some study respondents expressed largely inadequate employment opportunities in Af- the desire to gain access to better education. ghanistan. Similarly, Gembicka found that the moti- "ese migrants particularly targeted OECD vation for Afghan irregular migrants travelling to or countries as possible destination countries. through Kyrgyzstan was twofold: "e desire to earn more money, but also the wish to settle down in a t Family reunion: Irregular migrants who reside safer environment (Gembicka, 2006). "e desire for in their host countries without authorization a better life or the ability to improve the life situation and are not able to return home may consider of family at home was also frequently mentioned by bringing their family members by engaging in respondents in a study in Afghanistan (and Pakistan) migrant smuggling. conducted by UNODC (2010). UNODC (2010) also highlights that diaspora con- UNODC (2010) has identi!ed several variables that nections abroad constitute an important in&uence may facilitate a migrant’s decision to leave Afghani- on migrants’ choices of destinations. Social connec- stan through migrant smuggling or irregular migra- tions facilitate the development of criminal networks tion: capable of sustaining subsequent waves of migration, and are important in the recruitment phase. Accord- t Absolute poverty: Poor migrants primarily seek ing to UNODC, in general, the strongest smuggling menial work in third countries to support them- &ows are oriented towards countries with the most selves and their families in Afghanistan by remit- signi!cant diaspora populations. Research in CIS ting home. Due to no or low skills and limited countries, for example, revealed that some irregu- !nancial means, these migrants will be attracted lar Afghan migrants transiting through Kyrgyzstan to working in neighbouring countries or the la- wanted to move to Germany or Canada because they bour-importing economies of the Persian Gulf. had relatives there (Gembicka, 2006). t Ambition: Migrants with potential earning at home may be driven by potential higher wages in 4) Smuggler-migrant relationships destination countries. Furthermore, competition within communities and the display of wealth by a) Migrant perceptions of smugglers families of ‘successful’ irregular migrants may partly in&ate the economic ambitions of these migrants. "e reviewed literature provides no information on the perception of smugglers by migrants. t Security: Migration due to fear and insecurity derives from various sources in Afghanistan (and b) Nature of migrant-smuggler relationship Pakistan); most signi!cantly from internal pow- er struggles and international con&icts, but also "e literature reviewed provides no detailed infor- from inter-ethnic strife, religious persecution mation on the nature of the relationship between and family feuds. smugglers and migrants from Afghanistan.

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c) Factors in"uencing the relationship between Research by UNODC (2010) in Afghanistan (and smugglers and migrants Pakistan) revealed that smuggling agents usually are stationary (often outside of Afghanistan) and they "e literature at hand provides almost no informa- employ a network of facilitators that orbit around tion on factors that in&uence the nature of the rela- the point of origin. Depending on the complexity tionship between smugglers and migrants. However, of the service and accessibility of the route, mi- UNODC (2010) points out that the reputation of a grants are either accompanied by a facilitator from smuggling agent or organizer plays a key role accord- point A to point B, or provided with information ing to interviews with migrants from Afghanistan in order to meet a second facilitator at point B. (and Pakistan). Facilitators in western Afghanistan for example, smuggle migrants in batches between 10 and 80 people either on foot or by car (or bus or truck) 5) Organization of migrant smuggling across the border into Islamic Republic of Iran. A similar method, involving privately owned or hired a) How is migrant smuggling organized? transport, is employed for the route from Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran) to Turkey. As both legs "e reviewed literature provides some insight into of the route are well traversed, facilitators can eas- the organization of smuggling from Afghanistan, ily return to Afghanistan. Research conducted in noting that there are small, medium and larger inter- Tajikistan (Gembicka, 2006) showed that irregu- national networks. Some of these are hierarchical in lar migrants (including Afghans) usually travel in nature, whereas some are of a &atter structure. Smug- groups of three to !ve people, guided by a smug- gling operations often seem to be orchestrated from gler, who is responsible for arranging their travel, outside of Afghanistan with a network of facilitators accommodation, and travel documents. Accord- en route (UNODC, 2010). ing to information provided by NGOs in the area, smugglers help irregular migrants in crossing the UNODC (2010) points out that Afghanistan’s border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and very porous borders have a signi!cant impact on guide them to the border with Kyrgyzstan. the structure and organization of migrant smug- gling from Afghanistan itself. "ere is a lack of de- Heckmann describes how two Afghan smugglers mand for sophisticated services orchestrated from living in Hamburg (Germany) and Moscow (Rus- within Afghanistan, as Afghans can easily exit their sia) organized the smuggling of Afghan nationals country. "us, Pakistan and Islamic Republic of into Germany. "ey had established numerous con- Iran act as the de facto exit points for most Af- tacts with other Afghans in many countries all along ghans. Smuggling networks serving Afghans tend the route from Kabul to Germany. Local partners to concentrate in Pakistan, Islamic Republic of in Kabul carried out the recruitment and the mi- Iran and the UAE. Similarly, Koser claims that a grants began their journey as soon as their relatives signi!cant proportion of Afghan smuggling goes had paid the !rst instalment via the Hawalla3 pay- through Pakistan and that many smugglers op- ment system. "e migrant was then transported to erating in Pakistan are in fact Afghan nationals Moscow by minibus escorted by di#erent facilita- (Koser, 2008). According to UNODC (2010), tors, who also took care of lodging, food supply and, these smuggling networks may have nodes in Af- the bribing of border guards. A smuggler based in ghanistan; however, these are likely to be limited Moscow would subsequently organize the transit to to promotion, recruitment, direction and escort- Prague (Czech Republic) for the migrant together ing services (e.g. crossing the Iranian border). "is with other Afghan migrants. In Prague the migrant was also found to be the case for networks using air would then be transported to the Czech-German routes e.g. from Afghanistan (Kabul) via Dubai to border and !nally cross into Germany on foot. the UK (London). In these cases, the UAE or the During the whole journey, the migrant would carry UK will serve as the centre of operations for such a mobile phone, enabling him to contact the two a network, while facilitators in Kabul may provide main organizers in case of problems. With the ar- recruitment and assisting services in order to help migrants depart forthe UAE. 3 See 7.2 Methods of Payment.

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rival of the migrant in Germany, the relatives would Despite a geographical overlap of routes used by pay out the !nal sum of the smuggling fee (Heck- migrant smugglers, drug smugglers and, to a lesser mann, 2004, 2005). extent, arms smugglers (e.g. through Nimroz and Farah provinces of Afghanistan to Islamic Republic UNODC (2010) found that the more complex and of Iran), UNODC (2010) found little overlap in expensive air routes might involve a facilitator on the terms of networks involved in the di#erent types of same &ight as the migrant, acting as guide and en- smuggling. However, signi!cant overlaps with other suring the provision of necessary services during the (complementary) criminal activities were found, journey (e.g. bribing o$cials). "e facilitator usually such as identity fraud, corruption, and money laun- shares the same ethnic background, but is a natural- dering. "e study furthermore points out that coer- ized citizen of the destination country. cion among smuggling networks is not as common as in other organized crime networks. In addition, An important feature for the land route to Europe migrant smuggling experiences less social stigma in and in long distance air routes is the guarantee sys- Afghan society than, for example, the drug trade. tem, which some smugglers o#er. Under this system, the smuggler is obliged to provide three smuggling c) Does migrant smuggling attract persons attempts without charging additional fees. UNODC who have a history of involvement in other (2010) argues that this system suggests: (a) substan- crime? tial pro!t margins on each migrant (pro!table even in case of three attempts), (b) networks distributed No information is provided on whether or not peo- over several countries are held together by a degree of ple who are involved in Afghan migrant smuggling strength, and (c) a reduced likelihood that migrants have a history of involvement in other crimes. will share information with authorities after a failed attempt. d) What levels of professionalism/speciali-za- tion is there within migrant smugglers? According to UNODC (2010) smuggling by sea may be carried out accompanied or unaccompanied "e UNODC (2010) research report is the only em- by facilitators. Migrants are likely to be stowed away pirical study reviewed that provides speci!c informa- (often in groups) in ships and ferries, speci!cally tion on specialized tasks that may play a role within when travelling from Islamic Republic of Iran to the migrant smuggling networks facilitating irregular Persian Gulf, often facilitated by a bribe to o$cials. migration from Afghanistan. According to UNODC In the case of Turkey, some respondents reported (2010), it is helpful to distinguish between partici- that they had simply been provided with a boat and pants (those who actually provide services to smug- pointed in the direction of Greece. gled migrants) and sponsors (those who in&uence and bene!t from criminal markets, but exert not di- Based on empirical research conducted in the Neth- rect control over particular activities in the business). erlands, Bilecen (2009) found that some Afghan ir- "e primary example of a sponsor is a corrupt senior regular migrants do not rely on the services of trans- o$cial. Within the category of participants, there is national organized networks to get to the Nether- considerable variation, and there can be considerable lands, but instead make extensive use of friendship specialization. UNODC has identi!ed !ve key cat- and kinship networks. "ese migrants establish con- egories of participants: the major organizer, regional tact with smugglers in di#erent transit countries on organizer, agent, recruiter and facilitator. More in- their own, often by simply by asking around, and formation about each of these categories is provided also negotiate their own agreements. in Table 4.

b) Are persons involved in migrant smuggling e) What in"uences shape the way migrant also involved in other criminal activities? smugglers are organized? How and why do these organizations evolve? Little information is provided on whether or not people who are involved as migrant smugglers have a UNODC (2010) is the only source reviewed that history of involvement in other crimes. provides some information about what in&uences or

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shapes the way migrant smugglers are organized, and people began to refer migrants to his networks and reasons for their evolution. "e study highlights that hired others for facilitating services. In a similar way, Afghanistan’s very porous borders have a signi!cant regional organizers may evolve into major organiz- impact on the structure and organization of migrant ers. "is process may even be accelerated beyond smuggling from Afghanistan. It is concluded that borders by certain events e.g. if an organizer in the there is a lack of demand for sophisticated services UK can establish access to high quality documents, orchestrated from Afghanistan. "is is largely due to his contacts in Afghanistan and in possible transit the fact that Afghans can easily exit their country. countries will be able to boost their reputations and "us, Pakistan and Islamic Republic of Iran act as expand the range of services they o#er. the de facto exit points for most Afghans and smug- gling networks serving Afghans tend to concentrate in Pakistan, Islamic Republic of Iran and the UAE. 6) Migrant smuggling modus operandi

Furthermore, the UNODC (2010) study points a) Recruitment methods out that competition between organizers as well as the intervention of law enforcement may create an No speci!c information on the method of recruit- environment in which smugglers evolve with their ment is provided by literature at hand. successes (or disappear from the market if unsuccess- ful). "us, small agents that acquire a good reputa- b) Payment methods tion may set up their own network of recruiters and facilitators and evolve into regional organizers. For Two common payment plans were observed by the example, the study reports a case where a man who UNODC study for the overland route to Europe: had previously served as a facilitator (escort) estab- (1) third party guarantee and (2) direct guarantee lished his own operation to the point that several (UNODC, 2010). "e method of third party guar-

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77 2*-.&"%#345--,*"-#*"#!6*&

antee involves an upfront money deposit by the mi- ghan migrants arriving in Tajikistan by plane and grant with a third party guarantor, who either pays then transiting to Kyrgyzstan by taxi, crossing the entirely or in instalments depending on the agreed border into Batken province. "e UNODC study upon milestones en route, e.g. a !rst payment will be found that the majority of migrants from Afghani- released when the migrant reaches Tehran (Islamic stan seem to travel through Islamic Republic of Iran Republic of Iran), a second on arrival in Istanbul or before splitting into two general &ows: (1) the land Ankara (Turkey) and !nally after successfully cross- bridge to Europe, via Turkey and Greece, or the Bal- ing into Greece. "is method of payment seems to kans and (2) the sea bridge to the Persian Gulf, via be the most common for migrants leaving from east- Oman or the UAE (UNODC, 2010). ern Afghanistan. "ird party guarantors also play an important role in high-end smuggling operations, Beyond this, the literature does not provide further which involve smuggling by air and identity fraud. detailed information on the methods of transporta- "e second method requires the migrant to carry tion. money en route and pay cash for the di#erent legs of the trip. According to the study this appears to be e) Document use and misuse the most common method of payment, speci!cally for relatively inexpensive services, such as boat trips According to the research by UNODC (2010), from the Iranian coast to the Persian Gulf countries the supply of fraudulent travel documents mainly (particularly Oman). Similarly, migrants pay cash to comes from Pakistan, speci!cally from Peshawar cross the border from Afghanistan into Islamic Re- for exchange in Jalalabad. New Afghan passports public of Iran or at checkpoints in Turkey. can be obtained relatively easily through the o$- cial process, which makes the tampering of Afghan Heckmann (2004) highlights the so called ‘Hawala’ passports unnecessary4. Respondents in UNODC’s system, common in countries of the Middle East and study claimed, however, that this process is manipu- South-West Asia, which is based on the principle of lated on a regular basis to obtain genuine passports two containers; one in the country of origin and one for fraudulent identities and in most cases does not in the country of destination. A person who wants even require corruption. Interviews with Iraqi mi- to transfer money, thus, approaches a Hawala banker grants conducted by Gembicka revealed that these who, for a fee, contacts his partner in the destina- migrants crossed the border of Tajikistan irregularly tion country. "e Hawala banker in the destination with fraudulent Afghan (and Indian) travel docu- country then pays the agreed amount to the recipi- ments. "ey crossed the border with the help of a ent. smuggler via Afghanistan, bribing the Tajik border guards (Gembicka, 2006). c) Transfer of criminal proceeds Although fraudulent documents are predominantly "e literature at hand provides little information on used in smuggling by air, Afghan migrants travelling the methods of transferring criminal proceeds. overland also make use of these. UNODC (2010) observed that several migrants received fraudulent According to the UNODC study, Afghan smug- Iranian and/or Turkish passports to cross into and gling networks generally make use of Informal Value transit through Turkey. Transfer Systems (IVTS) — such as Hawala — to transfer money internationally. In some rare cases, Furthermore, UNODC (2010) found that diasporas direct cash transfers between facilitators (escorts, play an important role as source of documents for agents, etc.) take place (UNODC, 2010). 4 A two-step process is required to obtain a new passport in Afghanistan: d) Transportation methods !rst a national identity card has to be obtained. "is involves docu- ments of proof (such as birth certi!cates) but apparently can simply involve local o$cials or tribal leaders vouching for a person’s identity. Depending on the destination and !nancial means, Second, an application for a passport has to be !led, involving a copy migrants are smuggled by land, sea or air or by a of the ANIC, a form and a letter from the provincial police depart- ment (essentially con!rming the applicant’s absence from a criminal combination of these transportation methods. For watch-list). Passport o$ces are part of most provincial police depart- example, Gembicka (2006) reports of irregular Af- ments throughout Afghanistan (UNODC, 2010, p. 22).

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people with similar backgrounds, enabling impostors to a low priority issue. However, UNODC argues to travel with genuine travel documents. "us, mi- that authorities in Afghanistan increasingly pay at- grants leave Afghanistan (or Pakistan) with a genuine tention to smuggling issues, particularly due to the identity and local passport and switch to an alterna- growing interest of third countries. tive identity en route. Against this backdrop, Dubai appears to be an important relay point for irregular migrants travelling from Afghanistan (and Pakistan) 7) Migrant smuggling fees and mobilization of to Europe. Dubai has a large number of &ights avail- fees able and obtaining a visa is relatively easy. However, in many cases, smugglers will simply supply the mi- "e literature reviewed presents varying estimates grants with new travel documents within the airport and limited information on the mobilization of itself. For example, UNODC (2010) reports of a smuggling fees in Afghanistan, typically re&ecting case were four people checked in for a &ight heading particular routes and modes of transport. "e most to Dubai but instead boarded a plane bound for the recent estimates are in the UNODC research, which UK with business class tickets. suggests that fees for the cheaper, shorter land routes (e.g.: Herat in Afghanistan to Tehran) are between f) Corruption USD 500 and USD 900, sea crossings to Oman or the UAE cost between USD 300 and USD 700 No speci!c details on the role of corruption are whereas long-distance routes from Afghanistan via provided by literature at hand. UNODC’s study UAE and Africa to Europe range from USD 16,000 indicates that corruption at low levels (e.g. border toUSD 24,000, and North America via UAE at the crossings, obtaining documentation) appears to be top end, USD 24,000 to USD 30,000 (UNODC, institutionalized to the extent that smugglers cite 2010). standard rates per migrant (UNODC, 2010). Also, while government o$cials may not necessarily be Aoyama estimates the smuggling service over the part of the smuggling networks, they may be spon- Tajik-Kyrgyz border, including the transportation sors who bene!t from it (UNODC, 2010). Research to Bishkek, at USD 500. Tajik migration authorities in CIS countries also indicates that the bribing of in this study suggest that migrants from Afghanistan border guards is also common en route (Gembicka, (and South Asia) transiting through Tajikistan en 2006). route to Europe pay between USD 1,500 and USD 6,000 (Aoyama, 2009). g) Evolution of migrant smuggling methods in response to changes in migration policies Papadopoulou-Kourkoula obtained estimates ac- and counter measures cording to which the route from Afghanistan to Europe costs between USD 4,000 and USD 6,000 "e UNODC (2010) research assesses that the struc- (Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, 2008). Monzini esti- ture of the migrant smuggling industry in Afghani- mates the journey from Afghanistan to Italy at USD stan (and Pakistan) is evolving, due to increasing 5,000 (Monzini, 2004). Research carried out in Af- risk. It is therefore likely that more consolidated net- ghanistan notes that migrants travelling to Islamic works will form and increasing disruption e#orts by Republic of Iran pay smugglers between USD 400 destination countries may furthermore lead to two and USD 600 for their services (Kaya, 2008). "ose trends. First, a shift of organizers to the least acces- headed towards Europe pay amounts ranging from sible bases, and an upstream oriented shift of power, USD 4,000 to USD 8,000 for the complete jour- such as from Greece to Turkey or from Pakistan to ney via Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey and Greece. Afghanistan. Second, arrangements at the top level Petros reports a case where a family of !ve travelling of a network will become closer and more carefully from Afghanistan to Germany paid USD 29,873 controlled, resulting in narrower and tighter spon- (Petros, 2005). sorship. UNODC notes that these trends are consid- ered medium-term trends, since criminally facilitated "e smuggling fees are either raised by the migrant’s migration in Afghanistan (and Pakistan) is evolving family (savings) or by migrants themselves, taking from a low base and has risen from a marginal issue on debt. Families usually sell assets to generate the

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cash needed to pay the smuggling fees, although istan become vulnerable once the process of smug- some migrants in UNODC’s study reported to have gling has started (Kaya, 2008). "e study presents a handed over assets as part of a deal. "e study sug- case of a migrant smuggled into Islamic Republic of gests that migrants who run out of cash en route may Iran, where he subsequently was forced to work for have to work of their debt to the facilitator, which a third person. Kaya concludes that migrants paying usually is done in the informal economy of the re- for smuggling services may end up being exploited spective transit country (UNODC, 2010). in the process.

According to UNODC (2010), a general correlation Based on interviews with irregular Afghan (and exists between cost and the probability of success of Kurdish) migrants in Greece, Pro Asyl (2007, in par- a smuggling method. "us, travelling on foot or by ticular pp. 6–8) claims that irregular migrants face boat appears to appeal to lower socio-economic stra- serious human rights violations by the Greek author- ta of Afghanistan (and Pakistan). "e overland and ities. "ese include rejection of irregular migrants at sea route is for the masses and constitutes the cheap- sea, detainment without o$cial registration as well est and most &exible type of service that requires few as systematic abuse and torture. "e report charac- to no documents, e.g. crossing the border from Af- terized the conditions in detention-centres as inhu- ghanistan into Islamic Republic of Iran. However, man and degrading. It claims that no special provi- as the general risk in terms of being caught rises, sions are made for minors, torture victims, victims of such as when migrants try to enter Greece via sea tra$cking, disabled persons or persons with physical route or land route, greater di#erentiation of services and psychological problems. are available, including premium services with high success rates and high prices. Based on interviews with smugglers in Afghanistan (and Pakistan), Koser 9) Factors fuelling irregular migration and mi- points out that smugglers usually recommend di- grant smuggling rect &ights, not just because the pro!t margin of the smugglers is higher, but also because this method of "e literature at hand generally suggests that fac- smuggling apparently o#ers the highest success rate tors contributing to irregular migration and migrant (Koser, 2008). "ey will, however, discuss cheaper smuggling in Afghanistan are of socio-economic na- options with prospective clients who cannot a#ord ture, mainly related to issues of poverty and security this route. According to UNODC (2010), only a (UNODC, 2010; Koser, 2008; Kaya, 2008) small minority of migrants have the !nancial means to migrate by air routes. Some smugglers o#er an end-to-end service with a consolidated network of 10) Conclusions contacts and corrupt o$cials to facilitate safe passage by air. Despite being the most risky method in terms a) What we know about migrant smuggling in of being detected (tight airport security, o$cial scru- Afghanistan tiny), it is also the route with the highest success rate. It is assumed that high quality fraudulent travel doc- Resulting from decades of conflict, the main umentation and relevant services (e.g. bribes) are the drivers for irregular and smuggled migrants leaving norm. Ultimately, o$cials estimate that 8 out of 10 Afghanistan are of socio-economic nature and main- irregular migrants succeed !rst time by air, whereas ly related to poverty and security issues. only 3 out of 10 irregular migrants make it success- fully overland. Migrants in Afghanistan are smuggled to many parts of the world including the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, the EU, North America and Aus- 8) Human and social costs of migrant smuggling tralia. "e two main &ows follow the land bridge to Europe, via Turkey and Greece, or the Balkans and "e literature at hand provides little information on the sea bridge to the Persian Gulf, via Oman or the the human and social cost of Afghan migrant smug- UAE. Pakistan and Islamic Republic of Iran act as gling. Kaya found that smuggling often takes place the de facto exit points for most Afghan migrants. under harsh conditions and that migrants in Afghan- Depending on destination and !nancial means, mi-

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grants are smuggled by land, sea, air, or by a com- t smuggler-migrant relationships; bination of these methods, often facilitated by low- t involvement in other criminal activities of persons level corruption. involved in migrant smuggling; t methods of recruitment; Small, medium and larger international smuggling t fees paid to smugglers and their mobilization; networks o#er a range of services. "ese smuggling t the human and social costs of migrant smug- operations are often orchestrated from outside Af- gling; ghanistan with a network of specialized facilitators t the role of corruption; and en route. Fees for smuggling services vary consid- t methods of transferring criminal proceeds. erably depending on destination and methods em- ployed and may range up to several thousand USD. "e smuggling fees are either raised by the migrant’s References family or by migrants themselves, taking on debt. Payments for services are made through third party Aoyama, K. (2009). !ai migrant sex workers: From guarantee or direct cash transfer, while Afghan smug- modernization to . New York: Pal- gling networks usually make use of IVTS to transfer grave Macmillan. money. Asian Development Bank. (2009). Broken lives: Traf- Despite a geographical overlap of routes used by #cking in human beings in Lao People’s Demo- migrant smugglers, drug smugglers and arms smug- cratic Republic. Manila: Asian Development glers, there seems to be little overlap in terms of net- Bank. works involved in the di#erent types of smuggling in Afghanistan. However, there are signi!cant overlaps Bilecen, B. (2009). Human smuggling networks op- with other complementary criminal activities, such erating between Middle East and the Euro- as identity fraud, corruption, and money laundering. pean Union: Evidence from Iranian, Iraqi and Afghani [sic] migrants in the Netherlands. In: Smuggling organizations operating in Afghanistan COMCAD Working Papers (62). are evolving and it is likely that more consolidated networks will form, due to increasing pressure the Gembicka, K. (2006). Baseline research on smuggling authorities on the national and international level. of migrants, in, from and through Central Asia. Vienna: International Organization for Mi- b) What we don’t know about migrant smug- gration. gling in Afghanistan Heckmann, F. (2004). Illegal migration: What can "ere is a lack of comprehensive and representa- we know and what can we explain? "e case tive literature on migrant smuggling in Afghanistan. of Germany. In: International Migration Re- Most of the empirical studies at hand do not have a view, 38(3), pp. 1103–1125. focus on migrant smuggling in Afghanistan. Some of the studies are outdated while others draw con- Heckmann, F. (2005). !e social organisation of hu- clusions based on small samples. "e information in man smuggling. Warsaw: Centre for Interna- this chapter is predominantly based on one empirical tional Relations. study, recently published by UNODC (2010). Kaya, K. (2008). Tra"cking in persons in Afghanistan "ere is a clear need for further research regarding – Field survey. Kabul: International Organiza- migrant smuggling in Afghanistan. "e lack of in- tion for Migration. formation generally concerns all aspects of the phe- nomenon including irregular migration and tra$ck- Koser, K. (2008). Why migrant smuggling pays. In: ing &ows. International Migration, 46(2), pp. 3–26.

"e gaps in knowledge speci!cally concern: Monzini, P. (2004). Migrant smuggling via maritime t pro!les of smugglers; routes. In: Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale.

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Neske, M. (2006). Human smuggling to and through Germany. In: International Migra- tion, 44(4), pp. 121–163.

Neske, M. (2007). Menschenschmuggel. Deutschland als Transit- und Zielland irregulärer Migration. Stuttgart: Lucius and Lucius.

Neske, M., Heckmann, F. and Rühl, S. (2004). Men- schenschmuggel. Bamberg: European Forum for Migration Studies.

Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, A. (2008). Transit migra- tion: !e missing link between emigration and settlement. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Petros, M. (2005). "e costs of human smuggling and tra$cking. In: Global Migration Perspec- tives (31).

Pro Asyl. (2007). !e truth may be bitter, but it must be told: !e situation of refugees in the Aegean and the practices of the Greek Coast Guard. Frankfurt: Pro Asyl.

United States Department of State. (2010). Tra"ck- ing in persons report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State.

United Nations O$ce on Drugs and Crime. (2010). Crime facilitating migration from Pakistan and Afghanistan. Vienna: UNODC.

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:G/D17.('G.77I(:/268>,/

1) Quantitative assessments and $ows of irregular bodian-"ai border towns. In some cases, Cambodian migration, migrant smuggling, and tra"cking in families migrate in search of employment. "ey cross persons the border to work in "ailand either illegally or with a daily border pass that permits them entry as long as a) Estimated numbers and major routes: Ir- they return to Cambodia each night. Cambodian mi- regular migration from, to and through grants who cross in and out of "ailand each day work Cambodia mainly in agriculture, market shops, and the sex indus- try (Huguet & Punpuing, 2005; UNESCAP, 2007). According to Human Rights Watch (2010) most Cambodian migrants in "ailand are undocument- Some irregular migrants cross from Poipet, Cambo- ed, and therefore irregular. "e IOM estimated there dia, to Aranyaprathet Province in "ailand. Other were 80,000 unregistered Cambodian migrants in migrants use the services of private recruiters to trav- "ailand (Huguet & Punpuing, 2005). In 2006, the el farther into "ailand for work (Huguet & Pun- "ai National AIDS Authority reported there were puing, 2005). Cambodian migrants travelling from 183,541 unskilled irregular Cambodian migrants Poipet often work in Aranyaprathet Province as shop living and working in "ailand (UNESCAP, 2007). assistants or as vendors of fruit or sweets. While some Under the "ai Government’s 2004 irregular worker commute across the border every day, others stay in registration process 1,280,000 irregular workers reg- Aranyaprathet Province for two to three weeks at a istered from Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar. Of time (UNESCAP, 2007). Another common border this number 168,000 (14 percent) of those irregu- route is from Banteay Meanchey Province in Cam- lar workers who registered were from Cambodia. In bodia to "ailand (ILO, 2005). 2003, the Immigration Detention Centre in Bangkok detained 61,623 people for violating immigration b) Estimated numbers and major routes: Mi- regulations. Of this number, 38 percent were Cam- grant smuggling from, to and through Cam- bodians. In that same year, 38 percent of the 228,062 bodia persons arrested in "ailand for irregular entry/stay were Cambodian (Huguet & Punpuing, 2005). "e literature provides no estimates of migrant smug- gling from, to, or through Cambodia. Smuggled mi- Other countries identi!ed as hosting Cambodian grants comprise a subset of irregular migrants, and migrants included the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, therefore must be included within those estimates of Saudi Arabia, and Viet Nam. Except for "ailand, irregular migrants presented above. "e literature, however, the literature under review yielded no esti- however, makes no distinction between irregular mi- mates of irregular migration from Cambodia either grants and smuggled migrants, much less explores to or through other countries. concomitant issues.

Identi!ed irregular migration routes from Cambodia As noted above, the sources reviewed o#er some dis- to "ailand are found mostly in the vicinity of Cam- cussion of routes used by irregular migrants, and it can

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be assumed that a number of these people use the ser- (Huguet & Punpuing, 2005). "e U.S. Department vices of smugglers to travel to and irregularly enter into of State (2010) Tra"cking in Persons Report o#ers "ailand and other destination countries. Beyond that, more insight into the destinations of Cambodian the literature o#ers no conclusions regarding the major tra$cked persons including men, women, and chil- smuggling routes from Cambodia and across the region. dren tra$cked to Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and "ai- land; children tra$cked to "ailand and Viet Nam c) Estimated numbers and major routes: Traf- for begging, selling candy and &owers, and shining #cking in persons from, within, to and shoes; and women tra$cked to the Republic of Korea through Cambodia and Taiwan Province of China for brokered marriages that have resulted in sexual exploitation (U.S. Depart- Cambodia is a source, transit, and destination coun- ment of State, 2010). Women have been tra$cked try for tra$cking in persons. Internal tra$cking from "ailand and Viet Nam to major Cambodian is also an issue (U.S. Department of State, 2010). cities including Phnom Penh, Siem Riep, Svay Pak, According to some observers, Cambodia’s porous and Sihanoukville. Svay Pak is particularly known for border with "ailand contributes to the problem its large Vietnamese community and red-light dis- of tra$cking in persons between the two countries trict, and is a primary destination for Vietnamese sex (Blackburn, Taylor, & Davis, 2010). workers (Busza, 2004), some of whom are tra$cked.

Estimating numbers of people tra$cked is di$cult, d) Cross-over or overlap, if any, between popu- given the clandestine nature of the crime. Blackburn lations or routes et al. (2010) calculate that thousands of women and children working in the in Cambodia and "e literature does not speci!cally address this ques- "ailand have been tra$cked. "e U.S. Department tion, and no de!nitive conclusions can be drawn of State (2010) Tra"cking in Persons Report, which from it regarding crossovers and overlaps between provides !gures on tra$cking to Cambodia in 2009, populations and routes from Cambodia. However, included 535 victims of sex tra$cking reported to the reviewed research suggests that there seems to be provincial authorities and 143 victims of tra$cking a signi!cant overlap between irregular migration, mi- for forced labour. "e report did not identify the na- grant smuggling, and human tra$cking. Cambodia tionalities of these victims. In the same year, 11 Viet- is an important source country of irregular migrants namese victims of tra$cking were repatriated to Viet in "ailand. Irregular migration seems to be facili- Nam and 83 Cambodian victims were repatriated to tated mainly by smugglers, who are referred to in the Cambodia from "ailand (U.S. Department of State, literature as ‘brokers’ or ‘recruiters’. At the same time, 2010). "e UNODC Global Report on Tra"cking in many victims of human tra$cking in "ailand are Persons (2009) also presents !gures on tra$cking in from Cambodia. Although it is not clear to what ex- Cambodia. In 2006, 100 women, 183 girls, and 9 tent the Cambodian victims of human tra$cking in boys were identi!ed by Cambodian state authorities "ailand were victims of a pre-organized human traf- as victims of tra$cking in Cambodia. From 2005 to !cking process that started in Cambodia, it is clear 2007, 54 cases of domestic tra$cking involving 84 from the available literature that the irregular status o#enders and 32 cases of international tra$cking in- of Cambodian migrants signi!cantly contributes to volving 58 suspects were investigated (UNODC & making them vulnerable to a human tra$cking pro- UN.GIFT, 2009). Again, the nationalities of the vic- cess that might have only begun in "ailand. By fa- tims are not provided in this report. cilitating irregular migration, migrant smuggling can thus be a key contributor to human tra$cking. Cambodian women are tra$cked into prostitution and domestic servitude in "ailand (Huguet & Pun- puing, 2005). Women and children have been traf- 2) Pro#les of migrant smugglers !cked out of Cambodia and have ended up working in the sex industries of Malaysia, Taiwan Province of a) Socio-economic characteristics China, "ailand, and Viet Nam (Blackburn et al., 2010). Cases of Cambodian women tra$cked to "e literature includes only limited discussion of mi- Bangkok to work as beggars have also been reported grant smuggler pro!les. Evidence shows, however, that

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many Cambodians use social and family networks to b) Nature of migrant-smuggler relationship facilitate their irregular migration to "ailand (Chan- tavanich, 2008). "ose who are involved within these Very limited conclusions can be drawn concerning social networks will thus likely be known to migrants. the nature of the relationship between smugglers and migrants. "e only study that provides some insight b) Motivation into this issue, the Chantavanich (2008) ILO report, focuses on irregular and regular migration, without Neither does the literature o#er conclusions regard- making reference to smuggling as such. ing the motivations of smugglers, an issue that was not discussed in relation to Cambodia. According to Chantavanich (2008), where family or social networks are used to facilitate migration to and employment in "ailand, the relationship between so- 3) Pro#les of irregular migrants and smuggled cial networks and migrants is usually based on trust, migrants with the people involved in facilitating the travel being known to the migrant through family or social connec- a) Geographical and socio-economic charac- tions. Brokers or helpers who facilitate travel to "ailand teristics and job placement might be former irregular migrants themselves, who have experienced living and working Most Cambodian migrants — both regular and ir- conditions in "ailand. Some are known to assist other regular men, women, and children — are rural poor, migrants from their own villages in the irregular migra- low-skilled, and poorly educated (ILO, 2005; UN- tion process and with employment in "ailand. ESCAP, 2007). c) Factors in"uencing the relationship between b) Motivation smugglers and migrants

Economic opportunity is the main motivation for As noted above, trust in family and social networks is a Cambodians to migrate. Poverty, a lack of gainful signi!cant factor when making the decision to migrate. employment opportunities in rural villages, landless- Chantavanich (2008) notes that many social networks ness, and debt are signi!cant push factors for Cam- are operated by experienced former migrants who un- bodian migrants who travel to "ailand in search derstand living and working conditions in "ailand, of work (Chantavanich, 2008). Another economic and who pass this knowledge and information on to push factor is the incentive to support families back other potential migrants they know. "ese social net- home in Cambodia (ILO, 2005). works and the former migrants responsible for their op- eration have trusted connections at the provincial level According to Chantavanich (2008) potential migrants in both Cambodia and "ailand, which facilitates the are also encouraged by trusted social networks that can travel, entry, and subsequent employment of Cambodi- organize migration, as well as by stories of successful mi- an migrant workers in "ailand. Although these factors gration experiences from family and friends who have are not directly discussed in the literature, they probably previously migrated for work. It has also been reported a#ect relationships between smugglers and migrants. that contributing factors may include such personal rea- sons as the desire for adventure and new experience. A No other conclusions are possible, based on the lit- small number migrate to escape domestic problems and erature reviewed, regarding factors that in&uence the dangers such as domestic violence and abusive marriages. relationship between smugglers and migrants.

4) Smuggler-migrant relationships 5) Organization of migrant smuggling

a) Migrant perceptions of smugglers a) How is migrant smuggling organized?

"e literature does not discuss migrant perceptions of With no explicit reference to smuggling as such, the smugglers, and o#ers no conclusions in this regard. reviewed research notes that irregular migration from

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Cambodia is organized through family and social that informal recruiters supply the same services to networks. Such groups operate informally through many irregular migrants as those o#ered by formal friends and relatives, many of whom were irregular recruitment agencies, including job placement, safe migrants themselves. Social and family networks, of- travel across the border and to the destination, and ten already familiar to the potential migrants, readily accommodation once there, as well as information gain their trust. Such networks are willing to help about working and living in "ailand and the facili- friends and family in the migration process, pass- tation of remittances. All these services are generally ing on !rst-hand information regarding migration o#ered by informal recruiters at much less cost and routes and processes and work experience overseas. more e$ciently than they are by formal agencies.

"e literature also discusses the role of informal re- Where family or social contacts are used in facilitat- cruitment agencies operating between Cambodia ing irregular migration, relationships are based on and "ailand (Chantavanich, 2008; UNESCAP, such factors as trust, kinship, and friendship. "is 2007). Informal recruitment agencies are known contributes to informal modes of operation. Family to employ brokers or intermediaries who facilitate or social networks are often organized by veterans of job placement (Chantavanich, 2008). "e sources irregular migration who are familiar with migration reviewed leave it unclear, however, whether these and living and working overseas. "is may be viewed brokers and intermediaries also assist with irregular as specialized knowledge that former migrants capi- travel and entry into "ailand. talize on in gaining the trust of other potential mi- grants, encouraging them to use their services in b) Are persons involved in migrant smuggling making the same journey (Chantavanich, 2008). also involved in other criminal activities? e) What in"uences shape the way migrant "e literature does not address this question. smugglers are organized? How and why do these organizations evolve? c) Does migrant smuggling attract persons who have a history of involvement in other According to the reviewed literature, social connec- crime? tions to potential migrants drive the family and so- cial networks facilitating irregular migration from "e literature does not address this question. Cambodia. Former migrants who have lived and worked in "ailand as irregular migrants themselves d) What levels of professionalism/speciali-za- use their experience to assist potential migrants tion is there within migrant smugglers? known to them (Chantavanich, 2008). "erefore, social and family networks evolve from trust, kin- According to the literature, irregular migration from ship, and friendship combined with the irregular Cambodia is largely organized by informal networks migration experience of those now engaging in the including family and social networks and/or infor- network operation to facilitate the migration of oth- mal recruitment agencies. Given the available infor- ers known to them, including family, friends, and mation, it remains impossible to gauge the extent other villagers. of professionalization among informal recruitment agencies or social and family networks. Chantavanich (2008) also indicates that "ai de- mand for migrant workers, plus an expensive, com- As noted in Chantavanich (2008), informal recruit- plex, and ine$cient formal migration registration ment services often o#er cheap and e$cient alter- system, shapes the organization of irregular migra- natives to the formal recruitment process. In some tion. "e formal registration process fails to satisfy instances, informal agencies do not require potential the demand for Cambodian migrant workers in migrants to have correct identity and travel docu- "ailand. "us the residual demand is met instead ments or even the money to pay their recruitment by a ready supply of Cambodian workers looking for fees. Chantavanich (2008) compared the experiences better economic opportunity in countries like "ai- of both irregular and regular migrants from Cambo- land and Viet Nam, and who are willing to migrate dia and Lao PDR to "ailand. Its !ndings indicated by irregular means. Potential migrants often use the

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services of social or family networks and informal Recruitment fees, if the potential migrant can af- recruitment agencies to facilitate their irregular mi- ford it, are usually paid up front to the recruiter, gration to "ailand because they o#er cheaper and to the employer in "ailand, or to the informal re- more e$cient services. Where family or social net- cruitment agency responsible for facilitating migra- works are involved, furthermore, the service is usu- tion and employment in "ailand. Where migrants ally viewed as trustworthy, allaying fears potential cannot a#ord to pay their recruiters or employers migrants may have of dangers during the migration up front, employers may instead pay the informal journey. recruitment agency, subsequently deducting a per- centage from the migrant worker’s monthly salary to repay the debt. In other cases, the informal migra- 6) Migrant smuggling modus operandi tion agency may, instead of demanding fee payment up front, deduct a percentage of the migrant’s wage a) Recruitment methods from their monthly salary until the recruitment debt is repaid (Chantavanich, 2008). "e literature identi!es a number of irregular mi- grant recruitment methods. All of these likely over- c) Transfer of criminal proceeds lap with or involve the use of smuggling services at some point. Most recruitment methods involve so- "e literature includes no information about meth- cial and/or family networks because these are trusted ods used by smugglers to transfer criminal proceeds. by both potential migrants and informal recruitment agencies (Chantavanich, 2008). d) Transportation methods

Cambodian migrant communities in "ailand have Irregular migrants often travel in groups of 4–5 been known to support recruitment and employ- workers from the same village. "ese groups are gen- ment of new migrants. For example, many migrants erally accompanied by a broker who escorts them in "ailand’s !shing, agriculture, and manufactur- to the "ai border and, in some instances, to the ing sectors arrived with the assistance of family and "ai workplace. Social and family networks some- friends (Pearson & Punpuing, 2006). times also assist migrants with travel to the border and crossing into "ailand, as well as with escorting Informal recruitment in Cambodia is organized by them to their place of employment (Chantavanich, individual brokers and intermediaries who are them- 2008). selves former or current migrant workers, and who are willing to assist other potential migrants from "e literature included no further details regarding their own village. "ese intermediaries and brokers methods of transportation. have broad knowledge of the working situation in "ailand. "ey also often have good relationships e) Document use and misuse with their employers, who trust them to recruit other irregular migrant workers. In addition — although "e reviewed literature presents no discussion of this is not discussed at length within the literature documents in this context. Passports, for example, — they enjoy advantageous relationships with "ai are not needed to irregularly cross the Cambodian- police, which helps in facilitating irregular migration "ai border. Crossing without documents is easy at and employment. Independent informal recruiters many points outside o$cial checkpoints; the border can act independently or in conjunction with infor- is porous, not regulated or patrolled by "ai border mal recruitment agencies (Chantavanich, 2008). o$cials. Alternatively, some irregular migrants cross the border on daily border passes and overstay to b) Payment methods work in "ailand (Vasuprasat, 2008).

Direct research on fees for smuggling services is lack- f) Corruption ing, but the literature includes information regarding payment of recruitment fees, a proportion of which, "e literature provides no insight into how corruption at least in some cases, probably covers smuggling fees. a#ects irregular or smuggled Cambodian migrants.

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g) Evolution of migrant smuggling methods training, medical examination, passport and visa fee, in response to changes in migration policies and travel. According to Chantavanich (2008), ir- and counter measures regular migration through a smuggling network, by contrast, costs about USD 97 per migrant. "e literature includes no research focusing on the evolution of smuggling methods in response to Chantavanich (2008) illustrates that the high re- changes in migration policies or countermeasures. cruitment costs associated with formal recruitment But research on the e#ectiveness of the Cambodi- agencies often mean that "ai employers cover these an-"ai Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) costs in recruiting a migrant worker, and then de- on Employment Cooperation does provide insight duct a percentage, with interest, from the migrant’s into why shortcomings in certain government poli- monthly salary to repay the debt incurred. Yet an- cies likely contribute to the incidence of irregular other relative disadvantage of formal procedures for migration, including instances that use the services workers: under the MOU, regulated migrant work- of smugglers. ers are not able to change their employers, and are often bound to them by a contract for two years. Cambodia and "ailand signed a bilateral MOU on Employment Cooperation in 2003, aiming to legal- "e shortcomings and challenges of the formal re- ize and regulate migration &ows from Cambodia to cruitment process has encouraged most potential "ailand. Under the MOU, Cambodian migrants Cambodian migrants to prefer irregular migration can work in "ailand for a maximum of two years channels, including the services of smugglers, when with a two-year extension (Pearson & Punpuing, migrating to "ailand (Vasuprasat, 2008). 2006; Vasuprasat, 2008). "e MOU provides admin- istrative procedures for recruitment and the employ- ment of migrant workers. Private recruitment agen- 7) Migrant smuggling fees and mobilization of cies in Cambodia are identi!ed as the key players in fees recruitment and placement (Vasuprasat, 2008). "ai employers can make a formal demand for Cambo- "e literature presents varying information about dian migrant workers, but, as Chantavanich (2008) actual prices charged at particular locations or for points out, the formal supply of these workers does particular irregular migration services. "is probably not meet the demand for regulated migrant workers re&ects the speci!cs of di#erent routes as well as the under the MOU. In 2007, for example, "ai em- range of services potentially on o#er. ployers requested 39,010 Cambodian workers under these terms, but only 6,143 workers were placed. For- According to one source, the cost of irregularly mal demand for migrant workers in "ailand repre- migrating to "ailand from Cambodia through a sents only about 7 percent of the total demand for smuggling network is about THB 3,0005 (USD 97). migrant workers, since not all employers can a#ord to A cheaper alternative is to cross the Cambodian-"ai pay registration and recruitment costs. As a result, ir- border on a daily border pass for THB 10 (USD regular migrant workers meet the demand unsatis!ed 0.30) and overstay (Vasuprasat, 2008). Another by regular migrants (Chantavanich, 2008). source notes that a smuggler operating in the Cam- bodian border town of Poipet makes a pro!t of THB Vasuprasat (2008) also argues that high recruitment 300 to THB 500 (USD 10 to USD 15) per migrant costs under the regulated system of the MOU, plus to facilitate border crossings from Poipet to "ailand the time-consuming process of formalizing recruit- (Chantavanich, 2008). ment through private agencies, have driven more mi- grants to seek informal channels. Informal channels According to Chantavanich (2008), many informal- are cheaper, faster, and more e$cient — they can ly recruited migrant workers pay nothing to their re- generally have the potential migrant in "ailand and cruiters at the pre-departure stage. Informal recruit- working within a matter of days from the time of ini- ment agencies in Cambodia or employers in "ai- tial inquiry. "ough formal recruitment agency costs land initially cover the migration costs and deduct are not set, they can range between USD 409 and USD 709 for job placement services, pre-departure 5 THB refers to "ai Baht.

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this amount with interest from the migrant worker’s Although these sources do not distinguish migrant monthly salary with interest. "e report claims that, smuggling from irregular migration in general, it can through informal recruiters, migration fees can range be assumed that, for those who are smuggled out of from THB 1,050 to THB 4,300 (USD 30 to USD Cambodia, the push-pull factors are the same. 150) for irregular migrants travelling between Cam- bodia and "ailand. Poverty is identi!ed as the biggest push factor for irregular migration from Cambodia (Huguet & Punpuing, 2005; Chantavanich, 2008; UNESCAP, 8) Human and social costs of migrant smuggling 2007). A number of associated economic reasons, each of them linked to poverty, also encourage po- "ough the literature does not provide information tential migrants to leave Cambodia via irregular speci!cally related to smuggling migrants or any re- channels. Lack of gainful employment, particularly lated human and social costs, it can be assumed that in poor rural areas, landlessness, and debt are all irregular migration from Cambodia does involve identi!ed as factors that cause Cambodian migrants smuggling. to seek work in "ailand (Chantavanich, 2008). Many young Cambodians are also eager to work Human Rights Watch (2010) reports that irregular abroad to earn higher salaries and help support their migrants, however they have arrived, often live in families back home (ILO, 2005; UNESCAP, 2007). constant fear of arrest and deportation. Because of their irregular residence and labour status in "ai- Chantavanich (2008) also points to the high costs, land and other destinations, they are vulnerable to complexities, and ine$ciencies of formal recruit- harassment and arrest by police both within and out- ment agencies as another reason potential Cambo- side the workplace. dian migrants turn to irregular migration channels. Using the services of a formal recruitment agency is According to Pearson and Punpuing (2006), irregu- also likely to put potential migrants in debt to their lar migrants are particularly vulnerable to exploita- employer. In extreme cases, they may be held in debt tion and abuse within the workplace because of their bondage to their employers in "ailand, where they irregular status. "ey are unprotected by labour and are con!ned to their places of employment, threat- human rights laws, and have limited control over ened with harm if they leave, relieved of their iden- their workplace situation. Exploitation is widespread ti!cation, employment, and travel documentation, among low-skilled sectors that rely on irregular mi- and made to work to pay o# their debts. It can take grant labour in "ailand. Employers may exercise migrants over a year for migrants to repay employers harsh control over migrant workers, restricting their for migration costs. In contrast, informal migrants movements to within the workplace compound; can pay a one-o# fee for services costing, on average, con!scating and holding documents; in&icting phys- between THB 3,000 and THB 5,000 (USD 30 and ical, verbal and sexual abuse; limiting or restricting USD 50) for recruitment, and they are seldom sub- communication with outsiders or family and friends ject to salary deductions once in "ailand. back home; withholding, underpaying, or delaying payment; and not providing irregular workers with Social and family networks are appealing because written contracts. If their employers paid for their re- they are often known to the migrant and trusted to cruitment costs, irregular migrant workers may also facilitate their safe passage to the destination coun- be held in to their employers. "ese try. As members of social and family networks are workers may therefore be trapped in such situations often former or current migrant workers themselves, until their debt has been paid. they in&uence the decision of potential migrants to migrate by telling them of their own positive mi- grant experience (Chantavanich, 2008). "ese net- 9) Factors fuelling irregular migration and mi- works provide information about the migration pro- grant smuggling cess and working in "ailand.

"e literature identi!es a number of push-pull fac- As mentioned above, Chantavanich (2008) iden- tors that fuel irregular migration from Cambodia. ti!es other more personal reasons for the irregular

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migration of Cambodians including gaining experi- attractive economic opportunity for many potential ence and seeking adventure by working in "ailand. Cambodian migrant workers. Some also wish to accompany or be reunited with family members who have already migrated to "ai- b) What we don’t know about migrant smug- land. A small number of migrants are also believed to gling in Cambodia migrate irregularly to escape domestic problems and dangers at home. No estimates are available of migrant numbers smuggled in or from Cambodia. It is not known how migrant smuggling is organized, or how it oper- 10) Conclusions ates in the Cambodian context, or what smuggling routes are used. Neither do we know who the smug- a) What we know about migrant smuggling in glers are, or what their motivations are for engaging Cambodia in this activity. Whether the smugglers are involved in other criminal activities remains unknown; nor do Research on migrant smuggling in, to, and through we know if smuggling attracts persons who have a Cambodia is very limited. "e reviewed literature history of criminal activity. We lack information re- largely focuses on the irregular migration of Cambo- garding the transfer of criminal proceeds from smug- dian migrants to work in "ailand through formal gling. recruitment agencies, informal recruitment agen- cies, and social and family networks. "e literature Most conclusions drawn with respect to smuggled includes discussion contrasting formal and informal migrants have been derived from the experiences of recruitment agencies and family and social networks. irregular migrants. Little is known about the pro!le But the dearth of direct research into migrant smug- of smuggled migrants in particular (as opposed to gling means we can only assume that the issues as- irregular migrants who irregularly migrate without sociated with irregular migration are similar to those assistance) and the relationship they have with their associated with migrant smuggling. Necessarily, gaps smugglers. remain regarding migrant smuggling in the Cambo- dian context. References Most irregular migrants from Cambodia travel to "ailand. But the literature mentions other destina- Blackburn, A. G., Taylor, R. W. and Davis, J. E. tions, including the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, (2010). Understanding the complexities Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan Province of China. Not of human trafficking and child sexual ex- much detail is given on the irregular migration of ploitation: The case of Southeast Asia. In: Cambodians to countries other than "ailand. Most Women and Criminal Justice, 20(1-2), pp. irregular migrants use the services of social and fam- 105–126. ily networks or informal recruitment agencies to fa- cilitate their travel and entry to "ailand. "ese net- Busza, J. (2004). and migration: "e dan- works and agencies o#er a cheaper and more e$cient gers of oversimpli!cation: A case study of migration service than formal recruitment agencies. Vietnamese women in Cambodia. In: Health Social and family networks are more trusted by po- and Human Rights, 7(2), pp. 231–249. tential migrants because they are known to them. However, the precise role or involvement of smug- Chantavanich, S. (2008). !e Mekong challenge: An glers within these networks is not known. honest broker – Improving cross-border recruit- ment practices for the bene#t of government Economic factors, including poverty in Cambodia workers and employers. Bangkok: International and economic opportunities in "ailand or other Labour Organization. destination countries, act as strong push-pull factors for irregular migration because formal migration Huguet, J. W. and Punpuing, S. (2005). Interna- channels are more expensive and not so e$cient. "e tional migration in !ailand. Bangkok: Inter- demand for low-skilled migrants in "ailand is an national Organization for Migration.

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Human Rights Watch. (2010). From the tiger to the crocodile: Abuse of migrant workers in !ai- land. New York: Human Rights Watch.

International Labour Organization. (2005). !e Mekong challenge: Destination !ailand: A cross-border labour migration survey in Banteay Meanchey Province, Cambodia [Part of a series of studies on human tra$cking and labour migration in the Greater Mekong Subregion]. Bangkok: International Labour Organization.

Pearson, E. and Punpuing, S. (2006). !e Mekong challenge: Underpaid, overworked and over- looked: !e realities of young migrant workers in !ailand. Bangkok: International Labour Organization.

United States Department of State. (2010). Tra"ck- ing in persons report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State.

United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Paci!c. (2007). Perspectives on gender and migration. Bangkok: United Nations.

United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Tra$cking. (2010). !e Mekong region human country datasheets on human tra"cking 2010. Bangkok: UNIAP.

United Nations O$ce on Drugs and Crime and United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Tra$cking. (2009). Global report on tra"cking in persons. Vienna: UNODC and UN.GIFT.

Vasuprasat, P. (2008). Inter-state cooperation on la- bour migration: Lessons learned from MOUs between !ailand and neighbouring countries. Bangkok: International Labour Organization.

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1) Quantitative assessments and $ows of irregular and south to the United States, Canada, Australia migration, migrant smuggling, and tra"cking in and New Zealand (Chin, 2007). persons Hastings (2009) reports that 90 percent of all irregu- a) Estimated numbers and major routes: Ir- lar migrants in Taiwan Province of China come from regular migration from, to and through China and of these, 90 percent originate from Fujian China province. Migrants from China also constitute the majority of irregular migrants in Hong Kong (China) China has been and continues to be one of the (Lee, 2008; Leung & Lee, 2005). Statistics published world’s greatest sources of migration, with Chinese by the government of the Republic of Korea reveal people living in virtually every country on earth that in 2002, 72,000 irregular Chinese labour mi- (Skeldon, 2004). In 2001, among the approximate grants were residing in the country, corresponding total of 37.7 million ethnic Chinese migrants (in- to 59.1 percent of the total group of irregular foreign cluding those from Taiwan Province of China and labour migrants (Kim, 2004). Russia is considered a Hong Kong (China)), almost half (47.1 percent) destination and transit country for irregular migrants lived in the United States, followed by Canada (23.8 from China. It is estimated that Moscow alone hosted percent), Europe and Japan (19.2 percent), Austra- 250,000 migrants, who were mostly from China in lia (7.9 percent), and New Zealand (2 percent) (Re- the mid-1990s (Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, 2008). gional "ematic Working Group on International Migration Including Human Tra$cking (RTWG), According to Gembicka (2006), the central Asian 2008). countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan serve as transit countries for irregular migrants from "ere are no accurate estimates on the scope and China. "ese migrants often enter the countries with magnitude of irregular Chinese migration. "e re- student, tourist or business visas, obtained under false viewed literature provides only limited insight into pretences. In 2004, for example, China was among the estimated size of irregular migration from, to, the top countries whose nationals were charged with and through China, and major routes used. violating the rules of entry and stay these countries.

According to the reviewed literature, irregular mi- b) Estimated numbers and major routes: Mi- grants from China predominantly originate from grant smuggling from, to and through China the southern provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang, as well as the north-eastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin "e reviewed literature provides very little informa- and Heilongjian (Chin, 2007; Yun & Poisson, 2010; tion about the estimated size of migrant smuggling Pieke, 2010; Zhang, 2008). According to Chin, the from China and the major routes used. &ow of irregular Chinese migration is mainly direct- ed north into the Republic of Korea and Japan; west When departing by land, migrants are usually into and then through Russia into Europe; and east smuggled across the ’s neighbour-

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ing countries such as Russia, the Republic of Ko- c) Estimated numbers and major routes: Traf- rea, Hong Kong (China), Viet Nam, Lao PDR and #cking in persons from, within, to and Myanmar. From there they continue their journey to through China the desired destination often by transiting through multiple countries and using di#erent methods of "ere are inherent di$culties in estimating the transportation (Zhang, 2008). scale of tra$cking in persons in any country. "ese challenges re&ect, among other things, low levels of According to estimates of the U.S. Government awareness of the crime, barriers to reporting, and (Zhang et al., 2007), 30,000 to 40,000 smuggled Chi- the underground nature of the phenomenon (see nese migrants enter the United States each year. Chi- for example, IOM, 2005; Wei, 2008). As such, the nese migrants are moved to the United States by direct information that is available about the scale of traf- &ight, by maritime routes and also by transit through !cking in persons from, within and through China South and Central America, Mexico and Canada is far from complete or accurate. However, the re- (Zhang et al., 2007; Zhang 2008; Chin, 2007). viewed literature presents some data and informa- tion that provides some insight into the estimated Examining judicial case !les (N=88) on Chinese mi- size of tra$cking in persons from, within, to, and grant smuggling in the Netherlands, Soudijn (2006) through China and major routes used, based on calculated that the selected smugglers (N=172) direct and indirect indicators, e.g. o#ender and smuggled approximately 250 Chinese migrants per victim-related data obtained from police records or year to and through the Netherlands over an eight NGOs. year period (1996–2003). It is furthermore assumed that this !gure likely represents a minimum. According to the literature, China is generally con- sidered a source, transit and destination country for Germany is considered a destination and transit men, women and children who are victims of traf- country for irregular migrants from China, who of- !cking (U.S. Department of State, 2010). China ten try to enter the country via the Czech-German serves as a destination country mainly for neighbour- border. According to datasets of the German Federal ing countries, but reports also indicate victims being Police, a total of 238 smuggled migrants from China tra$cked from Africa and Europe (U.S. Department were recorded in 2005; corresponding to 42.5 per- of State, 2010). It also serves as a transit country for cent of all recorded Chinese irregular migrants for non-Chinese victims bound for "ailand and Ma- that period (Neske, 2007; Neske et al., 2004). How- laysia (United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Hu- ever, the datasets indicate a decreasing trend con- man Tra$cking (UNIAP), 2010). cerning smuggled Chinese migrants in Germany: 2001 (300); 2002 (618); 2003 (1,123); 2004 (822) According to the U.S. Department of State (2010) (Neske, 2007; Neske et al., 2004). Chinese nationals are tra$cked to all regions of the world - Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, Comparing costs of migrant smuggling and tra$ck- the Middle East and North America. Countries of ing in persons, Petros identi!ed the following smug- destination include: Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, gling destinations for China: the United States, the Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Chile, "e UK, Italy, Poland, and Australia (Petros, 2005). Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Israel, Italy, Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, D’Amato et al. found that migrants from China of- Maldives, , Mozambique, Myanmar, Ne- ten use Swiss airports as transit areas, where they are pal, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Roma- provided with new documents by smugglers to con- nia, Russia, "ailand, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe. In tinue their journey to Canada, the United States or the UK, for example, Chinese tra$cking victims are the UK (D’Amato, Gerber, & Kamm, 2005). considered to be largest single nationality group and constitute about 17 percent of all identi!ed victims Pieke (2010) describes a case where a Chinese mi- (Sheehan, 2009). grant had been smuggled into the UK via Russia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Germany, While the literature suggests considerable interna- and the Netherlands. tional tra$cking of Chinese nationals, it also sug-

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gests that the majority of tra$cking may occur Zhang points out that both migrant smugglers within the country and mainly in the context of and human tra$ckers are involved in the business large-scale domestic migration (U.S. Department of of transporting people across borders and to some State, 2010). A systematic content analysis of media extent may share similar organizational features reports in Chinese print media examined by Wei in- (Zhang, 2008). However, due to the lack of em- dicate some of the major sending and receiving prov- pirical data, apparent similarities in organizational inces for internal victims of tra$cking. In this study, patterns and organizational characteristics must be a total of 804 articles published in major Chinese treated with caution. newspapers between 2006 and 2007 were examined, with articles about cases abroad disregarded (Wei, 2008). Findings included that: 2) Pro#les of smugglers t most of the victims originated from Guangdong "is section predominantly draws on research con- (16.1%), Henan (12%), Yunnan (11.7%), Sich- ducted by Zhang and Chin, initially published uan (9.9%), Guizhou (6.0%), (5.5%), in 2004 but also referred to in subsequent pub- Shaanxi (4.9%), and Fujian (4.2%); lications (see in particular, Zhang & Chin 2004; t the majority of the victims were tra$cked to Zhang et al., 2007; Zhang, 2008). "is study drew Guangdong (24.3%), Shanxi (11.2%), Fu- on data collected from formal and informal face-to- jian (10.2%), Henan (8.7%), Sichuan (5.3%), face interviews with self-identi!ed smugglers resid- Guangxi (4.9%) and Jiangsu (4.0%); ing either in China or the United States. Primary sites for data collection were New York, Los Angeles t Most tra$cking cases were identi!ed in Guang- and Fuzhou in the Chinese province of Fujian. A dong (25.1%), Henan (10.3%), Fujian (7.3%), total of 129 interviews were conducted, of which Sichuan (7.3%), Shanxi (7.3%), Guanxi (6.7%), 89 percent were formal interviews. "e focus of Jiangxi (5.9%) and Yunnan (5.3%); and these interviews was to gain knowledge about or- ganizational and operational characteristics of Chi- t 67.5% of the news articles provided information nese migrant smuggling. It should be noted that, on origin and destination provinces of the vic- apart from Zhang and Chin (2004), there are no tims, identifying 70.9% as inter-provincial traf- recent studies available that draw conclusions based !cking cases. on direct interviews with smugglers rather than mi- d) Cross-over or overlap, if any, between popu- grants or police records. lations or routes a) Socio-economic characteristics "e literature at hand provides no details about any likely cross-over or overlap between populations of Empirical research on migrant smuggling into the irregular or smuggled migrants, and tra$cked per- United States conducted by Zhang and Chin showed sons, or routes. However, there is some discussion that people of various backgrounds could be found about the di$culty of identifying the dividing line in the smuggling business (Zhang & Chin, 2004). between migrant smuggling and tra$cking in per- "is study found the majority of the interviewed sons (Yun & Poisson, 2010). Chinese smugglers (N=129) were married, middle- aged males (in their thirties or forties) with a high Some studies highlight the general vulnerability of school education or less. Most of the respondents Chinese irregular and smuggled migrants and pro- described themselves as either unemployed or self- vide details on their precarious living conditions in employed. However, those who considered them- the destination countries, which may lead to and selves unemployed turned out to be self-employed, foster exploitation (speci!cally labour exploitation) engaging in numerous income generating activities. (see Section 9) (Yun & Poisson, 2010; Ceccagno, "e number of di#erent jobs held by the interviewed Ratrelli, & Salvati, 2010). However, none of the smugglers included restaurant owners, waiters and studies found a direct connection between migrant waitresses, housewives, handymen, masons, taxi smuggling organizations and tra$cking in persons drivers, farm labourers, seafood retailers, garment (see Sections 6.2 and 6.3). retailers, garment factory workers, hair salon owners,

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and fruit stand owners. Only a few of the respon- b) Motivation dents in the research held salaried jobs in state-run entities (government agencies, educational institu- "e primary motive for engaging in the migrant tions) or established corporations. "e vast majority smuggling business is money. According to Zhang were entrepreneurs of some sort and made a living in (2008), many of the interviewed smugglers (N=129) an occupation in which uncertainties and risk-taking considered this an easy way to assure a livelihood. were the norm (such as small retail stores and vend- Furthermore, some of the subjects appeared to be in ing outlets) and other independent or commission desperate need of making money fast, but had no based businesses, however none of the respondents other feasible option apart from migrant smuggling. were destitute. In addition, Zhang et al. (2007) found that assist- Based on judicial records, research on Chinese ing friends and relatives is another motivation for migrant smuggling conducted in the Netherlands some Chinese citizens to get involved in the migrant found that the provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang smuggling business. Speci!cally women seem to were an important region of origin for smugglers consider this to be an important factor. "us, family operating in the Netherlands (Soudijn & Klee- and friends serve as the primary client base for many mans, 2009). "e study found that the smugglers female smugglers. were in their twenties or thirties, and had recently migrated from China. "e smugglers communi- Male smugglers in China, according to Zhang cated in their native Wu or Min dialects. Mandarin (2008), often become involved in migrant smug- was used when smugglers from Fujian dealt with gling through contacts with others in the industry smugglers from Zhejiang. According to this study, or self-initiation. "ey also draw clients from their people from Hong Kong (China) play only a sub- family and friends, but rely primarily on external ordinate role in the Dutch migrant smuggling mar- sources for client recruitment, e.g. referrals from ket. other smugglers or former clients. In contrast, some women are introduced to the smuggling business Despite being a seemingly male dominated business, by male smugglers with whom they are romanti- Zhang (2008) notes that it is not uncommon to cally involved. Others !nd their way into the busi- !nd women involved in planning and coordinating ness through separation or divorce from their male smuggling operations. Soudijn (2006) also found partners. In need of economic self-su$ciency, these this to be the case for smuggling groups operating women become involved in migrant smuggling in the Netherlands. Jin Ping Chen (also known as through casual contacts with established smugglers. Sister Ping), for example, was thought to be the most famous and most respected migrant smuggler in the Fujianese community (Zhang, 2008; Sein, 2009). 3) Pro#les of irregular migrants and smuggled According to Zhang et al. (2007), she was probably migrants responsible for smuggling between 150,000 and 175,000 Chinese migrants. a) Geographical and socio-economic charac- teristics A demographic comparison conducted by Zhang and Chin (2004) found that, overall, female Chi- According to the literature, irregular migrants from nese smugglers were better educated and were China predominantly originate from the southern more likely to be single or divorced compared to provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang, as well as the male smugglers. Not many of the interviewed fe- north-eastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Hei- male subjects held salaried jobs at the time of the longjian (Chin, 2007; Yun & Poisson, 2010; Pieke, study and, similar to their male counterparts, de- 2010; Zhang, 2008; Cegaggno et al., 2010). scribed themselves as unemployed or self-employed (Zhang, 2008). Some of the women are introduced Fujian province appears to be the most prominent to the smuggling business through their relation- region for irregular migration and "unø and Pieke ships with family, speci!cally husbands (Zhang et (2005) note that an estimated 80 percent of all ir- al., 2007). regular migrants originate from this coastal prov-

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ince. Since the 1980s, many parts of central Fujian securing a livelihood in China. "us, thousands have have become fully specialized in overseas migration turned to migration. Recent estimates suggest that (Brees, 2008). "e Fujianese make up the vast major- 40–60 million workers have been laid o# in China ity of Chinese irregular migrants in the United States (Chin, 2007). (Zhang, 2008) as well as the UK (Pieke, 2010). A major sending region within Fujian is Fuzhou pre- Empirical research appears to con!rm these changes fecture, located in the south-east region of the prov- in migration &ows from China. Pieke (2010) found ince. Most migrants come from rural districts, rather evidence that the migration of low-skilled Chinese than Fuzhou City itself. "e major sending areas are to the UK has changed qualitatively since the late Mawei, Lianjiang, Changle, Fuqing and Pingtan. All 1990s. Until then, the vast majority of irregular mi- of these places are concentrated on the eastern coast grants in the UK came from central Fujian as part of of Fuzhou and share the common Fuzhou dialect a global Fujianese diaspora that had previously de- and rural culture (Lin & Bax, 2009). veloped. In the late 1990s, immigration from north- eastern China had started to develop (mainly from "unø and Pieke (2005) found that there were, in Liaoning province). However, since 2005–2006, fact, at least two distinct &ows of Fujianese migra- Chinese migrants appear to originate from many tion: one from the coastal areas, such as Fuzhou pre- more areas. While migrants from Fujian province are fecture, and one from the interior of the province, still a prominent group in the UK, migration from such as Sanming and Nanping prefectures. "e latter China has diversi!ed in terms of areas of origin and is considered of importance in continental Europe socio-economic background. It now includes rural as (e.g. Italy, Spain, Eastern Europe and Russia). "is well as urban migrants (Pieke, 2010). &ow, which started in the early 1990s, includes both rural and urban Chinese. Furthermore, it is support- Ceccagno et al. (2010) similarly con!rm changes in ed by the local government, which has made migra- migration &ows for Italy. Prior migration &ows from tion an important pillar of its developmental strategy Zhejiang and Fujian have been complemented since (Pieke, 2010). the late 1990s by migrants originating from north- , including from Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Chin (2007) highlights Zhejiang province as one of Liaoning. the major sending regions of irregular migrants to Western Europe. , a city in south-east Zhe- Yun and Poisson (2010) note that changing migra- jiang Province with a population of 7.43 million, is tion &ows are also suggested by !gures from France’s the largest concentrated source of out-migration to Agency for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Western Europe. "e villages of the semi-industri- Persons (OFPRA). "ese changes include: the end of alized plain around Wenzhou, particularly the dis- immigration from urban areas in the south of Zhe- tricts of Li’ao and Qingtian, are signi!cant regions of jiang, with migrants now coming predominantly origin for Chinese migrants in France (Boontinand, from rural areas; an increase in the arrival of minors 2010). and young people from Zhejiang; the predominance of urban immigration from northern China; the While Zhejiang and Fujian belong to the ‘tradi- emergence of migration sending regions in northern tional’ sending regions, migration from the north- Chinese including Dongbei region, the provinces of eastern provinces is a rather recent phenomenon, Guanxi, Jiangsu and Henan; and a preponderance which is mainly connected to unemployment in of women among those arriving from the northern the course of economic reforms since 1979. His- areas. torically, China’s heavy industry was concentrated in the north-eastern provinces and almost all the com- b) Motivation panies and factories in that region belong to state- owned enterprises. However, these enterprises have According to the literature, the goal to improve in- been declining rapidly over the last two decades and dividual economic positions and accumulate wealth many unpro!table, state-owned factories, mines and abroad also appears to be a key factor for Chinese enterprises have been closed. "is has forced a great migrants who choose to migrate by irregular means number of laid-o# workers to explore new ways of (Chin, 2007; Yun & Poisson, 2010).

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Chin (2007) claims that the vast majority of mi- break rather than to reunite family. As a result, the grants from China are economic migrants. Accord- !nal destination appears to be of less importance, ing to Yun and Poisson (2010), Chinese migrants in since the main objective is to get away (Yun & Pois- France frequently mention the desire to get rich in son, 2010). western countries as their main reason for migration. In addition, the traditional Confucian cultural value Research conducted in the UK (Pieke, 2010) and of reputation (‘to keep one’s face’) may also contrib- France (Yun & Poisson, 2010) showed that the ute to the migration of the younger generation of majority of the migrants from northern China had Chinese. "roughout coastal Chinese villages, there decided to migrate because of endemic unemploy- are successful villagers who were smuggled overseas ment. Others, however, had left employment in the years ago and then returned with large sums of money state or private sector voluntarily and migrated in the (Chin, 2007). Research in a coastal village in Fujian hope of making more money. Pieke (2010) found ("unø & Pieke, 2005) found that 80 percent of all that many interviewees from Fujian had, at least for houses in the village were newly constructed with re- some time, worked in local employment or as mi- mittances from recent migrants at a cost ranging be- grants in other parts of China or abroad. However, tween USD 36,000 and USD 60,000. "us, some of in view of the potential earnings in the UK, they all the successful migrants, who managed to accumulate came to the conclusion that they had no choice but great wealth abroad, serve as role models and symbols to migrate to the UK. that foster the hope of new potential migrants. "e display of material wealth by successful migrants may Migrants from the ‘Chinese quarter’ of Paris (Bel- thus push other villagers into migration in the hopes leville) used the expression of ‘the three taos’ to de- of imitating their success (Chin, 2007; Yun & Pois- scribe their reasons for migration: tao zhai (&eeing son, 2010; Lin & Bax, 2009; Chu, 2006). from debt), tao hun (leaving after becoming di- vorced), and tao jin (sifting gold) (Yun & Poisson, Based on empirical research in the Fuzhou region 2010). Nevertheless, people decide to migrate for (Fujian province), Lin and Bax (2009) claim that many reasons and in some cases the decision is driven China’s dual social security system, which is char- by more than just the desire to make money. Some- acterized by a general non-availability of social se- times the decision to migrate is made in the hope of curity for rural-residents, is a contributing factor to improving oneself or starting anew (Pieke, 2010). rural-migration. Contrary to urban areas, rural areas in China do not o#er health and old age insurance Chin (2007) argues that the local maritime histo- or unemployment and poverty relief systems. As a ry along the coastal villages of southern China also result, rural residents may consider migration so as needs to be taken into account. It is argued that the to enable them to prepare for possible emergencies people of the south-eastern provinces of Zhejiang by accumulating and saving capital earned abroad or and Fujian have a particular historical background to acquire foreign citizenship to bene!t from the re- related to travel and thus have always been more like- ceiving nation’s social security system. Yun and Pois- ly to migrate than people from other regions. Pieke son (2010) also found this to be the case in France, (2010) found that for most migrants from Zhejiang regarding migrants from the rural areas of Zhejiang and Fujian that came from rural areas, the ‘family province. Lin and Bax (2009) argue that internal chain’ was the main motivation for the decision to migration is considered a less attractive alternative, go abroad. "us, home-bonds with migrants already since rural residents are bound to their status by based in the destination country play a vital role China’s dual system. Once migrants acquire a for- in the selection of the country of destination. For eign passport, they are able to return to China with migrants from Zhejiang, for example, France seems a new status as overseas Chinese, a social category to be the obvious choice for migration, since they that is highly respected by local governments. "us, have relatives who have already settled there. On the irregular migration presents a shortcut to social mo- contrary, migration from the north-eastern parts of bility and to contest a low social status. China and from large metropolitan areas does not seem to be connected to a family migration project. Research conducted by Pieke (2010) in the UK, re- Especially in cases of divorce, the goal is to make a vealed that none of the interviewed migrants (N=35)

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expressed the desire to live in a democratic country or According to Zhang (2008) smugglers as well as mentioned any curiosity about Western countries as migrants are aware of potential payment con&icts. a factor in their decision to migrate. Freedom, which Since none of the agreements are legally enforceable, was frequently mentioned in interviews, referred to the client must be certain that the smuggler can be lack of restrictions on the movement, employment trusted and vice versa. Accordingly, the !rst stage and businesses of migrants. of the smuggling process (recruitment) involves a screening process in, which both parties assess each other through their social networks and reputation. 4) Smuggler-migrant relationships "us, smugglers typically rely on a good reputation a) Migrant perceptions of smugglers spread by word of mouth (Zhang, 2008) and have a clear interest in keeping their clients satis!ed, as they "e literature provides only limited insight into and their relatives bring in new business (Soudijn & Chinese migrants’ perception of migrant smugglers. Kleemans, 2009). According to Zhang et al. (2007), Chinese migrants constitute a willing clientele who seek opportunities c) Factors in"uencing the relationship between abroad; thus, smugglers are often perceived as pro- smugglers and migrants viding assistance to individuals and communities. Research in Italy found that Chinese migrants do "e literature at hand provides some information not view themselves as victims of criminal organi- on socio-economic factors that in&uence the nature zations, even if smuggling groups have no links to of the relationship between Chinese smugglers and friends or family (Boyle, 2009). "us, smuggling migrants. groups are not perceived as criminals, but as service providers or facilitators, who o#er the opportunity Smugglers who make migration possible and have of a better life elsewhere. Although smugglers indeed provided e$cient services are socially accepted, well break the law, this is viewed in the eyes of the irregu- known and sometimes even admired (Li, 2010; Yun lar migrants and their families as for the greater good & Poisson, 2010). However, smugglers may lose (Soudijn & Kleemans, 2009; Lin & Chen, 2007) their reputation and support network if they fail to successfully complete a smuggling operation. Fur- Empirical research conducted in coastal villages thermore, they may have to pay all the expenses in- in south-eastern China showed that in some rural curred themselves. If a serious incident occurs, such communities, smugglers are supported and highly as illnesses, disappearance or death, smugglers may praised by ordinary community members as well as even be bound to compensate the family of the mi- village cadres. "e study claims that they were even grant. In this vein, Yun and Poisson (2010) describe o#ered titles such as minjian laogong (ministers of a case, were a Zhejiangnese family was paid compen- non-governmental labour) and minjian yinhang (di- sation equivalent to the fare (EUR 12,000 or USD rectors of non-governmental banks) (Chin, 2007). 17,065) after the family member had disappeared during a smuggling operation. b) Nature of migrant-smuggler relationship Furthermore, Lin and Bax (2009) found that strong "e literature at hand generally suggests the exis- social norms in rural communities (e.g. in the Fu- tence of a business-like relationship between smug- zhou region) based on communal responsibility and glers and migrants, which is !nancially motivated reciprocal relationships function as a security system and usually comes to an end after the smuggling op- for potential migrants against unreliable migration eration has been completed and all the agreed fees brokers. Smugglers, in turn, try to protect their cli- have been paid (Soudijn, 2006; Zhang et al., 2007; ents to avoid negative social consequences. Zhang, 2008; Cegaggno et al., 2010; Pieke, 2010). Soudijn and Kleemans (2009) furthermore point Reports of torture, beatings and abuse, however, in- to a combined e#ort of smugglers, migrants as well dicate that Chinese smugglers do fall back on vio- as their social networks to circumvent immigration lence, at least occasionally. Researching the medical laws. conditions of Chinese irregular migrants who were

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shipped to Canada, Allan and Szafran (2005) report (e.g. invitations issued by partner companies in des- that some migrants in this study indicated they had tination countries in order to apply for business vi- been threatened, beaten, or raped aboard the boats. sas, which then enables the recipient to immigrate Pieke (2010) furthermore claims that Chinese smug- legally and overstay). glers will not hesitate to use violence in order to ex- pedite payments. According to Zhang (2008), this "e bottom level consists of local smugglers who may be speci!cally the case in maritime smuggling. act on an individual basis. Some of them have con- Smugglers who specialize in smuggling by sea appear nections to the middle tier or the top level through to be less strict in terms of !nancial requirements for intermediary contacts. "ey usually act as recruiters prospective migrants (compared to smugglers using with the task to !nd potential customers and intro- other methods of transportation). It is argued that duce them to the relevant companies or smugglers. maritime smugglers try to maximize their pro!ts by For each recruited migrant they charge a fee ranging !lling the vessel to its capacity. "erefore, it is pos- from a few hundred to tens of thousands of Yuan sible that migrants that may not have the adequate (Renminbi6). !nancial resources to get on board. Overall, how- ever, researchers assume that the actual use of force Researchers describe Chinese smuggling groups as by Chinese smugglers is more the exception than the small organizations (often three to four core individ- rule (Zhang, 2008; Pieke, 2010; Soudijn, 2010; Ce- uals) that can maximize their e#ectiveness because ccagno et al., 2010). they are characterized by adaptive, &exible networks that can easily expand and contract to deal with the uncertainties of the smuggling market (Soudijn, 5) Organization of migrant smuggling 2006). Participants in these transitory alliances orga- nize on an ad-hoc basis and only to the extent neces- a) How is migrant smuggling organized? sary to carry out the smuggling operation, if there is an opportunity to make money. "e leader of the According to Li (2010), Chinese smuggling orga- group is often based outside of China (Zhang et al., nizations form at least a three-tiered structure that 2007; Ceccagno at al., 2010). connects China and migrants’ destination countries. At the top level are ‘big smugglers’ who are often Based on empirical results, Zhang (2008) summariz- based outside of China and have legal status in their es the main operational and organizational features country of residence. "ey have access to large sums of Chinese migrant smuggling groups as follows: of money, which enables them to organize and ex- t most smuggling groups consist only of small pand transnational smuggling networks, provide peer groups arranged in simple hierarchies and necessary documents or facilities for migrants, and transactions among smugglers are mostly one- bribe government o$cials in China as well as transit on-one; countries. t smugglers typically participate in smuggling ac- tivities on a part time basis and most of them "e middle tier is comprised of institutional migra- have legitimate businesses aside, in addition to tion brokers, who often work for o$cially registered their smuggling activities; migration companies in the sending regions. "ese companies (or agencies) are authorized to procure t control over resources crucial to an operation de- labour exportation and assist in study abroad pro- termines the degree of authority within a smug- grammes and internationally contracted projects. gling organization, in terms of in&uence on the Clients pay for training courses (languages, com- direction and pace of a smuggling operation; puter skills, document preparation, etc.) and receive t smuggling operations involve highly di#eren- a document designed to prove that the recipient is tiated and specialized roles, which cannot be quali!ed and meets the requirements of the desti- easily duplicated or eliminated (e.g. document nation country. Furthermore, these institutional forgers, coordinators, recruiters); migration brokers may operate between legal and il- legal approaches by creating some of the documents 6 Currency of China. As of August 2011, USD 1 is equivalence to CNY requested by the authorities in destination countries 6.44.

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t smugglers acknowledge the existence of o$cial of selling migrants into prostitution or involvement and make extensive use of in the Chinese drug tra$cking business. "e use of corrupt o$cials; and force and violence among Chinese smugglers ap- t being dependent on the availability of clients pears not to be an issue, as opposed to Chinese drug and the socio-legal conditions of the market, tra$cking gangs in the Netherlands. Furthermore, smuggling organizations are mostly of a &uid no indication of the involvement of groups or and temporary nature. any formal Chinese organization based on region, occupation or clan a$liation was found (Soudijn, b) Are persons involved in migrant smuggling 2006; Soudijn & Kleemans, 2009). also involved in other criminal activities? Not a single case of involuntary recruitment for According to literature at hand, there is some dispute migration (or tra$cking in persons) was found in among researchers about the extent and level of in- interviews with Chinese irregular migrants (N=35) volvement of smugglers in other forms of criminal- conducted in the UK. Furthermore, none of the ity. However, recent research indicates no entangle- interviewees claimed to have been forced into any ment between migrant smuggling and other crimi- form of employment by their smugglers, even if they nal sectors, apart from complementing crimes such continued to be in debt to the smugglers. However, as document fraud. migrants in debt were frequently reminded of their obligations and, in one case, severe beatings and in- Sein (2008) and Zhang (2008), for example, point out jury were experienced. Chinese migrants, who had that at least some Chinese smugglers are members of entered the sex trade did so voluntary and only after more traditional crime groups (e.g. American gangs or some time in the UK (Pieke 2010). Triads in Asia). However, according to Zhang (2008) no convincing evidence has been produced that sub- In the case of Italy, also no involvement of Chinese stantiates any systematic participation of traditional migrant smugglers in tra$cking in persons could be Chinese organized crime groups in migrant smuggling, found. Instead, the relationship between smugglers by researchers who have engaged in primary data col- and migrants typically ended upon entry of the des- lection. Instead, most migrant smugglers arrested by tination country (Cegaggno et al., 2010). the Chinese authorities appear to be rather ordinary people. It is argued that their engagement in migrant Zhang (2008) acknowledges, however, that the lack smuggling activities was made possible by their famil- of involvement by traditional Chinese crime groups ial networks and fortuitous social contacts. Zhang and in empirical studies does not prove their complete Chin (2004) conclude that Chinese smugglers typi- absence in the migrant smuggling business. cally try to avoid entanglement with gangsters, street gangs or other criminal groups in the Chinese com- c) Does migrant smuggling attract persons munity (Zhang & Chin, 2004; Zhang, 2008). who have a history of involvement in other crime? According to Zhang (2008), the main feature dis- tinguishing migrant smugglers from traditional or- Little information is provided in the literature on ganized criminal groups is the relative absence of vio- whether migrant smuggling attracts persons with a lence within the smuggling groups as well as between history of involvement in other crime. rivalling smuggling groups. Research conducted in the Netherlands (Soudijn, Recent empirical studies conducted in the Nether- 2006) found that Chinese smugglers stand out com- lands (Soudijn, 2006; Soudijn & Kleemans, 2009), pared to other nationalities operating in the Nether- the UK (Pieke, 2010) and Italy (Cegaggno et al., lands, in terms of lack of criminal records. Of 140 2010) con!rm a lack of involvement by migrant cases, only two men from China and one man from smugglers in other criminality. For example, re- Hong Kong (China) had been arrested in the past search on Chinese migrant smugglers operating in for violating the Opium Act; another eight had prior the Netherlands suggests that they solely focus on convictions for migrant smuggling. A link to orga- the smuggling of migrants. No evidence was found nized crime could not be found in any of the cases.

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Zhang (2008) notes that none of the smugglers in t receiver of clients (migrants) (N=2 / 1.6%); his study considered themselves to be criminals. On t corrupt o$cial (N=1 / 0.8%); the contrary, many displayed a positive self-image t arranger of stowaways (N=1 / 0.8%); and portrayed themselves as people with a desire to t student visa fraud organizer (N=1 / 0.8%); and help others. Zhang concludes that this may help to t no speci!c role determined (N=18 / 14%). explain why otherwise law-abiding people, including reputable businesspeople and community leaders, Zhang (2008) points out that the identi!ed roles in have become involved in the smuggling of migrants. this study are not exhaustive and that some individu- als may play multiple roles (e.g. one of the interview- d) What levels of professionalism/specializa- ees acted as recruiter, payment collector, and trans- tion is there within migrant smugglers? porter at the same time).

Soudjin (2006) and Zhang (2008)7 are the only Soudijn (2006) also found specialized roles for studies that provide detailed information on special- Chinese smugglers operating in the Netherlands ized tasks that may play an important role in Chi- (N=178): nese migrant smuggling organizations. t organizer (N=22); t ransporter (N=88); According to Zhang (2008), many specialized roles t passport falsi!er (N=2); have emerged in Chinese migrant smuggling. "e t enforcer (N=10); more complex the method of transportation (in t corrupt o$cial (N=3); terms of organization), the more specialized tasks t supporting personnel (N=43);and are necessary to successfully complete the smuggling t unknown (N=10). project. Zhang argues that smugglers who specialize in direct air routes to the country of destination act Soudijn and Kleemans (2009) observed that Chinese at the lowest level, in terms of organizational com- smuggling groups in the Netherlands have special- plexity. Smugglers who transport migrants through ized in the crossing of the English Channel to the transit countries and utilize a combination of trans- UK. However, the smugglers themselves often lack port methods (land, air, and/or sea) operate at the the knowledge, skills and paperwork necessary to ob- highest level in terms of organizational complexity. tain a lorry and (fake) cargo. As a result, they usually approach Dutch or British lorry drivers to transport Based on empirical research, which included inter- large numbers of Chinese migrants into the UK. views with Chinese migrant smugglers (N=129) operating in China and the United States., Zhang e) What in"uences shape the way migrant (2008) identi!ed the following (possible) roles in smugglers are organized? How and why do Chinese smuggling organizations: these organizations evolve? t recruiter (N=29 / 22.5%); t document vendor (N=16 / 12.4%); Apart from Zhang (2008), no speci!c information t payment collector (N=15 / 11.6%); is provided on this issue by the literature researched. t coordinator (N=11 / 8.5%); Based on empirical research, Zhang (2008) identi!es t transporter (N=8 / 6.2); three basic prerequisites, which appear essential for t arranger of fraudulent business delegation (N=5 forming a Chinese migrant smuggling organization: / 3.9%); t securer of deposits (N=5 / 3.9%); 1. an existing market demand; t escort (N=4 / 3.1%); 2. membership in a tight social network; and t fraudulent marriage agent (N=4 / 3.1%); 3. the opportunity to build a relationship with t guard (N=3 / 2.3%); other smugglers (each oriented towards spe- t arranger of travel (N=2 / 1.6%); ci!c tasks such as client recruiter, document t guarantor (N=2 / 1.6%); vendor, transfer organizer, payment collec- t leaser of boats (N=2 / 1.6%); tor etc.).

7 Based on the original research by Zhang & Chin (2004).

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According to Zhang (2008), groups of smugglers8 6) Migrant smuggling modus operandi meet through their social networks and fortuitous contacts. "ey form international networks and sup- a) Recruitment methods ply services to o#er and perform the transport of fee- paying migrants to their destination of choice. "ese Based on empirical research on Chinese migrant smuggling organizations are made up of loosely con- smuggling (speci!cally from Fujian Province) to the nected diverse individuals, with no clear leadership. United States, Zhang (2008) concludes that by far, "ey are highly adaptable to market constraints and most Chinese smugglers and their prospective clients uncertainties. Some groups may break up when a key !nd one another through their mutual social net- member is lost, while others quickly replace the posi- works. More speci!cally, most would-be migrants at tion in order to provide the services demanded by least know the recruiters of the respective smuggling the market. Despite these organizational attributes, organization. "us, the recruitment process can de- most smuggling organizations appear to involve dis- velop in di#erent ways. In some cases, relatives or crete individuals who perform limited and highly friends who know people in the smuggling organiza- specialized tasks. "e &ow of information within tion and possibly want to make money through re- the group is highly restricted and responsibilities are ferrals approach prospective migrants. In other cases, clearly de!ned for each successive stage of the opera- clients seek out contacts that can help them realize tion. Relationships among the smugglers are mostly their migration project. Research in France (Yun one-on-one. Furthermore, most smugglers maintain & Poisson, 2010) found that in the rural areas of additional contacts of their own. It is argued that the Wenzhou (Zhejiang Province), most prospective mi- outcome of this unique pattern of mixed organiza- grants contact and meet a smuggler (recruiter) with tional attributes and operational norms is a distinc- a good reputation who is recommended by friends or tive task force orientation among the members of family. In urban areas, recruitment is also advertised the group. Zhang concludes that unique socio-legal through small notices posted on telephone kiosks, challenges and operational requisites in the market near secondary schools or in certain shops in work- are responsible for the emergence of these organiza- ing class districts. Interviews (N=35) conducted in tional structures and business practices. the UK revealed that all respondents took the initia- tive in !nding a smuggler or an agency to help them "ese socio-legal challenges and operational requi- reach the UK, which in all cases was the destination sites include (Zhang, 2008): country of choice (Pieke, 2010). t fear of arrest and the possible forfeiture of assets, including heavy !nes; b) Payment methods t unstable and limited clientele in terms of !nan- Based on interviews with Chinese migrant smug- cial liquidity; glers, Zhang (2008) is the only study reviewed that t logistical challenges that range from arranging provides detailed information on the payment pro- transportation and providing accommodation cedures. to safeguarding clients and evading attention from authorities; "e actual process of smuggling begins only when t the imminent risk and danger of accidents and the down payment (5–10 percent) has been made casualties en route; (Zhang et al., 2007; Zhang, 2008; Soudjin, 2006). t uncertainties regarding the individual stages of Recruiters, however, do not get paid until the mi- the smuggling process, which are serially linked grant reaches the desired destination. "e down and vital to the success of the operation alto- payment serves mainly two purposes: (a) to secure gether; and the prospective migrant’s commitment to working t sporadic availability of clients (which makes mi- with the same smuggler and (b) to cover basic costs grant smuggling a business of opportunities). (e.g. travel documents) (Zhang, 2008). Chin (2007), however, reports that some smuggling groups in China have adopted new methods of payment since 8 Zhang (2008) considers Chinese smugglers to be “entrepreneurs” and the late 1990s. According to this, some smuggling migrants to be “clients”. groups no longer ask for a deposit, but instead pay all

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costs including airplane tickets, meals and in-transit not utilized, as no actual transfer takes place. Friends accommodations. "ese groups do not charge any and relatives often serve as guarantors and often o#er money until migrants safely reach their destination. such money transfers free of charge.

"e predominant payment method is direct cash Zhang (2008) also reports that many of the Chinese transaction. In addition to this, Zhang (2008) de- smugglers (N=129) interviewed in his study claimed scribes two methods involving formal business pro- that migrants and their families paid the smuggling cedures that have emerged in response to occasional fees soon after arrival and that they did so gladly and fraud or fraudulent representation in the smuggling gratefully. business (e.g. a person may portray himself as a re- cruiter and then disappear after the down payment c) Transfer of criminal proceeds has been made). In one of these methods, the migrant (or a relative) and the smuggler go to a bank and "e reviewed literature provides almost no informa- open a joint account, which requires both signatures tion on the transferring of criminal proceeds ob- in order to withdraw money. "is is to ensure service tained through migrant smuggling. provision and payment receipt. Both parties return to the bank to settle the payment once the smuggling According to Zhang (2008), !nanciers or bankers operation has been completed or previously agreed are not involved in managing or monitoring !nan- upon tasks have been ful!lled. In another method, cial transactions of Chinese smuggling groups. Mon- the migrant (or a relative) opens a bank account and ey is passed on mostly from one smuggler to the next deposits the agreed upon amount of money. "en (mainly in the form of cash on delivery) and fees for he provides the smuggler with the passbook, but not speci!c services (e.g. travel documents) are also paid with the necessary password. "us, neither of the par- through direct cash transaction. Members of the ties is able to withdrawal money, as both password and smuggling group with speci!c tasks (e.g. acquiring passbook are needed to do so. After completion of the travel documents, arranging transportation or brib- smuggling operation, the migrant provides the smug- ing checkpoint personnel) receive payment quickly, gler with the password, who is then able to withdrawal while others (e.g. recruiters) have to wait until the the money. It is argued that such !nancial transactions smuggling operation has been completed. rarely arouse the suspicion of the Chinese authorities, due to China’s fast growing economy and the accom- d) Transportation methods panying abundance of banking activities. In the case of longer-term smuggling operations, which may take According to the literature at hand, Chinese migrant several months or even years (e.g. fraudulent mar- smugglers have developed a wide range of smuggling riage), these bank deposits appear even less suspicious. methods and Chinese migrants are smuggled by land, by air or by sea. Most smuggling groups seem According to Zhang (2008), payments can also be ar- to apply a combination of di#erent methods (Pieke, ranged through so called ‘mirror transfers’. "is can 2010; Zhang, 2008; Chin, 2007). easily be done with a few phone calls after the smug- gling journey has been completed. A mirror transfer Zhang (2008), for example, reports that one smug- is a !nancial practice employed by overseas Chinese gling group employed di#erent methods to smuggle in which no actual money is sent from one coun- their clients to the United States: First, the group try to another. A migrant who wants to send money would &y migrants from Fuzhou (Fujian Province) from the destination country to relatives in China to Kunming (the capital of Yunnan Province), where gives the money to an underground banker, who in the migrants would obtain local border region tour- turn makes a phone call to tell his or her business ist documents. "e group would then travel overland associate in China to deliver the equivalent amount and cross the border into Lao PDR. Guided by a in Chinese Yuan. Conversely, families in China can Laotian smuggler, the migrants would then be trans- also send money to the destination country by giv- ported across Lao PDR to Viet Nam. From there, the ing the money to someone in China, who in turn migrants would be &own to Singapore, then to In- calls his or her contact in the destination country to donesia, and then to Canada. From there, the clients deliver the money. "e legitimate banking system is would !nally be smuggled into the United States.

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e) Document use and misuse lar migrants travelling by land or by air usually must pass through a number of checkpoints. However, Reviewed studies indicate a crucial role and common he acknowledges that the Chinese authorities have use of counterfeit documents. According to Zhang et attempted to address this problem at border check- al. (2007), of identi!cation documents enabling mi- points by streamlining border patrol functions and grants to travel is vital to any smuggling operation. increasing the central government’s involvement in control measures. "us, Zhang concludes that the A migrant smuggler operating in the Netherlands, signi!cant increase in prices for bribery in recent for example, used forged passports to smuggle her years is a clear sign of growing di$culties for smug- clients by air from Europe to the United States. She glers. escorted small groups of Chinese migrants to a local commercial (Dutch) photographer and then sent the Having left China, it appears that corruption contin- pictures to "ailand. Her contact in "ailand then ues to have an important role throughout the jour- used these pictures to forge the necessary passports ney. An interviewed migrant smuggled into the UK, and sent them back to the Netherlands using regular for example, reported that after being arrested by the courier services (Soudijn & Kleemans, 2009). police in Russia, she and her smuggler were able to continue the journey after bribing their way out of Soudijn (2006) reports that in one case at Schiphol jail (Pieke, 2010). According to her interview, the airport ("e Netherlands), a Chinese man was ob- police in Russia release irregular migrants immedi- served giving a passport to an irregular Chinese mi- ately for a payment of USD 10,000. grant. "e passport had been altered with a photo- graph of the migrant. "e migrant claimed that he Soudijn (2006) reports that one smuggler had did not know how his photograph came to be in the ‘bought’ a highly placed customs o$cial at the passport, but that he had given six passport photo- airport in Paris. "e man, who had been o$cially graphs to a smuggler in China. appointed to prevent irregular migration into the United States and Canada, consulted frequently f) Corruption with embassy personnel and U.S. customs authori- ties. "is man gave detailed advice to the smuggler Zhang (2008) notes that there has been no system- (e.g. to smuggle a maximum of two people at a time atic data collection on the role of corrupt o$cials in in order to appear less suspicious) and received USD migrant smuggling. However, studies indicate that 2,000 per smuggled migrant. According to Soudijn, it plays an important role in Chinese migrant smug- he operated for a long time and was jointly respon- gling. sible for the successful smuggling of at least 30 ir- regular migrants. According to Zhang (2008), bribery is an essential part of migrant smuggling in China, which would g) Evolution of migrant smuggling methods not be possible without the direct or tacit involve- in response to changes in migration policies ment of some government o$cials. Chinese migrant and counter measures smugglers (N=129) interviewed by Zhang and Chin (2004) reported that corruption and bribery are an "ere is evidence in the reviewed literature that Chi- important component of smuggling operations in nese migrant smuggling methods evolve in response China. "e study found that corrupt government to relevant policy changes. o$cials tend to occupy low-level government func- tions, which are crucial to smuggling operations, Zhang (2008) reports that many would-be migrants such as passport inspectors at border checkpoints, from Fujian province now arrange to transplant clerical sta# for passport applications, and o$cials themselves to other provinces in China in order ac- who issue documents for residential or marital veri- quire non-Fujianese identi!cation cards and pass- !cations. ports. "rough this method, they try to avoid o$cial scrutiny, since Fujian is a major sending region and According to Zhang (2008) bribing checkpoint per- documents issued in this province usually receive sonnel is a common practice in China, since irregu- greater attention.

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Chin (2007) highlights that smuggling groups who such as market conditions, smuggling method used specialize in maritime routes have changed their (including the mode of transportation), distance strategies, due to better enforcement by the Chinese travelled, number of people being moved, and ad- authorities. To avoid the close monitoring employed ditional services (e.g. travel documents, bribes, etc.). by the Chinese coast guard in Fujian and Zhejiang While fees stated for speci!c destination regions (or provinces, prospective migrants are divided into countries) throughout literature are not consistent, small groups (two to three members) and often sent Chinese irregular migrants generally are considered to northern ports before they are put into contain- to pay higher smuggling fees than migrants from any ers and shipped overseas. Furthermore, Zhang et al. other country (Petros, 2005). (2007) points to the fact that strategies in smuggling Chinese migrants to the United States via maritime Travelling to the United States is the most expen- routes have changed since the early 2000s as a reac- sive Chinese smuggling route recorded throughout tion to improved counter strategies and intelligence the literature (Petros, 2005). Based on research con- gathering by U.S. authorities. Chinese migrant ducted in 2004, Yun and Poisson (2010) report that smugglers now drop the migrants at peripheral lo- the smuggling fee to Europe for people from Wen- cations (e.g. U.S. territories in the Paci!c, Mexico zhou (Zhejiang province) ranged from EUR 13,000 or Canada) instead of shipping migrants directly to to EUR 22,000 (USD 18,500 to USD 31,300). U.S. mainland shores. "rough this method, smug- Getting to the UK cost an additional EUR 11,000 glers try to gain access to the United States by a series (USD 15,600) and the rate tripled for the United of land-and-ocean relays. States. Based on interviews conducted in 2008, Li (2010) calculated that the fee for transportation from According to Zhang (2008), changes in fee payment Fujian province (Fuzhou region) to the U.S. ranged procedures for smuggling by air travel have emerged, between EUR 45,000 and 63,000 (USD 64,000 and speci!cally when the process involves fraudulent USD 90,000) and from Zhejiang province (Wen- documents and bribing checkpoint security. As all zhou region) to Europe between EUR 27,000 and parties involved realize that irregular migrants trav- 36,000 (USD 38,400 and USD 51,200). elling by air may be caught as soon as they land in their destination countries, the smugglers (including In terms of smuggling methods, Zhang et al. (2007) the corrupt security personnel) demand all payments claim that arranged marriages represent the saf- to be made immediately before departure. est method for migrant smuggling, yield the high- est success rate, and induce the highest smuggling Furthermore, a Chinese smuggler interviewed by fees. At the time of their study, the going rate for Zhang (2008) claimed that many customers wishing a fraudulent marriage in the Fuzhou region (Fujian to migrate to the United States by air prefer a &ight province) ranged between USD 60,000 and USD to Canada instead travelling directly to the United 70,000. In comparison, other methods of smuggling States. "e reason given for this is that the dura- into the United States, such as boat-land-air com- tion of custody for irregular migrants is signi!cantly binations involving multiple transit countries, cost lower in Canada (one month at most) than in the approximately USD 10,000 less. United States. If the Canadian authorities are unable to prove that the migrant intentionally entered the Di#erences also exist between provinces of ori- country, refugee status will be granted, which also al- gin in China; migrants from Fujian and Zhejiang lows migrants the right to work. Once the migrant is provinces appear to pay the highest smuggling fees. released from jail, smugglers pick him or her up and An explanation for the price di#erences between arrange for transit into the United States. the di#erent provinces of origin in China may lie in the di#erent smuggling methods employed. Pieke (2010) observes that, while urban Chinese 7) Migrant smuggling fees and mobilization of pay travel agencies that arrange for a business visa9 fees and air ticket for around EUR 5,000 (USD 7,100),

According to literature at hand, smuggling fees vary 9 "is method evolves around a loophole in UK immigration (Pieke, considerably depending on a number of variables 2010).

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Fujianese migrants appear to remain reliant on the Li et al. (2004) highlight the potential risks and services of migrant smugglers to get to the UK. hazards of maritime smuggling migrants. "e However, it remains unclear why migrants from study found an unexpected and potentially fatal Fujian continue to pay between EUR 25,000 to hazard of irregular migration based on an inci- over EUR 30,000 (USD 35,500 to USD 42,600) dent in which 18 irregular Chinese migrants were instead of utilizing this convenient, low-risk and smuggled into the United States aboard a ship- relatively cheap way of entry by simply overstaying board cargo container. Of these 18 migrants, three their visa. Yun and Poisson (2010) made a similar arrived dead and one died four months later. "e observation in the case of France; migrants from conditions su#ered aboard the shipping container Zhejiang rely on migrant smugglers, while north- were apparently responsible for all four deaths — ern Chinese and those from large urban areas pay a unique cluster of viral myocarditis, transmit- intermediaries to arrange for a Schengen business ted during transit, contributed to or caused these visa. deaths.

Li (2010) observes that the smuggling fees in China Research in France (Yun & Poisson, 2010) revealed seem to &uctuate with the wage level in the destina- that Chinese migrants are aware of the risks they tion country. It is argued that calculations are based possibly face when travelling overland: the risk of on the tacit standard that migrant workers will spend being attacked by strangers, subjected to racketeer- the equivalent of two years’ salary to cover the smug- ing, kidnapping, unlawful detainment and even gling fees. Similarly, Yun and Poisson (2010) found starvation. One of the interviewees stated that she that monthly instalments for Chinese irregular mi- nearly died on two occasions during her three- grants in France are based on a standard French month overland journey to France, when she al- wage, even though actual wages earned by irregular most drowned in a river and nearly su#ocated in a migrants are much lower. freight car. Chinese migrants (N=59) interviewed in Paris reported cases of friends, families or ac- In addition to personal savings, the money to !nance quaintances that had to have a limb amputated, a migration project is mostly borrowed from friends were struck down by tropical diseases, or were lost and family or local moneylenders (Soudijn, 2006; and even died during the journey or from its after Pieke, 2010; Li, 2010; Yun & Poisson, 2010). In e#ects. Some also su#ered assault or humiliation en some cases, migrants are able to borrow the money route. needed directly from the migrant smuggler (Pieke, 2010; Yun & Poisson, 2010). Chinese migrants (N=35) interviewed in the UK (Pieke, 2010), speci!cally from Fujian, also report- According to Yun and Poisson (2010), the smug- ed extreme hardship and danger while in transit. gler sometimes can be an immediate family mem- "e !ndings of this study con!rmed previous re- ber of the migrant. In these cases, a reduced price is search that concluded that the time of greatest risk charged. "ey conclude that the further removed po- of being subjected to violence and abuse appears tential migrants are from the smuggler’s family circle, to be while migrants are detained in safe houses. the higher the smuggling fee charged. Pieke suggests that this seems to particularly be the case, when waiting times become long and mi- grants as well as smugglers grow increasingly anx- 8) Human and social costs of migrant smuggling ious and restive. He furthermore concludes that Chinese smugglers do not hesitate to use violence Some information is provided in the literature on in order to expedite payments. However, he also the dangers and challenges presented by Chinese stresses the fact that most migrants in this study migrant smuggling, speci!cally when travelling via experienced an uneventful journey of a few days maritime routes or overland. A number of studies and violence upon arrival in the destination coun- also focus on the harsh and precarious living and try is rather unusual. working conditions of irregular Chinese migrants in destination countries, speci!cally within the Euro- Research in Italy (Cegaggno et al., 2010) found that pean context. women travelling alone and individuals lacking the

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necessary family or guanxi10 networks are particu- that hinders production and reduces all aspects of larly at risk of violence. "e researchers in this study personal and family life to bare essentials. However, suggest a tendency of degeneration of networks that the study also observed a common shared willing- were originally held together by family, clan-type ness and consent from Chinese workers to accept connections or reciprocal guanxi. It is argued that any working arrangements no matter how harsh and this degeneration in part stems from connections to degrading these may be. (non-Chinese) criminal networks in transit countries that assist the Chinese smuggling operation. As a re- Debt may also aggravate the vulnerability of Chinese sult, people who are unknown to the Chinese smug- migrants, who according to researchers (see Chapter glers and unfamiliar with the Chinese migrants’ so- 8) generally pay higher prices for smuggling journeys cial networks are included in the smuggling opera- than other nationalities. Research in France (Yun & tion (Cegaggno et al., 2010). Poisson, 2010) found that most Chinese migrants, speci!cally from Zhejiang province, had borrowed Pieke (2010), however, found that Chinese migrants’ money to !nance their migration project. Migrants greatest fear by far was to be detected (en route) by from the Wenzhou region (Zhejiang province) had the authorities and consequently the failure of the contracted debts twice as heavy as migrants from whole migration project. Migrants repatriated to other regions in China. Most of the Zhejiangnese still China face possible !nes and jail sentences (Zhang, owed between EUR 14,000 and EUR 20,000 (USD 2008). 20,000 and USD 28,400) after arrival in France. Ir- regular Chinese migrants in the UK (Pieke, 2010) Yun and Poisson (2010) observed that the fear of complained about the fact that the very high inter- detection and constant risk of being arrested fosters est rates charged by moneylenders in Fujian province the isolation of irregular Chinese migrants after their made it di$cult for them to ful!l their obligations. arrival in France. Many do not dare to go out, fear- Furthermore, the moneylenders frequently remind- ing to be stopped and questioned by the French po- ed the families back in China of the migration debt. lice. Furthermore, low levels of education combined While the average repayment period is reported to with extremely long working hours hamper e#orts be 2 years ("unø & Pieke, 2005; Li, 2010), the pe- to learn the French language. "is situation adds to riod for repayment of migration debt in France is the vulnerability of irregular Chinese migrants and reported likely to in the range from three to ten years makes them dependent on the Chinese community (Yun & Poisson, 2010). However, Yun and Poisson in terms of language as well as information. Rent (2010) present a case in which a Chinese family (in for accommodation, for example, is often twice as France) was not able to repay all of their migration high for irregular Chinese migrants than people le- debt even after 13 years. gally residing in France. According to French labour inspectors, Chinese migrants seldom !le complaints Lower wages may not only prolong the migration about their working conditions, unlike migrants of debt repayment period, but, combined with the ef- other nationalities (Yun & Poisson, 2010). "us, the fects of isolation, may also keep migrants in work- fear of deportation and consequences of repatriation ing conditions that would be unacceptable to others. speci!cally disadvantages Chinese migrants in terms "e garment sector in France, for example, is the of access to basic rights. most important job provider for Chinese migrants. On average, migrants work between 15 to 18 hours In Italy, Ceccagno et al. (2010) found that Chinese a day in the high season (5–6 months) for an average migrants working in Chinese workshops (predomi- wage of between EUR 310 and EUR 460 (USD 440 nantly in the garment industry) are forced to work and USD 654) per month. On average, this enables in precarious conditions, which exclude anything migrants to devote approximately EUR 1,550 (USD 2,200) of savings (per year) to pay of migration debt

10 “Guanxi can be loosely translated as “connections” except that it is (Yun & Poisson, 2010). often a complex social protocol. "e social standing of an individual can also be de!ned by the extent of the guanxi of that person. "e According to Yun and Poisson (2010) Chinese irreg- maintenance of guanxi is a never ending process of giving and receiv- ing favors, which often becomes the binding element in each social ular migrants in Paris are often victims of assault and network.” (Zhang et al., 2007, p. 706). violence, particularly on payday, since the migrants

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are usually paid in cash. "e aggressors (often mem- 9) Factors fuelling irregular migration and mi- bers of other ethnic groups but also Chinese gangs) grant smuggling are aware that the Chinese migrants will not report them to the police, due to their irregular status. Fur- According to the reviewed literature, socio-economic thermore, Chinese passports (speci!cally with a valid factors may contribute or fuel irregular migration visa) have a monetary value, as these can be sold to and migrant smuggling from China. Chinese migrant smugglers. Living in collective dor- mitories and without a bank account to deposit their Lin and Bax (2009) conclude that the characteristics money, Chinese irregular migrants are frequently at- of China’s rural social structure are important con- tacked in their homes. tributing factors to producing and perpetuating ir- regular migration from rural areas, such as Fuzhou Yun and Poisson (2010) highlight the considerable (Fujian). Rural residents may consider migration to increase of Chinese prostitution that has emerged enable them to prepare for emergencies by accumu- with the arrival of women from the north-eastern lating and saving capital earned abroad or to acquire provinces in the late 1990s and has grown consis- foreign citizenship to bene!t from the receiving na- tently since that time. It is argued that most women tion’s social security system. It is argued, furthermore, from north-east China su#er a considerable drop in that internal migration is considered a less attractive social status and have no community contacts (in alternative to out-migration, since rural residents are contrast to women from Zhejiang). In addition, bound to their status by China’s dual system. Once they generally are considered unsuitable for garment migrants acquire a foreign passport, they are able to making and cannot !nd jobs sewing in garment return to China with a new status as overseas Chi- workshops. Many can only engage in either casual nese, a social category that is highly respected by lo- or unbearable work and thus resort to prostitution cal governments. "us, irregular migration presents in order to make ends meet. Ceccagno et al. (2010) a shortcut to social mobility (Lin & Bax, 2009) and also observed the emergence of Chinese prostitution an escape from the segregationist education and with the arrival of women from Heilongjian, Jilin, health system in China (Yun & Poisson, 2010). and Lioaning provinces in Italy. "unø and Pieke (2005) found that migration from Researchers generally consider smuggling by air less Fujian is strongly embedded in local political, socio- hazardous than overland smuggling or maritime cultural and economic institutions and histories. smuggling (Zhang et al., 2007; Pieke, 2010; Yun & Factors that generate, direct and perpetuate the &ow Poisson, 2010). However, smuggling by air (speci!- of migration include a lack of government invest- cally when fraudulent documents are involved in the ment, the prominence of smuggling during the col- process) is by far the most risky method at least in lecting period, the late start of Chinese investment terms of being detected and detained, due to the tight in the area, the promotion of overseas Chinese links security at international airports. Nevertheless it is the and migration by the village leadership as well as a most sought after method by Chinese migrants, due cultural component that has strong references to a to its convenience and relative physical safety (Zhang, tradition of migration. Furthermore, "unø and 2008). Maritime smuggling, according to Zhang et Pieke suggest that smugglers are simply a part of the al. (2007), has the potential to yield the largest pro!ts local institutions that have come to play a key role but also incurs the highest safety risks. in mediating the scope and the nature of Fujianese out-migration. Zhang et al. (2007) claim that arranged marriages represent the safest method for migrant smuggling, Yun and Poisson (2010) identify the pressure ex- yield the highest success rate, and induce the high- erted by internal migration as a factor in external est smuggling fees. In addition, methods that re- migration. Areas that boom in the course of China’s volve around immigration loopholes, which enable economic development attract millions of migrant migrants to obtain business and travel visas and to workers, which in the end may drive local workers simply overstay in the destination country, are con- (speci!cally from rural areas) to seek their chances sidered the safest and sometimes even the cheapest abroad. "e area around Wenzhou (Zhejiang Prov- ways to migrate (Pieke, 2010; Yun & Poisson, 2010). ince) was at the height of its economic development

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in the 1990s as a result of the dynamism of the non- the organizational and operational features of Chi- state sector. Many factories in the coastal provinces nese migrant smuggling groups operating in China produced goods for export, which attracted mil- and abroad. lions of migrants from the poorest regions in west- ern China. "ese migrants were prepared to accept Chinese migrants are smuggled to North America, any job for an extremely low salary. Migrants also Europe and Australia as well as neighbouring coun- formed new classes of businesspeople, which led to tries in the Asian region. "e most desired countries saturation of shops and boutiques (e.g. area around of destination appear to be the United States and the port of Wenzhou). "us, competition and stand- the UK; however, research suggests the growing im- still social mobility may push some parts of the rural portance of continental Europe in terms of irregular population to engage in irregular migration (speci!- Chinese migration. Smugglers have developed a vari- cally if overseas family bonds already exist). ety of smuggling methods and smuggle migrants by air, by land and by sea, practically transiting through Chin (2007) claims that local governmental cadres countries all over the world. at the village level who are willing to defy the central and provincial governments orders, are the main rea- "e traditional main sending regions in China are son why the Chinese Government (despite its many considered to be the rural areas of the south-eastern e#orts) is still unable to curb or eliminate the diverse coastal provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang. Studies, (irregular) migration &ows from China, speci!cally however, indicate that migration from China has from coastal villages in southern China. It is argued diversi!ed in terms of areas of origin and socio-eco- that these local government o$cials share the ben- nomic background. Migrants increasingly originate e!ts gained from out-migration, since they are local from the north-eastern provinces of Heilongjian, residents (e.g. remittances, investments in local in- Jinlin and Liaoning. Furthermore, migration &ows frastructure by migrants). are characterized by an increase in migrants from metropolitan areas, single women as well as young Zhang (2008) highlights corruption among some people and minors. o$cials in China as one of the major obstacles to anti-smuggling e#orts. However, Chinese authori- Research suggests that the vast majority of Chinese ties have attempted to address the problem at border citizens engaging in transnational migration are eco- checkpoints, streamlined border patrol functions, nomic migrants. In addition, unemployment, per- and increased the central government’s involvement sonal tragedies (divorce), China’s dual social security in control measures. Zhang concludes that the sig- system, local maritime history, traditional cultural ni!cant increase in prices for bribery in recent signs values, and personal development act as driving fac- is a clear sign of growing di$culties for smugglers. tors for Chinese to migrate.

Studies suggest that Chinese migrant smugglers are Conclusions often rather ordinary people of various backgrounds, including both men and women. Money was identi- a) What we know about migrant smuggling in !ed as the main driver for to engage China in the smuggling of migrants. Smuggling, however, appears to be a part-time business for most and "e vast majority of reviewed studies on Chinese mi- many seem to be engaged in other entrepreneurial grant smuggling focus on migrant smuggling from activities of some sort. the People’s Republic of China into the United States and Europe. Findings may therefore not be appli- Smugglers tend to not consider themselves to be cable to other regions in the world. Furthermore, it criminals, but rather service providers, a view that should be pointed out that very few studies have at- also seems to be shared by migrants, village commu- tempted to describe Chinese smuggling groups and nities and even local government o$cials. "us, re- their composition. In addition, most studies draw searchers consider the relationship between migrants their !ndings on the accounts of migrants or judicial and smuggler to be a business relationship, which case !les, which only provide a limited insight into dissolves after completion of the migration project.

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"e sometimes enormous smuggling fees are paid References with personal savings and the help of family and friends or by borrowing money from local money- Allan, G. M. and Szafran, O. (2005). Health of Chi- lenders. "e average repayment period was found nese illegal immigrants who arrived by boat on to be between two and ten years, depending on the the West Coast of Canada in 1999. In: Journal wage level in the destination country. Extensive use of Immigrant Health, 7(4), pp. 233–238. of violence, involvement in other criminal activities or connections to traditional organized crime seems Balzer, H. and Repnikova, M. (2010). Migration not to apply to Chinese migrant smugglers. Chi- between China and Russia. In: Post-Soviet Af- nese migrant smuggling networks seem to consist of fairs, 26(1), pp. 1–37. rather small, &exible and temporary groups with the ability to quickly adapt to market conditions. "ey Boontinand, J. V. (2010). Domestic workers in "ai- also make extensive use of corruption and the coun- land: their situation, challenges and the way terfeiting of documents. forward News@ILO: International Labour Or- ganization Subregional O$ce for East Asia. Many Chinese migrants live and work in precari- ous situations in their countries of destination. Boyle, R. (2009). My heart is here: Alternative care Although a direct connection between smuggling and reintegration of child tra$cking victims organizations and tra$cking in persons (including and other vulnerable children. labour exploitation) could not be established, re- search does suggest that the indebtedness of many Brees, I. (2008). Refugee business: Strategies of work migrants aggravates the situation and fosters ex- on the "ai-Burma border. In: Journal of Ref- ploitative conditions. ugee Studies, 21(3), pp. 380–397.

b) What we don’t know about migrant smug- Ceccagno, A., Ratrelli, R. and Salvati, A. (2010). gling in China Exploitation of Chinese immigrants in Italy. In: G. Yun (ed.). Concealed chains: Labour "ere is a lack of comprehensive and representative exploitation and Chinese migrants in Europe. literature on migrant smuggling in China. "e lack Geneva: International Labour Organization of information generally concerns all aspects of the (Vol. 1). phenomenon including irregular migration and traf- !cking &ows. Much of the knowledge on Chinese Chin, J. (2007). Patterns, trends and government migrant smuggling organizations is based on origi- policies: Understanding irregular migration nal research conducted by Zhang and Chin (2004). from China. In: E. A. D. Aryeetey (ed.). Test- Findings based on migrants’ accounts predomi- ing global interdependence: Issues on trade, aid, nantly refer to Chinese migrant smuggling into the migration and development. Cheltenham: Ed- United States and Europe. "us, general statements ward Elgar. and conclusions have to be treated with caution. "e gaps in knowledge speci!cally concern: Chu, J. Y. (2006). To be “emplaced”: Fuzhounese migration and the politics of destination. In: t systematic data on the role of corruption among Identities, 13(3), pp. 395–425. o$cials for migrant smuggling in China and in transit countries; D‘Amato, G., Gerber, B. and Kamm, M. (2005). t the relationship between migrant smuggling and Menschenschmuggel und irreguläre Migra- tra$cking in persons; tion in der Schweiz. In: SFM – Forschungsb- t the role of traditional organized crime groups in ericht 37. migrant smuggling; t a lack of information on the methods of trans- Gembicka, K. (2006). Baseline research on smuggling ferring criminal proceeds; and of migrants, in, from and through Central Asia. t the scope and magnitude of irregular migration, Vienna: International Organization for Mi- tra$cking in persons and migrant smuggling. gration.

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Hastings, V. J. (2009). Illicit &ows in the Hong Pieke, F. N. (2010). Migration journeys and working Kong-China-Taiwan triangle. In: Issues and conditions of Chinese irregular immigrants in Studies, 45(2), pp. 185–220. the United Kingdom. In: G. Yun (ed.), Con- cealed chains: Labour exploitation and Chinese International Organization for Migration. (2005). migrants in Europe. Geneva: International La- Data and research on human tra$cking: A bour Organization (Vol. 1). global survey. Geneva: International Organi- zation for Migration. Regional "ematic Working Group on Internation- al Migration Including Human Tra$cking. Kim, W. B. (2004). Migration of foreign workers (2008). Situation report on international migra- into the Republic of Korea: From periphery tion in East and South-East Asia. Bangkok, "ai- to semi-periphery in the global labor market. land: International Organization for Migration. In: Asian Survey, 44(2), pp. 316–335. Sheehan, J. (2009). Human tra"cking between China Lee, M. (2008). Policing Chinese migrant sex work- and the UK. Nottingham: China Policy Insti- ers in Hong Kong. In: International Migra- tute, University of Nottingham. tion, 46(3), pp. 95–121. Skeldon, R. (2004). China: From exceptional case Leung, H. C. and Lee, K. M. (2005). Immigration to global participant. Retrieved from http:// controls, life-course coordination and live- www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/dis- lihood strategies: A study of families living play.cfm?ID=219 (accessed 19 August 2011). across the mainland-Hong Kong border. In: Journal of Family and Economic Issues, 26(4), Soudijn, M. R. J. (2006). Chinese human smuggling pp. 487–507. in transit (!rst edition). Den Haag: Boom Ju- ridische Uitgevers. Lin, S. and Bax, T. (2009). Irregular emigration from Fuzhou: A rural perspective. In: Asian and Pa- Soudijn, M. R. J. and Kleemans, E. R. (2009). Chi- ci#c Migration Journal, 18(4), pp. 539–551. nese organized crime and situational context: Comparing human smuggling and synthetic Lin, W. T. and Tzu-Hsing Chen, C. (2007). How the drugs tra$cking. In: Crime, Law and Social sex industry market determines the distribu- Change, 52(5), pp. 457–474. tion of smuggling hot spots in Taiwan: An em- pirical study of of main- "unø, N. and Pieke, F. N. (2005). Institutional- land Chinese females to Taiwan. In: Flinders izing recent rural emigration from China to Journal of Law Reform, 8(10), pp. 775–793. Europe: New transnational villages in Fujian. In: !e International Migration Review, 39(2), Neske, M. (2007). Menschenschmuggel. Deutschland pp. 485–514. als Transit- und Zielland irregulärer Migration. Stuttgart: Lucius and Lucius. United States Department of State. (2010). Tra"ck- ing in persons report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Neske, M., Heckmann, F. and Rühl, S. (2004). Men- Department of State. schenschmuggel. Bamberg: European Forum for Migration Studies. United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Tra$cking. (2010). !e Mekong region human Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, A. (2008). Transit migra- country datasheets on human tra"cking 2010. tion: !e missing link between emigration and Bangkok: UNIAP. settlement. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Wei, B. (2008). Reporting human tra"cking in Chi- Petros, M. (2005). "e costs of human smuggling na’s print media. "e Institute of Journalism and tra$cking. In: Global Migration Perspec- and Communication and the Chinese Acad- tives (31). emy of Social Sciences.

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Yun, G. and Poisson, V. (2010). Exploitation of Chinese migrants’ vulnerabilities in France. In: G. Yun (ed.), Concealed chains: Labour exploitation and Chinese migrants in Europe. Geneva: International Labour Organization (Vol. 1).

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Zhang, S. X., Chin, K. L. and Miller, J. (2007). Women’s participation in Chinese transna- tional human smuggling: A gendered mar- ket perspective. In: Criminology, 45(3), pp. 699–733.

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114 !#70'4&%*8#9':*';#$<#=*%'.&%5.'

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1) Quantitative assessments and $ows of irregular the scope and magnitude of irregular migration migration, migrant smuggling, and tra"cking in from the southern state of Tamil Nadu and Punjab persons in India is extensive (Saha, 2009; UNODC, 2009). From Tamil Nadu, there are two streams of irregular a) Estimated numbers and major routes: Irreg- migration: (1) unskilled irregular migration to the ular migration from, to and through India Middle East and South-East Asia, and (2) irregular migration to destination countries in Western Eu- India has arguably never promoted overseas labour rope. In an examination of 169 law enforcement re- migration; as a result, the percentages of migrant cords, Saha (2009) found that 25 percent of the cases workers abroad are small compared to the national related to Europe. "e UK was the preferred desti- labour force as a whole (Oishi, 2005). If an estimat- nation, although other targeted countries included ed 20 million Indians live abroad, as a percentage of Austria, Greece, Sweden, Italy, Germany, Ireland, the total population of India (1.21 billion), this is Poland, France, and the Netherlands (see Table 5). just under 2 percent. Nevertheless, India is still one Apart from destinations in Europe, other destina- of the !ve major South Asian labour sending coun- tions, excluding countries in the Middle East and tries (Martin, 2009). South-East Asia (e.g. Singapore), were the United States of America, Canada, the Republic of Korea, No data is systematically collected in India on irreg- Japan, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. ular migration. "e available information is largely derived from deportation data, limited !eld research, Although the deportation !gures from Chennai In- and media reports. Available evidence suggests that ternational airport highlighted in Table 5 are for a '/647(RI("0>,/0(>7D8.1775(9.82(81G7.(;8301.,75(NS/03/.@T!/@(KUUVO(N:G700/,(/,.D8.1O ?67&:.@ O%&(PQR N"A(PQR DĂƌĐŚ͛Ϭϳ 2,.-#(PQR C%@(PQR

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limited period (January to May 2007), the data indi- "e UNODC (2009) report illustrates that irregu- cates the volume of irregular migration (Saha, 2009). lar migration from the north-west state of Punjab is In 2007, an average of 140 people per month were both substantial and increasing. Estimates suggest either deported or prevented from departing by im- that over 20,000 youths from Punjab attempt to migration authorities. "e UNODC report (Saha, migrate through irregular channels each year. Based 2009) also reveals that Chennai, the capital of Tamil upon the review of immigration o#ence-related re- Nadu, is a transit point for irregular migrants not cords at the Indira Gandhi International Airport at just from within the state itself, but also from Andhra Delhi for the years 2005 to 2007, UNODC esti- Pradesh, Kerala, and other northern states. Irregular mates that almost half (47%) of the migration of- migrants from Sri Lanka, speci!cally from the Liber- fences related to Europe. ation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) dominant areas, are known to transit through Chennai. Somalis, Ira- Out of the cases of irregular migration to Europe, 27 nians, Iraqis, and Afghans have used Chennai airport percent related to the UK. Field visits con!rmed the as a transit point for destination countries in Europe. UK as the preferred destination. Indians are largest

'/647(WI("0>,/0(>7D8.1775(9.82(81G7.(;8301.,75(NKUURTKUUVO(NH74G,(/,.D8.1O X"%./ X"%./ ?67&:.@ ?67&:.@ UQQY UQQZ UQQR UQQY UQQZ UQQR ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ !" $* $( WŚŝůŝƉƉŝŶĞƐ !' $" # ĞůŐŝƵŵ % $) ( WŽůĂŶĚ % % $* ĂŶĂĚĂ #( $'( $!% WŽƌƚƵŐĂů ) ! ) ŚŝŶĂ $$ # $& YĂƚĂƌ $& !" *% &ƌĂŶĐĞ $'" %% (( ZƵƐƐŝĂ $") #( $'" 'ĞƌŵĂŶLJ &* %) &" ^ĂƵĚŝƌĂďŝĂ $) &!! ")) ,ŽŶŐ<ŽŶŐ $!" $$' !'* ^ŝŶŐĂƉŽƌĞ )!) )## !#% /ƌĞůĂŶĚ ) ! $ ^ůŽǀĂŬŝĂ ' $$ $ :ĂƉĂŶ $&! #& $*$ ^ŽƵƚŚĨƌŝĐĂ )# )$ $'*

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:ŽƌĚĂŶ $ $* ( ^ƉĂŝŶ $$ ( ( <ĂnjĂŬŚƐƚĂŶ ! ' $ ^ƌŝ>ĂŶŬĂ $'' #% !'% <ĞŶLJĂ !( *& "" ^ƵĚĂŶ $ ! & ^ŽƵƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ $&$ !!( )$* ^ǁĞĚĞŶ ! # !! <ƵǁĂŝƚ %* %* #% ^ǁŝƚnjĞƌůĂŶĚ & $! $' >ĞďĂŶŽŶ $ & ! ^LJƌŝĂ $* $! $% >ŝďLJĂ " % ) dŚĂŝůĂŶĚ $")) %(! $)!* >ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ ! ' ' dƵƌŬĞLJ $) # !( DĂůĂLJƐŝĂ #!( #&( *"# dƵƌŬŵĞŶŝƐƚĂŶ $ $& ' DĂůĚŝǀĞƐ $! !' !) h "&& #!% $$'# DĂůƚĂ $! !' !) hŐĂŶĚĂ " ' # DĂƵƌŝƟƵƐ !' !! $* h^ !*! !') !*) DŽƌŽĐĐŽ $' )! ! h< )'' )%# *)# EĞƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚƐ )* )! "# hŬƌĂŝŶĞ &$ % $# EŽƌǁĂLJ $! * ) hnjďĞŬŝƐƚĂŶ $# $! ! EĞǁĞĂůĂŶĚ *$ "( $% zƵŐŽƐůĂǀŝĂ $ !$ & EŝŐĞƌŝĂ $ $& ! ŝŵďĂďǁĞ % * ' KŵĂŶ $'! $$& $)$

56:%#(69(%##('67&:.-"/ YVUV(((((((((((((((((((((((((((((RQR[((((((((((((((((((((((((((((RUZT ;^ŽƵƌĐĞ͗hEK͕ϮϬϬϵͿ single ethnic minority group in Britain. As of 2010, Czech Republic, Hungary, and even the Scandina- the population of Indians in Britain was 1.4 million. vian countries were reportedly transit countries for "e number is expected to almost double to 2.67 onward travel to the UK or other Western countries. million by 2051. Indians are also estimated to hold Russia and the Ukraine are also key transit countries 19 percent of work visas (Düvell & Jordon, 2005). for irregular migration to Western Europe while Ka- In most of the reviewed deportation cases from Pun- zakhstan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia are emerg- jab and Tamil Nadu, irregular migrants travelled to ing transit points. Aside from countries in Western the UK via France on tourist visas, but then irregu- Europe, other destination countries include the larly entered the UK. Other migrants entered the USA, Canada, the Republic of Korea, Japan, South UK with tourist visas, but then overstayed. However, Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. o$cials at the British High Commission in Delhi disputed this contention, claiming that most irregu- "ailand, Malaysia, the UAE, and Singapore are also lar migrants from India enter the UK clandestinely major recipients of irregular migrants from India. As and not with a tourist visa. Other popular destina- irregular migration often parallels patterns of regular tion countries in Europe for irregular migrants from migration &ows, it is not surprising that certain Mid- Punjab included Germany, Austria, Spain, Belgium, dle Eastern and Asian countries have become major France, Italy, Greece, Norway, Switzerland, Bosnia, destinations for irregular migrants from India. Over Sweden, Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, Poland, the the last couple of decades, countries have introduced Czech Republic, and Hungary (Saha, 2009; UNO- bilateral agreements aimed at liberalizing market ac- DC, 2009; see also Table 6). cess for business and professional categories (IOM, 2008). Singapore, for example, relaxed visa restric- Not all countries shown in Table 6 are destination tions for Indian professions in 127 categories, in- countries for irregular Indian migrants (UNODC, cluding engineering, information technology, and 2009). For example, Bosnia, Portugal, Poland, the nursing (IOM, 2008). In December 2006, the UAE

117 2*-.&"%#345--,*"-#*"#!6*&

signed a MOU with India on labour and manpower destination, which for most migrants was Western sourcing. Less than a year later, the UAE Ministry of Europe. Although an exact percentage is not given, Labour claimed that there were 3.1 million foreign Saha claims that migrants who sought the services of workers (not just Indians) in the country. "e !g- smugglers had a higher success rate than ones who ure is suspected to be higher, however, as estimates had migrated on their own. from embassy o$cials suggest that Indians alone ac- count for 1.4 million UAE residents (Human Rights Although research on the scope and magnitude of Watch, 2009). migrant smuggling in relation to India is limited, some information is available, particularly on the Both Malaysia and "ailand have large numbers of major routes and hubs used. One preferred smug- irregular migrants from Asian countries, including gling route is Delhi – Moscow – Ukraine and then India, especially in the manufacturing, construc- into Eastern and Western Europe (Saha, 2007; tion, plantation, and service industries (Amnesty UNODC, 2009). Entry to Western Europe via International, 2004; IOM, 2008). Again, research Greece is an additional common option (UNODC, suggests that most irregular migrants enter through 2009). Another popular route is via Bangkok to authorized channels, but become undocumented for countries in South-East Asia as well as Japan, Hong various reasons (e.g. overstaying their visas, enter- Kong (China), the Republic of Korea, Australia, ing without proper documentation, or losing their and New Zealand. Some migrants reportedly tran- legal status during their stay in Malaysia or "ai- sit through countries in Eastern Europe, such as the land) (Amnesty International, 2004). A signi!cant Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, before being number of migrants also contact agents in Bangkok, smuggled into Western Europe. In one third of the illustrating that "ailand is not just a destination, cases, remote border crossings were used to enter but also transit country for irregular Indian migrants into countries (Saha, 2007). (UNODC, 2009). According to UNODC (2011), a popular route in India is also a destination for regular and irregular the past was to travel from India to Europe via West migrants from Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka and North Africa, and then cross into Europe by sea. (Das, 2008; Datta, 2004). "e Government of In- However, increased patrols by Spanish and Moroc- dia estimates that 20 million irregular migrants are can authorities and the six meter high, barbed wire residing in India (“India has 20 Million Irregular fences built around Ceuta and Melilla — two Span- Migrants”, 2010). Political and religious tensions, ish enclaves on Moroccan mainland — has meant demographic pressures, poverty, and environmental that numbers have dropped substantially. In 2006, disasters are some of the push factors that contrib- for example, the Direction Générale de la Sûreté ute to migration &ows into India from neighbouring Nationale (DGSN), the Moroccan national security countries (Das, 2008; Datta, 2004). Pull factors in- service, busted a major smuggling ring that brought clude better employment opportunities, land avail- migrants from India to Europe and Canada via Sub- ability, medical care, education, and similar cultural Saharan Africa and Morocco. landscapes (Das, 2008; Datta, 2004). c) Estimated numbers and major routes: Traf- b) Estimated numbers and major routes: Mi- #cking in persons from, within, to and grant smuggling from, to and through India through India

In an earlier study involving deportation records of According to the U.S. Department of State (2010) Indian nationals to Indira Gandhi airport in New Tra"cking in Persons Report, India is a source, tran- Delhi, Saha (2007) found that out of 1,108 cases, sit, and destination country for men, women, boys, 158 had reported using the services of smugglers, al- and girls tra$cked into forced labour, debt bond- though it is suspected that not all deportees would age, and commercial sexual exploitation. Forced have openly disclosed this information. "e ma- to work in brick kilns, rice mills, agriculture, and jority, however, had attempted to migrate on their carpet making factories, it is estimated that 90 per- own through irregular channels. Approximately 28 cent of tra$cking in India is internal, most com- percent were successful in reaching their preferred ing from the most disadvantaged socio-economic

118 !#70'4&%*8#9':*';#$<#=*%'.&%5.'

backgrounds (Dewey, 2008; Hameed, Hlatshwayo, As noted above, not all tra$cking in India is trans- Tanner, Turker, & Yang, 2010; U.S. Department of national. In one study that examined HIV among State, 2010). Forced domestic work is also a prob- women and girls tra$cked into sex work, 82 percent lem in the states of Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, of victims came from the state of Karnataka, a state Chhattisgarh, and Orissa (U.S. Department of in Southwest India (Gupta et al., 2009). "e major- State, 2010). ity were tra$cked to Mumbai (52.5%) and Delhi (26.2%). Over a third (34.4%) were forced to work Despite the diverse nature of work in which indi- as prostitutes for a period of one to !ve years while viduals are employed, most the available literature 21.3% had worked in forced prostitution for one focuses on tra$cking for the purposes of prostitu- year or less. Two women (3.3%) had endured forced tion (Blanchet, 2005; Crawford, 2010; Gupta, Raj, prostitution for !ve years or more. For the rest of the Decker, Reed, & Silverman, 2009; Hameed, et al., victims, the duration of the forced prostitution was 2010; Kara, 2009; Kotiswaran, 2008; Sarkar et al., unknown. 2008). Women and girls from Nepal, Bangladesh, and the Indian states of Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Data from the National Crime Records Bureau Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Karna- (NCRB) in Table 7 suggests that the prevalence of taka are tra$cked to Falkland Road and Kamathi- tra$cking in persons in India is declining (Ghosh, pura, two popular red light districts in Mumbai, for 2009). Ghosh, however, is sceptical of these !gures. forced prostitution (Crawford, 2010; Ghosh, 2009; Studies carried out by external researchers, he argues, Kara, 2009; U.S. Department of State, 2010). Al- dispute government !ndings. Ghosh contends that though one study showed that almost one in every the actual scale of the problem is unknown because four sex workers (24%) had joined the profession of its clandestine nature, its correlation with internal by being tra$cked, it is important to note that sex and cross-border migration, under reporting, and work and tra$cking are not synonymous (Sarkar, the methodological challenges associated with col- et al., 2008).11 Distinctions must be made between lecting accurate data. coercive and debt bondage situations and situa- tions where no deceit or abuse is involved, a point Further analysis of government data illustrates that made clearly by Kotiswaran (2008) in her study on the decline is far from uniform, and arguably inac- Sonagachi, one of India’s largest red light districts curate, due to problems such as police corruption, in Calcutta. category de!nitions (e.g., what is kidnapping), and human problems in reporting (e.g., reluctance of "e remote villages of Kamal Doha and Gorhiya, traumatized victims to testify or even report crimes). situated near the Nepalese border, are both source For example, when the data are disaggregated by and transit points for victims of tra$cking (Kara, state, Ghosh notes that just four southern states — 2009). Bribes are reportedly paid to police to en- Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala sure safe passage at both formal and informal border — account for 76 percent of the cases in 2006. But crossings. Routes frequently change in an attempt when this data are compared with the background of to avoid law enforcement o$cials. However, it is tra$cked victims, discrepancies are found. Research common for Nepalese tra$ckers to cross at the bor- conducted by the Action Research on Tra$cking der towns of Biratnagar, Bagdora, Kuchbihar, and in Women and Children (ARTWAC) found that Birganj, and then hand over the victims to local In- most victims were from the states of Maharashtra, dian tra$ckers who complete the trip to Varanasi or Bihar, Rajasthan, Delhi, and West Bengal, including Gorakhpur. Here, victims are handed over again to Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. dalals who take them to Mumbai, New Delhi, Cal- cutta, Chennai, and other large Indian cities with red Evidence also suggests that young girls and women light districts. from Bangladesh and Nepal are tra$cked to India for the purposes of marriage (Blanchet, 2005; Ghosh, 2009; U.S. Department of State, 2010).12 But again, 11 "e study involved 580 sex workers from four districts in West Bengal as Ghosh points out, rarely are these cases reported – Calcutta, 24 Parganas (North), Jalpaiguri, and 24 Parganas (South) who voluntarily agreed to participate in the research between May to October 2006. 12 "e legal age of marriage for women in India is 18 years.

119 2*-.&"%#345--,*"-#*"#!6*&

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to the police. Research shows that women and girls the entire journey from India to their preferred destina- from Bangladesh are sold as wives, mostly to men of tion on their own, without the assistance of smugglers Uttar Pradesh in the northern part of India (Blanchet, (Saha, 2009). "at said, most irregular migrants enter 2005). Her research documented a total of 112 cases destination countries through o$cial channels, but ei- between 2001 and 2003. "irty cases were found in ther overstay their visas or lose their legal status (Saha, Jessore and Satkhira while 67 cases came from villages 2009; UNODC, 2009). Other migrants who are un- in Rajshahi, Nawabgonj and Dinajpur districts. An able to obtain legitimate work, study, or tourist visas additional 15 cases were included from Jaipur, which reach destination countries with the assistance of India is situated Rajasthan, India, because the victims were based agencies, which are described as not being smug- Bangladeshi migrants living in India. Interviews with glers per se, but know how to work the immigration dalals and dalalis (the tra$ckers) indicate that the system (Düvell & Jordon, 2005). preference is to sell girls in Punjab or Kashmir rather than Uttar Pradesh because it was more pro!table. Irregular migrants, because of their status, are highly Even in Uttar Pradesh, prices were higher in Harid- vulnerable to exploitation, victimization, tra$ck- war and Bereilly than in Basti or Gonda (Blanchet, ing, and abuse (Amnesty International, 2004). "e 2005). Reasons why girls are more pro!table in some research of Leman and Janssens (2007) suggests that states compared to others are not given. migrant smuggling networks with Indian linkages are also involved in the tra$cking of persons. Clearly d) Cross-over or overlap, if any, between popu- though, more research is needed to fully understand lations or routes the linkages between irregular migration, migrant smuggling, and tra$cking in persons. "ere is considerable overlap among irregular, smuggled, and tra$cked migrant populations. "e relationship between irregular migration and migrant smuggling 2) Pro#les of migrant smugglers is highlighted throughout the literature, with most re- searchers recognizing the role migrant smuggling plays a) Geographical and socio-economic charac- in facilitating irregular migration (e.g. see Saha, 2007, teristics 2009; UNODC, 2011). Some irregular migrants use the services of smugglers for speci!c purposes (e.g. to Of the literature reviewed, two studies provided in- obtain a visa). After receiving their visas, migrants make formation on the pro!le of migrant smugglers. Ac-

120 !#70'4&%*8#9':*';#$<#=*%'.&%5.'

cording to Saha (2009), 84 percent of smuggling operating as agents (UNODC, 2009). "e number agents were based in Tamil Nadu, with the major- of agents was also growing in the districts of Sangrur, ity based in Chennai (71%). Although smuggling Fatehgarh Sahib, Moga, and Faridkot in Punjab as agents were scattered across the city of Chennai, well as the state of Haryana, and the UNODC re- most of their businesses were established in good port suggests that irregular migration and smuggling residential areas. Most operated under the guise of from these districts is likely to increase in the coming travel or recruitment agencies and had been in busi- years. ness for several years. Half (50%) of the smuggling agents were between 31 and 50 years of age. b) Motivation

Similar characteristics are found in Punjab. Jaland- "ere is a complete lack of information on the mo- har is a key hub, although agents were dispersed tivation of migrant smugglers in the Indian context. across the state. "e proliferation of agents in Punjab is attributed to the high demand for their services (UNODC, 2009). Half (50%) of the agents were 3) Pro#les of irregular migrants and smuggled between 31 and 50 years while the other half (50%) migrants were between 21 and 25 years of age. "e UNODC report states that most, if not all, of the agents o#ered a) Geographical and socio-economic charac- migrant smuggling services under the guise of travel teristics or recruitment agencies. "e older age cohort had likely been in business for a number of years while According to Saha’s research, the vast majority of ir- the younger cohort represented the up and coming regular and smuggled migrants are from the states generation. One key di#erence between Tamil Nadu of Tamil Nadu and Punjab (Saha, 2009; UNODC, and Punjab was that most of the agents in Punjab 2009). Table 8 indicates of the 169 deportation were subagents rather than principal agents. Princi- cases recorded at Chennai International airport, 41 pal agents were largely based in main cities in Punjab percent of deported migrants were from the state or Delhi. of Tamil Nadu while 18 percent were from Andhra Pradesh (Saha, 2009). In both states, most of the agents were male, al- though a few females in Punjab are engaged in the Yet, earlier research between 2001 and 2002 that in- migrant smuggling business (Saha, 2009; UNODC, volved an examination of 1108 deportation records 2009). In some cases, both husband and wife were of Indian citizens from other countries to Indira

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Gandhi International airport in New Delhi revealed ticularly among youth, are reasons why people seek a higher number of deportees from Punjab (Saha, employment abroad (Saha, 2009; UNODC, 2009). 2007). Of the 158 migrants who reported using Migrants are often young men from families with an the services of smugglers, three quarters were from older relative who currently works or has previously the state of Punjab while 13 percent were from the worked in Europe (UNODC, 2009, 2011). "us, neighbouring state of Haryana, which until 1966, the decision to migrate is related to networks abroad, was part of Punjab. but also the search for better economic opportuni- ties (Bartolomei, 2010; UNODC, 2009, 2011; La- "e pro!le of irregular and smuggled migrants in hiri, 2010; Saha, 2009). Young men are urged by India varies according to their place of origin. In the their families and relatives to earn income in Europe state of Tamil Nadu, smuggled and irregular migrants (UNODC, 2011). In her research on male domestic are largely low skilled labourers from rural areas with workers in Italy, Bartolomei (2010) found that wages high unemployment, failed crops, and growing costs were 10 times higher in Italy than in Kerala, India. of cultivation, which, in turn, yield huge debt bur- "e respondents were also motivated to take on do- dens (Saha, 2009). Of the 169 deportation cases re- mestic work because it provided board and lodging, viewed, more than 30 percent of the migrants came reduced expenses, and enabled them to save and re- from the district of Tanjavur. If the neighbouring mit more.13 For these reasons, men, even if they held districts of "iruvarur and Pudukkottai are included, a diploma or had attended university, were willing to the number reaches 45 percent (Saha, 2009). Most accept what is often viewed as a subordinate, femi- (43.2%) of the deported migrants from Tamil Nadu nine role.14 were men between the ages of 21 to 25 (19.5%) and 25 to 30 (23.7%) years. Research reveals that the decision to migrate is often not an individual decision, but a group one, often In the state of Punjab, smuggled and irregular mi- made by the male members of the household (Bar- grants are young men from rich agricultural fami- tolomei, 2010). Sending someone to work overseas lies in rural areas (Saha, 2007). Delhi International is seen as a step towards success. "e social structure airport deportation data from 2001 to 2007 reveals of the village, which was traditionally based on caste, that over half of irregular migration cases come from landholding, family background, and educational just four districts — Jalandhar, Kapurthala, Nawa- achievements, is now based on the distinction be- nshahr, and Hoshiarpur — in Punjab (UNODC, tween families with members in other countries and 2009). Cases of irregular migration to the UK were families without members in other countries (Saha, noted in almost every village in each district. All four 2009). "us, families are involved in the decision to districts in Punjab are prosperous with long histories send someone as well as in the smuggling process it- of migration. More than 50 percent of the families self (Saha, 2007, 2009). Families in Tamil Nadu and already have at least one member working abroad. Punjab typically contact the smugglers and mobi- Consequently, the social networks in destination lize the cash to pay the fees (Saha, 2009; UNODC, countries, which help facilitate irregular migration, 2009). are well established. Like Tamil Nadu, most of the deported irregular migrants were in the age group "e general attitude concerning migration among of 21 and 30 (61%, 53%, and 50% in 2005, 2006, youth in India is an additional motivating factor. and 2007 respectively). "e majority of irregular Some districts have a long history of migration that migrants from Punjab had a Matriculation level dates back to the Partition. Other youth see migra- (Standard X, equivalent to grade 10) or Intermediate tion as the best alternative, especially when faced by (Standard XII, equivalent to grade 12) level. high unemployment rates, failed crops, and mount- ing debt at home. Potential irregular or smuggled b) Motivation

13 In her sample of 48 Keralites, all were legal migrants (Bartolomei, "e reviewed research points out that because of lim- 2010). ited legal migration channels, most migrants resort 14 Bartolomei (2010) also notes that while women in Kerala are respon- sible for domestic chores in the household (e.g. cleaning, cooking, to irregular migration (UNODC, 2009). In addi- laundry, and childcare), domestic service as a public profession (e.g. tion, low wages and high unemployment rates, par- restaurants and hotels) is performed mostly by men.

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migrants learn about the success of previous mi- West African networks. Smugglers were in constant grants from their districts or villages, who are regard- contact with West (Burkina Faso and Mali) and ed as role models. With strong networks abroad, in North African (Morocco and Algeria) counterparts. the UK for example, potential migrants are con!- A group of migrants from Punjab reported being dent that they will !nd work. For example, although kept in the same house in Mali as migrants from many irregular migrants had opportunities to remain Bangladesh. "e Indian and Bangladeshi smugglers in France or go to other countries in Europe, the UK who had organized their trips visited the migrants was the preferred destination (UNODC, 2009). together at the safe house and jointly demanded that each group pay the smugglers additional money to reach their !nal European destination. "e migrants 4) Smuggler-migrant relationships then continued their journey as one large group. One Indian migrant claimed that the entire journey a) Migrant perceptions of smugglers across the Sahara and into Melilla, Spain was with a mixed group of South Asian and West African mi- "ere is no research on migrants and their percep- grants; although his experience seemed to be an ex- tions of smugglers in the Indian context. ception (UNODC, 2011).

b) Nature of migrant-smuggler relationship Investigations focusing on smuggling into Eastern Europe also suggest that Albanian smuggling net- Of the literature reviewed, only one study sheds works have linkages with Indian as well as Chinese some light on the nature of the relationships be- criminal organizations. Research reveals that Indian tween smugglers and migrants. Saha (2007) found criminal networks are involved in the recruitment that approximately 60 percent of migrants did not and delivery of Asian smuggling clients to Albanian know the names of their smugglers while fewer than smugglers based in Brussels, who then take charge 5 percent had an address for the smuggler. Deported of transportation for the last part of the trip from migrants had phone numbers in just two out of 158 Brussels to Britain. One of the Albanian networks cases. Interviews with deportees also suggested that studied has smuggled approximately 13,000 clients smugglers constantly shifted from one place to an- to Britain over a two-year period (Leman & Jans- other to remain elusive. In almost 10 percent of the sens, 2007). cases, the identity of the smuggler revealed by de- portees was the same. Other research supports these !ndings. Interviews with deported Indian migrants revealed that 8 per- c) Factors in"uencing the relationship between cent had used the services of smugglers based in smugglers and migrants other in countries, mainly Russia, Poland Ukraine, Serbia, and "ailand (Saha, 2007). Four of the de- "ere is a complete lack of data on factors that in&u- portees indicated that the smugglers abroad were ence the nature of the relationship between smug- originally from India, but now had citizenship or glers and migrants. permanent resident status in another country. Some deportees indicated that the smugglers had escorted them to a transit destination and then handed them 5) Organization of migrant smuggling over to a foreign agent. Safe houses at transits points were also reportedly used. Migrants sometimes spent a) How is migrant smuggling organized? more than a month at a safe house before continuing on to the !nal destination. Some deportees stated From the reviewed literature, there is clear evidence they were grouped together at safe house with other that the smuggling of migrants is carried out through smuggled migrants from other countries. Groups large trans-regional networks (UNODC, 2011; Le- ranged in size from 5 to 50 migrants. man & Janssens, 2007; Saha, 2007, 2009). For ex- ample, interviews with smuggled migrants who had "e research suggests that smuggling networks use travelled to Europe via the trans-Saharan route in- di#erent people for di#erent tasks, with each link in dicated linkages between South Asian networks and the chain playing a particular role. Important actors

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in the network are the agents in larger Indian cit- b) Are persons involved in migrant smuggling ies and the subagents in rural areas. "e subagents also involved in other criminal activities? develop their businesses by establishing contacts with recruitment agents who advertise job oppor- Some evidence exists that Indian migrant smug- tunities in di#erent countries in local newspapers gling networks are also involved in the tra$cking in (Saha, 2009; UNODC, 2009). "ey also visit lo- persons although further research is required before cal passport o$ces, o#ering to act a liaison between de!nitive conclusions can be drawn (Leman & Jans- the recruitment agent and the migrant. "e role of sens, 2007). the subagent is to recruit or mobilize potential mi- grants for agents located in Chennai or other cities, c) Does migrant smuggling attract persons such as Delhi. Often they do not even accompany who have a history of involvement in other the migrants as contacts can be established over the crime? telephone. Once contact is established, the subagent takes commission from both the migrant and the No conclusions can be drawn from reviewed re- recruitment agent (Saha, 2009; UNODC, 2009). search as to whether migrant smuggling attracts A subagent is able to earn from 10,000 to 15,000 persons who have a history of involvement in other Indian Rupees (USD 220 to USD 330) per migrant crime. (Saha, 2009; UNODC, 2009). Because migrants do not know much information about their agents d) What levels of professionalism/specializa- or subagents, rarely are arrests made by the police. tion is there within migrant smugglers? Moreover, reputation and trust are essential for smuggling agents and subagents who want to build According to the literature reviewed, the smug- a clientele. Agents often provide guarantees, for in- gling of migrants in India tends to be carried out by stance, by o#ering migrants a couple of attempts highly sophisticated, professional networks (Saha, to reach their destination if the !rst attempt is not 2007, 2009; UNODC, 2009). Indian criminal net- successful or even refunding the fee paid if both at- works involved in smuggling have established inter- tempts fail (Saha, 2009). national linkages in East and West Europe, Central and Southeast Asia, and Africa (UNODC, 2009, In some cases, up to three agents are involved (UNO- 2011; Leman & Janssens, 2007; Saha, 2009). Saha DC, 2009). "e UNODC (2009) report suggests that (2009) found that agents often o#er a ‘money back migrant smuggling operations in India are involved guarantee’. If a migrant fails to reach the destina- in di#erent activities (e.g. recruiting migrants, trans- tion, the agent returns the fees paid upfront after porting migrants, and forging documentation) and as costs incurred are deducted. Normally there is an a result, agents often work as a group. Carrier agents agreement between the agent and the migrant that a are also common actors in the migrant smuggling net- second attempt to the same or an alternative desti- works, a few of whom are female (UNODC, 2009). nation will be part of the price if the !rst attempt is Similar to Lahiri’s (2010) !ndings, female carriers not successful. Agents acknowledge that the amount are preferred because they attract less attention from paid might have to be refunded if both attempts law enforcement and border o$cials. "ey were also fail, but most are willing to take this chance because able to accompany children. Most carrier agents are pro!t margins are high when a journey is successful. from Delhi. "eir service is required because some Some agents, in Namakkal district (Tamil Nadu) for migrants are not comfortable travelling on their own example, claim a 100 percent success rate, which ac- with fraudulent documents. "e amount paid to a car- cording to Saha is a clear sign that Indian smugglers rier depends on the number of migrants. Although the are part of transnational network with strong link- data are limited to just six cases, the !gure ranged from ages in origin, transit, and destination countries. 200,000 to 600,000 Indian Rupees (USD 4,400 to Also the high quality of the forgeries suggests that USD 13,000). "e recruitment agents cover expenses, migrant smuggling is carried out by highly sophisti- such as travel, lodging, and board of the carrier agents. cated criminal networks. "e UNODC (2009) study reports that irregular mi- grants who are accompanied by carrier agents typically Little is known, however, about the irregular and pay higher fees to the recruitment agents. migrant smuggling networks that operate along the

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border near Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Bhutan, d) Transportation methods and Sri Lanka. "e perception among police o$cers and government o$cials in Punjab is that agents Smugglers transport migrants by air, land, and sea have become more professional over the years and using modes of transportation that include planes, operate through closely-knit networks within and boats, private vehicles, closed container trucks, outside of India (UNODC, 2009). trains, and by foot. Because the majority of data on smuggled migrants from India are derived from de- e) What in"uences shape the way migrant portation records, most of the information available smugglers are organized? How and why do involves the smuggling of migrants by air. (Saha, these organizations evolve? 2007, 2009; UNODC, 2009).

No conclusions can be drawn from reviewed research e) Document use and misuse as to what in&uences the way migrant smugglers are organized. According to the literature reviewed, the use of forged Indian, including photo or jacket substitu- tion, re-stitched passports, forged foreign visas, the 6) Migrant smuggling modus operandi use of foreign passports such as false Malaysian pass- ports, which require no visa to visit the UK, and a) Recruitment methods the exchange of boarding cards in security areas, are common methods used by smugglers (Saha, 2007, "ere is a lack of research on the methods of recruit- 2009; UNODC, 2009). "e use of photo substi- ment. Potential migrants are typically recruited by tuted passports and forged foreign visas are common subagents based in rural areas of India (Saha, 2009, strategies used by agents. On average, forged visas of UNODC, 2009). Larger agents, who are based in di#erent countries were used in about one third of main cities, such as Chennai or Delhi, advertise em- deportation cases between 2005 and 2007 (UNO- ployment opportunities abroad in local newspapers DC, 2009). and billboards, which, in turn, attract both subagents as well as potential migrants (Saha, 2007, 2009; f) Corruption UNODC, 2009). Increasingly, more and more mi- grants are directly contracting agents themselves, "ere is not research on the role of corruption re- speci!cally in Delhi, rather than going through sub- garding migrant smuggling in India. agents who are the lowest in the hierarchal network. As a result, agents from Punjab have reportedly start- g) Evolution of migrant smuggling methods ed to shift their base to Delhi (UNODC, 2009). in response to changes in migration policies and counter measures b) Payment methods "e available research about migrant smuggling from "ere is a dearth of research on the methods of pay- India does not address the question how migrant ment for migrant smuggling fees. Evidence suggests smuggling methods evolve in response to changes in that some payments are made in advance before the policies and counter measures. journey commenced (Saha, 2007). However, pay- ment in instalments seems more common, with a partial payment before departure and the rest upon 7) Migrant smuggling fees and mobilization of reaching the destination (Saha, 2007; UNODC, fees 2009). "e research literature provides some information c) Transfer of criminal proceeds on the cost of migrant smuggling: Deported Indian migrants between 2001 and 2002 reportedly paid "ere is a complete lack of research on the meth- migrant smuggling fees ranging from USD 200 to ods used to transfer criminal proceeds from migrant USD 10,000 (Saha, 2007). No correlations, accord- smuggling in India. ing to Saha, were found between destination coun-

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tries and the amount paid to smugglers. In a later Because most migrants are young men urged by their report, Saha (2009) found that the fees charged by families to seek work abroad, parents and other rela- agents had increased because of stricter enforcement, tives will sell or borrow funds from banks or infor- but also because of high demand. Most irregular mal money lenders to mobilize the fees (UNODC, migrants paid between 500,000 and 600,000 In- 2011; also see Van Esveld, 2009). Migrants and their dian Rupees (USD 11,000 and USD 13,000) to families also reportedly sold possessions, such as land reach the UK. For migrants destined for the Middle or jewellery, to accumulate the required fees (Human East or South-East Asia, fees range between 80,000 Rights Watch, 2009). and 120,000 Indian Rupees (USD 1,700 to USD 2,600). A report by Human Rights Watch reveals that Indian migrant workers paid recruitment agen- 8) Human and social costs of migrant smuggling cies an average of 125,000 Indian Rupees (USD 2,800) for employment in the UAE (Human Rights Research reveals that on the one hand, Indian em- Watch, 2009). ployers in Britain felt a moral obligation to assist fel- low migrants irrespective of their immigration status. Table 9 presents additional data on the migrant smug- On the other hand, some business owners admitted gling fees charged by agents (UNODC, 2009). It is relying on irregular migrant labour because of their clear from the table below that the fees paid are sig- willingness to accept harsh working conditions and ni!cant. Fees for Canada and the US were reportedly low wages in service, manufacturing, and retail sec- the highest, followed by the UK, and then other des- tor employment (Düvell & Jordon, 2005). tinations in Europe. Fees, however, are not uniform. Agents charge di#erent amounts for a particular des- As a Human Rights Watch report reveals, smuggled tination country, for example, the UK. "e UNODC migrants are especially vulnerable to exploitation be- report (2009) suggests that agents likely try to extract cause of the debts incurred during migration. Heav- as much money as possible from a potential migrant. ily indebted irregular migrants often need to work for months or even years to pay o# loans. Migrant In January 2006, when Moroccan o$cials arrested a workers in the UAE were often paid 25 percent to ring of smugglers bringing people from India to Eu- 45 percent less than the wage promised. Excessive rope and Canada via Africa and Morocco, interviews working hours, false contracts, extreme work condi- revealed that smuggled migrants had each paid fees tions, and physical injuries due to poor labour regu- ranging from USD 10,000 to USD 12,000 (UNO- lations were just some of the other problems faced by DC, 2011). migrants (Human Rights Watch, 2009). '/647(YI(Q775(;G/.-7>(6@(/-7015 <7+A".(69(+->.%&:/ N""/('0%.>"8 UQQY UQQZ UQQR фZƐϭϬϬ͕ϬϬϬ;h^Ϯ͕ϮϬϬͿ ) % % ZƐϭϬϬ͕ϬϬϬƚŽZƐϮϬϬ͕ϬϬϬ;h^Ϯ͕ϮϬϬƚŽh^ϰ͕ϰϰϬͿ !& " ) ZƐϮϬϬ͕ϬϬϬƚŽZƐϰϬϬ͕ϬϬϬ;h^ϰ͕ϰϰϬƚŽh^ϴ͕ϴϬϬͿ $" $' $) ZƐϰϬϬ͕ϬϬϬƚŽZƐϲϬϬ͕ϬϬϬ;h^ϴ͕ϴϬϬƚŽh^ϭϯ͕ϬϬϬͿ !* $( $% ZƐϲϬϬ͕ϬϬϬƚŽZƐϵϬϬ͕ϬϬϬ;h^ϭϯ͕ϬϬϬƚŽh^ϮϬ͕ϬϬϬͿ !' $* !$ ZƐϵϬϬ͕ϬϬϬƚŽZƐϭϮϬ͕ϬϬϬ;h^ϮϬ͕ϬϬϬƚŽh^Ϯϲ͕ϱϲϬͿ % * ( ZƐϭϮϬ͕ϬϬϬƚŽZƐϭ͕ϱϬϬ͕ϬϬϬ;h^Ϯϲ͕ϱϲϬƚŽh^ϯϯ͕ϮϬϬͿ Ͳ % " ZƐϭ͕ϱϬϬ͕ϬϬϬƚŽZƐϮ͕ϬϬϬ͕ϬϬϬ;h^ϯϯ͕ϮϬϬƚŽh^ϰϰ͕ϬϬϬͿ $ ! $ хZƐϮ͕ϬϬϬ͕ϬϬϬ;h^ϰϰ͕ϬϬϬͿ Ͳ $ " 56:%# SZ RQ [T ;^ŽƵƌĐĞ͗hEK͕ϮϬϬϵͿ

126 !#70'4&%*8#9':*';#$<#=*%'.&%5.'

9) Factors fuelling irregular migration and mi- holding, family background, and educational achieve- grant smuggling ments, often is now based on the distinction between families with members in other countries and families Datta (2004) found that economic push and pull without member in other countries. Subsequently, the factors were important. Indeed, the macroeconomic decision to migrate is not an individual decision, but stabilization and structural adjustment policies of the a group one. Families are involved in the decision to 1990s opened up the Indian economy to the global send someone abroad as well as the smuggling process market. Despite rapid economic growth during this itself (e.g. contacting the smugglers). period, the average per capita income between high income countries (e.g. Britain or the UAE) and lower "e UK is a preferred destination for irregular migra- middle income countries (e.g. India) remained wide tion. Cases of irregular migration to the UK, for ex- (Martin, 2009).15 "ese economic inequalities pro- ample, were noted in every village in Jalandhar, Ka- vide strong incentives, especially for youth, to seek purthala, Nawanshahr, and Hoshiarpur districts of employment opportunities in higher wage countries Punjab. It is assumed that other cases exist in other (Martin, 2009). Other research argues that gender districts in other states, but more research needs to be discrimination, the low regard for women’s rights, low done. Assisted by smugglers, the majority of irregular levels of education, the marginalization of women, migrants travelled to the UK via France on tourist vi- and the practice of dowry are all factors that fuel traf- sas, but then irregularly entered the UK. Other mi- !cking in persons, migrant smuggling, and irregular grants entered the UK with tourist visas, but then over- migration (Hameed et al., 2010). Natural disasters, stayed. Middle Eastern and South-East Asian countries such as &oods and cyclones, as well as political in- are also popular destinations for irregular migration. stabilities caused by rebel groups in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh were also reported as key factors contrib- Although they are not always from the poorest uting to irregular migration (Hameed et al., 2010). households, investing in the smuggling of a family member is an enormous !nancial burden. Fami- lies sell possessions or take out loans to cover the 10) Conclusions smuggling fees that range from USD 2,000 to USD 44,000. Payments are usually made in two instal- a) What we know about migrant smuggling in ments. Smugglers are only paid in full once the mi- India grant has reached the intended destination. In e#ect, they o#er a ‘money back guarantee,’ which involves According to the reviewed literature, India is a source, a substantial investment for the smugglers without a transit point, and destination for irregular migrants. guaranteed return. "e smuggling of migrants in In- "e scope and magnitude of irregular migration from dia is carried out by highly sophisticated, profession- the states of Punjab and Tamil Nadu in particular is al networks, with linkages around the world. Agents considerable. Each year, more than 20,000 youths usually operate under the guise of travel or recruit- from Punjab attempt to migrate through irregular ment agencies. Most adopt a diversity of methods channels. "e pattern of migration is changing as ir- to smuggle migrants, including the use of forged regular migration and migrant smuggling has spread Indian and foreign passports, photo substitution in to new areas in Punjab and Tamil Nadu, but also to Indian and foreign passports, jacket substitution of neighbouring states of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Indian passports, the use of restitched passports, the Jammu, and Kashmir, which until recently, had not exchange of boarding cards in security areas, and the had high numbers of irregular migrants. Although the used of forged visas and residence permits. "e qual- costs of migration seem to be increasing, young men ity of the forged documentation is often very good. and their families are !nding ways to mobilize the fees. Sending someone to work overseas frequently is Because of their irregular status, smuggled Indian mi- seen a step towards success. "e social structure of the grants are more at risk of experience harsh and ex- village, which was traditionally based on caste, land- ploitative conditions in destination countries. Stories of deceit and exploitation are not uncommon. But for 15 "e World Bank classi!ed India as a lower middle income country. See most, the decision to migration is economically driv- http://data.worldbank.org/country/india en, and the costs are seen as outweighing the bene!ts.

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b) What we don’t know about migrant smug- Blanchet, T. (2005). Bangladeshi girls sold as wives gling in India in North India. In: Indian Journal of Gender Studies, 12(2–3), pp. 305–334. Although some studies exist, rigorous research is re- quired on all aspects of migrant smuggling and ir- Crawford, M. E. (2010). Sex tra"cking in South Asia: regular migration to, from, and through India. "e Telling Maya’s story. New York: Routledge. three main studies reviewed in this report (Saha, 2007, 2009; UNODC, 2009) are largely based on Das, P. (2008). India-Bangladesh Border Manage- deportation records and focused on irregular migra- ment: A Review of Government’s Response. tion from two distinct states — Tamil Nadu and Strategic Analysis, 32(3), 367-388. Punjab — to Europe. "ese reports indicate that accurate assessments of the size and scope of irregu- Datta, P. (2004). Push-pull factors of undocumented lar migration and smuggling are di$cult due to the migration from Bangladesh to West Bengal: A clandestine nature of the phenomenon. "ere is also perception study. In: Qualitative Report, 9(2), a scarcity of research on irregular migration and pp. 335–358. smuggling within the South Asian region itself. Fur- thermore, there are clear knowledge gaps that should Dewey, S. (2008). Hollow bodies: Institutional re- be addressed through further research on the follow- sponses to sex tra"cking in Armenia, Bosnia ing: and India. Sterling, Virginia [USA]: Kumar- ian Press. t quantitative assessments of irregular migration, migrant smuggling, and tra$cking in persons Düvell, F. and Jordon, B. (2005). Documented &ows; and undocumented immigrant workers t the major routes used, particularly to other des- in the UK: Changing environments and tination countries outside Western Europe; shifting strategies. In: F. Düvell (ed.), Il- t the pro!les of smugglers and smuggled migrants; legal immigration in Europe: Beyond control t the motivations of smugglers and smuggled mi- (pp. 48–74). Basingstoke: Palgrave Mac- grants; millan. t smuggler-migrant relationships, including their perceptions of one another; Ghosh, B. (2009). Tra$cking in women and chil- t linkages to other forms of criminality and the dren in India: Nature, dimensions and strat- transfers of criminal proceeds; egies for prevention. In: !e International t the modus operandi of migrant smuggling, in- Journal of Human Rights, 13(5), pp. 716– cluding methods of recruitment, payment, and 738. transportation; t the role of corruption; and fees paid to smug- Gupta, J., Raj, A., Decker, M. R., Reed, E. and Sil- glers and their mobilization. verman, J. G. (2009). HIV vulnerabilities of sex-tra$cked Indian women and girls. In: In- ternational Journal of Gynaecology and Obstet- References rics, 107(1), pp. 30–34.

Amnesty International. (2004). Malaysia: human Hameed, S., Hlatshwayo, S., Tanner, E., Turker, rights at risk in mass deportation of undocu- M. and Yang, J. (2010). Human tra"cking in mented migrants. London: Amnesty Interna- India: Dynamics, current e%orts and interven- tional, International Secretariat. tion opportunities for !e Asia Foundation. San Francisco: "e Asia Foundation. Bartolomei, M. R. (2010). Migrant male domes- tic workers in comparative perspective: Four Human Rights Watch. (2009). “!e island of happi- case studies from Italy, India, Ivory Coast and ness”: Exploitation of migrant workers on Saa- Congo. In: Men and Masculinities, 13(1), pp. diyat Island, Abu Dhabi. New York: Human 87–110. Rights Watch.

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International Organization for Migration. (2008). United States Department of State. (2010). Tra"ck- World migration report 2008. Geneva: Inter- ing in persons report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. national Organization for Migration. Department of State.

India has 20 million irregular migrants (2010, May United Nations O$ce on Drugs and Crime. (2009). 13). Acoustic Nerve. Retrieved from http:// Smuggling of migrants from India to Europe www.nerve.in/news:253500311074 (accessed and in particular the UK: A study on Punjab 27 May 2011). and Haryana. New Delhi: UNODC.

Kara, S. (2009). Sex tra"cking: Inside the business of United Nations O$ce on Drugs and Crime. (2011). modern slavery. New York: Columbia Univer- !e role of organized crime in the smuggling sity Press. of migrants from West Africa to the European Union. Vienna: UNODC. Kotiswaran, P. (2008). Born unto brothels: Toward a legal ethnography of sex work in an Indian red-light area. In: Law and Society Review, 33(3), pp. 579–629.

Lahiri, A. (2010). Women smugglers of Naxalbari. In: Indian Journal of Gender Studies, 17(2), pp. 287–295.

Leman, J. and Janssens, S. (2007). "e various ‘safe’- house pro!les in East-European human smug- gling and tra$cking. In: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 33(8), pp. 1377–1388.

Martin, P. (2009). Migration in the Asia-Paci!c Region: Trends, factors, impacts: United Na- tions Development Programme.

Oishi, N. (2005). Women in motion: Globalization, state policies and labor migration in Asia. Stan- ford: Stanford University Press.

Saha, K. C. (2007). Smuggling of Indian citizens: Preliminary !ndings. In: Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Services, 5(1), pp. 55–69.

Saha, K. C. (2009). Smuggling of migrants from In- dia to Europe and in particular to the UK. A study on Tamil Nadu. New Delhi: United Nations O$ce on Drugs and Crime.

Sarkar, K., Bal, B., Mukherjee, R., Chakraborty, S., Saha, S., Ghosh, A. and Parsons, S. (2008). Sex-tra$cking, violence, negotiating skill and HIV infection in brothel-based sex workers of eastern India, adjoining Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. In: !e Journal of Health and Popular Nutrition, 26(2), pp. 223–231.

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1) Quantitative assessments and $ows of irregular province are taken to a transit province, where they migration, migrant smuggling, and tra"cking in are provided with local identity papers, a procedure persons conducted by both o$cial and uno$cial recruiters. In addition, uno$cial recruiters can obtain passports a) Estimated numbers and major routes: Ir- through connections in the Department of Immi- regular migration from, to and through In- gration within days. Uno$cial recruiters are thus donesia able through illegal means to procure o$cial travel documents for migrants. "e reviewed literature only provides few estimates on irregular migration with regard to Indonesia. "e Most irregular migration from Indonesia is labour literature indicates that most irregular migration out migration. In a study conducted on Indonesian la- of Indonesia is destined for Malaysia and parallels bour migrants, 84 percent of the respondents at- regular migration &ows out of the country (Asis, tested to having bypassed the Indonesian Ministry 2004). "e history of Indonesia-Malaysia migration of Manpower to !nd work abroad. "is study may has led to established migratory routes: West Ma- not be representative, however, as it remains unclear laysia is usually accessed via the Strait of Malacca, how many Indonesian migrants were interviewed for whereas East Malaysia is entered by land from Ka- the study or how they were chosen (Asis, 2004). limantan (Asis, 2004). Indonesian migrants enter Malaysia through a range of formal, semi-formal, According to Hosen (2005), crackdowns on irregu- and informal channels, primarily through Sumatra lar migrants by the Malaysian Government provided and Kalimantan (Ford, 2006). Regular and irregular a glimpse into the number of unauthorized Indone- migratory patterns vary by region. Indonesians from sian workers in the country and their contribution East Java generally enter Malaysia through o$cial to the Malaysian economy. About 400,000 irregular migration channels, and are for the most part em- Indonesian workers were deported between October ployed in the construction sector. Indonesians from 2004 and April 2005. Lombok, on the other hand, normally enter Malay- sia through irregular channels with the assistance of More Indonesians than any other migrant national- brokers, and are mostly employed in the plantation ity in East Asia overstay their visas. In 2002, one in sector (Asis, 2004). four female Indonesian migrants in Japan were un- documented; in the Republic of Korea, there were Ford (2006) points out that the borders between 189.3 percent more undocumented female Indone- Indonesia and Malaysia are quite porous, making sian migrants than documented (Sim & Wee, 2009). it easier for irregular migrants to cross undetected. He notes that not all Indonesian migrants entering Patterns of visa overstay among Indonesian migrants Malaysia through uno$cial channels are undocu- are also apparent in Hong Kong (China) and Macao mented. "rough connections with corrupt local of- (China), China’s two special administrative regions. !cials, Indonesians who are recruited in a sending Hong Kong (China)’s ‘two-week rule’ stipulates that

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foreign workers must leave within two weeks of ter- point for Middle Eastern and South-West Asian ir- mination of their employment contract. If they are regular migrants, who are then transported to Aus- unable to !nd further employment within those two tralia by well-developed smuggling networks (Crock, weeks, they must leave Hong Kong (China) to pro- Saul, & Dastyari, 2006; Hunter, 2004; UNODC, cess a new employment visa. Some Indonesian mi- 2010). "ese routes are &uid, adaptable to changes grants instead choose to overstay their visas in Hong in migration policy. Since 2007, smuggling routes Kong (China), and try to !nd employment without of ethnic minority Hazara from Afghanistan to Aus- a visa. Others attempt to maintain their legal status tralia have become more complicated due to Indo- by migrating to Macao (China), where visitor visas nesia’s stricter visa regime. Instead of travelling di- can be extended for up to 60 days. Many Indonesian rectly to Indonesia from Afghanistan, migrants !rst women who are unable to !nd employment during stop in Malaysia to be ferried by boat to Indonesia, this window overstay their visitor visas to !nd work where they board yet another boat bound for Aus- through unauthorized channels in Macao (China) tralia (UNODC, 2010). While having attracted a lot (Sim & Wee, 2009). of media attention, there is no recent research spe- ci!cally focused on Indonesia as migrant smuggling Beyond its main status as a country of origin for ir- transit country. regular migration, Indonesia also serves as a transit country for irregular migrants from Afghanistan, c) Estimated numbers and major routes: Traf- Iraq, and the Middle East en route to Australia. #cking in persons from, within, to and Smuggling networks coordinate most of these move- through Indonesia ments (Hunter, 2004). According to the U.S. Tra"cking in Persons Report, b) Estimated numbers and major routes: Mi- Indonesia is a major source country and, to a much grant smuggling from, to and through Indo- lesser extent, a destination and transit country for nesia tra$cked men, women, and children. "e most sig- ni!cant regions of origin within the country for traf- As with general irregular &ows, smuggling &ows leav- !cking are Java, West Kalimantan, Lampung, North ing Indonesia mimic o$cial Indonesian government Sumatra, and South Sumatra. Destinations include labour migration export strategies, and are largely Japan, Kuwait, Iraq, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Sin- directed toward Malaysia. Although no reliable es- gapore, and Syria, where many Indonesian migrant timates of smuggled numbers are available, it is un- workers are tra$cked for forced labour. Indonesian derstood that irregular recruitment channels, i.e. women are tra$cked abroad, particularly to Malaysia, smuggling, to Malaysia operate in parallel to formal the Middle East, and Singapore, for forced labour and channels, but on a larger scale (Asis, 2004). Since In- forced prostitution (U.S. Department of State, 2010). donesia o$cially deploys about 300,000 Indonesian migrant workers per year, smuggling &ows out of the Of an estimated 6.5 to 9 million (regular and irregu- country can be estimated as being at least that large lar) Indonesian migrant workers working abroad, the (Asis, 2004). Indonesian NGO Migrant Care reports that about 3 million are working under tra$cking conditions Migrant smuggling to Malaysia normally involves (U.S. Department of State, 2010). unlicensed recruitment agencies and unauthorized brokers in both countries that facilitate irregular en- As the main destination for Indonesian migrant try and job placement in Malaysia (Hosen, 2005). workers, Malaysia is also the main destination for Unlicensed recruitment agencies have established a Indonesian tra$cking &ows. According to the ILO, strong economic base; in East Java, for instance, un- a high incidence of forced labour is found among In- licensed recruiters have developed a major industry donesian workers there. Human Rights Watch states of facilitated unauthorized entry and labour recruit- that tra$cked Indonesian women and girls are usu- ment (Silvey, 2007). ally brought to Malaysia as domestic servants, but some are then sold by their agents or other inter- Indonesia is also a country of transit for migrant mediaries to work in discos and the entertainment smuggling &ows to Australia. Indonesia is a transit industry (ILO, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 2004).

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Another issue is internal tra$cking in persons within sphere, which isolates migrants from outside con- Indonesia. Children are tra$cked within the coun- tacts. try and abroad for domestic servitude, forced prosti- tution, and cottage industries. Women and girls are tra$cked internally for domestic servitude, sexual 2) Pro#les of migrant smugglers exploitation, rural agriculture, mining, and !shing. Child sex is also prevalent in most urban a) Socio-economic characteristics areas and tourist destinations (U.S. Department of State, 2010). "e reviewed literature provides very limited infor- mation about smugglers as individuals in Indonesia. d) Cross-over or overlap, if any, between popu- In the case of labour migration &ows from Indonesia lations or routes to Malaysia, local village brokers — both licensed and unlicensed — are often respected patronage !gures A great deal of overlap between regular, irregu- such as village heads, successful local businessmen, lar, smuggling, and tra$cking &ows is apparent, or religious leaders (Rudnyckyj, 2004). Information particularly in the case of out-migration from In- regarding smugglers involved in other steps or higher donesia to Malaysia. Prospective migrant workers rungs of the smuggling process is unavailable. in Indonesia choose from a variety of migration channels to Malaysia: (1) entry and job placement Media sources provide sketchy pro!les of smugglers through a licensed recruitment agency, (2) autho- involved in transit operations from the Middle East rized entry and subsequent visa overstay, (3) unau- and South-West Asia through Indonesia to Austra- thorized and unassisted entry into Malaysia, and lia, an area unaddressed in the empirical literature. (4) unauthorized entry and job placement with the According to interviews conducted with smugglers assistance of an unlicensed recruitment agency or and recorded with hidden cameras, many smugglers broker. operating in Indonesia, although some are Indone- sian, are themselves from Middle Eastern and South- "e reviewed literature indicates that, because local West Asian countries such as Iraq and Kuwait. Some village recruiters may work for both o$cial and un- Middle Eastern and South-West Asian smugglers in o$cial agencies, migrants !nd it di$cult to know Indonesia seek or enjoy UNHCR refugee status, and whether they are migrating through formal or in- are under consideration for resettlement to Australia. formal channels (Human Rights Watch, 2004; Sil- "us, they have pro!les similar to many of their pas- vey, 2007). Even with a single person, the migratory sengers who share this same refugee status (Ferguson, process can entail both authorized and unauthor- 2010). ized segments. Migrants may think they are migrat- ing through legal channels, when actually they were b) Motivation given fraudulent or inaccurate documents at some point in the process. Many migrants know very Speci!c motivations for smugglers in Indonesia are little about their recruitment agency, unsure even unexamined in the literature, although it can be as- whether it is licensed or not (Human Rights Watch, sumed that !nancial gain plays a signi!cant role. 2004).

Human Rights Watch (2004) reports that tra$ck- 3) Pro#les of irregular migrants and smuggled ing in persons from Indonesia to Malaysia often migrants also occurs through recruitment agencies. Many women tra$cked for prostitution expect to work as a) Geographical and socio-economic charac-teris- maids, but are subsequently sold to the entertain- tics ment industry upon arrival. Even women who do work as maids may experience situations of tra$ck- "e literature notes that overall migration out&ows ing for forced labour, as these jobs are often poorly from Indonesia have been increasingly feminized in remunerated and entail a high risk of abuse due to the past decades, a trend that is also re&ected in irreg- the fact that the work is performed in the private ular migration. Many more Indonesian women enter

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Malaysia through semi-formal or informal channels 2004). Migrants from the Middle East and South- than through o$cial programmes (Ford, 2006). Ru- West Asia, who constitute a large number of the ral areas of Java, Lombok, and Sumatra in particular smuggled migrants transiting through Indone- are major places of origin for both regular and ir- sia to Australia, are motivated by factors such as regular young female migrants (Sim & Wee, 2009; economic opportunity, uncertain security in their Rudnyckyj, 2004). Other research, however, found home country, educational prospects, and fam- that irregular labour migrants from Indonesia are 79 ily reuni!cation (UNODC, 2010). In the case of percent male (Asis, 2004). the SIEV X16, which sank en route from Indone- sia to Australia, the migrants on board chose to be "e empirical literature does not provide much in- smuggled largely because they saw no other way sight into irregular transiting through Indonesia. It to be reunited with their families. Many husbands is known that many of these migrants originate from and fathers of the passengers onboard had already Middle Eastern and South-West Asian countries received Temporary Protection Visas in Australia, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan (UNODC, which did not provide for legal family reuni!cation 2010). And, according to media sources, many of (Gibbings, 2010). these migrants have UNCHR refugee status (Fergu- son, 2010). Media sources suggest that recognized refugees from Middle Eastern and South-West Asian countries may b) Motivation choose to be smuggled to Australia due to lengthy waits for resettlement that can entail years of un- "e overarching motivation for regular and irregular certainty in Indonesian refugee housing (Ferguson, labour migration out of Indonesia, according to the 2010). While this issue attracts much media cover- research literature, is the hope of !nding employ- age, it remains barely examined in the research lit- ment abroad. Among women, poverty, limited job erature. opportunities at home, and the fact that they earn just 46 percent as much as men on average are all fac- tors motivating them to seek work abroad (Human 4) Smuggler-migrant relationships Rights Watch, 2008). Remittances are an important source of revenue in Indonesia, especially in rural a) Migrant perceptions of smugglers areas, which provides additional impetus for both regular and irregular migration (Rudnyckyj, 2004). Research found that labour migrants often trust smuggling networks more than o$cial migration Crinis (2005) reports that the choice to migrate out- channels. "is is because migrants already have a re- side of authorized &ows is a strategy to avoid red tape lationship with local brokers, who are often of good and costs associated with regular labour exportation reputation and have had previous contact with the schemes. Especially with migration to Malaysia, In- family (Hugo, 2004; Rudnyckyj, 2004). Especially donesians have preferred to use irregular routes be- with well-established smuggling &ows of labour mi- cause they involve fewer bureaucratic processes and grants from Indonesia to Malaysia, migrants tend to are less expensive and time consuming. Irregular trust the system of agents who facilitate their entry migration networks are also often more trusted than and job placement because the chain starts at the lo- o$cial migration schemes because there is more per- cal level, where the agent must bear the results of ceived personal accountability, and o$cial systems a system failure or exploitation (Hugo, 2004). In involve myriad costs and delays (Hugo, 2004). East Java, smuggling routes are considered safe and straightforward, they involve fewer costs and delays Indonesian migrants may also choose to overstay their than regular migration, and they are well organized visas to avoid returning to Indonesia and re-entering (Hosen, 2005). the debt cycle and mandatory training camps associat- ed with the labour export process (Sim & Wee, 2009). 16 A vessel that sank in 2001 with the loss of 353 asylum seekers, most of them women and children. "e acronym SIEV stands for “suspected illegal entry vessel”, a designation the Australian Defence Force and Migrants employing smugglers to ferry them to Australian Coastwatch use for vessels that try to reach Australia with- Australia are mainly seeking asylum (Hunter, out authorization.

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Information is unavailable, beyond the local level the local scale of the home village. Neither does it in the home village, regarding migrant perceptions address the relationship between Middle Eastern and of smugglers. Similarly, the empirical literature South-West Asian migrants and smugglers who op- lacks information on perceptions of smugglers erate in Indonesia. among Middle Eastern and South-West Asian mi- grants. 5) Organization of migrant smuggling b) Nature of migrant-smuggler relationship a) How is migrant smuggling organized? Rudnyckyj (2004) likens Indonesian migrant re- lationships with their local brokers to traditional According to the literature, migrant smuggling of patron-client networks which, according to him, in Indonesian citizens often parallels licensed labour re- the absence of strong state institutions, continue to cruitment agencies in the form of informal brokerag- play an important role. In this ‘peasant-landowner’ es. "ese operations now represent a major industry relationship, clients willingly consent to exploitation in some parts of Indonesia, among them rural Java by higher-status patrons in exchange for the patron (Silvey, 2007). Local agents known as calo, tialong, guaranteeing their livelihoods when they fall on hard tauke, or mandor, who usually operate extensive times. "is relationship is re&ected in migrant-bro- networks in both countries, o#er highly organized ker relationships, when well-known, respected bro- facilitation of migration to Malaysia (Hugo, 2004). kers in the community provide small-scale loans to "e local agent resides in the home community and migrants and provide contacts to recruitment agen- provides local accountability and security to the as- cies. sisted migrants (Hugo & Stahl, 2004).

"e literature provides no further information re- b) Are persons involved in migrant smuggling garding the relationship of migrants with smugglers also involved in other criminal activities? beyond the local level. Neither is any information provided on relationships among Middle Eastern Smugglers facilitating migration from Indonesia to and South-West Asian migrants with their smugglers Malaysia often engage in related forms of crime that who operate in Indonesia. support migrant smuggling. To meet the eligibil- ity requirements established by the Indonesian and c) Factors in"uencing the relationship between Malaysian Governments, local recruiters — even smugglers and migrants licensed recruiters — often falsify migrants’ docu- ments and personal information, including letters of "e social position of brokers in the home village permission, documents of residence, identi!cation greatly determines the nature of their relationship cards, birth certi!cates, and travel documents (Ho- with Indonesian migrants. Because brokers and sen, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 2004). agents are often well-known and respected in their communities, would-be migrants feel safer entrust- According to Crock et al., smugglers who ferry mi- ing their future to them than to an impersonal gov- grants from the Middle East and South-West Asia ernmental system (Hugo, 2004; Rudnyckyj, 2004). through Indonesia to Australia are usually involved According to Rudnyckyj’s comparison of the broker- in other forms of crime that support these activi- migrant connection to a patron-client relationship, ties, including document fraud. (Crock, et al., brokers may be expected to assist migrants if they 2006). experience di$culties abroad. Given the local scale of the relationship, however, cases where brokers c) Does migrant smuggling attract persons may not know how to respond adequately to these who have a history of involvement in other problems may damage the broker’s reputation as a crime? recruiter (Rudnyckyj, 2004). It is unclear from the literature whether individuals "e literature does not discuss factors in&uencing re- are involved in other forms of criminality before they lationships between smugglers and migrants beyond become involved in smuggling of migrants.

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d) What levels of professionalism/specializa- Beyond merely recruiting migrants, agents arrange tion is there within migrant smugglers? irregular entry and assist with job placement and !nding accommodation in Malaysia (Hugo, 2004; "e available literature leaves unclear the level of Hosen, 2005). Human Rights Watch reports that professionalism and specialization among migrant both the licensed and unlicensed agencies often ex- smugglers. tort money, falsify travel documents, and mislead women and girls about the working situations await- e) What in"uences shape the way migrant ing them (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Research smugglers are organized? How and why do also reveals that, even among licensed agencies, of- these organizations evolve? !cial recruitment procedures and regulations are of- ten ignored. According to research this due to the Human Rights Watch reports that, in Indonesia, limited oversight exercised by the Indonesian Gov- smuggling networks for labour migration are greatly ernment over recruitment agencies (Hosen, 2005; shaped by the overall organization of licensed labour Human Rights Watch, 2005). recruitment agencies. Unlicensed recruiters mimic the operations of licensed agents and provide prac- Licensed and unlicensed agencies are so similar tically identical services. In fact, local recruiters in that migrants !nd it di$cult to tell the di#er- villages may work for both licensed and unlicensed ence between them (Silvey, 2007). Migrants often agencies, blurring the line between smuggling ser- do not even know the name of their recruitment vices and authorized channels of labour migration agency, or whether it is licensed (Human Rights (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Watch, 2004). Most migrants are assisted by an unlicensed agent at some point in the recruitment process, although they may be unaware of this 6) Migrant smuggling modus operandi (Silvey, 2007).

a) Recruitment methods "e literature does not examine recruitment prac- tices for Middle Eastern and South-West Asian ir- Judging from the !ndings of the reviewed literature, regular migrants in the context of Indonesia. most migrant smugglers in Indonesia engage in labour migration recruitment, the majority of which is di- b) Payment methods rected toward Malaysia. "e Indonesian Government requires that migrant workers, to work abroad legally, "e literature does provide insights into payment be channelled through licensed labour recruitment methods. Smugglers who facilitate irregular la- agencies that assist in applying for passports and em- bour migration &ows from Indonesia to Malaysia ployment visas, obtaining medical clearance, paying are either paid up front or through monthly cuts insurance and other fees, and providing training. Un- from the migrant’s salary. Each facilitator who is authorized recruitment practices parallel the recruit- part of the smuggling process from Indonesia to ment activities of licensed recruitment agencies, and Malaysia receives a small payment (Hugo, 2004). are sometimes even conducted by the same recruiters Both regular and irregular migrants usually make (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Asis (2004) points out monthly payments to recruiters to pay o# their that irregular recruitment channels for labour migra- accrued debt (Rajaram & Grundy-Warr, 2004). tion are more extensive. Over 400 licensed recruit- Some agents operating between Indonesia and ment agencies operate in Indonesia; many more op- Malaysia have direct arrangements with Malay- erate without licenses (Human Rights Watch, 2004). sian employers to collect migrants’ wages until the full debt for recruitment services has been repaid According to Hosen (2005) the recruitment process (Santhiago, 2005). begins in the home village with the local recruiter, who is also known as the sponsor, agent, broker, or middle- Some unlicensed agents are merely facade opera- man. Recruiters play a crucial role in both licensed and tions, and require upfront payments without deliv- unlicensed labour migration recruitment, guiding mi- ering the promised services (Hugo, 2004; Human grants through the entire labour recruitment process. Rights Watch, 2005).

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"e literature does not address payment methods Human Rights Watch, 2004). Because Malaysia re- with regard to Middle Eastern and South-West Asian quires that domestic workers be between 25 and 45 migrants transiting Indonesia. years of age, young Indonesian girls or older women sometimes use false travel documents or have their c) Transfer of criminal proceeds passports altered to meet age requirements for labour migrants (Human Rights Watch, 2004). "e U.S. "e literature at hand provides no information re- Department of State (2010) argues that the weakly garding how smugglers transfer their criminal pro- institutionalized state system of documentation in ceeds. Indonesia exacerbates the problem. Experts estimate that 40–60 percent of Indonesian children younger d) Transportation methods than 5 years do not have birth certi!cates, which ex- poses them to a variety of risks, including increased "e research literature reports that the transporta- vulnerability to being tra$cked. "is de!cit of in- tion of smuggled migrants from, through, and to stitutionalized identity documentation invites docu- Indonesia takes a variety of forms. ment falsi!cation to !ll this gap.

Smuggling &ows for labour migration out of Indo- According to Human Rights Watch (2004) the use nesia largely target Malaysia and, depending on the of falsi!ed documents is not always intentional. Mi- point of departure, either follow land routes or em- grants may think that they are travelling in an autho- ploy !shing vessels by sea (Hunter, 2004). In East rized manner, when actually then have been given Java, migrants !rst travel to Riau Island, where they fraudulent or inaccurate documents. Government are housed in holding centres before continuing on o$cials sometimes do not realize or wilfully ignore to Malaysia via boat (Hosen, 2005). In the Strait of the fact that health certi!cates, family registration Malacca, agents transport migrants from Indonesia cards, and identity cards have been forged (Rud- on passenger boats and !shing trawlers or in con- nyckyj, 2004). Other research reveals the procure- tainers on boats that normally depart from Sumatra, ment of o$cial documents through illegal means. Batam, or Rapat (Santhiago, 2005). "ese boats gen- According to Ford (2006) some uno$cial recruiters erally transport between 5 and 15 migrants and em- had connections to some members in the Indonesian bark between 1 a.m. and 4 a.m. to avoid detection by immigration department that, in return for a bribe, the Indonesian or Malaysian authorities (Santhiago, could provide hundreds of o$cial passports within a 2005). number of days. "ese documents are known as asli tapi palsu, ‘original but fake’. Indonesia is also a country of destination and tran- sit for migrant smuggling. Migrants have reportedly f) Corruption been smuggled from the Middle East and South- West Asia to Indonesia by boat, as well as by plane "e literature reports that various levels of corrup- from Islamic Republic of Iran to Malaysia and on- tion in Indonesia and destination countries facilitate ward by boat to Indonesia (Hunter, 2004). Many of smuggling operations and irregular migration in these migrants continue onward to Australia by boat general. Overall, according to some research, Indo- (Gibbings, 2010; Hunter, 2004). nesia’s highly regulated labour export policies tend to encourage the bribing of o$cials, who may choose e) Document use and misuse to overlook falsi!ed travel documents in return for money (Hosen, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 2005). According to Hosen, the forgery of birth and mar- According to Santhiago, corruption of some mem- riage certi!cates, identity cards, and passports has bers within law enforcement agencies contributed become an industry in Indonesia (Hosen, 2005). to increasing irregular migration from Indonesia to Both licensed and unlicensed recruiters often falsify Malaysia (Santhiago, 2005). travel documents, letters of permission, documents of residence, identi!cation cards, birth certi!cates, Some reports point out that during the recruitment and other documents needed to meet the eligibil- process, to avoid delays in document processing and ity requirements of the Government (Hosen, 2005; to prevent interferences in their businesses, even

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licensed recruiters pay regular bribes and uno$- is unclear to what extent this a#ects the methods of cial fees to Indonesian authorities (Human Rights smugglers (Crock et al., 2006). Watch, 2004). If legal problems arise, recruitment agencies reportedly use ties to Indonesian govern- ment o$cials or the police to escape punishment 7) Migrant smuggling fees and mobilization of (U.S. Department of State, 2010). fees

A UNODC research report reveals that relations "e literature indicates that the !nancial costs of with law enforcement are of particular importance smuggling services from, through, and to Indonesia to smugglers when new visa restrictions are imposed, vary widely, depending on migrant origins and desti- as was recently the case in Indonesia. Smugglers in- nations. "e prices for irregular migration to Malay- volved in the smuggling of Afghan migrants through sia range from USD 25, from Batam, to USD 200 Indonesia to Australia seek protection for smuggling from West Nusa Tenggara, whereas migrants using operations during the transit phase by maintaining o$cial channels are expected to pay about USD 325 contacts with and sending payments to o$cials in (Hugo & Stahl, 2004). both Malaysia and Indonesia (UNODC, 2010). According to (Human Rights Watch, 2004), female Ferguson (2010) claims that some members of the Indonesian migrant workers who engage the services Indonesian police, the military, and the Department of unlicensed agents to !nd work abroad usually pay of Immigration were involved to varying degrees in between USD 180 and USD 245. Licensed recruit- smuggling operations to Australia (see also Crock et ers, on the other hand, charge migrants about USD al., 2006). According to his research, corrupt high- 1,500 for job placement abroad. level Immigration o$cials sometimes release asylum seekers from detention facilities in exchange for bribes. Indonesian migrants usually mobilize the funds for Corruption within the Indonesian military and police licensed and unlicensed recruiting fees by selling force also supports smuggling operations to Australia. land or taking on debt (Hosen, 2005). According Smugglers sometimes allegedly pay bribes to police to (Human Rights Watch, 2004), money is raised and military o$cers to ensure that passengers will not by borrowing money from relatives, friends, village be arrested on their way to the boats, and to ensure moneylenders, or the agent at high rates of interest. that the boats pass unhindered. According to inter- To pay these accrued debts, the !rst 4–5 months or views conducted and recorded, smugglers reportedly even 6–8 months of migrant salaries are often held as pay substantial fees for engaging the assistance of the payment by the recruiter. Indonesian military; one smuggler claimed to have paid an initial deposit of USD 20,000 followed by a "e literature also provides information regarding USD 20,000 bribe to a top general. fees paid by irregular migrants from the Middle East and South-West Asia for smuggling services to According to the literature, corrupt practices are Indonesia. Migrants from Baghdad allegedly paid also found within institutions responsible for issuing USD 4,000 per person to be smuggled to Indone- travel documentation, including o$cials at the local sia (Hunter, 2004). "ose smuggled from Malaysia level and the Indonesian Department of Immigra- paid USD 400 per person or USD 1,200 per fam- tion (Ford, 2006). ily to travel by plane with forged passports to In- donesia (Hunter, 2004). "e fare for the onward g) Evolution of migrant smuggling methods journey from Indonesia to Australia is estimated by in response to changes in migration policies the Australian Federal Police at between USD 1,500 and counter measures and USD 2,500 (Crock et al., 2006). According to a more recent media source, smuggling fees from "e literature provides little information about the Indonesia to Australia can amount to USD 7,000 e#ect of migration policies on the evolution of smug- (Ferguson, 2010). glers’ modus operandi. While increased pressure by law enforcement agencies and targeted national poli- According to UNODC (2010) research, migrants in cies can eliminate smaller smuggling operations, it Pakistan and Afghanistan reported smuggling fees

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to Australia via Indonesia and/or Malaysia ranging that counter-smuggling policy has had the result that from USD 12,000 to USD 18,000. Smuggling fees vessels are unwilling to pick up migrants in distress stated by migrants already in Indonesia or Australia, at sea. According to Crock et al., survivors of the however, ranged as high as USD 20,000 or more. vessel SIEV X reported that a number of private "is discrepancy may be due to the fact that some ships approached the wreckage and then continued migrants choose not to pay for ‘end to end’ service, onward without o#ering assistance to the hundreds and subsequently pay higher fees. Some migrants of people clinging to pieces of debris. Crock et al. at- simply pay for plane tickets to Malaysia and then tributed such reactions to Australia’s handling of the make their own arrangements to Indonesia by boat. Tampa incident, during which a ship that assisted According to the report, estimates from Afghanistan ship-wrecked asylum seekers became entangled in a and Pakistan suggest that 60 percent of migrants month-long a#air that cost the proprietor’s company take the end-to-end service to Australia and 40 per- a signi!cant amount of time and money. "us, ac- cent make their own arrangements after arriving in cording to Crock et al., private ships, fearing legal Malaysia. and economic consequences, may no longer be will- ing to assist shipwreck victims.

8) Human and social costs of migrant smuggling Human Rights Watch (2004) suggests that the post- arrival phase also entails a greater variety of risks for Risks during the smuggling process subject migrants smuggled migrants than for migrants who use autho- to a variety of potential human and social costs. Ac- rized channels. If a migrant encounters di$culties cording to the literature, these risks are prevalent while abroad, it is more di$cult to seek redress from through the entire procedure — in the pre-depar- unlicensed agents than through authorized recruit- ture, transit, and post-arrival stages. ers, often due to the fact that unlicensed recruiters regularly change their phone numbers or even disap- Some research indicates that the greatest social cost in pear altogether (Human Rights Watch, 2004). the pre-departure phase is the !nancial cost. Would- be labour migrants often sell land or borrow money Research by Human Rights Watch also reveals a cy- from family, friends, and neighbours to mobilize cle of debt initiated in the pre-departure phase that the necessary funds for job placement. "us begins continues once the migrant has reached the country a cycle of debt that propagates itself through with- of destination. "is level of debt subsequently opens held salaries in the post-arrival stage (Hosen, 2005; the door to further risk factors and vulnerabilities. Human Rights Watch, 2005). Debt a#ects not just Several Indonesian workers in Singapore who mi- the migrants themselves, but also their families and grated through unlicensed agencies reported their communities; and it can usher in a host of additional agents threatened them with tra$cking into pros- risks and vulnerabilities. Recruiters have also been titution or the levy of substantial !nes if they did known to deceive migrants about the amount of not complete their debt payment (Human Rights payments and the working conditions in the country Watch, 2005). of destination (Human Rights Watch, 2004; Hosen, 2005). 9) Factors fuelling irregular migration and mi- "e transit phase, particularly travel by sea, entails a grant smuggling great number of risks for smuggled migrants. Poor travel conditions, old and unseaworthy vessels, and According to Hugo and Stahl (2004), who examined unscrupulous boat crews are merely the tip of the labour export strategies in Asia, uno$cial migration iceberg (Hunter, 2004). Boats often do not carry schemes exist because government systems cannot enough food and water for the duration of the voy- compete with them in terms of cost or e$ciency. age, and are far too small for the number of passen- Unauthorized migration is often cheaper, for one gers on board, greatly increasing the risk of dehydra- thing; for another, the o$cial system requires sub- tion, sickness, and drowning (Hunter, 2004). Pirates stantial upfront payments that require migrants to operating in the Indian Ocean near Indonesia pose sell land and property; lastly, the o$cial system is another risk (Crock et al., 2006). One study argued time consuming and fraught with red tape (Hugo

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& Stahl, 2004). According to the UNDP (2009) tained by the desire to avoid costs, save time, and all these factors apply to Indonesia, where extensive sidestep bureaucratic procedures. Indonesia’s highly regulations and o$cial fees, as they are embodied by regulated labour exportation policy imposes oner- Indonesia’s rigid labour export strategy, encourage ous claims on migrants’ time and budgets, especial- migrants to seek routes outside o$cially sanctioned ly among migrants in rural areas who may have to channels. travel long distances to complete their paperwork, training, and tests. "erefore, many choose to avoid Hosen (2005) found that economic hardship at o$cial channels by seeking unlicensed recruiters able home, as well as gaps in wealth between neighbour- to speedily procure the required documents and put ing countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia, can migrants in contact with potential employers. be another factor driving unauthorized migration channels. During the Asian economic and !nancial Document falsi!cation industries are also well under- crisis in the late 1990s, which severely strained the stood. Because of restrictions in both Indonesia and Indonesian economy, numbers of irregular migrant Malaysia, these services are used not only by unli- workers leaving the country increased at a greater censed agencies, but also by authorized recruiters to rate than numbers of documented workers. increase the number of migrants they can send abroad.

Other research argues that another important factor Within unlicensed labour recruitment syndicates, is allegedly passive governmental acceptance of ir- migrant relationships with initial recruiters is clear at regular migration. According to Ford (2006), the In- the local level, where the agent often holds a respect- donesian authorities made little e#ort to stop semi- ed role in the community and is a trusted !gure. "is formal and informal migration &ows. Local o$cials relationship becomes less clear beyond the local lev- may generally assume that irregular migration is one el, however. Nothing is known about migrant rela- of the only sources of employment and income for tionships with the many other people involved in the the region, generating remittances and sources of smuggling process with whom they have no personal wealth, and turn a blind eye (Hugo & Stahl, 2004). connections, among them travel agents, document According to Ford (2006), in some cases, local In- suppliers, and providers of transportation. Indeed, donesian Immigration o$cials in transit provinces little is known about the extent of the relationship directly helped migrants to enter Malaysia through between the initial recruiter or agent and subsequent semi-legal channels by procuring o$cial documents links in the smuggling chain. in exchange for bribes. Less is known about smuggling of migrant workers to destinations other than Malaysia. "ese opera- 10) Conclusions tions also begin with unlicensed recruitment agen- cies in Indonesia, but details of their liaison with a) What we know about migrant smuggling in recruiters in other countries of destination and their Indonesia overall modus operandi remain unclear.

Research-based knowledge of migrant smuggling Methods of payment and migrant strategies for mo- with regard to Indonesia is mainly limited to the bilizing the necessary capital appear to be under- smuggling of Indonesian migrant workers to Malay- stood on a basic level. Both o$cial and uno$cial sia. "ese &ows tend to overlap with and mimic of- recruitment entails a signi!cant !nancial invest- !cially condoned channels of migration. ment, although uno$cial channels are often more a#ordable. Migrants sell land, take on debt, or pay Irregular labour migration from Indonesia to Ma- instalments from their salary after reaching their des- laysia is due to economic disparities within neigh- tination, which results in burdensome debt cycles for bouring countries, a history and policy of well-estab- regular and irregular migrant workers. lished migration &ows in the region, and the desire to improve household economic standing through Only limited, dedicated research is available regard- employment. "e reviewed literature also points out ing transit migrant smuggling through Indonesia. that uno$cial migration channels are further sus- Although migrant smuggling from Indonesia to Aus-

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tralia has been in the media spotlight, particularly Crock, M., Saul, B. and Dastyari, A. (2006). Future within the Australian media, little empirical research seekers II: Refugees and irregular migration in has been devoted to these migrant &ows. A UNO- Australia. Sydney: "e Federation Press. DC report (2010) on migrant smuggling from Af- ghanistan and Pakistan provides information about Ferguson, S. (writer). (2010). Smugglers’ paradise. smuggling fees paid by migrants for being smuggled On Four Corners. Australia: Australian Broad- to Australia via Indonesia. "is report also highlights casting Corporation. the importance of corruption in transit countries such as Indonesia. However, it does not provide de- Ford, M. (2006). After Nunukan: "e regulation tails on how these smuggling organizations operate of Indonesian migration to Malaysia. In: A. in Indonesia speci!cally. Kaur and I. Metcalfe (eds.), Mobility, labour migration and border controls in Asia. New b) What we don’t know about migrant smug- York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 228–247. gling in Indonesia Gibbings, B. (2010). Remembering the SIEV X: While irregular migration from Indonesia to Ma- Who cares for the bodies of the stateless, lost laysia and related migrant smuggling practices are at sea? In: Public Historian, 32(1), pp. 13–30. relatively well researched, the reviewed literature provided only rudimentary information about mi- Hosen, M. N. (2005). Governance of Indonesian la- grant smuggling to and through Indonesia. Surpris- bour and migration to Malaysia: An overview. ingly, with the exception of one recent media source [Paper in special issue: A. Kaur and I. Met- (Ferguson 2010), no recent empirical research on calfe (eds.). Migrant Labour in Southeast Asia: this issue has been conducted. Future investigation Needed, Not Wanted.] In: Review of Indonesian of migrant smuggling to and through Indonesia is and Malaysian A%airs, 39(2), pp. 31–44. needed to clarify and document the following areas: t extent of migrant smuggling; Hugo, G. (2004). International migration in the t routes used; Asia-Paci!c region: Emerging trends and is- t pro!les of migrant smugglers; sues. In: D. S. Massey and J. E. Taylor (eds.). t pro!les of smuggled migrants; International migration, prospects and policies t nature of smuggler-migrant relationships; in a global market. New York: Oxford Univer- t organization of such migrant smuggling and sity Press. methods used; t smuggling fees; and Hugo, G. and Stahl, C. (2004). Labour export strat- t human and social costs of such migrant smug- egies in Asia. In: D. S. Massey and J. E. Taylor gling. (eds.), International migration, prospects and policies in a global market. New York: Oxford University Press. References Human Rights Watch. (2004). Help wanted: Abuses Asis, M. M. B. (2004). Borders, globalization and against female migrant domestic workers in In- irregular migration in Southeast Asia. In: A. donesia and Malaysia (Vol. 16, No. 9 (B), p. Ananta and E. N. Ari!n (eds.), International 112). New York: Human Rights Watch. Migration in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Insti- tute of Southeast Asian Studies. Human Rights Watch. (2005). Maid to order: End- ing abuses against migrant domestic workers in Crinis, V. (2005). "e devil you know: Malaysian Singapore. New York: Human Rights Watch perceptions of foreign workers. [Paper in (Vol. 17, No. 10 (C). special issue: A. Kaur and I. Metcalfe (eds.). Migrant Labour in Southeast Asia: Needed, Not Human Rights Watch. (2008). “As if I am not human”: Wanted.] In: Review of Indonesian and Malay- Abuses against Asian domestic workers in Saudi sian A%airs, 39(2), pp. 91–111. Arabia. New York: Human Rights Watch.

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Hunter, C. (2004). "e ‘people in between’: Indone- sia and the failed asylum seekers to Australia. In: Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Af- fairs, 38(2), pp. 101–127.

International Labour Organization (2005). Fact Sheets on Forced Labour in Asia. Retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/public/english/re- gion/eurpro/moscow/news/2005/factsheeta- siaen.pdf (accessed 16 October 2010)

Rajaram, P. K., and Grundy-Warr, C. (2004). "e Irregular Migrant as Homo Sacer: Migration and Detention in Australia, Malaysia, and "ailand. International Migration, 42(1), 33- 64.

Rudnyckyj, D. (2004). Technologies of servitude: Governmentality and Indonesian transna- tional labor migration. In: Anthropological Quarterly, 77(3), pp. 407–434.

Santhiago, A. (2005). Human smuggling, migration and human rights: A Malaysian perspective. [Paper presented at the Review Meeting Mi- gration: Human rights protection of smug- gled persons, Geneva, 25–26 July 2005.].

Silvey, R. (2007). Unequal borders: Indonesian transnational migrants at immigration con- trol. In: Geopolitics, 12(2), pp. 265–279.

Sim, A. and Wee, V. (2009). Undocumented Indo- nesian workers in Macau: "e human out- come of colluding interests. In: Critical Asian Studies, 41(1), pp. 165–188.

United States Department of State. (2010). Tra"ck- ing in persons report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State.

United Nations Development Programme. (2009). Human Development Report 2009. Over- coming barriers: Human mobility and devel- opment Human Development Reports.

United Nations O$ce on Drugs and Crime. (2010). Crime facilitating migration from Pakistan and Afghanistan. Vienna: UNODC.

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:G/D17.()7?70I(+/8(C78D47Z5(H728;./1,;($7D364,;

1) Quantitative assessments and $ows of irregular Lao PDR to "ailand that begin in Lao border prov- migration, migrant smuggling, and tra"cking in inces — including Savannakhet, Champasak, and persons Khammuane — where migrants cross over to travel to such "ai destinations as Bangkok and "ailand’s a) Estimated numbers and major routes: Ir- central and eastern provinces. "e UNIFEM study regular migration from, to and through Lao refers to the Lao Migration Survey 2003, which re- PDR ported that "ailand hosted 81.5 percent of the Lao migrant population. Every day, hundreds of Lao citizens cross the border irregularly to work in "ailand. A working paper by A small number of Lao migrants enter other border- "ongyou and Ayuwat (2005) reports varying esti- ing countries, including Cambodia, China, Myan- mates of irregular migrants in "ailand — including mar, and Viet Nam. those from Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) — produced by the di#erent "ai government Information from the "ai authorities indicates that departments responsible for managing migration. most Lao workers entering "ailand irregularly cross However much the actual estimates produced by the Mekong River just outside Vientiane to arrive at each department vary, all indicate growing numbers Nong Khai. Another common Mekong River cross- of irregular migrants. Under the "ai Government’s ing point is from Champasak Province in Lao PDR to 2004 registration of irregular migrant workers pro- Khemmarat District of Ubon Rachathani Province, cess, irregular migrant workers from Lao PDR who "ailand. At the same time, irregular Lao migrants registered themselves numbered 181,614–80,981 reportedly cross into "ailand both at o$cial border men and 100,633 women ("ongyou, 2005). A checkpoints and through unauthorized border cross- study conducted by Phetsiriseng for UNIFEM ings. Irregular Lao migrants have been known to (2007) indicates that, since the bilateral MOU be- cross at the o$cial border checkpoints from Hoixay, tween "ailand and Lao PDR on Employment Bokeo Province, to Chiangkhong, Chiang Rai; from Cooperation for Migrant Workers came into e#ect Kaenthao, Xayaboury Province, to Nakaxeng, Loei; in 2005, the number of regular, and therefore reg- from the capital city of Vientiane to Nong Khai over istered, Lao migrant workers in "ailand had risen the First Lao-"ai Friendship Bridge; from Paksanh, to 3,105. Local authorities in Lao PDR, however, Bolikhamxay Province, to Bungkan, Nong Khai; believe the actual number of Lao migrants living in from "akek, Khammuane Province, to Makorn "ailand is higher than the registration !gures sug- Phnom; from Savannakhet Province to Mukdahan gest and increasing. "e study concludes that the over the Second Lao-"ai Friendship Bridge; and vast majority of Lao migrant workers in "ailand from Vangtao, Champasak Province, to Chongmek, have irregular status. Ubon Rachathani (Phetsiriseng, 2007).

"e UNIFEM study (Phetsiriseng, 2007) describes While Lao migrants have been found in all provinces major routes for irregular migrants travelling from of "ailand, a signi!cant number of Lao migrants

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work in the south of "ailand on rubber plantations. ple are tra$cked from China and Viet Nam through According to the UNIFEM research, many of these Lao PDR onwards to destinations including Malay- migrants follow historical migration patterns and sia and "ailand. Lao people are known to have been come from speci!c villages, in particular Champasak, tra$cked to China, Malaysia, and "ailand. "ai- where returned migrants who have lived and worked land has emerged as the number-one destination in on these plantations pass on information to potential the GMS for tra$cked women and children, with migrants in their home towns about migrating for the majority coming from Cambodia, Lao PDR, and work to the south of "ailand (Phetsiriseng, 2007). Myanmar. Lao citizens are tra$cked to "ailand and exploited in the sex industry, as domestic workers, b) Estimated numbers and major routes: Mi- and as labourers in such low-skilled sectors as !sher- grant smuggling from, to and through Lao ies, agriculture, seafood processing, and manufactur- PDR ing (Pearson & Punpuing, 2006; UNIAP, 2010).

"e review literature o#ers no statistics or estimates d) Cross-over or overlap, if any, between popu- of the number of smuggled migrants from, to, and lations or routes through Lao PDR. It can be concluded, however, that smuggled migrants are a subset of irregular migrants, "e literature does not speci!cally address this ques- and therefore must be included within the estimates tion, and no de!nitive conclusions can be drawn of irregular migrants presented above. No distinction from it regarding crossovers and overlaps between between irregular migrants and smuggled migrants is populations and routes from Lao PDR. However, made, much less explored, within the literature. the reviewed research suggests that there seems to be a signi!cant overlap between irregular migration, mi- Neither does the literature o#er grounds for conclu- grant smuggling, and human tra$cking: Lao PDR is sions regarding major smuggling routes from Lao an important source country of irregular migrants in PDR and across the region. While there is no dis- "ailand. Irregular migration seems to be facilitated cussion of major smuggling routes into, out of, or mainly by smugglers, who are often referred to in through Lao PDR, however, it may be assumed that the literature as ‘brokers’ or ‘recruiters’. At the same some of the irregular migrants referred to in the pre- time, many victims of human tra$cking in "ai- vious section use the services of smugglers to travel land are from Lao PDR. Although it is not clear to to and enter "ailand irregularly. Informal recruit- which extent the Lao victims of human tra$cking ment agencies are known to recruit Lao migrant in "ailand were victims of a pre-organized human workers and facilitate their travel and entry into tra$cking process that began in Lao PDR, it is clear "ailand, and some agencies employ the services of from the available literature that the irregular status smugglers to manage this stage of the recruitment of Lao migrants signi!cantly contributes to making process (Phetsiriseng, 2007). them vulnerable to a human tra$cking process that might have only begun in "ailand. By facilitating c) Estimated numbers and major routes: Traf- irregular migration, migrant smuggling can thus be #cking in persons from, within, to and a key contributor to human tra$cking. through Lao PDR

No accurate estimates are available for the number 2) Pro#les of migrant smugglers of tra$cked Lao citizens. "e total o$cial number of Lao tra$cking victims in 2009 was 128, though a) Socio-economic characteristics this can be only a partial indicator of the size of the problem (UNIAP, 2010). "is !gure includes both "e research literature lacks information regard- cross-border and internal tra$cking but, for reasons ing the socio-economic characteristics of migrant that remain unclear, excludes Lao victims tra$cked smugglers. "e literature does indicate, however, into "ailand. that many recruiters who operate through social net- works themselves were or still are irregular migrants "e literature classi!es Lao PDR as both a source ("ongyou, 2005; Phetsiriseng, 2007; Pearson & and a transit country for tra$cking in persons. Peo- Punpuing, 2006).

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b) Motivation b) Motivation

Many Lao migrants seek the services of trusted fam- Economic opportunity and escape from poverty, ily and friend networks to facilitate travel and entry according to the literature, is the overarching moti- to "ailand, and some migrant smugglers see them- vation among Lao people to migrate, whether regu- selves as assisting friends and family, as opposed to larly or irregularly (Phetsiriseng, 2003, 2007; Chan- viewing their services as business transactions. In ad- tavanich, 2008; "ongyou, 2005). "e demand for dition, as mentioned earlier, some informal recruit- cheap, low-skilled migrant worker in "ailand pro- ment agencies use the services of smugglers to facili- vides potential Lao migrants with (perceived) op- tate transport and entry of irregular migrants into portunities to escape poverty and bene!t !nancially "ailand (Phetsiriseng, 2007). (Phetsiriseng, 2003).

"e literature does not discuss the motivations of Returned migrants with positive experiences of mi- migrant smugglers in any further detail. In broad gration to "ailand are another source of encourage- terms, however, the literature does refer to "ai de- ment among potential young Lao migrants (Chan- mand for low-skilled Lao migrant workers together tavanich, 2008). Networks that include such veteran with the ready supply of Laotians who wish to mi- migrants can provide potential migrants with infor- grate to "ailand for work (Pearson & Punpuing, mation about job opportunities and the migration 2006; Phetsiriseng, 2003, 2007; Chantavanich, process, and connect them with trusted recruiters 2008). Recruiters capitalize on this demand, which and smugglers. is — according to the literature — due in part to the lengthy, complex, and expensive formal system of In addition, irregular migration is often perceived recruitment for migrants wanting to work in "ai- as more a#ordable and more time-e$cient than the land (see Section 9, below, for more details). "e path o#ered by formal recruitment agencies (Phet- literature suggests that the ine#ective formal recruit- siriseng, 2007). Section 9, below, presents more de- ment system results in many potential Lao migrants tailed discussion of this factor. instead seeking the services of informal recruitment agencies, family and friend networks, and smugglers (Vasuprasat, 2008). 4) Smuggler-migrant relationships

a) Migrant perceptions of smugglers 3) Pro#les of irregular migrants and smuggled migrants No empirical research has been undertaken on how migrants perceive smugglers. Nevertheless, some ob- a) Geographical and socio-economic charac- servations are possible on the basis of the reviewed teristics literature.

"e reviewed research indicates that most Lao mi- "e ILO study (Chantavanich, 2008) involved in- grants are young adults and teenagers from poor terviews and surveys focusing on the experiences of rural areas. "ey are generally poorly educated, 85 returned Lao migrants. Fully 80 percent of the poorly informed, and poorly equipped to migrate potential Lao migrants expressed clear awareness of and experience city life in "ailand. Most Lao mi- the risks associated with irregular migration. "e lit- grant workers are subsistence farmers who lack erature also identi!es trust as an important factor in the skills and experience for working in industri- choosing, despite the evident dangers, the services alized systems and factory settings (Phetsiriseng, of smugglers, informal recruitment agencies, or fam- 2007; "ongyou, 2005). "e vast majority of Lao ily networks to migrate to "ailand (Chantavanich, women and girls in "ailand are employed in the 2008; Phetsiriseng, 2007; "ongyou, 2005). Irregu- domestic sector. According to Phetsiriseng (2007), lar migrants use family networks and connections 90 percent of Lao women who migrate to "ailand because of the associated kinship and friendship ties, irregularly work as domestic servants in private and because these services have often been success- households. fully tried and tested by other family members and

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friends who previously migrated to "ailand. "e ploy these service providers. Allied to the trust factor ILO report (Chantavanich, 2008) found, on the is the smuggler’s capacity to deliver services e$cient- other hand, that many potential migrants from Lao ly, including the facilitation of entry into "ailand, PDR and Cambodia did not trust formal recruit- !nding employment, transporting remittances back ment agencies, viewing them as untrustworthy, as home, and assisting with communications with fam- well as expensive and ine$cient. ily and friends in Lao (Phetsiriseng, 2003).

b) Nature of smuggler-migrant relationship At the same time, another ILO report on migrant workers in "ailand (Pearson and Punpuing (2006) No speci!c research is available regarding the rela- shows that it is important for smugglers to gain the tionship between smugglers and migrants, but the trust of those who want to use their services. And when ILO report by Chantavanich (2008) and Phetsiris- a smuggler wins a client’s trust, their business oppor- eng (2007) notes that the relationship between ir- tunities improve because clients will often recommend regular migrants and those who facilitate their travel their services to others (Pearson & Punpuing, 2006). is largely based around an attitude of trust. And such trust, or lack of it, can in&uence the decision to mi- grate. Research also indicated that those migrants 5) Organization of migrant smuggling who have a personal relationship with their smug- gler have a better chance of successfully migrating, a) How is migrant smuggling organized? while those migrants who use the service of informal recruitment agencies are more vulnerable to physical "e UNIFEM report by Phetsiriseng (2007) is the and sexual abuse and exploitation both during the only study in the review that addressed the organi- journey and in their "ai workplace. zation of migrant smuggling to, from, and through Lao PDR. But other research did o#er insights into c) Factors in"uencing the nature of the smug- certain features of migrant smuggling organizations. gler-migrant relationship According to this report, smuggling is a means of Personal connection to the smuggler through social facilitating irregular migration. Informal recruit- networks is arguably a crucial factor in&uencing ment agencies and family networks may use or orga- both the nature of the relationship between smug- nize the services of smugglers. Informal recruitment glers and Lao migrants and the decision to migrate. agencies operate in Lao PDR and "ailand to recruit One report notes that 44 percent of the informal Lao migrant workers into low-skilled "ai industries migrants surveyed chose to migrate through social where demand for migrant workers is high, among networks for reasons related to personal connections these seafood processing, manufacturing, agricul- (Chantavanich, 2008). ture, and commercial !shing. Some of these informal recruitment agencies are well organized and well es- Social networks can be critical for irregular Lao mi- tablished, particularly around Lao-"ai border areas. grants travelling to "ailand for work or other rea- "e UNIFEM report sheds light on the organization sons. One observer argues that a Lao social network is of these informal recruitment agencies. "e recruit- the primary mechanism providing potential migrants ers are based in Lao PDR with "ai counterparts with a range of services, including assistance with that set up working opportunities with employers travel, entering "ailand irregularly, and !nding em- in "ailand. Lao and "ai recruiters then meet at ployment once in that country. Lao social networks speci!ed locations to hand the migrants over to the are often responsible for encouraging their friends "ai side for delivery to employers. Some of these and families to migrate, particularly when they have informal recruitment agencies are known to use the had a positive experience of migration to work in services of smugglers in transporting Lao migrants "ailand, including trouble-free facilitation of travel across the border and facilitating their irregular entry and entry into "ailand (Phetsiriseng, 2007). into "ailand (Phetsiriseng, 2007).

Where migrants sense danger from unfamiliar smug- "e literature also indicates that some recruiters op- glers or recruiters, it is less likely that they will em- erating through social networks o#er other services

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to their irregular migrant clients, including transport experiences are particularly in&uential in the deci- of remittances from the Lao workers in "ailand to sions of potential migrants ("ongyou, 2005). their families back home ("ongyou, 2005; Phet- siriseng, 2007; Pearson & Punpuing, 2006). According to the reviewed research, shortcomings in migration management policies have contributed b) Are persons involved in migrant smuggling to the establishment of informal recruitment agen- also involved in other criminal activities? cies, some of which employ the services of smug- glers. According to Vasuprasat (2008) the expense "e literature provides little information on migrant and ine$ciency associated with formal recruitment smugglers’ involvement in other forms of crime. "e practices designed to regulate migration to "ailand UNIFEM report, however, mentions that migrant have made informal recruitment agencies, which are smugglers also transport illicit commodities other generally cheaper and faster, more appealing to many than migrants, without providing further detail Lao migrants. (See Section 9 for a more detailed dis- (Phetsiriseng, 2007). cussion.)

c) Does migrant smuggling attract persons who have a history of involvement in other 6) Modus operandi of migrant smuggling crime? a) Recruitment methods Whether migrant smuggling attracts people who have a history of involvement in other crime remains "e research under review does not address the unclear, given the limited research available for re- modus operandi of smugglers. Nevertheless, some view. general observations may be based on the literature concerning irregular migration. Social networks d) What levels of professionalism/specializa- and informal recruitment agencies are used most tion is there within migrant smugglers? frequently by irregular Lao migrant workers (Phet- siriseng, 2007). Most potential informal migrants Given the limited relevant literature available, no are recruited by someone they know (Chantavanich, conclusions can be drawn regarding the degree of 2008). It is often true that recruiters are or were professionalization/specialization of migrant smug- themselves irregular migrants in "ailand. With the glers. knowledge and experience of migration to "ailand, recruiters can in&uence the decisions of others to e) What in"uences shape the way migrant migrate, especially if their migration experience was smugglers are organized? How and why do positive. "is is particularly the case among those these organizations evolve? recruiters with personal connections to potential mi- grants through family or social networks (Phetsiris- "e literature underscores the fact that social net- eng, 2007). works of family and friends who have irregularly mi- grated to "ailand signi!cantly shape the organiza- b) Payment methods tion of Lao migrant smuggling to "ailand (Pearson & Punpuing, 2006; Chantavanich, 2008; Phetsiris- No empirical research in the literature addresses eng, 2007). "ese networks have developed to assist methods of payment. Nevertheless, based on the lit- in organizing and facilitating migration to and em- erature concerning irregular migration, some general ployment in "ailand. "ey serve as reliable sources observations can be o#ered. Methods of payment to of information regarding the irregular migration recruiters vary. Some irregular migrants pay their fee process and working in "ailand. "ey are well con- to the recruiters up front, and are therefore free of nected both to other Lao migrant communities and any debt or potential debt bondage to their recruiter. to "ai employers in "ailand. On a basis of !rst- Others take out loans from their recruiters, or from hand experience, they know the migration routes, friends or family members. (Chantavanich, 2008). modes of transport, and how to cross the border into Irregular migrant workers more commonly do not "ailand irregularly. "ose with positive migration themselves pay for their migration to "ailand. In-

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stead, their "ai employers pay for recruitment and ments con!scated by employers upon arrival. Pass- travel expenses, paying the recruiters upon delivery ports are kept by "ai employees to control the Lao of the workers. Employers usually pay the recruiter migrant workers and to prevent them from running in one lump sum when the migrants arrive, and then away. Without passports or other identity docu- deduct this amount, with interest, in instalments ments, migrant workers are made vulnerable to ex- from the migrants’ salaries once they begin work ploitation and abuse within their workplaces. (Phetsiriseng, 2007). f) Corruption c) Transfer of criminal proceeds "e literature suggests the importance of corrupt "e literature includes no information regarding the practices by Lao and "ai o$cials, during or fol- transfer of criminal proceeds from migrant smug- lowing migration. According to Phetsiriseng (2007), gling operations. at o$cial border checkpoints, it is often necessary for Lao migrants or their recruiters to bribe im- d) Transportation methods migration authorities so that they can cross into "ailand. In some "ai workplaces, irregular Lao "e reviewed literature does not examine this ques- migrant workers have to pay police on a regular ba- tion in detail. Given that Lao PDR is a landlocked sis to avoid arrest and deportation. Human Rights country and shares a relatively porous border with Watch (2010) reported that police might con!scate "ailand, transport to "ailand is generally over- all the earnings of arrested Lao migrants, who are land. Some irregular migrants travel independently, then deported without their savings. According to and may have the telephone numbers of social con- Phetsiriseng (2007), some deportees are then subject tacts in "ailand should they need assistance on ar- to heavy !nes upon their return by the immigration rival. Other irregular migrants travel in groups of police and/or their village authorities, depending on 4–5 people, with recruiters or brokers and friends which village they are from. Some "ai employers and relatives who assist with travel and facilitation of who have recruited irregular migrant workers report- entry to "ailand (Chantavanich, 2008). edly bribe police and/or labour inspectors to prevent them from inspecting their workplaces and employ- Once in "ailand, irregular Lao migrants are usually ment practices. transported by road, hidden under cover in the back of trucks, to the destination place of work. Some em- g) Evolution of migrant smuggling methods ployers pick the migrants up at the border and trans- in response to changes in migration policies port them to the workplace (Phetsiriseng, 2007). and counter measures

e) Document use and misuse "e reviewed research does not speci!cally address the evolution of migrant smuggling methods in re- "e literature does not provide direct insight into the sponse to changes in migration policies and counter- use or misuse of documents in migrant smuggling measures. "e literature does refer, however, to the processes. In some cases, informal Lao migrants travel role of legislation and policies in the evolution of ir- irregularly across the border to "ailand without pass- regular migration from Lao PDR to "ailand. In par- port or other documents. Many Lao citizens lack o$- ticular, the research notes that, despite a recent MOU cial identi!cation documents or passports needed for on labour migration and alien registration schemes in the formal recruitment process, and therefore turn to "ailand, irregular migration between Lao PDR and informal recruitment channels (Chantavanich, 2008). "ailand continues and has probably increased.

"e research conducted by UNIFEM (Phetsiriseng, Vasuprasat (2008) argues that weak legal enforce- 2007) and ILO (Chantavanich, 2008) included sur- ment of migrant smuggling legislation and the re- veys and interviews with returned Lao migrants who strictive nature of the Lao-"ai migration regime had worked in "ailand. "is information indicated under the MOU has exacerbated irregular migra- that many returned migrants had their passports and tion. According to this report, the migration regime other identi!cation and employment-related docu- prescribed by the MOU has proved unpopular with

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many potential Lao migrants because it is too costly, ment network. "e UNIFEM study reports !erce complex, and lengthy. Another MOU limitation is competition between networks. "is works in the that migrant workers are only allowed to work for a migrants’ favour by driving recruitment and trans- speci!c employer and at the workplace speci!ed in port fees down and providing cheaper, faster, and their work permit. Regular migrant workers there- safer services. fore !nd it di$cult to change jobs or employers if they are unsatis!ed with their workplace. Irregular Further, the UNIFEM report indicates that migrant migration may therefore have greater appeal because smugglers can charge between THB 100 and THB it is perceived as more &exible, more e$cient, and 500 (USD 3 and USD 15) per person, depending on less expensive. the prevailing security situation along the Lao-"ai border, to informal recruitment companies who use their services to transport these individuals from Lao 7) Migrant smuggling fees and mobilization of PDR to "ailand. "is service excludes assistance fees with !nding employment in "ailand (Phetsiriseng, 2007). "e reviewed research shed no light on the speci!c issue of fees charged for migrant smuggling or how fees are mobilized by migrants. It does, however, pro- 8) Human and social costs of migrant smuggling vide some information about the respective costs of pursuing migration through the formal and infor- "e literature does not speci!cally address the hu- mal labour migration sectors. Costs associated with man and social costs of migrant smuggling from Lao formal recruitment agencies can include, among PDR. Neither does it address migrant smuggling as others, expenses for medical examination, passport, such, though it suggests, with regard to irregular mi- travel, and work permit, and can total between THB gration that, while social networks play an impor- 15,000 (USD 490), for a single-entry visa, and THB tant role in facilitating safe migration, irregular Lao 18,000 (USD 590) for a multi-entry visa (Chanta- migrants are nonetheless vulnerable to exploitation vanich, 2008). and abuse during the journey to "ailand and upon arrival in their "ai workplaces. According to a 2003 study, transporters (referred to as ‘tra$ckers’ in the article) are responsible for re- Research indicates that labour protection laws are questing a border pass from the Lao authorities to poorly enforced for migrant workers in "ailand, transport their clients across the border, moving and irregular migrant workers are subject to arrest their clients onwards outside the provincial limita- and deportation because of their uno$cial status tions imposed by the border pass and on to the desti- (Human Rights Watch, 2010; Huguet & Punpu- nation point in "ailand. Payments to transporters, ing, 2005). Many irregular migrants therefore ex- at that time, ranged between THB 6,000 and THB perience mistreatment, underpayment, long work- 8,000 (USD 140–USD 186) per person. (Phetsiris- ing hours, and poor working conditions in terms eng, 2003). of health and safety standards. Furthermore, "ai employers are able to control the irregular migrant According to the UNIFEM report (Phetsiriseng, workers by threatening to inform the "ai o$cials 2007), some recruiters from informal recruitment of their irregular status, leading to arrest and de- agencies charge "ai employers for bringing in Lao portation (Human Rights Watch, 2010; Chanta- workers. "e migrants often do not pay the recruit- vanich, 2008). Extortion has been reported on the er themselves. "e UNIFEM report indicates that part of "ai o$cials, who can strip irregular mi- some informal recruiters charge the employers be- grant workers of their earnings and other valuables tween THB 2,000 and THB 3,000 (USD 60 and upon arrest or before they are deported (Human USD 90), or one month’s salary per worker, upon Rights Watch, 2010). After deportation and upon the delivery of the worker to the "ai workplace. their return to Lao PDR, irregular migrants can Worker are then required to work for their employ- face additional !nes imposed by the Lao Depart- ers until the recruitment fee has been paid o#. "e ment of Immigration and/or village authorities charges vary, depending on the smuggling or recruit- (Phetsiriseng, 2007).

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Phetsiriseng (2007) reports that irregular migrants Relatively high demand draws a ready and willing are often placed in low-skilled, dangerous, dirty, and supply of Lao migrants to "ailand to work in low- demanding employment sectors where health and skilled work sectors such as !sheries, seafood process- safety standards are poor. In addition, Lao migrant ing, manufacturing and agriculture, and domestic workers, particularly those from rural areas, are often work. According to Phetsiriseng (2007) the formal poorly informed and have no experience working in recruitment and migration process is too slow and industrialized sectors. Informal migrants do not re- ine$cient to match this demand. Both Phetsiriseng ceive training before arrival in their "ai workplace, (2007) and Vasuprasat (2008) argue that, because and many are subject to additional workplace dan- of its shortcomings, the MOU has worked to fuel gers because they are unfamiliar with equipment and rather than reduce irregular migration. processes. Phetsiriseng (2003) also identi!ed HIV/ AIDS as a health issue connected to migration. "is At the time Vasuprasat (2008) conducted his re- is especially the case among women and girls who are search, there were nine authorized foreign employ- tra$cked or who migrate to work in the sex indus- ment agencies recruiting Lao migrant workers in Lao try. Returned migrant workers are known to su#er PDR. Provisions for formal recruitment agencies, from trauma associated with exploitation and abuse both state-managed and privately operated, are pre- in their "ai workplaces. Other returned migrants sented under the Lao PDR-"ai bilateral MOU on su#er continuing health problems contracted in Cooperation in the Employment of Workers (2002). their working environments in "ailand (Phetsiris- Also included under the MOU are provisions relat- eng, 2007). ing to actions against unauthorized border crossings and the employment of irregular migrant workers to "e reviewed research also identi!es accumulated debt support the use of formal recruitment agencies. "e as a risk for Lao migrants. Both regular and irregular formal agencies established in Lao PDR, however, Lao migrant workers may incur large debts as a result struggle to meet "ailand’s demand for workers. In of their migration to "ailand. Indebted to either their 2005, for example, under the MOU "ailand antici- recruiter or to their employer, many such workers en- pated a demand for 51,105 workers from Lao PDR, dure harsh conditions in their "ai workplaces to pay whereas Lao PDR could only provide 3,148 workers o# their migration debt and, they hope, save some through formal channels (Vasuprasat, 2008). money of their own (Vasuprasat, 2008). In extreme cases, migrant workers can be held in debt bondage to Chantavanich (2008) points to the high demand for their employer (Human Rights Watch, 2010). domestic workers in "ailand. Because the Lao Gov- ernment does not recognize domestic work as a for- mal sector of employment for migrant workers, how- 9) Factors fuelling irregular migration and mi- ever, Lao domestic workers use irregular migration grant smuggling channels to enter "ailand and !nd employment.

A number of push-pull factors commonly contrib- According to Phetsiriseng (2007) the very existence ute to the irregular migration of Lao citizens to of informal recruitment agencies and social networks "ailand and other countries bordering Lao PDR. established to facilitate irregular travel, entry, and em- Many of these have been discussed previously, in- ployment in "ailand is another reason irregular mi- cluding the overarching issue of pursuing economic gration continues to operate between Lao PDR and opportunity in "ailand and escaping rural poverty "ailand. Moreover, deterrent measures against these in Lao PDR. According to the literature reviewed, unauthorized procedures are limited. Border guards furthermore, informal migration channels are often and police o$cials can be bribed to prevent arrest and favoured by potential Lao migrants because they are prosecution, and those irregular migrants who are ar- faster, cheaper, and more e$cient in terms of facili- rested and deported can re-enter "ailand again. tating travel, entry into, and employment in "ai- land, compared to the relatively expensive, lengthy, Phetsiriseng (2007) also reports that few Lao citizens and complex formal recruitment system established hold a passport or border pass to travel regularly to under the Lao-"ai MOU on Employment Coop- "ailand. Passports are expensive and time consum- eration (Vasuprasat, 2008). ing to process, and many Lao citizens are unfamiliar

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with the application process. Border passes, a cheaper discussion presented in this chapter draws primar- option, take 3–5 days to process at a cost of USD 3. ily upon research on irregular migration. While no "ey are valid for one year, and allow Lao citizens to distinction is made in the research under review be- cross into "ailand through o$cial Lao-"ai border tween migrant smuggling and other methods of ir- checkpoints. For each entry into "ailand, however, regular migration, it may be assumed that migrant the Lao border-pass holder can stay a maximum of smuggling is an undisclosed subset of irregular mi- only three days, and must remain within the "ai gration. province of entry. In practice, Lao migrants enter "ailand with a border pass but stay on in "ailand "e literature includes a strong focus on irregular irregularly once the border pass has expired. labour migration from Lao PDR to "ailand. In general, the methods used by irregular Lao migrants Vasuprasat (2008,) refers to another factor that fuels ir- in travelling to "ailand parallel methods used by regular migration: Formal recruitment agencies do not migrant smugglers. necessarily guarantee migrants safe passage to "ailand or labour protection once in "ailand. Trusted social Informal recruitment agencies may use the services of networks that assist with irregular migration arguably smugglers to facilitate entry into "ailand, although o#er potential migrants safer passage into "ailand the extent of this practice remains unknown. Social and employment in more trusted workplaces. "e for- networks, because they are trusted, are also identi!ed mal recruitment process, furthermore, prohibits mi- as crucial to the facilitation of irregular migration for grants from changing employers if they are unsatis!ed Lao migrants. Often those individuals within the social with their working conditions. It is common for "ai networks who engage in organizing irregular migration employers to con!scate travel and employment docu- were irregular migrants themselves: they have tried and ments from formal migrant workers on arrival at the tested the migration routes, and have often had positive workplace, e#ectively allowing the employer to exert experiences of living and working in "ailand. control over the workers on and o# the job. Various authors point out that this practice makes migrant Factors that drive irregular migration from Lao PDR workers vulnerable to exploitation and abuse (Chanta- to "ailand include shortcomings in the Lao-"ai vanich, 2008; Pearson & Punpuing, 2006). migration management policies directed by the MOU on Employment Cooperation; perceived eco- Finally, Phetsiriseng (2007) suggests that labour laws nomic opportunity in "ailand on the part of young in Lao PDR may be a potential push factor for ir- Lao citizens; the desire to escape poverty; and the regular migration. Lao PDR labour laws provide existence of informal recruitment agencies and social basic protection to workers, including the right to networks. "ese factors, arguably, also fuel organized equal pay, minimum wage, overtime, and provisions smuggling between Lao PDR and "ailand. relating to occupational health and safety. "ese laws are poorly enforced, however, and many Lao workers b) What we don’t know about migrant smug- consequently lack protection of their worker’s rights. gling in Lao PDR Lao workers can be subject to exploitation and abuse, including underpayment, within their workplaces. Many gaps persist in research concerning migrant "is has been identi!ed as a push factor for migration smuggling in Lao PDR, and little information is to work in "ailand, where working conditions and available on the subject. Discussion presented in the pay are perceived as better that those in Lao PDR. literature mostly concerns irregular migration and, to a lesser extent, tra$cking in persons.

10) Conclusions "e data needed to estimate numbers of Lao smug- gled migrants are unavailable. Limited information a) What we know about migrant smuggling in is available, however, regarding pro!les of migrant Lao PDR smugglers operating in Lao PDR.

In the absence of any de!nitive research on migrant Discussion within the literature provides little in- smuggling to, through, and from Lao PDR, the sight into the organization of migrant smuggling

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operations. Phetsiriseng (2007) o#ers a brief discus- Phetsiriseng, I. (2007). Gender concerns in migra- sion of smuggling between Lao PDR and "ailand, tion in Lao PDR: Migration mapping study: A although this is couched within a broader discus- review of trends, policy and programme initia- sion of irregular migration methods. "e issue of the tives. Vientiane:United Nations Development transfer of criminal proceeds is not addressed. Fund for Women, Regional Programme on Em- powering Women Migrant Workers in Asia. In short, dedicated research is needed to better un- derstand the following issues: Sciortino, R. and Punpuing, S. (2009). International t quantitative extent of irregular migration, mi- migration to !ailand. Bangkok: International grant smuggling, and tra$cking in persons; Organization for Migration. t smuggler pro!les and motivations; t pro!les of irregular and smuggled migrants and "ongyou, M. and Ayuwat, D. (2005). Social net- their motivations; work of Laotian migrant workers in "ailand. t migrant-smuggler relationships; In: Working Paper Series (80). t organization of migrant smuggling; t modus operandi of migrant smuggling; United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human t fees paid to smugglers and mobilization of fees; Tra$cking. (2010). !e Mekong region human t human and social costs of migrant smuggling; country datasheets on human tra"cking 2010. and Bangkok: UNIAP. t factors contributing to irregular migration and smuggling. Vasuprasat, P. (2008). Inter-state cooperation on la- bour migration: Lessons learned from MOUs between !ailand and neighbouring countries. References Bangkok: International Labour Organization.

Chantavanich, S. (2008). !e Mekong challenge: An honest broker – Improving cross-border recruit- ment practices for the bene#t of government workers and employers. Bangkok: International Labour Organization.

Huguet, J. W. and Punpuing, S. (2005). Interna- tional migration in !ailand. Bangkok: Inter- national Organization for Migration.

Human Rights Watch. (2010). From the tiger to the crocodile: Abuse of migrant workers in !ai- land. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Pearson, E. and Punpuing, S. (2006). !e Mekong challenge: Underpaid, overworked and over- looked: !e realities of young migrant workers in !ailand. Bangkok: International Labour Organization.

Phetsiriseng, I. (2003). Lao PDR preliminary assess- ment of illegal labour migration and tra$ck- ing in children and women for labour exploi- tation. In: ILO Mekong Sub-Regional Project to Combat Tra"cking in Children and Women. Bangkok: International Labour Organization.

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:G/D17.(A,-G1I(!/4/@5,/

1) Quantitative assessments and $ows of irregular reviewed literature includes estimates indicating that migration, migrant smuggling, and tra"cking in levels of undocumented migrants have remained high person over the past three decades. In 1995, it was estimated that 650,000 undocumented migrants were living a) Estimated numbers and major routes: Ir- in Malaysia, while in 1999 ILO estimates indicated regular migration from, to and through that less than half of Malaysia’s 1.8 million foreign Malaysia workers had travel documents (Crinis, 2005). Esti- mated numbers of irregular migrants have remained Malaysia, according to the reviewed literature, is a at least as high in the 21st century. In 2002, estimates country of destination for irregular migration. "e placed the number of irregular unskilled labour mi- country has hosted a great number of irregular mi- grants from Indonesia and the Philippines at about grants since the 1970s ushered in the New Economic 600,000 (Asis, 2004). Later estimates ranged up to Policy. A concomitant new migration policy focused 1.3 million for 2004 and 2005 (Santhiago, 2005). In on export-oriented industrialization and public-sec- July 2006, the IOM estimated that 600,000 irregu- tor expansion, triggering a wave of urban job growth lar migrant workers were in Malaysia (IOM, 2008). and subsequent mass migration, some of it within In 2009, according to other observers, Malaysia was Malaysia itself (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Dur- hosting an estimated 1.9 million undocumented ing this time, shortages in the plantation, construc- workers (U.S. Department of State, 2010). tion, and service sectors were being !lled mainly by Indonesian migrant workers (Asis, 2004). Although estimates vary, Malaysia’s irregular mi- grants are overwhelmingly comprised of labour mi- According to Santhiago (2005) and Ford (2006) many grants from Indonesia and the Philippines (Santhia- irregular migrants in Malaysia are overstayers, because go, 2005), though Malaysia also hosts a number of ASEAN nationals, including Indonesians and Filipi- irregular Bangladeshi migrants (Mehdi, 2010). nos, require only a social visit pass to enter the country. For migrants who choose to irregularly enter Malaysia b) Estimated numbers and major routes: Mi- at the border, the assistance of smugglers, i.e. recruiters, grant smuggling from, to and through Ma- brokers, and middlemen, is often unnecessary. Indone- laysia sian migrants enter Malaysia through a range of formal, semi-formal, and informal channels. Major points of "e reviewed literature provides no quantitative esti- departure in Indonesia for unassisted entry into Malay- mates of the number of migrants smuggled to, from, sia include Kalimantan, Nunukan, Sebatik, and Tara- and through Malaysia. kan. Malaysia’s borders with Indonesia are very porous, and irregular migrants can easily cross them. "e available research does, however, con!rm that, as with irregular migration &ows, Malaysia is a coun- Accurately quantifying the number of irregular mi- try of destination and transit for migrant smuggling. grants in Malaysia is currently impossible. But the Smuggling of migrants from Indonesia to Malaysia

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has become a formidable industry, one that, in the mates of migrant numbers tra$cked to, from, and form of unlicensed recruitment agencies and unau- through Malaysia. thorized brokers, normally parallels o$cial labour recruitment schemes. Networks in both countries According to the literature, Malaysia is a country facilitate irregular entry into Malaysia and job place- of destination and, to a lesser extent, of origin and ment after arrival (Hosen, 200). In the Malaysian transit for tra$cking in persons. Most tra$cking state of Sarawak alone, the authorities have identi- victims in Malaysia are migrant workers looking for !ed 72 land routes used by smugglers. ("ese routes, employment opportunities who come from Bangla- cleared by border dwellers and illegal loggers, are desh, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Myan- known as lorong tikus, or ‘rat lanes’.) According to mar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, "ailand, and Malaysia’s Department of Immigration, smugglers Viet Nam. Malaysian citizens are tra$cked both in- seek and establish new routes when old channels are ternally and to France, Hong Kong (China), Singa- discovered (Santhiago, 2005). Hunter (2004) con- pore, and the UK (U.S. Department of State, 2010). !rms that smuggling &ows for labour migration out Transit routes through Malaysia continue onward to of Indonesia to Malaysia use either !shing vessels or Europe, Hong Kong (China), Japan, Singapore, Tai- land routes, depending on the point of departure. wan Province of China, and "ailand (Saat, 2009).

Smuggling agents in the Philippines, another ma- Some tra$ckers work alone, but most tra$cking in jor source country of migrant labour in Malaysia, persons to Malaysia involves organized crime syn- help migrants to enter Malaysia using unauthorized dicates. Some labour recruitment agencies are also routes from the islands of Sulu and Balawan in the involved in tra$cking, outsourcing excess workers southern Philippines. Smuggling groups also report- who are often subjected to conditions of forced la- edly assist migrants from Bangladesh, Cambodia, bour (U.S. Department of State, 2010). Tra$cked Lao PDR, Myanmar, Nepal, "ailand, and other Indonesian girls and women are usually brought to countries to cross the land border from "ailand to Malaysia as domestic maids and are then sold by Malaysia (Santhiago, 2005). their agents to work in discos and the entertainment industry (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Tra$cking Migrants from other Asian countries use Malaysia in persons can continue internally, with victims be- as a transit country on their way to Australia, Saudi ing sold from club to club (Saat, 2009). Arabia, and Singapore (Santhiago, 2005; Mehdi, 2010). It is unclear whether migrants proceed inde- Because the 2006 MOU on migrant workers be- pendently to Saudi Arabia and Singapore or by way tween Malaysia and Indonesia allows Malaysian of smuggling networks. Organized smuggling net- employers to con!scate and hold the passports of works are responsible for arranging transit to Aus- domestic employees, these workers are more vulner- tralia (Crock et al., 2006). Depending on the route, able to tra$cking conditions and exploitation by Malaysia may not be the only country of transit employers (U.S. Department of State, 2010). for these migrants. Since 2007, due to Indonesia’s stricter visa regime, smuggling routes for members "e Malaysian state of Sabah is the main point of of the Hazara ethic minority from Afghanistan who entry for tra$cking in persons from the Philippines. are irregularly migrating to Australia have become Tra$cking routes from the Philippines involve a more complicated. Instead of travelling directly to combination of air, sea, and land travel, and most Indonesia from Afghanistan, migrants !rst stop in victims enter Malaysia through a multi-stage journey Malaysia and are then ferried by boat to Indonesia, of &ights and ferries (Saat, 2009). where they change to another boat bound for Aus- tralia (UNODC, 2010). d) Cross-over or overlap, if any, between popu- lations or routes c) Estimated numbers and major routes: Traf- #cking in persons from, within, to and While the reviewed literature does not speci!cally through Malaysia discuss this issue, it con!rms that a great deal of over- lap exists between regular, irregular, smuggling, and "e literature does not provide quantitative esti- tra$cking &ows to Malaysia. Coming from the two

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major source countries for authorized migrant la- b) Motivation bour in Malaysia, Indonesian and Filipino migrants also comprise the bulk of unauthorized &ows. Un- According to the reviewed literature, irregular mi- licensed agencies in Indonesia and Malaysia re&ect grant workers from Indonesia and the Philippines authorized migration patterns, and facilitate irregu- enter Malaysia with the hope of !nding employment lar entry into Malaysia and job placement through and bettering their economic situation. In addition, contacts with Malaysian employers (Hosen, 2005). Hosen (2005) and Hugo and Stahl (2004) report Allegedly, some agencies are also involved in tra$ck- that, instead of using o$cial labour migration chan- ing &ows, and sell their clients to discos and clubs in nels, migrants can much more easily !nd employ- Malaysia (Human Rights Watch, 2004). ment through uno$cial recruiters. Authorized mi- gration to Malaysia entails a number of bureaucratic hurdles, which can be avoided through irregular en- 2) Pro#les of migrant smugglers try and unauthorized employment. "us paperwork, fees, embassy visits, and required job placement and a) Socio-economic characteristics training through recruitment agencies may turn mi- grants to unlicensed recruiters, who provide faster Given the available literature, no conclusions can be and cheaper services for migrants living close to Ma- drawn regarding the socio-economic characteristics laysia. of smugglers. Santhiago (2005) reports that migrants from Myan- b) Motivation mar, often with the assistance of smugglers, irregu- larly enter Malaysia to seek asylum. "ey transit "e reviewed literature did not speci!cally research through "ailand before entering Malaysia. Once the motivation of migrant smugglers. in the country, they often take up irregular employ- ment.

3) Pro#les of irregular migrants and smuggled Other irregular migrants, in particular from the migrants Middle East and South-West Asia, use Malaysia as a transit country before continuing onward to Austra- a) Geographical and socio-economic charac- lia (Crock et al., 2006). teristics

"e literature indicates that, as with regular mi- 4) Smuggler-migrant relationships grant workers, irregular and smuggled migrants in Malaysia most often originate from the neighbour- a) Migrant perceptions of smugglers ing countries of Indonesia and the Philippines (San- thiago, 2005). Many of these migrants are women. "e reviewed literature provides very limited infor- Overall, labour &ows to Malaysia and more generally mation about migrant perceptions of their smug- within South-East Asia have become increasingly glers. Trust is repeatedly mentioned as a key factor. feminized, with more women leaving their home In the well-established routes from Indonesia to countries through regular and irregular channels to Malaysia, migrants tend to trust unlicensed agents. !nd work abroad (Crinis, 2005). Because labour migration recruiters in Indonesia tend to be individuals of good standing in their vil- Smuggled migrants transiting through Malaysia are lages, potential migrants are prone to trust them often from Middle Eastern and South-West Asian more than they do unknown o$cials (Hugo, 2004; countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNO- Rudnyckyj, 2004). DC, 2010).17 According to Santhiago (2005), some Middle East- ern and South-West Asian migrants smuggled to or 17 For further information about socio-economic characteristics of Af- ghan and Pakistani migrants, please refer to the respective country through Malaysia reported that, although smugglers chapters. demanded a great deal of money, they were good

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men who ful!lled their promises and assisted mi- Smuggling operations from Indonesia to Malaysia grants in &eeing from dangerous situations. often parallel licensed labour recruitment agencies in the form of informal brokerages. Unlicensed b) Nature of migrant-smuggler relationship agents have local contacts in Malaysia who assist with job placement and !nding accommodation. Beyond the recruitment phase in Indonesia, the Smugglers are referred to as ‘middlemen’, ‘brokers’, literature does not provide information on Indo- ‘agents’, ‘snakeheads’, tekong darat (anchormen on nesian migrant relationships with other actors in land), and tekong laut (anchormen at sea) (Santhia- the smuggling process. Rudnyckyj (2004) likens go, 2005). Indonesian migrants’ relationships with their lo- cal brokers to traditional patron-client networks, Saat (2009) provides information about the struc- which play an important role in the absence of ture of 11 criminal groups operating in West Ma- strong state institutions. In this ‘peasant-landown- laysia that are involved in both tra$cking in per- er’ relationship, clients willingly consent to exploi- sons and migrant smuggling from the Philippines tation by higher-status patrons in exchange for the to Malaysia. "ese groups range in size from fewer patron guaranteeing their livelihoods when they than 5 to as many as 20 members. Saat describes fall on hard times. "is relationship is re&ected in a four-level structure of such groups: (1) the deci- migrant-broker relationships, when well-known sion-makers, about whom little is known; (2) in- and respected brokers in the community provide dividuals who receive orders, pass on information, small-scale loans to migrants and provide contacts and give directions to level 3; (3) members who to recruitment agencies. organize on the ground operations, work closely with level 4, and have close ties with government c) Factors in"uencing the relationship between o$cials in the police and Immigration, generally smugglers and migrant greasing the wheels of the operation; and (4) errand boys who arrange transportation, buy food, and "e reviewed literature did not speci!cally research pass information to level 3. "ese errand boys also this issue. "e scant available information, which scout for new clients and areas of expansion, and relates only to migrant smuggling from Indonesia normally know local sex workers. In addition, they to Malaysia, indicates that the social standing of often deal in hard illicit drugs and pharmaceuticals Indonesian brokers at home greatly in&uences the (Saat, 2009). nature of their relationship with migrants. If bro- kers are respected in their communities, potential On the other hand, according to Saat, groups in- migrants feel safer entrusting their future to them volved in migrant smuggling and human tra$ck- (Hugo, 2004; Rudnyckyj, 2004). Given Rudnyckyj’s ing from the Philippines to Sabah are smaller and above-mentioned patron-client relationship between organized di#erently. "ese groups have up to 10 broker and migrant, a broker may be expected to as- members and adopt a 3-level structure: (1) people sist migrants if they experience di$culties abroad. embedded in the Sabah entertainment industry; However, brokers may not be able to adequately re- they force women into prostitution; (2) agents who spond to these problems. In such cases, the broker’s recruit and sell or hand over women to the enter- reputation as a recruiter may su#er due to the local tainment industry in Malaysia or to other agents, scale of the relationship. who are most often Filipinos; and (3) recruiters hired by the agents to recruit girls in the Philippines (Saat, 2009). 5) Organization of migrant smuggling b) Are persons involved in migrant smuggling a) How is migrant smuggling organized? also involved in other criminal activities?

"e reviewed research did not examine the organiza- According to Saat (2009) migrant smuggling and tional structure of networks that operate in Malaysia tra$cking in persons from the Philippines to Ma- and are involved in migrant smuggling from coun- laysia are sometimes conducted by the same ac- tries other than Indonesia and the Philippines. tors.

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c) Does migrant smuggling attract persons b) Payment methods who have a history of involvement in other crime? "e reviewed literature provides information only about methods of payment with regard to migrant It is unclear from the literature whether individuals smuggling from the Philippines and Indonesia to are involved in other forms of criminality before they Malaysia. Both regular and irregular migrants usu- become involved in smuggling of migrants. ally make monthly payments to recruiters to repay their accrued debt (Rajaram & Grundy-Warr, 2004). d) What levels of professionalism/specializa- Some agents operating between Indonesia or "ai- tion is there within migrant smugglers? land and Malaysia have direct arrangements with Malaysian employers to collect migrants’ wages until "e literature does not speci!cally address the level the full debt for recruitment services has been repaid of professionalism and specialization among migrant (Santhiago, 2005). Unauthorized recruitment from smugglers. the Philippines involves a similar process: smugglers transferring migrants from the Philippines to Malay- e) What in"uences shape the way migrant sia are usually paid in Philippine pesos, also receiving smugglers are organized? How and why do a cut of migrants’ initial earnings as payment (Sadiq, these organizations evolve? 2005).

According to Human Rights Watch (2004) smug- c) Transfer of criminal proceeds gling networks for labour migration from Indonesia to Malaysia are shaped in large part by the overall "e available literature does not provide grounds for organization of licensed labour recruitment agen- conclusions regarding methods of transferring crimi- cies. Unlicensed recruiters mimic the operations of nal proceeds of migrant smuggling. licensed agents and provide practically identical ser- vices. Local recruiters in villages may work for both d) Transportation methods licensed and unlicensed agencies, blurring the line between smuggling services and authorized channels Santhiago (2005) provides some information about of labour migration. transportation of irregular migrants to Malaysia from Indonesia, the Philippines, and "ailand:

6) Migrant smuggling modus operandi Transportation from Indonesia is usually via land or sea. In the Malaysian state of Sarawak, 72 land routes a) Recruitment methods from Indonesia have been identi!ed by the authori- ties. In the Strait of Malacca, agents transport mi- According to the reviewed literature, prospective mi- grants from Indonesia on passenger boats and !shing grant workers in Indonesia use both licensed and un- trawlers that normally depart from Sumatra, Batam, licensed labour agents to secure employment in Ma- or Rapat. Sometimes Indonesian migrants are hid- laysia (Human Rights Watch, 2004). "e process of den in containers on boats to be transported to Ma- recruitment begins in the home village with the local laysia. "ese boats generally transport between 5 and recruiter, who is also known as the sponsor, agent, 15 migrants, and embark between 1 a.m. and 4 a.m. broker, or middleman (Hosen, 2005). Unauthorized to avoid detection by the Indonesian or Malaysian Indonesian agents arrange irregular entry and assist authorities. "e role of Indonesian agents usually with job placement and !nding lodgings in Malaysia ends with the transportation stage, at which point (Hugo, 2004; Hosen, 2005). Malaysian agents assume responsibility for oversee- ing job placement. According to research conducted by Saat, criminal groups that are allegedly involved in both human traf- Irregular migrants from the Philippines are usually !cking and migrant smuggling from the Philippines transported to Malaysia aboard small vessels used to Malaysia often !rst establish contact with women by Filipino barter traders in the southern Philip- through relatives, friends, and neighbours. (Saat, 2009). pines. Smugglers navigating the boats drop an-

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chor near the Sabah shoreline and migrants wade that migrant smuggling syndicates are linked to ashore. some members in law enforcement, and of corrup- tion among some members of law enforcement o$- "e land border between "ailand and Malaysia is cials. For example Santhiago notes that in December crossed by car, on foot, or by riverboat. Migrants are 2003, a smuggling ring was cracked that included hidden in car boots or bus baggage compartments, o$cials from Malaysian Airlines and the Malaysian led through the jungle on foot, or loaded into sam- airport. Another suspected smuggler was arrested pans or other boats to cross rivers. "e River Golok is with copious numbers of immigration forms, sug- a particularly common crossing point for smugglers gesting corruption in the Department of Immigra- in southern "ailand, because it takes less than 5 tion. According to Asis (2004), in Malaysia, protec- minutes for boats to reach the Malaysian side. Un- tion from arrest and deportation can be secured for authorized agents use about 31 exit points for their a fee and smugglers often go unpunished because of operations in southern "ailand. As with clandestine corruption or political patronage. Sadiq (2005) also movements from Indonesia, these covert operations reports that corruption can help in obtaining falsi- usually occur during the night to avoid apprehension. !ed documents, saying that the Malaysian National Registration Department relies on community lead- Malaysia is also a country of transit for irregular mi- ers and other agencies to verify or register people in grants from the Middle East and South-West Asia. remote areas without birth certi!cates, which creates "ese people usually enter Malaysia by air before a window of opportunity for securing a fraudulent continuing their journey by boat to Indonesia, and birth certi!cate. from there they proceed to Australia (Hunter, 2004). "e available literature supplies no further details g) Evolution of migrant smuggling methods about these routes with regard to Malaysia. in response to changes in migration policies and counter measures e) Document use and misuse "e literature provides no information regard- "e literature indicates that both licensed and unli- ing whether or how smugglers adapt operations to censed Indonesian recruiters often falsify travel docu- changes in migration policy and e#orts to combat ments, letters of permission, documents of residence, unauthorized entry. identi!cation cards, birth certi!cates, and other re- quired documents to meet the eligibility requirements imposed by the Government (Hosen, 2005; Human 7) Migrant smuggling fees and mobilization of Rights Watch, 2004). Because Malaysia requires that fees domestic workers be between 25 and 45 years of age, young Indonesian girls or older women sometimes use "e costs of smuggling services from, through, and false travel documents or have their passports altered to Malaysia vary widely, depending on operational to meet the age requirements for labour migrants (Sil- points of origin and destination. "e prices for irreg- vey, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2004). ular migration from Indonesia range from USD 25, from Batam, to USD 200 from West Nusa Tenggara. In operations from the Philippines, according to Migrants using o$cial channels, on the other hand, Saat (2009), smuggling groups usually do not forge are expected to pay about USD 325 (Hugo & Stahl, documents themselves, instead relying on special- 2004). It is believed that migrants smuggled across ized criminal groups to provide this service. "ese the Strait of Malacca from Indonesia pay between syndicates are known as sandiket IC palsu (‘the forg- MYR 15018 and MYR 500 (USD 50 and USD 65) ing syndicates’), and they falsify identity cards, birth for transport services (Santhiago, 2005). certi!cates, temporary identity card slips, passport stickers, and temporary refugee passes. Migrants from "ailand pay an estimated MYR 50 and MYR 800 (USD 16 and USD 260) for smug- f) Corruption gling services. Smuggling services from Malaysia to

According to Santhiago (2005), there are allegations 18 MYR = Malaysian Ringgit.

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Singapore are signi!cantly more expensive, with boat It is also clear that migrant smuggling, especially transit estimated at USD 1,200 (Santhiago, 2005). by sea from Indonesia or the Philippines, is fraught with risk due to poor travel conditions, unseawor- According to UNODC (2010), transit fees through thy vessels, lack of food and water, overloaded boats, Malaysia from the Middle East and South-West Asia and crews with little regard for the human lives on are even higher. Research conducted for a UNODC board (Hunter, 2004). To evade apprehension by report indicates that migrants in Afghanistan and the authorities, smugglers may refuse to approach Pakistan reported smuggling fees to Australia via In- the shoreline of the destination country, forcing mi- donesia and/or Malaysia ranged from USD 12,000 grants to swim the last stretch. Migrants transiting to USD 18,000. Migrants already in Australia or In- from Malaysia to Singapore by boat have reportedly donesia, however, reported smuggling fees ranging been forced to swim the last two kilometres to shore, as high as USD 20,000 and more. "is discrepancy allowing smugglers to avoid arrest at the cost of put- may be due to the fact that some migrants choose ting the lives of migrants in grave danger (Santhiago, not to pay for ‘end to end’ service, subsequently pay- 2005). ing higher fees. Some migrants simply pay for plane tickets to Malaysia and then make their own ar- rangements for the onward trip to Indonesia by boat. 9) Factors fuelling irregular migration and mi- According to the report, estimates from Afghanistan grant smuggling and Pakistan suggest that 60 percent of migrants take the end-to-end service to Australia, while 40 "e reviewed literature identi!es a number of factors percent make their own arrangements after arriving that fuel irregular migration and migrant smuggling in Malaysia. to Malaysia.

Migrants from Indonesia usually sell land or incur Geographic proximity plays a role in easing irregular debt to mobilize funds for licensed and unlicensed entry, as is the case with Indonesia and the Philip- recruiting fees (Hosen, 2005). Money is raised by pines, whose citizens can easily enter Malaysia by borrowing money from relatives, friends, village land or sea. "e number of small, uninhabited is- moneylenders, or the recruiter at high interest rates. lands o# the cost of Sabah makes the location ideal To clear the accrued debts, the !rst 4–5 months or for staging clandestine entries (Sadiq, 2005). even 6–8 months of migrants’ salaries are often held as payment by the recruiter (Human Rights Watch, Hosen (2005) points to employer demand for un- 2004, 2005). authorized workers as one factor fuelling irregular migration. Unauthorized recruiting agents in Paki- "e literature does not estimate smuggling fees from stan claim that there is a large demand for Paki- the Philippines to Malaysia. As with their Indone- stani labour in Malaysia for low-skilled jobs because sian counterparts, Filipino smugglers often take a residents are no longer willing to perform this work cut of migrants’ initial earnings as payment (Sadiq, (Hasan, 2010). 2005). It is unclear how these migrants mobilize up- front payments. Economic disparities between Indonesia and the Philippines and Malaysia are a key driver of irregular migration to Malaysia (Santhiago, 2005). Shortcom- 8) Human and social costs of migrant smuggling ings in o$cial migration schemes present another major driver for irregular migration from Indonesia "ere is very limited information in the literature to Malaysia, given that irregular migration is faster about the human and social costs of migrant smug- and cheaper. ("is report’s country chapter on Indo- gling involving Malaysia. Hosen (2005) notes that, nesia discusses this in greater detail.) to raise smuggling and job placement fees, migrants often borrow money at high interest rates or sell piec- According to Turner (2005), the Malaysian Gov- es of land to quickly mobilize capital. "is triggers a ernment’s tacit approval of irregular migration also cycle of debt that often continues in Malaysia, when allowed these operations to continue largely with- agents take cuts of migrants’ salaries as debt payments. out interference. Crinis (2005) argues that, before

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the 1990s Asian economic crisis, the Malaysian ployment. Still, it remains unclear how migrants are Government was neither serious about combat- normally recruited and what connections the smug- ing irregular labour migration nor had the institu- glers have with employers in Malaysia. tional capacity to do so (Crinis, 2005). According to Ford (2006), in Indonesia, local immigration Only very limited information is available regard- o$cials in transit provinces explicitly helped mi- ing migrant smuggling to Malaysia from Cambodia, grants to enter Malaysia through semi-legal chan- Myanmar, "ailand, and other neighbouring coun- nels by procuring o$cial documents in exchange tries. Most details are provided through case studies, for bribes. however, and these do not indicate overall trends. "ese case studies do not describe how migrants come into contact with smugglers or the structure 10) Conclusions of these smuggling organizations. It is also unclear whether these migrants choose to be smuggled main- a) What we know about migrant smuggling in ly for economic reasons or to seek asylum. A num- Malaysia ber of asylum seeker case studies from neighbouring countries are provided in the literature. Most of what is known about migrant smuggling in Malaysia revolves around the smuggling of work- "e document forgery business for unauthorized la- ers from Indonesia. Compared to other smuggling bour migration is relatively well researched, particu- routes, these &ows are well researched and well un- larly regarding migration from Indonesia and the derstood. Philippines. Migrant smuggling organizations either falsify documents themselves or rely on other crimi- In Indonesia, smugglers usually operate through nal syndicates to provide this service. unlicensed labour recruitment agencies that fa- cilitate unauthorized entry and job placement in b) What we don’t know about migrant smug- Malaysia. "ese unlicensed agencies operate very gling in Malaysia similarly to licensed recruiters, and can be di$cult to distinguish from authorized agencies. Migrants "ere is no recent and dedicated research regarding are often recruited locally by respected !gures in migrant smuggling from, to, and through Malaysia. the community who either work for or have ties to the agency. While irregular migration from Indonesia to Ma- laysia and related migrant smuggling practices are Many migrants choose to migrate through unli- relatively well researched, the reviewed literature censed agencies because they impose fewer bureau- provides only limited information about migrant cratic requirements, facilitate entry and employment smuggling from the Philippines to Malaysia, and at a faster tempo, and are often less expensive than there are tremendous research gaps with regard to licensed recruiters. Payments are made either up migrant smuggling from other countries to Malay- front or through withholding migrants’ salaries for a sia. number of months. In this respect, future research on migrant smug- "e Philippines is another major source country gling to and through Malaysia is needed to clarify for regular and irregular migration to Malaysia, and and document the following: migrant smuggling from that country also mainly t extent of migrant smuggling; involves labour migration. Fewer details are known t routes used; about the process, however. One study describes how t pro!les of migrant smugglers; well-structured criminal groups smuggle migrants t pro!les of smuggled migrants; from the Philippines to Malaysia. "e researched t nature of smuggler-migrant relationships; groups were also involved in human tra$cking, t organization of migrant smuggling and methods however, and it is not clear to what extent the results used; can be generalized. In addition, labour recruitment t smuggling fees; and agencies are involved in smuggling migrants for em- t human and social costs of migrant smuggling.

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References Human Rights Watch. (2005). Maid to order: End- ing abuses against migrant domestic workers in Asis, M. M. B. (2004). Borders, globalization and Singapore. New York: Human Rights Watch irregular migration in Southeast Asia. In: A. (Vol. 17, No. 10 (C). Ananta and E. N. Ari!n (eds.), International Migration in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Insti- Hunter, C. (2004). "e ‘people in between’: Indone- tute of Southeast Asian Studies. sia and the failed asylum seekers to Australia. In: Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Af- Crinis, V. (2005). "e devil you know: Malaysian fairs, 38(2), pp. 101–127. perceptions of foreign workers. [Paper in special issue: A. Kaur and I. Metcalfe (eds.). International Organization for Migration. (2008). Migrant Labour in Southeast Asia: Needed, Not World migration report 2008. Geneva: Inter- Wanted.] In: Review of Indonesian and Malay- national Organization for Migration. sian A%airs, 39(2), pp. 91–111. Mehdi, S. S. (2010). Illegal migration, human smug- Crock, M., Saul, B. and Dastyari, A. (2006). Future gling and tra"cking: From Bangladesh to Paki- seekers II: Refugees and irregular migration in stan and beyond. Geneva: International Orga- Australia. Sydney: "e Federation Press. nization for Migration.

Ford, M. (2006). After Nunukan: "e regulation Rajaram, P. K., and Grundy-Warr, C. (2004). "e of Indonesian migration to Malaysia. In: A. Irregular Migrant as Homo Sacer: Migration Kaur and I. Metcalfe (eds.), Mobility, labour and Detention in Australia, Malaysia, and migration and border controls in Asia. New "ailand. International Migration, 42(1), 33- York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 228–247. 64.

Hasan, A. (2010). Migration, small towns and social Rudnyckyj, D. (2004). Technologies of servitude: transformations in Pakistan. In: Environment Governmentality and Indonesian transna- and Urbanization, 22(1), pp. 33–50. tional labor migration. In: Anthropological Quarterly, 77(3), pp. 407–434. Hosen, M. N. (2005). Governance of Indonesian la- bour and migration to Malaysia: An overview. Saat, G. (2009). Human tra$cking from the [Paper in special issue: A. Kaur and I. Met- Philippines to Malaysia: "e impact of ur- calfe (eds.). Migrant Labour in Southeast Asia: banism. In: South Asian Survey, 16(1), pp. Needed, Not Wanted.] In: Review of Indonesian 137–148. and Malaysian A%airs, 39(2), pp. 31–44. Sadiq, K. (2005). When states prefer non-citizens Hugo, G. (2004). International migration in the Asia- over citizens: Con&ict over illegal immigra- Paci!c region: Emerging trends and issues. In: tion into Malaysia. In: International Studies D. S. Massey and J. E. Taylor (eds.). Interna- Quarterly, 49(1), pp. 101–122. tional migration, prospects and policies in a global market. New York: Oxford University Press. Santhiago, A. (2005). Human smuggling, migra- tion and human rights: A Malaysian perspec- Hugo, G. and Stahl, C. (2004). Labour export strategies tive. [Paper presented at the Review Meet- in Asia. In: D. S. Massey and J. E. Taylor (eds.), ing Migration: Human rights protection International migration, prospects and policies in a of smuggled persons, Geneva, 25–26 July global market. New York: Oxford University Press. 2005.]

Human Rights Watch. (2004). Help wanted: Abuses Silvey, R. (2007). Unequal borders: Indonesian against female migrant domestic workers in In- transnational migrants at immigration donesia and Malaysia (Vol. 16, No. 9 (B), p. control. In: Geopolitics, 12(2), pp. 265– 112). New York: Human Rights Watch. 279.

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Turner, D. (2005). Malaysia’s regime of labour con- trol and the attempted transition to a knowl- edge based economy: the problematic role of migrant labour. [Paper in special issue: Migrant Labour in Southeast Asia: Needed, Not Wanted. Kaur, Amarjit and Metcalfe, Ian (eds.).]. Review of Indonesian and Malaysian A%airs, 39(2), 45-68.

United States Department of State. (2010). Tra"ck- ing in persons report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State.

United Nations O$ce on Drugs and Crime. (2010). Crime facilitating migration from Pakistan and Afghanistan. Vienna: UNODC.

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1) Quantitative assessments and $ows of irregular (UNODC, 2009)19. Otherwise, there is no research migration, migrant smuggling, and tra"cking in on irregular migration in relation to the Maldives. persons b) Estimated numbers and major routes: Mi- a) Estimated numbers and major routes: Ir- grant smuggling from, to and through the regular migration from, to and through the Maldives Maldives Data on the smuggling of migrants in relation to the According to Bhat and Millar (2009), although the Maldives are nonexistent. Maldives is heavily dependent on migrant labour, there is almost no data on irregular migration &ows. c) Estimated numbers and major routes: Traf- Estimates suggest there are more than 80,000 mi- #cking in persons from, within, to and grant workers in the Maldives. Of that total, ap- through the Maldives proximately 30,000 or 37.5 percent are said to be irregular migrants. Other reports indicate that this A review of the implementation of the South Asian number might be underestimated. For example, the Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) U.S. Department of State (2010) Tra"cking in Per- Convention on Preventing and Combating Tra$ck- sons Report contends that about 110,000 migrants, ing of Women and Children for Prostitution (com- mainly from Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka, are monly known as the SAARC Tra$cking Conven- working in the construction and services sectors. tion) by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Diplomatic sources estimate that half of the 35,000 IOM in 2009 states that tra$cking in persons is Bangladeshis entered the Maldives without authori- an emerging issue for the Maldives (Bhat & Millar, zation, and that most of these migrant workers were 2009). Acknowledging the lack of publicly available likely victims of tra$cking. Oishi (2005) also claims data, the report continues to purport that the Mal- that Sri Lankan women are working in factories in dives is primarily a destination country for forced la- the Maldives, although no reference is given as to the bour. Moreover, in contrast to other countries in the source of this information. region, cross border tra$cking &ows into the coun- try are largely from regions in other South Asian, Aside from these reports, just two other sources pro- East Asian, and South-East Asian countries. Internal vide a picture of irregular migration. Deportation tra$cking also occurs, but again, the lack of reliable !gures for the period of January to May 2007 from Chennai airport in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu 19 "e study is based on 340,276 immigration o#ense related records and 196 immigration cases from Indira Gandhi International airport show that, 11 Indians were deported from the Mal- (2005-2007) in addition to 39 immigration o#ence related records dives (Saha, 2009). Another study based on immigra- from the international airport in Amritsar, Punjab (2007), and 103 tion o#ense related records from Indira Gandhi Inter- police records against migrant smuggling agents in the districts of Ja- landhar, Kapurthala, Nawanshahr, and Hoshiarpur. Interviews were national airport (2005–2007) found that 55 Indians also undertaken in the UK and France with senior government of- were deported from the Maldives during this period !cials, police, and border o$cers.

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data makes it di$cult to determine the scale of the b) Motivation problem (Bhat & Millar, 2009). "ere is also a notable lack of research on the motiva- "e U.S. Department of State (2010) Tra"cking in tions of irregular and smuggled migrants. Persons Report supports the above !ndings and main- tains that the Maldives is largely a destination for mi- grant workers from Bangladesh and, to a much lesser 4) Smuggler-migrant relationships extent, India. Some of these migrants are tra$cked into forced labour. Women are reportedly forced a) Migrant perceptions of smugglers into prostitution. "e report also claims that 30,000 migrants in the Maldives do not have legal status, "ere is no empirical research on migrants and their although both regular and irregular migrants are vul- perceptions of smugglers. nerable to forced labour conditions. A small number of women from Sri Lanka, "ailand, India, China, b) Nature of migrant-smuggler relationship the Philippines, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union are reportedly recruited into forced "ere is no empirical research on the nature of the prostitution in the capital Malé. Finally, the report relationships between smugglers and migrants. mentions that Maldivian girls from other islands are sometimes tra$cked to Malé for domestic servitude. c) Factors in"uencing the relationship between smugglers and migrants d) Cross-over or overlap, if any, between popu- lations or routes. !ere is no empirical research on factors in$uencing the relationship between smugglers and migrants. As almost no research exists on irregular migration, migrant smuggling, or tra$cking in persons in rela- tion to the Maldives, it is impossible to assess if there 5) Organization of migrant smuggling is overlap between populations. a) How is migrant smuggling organized?

2) Pro#les of migrant smugglers "ere is no research on how migrant smuggling is organized in the Maldives. a) Socio-economic characteristics. b) Are persons involved in migrant smuggling "ere is no research on the socio-economic charac- also involved in other criminal activities? teristics of migrant smugglers. As there is no research on migrant smugglers themselves, b) Motivation. it is impossible to say whether persons involved in mi- grant smuggling are involved in other criminal activities. "ere is no research on the motivations of migrant smugglers. c) Does migrant smuggling attract persons who have a history of involvement in other crime? 3) Pro#les of irregular migrants and smuggled migrants "ere is no information as to whether migrant smug- glers have a history of involvement in other crime. a) Geographical and socio-economic charac- teristics d) What levels of professionalism/specializa- tion is there within migrant smugglers? "ere is a complete lack of research on the pro!les of irregular and smuggled migrants both to and from "ere is no research on the level of professionalism the Maldives. among migrant smugglers.

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e) What in"uences shape the way migrant sions from the available literature on the evolution of smugglers are organized? How and why do migrant smuggling methods in response to changes these organizations evolve? in migration policies and counter measures.

"ere is no research on how migrant smuggling is organized. 7) Migrant smuggling fees and mobilization of fees

6) Migrant smuggling modus operandi "ere is no research on migrant smuggling fees or the mobilization of fees. "e only information available a) Recruitment methods is from the U.S. Department of State (2010) Traf- #cking in Persons Report that claims migrant workers "ere is no literature on how smuggled migrants are pay USD 1,000 to USD 4,000 in recruitment fees recruited to and from the Maldives. in order to migrate to the Maldives. However, no further information is given. b) Payment methods

"ere is no speci!c research on how payments of mi- 8) Human and social costs of migrant smuggling grants to smugglers are made in the context of the Maldives. "ere is a complete lack of data on the human and social costs of migrant smuggling to and from the c) Transfer of criminal proceeds Maldives.

"ere is no research available on the methods of transferring criminal proceeds derived from migrant 9) Factors fuelling irregular migration and mi- smuggling in the Maldives. grant smuggling

d) Transportation methods "ere is no research on factors that contribute to or fuel irregular migration and migrant smuggling "ere is no research available on the methods of from, to or through the Maldives. transportation used by Maldivian migrant smug- glers. 10) Conclusions e) Document use and misuse a) What we know about migrant smuggling in "ere are no data on use and misuse of documents the Maldives in relation to migrant smuggling to and from the Maldives. A systematic review of available resources on migrant smuggling in relation to the Maldives con!rms that f) Corruption there are huge gaps in the current knowledge base. We know virtually nothing. A few studies on tra$ck- "ere is a complete lack of research on the role of ing in persons state that the Maldives is a destina- corruption in the smuggling of migrants in the Mal- tion for migrant workers from Bangladesh and India, dives. some of whom are subjected to tra$cking in persons, speci!cally for forced labour (e.g. see U.S. Depart- g) Evolution of migrant smuggling methods ment of State, 2010). Aside from that information, in response to changes in migration policies we know that the Maldives is heavily dependent on and counter measures migrant labour. Estimates suggest that there are more than 80,000 migrant workers in the Maldives. Of Given the paucity of research on migrant smuggling that total, approximately 30,000 or 37.5 percent are in the Maldives, it is not possible to draw conclu- said to be irregular migrants (Bhat & Millar, 2009).

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b) What we don’t know about migrant smug- United States Department of State. (2010). Tra"ck- gling in the Maldives ing in persons report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State. "ere is a striking lack of reliable data and research on all aspects of migrant smuggling in the Maldives. Research needs to be carried out on irregular migra- tion, migrant smuggling, and tra$cking &ows from, within, and to the Maldives because there are no reli- able statistics. "ere is a dearth of research on: t quantitative assessments of irregular migration, mi- grant smuggling and tra$cking in persons &ows; t the pro!les of smugglers and their motivations; t the pro!les of irregular and smuggled migrants and their motivations; t migrant-smuggler relationships; t the organization of migrant smuggling; t the modus operandi of migrant smuggling; t the fees paid to smugglers and their mobiliza- tion; t the human and social costs of migrant smug- gling; and t the factors that contribute to irregular migration and smuggling.

References

Bhat, A., & Millar, H. (2009). Review of the SAA- RC convention and the current status of im- plementation in the Maldives. Manilla and Dhaka: Asian Development Bank and the In- ternational Organization for Migration.

International Organization for Migration. (2009). Migration, environment and climate change: Assessing the evidence. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.

Oishi, N. (2005). Women in motion: Globalization, state policies and labor migration in Asia. Stan- ford: Stanford University Press.

Saha, K. C. (2009). Smuggling of migrants from In- dia to Europe and in particular to the UK. A study on Tamil Nadu. New Delhi: United Nations O$ce on Drugs and Crime.

United Nations O$ce on Drugs and Crime. (2009). Smuggling of migrants from India to Europe and in particular the UK: A study on Punjab and Haryana. New Delhi: UNODC.

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1) Quantitative assessments and $ows of irregular While most migration from Myanmar involves eco- migration, migrant smuggling, and tra"cking in nomic migrants, the country is also a source of refu- persons gees. "ailand currently hosts about 140,000 refugees from Myanmar, while Malaysia hosts an estimated a) Estimated numbers and major routes: Ir- 10,000 Rohingya and several thousand Chin refugees regular migration from, to and through (Huguet & Punpuing, 2005). "ailand is the main Myanmar destination for migrants from Myanmar (Arnold & Hewison, 2005), with migration &ows comprising "e reviewed literature provides no accurate es- two main groups: documented and undocumented timates regarding the scope and magnitude of ir- migrants. "e vast majority of migrants from Myan- regular migration from, to, and through Myanmar. mar, however, arrive in "ailand without any form However, it does provide some indicative !gures and of documentation (Pollock & Lin, 2010). Arnold information regarding routes, though almost exclu- and Hewison (2005) found estimates of Myanmar sively those from Myanmar into "ailand. workers in "ailand ranging between 1 and 1.5 mil- lion nationwide, while Huguet and Punpuing (2005) Leiter et al. (2006) focus on the long and porous estimate that between 1.5 and 2 million Myanmar "ai-Myanmar border, where irregular migration of- nationals are in the country. Citing an estimate from ten simply involves crossing a river by boat, taking a March 2009, Mon (2010) suggests that about 2 mil- bus, or crossing on foot. According to Mon (2005), lion irregular Myanmar migrants reside in "ailand, many routes o#er entry into "ailand from Myna- in addition to 138,999 regular migrants. mar. Popular border crossing points include these: t Myawaddy (Myanmar) to Mae Sot ("ailand); Other destination countries for Myanmar migrants t Tachilek (Myanmar) to Mae Sai ("ailand); and include Pakistan. A recent baseline study concluded t Kawthaung (Myanmar) to Ranong ("ailand). that Myanmar nationals were in the top three groups of irregular migrants in that country, with around Research conducted by Arnold and Hewison identi- 100,000 irregular migrants from Myanmar in the !ed the "ai border town of Mae Sot (Tak Province) city of Karachi alone (BEFARE, 2009). as the busiest crossing point along the "ai-Myan- mar border. Tak Province hosts an estimated 200,000 b) Estimated numbers and major routes: Myanmar migrants, while Mae Sot has about 70,000 Migrant smuggling from, to and through to 100,000 migrant workers. Myanmar migrants can Myanmar easily access Mae Sot by crossing the bridge or ford- ing the river in the dry season. Some irregular mi- "e reviewed literature provides almost no informa- grants legally cross the border on a one-day pass and tion about either the extent of migrant smuggling simply overstay. Even if they are deported, migrants from Myanmar or speci!c routes used. "e scant in- can cross back into "ailand with relative ease (Ar- formation available appears in discussions of irregu- nold & Hewison, 2005). lar migration into "ailand.

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One study (Leiter et al., 2006), where researchers Tra$cking routes to "ailand include those from interviewed various NGOs working with Myan- Kengtung and Tachileik to Mae Sai ("ailand), from mar migrants, reported the experiences of Myanmar Myawaddy to Mae Sot ("ailand), from Kawthaung women in "ailand. Several NGOs in this study re- to Ranong ("ailand), and from "anbyuzayat marked on the importance of smuggling or paid bro- through the "ree Pagodas Pass to Bangkok via kerage for migration from Myanmar to "ailand. In Sangkhlaburi and Kachanaburi (UNIAP, 2010). the Shan State (Myanmar)–Fang District ("ailand) Sometimes victims are tra$cked from these transit border areas, large numbers of migrants travel every points through to Malaysia. month from Myanmar to "ailand, generally paying brokers or smugglers who have contacts with the po- UNIAP (2010) highlights two major tra$cking routes lice. One NGO source reported the risk entailed in to China: from Muse (Myanmar) to Rulli (Yunnan migrating without the help of a smuggler, given the Province, China), and from Lweje (Myanmar) to Jeng danger of land mines. Feng and Rulli (Yunnan Province, China).

Another study presents estimates of 300 Myanmar d) Cross-over or overlap, if any, between popu- migrant workers being smuggled into "ailand daily, lations or routes as well as about 150 smuggled daily from the border town Mae Sot to Bangkok (Mon, 2010). "e literature does not speci!cally address this ques- tion, and no de!nitive conclusions can be drawn c) Estimated numbers and major routes: Traf- from it regarding crossovers and overlaps between #cking in persons from, within, to and populations and routes from Myanmar. However, the through Myanmar reviewed research suggests that there seems to be a sig- ni!cant overlap between irregular migration, migrant No reliable data is available on the scope and mag- smuggling and human tra$cking. Myanmar is the nitude of tra$cking in persons from, within, to and most important source country of irregular migrants through Myanmar. However, the literature does pro- in "ailand. Irregular migration seems to be facilitat- vide some information on major tra$cking routes. ed mainly by smugglers, who are often referred to in the literature as ‘brokers’ or ‘recruiters’. At the same Myanmar is a source country for tra$cking in per- time, many victims of human tra$cking in "ailand sons, speci!cally for forced labour and forced prosti- are from Myanmar. Although it is not clear to what tution of women and children. "e main destination extent the Myanmar victims of human tra$cking in countries are China, Malaysia, and "ailand, with "ailand were victims of a pre-organized human traf- China being the primary destination for cross-bor- !cking process that started in Myanmar, it is clear der tra$cking. Myanmar victims are also tra$cked from the available literature that the irregular status to Bangladesh, India, the Republic of Korea, and of Lao migrants signi!cantly contributes to making the Middle East. In addition, Myanmar serves as a them vulnerable to a human tra$cking process that transit country for victims of tra$cking from Ban- might have only begun in "ailand. By facilitating gladesh destined for Malaysia and China by way of irregular migration, migrant smuggling can thus be a "ailand (U.S. Department of State, 2010; UNIAP, key contributor to human tra$cking. 2010).

Source regions and internal routes identi!ed by UNI- 2) Pro#les of migrant smugglers AP include Yangon Division, Mandalay Division, Northern Shan State, Kachin State, Bago Division, "e literature does not provide speci!c informa- Mon, Magway Division, Kayin State, Bago (West), tion on pro!les of migrant smugglers from Myan- and Ayeyarwaddy (UNIAP, 2010). "e central dry- mar. However, research on labour exploitation of zone areas (Mandalay, Sagaing, and Magway) and migrant workers in "ailand (Pearson & Punpuing, Delta areas are source areas for people tra$cked, via 2006) features interviews with 10 Myanmar recruit- Kawkreik and Myawaddy, to Mae Sot in "ailand. ers operating in "ailand. ‘Recruiters’, in this study, Another route is from Yangon and surrounding areas were identi!ed as facilitators who assisted migrants to Mae Sot via Hpa-an and then Myawaddy. in acquiring employment, rather than facilitating ir-

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regular border crossings into "ailand. Nevertheless, Research by Pearson and Punpuing (2006) with re- the study found that most respondents were part of cruiters indicates that monetary gain is a motive, al- networks operating on both sides of the "ai-Myan- though the !ndings are unclear. "e study notes that mar border. "e study claims that the subjects in this some respondents received payments from employers study were apparently not human tra$ckers. It does for introducing workers. Others received payments not make it clear, however, whether the respondents only from migrants, with fees varying widely be- were part of ‘traditional smuggling networks’, in terms tween USD 2.50 and USD 1,000. One respondent, of facilitating irregular border crossing for pro!t. In who never charged migrants any money, reported his addition, because of its small sample and focus on main motive was helping fellow countrymen. "ailand, no conclusions can be drawn regarding the pro!les of Myanmar migrant smugglers in general. Despite this, and since this issue is not considered in 3) Irregular and smuggled migrant pro#les detail by other available literature, the following sec- tion draws exclusively on the study !ndings. a) Geographical and socio-economic charac- teristics a) Socio-economic characteristics According to Mon (2005), most Myanmar migrants All of the 10 recruiters interviewed by Pearson and Pun- in "ailand come from rural areas throughout Myan- puing (2006) were male Myanmar nationals of vary- mar. "ese migrants include such ethnic groups ing ethnicities, including Karen, Burman, and Mon. as Arakanese, Burman, Indo-Myanmar, Kachin, Respondents were aged between 28 and 39 years, and Karen, Kayah, Mon, Gurkha (Nepalese), Shan, and generally had 7–8 years of experience in recruitment. Tavoyan. Most are single and aged between 12 and Two of the subjects were part-time recruiters who also 55 years, with low levels of educational attainment. had other, regular employment. "e study highlights Previous occupations were found to vary widely, and that none of the subjects identi!ed themselves as re- included professions such as teaching and nursing, as cruiters, but rather as ‘intermediaries’, or claimed they well as clerical and agricultural work. were simply helping friends and relatives. b) Motivation "e 10 interviewees in this research had generally worked as migrant workers in various industries (e.g. "e literature does not determine motives for migrants manufacturing, !sh processing, and construction) who choose to use the services of smuggling networks before becoming recruiters. Several respondents in Myanmar. Instead, several studies reveal a range of found their way into this profession because of their push-pull factors encouraging Myanmar migrants to experience and knowledge of the migrant worker travel to "ailand. "ese interconnected factors are context (e.g. workplaces, employers, local geography, economic, social, and political in nature, which makes "ai language, and other recruiters). Consequently, it generally di$cult to distinguish between economic many respondents were approached by friends, rela- migrants and refugees from Myanmar. tives, or other migrant workers seeking advice and know-how regarding migration to "ailand, acquir- Arnold and Hewison (2005) report that, given the ing employment, and solving speci!c problems in severity of Myanmar’s poor socio-economic situa- "ailand (e.g. abusive "ai employers). tion, a growning number of families are increasingly dependent on migrant remittances. Huguet and Having started by helping friends and relatives, the Punpuing cite a previously conducted study20 that subjects of this study began to provide recruitment found !ve main reasons people from Myanmar are and other services (e.g. remittance services) on a migrating to "ailand: more frequent basis. t low earnings in Myanmar; t unemployment in Myanmar; b) Motivation

20 Research conducted by the World Vision Foundation of "ailand "e reviewed literature does not consider the moti- (WVFT) and the Asian Research Center for Migration (ARCM) on vation of Myanmar migrant smugglers. labour migration to "ailand between January and May 2003.

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t family poverty; may play a signi!cant role between Myanmar mi- t traumatic experiences (e.g. forced labour); and grants and (job) recruiters. t lack of quali!cations for employment (Huguet & Punpuing, 2005, p. 6). Based on interviews with 10 recruiters, Pearson and Punpuing report the informal nature of the relation- A study conducted by Brees (2008), on the other ship between recruiters and migrants. "e study hand, found that most interviewees left Myanmar found that recruiters generally know the migrants or for reasons related to con&ict, rather than for eco- their families through their personal social network. nomic reasons, with push factors including a climate In addition, recruiters often provide other services to of fear and reported human rights abuses in Myan- migrant workers (e.g. sending remittances or goods, mar. A survey of Myanmar migrants in "ailand or arranging communications), which results in a cited by Rukumunikit (2009) found that 21 percent continuing relationship after recruitment. Recruiters of all respondents had been subject to forced labour thus have an economic interest in delivering e#ec- in Myanmar, and one-third of the migrants had suf- tive services. In the same way, it is in their interest fered a combination of traumatic experiences. Brees to ensure that migrants do not later face exploitation (2008), meanwhile, suggests that the strong "ai or abuse, since most workers tend to use the same economy constitutes an irresistible pull factor. Sev- recruiter to organize additional services. "e study eral respondents in this study, for example, reported also found that some recruiters felt responsible for a case where an entire Myanmar village moved to migrants, and engaged in negotiating wages or im- "ailand to work in the same factory. At the same proving living or working conditions, even !nding time, respondents said that their greatest wish was to alternative work if migrants ended up in exploitative return to Myanmar. Similarly, other research found situations. migrants consistently motivated to escape poverty and/or human rights abuse in Myanmar, while also c) Factors in"uencing the relationship between observing that most migrants ultimately wish to re- smugglers and migrants turn home (Leiter et al., 2006; Pangsapa 2007). "e literature at hand does not provide speci!c in- formation regarding migrant-smuggler relationships 4) Smuggler-migrant relationships in Myanmar.

"e following section draws exclusively on the !nd- Some research indicates that personal connections ings of the study conducted by Pearson and Punpu- and informal ties may play a signi!cant role in shap- ing (2006), since this issue was not considered in ing the relationship between migrants and Myanmar detail by any of the other literature under review. recruiters operating in "ailand (Pearson & Punpu- ‘Recruiters’ in this study were identi!ed as facilita- ing, 2006). tors who assisted migrants in acquiring employment, rather than helping with irregular border crossings into "ailand. 5) Organization of migrant smuggling

a) Migrant perceptions of smugglers a) How is migrant smuggling organized?

"e reviewed literature provides no speci!c infor- "e literature does not provide speci!c informa- mation on the perception of migrant smugglers by tion about the organization of migrant smuggling in Myanmar migrants. Myanmar. One study noted that Myanmar labour re- cruiters in "ailand are part of networks that operate b) Nature of migrant-smuggler relationship on both sides of the border (Pearson & Punpuing, 2006). Services provided by these networks include "e literature provides no clear information on the transport from Myanmar-"ai border areas to !nal relationship between migrant smugglers and mi- employment destinations in "ailand (e.g. from Tak grants in Myanmar. "e study conducted by Pearson Province to Bangkok). Beyond this, however, infor- and Punpuing (2006), however, indicates that trust mation is currently unavailable.

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b) Are persons involved in migrant smuggling vices in their hometowns in Myanmar. It can be as- also involved in other criminal activities? sumed that those who provide recruitment services are also linked to the facilitation of irregular entry. No information is available on whether persons in- volved in Myanmar migrant smuggling are involved b) Payment methods in other criminality. "e literature at hand provides no information re- c) Does migrant smuggling attract persons garding methods of payment. who have a history of involvement in other crime? c) Transfer of criminal proceeds

No information is provided on whether or not peo- "e literature at hand provides no information on ple who are involved as migrant smugglers in Myan- the methods of transferring criminal proceeds. mar have a history of involvement in other crimes. d) Transportation methods d) What levels of professionalism/speciali-za- tion is there within migrant smugglers? "e literature at hand does not speci!cally discuss methods of transportation, beyond noting that entry "e literature does not provide any details on rela- into "ailand can be on foot, by boat (crossing riv- tive degrees of professionalism or specialization on ers), or by road vehicle. Leiter et al. (2006) note that, the part of Myanmar migrant smugglers. once migrants cross the border into "ailand, they can pay for motorcycle rides from established river or e) What in"uences shape the way migrant mountain crossing sites to bypass checkpoints on the smugglers are organized? How and why do main roads. Documented examples are also available these organizations evolve? of smuggled migrants being transferred in the back of trucks and containers. "e literature does not provide many details on the way Myanmar migrant smugglers are organized. e) Document use and misuse

In the case of "ailand, research by Pearson and "e literature at hand provides limited information Punpuing (2006) indicates that Myanmar networks on use and misuse of documents. Mon notes that involved in job recruitment and facilitation of bor- Myanmar nationals can !nd it di$cult and expen- der crossing appear to feature specialized roles such sive to get passports. Prior to 2007, Myanmar na- as ‘recruiters’ and ‘transporters’. tionals were required to apply for passports through complex procedures that required a letter of appoint- ment from a company overseas. "is led to extensive 6) Migrant smuggling modus operandi falsi!cation of such letters. "e system has changed since this time, however, and letters of appointment a) Recruitment methods are no longer required. As Mon notes:

"e reviewed literature provides limited informa- Yet this does not mean that it is now easy for tion regarding the recruitment of clients for migrant Myanmar nationals to legally migrate. Ap- smuggling. Following primary research on this issue, plicants for migration still encounter many one study found that recruitment for employment problems if they want to resign from their in "ailand is largely informal, and that recruiters jobs in the government sector, and amongst know either the migrants or their families, who usu- other things, they are often required to com- ally initiate contact with the recruiter (Pearson & pensate the government for their educational Punpuing, 2006). Some recruiters leave contact in- costs. (Mon, 2010, p. 35) formation, for example telephone numbers, at places near the border in "ailand where migrant workers Mon notes that large sums of money and good con- congregate upon arrival. Others advertise their ser- nections are required to get a passport, a process

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which can take up to one year. Mon (2010) also 7) Migrant smuggling fees and mobilization of notes that, according to one source, the real cost of fees acquiring a passport in a short time (one week) is about MMK 500,00021 (USD 400). Prior to 2006, "e literature provides limited information regard- passport holders could not hold onto their passports ing migrant smuggling fees in Myanmar, and studies for more than six months after their travel date. "is of irregular migration to "ailand provide varying system has been changed such that passport hold- !gures. Generally, no information is available re- ers can now keep their passports while they are in garding the mobilization of fees. Myanmar. However, they must still follow complex procedures in doing so. As Mon remarks: According to Mon, fees for migrants travelling from Myanmar to "ailand depend on the type of ser- All these complicated procedures deter many vices provided and destination of the migrants. "e Myanmar migrants, especially those from the overall brokerage fees, reportedly, have experienced lower socio-economic groups, to leave the a signi!cant rise during the past decade. In 1998, country legally. Consequently, the majority the average fee for travelling to "ai border areas of Myanmar migrants enter "ailand illegally. varied from THB 2,000 to THB 3,000 (USD 63 to (Mon, 2010, p. 36). USD 94.50) and THB 5,000 to THB 6,000 (USD 157 to USD 189) for travelling to central regions f) Corruption in "ailand (e.g. Bangkok). In 2000, these fees in- creased to THB 7,000 to THB 8,000 (USD 220 to No detailed information is provided on the role of cor- USD 252) and further, in 2008, to THB 10,000 to ruption regarding Myanmar migrant smuggling. "e THB 15,000 (USD 315 to USD 472) (Mon, 2005, reviewed research makes it clear, however, that corrup- 2010). tion plays a role, particularly in relation to certain key border crossings. For example, according to research Another study that drew on primary data regarding conducted in the "ai-Myanmar border town of Mae this issue (Pearson & Punpuing, 2006) found fees Sot (Brees, 2008), Myanmar refugees have to pay for recruitment services varied between THB 100 bribes to police, military, border patrols, immigration and THB 40,000 (USD 2.50 and USD 1,000): in o$cers, and others. According to this study, bribes some cases the fees included transportation costs vary from a few hundred to thousands of "ai baht, from Myanmar. "e average cost was calculated at putting refugees deep in debt. Brees (2008) notes that THB 5,750 (USD 144). the border town of Mae Sot is recognized as a lucrative posting and hence is a popular station among police- men. Research by Mon (2005) notes the bribing of 8) Human and social costs of migrant smuggling border police at checkpoints along transit routes with the sexual favours of young women. According to this Little information is provided by the available litera- study, the fee was around MMK 200 to MMK 500 ture concerning human and social costs directly con- (USD 0.25 to USD 0.50) at every checkpoint along nected to Myanmar migrant smuggling. the route, with passengers without documentation re- quired to pay an additional MMK 2,000 (USD 2.50). Some studies highlight an incident in early 2008 that revealed the risks associated with the smuggling of g) Evolution of migrant smuggling methods Myanmar migrants in "ailand (Gjerdingen, 2009; in response to changes in migration policies Wyler, 2008). According to these studies, in this in- and counter measures stance, 121 Myanmar migrant workers boarded the refrigeration compartment of a cold-storage truck in "e literature does not provide any details on the Ranong Province ("ailand). "e truck was destined evolution of Myanmar migrant smuggling methods for Phuket Province ("ailand), where the migrants in response to changes in migration policies and planned to work. In the course of the journey, 54 countermeasures. of the 121 migrants died of su#ocation. Among the survivors, the police discovered 14 children and 46 21 MMK = Myanmar Kyat. workers without proper documentation.

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An NGO worker interviewed by Leiter et al. (2006) law enforcement o$cials in the border town of Mae recounted certain risks of travelling from Myanmar to Sot of actively engaging in the exploitation and traf- "ailand without the guidance of smugglers or bro- !cking of Myanmar women. According to this report kers. "e interviewee referred to a 2004 incident in these allegations, Myanmar women were tra$cked Shan State (Myanmar) where six migrants unknow- into commercial sex venues following their detention. ingly entered a mine!eld while trying to cross into "ailand. In the subsequent explosion, !ve of the six Brees (2008) points out that irregular Myanmar mi- migrants were killed, leaving a 15-year-old boy as the grants, speci!cally refugees, also engage in clandes- sole survivor. Leiter et al. (2006) also found that Shan tine practices such as pawnbroking, brewing alcohol, women, when in transit across con&ict zones in Shan commercial sex work, and carrying remittances, as State (Myanmar), were at particular risk of rape and well as illegal practices such as logging, drug smug- sexual assault from Myanmar military forces. gling, and tra$cking in persons.

Aside from this, the literature does not provide de- Clarke (2009) notes that the di$culties that mi- tailed information on human and social costs directly grants from Myanmar face are compounded by an related to Myanmar migrant smuggling. "e vast ma- underlying prejudice displayed by many "ais to- jority of the reviewed literature, however, highlights wards them. It is argued that this is due to a long the harsh and exploitative living and working condi- history of con&ict, distrust, and general antipathy tions that Myanmar migrant workers generally face between "ailand and Myanmar. in "ailand. Due to their irregular status, these mi- grants typically !nd work in low-skilled sectors. "e so-called ‘3D’ jobs — dirty, dangerous, and degrading 9) Factors fuelling irregular migration and mi- — include agriculture, !sheries, day labour, and do- grant smuggling mestic work. Migrants often have no choice but to ac- cept high levels of exploitation, including long work- Internal con&ict, insecurity, and the severity of socio- ing hours, unsafe conditions, and payment well below economic conditions in Myanmar contribute to irregu- "ailand’s minimum wage. For example, migrant lar migration from that country. Irregular migration workers in Mae Sot generally earn THB 50–70 per into "ailand, speci!cally, is driven by strong push-pull day, while overtime is paid at roughly THB 7 an hour. factors such as the economic and social disparity be- "e o$cial minimum wage in Tak Province is THB tween "ailand and Myanmar, including disparities 135 a day, and THB 25 per hour for overtime. In ad- in income, living standards, and stages of political and dition, Myanmar migrants often lack access to proper economic development (Rukumnuaykit, 2009). education for their children and adequate medical care (Leiter et al., 2006; Brees, 2008; Arnold & Hewi- son, 2005; Rukumnuaykit, 2009; Toyota, 2006). 10) Conclusions

Toyota (2006) research has shown that Myanmar a) What we know about migrant smuggling in migrants commonly start working as housemaids be- Myanmar tween the ages of 13 and 19 years. However, one of the interviewees in this study reported that she started No empirical studies of migrant smuggling in Myan- as an eight-year-old, despite the fact that children mar are currently available. "e literature reviewed younger than16 years are ineligible to work in "ai- mainly focuses on regular and irregular Myanmar land. According to this study, housemaids in "ailand labour migration into "ailand, and associated hu- are perceived as servants (kon-chai) or child servants man rights issues. Given the prevailing lack of rel- (dek-rab-chai), rather than employees (look-jang). One evant information, however, it is impossible to draw respondent, who started at age 13, reported having satisfactory conclusions. been paid a salary of THB 500 (USD 15.89) per year. b) What we don’t know about migrant smug- According to a study conducted by Leiter et al. (2006), gling in Myanmar based on interviews with irregular Myanmar migrants, one study notes that several respondents accused "ai "ere is a clear need for research into migrant smug-

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gling in Myanmar. As it stands, no conclusions re- Leiter, K., Suwanvanichkij, V., Tamm, I., Iacopino, garding the associated issues can be drawn from the V. and Beyrer, C. (2006). Human rights abus- reviewed literature. "e little information available es and vulnerability to HIV/AIDS: "e expe- mainly refers to regular and irregular migration into riences of Burmese women in "ailand. In: "ailand from the perspective of the receiving coun- Health and Human Rights, 9(2), pp. 88–111. try. Mon, M. (2005). Burmese migrants in "ailand. Speci!c areas needing more research include the fol- [Paper in special issue: A. Kaur and I. Met- lowing: calfe (eds.). Migrant Labour in Southeast Asia: t pro!les of smugglers; Needed, Not Wanted.] In: Review of Indonesian t pro!les of smuggled migrants; and Malaysian A%airs, 39(2), pp. 129–150. t migrant-smuggler relationships; t organization of migrant smuggling; Mon, M. (2010). Burmese labour migration into t modus operandi of migrant smuggling ; "ailand: governance of migration and labour t fees paid to smugglers and mobilization of the rights. Journal of the Asia Paci#c Economy, fees; and 15(1), pp. 33–44. t factors contributing to irregular migration and smuggling. Pangsapa, P. (2007). Global social policy forum: En- slavement in "ailand: Southeast Asia as the microcosm of 21st century slavery. In: Global References Social Policy, 7(1), pp. 10–14.

Arnold, D. and Hewison, K. (2005). Exploitation Pearson, E. and Punpuing, S. (2006). !e Mekong in global supply chains: Burmese workers in challenge: Underpaid, overworked and over- Mae Sot. In: Journal of Contemporary Asia, looked: !e realities of young migrant workers 35(3), pp. 319–340. in !ailand. Bangkok: International Labour Organization. Basic Education for Awareness Reforms and Em- powerment (BEFARE). (2009). Baseline study Pollock, J. and Soe Lin, A. (2010). Critical times: on illegal migration, human smuggling and traf- Gendered implications of the economic crisis #cking in Pakistan. for migrant workers from Burma/Myanmar in "ailand. In: Gender and Development, Brees, I. (2008). Refugee business: Strategies of work 18(2), pp. 213–227. on the "ai-Burma border. In: Journal of Ref- ugee Studies, 21(3), pp. 380–397. Rukumnuaykit, P. (2009). A synthesis report on labour migration policies, management and immigra- Clarke, M. (2009). Over the border and under the tion pressure in !ailand (pp. 25). Bangkok: radar: Can illegal migrants be active citizens? International Labour Organization. In: Development in Practice, 19(8), pp. 1064– 1078. Toyota, M. (2006). Health concerns of ‘invisible’ cross-border domestic maids in "ailand. In: Gjerdingen, E. (2009). Su#ocation inside a cold Asian Population Studies, 2(1), pp. 19–36. storage truck and other problems with traf- !cking as “exploitation” and smuggling as United States Department of State. (2010). Tra"ck- “choice” along the "ai-Burmese border. Ari- ing in persons report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. zona Journal of International & Comparative Department of State. Law, 26(3), 41. United Nations Development Programme. (2010). Huguet, J. W. and Punpuing, S. (2005). Interna- Human Development Initiative. Annual Report tional migration in !ailand. Bangkok: Inter- 2010. Myanmar: United Nations Develop- national Organization for Migration. ment Programme.

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United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Tra$cking. (2010). !e Mekong region human country datasheets on human tra"cking 2010. Bangkok: UNIAP

Wyler, L. S. (2008). Burma and Transnational Crime. CRS Report for Congress: Congressio- nal Research Service.

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:G/D17.(A47?70I(C/<,51/0

1) Quantitative assessments and $ows of irregular '/647(JUI(A51,2/17>(,..7-34/.(2,-./01( migration, migrant smuggling, and tra"cking in D8D34/1,80(,0(C/<,51/0 persons /ƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌDŝŐƌĂŶƚƐŝŶWĂŬŝƐƚĂŶ a) Estimated numbers and major routes: Ir- ĨŐŚĂŶƐ;ĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶͿ!! Ϯ͕ϮϭϬ͕ϬϬϬ regular migration from, to and through ĞŶŐĂůŝƐ;ĂŶŐůĂĚĞƐŚͿ ϭ͕ϬϯϬ͕ϬϬϬ Pakistan DLJĂŶŵĂƌŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ;DLJĂŶŵĂƌͿ ϭϬϬ͕ϬϬϬ According to the 1998 population census, there EŝŐĞƌŝĂŶƐ;EŝŐĞƌŝĂͿ Ϯ͕ϬϬϬ are approximately 1.9 million irregular migrants in ^ŽŵĂůŝƐ;^ŽŵĂůŝĂͿ Ϯ͕ϬϬϬ Pakistan (Enterprise for Business & Development KƚŚĞƌƐ ϲ͕ϬϬϬ Management (EBDM), 2009). More current esti- mates (2004) from the National Alien Registration 56:%# WHWYQHQQQ ;^ŽƵƌĐĞ͗D͕ϮϬϬϵďĂƐĞĚŽŶϮϬϬϴEZƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ͘Ϳ Authority (NARA) suggest that the number is 3.35 million, with most living in the Karachi district of trends are provided through the reviewed litera- (Azam, 2009). ture. "e Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) — one of two main government agencies dealing with ir- Table 10 shows, the majority of irregular migrants regular migration, migrant smuggling, and tra$ck- in Pakistan are from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and ing in persons in Pakistan — claims that a total of Myanmar. From Afghanistan, Chaman (29%) and 66,594 Pakistanis were deported back to Pakistan Torkhum (26%) are the most popular land border between 2005 to 2008, an average of 16,649 per year crossings into Pakistan while irregular migrants com- (Human Rights Council, 2007). ing from Bangladesh typically use Lahore (15%) or Bahawalnagar (9%) as entry points (EBDM, 2009). In his research on return migrants, Arif (2009) found that almost half (44%) of Pakistani migrants "e district of Karachi is a principal destination, but in his sample were recruited through private recruit- also a transit point for irregular migrants (e.g. Ben- ment agents and overseas employment promoters, galis) en route to other countries, including Islamic one !fth (21%) made arrangements through friends Republic of Iran, Turkey, Greece, Central Europe, or relatives, another one !fth (20%) were recruited and Western Europe (EBDM, 2009). "ere is little directly by foreign employers, and just 1 percent empirical research on these transit populations. "e had used the Overseas Employment Corporation extent to which Karachi is a source of Pakistani mi- (OEC). More importantly, however, 14 percent of grants to other countries is also unknown due to a return migrants (19 of 138 in total) had migrated us- lack of data. 22 According to the O$ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 1.7 million persons are registered Afghan In terms of irregular Pakistani migrants abroad, there refugees (as of January 2010). NARA statistics do not di#erentiate be- are no reliable estimates although some indications tween irregular migrants and refugees.

177 2*-.&"%#345--,*"-#*"#!6*&

ing irregular channels. Half had gone overseas with- refused to provide more speci!c information (Gem- out documentation and crossed borders irregularly bicka, 2006). while the other half had stayed on after the Haj pil- grimage.23 Arif suggests that these !ndings are likely Irregular Pakistani migrants have also tried to reach just the tip of the iceberg. Even though irregular Europe via the south. Between 2004 and 2008, migration is di$cult to quantify, he points to the Pakistanis &ew to West Africa and then travelled fact that 60,000 Pakistani migrants were deported overland to North Africa before reaching Europe, from di#erent countries due to their irregular status usually Spain, by sea (UNODC, 2011). Since in 2003–2004 as an indication of its scope. 2008, however, the route has become less popular because entry into Europe by sea has become more Interviews carried out as part of BEFARE baseline di$cult. study on irregular migration, migrant smuggling, and tra$cking in persons in Pakistan reveal the As the above research suggests, Western Europe is most common destinations for Pakistani migrants a key destination for irregular Pakistani migrants. were the UAE, Islamic Republic of Iran, the UK, Most of the available research is on irregular and Greece, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey (EBDM, 2009). smuggled Pakistani migrants to the UK (Ahmad, "e report continues to suggest that countries such 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Koser, 2008). Pakistanis and as Turkey and Greece are also major transit points Afghans represent a signi!cant proportion of the for irregular migrants. A common route is to travel estimated 430,000 irregular migrants residing in to the Middle East, though Turkey, Greece, or Italy, the UK, with a large concentration based in Lon- and then further on into Western Europe (e.g. UK). don (Ahmad, 2008a).24 Home O$ce asylum and UNODC (2010) research suggests that the majority immigration statistics, Ahmad contends, o#er a of migrants from Pakistan tend to transit through rough indication of which groups are likely to con- Islamic Republic of Iran before continuing on either stitute the ‘illegal’ population. Statistics reveal that by land to Europe, via Turkey and Greece or the Bal- in 2010 1,400 Pakistanis (excluding dependents) kans or by sea to the Gulf via Oman and the UAE. and 1,605 Afghans applied for asylum (Shah, 2011). If his contentions are accurate, then Paki- An IOM report identi!es Kazakhstan as a transit stanis are among the top !ve groups, along with point for irregular Pakistani migrants (Gembicka, Iranians, Afghans, Zimbabweans, and Sri Lankans. 2006). Most arrive in Kazakhstan via other cen- He admits, however, that it is di$cult to provide tral Asian countries, such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, accurate estimates. and Uzbekistan, by car or on foot. "e next leg is to continue through Russia. "e IOM report refers b) Estimated numbers and major routes: Mi- to several documented instances of smugglers using grant smuggling from, to and through Paki- this route. For example, at the beginning of 2005, 30 stan Pakistani migrants were caught attempting to cross the Russian border irregularly (Gembicka, 2006). In According to Koser (2008), there are three major 2004, seven irregular Pakistanis were detained in At- routes smugglers use from Pakistan to Western Eu- kau, Kazakhstan. "e services of smugglers had been rope. "e !rst is a direct &ight from Pakistan to an used en route from Karachi (Pakistan) through Baku intended destination in Europe. "e second route (Azerbaijan) to Aktau (Kazakhstan). "e report sug- involves a stopover in a transit destination, such as gests that the migrants had intended to cross into Bangkok ("ailand), Casablanca (Morocco), Dha- Russia, and then possibly into Eastern and Western ka (Bangladesh), Istanbul (Turkey), Jeddah (Saudi Europe. "e same report highlights a third case in Arabia), Johannesburg (South Africa), Kampala which irregular Pakistani migrants &ew from Islamic (Uganda), Kiev (Ukraine), Larnaca (Cyprus), Ma- Republic of Iran to Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan on tourist puto (Mozambique), Mauritius, Moscow (Russia), visas and were arrested attempting to cross into Ka- or Riyadh (Saudi Arabia), to legally obtain a visa. zakhstan irregularly. "e irregular migrants revealed that their intended destination was Europe, but they 24 "e number of 430,000 illegal migrants is based on 2001 data and was obtained from an online Home O$ce report published in 2005 23 "e Haj is the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia. (http://rds.homeo$ce.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/rdsolr2905.pdf).

178 !#70'4&%*8#9':*';#$<#=*%'.&%5.'

"e third route is to &y to a transit destination, and In terms of actual numbers, estimating the scale then complete the journey overland. At the time of of migrant smuggling from Pakistan is challeng- Koser’s research (October 2003 to January 2004), ing. According to Koser (2008), the explanations the most popular route was to &y to Dushanbe, are three fold. First, there is almost no published Tajikistan, then travel overland to Moscow, from research on irregular migration or migrant smug- Moscow to Eastern Europe, and !nally to Western gling between Pakistan and other countries, with Europe. Previous routes — travelling the whole the exception of the UK. As a result, data on trends route overland or by sea — are now considered too are derived largely from Pakistani media and un- dangerous. published reports from local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Second, the smuggling of Other studies con!rm that one of the major smug- Pakistanis attracts not enough attention from the gling routes to Western Europe is through Central Pakistani government. "ird, it is di$cult to dis- Asia and China. According to the IOM report, mi- tinguish the smuggling of Afghans from Pakistan grants travel with prearranged student, tourist, or to the West from that of Pakistanis (also see UNO- business visas from Karachi, Pakistan to Kazakhstan DC, 2010). Some of the reasons are: by air. Smugglers then assist the migrants to cross t Pakistan is used as a transit country by Afghan into Russia and onwards to Western Europe through nationals; Eastern European countries (Gembicka, 2006). t most Afghans smuggled to the West over the Other common routes are to arrive !rst in Azerbai- last 20 years are from Pakistani refugee camps; jan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, or Uzbekistan, and then t most Afghans smuggled out of Pakistan used travel further with the help of smugglers to Kazakh- Pakistani passports, especially during the Tali- stan and Russia. In 2009, several dozen Pakistanis ban period (1995–2001); were arrested in China’s Shenzhen province, en route t most smugglers operating in Pakistan are Af- to Hong Kong (China) (UNODC, 2010). Evidence ghan nationals who smuggle both Afghans and also suggests that Malaysia, "ailand, and Indonesia Pakistanis; and are transit points for smuggled Pakistani migrants on t Pakistani smugglers move both Afghans and their way to North America or Australia. Pakistanis, although Afghans are usually pre- ferred because they often pay higher prices. According to UNODC (2011), a popular smuggling route in the past (2004–2008) was from South Asia UNODC (2010) research supports these !ndings. through West Africa and North Africa to parts of In addition to the information above, the report re- Western Europe. Research illustrates that it was not veals that Afghans and Pakistanis often use the same uncommon for Pakistani migrants to be smuggled smuggling agents and routes. Destination countries from Burkina Faso to Morocco via Mali and Algeria also blur the two nationalities together in terms of over an 18 day period. Yet, not all smuggling op- migration restrictions and opportunities. For these erations were successful. Interviews with young male reasons, there is no accurate quantitative data on the migrants revealed that some had been provided with smuggling of Pakistani migrants. Only indicative !g- air tickets and travel documents to Burkina Faso or ures exist. Yet, even these estimates should be treated Mali, but were then left to travel across the Sahara with caution as the !gures discussed below are some- desert themselves because of a breakdown in com- what dated. munication between South Asian and West African smugglers. In an attempt to reach their !nal Euro- Sources in 2004 estimated that up to 500,000 pean destination, some fell into the hands of local people per year were smuggled into and out of tra$ckers while others became stuck in North Af- Pakistan, of which only a small proportion were rica, unable to continue or return to Pakistan. "ose smuggled to the West (Koser, 2008). Local press who made it to Morocco were forced to engage the sources claimed that 1,336 Pakistani irregular mi- services of other smugglers and pay additional fees grants were deported from European countries in for the !nal crossing to Spain. As entry into the EU 2001–2004, although some of these might have from Africa by sea became more di$cult, South been classi!ed as irregular migrants for reasons Asian smugglers abandoned the West African route other than unauthorized entry, such as overstay- in 2008. ing their visas (Koser, 2008). Local press sources

179 2*-.&"%#345--,*"-#*"#!6*&

also reported that in 2004, 1,495 Pakistanis were c) Estimated numbers and major routes: Traf- imprisoned in Europe for unauthorized entry. In #cking in persons from, within, to and 2003, the media claimed that 389 Pakistanis died through Pakistan while attempting to cross irregularly into Greece, Spain, and Turkey (Koser, 2008). But again, Koser Pakistan is said to be a country of source, transit, and warns that one should be cautious in interpret- destination for tra$cked men, women, and children ing these !gures because at least a proportion of forced into labour and prostitution (U.S. Depart- the people counted are likely to be Afghans rather ment of State, 2010). Although the scope and nature than Pakistanis. of tra$cking in persons from and through Pakistan remains largely undocumented, some information "e BEFARE research identi!ed 14 target countries is available, mainly from organizations working to for Pakistani migrants, with 59 percent of migrants combat the problem. successfully reaching their intended destination (see Table 11). Of the 79 irregular migrants interviewed, In 2009, researchers carried out interviews with a to- 38 percent had used the services of smugglers. Other tal of 173 victims of tra$cking in !ve areas of Paki- studies have also found that the smuggling of mi- stan: Karachi, Quetta, Rahim Yar Khan, Peshawar, grants plays an important role in facilitating irregular and Swabi as part of the BEFARE project (EBDM, migration (Ahmad, 2008b). 2009). As Table 12 reveals, most victims were found in the Balochistan (38%) and Punjab (31%) prov- '/647(JJI("..7-34/.(!,-./015I()3;;755(,0( inces, followed by the NWFP (25%). $7/;G,0-(H751,0/1,80(NC/<,51/0O Although their place of origin is unknown, three ƩĞŵƉƚĞĚĚĞƐƟŶĂƟŽŶ((((( X"/ <6 ] quarters (76%) of the tra$cked victims were Paki- hŶŝƚĞĚƌĂďŵŝƌĂƚĞƐ $( % ))1 stani nationals while the rest were foreign nationals /ƐůĂŵŝĐZĞƉƵďůŝĐŽĨ/ƌĂŶ ( & $(1 (24%). "is suggests that the tra$cking in persons problem in Pakistan is more of an internal one, al- ^ĂƵĚŝƌĂďŝĂ * ! (1 though it is possible that some of these Pakistan hŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ ) " (1 nationals were returnees who had been repatriated 'ƌĞĞĐĞ Ͳ & #1 from overseas (e.g. Azam, 2009; EBDM, 2009; Kos- er, 2009). dƵƌŬĞLJ Ͳ " *1 ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ ) Ͳ "1 "e BEFARE research also reveals that the major- ĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶ $ Ͳ $1 ity of the respondents were male (66%) while 34 percent were female. "e victims of tra$cking were DĂůĂLJƐŝĂ $ Ͳ $1 subjected to forced and bonded labour (38%), sex- WŚŝůŝƉƉŝŶĞƐ $ Ͳ $1 ual exploitation (16%), prostitution (14%), camel YĂƚĂƌ $ Ͳ $1 jockeying (12%), and begging (6%) (Human Rights Council, 2007). "e other respondents (14%) did KŵĂŶ $ Ͳ $1 not want to discuss their experiences of exploitation. ^ŽƵƚŚĨƌŝĐĂ $ Ͳ $1 "e report yielded no de!nitive insights into which ^ǁĞĚĞŶ $ Ͳ $1 sectors of forced and bonded labour were most prev- alent, despite the percentages presented. "e sample ZĞĨƵƐĞĚƚŽŝĚĞŶƟĨLJͬƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ $ Ͳ *1 was small, and its authors clearly state that further ;^ŽƵƌĐĞ͗D͕ϮϬϬϵͿ 7DEOH5HJLRQDOGLVWULEXWLRQRIWUDI¿FNLQJYLFWLPV 3DNLVWDQ B-&80 3%#6'0-/:%& D7&M%A <^ND 56:%# <ĂƌĂĐŚŝ YƵĞƩĂ ZĂŚŝŵzĂƌ<ŚĂŶ WĞƐŚĂǁĂƌ ^ǁĂďŝ $$ &* *" )" # $%! &1 )#1 )$1 !'1 *1 $''1

180 !#70'4&%*8#9':*';#$<#=*%'.&%5.'

research is required. However, the U.S. Department !culties in distinguishing tra$cking from migrant of State (2010) Tra"cking in Persons Report claims smuggling (facilitated irregular migration) and/or ir- that there are over one million bonded labour vic- regular migration as such (regardless if occurred with tims in agriculture and brick making, and to a lesser or without assistance) (e.g. EBDM, 2009; HRCP, extent in mining and carpet weaving (U.S. Depart- 2009). Large numbers of Pakistanis migrate through ment of State, 2010). Boys and girls are reportedly regular and irregular channels to the Middle East, tra$cked into begging, domestic servitude, prosti- Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey, Greece, the UK, tution, and agriculture. "e BEFARE research cor- Canada, the US, and Western European countries roborates some of these claims as 36 percent of the in search of employment. Once overseas, some reg- victims (62 out of 172 respondents) in its sample ular migrants overstay their visas, and their status were children, but no information was provided on becomes irregular while others, both regular and ir- the forms of exploitation. regular, become victims of labour exploitation. Sta- tistical data do not often clearly distinguish between Other studies shed a bit more light on nature of traf- irregular migration, tra$cking, and smuggling. Nor !cking in persons from and through Pakistan. For do the data distinguish between populations, such as example, an IOM report reveals that Pakistani men, Pakistani and Afghan migrants, as the work by Koser women, girls, and boys are tra$cked to Afghanistan (2008) illustrates. for the purposes of sexual exploitation and forced labour while Afghans are tra$cked or smuggled to, and through, Pakistan (Kaya, 2008). Uno$cial land 2) Pro#les of migrant smugglers borders were used to cross between Pakistan and Af- ghanistan. a) Socio-economic characteristics

Finally, the HRCP (2010) examined court proceed- "ere is a lack of research on the socio-economic ings in Quetta involving cross border tra$cking in characteristics of migrant smugglers. "e research persons cases over a four-year period (2005–2008). by Koser (2008) on smuggled Pakistani migrants is Although the distinction between ‘tra$cked’ and the only study that attempted to include migrant ‘smuggled’ was blurred, the tra$cked migrants had smugglers in its sample. He found it relatively easy travelled by train to Punjab to Karachi, and then to identify smugglers (e.g. through advertisements) transited through Islamic Republic of Iran and Tur- and most openly admitted that they provided mi- key on their way to Greece. All were caught and gration services. However, just !ve smugglers and detained by either Iranian or Turkish authorities, !ve subagents (e.g. forgers and intermediaries) were deported back to Pakistan, and eventually released. willing to divulge detailed information about how Most of the migrants/victims were from three dis- they operated. Nevertheless, in terms of the migrant tricts in Punjab province — Gujrat, Gujranwala and smugglers themselves, the only information Koser Sialkot — and had entered into Islamic Republic of provides is that all were male. Iran at the Balochistan border crossing. b) Motivation d) Cross-over or overlap, if any, between popu- lations or routes "ere is a complete lack of research on the motiva- tions of migrant smugglers. "ere is overlap, as well as confusion in terminology, among the categories of irregular migration, migrant smuggling, and tra$cking in persons. Researchers 3) Pro#les of irregular migrants and smuggled have noted that the smuggling of migrants plays a migrants crucial role in facilitating irregular migration (e.g. Ahmad, 2008c; EBRM, 2009; Gembicka, 2006). a) Geographical and socio-economic charac- Ahmad, for example, is quick to point out that not all teristics irregular migrants are smuggled, but acknowledges how the lines can become blurred. An examination Research on regular and irregular Pakistani migrants of the literature reveals that some researchers had dif- to the Middle East reveals that most came from

181 2*-.&"%#345--,*"-#*"#!6*&

just 20 districts, in particular from North Punjab, one to six adults. "e mean number of household NWFP, Karachi, and a few districts in Southern adults was 3.44. Migrant households were selected Punjab (Arif, 2009).25 Migrants had stayed over- from middle class areas of Karachi (e.g. Gulshan-e- seas for an average of 4.7 years, with most having Iqbal, North Nazimabad, and Federal B Areas) as worked in Saudi Arabia or UAE (98%). "e ma- well as from areas that were among the poorest (e.g. jority of migrants from Punjab province had held Malir and Orangi). Of the 38 households surveyed, at least two di#erent contracts, claiming that one 27 respondents owned property (71%), six owned contract was not enough to cover the high costs land (16%), and one owned a business. Koser in- of migration and accumulate savings. Skilled jobs, sists, however, that even though migrants are not such as drivers, masons, and carpenters, were the from the poorest households, investing in the smug- most common types of employment for migrants gling of a family member is still an enormous !- from urban areas while rural migrants mostly took nancial burden as most migrants must draw upon up unskilled jobs. their saving, sell possessions, or take out loans (see Section 8). "ree quarters (74%) of the migrants were em- ployed before going abroad, 44 percent had owned Ahmad’s research also presents information on the livestock, and 74 percent owned a pukka or cement pro!les of smuggled migrants. "ree of the men house. "e average urban household income before he interviewed were from the North West Fron- migration was Rupees 11,835 (USD 140) and Ru- tier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Adminis- pees 13,264 (USD 156) for rural households.26 "e tered Tribal Areas (FATA), two were from Punjab di#erence is attributed to the fact that rural house- Province, and two were from Afghanistan, but had holds have more earners than urban households. "e lived in Pakistan prior to being smuggled to the average age of return migrants was 29 years when UK (Ahmad, 2008a, 2008b). "e average age of they !rst went abroad. More than half were married the smuggled migrants was 30, and ranged from at the time of their departure. Wives and children 24 to 50 years of age. Just two of the men were were left behind. married. All but one arrived in the UK between 2002 and 2004. "is respondent had been smug- What the above data shows, Arif argues, is that gled into the UK in 1992. "eir levels of education migrants are not the poorest of the poor (also see ranged from primary education (the migrant had Hasan, 2010). On the whole, respondents were left before he turned 11 years old) to a Bachelor of well above the poverty line, which in 2004–2005 Arts degree. All of the smuggled migrants had at- was Rupees 878 (USD 10) per month per adult. tained legal residency by the time that the research It is important to note that 19 irregular migrants was carried out. were included in his sample of 138 return mi- grants although almost no disaggregated data is UNODC (2010) research also presents some general presented. characteristics of smuggled migrants according to di#erent market segments (see Table 13). Given the !nancial cost involved (see Section 8), Arif’s !ndings are perhaps not surprising. In fact, "e most fundamental generalization, according to Koser (2008) drew the same conclusion from his re- the report, is that the vast majority of smuggled mi- search. "irty-eight of the 50 households surveyed grants on the routes mentioned above are men be- answered questions about income. His !ndings tween the ages of 18 and 35 (UNODC, 2010). In all showed that the mean monthly income of respon- the research reviewed, the overwhelming majority of dents in 2004 was Rupees 12,700 (USD 150), and irregular and smuggled migrants were male (Ahmad, the range was from Rupees 3,500 (USD 41) to Ru- 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Arif, 2009; Gembicka, 2006; pees 35,000 (USD 413). In interpreting the data, Hasan, 2010; Human Rights Council, 2007; Koser, Koser reminds us that household size varied from 2008; UNODC, 2010).

25 Irregular migrants (19 of 138 in total) were included in the sample of b) Motivation return migrants. 26 Based on April 2011 exchange rates. Irregular and smuggled migrants are largely moti-

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183 2*-.&"%#345--,*"-#*"#!6*&

with material goods and then actively recruited in- work. According to respondents in a research carried dividuals and groups of men to be transported over- out by UNODC (2011), Pakistani smugglers were land irregularly to the UK for payment of a fee (Ah- in regular phone contact with West African (Burkina mad, 2008c). Since then, migrant smuggling from Faso and Mali) and North African (Morocco and Al- Pakistan has developed into an organized business geria) smuggling counterparts along the entire route. that involves a network of actors, including recruit- Pakistani migrants explained how they were trans- ers, transporters/guides, drivers, forgers, airline sta#, ported from Burkina Faso to Morocco via Mali and immigration o$cials, and other intermediaries both Algeria in cars driven by local smugglers who coor- within Pakistan and in di#erent parts of the world dinated drop o# and pickups at border crossing us- (UNODC, 2011; Koser, 2008; UNODC, 2010). ing walkie-talkies along the route. Other interviews "e network is best explained through Table 14, revealed that West African smugglers, contracted which illustrates the process of migrant smuggling through Pakistani smugglers based in either Pakistan via a direct route from Pakistan to the UK (Koser, or West Africa, at times picked the migrants up at 2008). "e processes involving indirect travel are the airport. "eir passports were con!scated and the more complex. migrants were kept in a private house until onward travel to Europe, including &ights and visas, was or- Two observations are relevant here. First, smug- ganized. Also on occasion, smugglers accompanied glers o#er migrants and their families a guarantee migrants from Pakistan by air to West Africa or met of return. If the smuggled migrant does not arrive them in person when they arrived. But as explained at his or her end destination, the total payment is previously, these networks are not as strong as they refunded. Typically though, the migrant is o#ered were prior to 2008 when the route was more popular three attempts for a single price (UNODC, 2010). among smugglers (UNODC, 2011). If the smuggler is successful, about half of the fee is received as pro!t. Second, there was evidence of b) Are persons involved in migrant smuggling competition among the small number of smugglers also involved in other criminal activities? operating in Pakistan at the time of Koser’s research. Smugglers were willing to undercut competitors and "ere is little research on whether persons involved o#er group discounts because the cost per migrant in migrant smuggling are involved in other crimi- was reduced. Smuggling a group was appealing to nal activities. One smuggled migrant was reportedly a smuggler because if one of the migrants arrived forced by criminal networks in Moscow (Russia) and safely, the entire fee paid by the group was released. Kiev (Ukraine) to engage in pick-pocketing as well as drug and migrant smuggling for local criminal gangs Smuggled migrants who had travelled to Europe via in order to survive and facilitate his onward move- the African route also reported that Pakistani smug- ment. According to the BEFARE research, linkages glers were part of an organized transnational net- exist between irregular Bengali and Afghan migrant '/647(JPI(F.-/0,[/1,80(89(2,-./01(523--4,0-(,0(C/<,51/0 dŚĞƐŵƵŐŐůŝŶŐŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ͕ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ͕ĂŶĚƉĂLJŵĞŶƚƐ

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184 !#70'4&%*8#9':*';#$<#=*%'.&%5.'

communities and crime, such as tra$cking in arms, the reputation of an agent is important, and poten- drugs, and humans, in Karachi as well as other urban tial migrants often select a smuggler whose repu- areas (EBDM, 2009). Clearly though, more studies tation increases the likelihood of success (UNO- are needed before any de!nitive conclusions can be DC, 2010). Smugglers also promote their services made. Yet other research suggests that there appears openly, assumingly through advertisements (Koser, to be little overlap between migrant smuggling and 2008). Illegal labour agents, as well as subagents of other type of criminal activities (UNODC, 2010). licensed private recruitment agents and overseas em- According to UNODC (2010), networks involved ployment promoters are also involved in the recruit- in migrant smuggling and drug smuggling, for ex- ment of migrants interested in the services of smug- ample, tend to remain separate. glers (Arif, 2009; U.S. Department of State, 2010). False job o#ers and the overcharging of fees are not c) Does migrant smuggling attract persons uncommon practices, and as a result, some labour who have a history of involvement in other migrants !nd themselves in exploitative situations, crime? including involuntary servitude or debt bondage overseas. No conclusions can be drawn from the reviewed lit- erature as to whether migrant smugglers have a his- b) Payment methods tory of involvement in other crime. Payments are made to smugglers in advance either as d) What levels of professionalism/specializa- a lump sum or instalments to a third party (Koser, tion is there within migrant smugglers? 2008; UNODC, 2010). In Peshawar, for example, payments were made to one of the money chang- Although further research is required, the reviewed ers in the Chowk Yadgar bazaar in the Old Town research indicates that there is a well developed level or sometimes to a jeweller (Koser, 2008). Formal re- of professionalism among Pakistani smuggling net- ceipts were given to the migrant, the migrant’s fam- works. As Section 6)b) shows, smugglers are only ily, and the smuggler. "e third party releases the paid in full once the migrant has reached the in- funds to the smuggler once the smuggled migrant’s tended destination (Koser, 2008; UNODC, 2010). family con!rms that he or she arrived safely (also see In e#ect, smugglers o#er a “money back guarantee” Section 5)a). (Koser, 2008, p. 19). "is system represents a sub- stantial investment for the smugglers without a guar- Koser (2008) acknowledges that more research on anteed return of their investment. methods of payment is required. For example, it is not known how the money changers bene!t. Some e) What in"uences shape the way migrant respondents claimed that they charged a commis- smugglers are organized? How and why do sion fee. Others said that they earned interest on these organizations evolve? the deposit. As well, it is unclear how a successful journey is de!ned. Does the migrant have to reach Conclusions cannot be drawn from the reviewed the intended destination or will reaching European literature about what in&uences the way migrant soil su$ce? How is this information veri!ed? "e smugglers are organized. smuggled migrant could lie so the fee is returned to the family. Koser acknowledges that the respondents surveyed provided vague answers to these questions. 6) Migrant smuggling modus operandi Other research suggests that some smugglers are paid the full amount upfront (e.g. UNODC, 2010, a) Recruitment methods 2011).

"ere is a dearth of research on the methods of re- c) Transfer of criminal proceeds cruitment. According to UNODC (2010), social networks in destination countries are important as "ere is a complete lack of research on the methods migrants are introduced to smugglers through these of transferring criminal proceeds derived from mi- connections. Interviews with migrants reveal that grant smuggling in Pakistan.

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d) Transportation methods and detection procedures, or more sophisticated forgeries. Smugglers transport migrants by air, land, and sea. Direct or indirect &ights from Pakistan to intended f) Corruption (e.g. Western Europe) or transit (e.g. Central Asia) destinations are the most common method of trans- Very limited information is available on this point. portation (Human Rights Council, 2007; Koser, Koser (2008) found evidence of bribery among airline 2008). "e majority of migrants are smuggled by air and airport o$cials, including immigration o$cers. depart from Karachi airport (Human Rights Council, On average, USD 5,000 was paid to these individuals. 2007). Migrants are also known to cross by car or on foot at o$cial and uno$cial land borders. Mand Billo g) Evolution of migrant smuggling methods and Taftan in Balochistan are popular entry points in response to changes in migration policies for irregular and smuggled Pakistani migrants enter- and counter measures ing Islamic Republic of Iran (Human Rights Council, 2007). Another method is to travel to Islamic Repub- Two examples of the evolution of migrant smuggling lic of Iran and other parts of the Middle East (e.g. methods in response to changes in migration policies Saudi Arabia and UAE) by boat. Along the African or counter-measures were found in the literature. and Central Asian routes into Western Europe, smug- "e !rst stretches back to Britain in the early 1960s glers use a combination of transport options including (Ahmad, 2008c). Before the 1962 Commonwealth air, car, and boat (Gembicka, 2006; UNODC, 2011). Immigration Act was passed, citizens of the Com- monwealth (e.g. Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka) had e) Document use and misuse unrestricted entry into Britain as well as the right to live and work without a visa under the British In arranging a &ight out of Pakistan, the !rst task Nationality Act of 1948. Only a small number of is to secure a passport and visa (Koser, 2008). Most South Asians had taken up the opportunity to go Pakistani migrants, for example, were &own into overseas. However, when rumours circulated that West Africa using forged visas (UNODC, 2011). more restrictive policies were going to be introduced, Pakistani and Afghan passports are the easiest to get thousands left for Britain, some of whom, Ahmad although some smugglers use passports of other na- purports, may never had gone abroad had not it not tionalities (e.g. Britain) (Koser, 2008). Passports and been for the impending legislative changes (Ahmad, visas were obtained through either theft or bribery, 2008c). He claims that his research !ndings reveal or they were forged for a cost of approximately USD that at that moment in the early 1960s “human 2,000 depending on the nationality of the pass- smuggling in its modern form from South Asia to port and the quality of the forgeries (Koser, 2008). the West began, not, as it is often assumed, in the Other research reveals that a high quality photo re- 1990s, the 1980s or even the 1970s” (p. 140). placement in a passport costs around USD 1,200 in Pakistan (UNODC, 2010). Interviews with Paki- "e recent tightening of legislation in Pakistan and stani migrants suggest that the supply of tampered Europe has made smuggling more risky, di$cult to documents comes largely from Pakistan, speci!cally get intermediaries involved, and altered the routes from Peshawar. One blank UK passport costs USD of smugglers. For example, Pakistani smugglers tend 25,000 while an excellently forged UK passport can not to use anymore the route from West and North be sold for up to USD 20,000. Africa to Europe via Spain because the boat cross- ing to Spain became more di$cult due to patrols FIA data also show that the use of falsi!ed or (UNODC, 2011; Koser, 2008). forged travel documents is prevalent (Human Rights Council, 2007). In 2005, airport authori- ties revealed 178 cases of forged documents. "ree 7) Migrant smuggling fees and mobilization of years later, just 39 cases were intercepted. Al- fees though no explanation is o#ered, reasons for the di#erence might be explained by a decrease in the "ere is some research on the costs of smuggling use of fraudulent documents, weak investigative of migrants and how fees are mobilized. Koser

186 !#70'4&%*8#9':*';#$<#=*%'.&%5.'

(2008) o#ers detailed information about fees paid Research carried out by Arif (2009) on regular mi- to smugglers (see Table 15). It is clear that costs gration supports the above !ndings. Pakistani work- vary depending on factors such as destination, ers who migrated through authorized channels to the means of transport, additional services required Middle East raised funds to cover the fees (e.g. for (e.g. forged documents), and whether the journey tickets, passports, visas, medical tests, professional is direct or involves transit points. "e informa- agents, etc.) through personal or family savings, loans tion presented in Table 15 is supported by empiri- or mortgages, and/or the sale of possessions, such as cal research carried out by Ahmad (2008b) who property or jewellery. Migrants often needed a com- found that migrants paid the equivalent of USD bination of sources to raise the required amount. 13,000 to be smuggled into the UK between 2003 and 2004. When the southern route into Europe via Africa was more popular, young Pakistani men reportedly Koser’s data were collected between October 2003 sold land or borrowed funds from banks or infor- and January 2004, and he notes that smuggling costs mal money lenders to pay the advance sum of EUR have risen over the last four to !ve years. More recent 12,000 to EUR 18,000 to organized smuggling net- research suggests that migrant smuggling fees from works. "e fees were paid at the start of their jour- Pakistan to the US via Bangkok are between USD ney, which included a plane ticket to West Africa, 18,000 and USD 26,000 while Pakistan to Austra- visa, and overland transport into North Africa. As lia via Malaysia and Indonesia costs between USD the journey became increasingly di$cult, migrants 12,000 and USD 18,000 (UNODC, 2010). were forced to pay di#erent smugglers an additional EUR 3,000 for the crossing to Spain (UNODC, Regarding how fees for smuggling were mobilized, 2011). only 30 of the 50 households Koser (2008) surveyed were willing to answer the question. "e most com- mon response was savings, with some households 8) Human and social costs of migrant smuggling indicating that they had put aside several thousand US dollars. Other households sold possessions, such Smuggled migrants are vulnerable to exploitation as land or jewellery, to raise the required funds (see because of the debts incurred in migration. In his also UNODC, 2010). Loans from relatives, friends, research on smuggled Pakistanis in the UK, Ah- the bank, or private lenders were also used to pay mad (2008b) found that newly arrived migrants use fees. It was not uncommon for households to have Pakistani and South Asian employment networks to several sources of funding. Clearly though, it is the !nd work, usually in the service sector. Irregular and families rather than the migrants themselves who smuggled migrants often work without contracts, mobilize the smuggling fees. As a result, smuggling six days a week/12–16 hours per day, for months in represents a signi!cant communal investment on poor working conditions. which a return is expected by entire families through remittances, even if people within these households If migrants are unable to !nd employment or leave bene!t disproportionately. employers because of exploitative conditions, it is

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not uncommon for men to ask for further !nancial tun (also called Pathans) respondents he interviewed, support from relatives in Pakistan (Ahmad, 2008b). for example, either had fathers who had returned or "e debts are both economic and psychological were still in the Middle East. He argues that large burdens for the migrants. Ahmad’s research found scale migration to the Gulf States had a pronounced that smuggled migrants believed that they needed to impact in the NWFP and in particular because be- make the most of their time in the UK in case they fore 1970, migration was not common, unlike other were caught. It also revealed that the realities faced parts of Pakistan, such as Punjab. However, over the by the migrants were harsher than expected. Some last 40 years, remittances have kept the economy expressed doubt about their decision to come irreg- a&oat, and most respondents stated that it was now ularly to the UK, although explicit regret was rare. the norm for men to live and work overseas at some Returning to Pakistan was not an option because of stage in their life (Ahmad, 2008c). Unemployment the sacri!ces made by their families. and underemployment also were cited as push fac- tors (Arif, 2009). "e research shows that the sacri!ces made by fami- lies are signi!cant. On average, it takes a Pakistani household two years to repay their investment us- 10) Conclusions ing remittances (Koser, 2008). Typically, remittances are used for consumption, such as building or im- a) What we know about migrant smuggling in proving homes, starting business enterprises, and Pakistan improving lifestyles (Hasan, 2010). Migration and remittances can also exacerbate household inequali- Although Pakistan is a country of source, transit, and ties. Remittances seldom bene!t the household as a destination for smuggled migrants, there is very lim- whole (Ahmad, 2008c). As Ahmad states, there can ited research on this issue and much more research be gendered implications from remittances: needs to be done. "ere are a handful of empirical research studies on the smuggling of Pakistani mi- It is not uncommon for women to experience grants abroad, but in terms of scope, there are no greater seclusion and con!nement to their reliable estimates. In terms of destinations, popular home when their households are lifted out of ones are the UAE, Islamic Republic of Iran, Saudi material poverty by overseas male migrants, Arabia, the UK, Greece, and Turkey. Most of the who tend to deploy their resources to impose available research examines the smuggling of Paki- stricter purdah and increase their own social stani migrants to Western Europe, in particular the standing... (p. 135) UK, which is re&ected in the reviewed literature about the following migrant smuggling routes: Ahmad also points out that the departure of the t Pakistan ÆMiddle East ÆTurkey/Greece/Italy husband can weaken the position of the wife in the ÆWestern Europe, extended household. As a result, the decision to mi- t Pakistan ÆCentral Asia27 ÆRussia ÆEastern grate through regular or irregular channels is a deci- Europe ÆWestern Europe sion that is sometimes made against the wishes of t Pakistan ÆWestern AfricaÆNorth Africa the household as they are left to bear at least some ÆWestern Europe (no longer used) of the costs. t Pakistan ÆWestern Europe

"e majority of smuggled migrants come from a 9) Factors fuelling irregular migration and mi- select number of districts in Punjab as well as the grant smuggling Northwest Frontier Province. Most were not from the poorest households, but even so, investing in the Since the 1970s, the Pakistan government has en- smuggling of a family member was an enormous !- couraged migration as one means of alleviating nancial burden as most migrants must draw upon the country’s economic problems. Ahmad (2008c) their family’s savings, sell possessions, or take out found that several of the irregular migrants he inter- loans to cover the smuggling fees that were around viewed came from families that bene!ted from mi- gration to the Middle East. Five out of the six Pash- 27 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

188 !#70'4&%*8#9':*';#$<#=*%'.&%5.'

USD 13,000 to USD 14,000 for a direct &ight to these realities are a#ecting the situation is unknown. Western Europe. It is families, not the migrants "ere are clear knowledge gaps that should be ad- themselves, who mobilise the fees to pay the smug- dressed through further research on the following: gler for the services. Payments are made to smugglers t quantitative assessments of irregular migration, in advance either as a lump sum or instalments to migrant smuggling, and tra$cking in persons a third party. Smugglers are only paid in full once &ows; the migrant has reached the intended destination. In t the major routes used, particularly to other des- e#ect, they o#ered a ‘money back guarantee,’ which tination countries outside Western Europe; involved a substantial investment for the smugglers without a guaranteed return. Smuggling migrants is t the pro!les of smugglers and smuggled migrants; a business in Pakistan and involves a network of in- t the motivations of smugglers and smuggled mi- termediaries, all whom stand to pro!t. grants; t smuggler-migrant relationships, including their "e realities faced by smuggled migrants are often perceptions of one another; harsher than expected. Evidence suggests that be- t how migrant smuggling is organized, including cause of their irregular status, smuggled Pakistani the level of professionalism and specialization; migrants are more at risk of experience harsh and t linkages to other forms of criminality and the exploitative conditions, both on route and in des- transfers of criminal proceeds; tination countries, than regular migrants. Stories of exploitation are not uncommon, and some smug- t the modus operandi of migrant smuggling, in- gled migrants openly expressed doubt about their cluding methods of recruitment, payment, and decision to migrate through irregular channels. For transportation; some, the choice to take on the risks and costs of t the role of corruption and the misuse of docu- smuggling is not always economically driven. Several ments; young male migrants interviewed in one research t fees paid to smugglers and their mobilization; project admitted they were driven by an adventure and overseas and the freedoms of the West. Materialism t the factors — political, economic, and social — and wealth, which brings status to young Pakistani that contribute to irregular migration and smug- men in particular, were other motivating factors ac- gling. cording to respondents.

b) What we don’t know about migrant smug- References gling in Pakistan Ahmad, A. N. (2008a). Dead men working: Time Although some empirical studies exist, rigorous re- and space in London’s (‘illegal’) migrant econ- search is required on all aspects of migrant smug- omy. In: Work, Employment and Society, 22(2), gling and irregular migration to, from, and through pp. 301–318. Pakistan. Clear distinctions need to be made among irregular migration, migrant smuggling, and traf- Ahmad, A. N. (2008b). "e labour market conse- !cking in persons as the concepts were used inter- quences of human smuggling: ‘Illegal’ em- changeably in the literature reviewed. "e blurred ployment in London’s migrant economy. In: relationships hinder reliable data collection on the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 34, scope and nature of migrant smuggling. Moreover, pp. 853–874. literature reviewed in this report is neither compre- hensive nor representative of migrant smuggling in Ahmad, A. N. (2008c). "e romantic appeal of il- Pakistan. Most of the studies are based on small sam- legal migration: Gender, masculinity and ples of irregular or smuggled migrants. Some of the human smuggling from Pakistan. In: M. research is outdated. Smugglers shift and adapt their Schrover et al. (eds.), Illegal migration and services according to the needs of migrants; equally gender in a global and historical perspective. important, countermeasures are being deployed by IMISCOE research: Amsterdam University destination countries to manage migration. How Press.

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Arif, G. M. (2009). Recruitment of Pakistani workers Shah, M. (2011). Asylum to Pakistanis not aimed at for overseas employment: Mechanisms, exploita- interference: UK minister. !e News. Retrieved tion and vulnerabilities. Geneva: International from www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail. Labour Organization. aspx?ID=4341&Cat=13&dt=3/2/2011 (ac- cessed April 15, 2011) Azam, F. (2009). Human tra"cking, human smug- gling and illegal migration to and from Paki- United States Department of State. (2010). Tra"ck- stan: Review of government policies and pro- ing in persons report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. grammes. Islamabad: Basic Education for Department of State. Awareness Reforms and Empowerment, Ac- tionAid Pakistan and the European Commis- United Nations O$ce on Drugs and Crime. (2010). sion. Crime facilitating migration from Pakistan and Afghanistan. Vienna: UNODC. Basic Education for Awareness Reforms and Em- powerment (BEFARE). (2009). Baseline study United Nations O$ce on Drugs and Crime. (2011). on illegal migration, human smuggling and traf- !e role of organized crime in the smuggling #cking in Pakistan. of migrants from West Africa to the European Union. Vienna: UNODC. Gembicka, K. (2006). Baseline research on smuggling of migrants, in, from and through Central Asia. Vienna: International Organization for Mi- gration.

Hasan, A. (2010). Migration, small towns and social transformations in Pakistan. In: En- vironment and Urbanization, 22(1), pp. 33–50.

Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. (2010). Human tra"cking through Quetta: A report by Balochistan Chapter. Lahore: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan.

Human Rights Council. (2007). Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 OF 15 March 2006 Entitled “Human Rights Coun- cil”. Addendum: Communications sent to Governments and replies received. New York: United Nations.

Kaya, K. (2008). Tra"cking in persons in Afghanistan – Field survey. Kabul: International Organiza- tion for Migration.

Koser, K. (2008). Why migrant smuggling pays. In: International Migration, 46(2), pp. 3–26.

Mehdi, S. S. (2010). Illegal migration, human smug- gling and tra"cking: From Bangladesh to Paki- stan and beyond. Geneva: International Orga- nization for Migration.

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1) Quantitative assessments and $ows of irregular Santhiago (2005) provides information con- migration, migrant smuggling, and tra"cking in cerning agents who were prosecuted for migrant persons smuggling between Malaysia and Singapore. One driver was charged for smuggling Chinese, a) Estimated numbers and major routes: Ir- Myanmar, and Thai nationals from Singapore to regular migration from, to and through Malaysia in a car boot. Another smuggler was Singapore prosecuted in Singapore for smuggling Bangla- deshi, Chinese, Myanmar, and Nepalese nation- No estimated !gures are available for irregular migra- als from Malaysia to Singapore by boat. These tion to Singapore, but experts believe numbers are cases, however, are isolated examples that do not low (IOM, 2008). According to Asis (2004), Singa- necessarily reflect common smuggling practices pore has succeeded in preventing irregular migration in Singapore. because governmental policies and restrictions were in place before migrants arrived, and because law en- c) Estimated numbers and major routes: Traf- forcement agencies e$ciently execute these policies. #cking in persons from, within, to and Singapore’s status as an island with few points of en- through Singapore try has also contributed to o$cial e#orts to prevent irregular migration into and through the country. According to the U.S. Department of State (2010), Singapore is a destination country for forced prosti- "e literature does not describe the various forms tution of women and girls, and possibly for labour that irregular migration takes in Singapore, nor does for some migrant workers, including domestics. it specify those nationalities most highly represented Most tra$cked migrants originate in Bangladesh, among irregular migrants. India, Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, "ailand, Viet Nam, and other Asian coun- b) Estimated numbers and major routes: Mi- tries. grant smuggling from, to and through Sin- gapore "e literature o#ers no basis for estimating the num- ber of tra$cking victims in Singapore. Migrant smuggling exists in Singapore, but little is known of its frequency or routes. d) Cross-over or overlap, if any, between popu- lations or routes Organized criminal groups in Singapore have report- edly smuggled people from Afghanistan, the Middle "e literature o#ers insu$cient information about East, and North Africa through to Australia (Crock irregular, smuggling, and tra$cking &ows to, et al., 2006). Speci!c routes for these movements are through, and from Singapore to determine whether not speci!ed in the literature. these &ows overlap.

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2) Pro#les of migrant smugglers c) Factors in"uencing the relationship between smugglers and migrants a) Socio-economic characteristics Because no information is provided in the literature "e literature provides no information on the char- regarding the relationship between smugglers and acteristics of migrant smugglers. migrants, it is impossible to determine what factors in&uence this relationship. b) Motivation

No details are given in the literature on individuals’ 5) Organization of migrant smuggling reasons for engaging in smuggling operations. a) How is migrant smuggling organized?

3) Pro#les of irregular and smuggled migrants Given how little related information appears in the literature, it is impossible to describe the inner a) Geographical and socio-economic charac- structures of smuggling groups and syndicates. Un- teristics licensed labour recruitment agencies in countries of origin facilitate unauthorized migration to Sin- Irregular or smuggled migrants were not explicitly gapore, and the organization of these entities may pro!led in the literature reviewed, but irregular mi- re&ect the structure of authorized agencies, as is the gration &ows may to some extent mirror authorized case in Indonesia (Human Rights Watch, 2004). No &ows. Most foreign nationals in Singapore are mi- details are provided in the literature, however, and grant workers. Singapore attracts skilled and un- no speci!c countries of origin are mentioned in con- skilled workers as well as female migrant domestic nection with unlicensed agencies. workers from the region. Most migrant women in Singapore are from Indonesia, the Philippines, and According to Crock et al. (2006), organized groups Sri Lanka (Human Rights Watch, 2005). facilitate migrant smuggling through Singapore from Afghanistan, the Middle East, and North Africa on- b) Motivation ward to Australia, but the structure of such groups is not addressed in the literature. Economic growth and a declining birth rate in Sin- gapore create a high demand for workers at almost b) Are persons involved in migrant smuggling all job levels (Pudjiastuti, 2005). "e literature leaves also involved in other criminal activities? it unclear whether motivations among irregular mi- grants are di#erent from those among authorized "e literature provides no information on additional migrants. Neither does the literature address the forms of criminality among smugglers. question of why migrants choose to migrate to Sin- gapore through unauthorized channels. c) Does migrant smuggling attract persons who have a history of involvement in other crime? 4) Smuggler-migrant relationships "e literature does not address the personal back- a) Migrant perceptions of smugglers ground of smugglers in this way.

"e literature at hand provides no information on d) What levels of professionalism/specializa- the relationship between smugglers and migrants. tion is there within migrant smugglers?

b) Nature of migrant-smuggler relationship "e literature provides insu$cient information about smugglers and smuggling rings to judge re- "e literature at hand provides no information on spective levels of professionalism and specialization the relationship between smugglers and migrants. within their trade.

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e) What in"uences shape the way migrant the Middle East, and North Africa through Singa- smugglers are organized? How and why do pore to Australia, the literature does not so much as these organizations evolve? hint at their modus operandi (Crock et al., 2006).

Because the overall organization of smuggling syn- e) Document use and misuse dicates in Singapore remains an unknown, it is not possible to determine what shapes this structure and "e falsi!cation and forgery of documents to assist how it evolves. in the smuggling process to, through and from Sin- gapore remains unaddressed in the current literature.

6) Migrant smuggling modus operandi f) Corruption

a) Recruitment methods "e literature does not discuss the role of corruption in the smuggling process. "e literature provides almost no information about recruitment of smuggled migrants in, to, or from Sin- g) Evolution of migrant smuggling methods gapore. In Indonesia, which is a sending country for in response to changes in migration policies Singapore, the process of recruitment through both and counter measures regular and irregular channels begins in the home village with the local recruiter, who is also known as No information was provided in the literature re- the sponsor, agent, broker, or middleman (Hosen, garding the evolution of smugglers’ modus operandi. 2005). Local brokers often have a good reputation and have had previous contact with the migrants’ family (Hugo, 2004; Rudnyckyj, 2004). It is unclear 7) Migrant smuggling fees and mobilization of whether similar patterns of recruitment exist in other fees countries of origin. "e literature provides very limited information on b) Payment methods smuggling fees and migrant mobilization of this cap- ital. One Malaysian ‘snakehead’ prosecuted in Sin- Migrants in Singapore are normally indebted to their gapore had charged SGD 2,00028 (USD 1,200) for recruitment agency and obliged to repay them in in- transportation by boat from Malaysia to Singapore. stalments from their salary, which can amount to 4 To protect smugglers from apprehension by the au- to 10 months without pay (Human Rights Watch, thorities, the passengers had been forced to swim the 2005). "e literature provides no details on the spe- last two kilometres to shore (Santhiago, 2005). ci!c situation of smuggled migrants, but they may also be trapped in a similar debt cycle upon arrival. No further speci!c fees are detailed in the literature, and no information is provided on how migrants c) Transfer of criminal proceeds mobilize the necessary funds to !nance their migra- tion to Singapore. "e literature provides no information on how smugglers transfer their criminal proceeds. 8) Human and social costs of migrant smuggling d) Transportation methods "e literature reviewed revealed very limited infor- Minimal information is provided by the literature mation about the human and social costs of migrant on various methods of transporting migrants. One smuggling. According to Human Rights Watch study notes two speci!c examples of smugglers being (2005), once in Singapore, migrants are more likely prosecuted for smuggling migrants from Singapore to experience poor conditions if they used the ser- to Malaysia via car and from Malaysia to Singa- vices of an unlicensed recruitment agency. Female pore via boat (Santhiago, 2005). Although criminal groups allegedly smuggle people from Afghanistan, 28 SGD = Singapore Dollar.

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migrants who enter Singapore through unlicensed isting evidence so scant, that it is di$cult to make agencies are more likely to earn less, have no days interpretations or draw substantial conclusions. o#, and be illegally deployed to multiple households. Several Indonesian workers in Singapore who mi- b) What we don’t know about migrant smug- grated through unlicensed agencies reported being gling in Singapore threatened by their agents with tra$cking into pros- titution or paying substantial !nes if they failed to "e literature at hand provides no information on complete their debt repayment. overall migrant smuggling trends, and what infor- mation is available remains piecemeal. "e reviewed literature provides no further informa- tion about the human and social costs of migrant Irregular migration and migrant smuggling operate smuggling with regard to Singapore. on a lesser scale in Singapore than in neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, such operations do exist. And the literature provides no information on the 9) Factors fuelling irregular migration and mi- various forms of irregular migration in Singapore or grant smuggling which nationalities are most represented. Migrant smugglers have been apprehended in Singapore, but According to a report by Human Rights Watch little is known about the frequency of smuggling ac- (2005), strict enforcement of its immigration laws, tivities, their modus operandi, or their routes. Mi- as well as its small geographical size, has helped Sin- grant smuggling to and through Singapore allegedly gapore to maintain lower levels of irregular migra- moves irregular migrants from the Middle East, but tion than other countries in the region. Beyond this the literature does not detail routes or methods of and the appeal of the country’s economic success, the transport. Neither is it clear whether their smugglers literature suggests no other factors that contribute to originate in the Middle East or whether they are fuelling irregular and smuggling &ows. from Singapore or other countries.

"us, further research on migrant smuggling with 10) Conclusions regard to Singapore is needed to clarify the follow- ing: a) What we know about migrant smuggling in t quantitative extent of irregular migration, mi- Singapore grant smuggling, and tra$cking in persons; t pro!les of smugglers and their motivations; What is known about migrant smuggling in Singa- t pro!les of irregular and smuggled migrants and pore remains greatly outweighed by what remains their motivations; unknown. Perhaps it has been Singapore’s overall t migrant-smuggler relationships; success in preventing irregular migration and mi- t organization of migrant smuggling; grant smuggling that has limited research on these t modus operandi of such smuggling; topics. Irregular migration and migrant smuggling t fees paid to smugglers and their mobilization; do occur, but details of their structure and operation t human and social costs of migrant smuggling; remain unclear. and t factors contributing to irregular migration and Apprehended smugglers provide case studies for un- smuggling. derstanding smuggling routes and modus operandi. "ese are only individual cases, however, and may not re&ect wider trends among smuggling operations References in the region. Such examples supply little or no infor- mation regarding the organization of migrant smug- Asis, M. M. B. (2004). Borders, globalization and gling or the motivations of smugglers and migrants. irregular migration in Southeast Asia. In: A. Ananta and E. N. Ari!n (eds.), International Overall, the current knowledge base regarding mi- Migration in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Insti- grant smuggling in Singapore is so limited, the ex- tute of Southeast Asian Studies.

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Crock, M., Saul, B. and Dastyari, A. (2006). Future United States Department of State. (2010). Tra"ck- seekers II: Refugees and irregular migration in ing in persons report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Australia. Sydney: "e Federation Press. Department of State.

Hosen, M. N. (2005). Governance of Indonesian la- bour and migration to Malaysia: An overview. [Paper in special issue: A. Kaur and I. Met- calfe (eds.). Migrant Labour in Southeast Asia: Needed, Not Wanted.] In: Review of Indonesian and Malaysian A%airs, 39(2), pp. 31–44.

Hugo, G. (2004). International migration in the Asia-Paci!c region: Emerging trends and is- sues. In: D. S. Massey and J. E. Taylor (eds.). International migration, prospects and policies in a global market. New York: Oxford Univer- sity Press.

Human Rights Watch. (2004). Help wanted: Abuses against female migrant domestic workers in In- donesia and Malaysia (Vol. 16, No. 9 (B), p. 112). New York: Human Rights Watch.

Human Rights Watch. (2005). Maid to order: End- ing abuses against migrant domestic workers in Singapore. New York: Human Rights Watch (Vol. 17, No. 10 (C).

International Organization for Migration. (2008). World migration report 2008. Geneva: Inter- national Organization for Migration.

Pudjiastuti, T. N. (2005). Irregular Migrant Work- ers in East Asia: An Emerging Issue of Trans- national Security "reats. In D. F. e. Anwar (Ed.), Development, migration and security in East Asia: people’s movements and non-tradi- tional security challenges in a changing East Asia (pp. 347). Jakarta: "e Habibie Center.

Rudnyckyj, D. (2004). Technologies of servitude: Governmentality and Indonesian transna- tional labor migration. In: Anthropological Quarterly, 77(3), pp. 407–434.

Santhiago, A. (2005). Human smuggling, migra- tion and human rights: A Malaysian perspec- tive. [Paper presented at the Review Meet- ing Migration: Human rights protection of smuggled persons, Geneva, 25–26 July 2005.]

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:G/D17.('G,.1770I().,(+/0

1) Quantitative assessments and $ows of irregular b) Estimated numbers and major routes: Mi- migration, migrant smuggling, and tra"cking in grant smuggling from, to and through Sri persons Lanka

a) Estimated numbers and major routes: Ir- "e identi!ed research literature does not provide regular migration from, to and through Sri any statistics on the smuggling of migrants are, but Lanka some information, largely from intergovernmen- tal agencies or the media, sheds light on the major "ere are no accurate estimates of the scope and routes used. A IOM report (Gembicka, 2006) re- magnitude of irregular migration from Sri Lanka. veals that several countries of Central Asia are used However, some indications of trends are provid- a transit points for smuggled Sri Lankan migrants, ed through the reviewed literature, in particular who often enter with false student, tourist, or busi- through a UNODC research report written by ness visas. "is IOM report also discusses a Decem- Saha (2009). An examination of Indian immigra- ber 2000 case in which 25 Sri Lankans were deserted tion related records by the UNODC reveals that 23 by their smuggler on the Russian-Kazakhstan bor- percent of deportation cases (39 of 169 in total) re- der. "e migrants travelled to the UAE by air, moved lated to irregular migration of Sri Lankan nationals to Kazakhstan, and then went overland by truck to from July 2006 to June 2007 (Saha, 2009). Some the Russian-Kazakhstan border. In 2001, there were of these irregular migrants were already in India 100 Sri Lankans caught in Northern Kazakhstan. A with refugee status or as temporary residents. "e quarter of the migrants were repatriated to Colom- UNODC report argues that due to strict migration bo. Around the same time, 150 migrants arrived in checks for Tamils in Sri Lanka, migrants prefer to Tajikistan with student visas. No other information come to Chennai, the capital of the Tamil Nadu was revealed about their irregular situation. Accord- state before migrating irregularly to destination ing to the same report, a more typical route is to ar- countries in Europe. "e report goes on to high- rive !rst in Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, then travel fur- light three separate cases involving Sri Lankans ther with the help of smugglers through Kazakhstan who attempted to depart for Greece, France, and and Russia, passing through Belarus and Poland to Italy respectively using forged documents or fake reach Western Europe. However, it should be cau- passports. Although the majority of the Sri Lankan tioned that this information is a decade old, and it is Tamil deportees originated from the LTTE domi- di$cult to ascertain its current validity. nated areas of Ja#na (38.5%), Vayuniya, and Trin- comalee, the place of origin was unknown for al- Information from media reports about the smug- most one quarter (23%) of the Sri Lankan irregular gling of Sri Lankan migrants is more current. For migrants. instance, Canadian authorities intercepted the ship

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MV Sun Sea o# the coast of British Columbia in Eastern countries. Other studies have described the August 2010. On board the ship, which reportedly conditions of Sri Lankan domestic workers as con- travelled from "ailand and then crossed, were 492 temporary forms of slavery (Jureidini & Moukarbel, Tamil migrants who had spent three months at sea 2004; Moukarbel, 2009). (“Tamil died during voyage from Sri Lanka,” 2010). "e arrival of the MV Sun Sea follows the Ocean Only a few actual cases of tra$cking in persons Lady, which reached Canadian shores in October are referenced in the literature. "e UNODC and 2009 carrying 76 Sri Lankan migrants. UN.GIFT (2009) Global Report on Tra"cking in Per- sons notes that 14 tra$cking cases were recorded by Migrant smuggling from Sri Lanka is also a matter Sri Lankan police in 2005 and 35 were recorded in of concern to the Australian Government (Crock et 2006. "rough to June 2007, an additional 16 cases al., 2006; “Australia Halts,” 2010). Again, while re- were reported.29 Most, if not all, of the victims in- search has not focused on this issue in greater detail, volved in these cases were Sri Lankan. Other research the media regularly reports about migrant smug- suggests that the tra$cking in persons problem in gling incidents. For example, in February 2011 Aus- Sri Lanka is also an internal one. A study carried out tralian authorities intercepted a !shing trawler, and by Jayatilaka (2008) also supports this claim. Her detained 17 irregular migrants from Sri Lanka (“Sri research was based on interviews with 46 internally Lanka Foils Smugglers,” 2011). tra$cked female migrants. She also interviewed 39 externally tra$cked female migrants, but provided c) Estimated numbers and major routes: Traf- no information about internal or external &ows, pat- #cking in persons from, within, to and terns, or forms of exploitation. through Sri Lanka "e U.S. Department of State (2010) Tra"cking in "e reviewed research literature does not provide Persons Report also states that women and children statistical information about tra$cked Sri Lankans, are tra$cked into brothels, particularly in the Anu- and little information exists on the major routes radhapura area, which is a transit point for members used. "e U.S. Department of State (2010) Traf- of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces heading north. In #cking in Persons Report maintains that Sri Lanka is the coastal areas, some of which are popular domes- largely a source, and to a much lesser extent, a des- tic child sex tourism destinations, boys are more than tination for tra$cked persons. "e report states that likely than girls to be tra$cked into prostitution. Fi- men and women migrate through authorized chan- nally, the report suggests that children are subjected nels as construction workers and domestic servants, to bonded labour in dry zone farming areas and on largely to the Middle East (also see Shaw, 2010). plantations to help pay o# loans taken by their par- Some of these workers subsequently !nd themselves ents. in conditions of forced labour (e.g. through threats, physical or sexual abuse, withholding of passports, d) Cross-over or overlap, if any, between popu- restricted movement) or debt bondage (e.g. due to lations or routes in&ated recruitment fees charged by licensed and un- licensed agents). Some women are forced to work in Much like other labour sending countries, the lines brothels, largely in Singapore, while a smaller num- between regular, irregular, smuggled, and tra$cked ber of women are tra$cked to the Maldives for the Sri Lankan migrant populations are blurred. "e purposes of prostitution. available research suggests that most irregular mi- grants enter destination countries through authorized Some material produced by non-governmental or- channels, but many migrants overstay their visas or ganizations (NGOs) and academics highlights the leave their regular employment for other irregular treatment and conditions of Sri Lankan migrants jobs; thus, their status becomes irregular (Moukarbel, overseas without referring to tra$cking in persons 2009). Other reports indicate that violations of la- per se. For example, several Human Rights Watch bour rights represent considerable risks for Sri Lankan (2005, 2007, 2008) reports have documented de- ception by Sri Lankan recruitment agents as well as 29 "ere were no convictions for tra$cking in persons between 2005 and inhumane treatment by employers in several Middle June 2007.

198 !#70'4&%*8#9':*';#$<#=*%'.&%5.'

workers abroad (Human Rights Watch, 2005, 2007, India originated from LTTE dominated areas. Strin- 2008). Although abuse and exploitation occur in all gent migration policies have led to limited oppor- types of employment and destination countries, evi- tunities for authorized migration (e.g. to Europe), dence indicates that domestic servants in the Middle leading potential migrants to rely upon smugglers to East are more at risk than other workers. Housemaids provide transport as they search for work overseas. are especially vulnerable to exploitation because they work in unregulated environments and in isolated conditions (Human Rights Watch, 2005, 2007, 4) Smuggler-migrant relationships 2008; Jureidini & Moukarbel, 2004; Moukarbel, 2009). Clearly though, there is a lack of substantial a) Migrant perceptions of smugglers research on irregular migration, migrant smuggling, and tra$cking in persons in Sri Lanka. "ere is no empirical research on migrants and their perceptions of smugglers.

2) Pro#les of migrant smugglers b) Nature of migrant-smuggler relationship

a) Socio-economic characteristics "ere is no empirical research on the nature of the relationships between smugglers and migrants. "ere is a complete lack of research on the socio- economic characteristics of migrant smugglers. c) Factors in"uencing the relationship between smugglers and migrants b) Motivation "ere is a complete lack of information on the na- "ere is also a notable lack of research on the motiva- ture of the relationships between smugglers and mi- tions of migrant smugglers. grants.

3) Pro#les of irregular migrants and smuggled 5) Organization of migrant smuggling migrants a) How is migrant smuggling organized? a) Geographical and socio-economic charac- teristics "e available research indicates that most irregular migrants enter destination countries through autho- Although there is some research on the characteris- rized channels, but subsequently become irregular tics of migrants in general, the reviewed literature after they overstay their visas or violate conditions of provides only little information about irregular and their contracts (Moukarbel, 2009). smuggled migrants’ pro!les. "e UNODC report (Saha, 2009) highlights that out of the 39 irregular b) Are persons involved in migrant smuggling migrant cases involving Sri Lankans, four deportees also involved in other criminal activities? were women. "e age range was from 15 to 60 years, with the majority of irregular migrants between the As there is no research on migrant smugglers them- ages of 26 to 30 years. selves, it is impossible to say whether persons in- volved in migrant smuggling are involved in other b) Motivation criminal activities.

According to UNODC (Saha, 2009), the limited c) Does migrant smuggling attract persons available research reveals that migrants, in general, who have a history of involvement in other seek work abroad primarily for economic reasons al- crime? though in the case of Sri Lanka, consideration must be given to political motivations. According to Shaw "ere is no information as to whether migrant smug- (2010), most of Sri Lankan Tamil deportees from glers have a history of involvement in other crime.

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d) What levels of professionalism/specializa- (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Some migrants end tion is there within migrant smugglers? up paying fees twice. "e agent’s fee is paid in Sri Lanka, but then the !rst month’s salary is also with- "e level of professionalism among migrant smug- held by the agent (Moukarbel, 2009). glers is unclear based on reviewed research. c) Transfer of criminal proceeds e) What in"uences shape the way migrant smugglers are organized? How and why do "ere is no research available on the methods of these organizations evolve? transferring criminal proceeds derived from migrant smuggling in Sri Lanka. As there is no research on how migrant smuggling is organized, it is di$cult to draw conclusions about d) Transportation methods factors that in&uence it. Although there is scant research available on the meth- ods of transportation used, media reports illustrate 6) Migrant smuggling modus operandi that migrants are smuggled by boat to transit and/or destination countries, such as Australia and Canada. a) Recruitment methods Evidence exists that migrants are smuggled by air to Central Asia and then travel overland by truck into "ere is no literature on how smuggled migrants are Western Europe (Gembicka, 2006). Research also re- recruited. veals that irregular Sri Lankan migrants use Chennai airport in India to reach Europe (Saha, 2009). As stated previously, most departures are arranged within the legal framework, but it is clear that irregu- e) Document use and misuse lar channels exist alongside regular labour migration channels (Shaw, 2010). Migrants also use both li- "ere is evidence of recruitment agents falsifying pass- censed and unlicensed agents. Unlicensed subagents ports in order to meet age requirements for jobs abroad at the village level, with no formal a$liation with li- or bear Muslim names (Human Rights Watch, 2007; censed recruitment agencies are often negligent. "e Moukarbel, 2009). Research carried out for UNODC overcharging of fees, the falsi!cation of documents, by Saha (2009) also revealed at least 14 cases in which deception with regard to the nature of employment, Sri Lankan migrants were arrested at Chennai airport and contract substitution are not uncommon prac- with forged Indian or foreign passports. In each case, tices (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Europe (UK, Italy, and France) was the intended des- tination. "ere were also cases of Sri Lankans with b) Payment methods fake foreign visas. In these incidences, Canada and Greece were the destination points. Although there is no speci!c research on how pay- ments of migrants to smugglers are made, infor- f) Corruption mation is available on the method of payment to licensed and unlicensed agents, some of whom are "e literature does not address the role of corruption likely to be involved directly or indirectly in smug- in migrant smuggling involving Sri Lanka. gling. Fees, which are often covered by the agent, are deducted from the migrant’s salary once he or she g) Evolution of migrant smuggling methods starts work. Otherwise, assets are pawned (e.g. jewel- in response to changes in migration policies lery) or money is borrowed from local lenders, often and counter measures at high interest rates (e.g. 20% per month) (Human Rights Watch, 2007; Moukarbel, 2009). Return Given the paucity of research on migrant smuggling airfares, agency commissions, and work permits are in Sri Lanka, it is not possible to draw conclusions typically the responsibility of employers, although in from the available literature on the evolution of mi- practice some attempt to shirk their responsibilities grant smuggling methods in response to changes in so the costs are deducted from the migrant’s salary migration policies and counter measures.

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7) Migrant smuggling fees and mobilization of research on this issue despite the fact that migrant fees smuggling from Sri Lanka has existed for decades.

"ere is no research on migrant smuggling fees or the b) What we don’t know about migrant smug- mobilization of fees. According to Shaw (2010), un- gling in Sri Lanka documented migrants report paying up to USD 5,000 per attempt and it may take several attempts before the "ere is a striking lack of reliable data on all aspects migrant reaches his or her intended destination. Some of migrant smuggling in Sri Lanka. Research needs media reports support this !nding, claiming that mi- to be carried out on irregular migration, migrant grant smugglers charge up to USD 5,000 for a journey smuggling, and tra$cking &ows from, within, and to Canada, Europe, Australia, or New Zealand (“Sri to Sri Lanka because there are no reliable statistics. Lanka Foils Smugglers,” 2011). Other media reports claim that Sri Lankans migrants have paid as much as "ere is a dearth of research on: USD 50,000 per person to be smuggled to Canada t the pro!les of smugglers; (“Big Pro!ts,” 2010). Clearly more research is needed t migrant-smuggler relationships; on the fees paid for smuggling and irregular migration. t the organization of migrant smuggling; t the modus operandi of migrant smuggling; t the fees paid to smugglers and their mobiliza- 8) Human and social costs of migrant smuggling tion; and t the factors that contribute to irregular migration "e reviewed literature on this point is very limited. and smuggling. It is clear from media reports that travel by boat is dangerous due to the poor conditions of the ves- sels, overcrowding, and long, treacherous voyages References through rough seas and weather. For example, a Sri Lankan Tamil refugee died aboard a cargo ship dur- Australia halts Sri Lankan and Afghan asylum ing a 90 day trip from "ailand to Canada in August claims. (2010, April 9). British Broadcasting 2010 (“Tamil died during voyage from Sri Lanka,” Corporation (BBC). Retrieved from http:// 2010). However, this is an issue not examined in the news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8610679.stm (accessed research literature. "e literature notes brie&y that 11 March 2011) journeys by land can be perilous. In December 2000, one smuggled Sri Lankan male died on route to Ger- Big pro!ts for smugglers of Tamil migrants: many due to the severe travel conditions through Toews. (2010, August 16). Canadian Tele- Central Asia (Gembicka, 2006). vision Network (CTV). Retrieved from http://www.ctvbc.ctv.ca/servlet/an/local/ CTVNews/20100816/migrants-hearings- 9) Factors fuelling irregular migration and mi- 100816?hub=BritishColumbiaHome (ac- grant smuggling cessed 11 March 2011)

"e reviewed research literature does not speci!cally Crock, M., Saul, B. and Dastyari, A. (2006). Future address this issue. seekers II: Refugees and irregular migration in Australia. Sydney: "e Federation Press.

10) Conclusions Gembicka, K. (2006). Baseline research on smuggling of migrants, in, from and through Central Asia. Vi- a) What we know about migrant smuggling in enna: International Organization for Migration. Sri Lanka Human Rights Watch. (2005). Maid to order: End- A systematic review of available resources on migrant ing abuses against migrant domestic workers in smuggling in Sri Lanka con!rms that there are huge Singapore. New York: Human Rights Watch gaps in our knowledge base. "ere is no dedicated (Vol. 17, No. 10 (C).

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Human Rights Watch. (2007). Exported and exposed: United Nations O$ce on Drugs and Crime. (2009). Abuses against Sri Lankan domestic workers in Smuggling of migrants from India to Europe Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon and United and in particular the UK: A study on Punjab Arab Emirates. New York: Human Rights and Haryana. New Delhi: UNODC. Watch (Vol. 19, No. 16 (C). United Nations O$ce on Drugs and Crime and Human Rights Watch. (2008). “As if I am not human”: United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Abuses against Asian domestic workers in Saudi Human Tra$cking. (2009). Global report on Arabia. New York: Human Rights Watch. tra"cking in persons. Vienna: UNODC and UN.GIFT. Jayatilake, R. (2008). Women migrant workers and tra"cking in Sri Lanka. Colombo: Women’s Education and Research Centre.

Jureidini, R. and Moukarbel, N. (2004). Female Sri Lankan domestic workers in Lebanon: A case of ‘contract slavery’? In: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30(4), pp. 581–607.

Moukarbel, N. (2009). Sri Lanka housemaids in Lebanon: A case of ‘symbolic violence’ and everyday forms of resistance. IMISCOE Dis- sertations.

Saha, K. C. (2009). Smuggling of migrants from In- dia to Europe and in particular to the UK. A study on Tamil Nadu. New Delhi: United Nations O$ce on Drugs and Crime.

Shaw, J. (2010). From Kuwait to Korea: "e diver- si!cation of Sri Lankan labour migration. In: Journal of the Asia Paci#c Economy, 15(1), pp. 59–70.

Sri Lanka navy foils smuggling mission to Austra- lia. (2011, February 22). Daily Times. Re- trieved from http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/ default.asp?page=2011%5C02%5C22%5Cst ory_22-2-2011_pg14_8 (accessed 11 March 2011)

Tamil died during voyage from Sri Lanka. (2010, Au- gust 16). CBC News. Retrieved from http:// www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2010/08/15/ tamil-hearings-monday.html (accessed 11 March 2011)

United States Department of State. (2010). Tra"ck- ing in persons report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State.

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:G/D17.(Q83.1770I('G/,4/0>

1) Quantitative assessments and $ows of irregular with irregular migration status, they probably number migration, migrant smuggling, and tra"cking in in the hundreds of thousands. Reliable estimates are persons unavailable because irregular migrants are undocu- mented, residing and working in "ailand without au- a) Estimated numbers and major routes: Ir- thorization and avoiding detection by the authorities. regular migration from, to and through If discovered, irregular migrants are often arrested and !ailand deported or subjected to !nes or pay-o#s to the police.

"e reviewed literature includes no comprehensive Since 2004, the Government of "ailand has at- data on numbers of "ai nationals who have migrat- tempted to regularize and manage the irregular mi- ed through irregular channels. grant worker population through a periodic registra- tion process that allows irregular migrant workers A 2009 IOM report on International Migration in who register to work temporarily in "ailand with- !ailand presents !gures relating to irregular "ai out fear of deportation. According to the reviewed migrants living and working abroad (Sciortino & research, however, this process has been poorly man- Punpuing, 2009). In 2008, an estimated 200,000 aged, is relatively restrictive, and is either inaccessible "ais were working in Malaysia. Most of them, pre- or unattractive to many irregular migrant workers. sumably, were irregular, given the high cost of ob- Registration is only available to irregular migrants taining work permits plus the fact that Malaysia, who attain a work permit; o$ces for registration are being geographically close, is a popular destination found only in certain locations; and registration can country for "ai migrant workers. As of 2005, the only be granted if the worker agrees to stay with the Republic of Korea hosted an estimated 11,146 ir- same employer for the course of the registration year. regular "ai migrants. Hundreds of thousands of Consequently, the above-mentioned 2009 IOM re- irregular migrants are living and working in Japan, port argues that irregular and unregistered migrant including a large number of "ais, many of whom workers consistently outnumber registered workers, entered Japan regularly but who then overstayed a circumstance that also became evident during the their visas. In 2006, the Japanese authorities esti- registration rounds (Sciortino & Punpuing, 2009). mated that 10,352 "ai overstayers were residing in the country. It is believed, however, that the number "e IOM (Sciortino & Punpuing, 2009) estimates of "ais smuggled or tra$cked into Japan by air and that 200,000 unregistered migrants were residing in by boat is much larger than the number of visa over- "ailand in 2004. By 2007, this number had soared stayers. Many irregular "ai migrants, reportedly, to an estimated 1.3 million irregular migrants. "is also reside in Israel, where "ailand ranks as the top !gure was calculated by combining the volume of sending country for migrant workers . unmet employers’ requests for low-skilled migrant workers at the time of registration, the number of Huguet and Punpuing (2005) argue that, although no migrants who had failed to re-register since 2004, reliable estimates exist for people living in "ailand and an approximate number of new entrants.

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According ot the IOM report (Sciortino & Punpu- have used the services of smugglers. "e literature ing, 2009), various migration routes o#er passage into on irregular migration, however, refers to migrants and out of "ailand. "ailand shares land borders with making use of intermediaries and facilitators. "is Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar, o#ering ample clearly suggests the estimated numbers of irregular choice of land crossings. Aside from o$cial border cross- migrants include a sub-set of smuggled migrants. ing points, there are extensive border areas where one "e distinction, however, remains unexplored in the can cross through forests, rivers, or other unpatrolled or literature. "e literature also neglects to directly ad- relatively lightly patrolled areas. In addition, corruption dress the issue of related smuggling routes. at border points allows people to cross through o$cial checkpoints without proper documentation. c) Estimated numbers and major routes: Traf- #cking in persons from, within, to and "e most common migration route into "ailand is di- through !ailand rect entry from neighbouring GMS countries. Migrants from Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam "ailand serves as a regional hub for tra$cking in typically cross the "ai border overland or by river cross- persons. People are tra$cked into "ailand from ings. GMS migrants may travel internally from their Cambodia, China, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet home villages to border towns before crossing into "ai- Nam. Some are then tra$cked onwards from "ai- land. Once in "ailand, migrants either live and work land to Japan, Malaysia, and other destinations in in border-town areas, or travel farther into "ailand to Asia, Australia, Europe, and the U.S. (Sciortino & the major cities, including Bangkok. A 2008 ILO report Punpuing, 2009). Given the clandestine nature of (Chantavanich, 2008) identi!es the two most common the crime, reliable estimates are unavailable for the migration routes between Cambodia and "ailand — number of persons tra$cked within, from, and to from Prey Veng to Battambang to Poipet and across the "ailand. border into "ailand; and the Kampot to Koh Kong route. According to "ai authorities, most irregular Lao "ai people have been tra$cked from "ailand to migrant workers enter "ailand by crossing the Mekong destinations within Asia including Japan, where River at Nong Khai, or from Champasak Province, Lao there are known cases of "ai women tra$cked for PDR, to Khemmarat districts in Ubon Ratchathani the purpose of sexual exploitation in the commer- Province, "ailand. Other unauthorized border cross- cial sex industry (Aoyama, 2009). According to the ings are made along the Mekong River where it borders UNIAP SIREN 2010 Datasheet for "ailand, "ai "ailand (Phetsiriseng, 2007). citizens are tra$cked to Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Irregular migrants from Myanmar clandestinely cross Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, the Maldives, Qa- the border into "ailand by river crossings in boats, tar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan by walking through forests, and by way of upland hill Province of China, Timor Leste, the UAE, the U.S., routes. Some continue onward to the south of "ai- and Viet Nam (UNIAP, 2010). "ere are known cas- land to board boats from Phuket to Malaysia (Sciorti- es of tra$cking in "ai women to Australia for the no & Punpuing, 2009). Many migrants from Myan- purpose of sexual exploitation. Between May 2004 mar work in Mae Sot, which is located on the "ai and January 2008, 62 "ai women victims of traf- side of the "ai-Myanmar border. "e migrants reach !cking for the purpose of sexual exploitation were Mae Sot by crossing the Moei River from Myawaddy, provided assistance and support by the Australian on the Myanmar side of the border. Another Myan- Government. Internal tra$cking, mostly from rural mar-"ailand migration gateway is from Kawthuang, areas to urban centres in "ailand is also an issue in Myanmar, to Ranong, in "ailand (Mon, 2005). (David, 2008).

b) Estimated numbers and major routes: Mi- d) Cross-over or overlap, if any, between popu- grant smuggling from, to and through !ai- lations or routes land "e literature does not speci!cally address this ques- "e estimated numbers of irregular migrants in tion, and no de!nitive conclusions can be drawn "ailand leave unclear how many of these people from it regarding crossovers and overlaps between

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populations and routes from neighbouring countries migrants to send money back home. "ese ‘extra’ to "ailand. However, the reviewed research suggests services are to the economic bene!t of the recruit- that there seems to be a signi!cant overlap between er. According to both this ILO report and Curran irregular migration, migrant smuggling and human (2005), family and friend networks are also favoured tra$cking. "ailand is the most important destina- by potential irregular and smuggled migrants as fa- tion country for irregular migrants coming from cilitators of the journey to and from "ailand. One Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar. Irregular mi- recruiter claimed that, instead of facilitating travel gration seems to be facilitated mainly by smugglers, and employment for pro!t, he helped friends and who are often referred to in the literature as ‘brokers’ family for altruistic motives. or ‘recruiters’. At the same time, many victims of human tra$cking in "ailand are from Cambodia, b) Motivation Lao PDR, and Myanmar. Although it is not clear to what extent the victims of human tra$cking from "e recruiters identi!ed in the 2006 ILO report these countries in "ailand were victims of a pre- (Pearson & Punpuing, 2006) said that one reason organized human tra$cking process that started in they chose to become recruiters was to use their own Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar, it is clear from knowledge and experience of the migration situation the available literature that the irregular status of to and from "ailand, including their familiarity these migrants signi!cantly contributes to making with the employment context and ability to facili- them vulnerable to a human tra$cking process that tate employment for potential migrants in "ailand. might have only begun in "ailand. By facilitating Another motivating factor was the opportunity to irregular migration, migrant smuggling can thus be !nancially bene!t from providing migrants with a key contributor to human tra$cking. remittance and communication services with fam- ily back home. Interestingly, some recruiters who organize smuggling and unauthorized employment 2) Pro#les of migrant smugglers opportunities in "ailand do not view smuggling as a crime. One of the 10 Myanmar recruiters oper- a) Socio-economic characteristics ating in "ailand interviewed in 2006 believed his actions, rather than being criminal, were more like a Little research has been conducted on this topic. favour, merely helping family and friends to migrate One exception is a 2006 ILO study by Pearson and and !nd better economic opportunities. "ough he Punpuing (2006) on levels of labour exploitation did not necessarily demand payment for his services, experienced by migrant workers. "is report focuses !nancial pro!t was an incentive for the other recruit- on four low-skilled employment sectors in "ailand: ers interviewed for the study. the !shing sector (both commercial !shing boats and !sh-processing factories), domestic workers, ag- riculture, and manufacturing. "e research included 3) Pro#les of irregular and smuggled migrants interviews with 10 Myanmar recruiters seeking in- sight into the recruitment process. "ese recruiters a) Geographical and socio-economic charac- helped to !nd employment for potential migrants, teristics but were not directly involved in transporting the migrants across the border into "ailand. "ese Most "ai migrants working overseas are regular mi- interviewees had worked in "ailand as migrants grants who have left their home country and entered themselves, and had become recruiters because they their destination country through authorized chan- were familiar with the "ai migrant worker context. nels. "ese people become irregular migrants only "e study leaves it unclear whether these recruiters when they overstay their visas or when they take on were working to smuggle or facilitate the entry of employment not permitted by their visa restrictions migrants into "ailand for pro!t. "e study does (Huguet & Punpuing, 2005). "e only data avail- show, however, that some recruiters o#er additional able on "ai national overseas migrant workers in- services to migrant workers, for example acting as cluding destination, gender, and age relates to those a channel of communication between workers and workers who migrated through regular government their families and providing remittance services for channels. Such data show that most "ai migrant

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workers abroad are men — in 2007, of a total popu- Migration both to and from "ailand is sustained, lation of 161,917 "ai overseas migrant workers, 85 on the one hand, by continuing demand for low- percent were men. "e data also show that most "ai skilled migrant workers from abroad in certain sec- migrants are over the age of 25 years (Sciortino & tors of the "ai economy, and, on the other hand, by Punpuing, 2009). the demand for low-skilled workers in destinations attractive to "ai migrants, including Israel, Qatar, Rural to urban migration is common in the GMS and the UAE in the Middle East, and Hong Kong countries both internally and transnationally, includ- (China), Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan ing to and within "ailand. On the one hand, many Province of China in East Asia (Sciortino & Punpu- migrants in "ailand that come from neighbouring ing, 2009). "e prospect of work that is better paid GMS countries are from rural areas, such locations than are potential jobs at home is a major pull fac- often being less socio-economically advantaged than tor for migration to and from "ailand among both urban centres, and lacking the economic opportuni- regular and irregular migrants. Opportunities to mi- ties and demand for workers that cities can provide. grate for work aboard provide powerful economic Much of the overseas "ai migrant worker popula- incentives, where potential migrants believe they can tion, on the other hand, comes from the poorest and improve the quality of life for themselves and their most disadvantaged areas in "ailand’s North and families in ways that may not be achievable in rural North-east (Sciortino & Punpuing, 2009). villages at home.

Most migrants who arrive in "ailand in search of Arguably, the very existence of smuggling networks work are unskilled or low-skilled and poorly educat- to facilitate irregular migration to "ailand and en- ed, and take on low-skilled jobs (Pearson & Punpu- try into the "ai workforce provides motivation for ing, 2006; Sciortino & Punpuing, 2009). Most male potential migrants (Human Rights Watch, 2010). migrants workers !nd employment in manufactur- Smugglers and recruiters can make the journey for ing, construction, agricultural, and commercial !sh- work easier, cheaper, and faster than it is through of- ing. Female migrants typically work in factories (gar- !cial channels — regular migration routes are often ment and seafood); in the commercial service sector more administratively complicated, more costly, and as caregivers, maids, entertainers, and sex workers; more time consuming. Porous borders with "ai- and as domestic workers (Sciortino & Punpuing, land’s neighbouring GMS countries, corrupt police 2009). and border authorities, and a robust demand for mi- grant workers in "ailand generates good business Both formal and informal migrants arriving in "ai- for smugglers. land from Cambodia and Lao PDR are typically aged 17–35 years (Chantavanich, 2008). "e 2006 ILO "e same factors motivate "ai migrants who leave study by Pearson and Punpuing indicate that 4.8 their country to work abroad. "ese people are often percent of migrant workers in "ailand are younger from poor backgrounds with limited educational at- than 15 years, with 20.7 percent aged 15–17 years. tainments and low skill levels. Yet some low-skilled Most child migrant workers in "ailand, according "ai migrant workers in Taiwan Province of China to this study, work in the !shing and agricultural sec- reportedly earn four times as much as they would in tors. similar employment in "ailand (Sciortino & Pun- puing, 2009). b) Motivation

Factors that in&uence the decision of migrants to 4) Smuggler-migrant relationships move to "ailand include the lack of economic opportunity at home and the desire to escape pov- a) Migrant perceptions of smugglers erty, the allure of "ailand’s perceived economic development, an established community of family "e literature provides only limited information on and friends already working in "ailand, and ease migrant perceptions of smugglers. No speci!c infor- of entry into "ailand because of its porous border mation regarding smuggler-migrant relationships is (Chantavanich, 2008). available, since the literature tends instead to discuss

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the role of informal recruiters and their services. No the migrant-recruiter relationship in the post-re- dedicated discussion of the role of smugglers is avail- cruitment phase, recruiters often do not maintain able, although it can be assumed that informal re- ongoing relations with migrants once they have ar- cruiters do operate as smugglers, to the extent they rived in "ailand. But some recruiters do maintain facilitate the unauthorized entrance and employ- contact with the migrants they recruited by provid- ment of migrants to "ailand for work. ing additional services, including help with send- ing remittances, money lending, and communicat- "e migration services used by informal recruiters ing with family back home (Pearson & Punpuing, are usually cheaper than the formal recruitment pro- 2006). cess for migrant workers. Informal recruiters have a reputation for being more e$cient in terms of time c) Factors in"uencing the relationship between and organization of travel, providing relevant docu- smugglers and migrants ments, and helping with employment opportunities (Chantavanich, 2008). Personal connections to the recruiters through fam- ily or friends exerts a major in&uence on decisions Many migrants use family and social networks to es- among potential clients to migrate from the neigh- tablish contact with recruiters that they know and bouring GMS countries into "ailand by irregular trust. "is is very important for migrants who travel means for the purpose of employment (Chanta- to "ailand from the neighbouring GMS countries. vanich, 2008). Migrant networks are relatively well Some migrants have had family members migrate established, with long-standing irregular migration before them through the same networks, and there- patterns from these other countries into "ailand. fore trust these recruiters to successfully facilitate "us, potential migrants often have personal con- their entry to and employment in "ailand in the nections with a recruiter or with others who have same way (Pearson & Punpuing, 2006). used the recruiter and trust his or her services (Pear- son & Punpuing, 2006). b) Nature of migrant-smuggler relationship

"e available research identi!es personal connections 5) Organization of migrant smuggling to the recruiters through trusted social networks of family and friends as the most important consider- a) How is migrant smuggling organized? ation among migrants from Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar when employing a recruiter to trans- According to the 2008 ILO study (Chantavanich, port them to "ailand (Pearson & Punpuing, 2006; 2008), migrant smuggling to "ailand in the re- Chantavanich, 2008; Curran, 2005). "e 2008 ILO gion involves small groups, networks, large groups, study found that social networks play a pivotal role and individuals who facilitate the recruitment and in the decision to migrate for many regular and ir- transport process. Brokers are largely responsible for regular migrants (Chantavanich, 2008). It is impor- facilitating the journey to the "ai border, and some tant for migrants to know and have con!dence in escort the migrants to their workplace. their recruiters for facilitating their irregular migra- tion, !nding them a good job, assisting with sending b) Are persons involved in migrant smuggling remittances home, and acting as a communications also involved in other criminal activities? channel for sending messages to family and friends back home. Migrants are usually introduced to their "e reviewed research provided no information or recruiters through social networks and contact them discussion on this topic with relation to "ailand. directly (Pearson & Punpuing, 2006; Chantavanich, 2008). c) What levels of professionalism/specializa- tion is there within migrant smugglers? "e relationship between migrants and their infor- mal recruiters may or may not continue once the No discussion of the history of involvement in other migrant has arrived at the place of employment. crime among migrant smugglers was found in the According to the 2006 ILO study, which examines literature.

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d) What levels of professionalism/specializa- employment in "ailand for migrants, and can sig- tion is there within migrant smugglers? ni!cantly in&uence the decision to migrate. Many recruiters have worked or currently work irregularly "e available literature makes no clear distinction in "ailand, and are thoroughly familiar with the between smugglers and informal recruiters, with re- irregular migration and employment process, an spect to migrant workers from Cambodia and Lao asset which they use to promote their recruitment PDR entering "ailand, though it may be suggested services. "e connection of potential migrants to that informal recruiters e#ectively operate as smug- other family members or friends who successfully glers. But irregular entry into "ailand does not re- migrated irregularly to live and work in "ailand quire sophisticated measures, and the reviewed lit- also in&uences the evolution of such informal re- erature does not provide grounds to conclude that cruitment operations. Trust and word-of-mouth migrant smugglers operate networks with a high promotion of recruiters among migrant networks degree of planning, specialization, and division of helps to sustain the recruiters’ businesses — con- labour. Informal recruiters do, however, also o#er !dence in recruiters’ success clearly increases de- additional services including facilitating remittances mand for their services. and communications to family back home (Pearson & Punpuing, 2006; Chantavanich, 2008). Yet another in&uential factor in the organization of migrant smuggling to "ailand is perceived short- e) What in"uences shape the way migrant comings in migrant labour policies (see also Section smugglers are organized? How and why do 9, below). "e literature indicates that o$cial migra- these organizations evolve? tion policies often impose expensive, ine$cient, and time-consuming restrictions on migrants, and often "e literature under review provides no direct in- restrict the migrant worker to one employer. Smug- formation on this topic. Discussion within the lit- glers and informal recruiters help to bypass such erature on push-pull factors for migration, however, constraints, and the organization of migrant smug- can o#er insights into the organizational evolution gling networks, arguably, is thus shaped by o$cial of migrant smuggling. As mentioned earlier, the lit- migrant labour policies (Vasuprasat, 2008; Chanta- erature largely refers to informal or irregular migra- vanich, 2008). tion through the services of recruiters or informal recruitment agencies, and does not directly address migrant smuggling networks. According to discus- 6) Migrant smuggling modus operandi sion in the literature of push-pull factors for migra- tion, the greatest in&uences on the evolution of ir- a) Recruitment methods regular migration are (1) the demand for low-skilled migrant workers in "ailand, on the one hand, and According to the literature, informal recruitment in destination countries for "ai migrants on the channels are attractive to many potential migrants other, coupled with (2) the migrants’ hope for bet- because they are cheaper and less time consuming ter economic opportunities working abroad. Mean- than formal migration processes. Informal recruiters while, the ine$ciency and expense associated with approach potential migrants, who are usually fam- formal recruitment agencies has caused migrants to ily or friends of those they have assisted to migrate turn in preference to informal recruiters or recruit- to "ailand already (Sciortino & Punpuing, 2009). ment agencies. At the same time, some foreign em- Alternatively, if they are trusted, recruiters may be ployers have turned to employing irregular migrants approached by potential migrants to facilitate their because the formal recruitment process has failed to journey to and employment in "ailand. "ai em- satisfy demand with regular migrants (Vasuprasat, ployers may also pay for recruiters to facilitate the 2008; Phetsiriseng, 2007). irregular migration of workers from Cambodia and Lao PDR and to escort the migrants to their work- Another theme that emerged from the literature place (Pearson & Punpuing, 2006). "e fees paid (Chantavanich, 2008; Pearson & Punpuing, 2006) by the employer for the migrants are then deducted is the importance of family and social networks. incrementally from migrant wages each month, usu- "ese networks organize or facilitate entry to and ally at a high rate of interest.

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b) Payment methods migrants to the border in small groups. Some assist with the border crossing and then take the migrants "e literature provides little discussion of how mi- to their place of employment in "ailand (Chanta- grants pay their smugglers or recruiters. "e 2008 vanich, 2008). Some migrants living in Myanmar ILO report (Chantavanich, 2008) concluded, on the border towns simply cross over the border on foot basis of interviews with 160 irregular Cambodian to work in "ailand each day (Arnold, 2005; Sci- and Lao migrants, that most informal migrants make ortino & Punpuing, 2009). Some irregular Lao mi- a one-time service payment to their recruiters to fa- grants in "ailand cross into the country using so- cilitate their travel and entry into "ailand. Other called border passes. "ese documents are issued for migrants using the services of informal recruiters in- a maximum stay of three days in "ailand, and with cur a debt to their recruiters to facilitate their migra- the further restriction that the pass holder may only tion to and employment in "ailand. Money can be stay within the "ai province that they entered at loaned to potential migrants by family, friends, or the border crossing. Many Lao migrants who enter the recruiters themselves. "ailand with a border pass travel beyond the o$cial geographical limits, and/or overstay the time limit In other cases, the "ai employer pays a recruitment allowed by the pass (Phetsiriseng, 2003). agent (Chantavanich, 2008). "e costs are then de- ducted from migrants’ salaries after they begin work. According to Sciortino and Punpuing (2009), some In such cases, the migrant may be e#ectively held in migrant workers from Myanmar who travel through debt bondage to his or her employer, making him "ailand and Malaysia to eventually reach Singapore or her vulnerable to exploitation. "is can also be by swimming. "is is dangerous and exhausting, and true for people who migrate to "ailand for work drowning is common. Other migrants from Myan- through formal recruitment agencies. If they can- mar travel to Malaysia by boat. Migrants leaving not pay the recruitment fees up front, they become "ailand for work in Japan are generally transported indebted to their employers or recruitment agencies by air or by sea. (Chantavanich, 2008; Vasuprasat, 2008). e) Document use and misuse Most irregular "ai migrants pay a private recruit- ment agency in "ailand in advance, including fees According to the literature, irregular migration be- for travel and entry into their destination country tween "ailand and the neighbouring GMS coun- (Huguet & Punpuing, 2005). However, "ai mi- tries often does not require the use of documents. grants often use the services of recruitment agencies "ailand has such porous borders with neighbour- to enter Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of ing countries, and migration routes are so well es- China with a legitimate visa, which does not give tablished, that irregular migrants from Cambodia, them the right to work in these countries (Chanta- Lao PDR, and Myanmar easily cross into "ailand vanich, 2008). Although the migrants enter these without papers (Sciortino & Punpuing, 2009). countries regularly, they often enter the workforce illegally and/or overstay their visa, thereby becoming A few migrants in "ailand from Cambodia, Lao irregular migrants. PDR, and Myanmar arrive through formal chan- nels with valid travel documents and work visas, but c) Transfer of criminal proceeds then overstay their visas, living and working in "ai- land without authorization (Sciortino & Punpuing, "e literature provides no information or discussion 2009; Huguet & Punpuing, 2005). of how criminal proceeds might be transferred in "ailand. f) Corruption

d) Transportation methods According to the literature reviewed, low level cor- ruption plays an important part in smuggling mi- "e literature reveals little about methods of trans- grants into "ailand (Phetsiriseng, 2007; Pearson & port used for migrant smuggling from neighbour- Punpuing, 2006). Travel to "ailand and entry into ing GMS countries to "ailand. Transporters take the country at o$cial border checkpoints may re-

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quire irregular migrants to deal, directly or indirect- Most signi!cantly, in an attempt to manage irregu- ly, with corrupt authorities. Recruiters sometimes lar migration to "ailand, in 2004 the "ai Gov- establish personal relationships with the authorities ernment, aiming to regulate the irregular workforce, at border checkpoints, thereby easing the passage of allowed all irregular labour migrants and their de- their migrants. "e police can also be involved in pendents already in "ailand to register for free one- the placement process of irregular migrants, receiv- year work permits. In the event, close to 1.3 million ing payments for transporting migrants and assist- irregular migrants from Cambodia, Lao PDR, and ing with !nding jobs. According to the 2006 ILO Myanmar registered. Over the years until 2008, how- report (Pearson & Punpuing, 2006), 34 out of the ever, the number of registered migrants decreased to 376 Cambodian and Lao migrants surveyed said that only 500,000. Reports indicate that labour migra- they had paid a police o$cer to facilitate their em- tion to "ailand, on the other hand, increased over ployment in "ailand. the same period, leading to the conclusion that more migrants were choosing to enter "ailand by irregu- g) Evolution of migrant smuggling methods lar means, outside of the formal registration process in response to changes in migration policies (Mon, 2010; Sciortino & Punpuing, 2009). and counter measures

According to Vasuprasat (2008), "ai migrant la- 7) Migrant smuggling fees and mobilization of bour policies have contributed to the large number fees of irregular migrants arriving in "ailand to engage in low-skilled work. Given the demand for such Migrant smuggling fees can vary according to the labour in many sectors of the "ai workforce, a speci!c irregular migration journey from place of or- signi!cant proportion of the "ai economy is sup- igin to destination. According to the literature, irreg- ported by irregular migrant labour, and the Gov- ular migrants travelling from rural Lao villages into ernment has entered into bilateral agreements de- "ailand, for example, pay a one-time THB 2,500 signed to help meet domestic labour demand. "ai to THB 3,000 (USD 80 to USD 96) service fee to migration management policies are embodied in their recruiter for recruitment and transport across bilateral MOUs on the Cooperation of Employ- the border (Chantavanich, 2008). Another reported ment of Workers between "ailand and Cambodia, estimate was USD 60 to USD 85 (Martin, 2009). Lao PDR, and Myanmar (2003).30 "e MOUs are Smuggling costs from Myanmar to Bangkok, "ai- the primary legal framework for regulating formal land, have been calculated at between THB 10,000 labour migration to "ailand from Cambodia, Lao and THB 15,000 or USD 320 and USD 480 (Mon, PDR, and Myanmar. "e reviewed research litera- 2010). Full upfront payment to recruiters means ture indicates that the MOUs have failed to dis- that migrants do not incur any debt for their trans- courage irregular migration to "ailand. In fact, port and recruitment unless they have borrowed the they may have contributed to the continuation of smuggling fee from friends, family, or the recruiters irregular migration to "ailand and to the reduced themselves (Chantavanich, 2008). number of Lao and Cambodian migrants willing to register through formal channels. According to Alternatively, recruiters may collect money from Martin (2009), the migration process set out under "ai employers who use their services to recruit ir- the MOUs is time consuming, costly, and tedious regular migrants in Cambodia and Lao PDR for for the potential migrant, thus making the option their workplaces. Once the migrants arrive for work of employing the services of a smuggler or recruiter in "ailand, their recruitment costs are deducted more attractive. For example, the formal govern- from their salaries. In other cases, recruiters are paid ment migration fee is 4–5 months’ wages for many by "ai employers per migrant worker recruited, col- potential migrants, whereas smuggling fees typically lecting between USD 5 and USD 12.50 per migrant amount to about 1 month’s earnings. worker. Additional costs to the migrants may be add- ed to their recruitment fee. Once recruited, migrants will likely need to pay for transport to and entry into 30 "e terms of the Cambodian and Lao PDR MOUs were not imple- mented until 2006, while the MOU with Myanmar still had not been "ailand, as well as for any additional costs associ- implemented at the time the report under review was prepared. ated with the facilitation of employment, homeward

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remittances, and communication with friends and 9) Factors fuelling irregular migration and mi- family back home (Pearson & Punpuing, 2006). grant smuggling

"e reviewed literature reveals a number of push-pull 8) Human and social costs of migrant smuggling factors that contribute to irregular migration to and from "ailand. Perhaps the most powerful pull fac- "e reviewed literature suggests a number of factors tor is that of demand for low-skilled migrant work- that lead to signi!cant human and social costs of mi- ers in low-skilled sectors of the "ai economy and grant smuggling. in low-skilled sectors in East Asia and the Middle East. "is is complemented by an equally powerful Smuggling journeys can be particularly dangerous. push factor — the many "ai migrants in search of For example, 54 Myanmar migrants su#ocated in the economic opportunity in such attractive destination back of a truck while travelling to job sites in "ai- countries (Sciortino & Punpuing, 2009). land (Gjerdingen, 2009). Some Myanmar migrants put their lives at risk by swimming from Malaysia "e supply of "ai workers prepared to work in "ai- to Singapore (Sciortino & Punpuing, 2009). In ad- land in low-skilled, 3-D sectors (dangerous, dirty, dition, the reviewed research suggests that "ai mi- and di$cult) is limited. "is has lead to substantial grants may end up in debt, either to the recruiter or labour shortages in many sectors, and "ai employ- to employers who may have provided for travel and ers in these sectors thus tend to view both regular recruitment costs (Sciortino & Punpuing, 2009). and irregular migrant labour as the only guarantee of su$cient workforce numbers. Indeed, industries Because of their irregular status, migrants are highly such as !shing, agriculture, manufacturing, seafood vulnerable to exploitation and abuse in their "ai processing, and domestic work have become depen- workplaces. Irregular migrant workers in low-skilled dent on irregular migrant workers (Chantavanich, jobs — e.g. those employed in !sh-processing facto- 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2010). ries and other manufacturing sectors; in agriculture; on commercial !shing boats; and as domestic work- "e ready supply of migrant workers willing to come ers or commercial sex workers — often su#er long to "ailand is fuelled by issues such as poverty and hours of work, underpayment, delays in payment, lack of economic opportunity in homelands and no payment at all, wage deductions to service debts villages, particularly among those migrants who to their employer, work in dangerous and hazardous live in poor rural locations (Chantavanich, 2008,). conditions and, in extreme cases, physical, sexual, or "ailand is alluring because of its economic oppor- emotional abuse at the hands of employers (Pearson tunities. "e "ai media and word of mouth from & Punpuing, 2006). "ai workers in Taiwan Province friends and family who have enjoyed a positive ex- of China, on the other hand, have reported similar perience of migration to "ailand reinforce this per- workplace situations (Sciortino & Punpuing, 2009). ception of the country among potential migrants in neighbouring GMS countries (Phetsiriseng, 2007; Irregular migrant workers are also vulnerable to a Chantavanich, 2008). number of health risks, including sexually transmit- ted diseases such as HIV/AIDS. "is is particularly "e literature also points to shortcomings in for- likely for those who work in the commercial sex mal migration channels to "ailand. As we have industry. "ose who contract HIV/AIDs are often seen above, bilateral MOUs with Cambodia, Lao stigmatized, furthermore, and this can a#ect their PDR, and Myanmar have helped to shape relative- livelihoods and social interactions both abroad and ly costly and ine$cient recruitment channels. As a at home (Huguet & Punpuing, 2005). Other work- result, many migrants wanting to work in "ailand place hazards endured by irregular and regular mi- prefer irregular migration because it is often sim- grant workers in "ailand include inadequate safety pler, faster, and cheaper. "ere is greater demand measures in the workplace, dangerous and faulty for formally recruited regular migrant workers in equipment, and exhaustion from overwork, sleep de- "ailand from Cambodia and Lao PDR than the privation, and malnutrition (Huguet & Punpuing, Lao and Cambodian government ministries can 2005; Leiter et al., 2006; Mon, 2010). supply through o$cial channels. "is also contrib-

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utes to the sustainability of the relatively more e$- former irregular migrant workers, and are familiar cient irregular migration organized by informal re- at !rst hand with the geographical and employ- cruiters and recruitment agencies (Chantavanich, ment context in "ailand. Demand for low-skilled 2008). migrant workers that cannot be met by formal re- cruitment channels arguably works to fuel irregular migration. Where demand for low-skilled workers 10) Conclusions cannot be met by formal recruitment agencies, in- formal recruiters will continue to operate to facili- "e literature focuses mainly on irregular migration tate the entry to and employment in "ailand for from Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar to "ai- many irregular migrants. land for the purpose of labour. It discusses irregular migration of "ai citizens — including smuggling b) What we don’t know about migrant smug- of these people to destination countries for the pur- gling in !ailand pose of labour — only to a much lesser extent. It can be assumed that migrant smuggling is a part of the Obvious gaps persist in the literature on migrant irregular migration patterns, but this distinction is smuggling and the e#ect it has within "ailand. rarely made within the literature. Most of these regard migrant smuggler typologies, the organization of smuggling operations, and their a) What we know about migrant smuggling in modus operandi. "e literature focuses on irregular !ailand versus regular migration channels, presenting many examples of both formal and informal migrant re- Little is known about migrant smuggling to "ai- cruitment agencies without speci!c regard for the land. Some information is available regarding estab- probable involvement of migrant smugglers, in the lished migration routes and border crossings used informal recruitment sector, who o#er transport and by informal recruiters into and out of "ailand. "e facilitation of entry services. literature includes more discussion of irregular mi- grant pro!les, which identi!es a number of common Further empirical research needs to address the fol- characteristics. Irregular migrants are often from lowing areas: poor backgrounds, rural villages with little economic t numbers of smuggled migrants into, from, and opportunity, and are aware of better employment through "ailand; opportunities in "ailand. Social networks are sig- t smuggler pro!les; ni!cant in terms of helping to encourage irregular t migrant-smuggler relationships; migration, connecting potential migrants to recruit- t organization and methods of migrant smugglers; ers and facilitating transport to and employment in t transfer of criminal proceeds derived from smug- "ailand. gling operations; t roles and misuse of documents in smuggling op- Migration to "ailand arrives through both for- erations; and mal and informal channels. Formal, government- t involvement, or history of involvement, of mi- supported recruitment agencies work to ensure au- grant smugglers in other forms of criminality. thorized worker migration to "ailand, providing documents needed for border crossings, transporta- tion, and employment in "ailand. Formal recruit- References ment agencies are severely criticized within the lit- erature for their ine$ciency, high cost, and lengthy Aoyama, K. (2009). !ai migrant sex workers: From recruitment period. According to the reviewed lit- modernization to globalization. New York: Pal- erature, informal recruitment agencies and recruit- grave Macmillan. ers o#er a more e$cient, cheaper, and faster migra- tion service, thus presenting an attractive migration Arnold, D. and Hewison, K. (2005). Exploitation option. In addition, informal recruiters are often in global supply chains: Burmese workers in more trusted because they are usually known to Mae Sot. In: Journal of Contemporary Asia, potential migrants. Some recruiters are themselves 35(3), pp. 319–340.

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Chantavanich, S. (2008). !e Mekong challenge: An Mon, M. (2010). Burmese labour migration into honest broker – Improving cross-border recruit- "ailand: governance of migration and labour ment practices for the bene#t of government rights. Journal of the Asia Paci#c Economy, workers and employers. Bangkok: International 15(1), 33-44. Labour Organization. Pearson, E. and Punpuing, S. (2006). !e Mekong Curran, S. R., Garip, F., Chung, C.Y., and Tangchon- challenge: Underpaid, overworked and over- latip, K. . (2005). Gendered Migrant Social looked: !e realities of young migrant workers Capital: Evidence from "ailand. Social Forc- in !ailand. Bangkok: International Labour es, 84(1), 225-255. Organization.

David, F. (2008). Tra$cking of women for sexual Phetsiriseng, I. (2007). Gender concerns in migra- purposes. In: Research and Public Policy Series tion in Lao PDR: Migration mapping study: A (Vol. 95). Canberra: Australian Institute of review of trends, policy and programme initia- Criminology. tives. Vientiane:United Nations Development Fund for Women, Regional Programme on Em- Gjerdingen, E. (2009). Su#ocation inside a cold powering Women Migrant Workers in Asia. storage truck and other problems with traf- !cking as ‘exploitation’ and smuggling as a Sciortino, R. and Punpuing, S. (2009). International ‘choice’ along the "ai-Burmese border. Ari- migration to !ailand. Bangkok: International zona Journal of International and Comparative Organization for Migration. Law, 26(3), 699-737. United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Huguet, J. W. and Punpuing, S. (2005). Interna- Tra$cking. (2010). !e Mekong region human tional migration in !ailand. Bangkok: Inter- country datasheets on human tra"cking 2010. national Organization for Migration. Bangkok: UNIAP.

Human Rights Watch. (2010). From the tiger to the Vasuprasat, P. (2008). Inter-state cooperation on la- crocodile: Abuse of migrant workers in !ai- bour migration: Lessons learned from MOUs land. New York: Human Rights Watch. between !ailand and neighbouring countries. Bangkok: International Labour Organization. Jones, L., Engstrom, D., Hilliard, P. and Sungakawan, D. (2009). Human tra$cking between "ai- land and Japan: Lessons in recruitment, tran- sit and control. In: International Journal of Social Welfare, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 203–211.

Leiter, K., Suwanvanichkij, V., Tamm, I., Iacopino, V. and Beyrer, C. (2006). Human rights abus- es and vulnerability to HIV/AIDS: "e expe- riences of Burmese women in "ailand. In: Health and Human Rights, 9(2), pp. 88–111.

Martin, P. (2009). Migration in the Asia-Paci!c Re- gion: Trends, factors, impacts: UNDP.

Mon, M. (2005). Burmese migrants in "ailand. [Paper in special issue: A. Kaur and I. Met- calfe (eds.). Migrant Labour in Southeast Asia: Needed, Not Wanted.] In: Review of Indonesian and Malaysian A%airs, 39(2), pp. 129–150.

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:G/D17.(Q,91770I(\,71(&/2

1) Quantitative assessments and $ows of irregular Irregular Vietnamese migrants who arrived in the migration, migrant smuggling, and tra"cking in UK in the late 1990s appear to have been smuggled persons mainly from North Viet Nam. Concerning recent migration, o$cial estimates for 2004–2005 record a) Estimated numbers and major routes: Ir- 800 irregular migrants, whereas other estimates sug- regular migration from, to and through Viet gest up to 20,000 arrivals in the UK. Regarding the Nam arrival of unaccompanied asylum seeking children in the UK, Viet Nam took the second place with "e reviewed literature provides only limited insight an average of 10–15 Vietnamese children per month into the estimated size of irregular migration from, claiming asylum throughout 2004 and 2005. to, and through Viet Nam, and major routes used. Some information is available about the size of ir- During their research, Silverstone and Savage (2010) regular migration to the UK, the EU and to a lesser obtained estimates that there are approximately extent, the Republic of Korea. 100,000 irregular Vietnamese migrants in other Eu- ropean countries. "ese Vietnamese communities Silverstone and Savage (2010) provide information are mostly based in the Czech Republic and Slova- about the various waves of regular and irregular mi- kia, Germany and Poland. According to Nozina, gration from Viet Nam to the UK. "ey note that estimates place the present number of Vietnamese at the end of the US - Viet Nam War, the !rst waves residents with irregular status in the Czech Republic of approximately 16,000 Vietnamese refugees came between 10,000 and 25,000 (Nozina, 2010). to the UK, as part of a planned resettlement pro- gramme from South Viet Nam. Most of the refugees According to o$cial statistics, a total number of settled in London and in the south-east of England, 10,608 irregular Vietnamese migrant workers were but signi!cant numbers also moved to north-western in the Republic of Korea. "is corresponds to 4.1 cities in the UK such as Birmingham, Liverpool, and percent of all foreign irregular migrant workers in Manchester. "is was followed by smaller migrations the country for that period of time (Kim, 2004). to the UK in the 1980s and early 1990s. Around 50,000 Vietnamese citizens are estimated to be le- b) Estimated numbers and major routes: Mi- gally residing in the UK at present, of which 35,000 grant smuggling from, to and through Viet are based in London. However, irregular migrants, Nam who arrived during the late 1980s and early 1990s as part of a ‘third wave’, have signi!cantly augmented "e reviewed literature provides very little information this total number of Vietnamese migrants. about the estimated size of migrant smuggling from, to, and through Viet Nam and the major routes used. According to Silverstone and Savage (2010), Viet- namese migrants entered the UK through the former Research conducted by Silverstone and Savage Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. (2010) indicates that the smuggling route from Viet

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Nam to the UK could include several transit coun- t Viet Nam to beyond the Mekong Subregion (for tries: from Viet Nam to China, Russia, the Czech forced marriage, sex work and forced labour); Republic, Germany, France and, !nally, the UK. Other destination countries include Malaysia, Tai- Nozina (2010) found that migrants smuggled to the wan Province of China, the Republic of Korea, Ja- Czech Republic most frequently travel to Russia by pan, "ailand, Indonesia, and countries in Western plane, from where they are transported by trucks Europe and the Middle East (UNIAP, 2010; U.S. across Ukraine to Slovakia and !nally to the Czech Department of State, 2010). Republic. "e primary source country for tra$cking in per- According to datasets of the German Federal Police sons into Viet Nam is Cambodia, speci!cally for the (Neske, 2006, 2007; Neske et al., 2004) a total of purpose of begging in Ho Chi Minh City as well as 94 Vietnamese smuggled migrants were recorded in other urban areas (Tucker, 2009; UNIAP, 2010). 2005, corresponding to 42.5 percent of all recorded irregular Vietnamese migrants in Germany for that For the period of 2004 to 2009, Viet Nam’s Min- period. "ese datasets indicate decreasing numbers of istry of Public Security (MPS) recorded a total of smuggled Vietnamese migrants in Germany: in 2001, 2,935 Vietnamese victims of (domestic) tra$cking there were 388 smuggled migrants from Viet Nam re- (UNIAP, 2010). corded, whereas these numbers had dropped to 356 in 2002, 247 in 2003, and 151 in 2004. Furthermore, Several reports (RTWG, 2008; Tucker et al., 2010; since the Czech Republic joined the Schengen secu- Sandy, 2006) cite a calculation by Steinfatt (2003) rity system, smuggling activities have moved from the according to which up to 4,000 commercial sex German-Czech border to the external borders of the workers from Viet Nam could be considered as EU in Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary (Nozina, 2010). having been tra$cked to Cambodia in 2002– 2003. Besides that, the reviewed literature does not c) Estimated numbers and major routes: Traf- provide quantitative estimates available about the #cking in persons from, within, to and number of Vietnamese victims tra$cked interna- through Viet Nam tionally.

"e reviewed literature provides some information about d) Cross-over or overlap, if any, between popu- the estimated size of tra$cking in persons from, within, lations or routes to, and through Viet Nam and major routes used. "e literature does not speci!cally address this ques- Viet Nam is primarily a source and to a lesser extent tion, and no de!nitive conclusions can be drawn a destination country for men, women and children, from it regarding crossovers and overlaps between tra$cked for forced prostitution and labour exploita- populations and routes from Viet Nam to other tion (U.S. Department of State, 2010; UNIAP, 2010). countries. Tr a $cking in Viet Nam occurs both domestically and internationally. Domestic tra$cking, speci!cally in women and girls, is mainly directed from poor rural 2) Pro#les of migrant smugglers areas to developed urban areas (UNIAP, 2010). a) Socio-economic characteristics Tucker, Kammel, Lehman & Ward (2010) identi!ed four main routes for international cross border traf- "e literature at hand provides no information on the !cking leading out of Viet Nam: socio-economic characteristics of migrant smugglers. t Viet Nam to China (for forced marriage, forced labour, sex work and boys for adoption); b) Motivation t Viet Nam to Cambodia (as part of the sex trade and for begging); Generally, no information on the motivation of t Viet Nam to Lao PDR and "ailand (for sex Vietnamese migrant smugglers is provided by re- work); and viewed literature.

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Silverstone and Savage (2010), however, suggest that well to do families, which through their contacts Vietnamese citizens in the UK who are active in il- and in&uence are able to facilitate the journey into licit enterprises such as the smuggling of migrants (as the UK. well as cannabis cultivation and money laundering), are mainly motivated by monetary gain. Vijeyarasa, (2010) points out that various studies document parental-decision making in Viet Nam as a driving force for the internal and international 3) Pro#les of irregular migrants and smuggled migration of young women in Viet Nam, and argues migrants that speci!cally young women in Viet Nam are per- ceived as an additional source for generating remit- a) Geographical and socio-economic charac- tances. teristics Literature in general concludes that irregular mi- "e literature on the geographic and socio-economic grants from Viet Nam originate from underdevel- characteristics of irregular and smuggled migrants oped rural areas and thus may be considered pre- from Viet Nam is fairly limited. In the speci!c con- dominantly economic migrants (U.S. Department text of irregular migration from Viet Nam to the UK, of State, 2010; Tucker et al., 2010; Nozina, 2010; research conducted by Silverstone and Savage (2010) Krebs & Pechova, 2008; Asia Foundation, 2008). indicates that by far the most irregular migrants that arrived in the UK recently (‘new arrivals’) came from North Viet Nam. Most irregular migrants in this 4) Smuggler-migrant relationships study originated from the provinces of Hai Phong and its neighbouring province of Qunag Ninh. a) Migrant perceptions of smugglers

"e literature in general concludes that irregular mi- "e reviewed literature provides no information on grants from Viet Nam originate from poorer rural the perception of migrant smugglers by migrants. areas (U.S. Department of State, 2010; Tucker et al., 2010; Nozina, 2010; Arnold, 2005). b) Nature of migrant-smuggler relationship

b) Motivation Silverstone and Savage (2010) is the only source identi!ed that examines the nature of the relation- "e research of Silverstone and Savage (2010) pro- ship between smugglers and migrants. According to vides some insights into the motivations of irregular their research, the relationship can be characterized migrants from Viet Nam to the UK; they note that as a business relationship. Based on research carried senior law enforcement in Hai Phong province (a out in Viet Nam, they argue that smugglers aggres- migrant sending region) describe the people of this sively and proactively seek new clients who are in- province as outward looking and resilient. "e lucra- terested in travelling to the UK, rather than simply tive nature of the cannabis business, both in the UK waiting to be approached. "e authors note that and Canada, is well known to the people within that trust and informal ‘contracts’ characterize Vietnam- province. "is has particularly been the case since ese migrant smuggling operations and payment of several migrants returned after managing to accumu- smuggling fees. Little evidence was found that vio- late great wealth abroad. lence is used in enforcing these contracts and both sides (smuggler and migrants) appear to honour Based on interviews with irregular Vietnamese mi- their agreements. grants (N=24), Silverstone and Savage (2010) also found that the predominant motives for Vietnamese c) Factors in"uencing the relationship between minors seeking migration to the UK were to !nd smugglers and migrants work, to gain an English education, or to become pro!cient in the English language (or a combina- "e literature at hand provides no information on tion of the three). Furthermore they suggest that factors that in&uence the nature of the relationship these minors come from well connected and rather between smugglers and migrants.

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5) Organization of migrant smuggling farmers in the UK are almost exclusively irregular mi- grants the connection remains unclear, as it is also as- a) How is migrant smuggling organized? sumed that the networks of smugglers who facilitate irregular migration are not the same people who culti- "e information in the literature about the organi- vate cannabis. Research rather indicates that Vietnam- zation of migrant smuggling is fairly limited. Sil- ese smuggling networks operate autonomously and verstone and Savage (2010) found that Vietnamese have most of their members outside the UK. migrant smuggling operations involve networks of ‘agents’ in Viet Nam as well as transit countries c) Does migrant smuggling attract persons (depending on the smuggling route). "ese agents who have a history of involvement in other facilitate the smuggling operation mainly through crime? Vietnamese channels (e.g. transport is provided by Vietnamese drivers, migrants are accommodated in No information is provided on whether or not peo- Vietnamese safe houses, etc.). Furthermore, Silver- ple who are involved as migrant smugglers have a stone and Savage observed that Vietnamese migrants history of involvement in other crimes. tend to travel in homogenous groups, rather than mixing with migrants of other nationalities. How- d) What level of professionalism / specializa- ever, in the case of smuggling to the UK, research tion is there within migrant smugglers? indicated that the transportation process in the !nal leg of the journey (from France to the UK) involved "e literature does not provide any details on the non-Vietnamese facilitators. level of professionalism or specialization within mi- grant smugglers. According to Nozina (2010), migrants from Viet Nam who are smuggled into the Czech Republic e) What in"uences shape the way migrant generally travel via Moscow, from where they are smugglers are organized? How and why do brought to a &at (a so-called ‘waterhole’). Once there, these organizations evolve? migrants are usually locked up and isolated, and wait for the next step, which is initiated as soon as a suf- "e literature does not provide any information !cient number of migrants have been collected by about what in&uences or shapes the way migrant the smugglers. At this point of time, the migrants are smugglers are organized. divided into smaller groups and then transferred by car (or other means) to the next destination en route. 6) Migrant smuggling modus operandi Nozina (2010) found that Vietnamese criminal groups with connections to Czech criminal organiza- a) Recruitment methods tions arrange for transport of smuggled migrants of Chinese smuggling networks exclusively across the "e literature provides very limited information Czech Republic. about the methods of recruitment used by migrant smugglers. Research conducted in Viet Nam about b) Are persons involved in migrant smuggling smuggling to the UK observed that smugglers ag- also involved in other criminal activities? gressively and proactively seek new clients who are interested in travelling to this country (Silverstone According to Silverstone and Savage (2010), Viet- & Savage, 2010). Smugglers target people who are namese smuggling networks o#er end-to-end service looking for work and extol the bene!ts of moving from Viet Nam to the UK, which usually includes a and working in the UK, by exaggerating the wages promise of employment or education in the destina- earned and quality of life. tion country. Migrants are o#ered work in the illicit cannabis cultivation industry. It is assumed that many b) Payment methods migrants know about the option of working in canna- bis cultivation in the UK when they choose to utilize According to Silverstone and Savage (2010), pay- the services of migrant smugglers. Whereas, cannabis ment for smuggling operations is made in various

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ways. Sometimes, payment is made in Viet Nam pri- g) Evolution of migrant smuggling methods or to the journey and in other cases payment is made in response to changes in migration policies on delivery to the destination country. In the case of and counter measures smuggling into the UK, payment is generally made over time (up to one year). Furthermore, Silverstone No information exists on the evolution of migrant and Savage found that family members of smuggled smuggling methods in response to changes in migra- migrants based in Viet Nam or the destination coun- tion policies and counter measures. try often make the payment or part of the payment for the smuggling operation. "e better the family is known to the smugglers, the longer the migration 7) Migrant smuggling fees and mobilization of debt repayment period will be. fees

c) Transfer of criminal proceeds Research in the UK by Silverstone and Savage (2010) found that some Vietnamese migrants were smug- "e literature at hand provides no information on gled into the UK via a number of transit countries the methods of transferring criminal proceeds. and were charged considerable smuggling fees be- tween GBP 12,000 and GBP 15,000 (USD 19,700 d) Transportation methods and USD 24,600). Additional costs of up to GBP 3,000 (USD 4,900) could be charged for fraudulent "e literature provides very little information about travel documents, such as identity cards and pass- methods of transportation used in smuggling mi- ports. Furthermore, they found that migrants were grants from Viet Nam. In the case of the Czech Re- o#ered marriage fraud schemes to support residency public, Vietnamese migrants often to &y to Russia, applications for GBP 30,000 (USD 49,300) per from where they are transported by truck (or other marriage. Furthermore, it was observed that smug- means), transiting through Eastern European coun- gling fees &uctuated considerably depending on the tries (Nozina, 2010). demand and the e#ectiveness of the counter-smug- gling operations. e) Document use and misuse

Research in the Czech Republic (Nozina, 2010) 8) Human and social costs of migrant smuggling found that counterfeit documents are frequently used in irregular Vietnamese migration, including "ere is very little information in the available lit- counterfeit visas and altered passports from West- erature about the human and social costs of migrant ern countries (mainly Germany and Belgium). Fur- smuggling from Viet Nam. One of the interviewees thermore, selling of identities is a common practice (N=24) of Silverstone and Savage mentioned having among the members of the Vietnamese community been left behind with ever-growing debt as a result of in the Czech Republic. "us, migrants who decide his journey to the UK. Another migrant mentioned to return to Viet Nam can easily sell their complete life threatening ‘forced marches’ as part of his jour- identity (e.g. passport, visa, business licence) to a re- ney (Silverstone & Savage, 2010). Other than that, cently arrived irregular compatriot, who then him- the literature does not provide further information self can start his own business quickly. on human and social costs directly related to migrant smuggling. Silverstone and Savage (2010) found evidence that adult Vietnamese migrants often successfully pass However, the fate of many regular Vietnamese labour themselves as minors in order to strengthen their migrants in the Czech Republic, highlighted by Krebs case for asylum in the UK. and Pechova (2008), provides insight into the di$- culties that irregular migrants (some of whom appear f) Corruption to have paid intermediaries) may face in the destina- tion countries. According to o$cial statistics, there No details on the role of corruption are provided in are 60,000 Vietnamese living in the Czech Republic the literature at hand. at present. However, up to 20,000 alone arrived be-

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tween 2006 and 2008, attracted by the urgent need Vietnamese migrant smugglers operating in European of labour in Czech industries. "e migrants arrived countries, speci!cally in the UK and the Czech Repub- on work and business visas arranged by o$cially reg- lic, may be part of or at least connected to organized istered and uno$cial intermediary agencies in Viet crime networks within the Vietnamese communities. Nam, which cooperate with agencies in the Czech Re- In the case of the UK, there appears to be a connection public. Many of the migrant workers, who came from to the illicit cannabis industry. Migrants in Viet Nam rather poor areas, paid these intermediary agencies are aggressively recruited through job o#ers in the des- between USD 6,500 and USD 14,000 for the travel. tination countries, which include illicit activities. In the course of the global economic crisis however, masses of Vietnamese labour migrants were laid o# In the case of the UK, the relationship between smug- and thus, lost their visas. As returning home with glers and migrants seems to be of a business nature, huge debt was an unthinkable alternative for many, respected by both sides and without use of force. they stayed in the country and subsequently became irregular migrants. According to the study, irregular Migrants seem to be generally transported to Europe migrants in the Czech Republic live in constant fear via transit through Russia. Smuggling fees can be of not being able to pay o# debt, of ill-health due to high and result in heavy indebtedness. Family and lack of health insurance, and of immigration authori- friends of the migrant seem to help with repayment, ties. In some cases, this situation even lead to suicide. which, in the case of the UK, is done through instal- ments over a period of time.

9) Factors fuelling irregular migration and mi- Migrant smuggling and other forms of irregular mi- grant smuggling gration appear to be facilitated by the surplus of la- bour in Viet Nam and poverty in general. According to the literature reviewed, poverty, speci!- cally in rural areas and the surplus of labour in Viet b) What we don’t know about migrant smug- Nam may be considered as one of the driving factors gling in Viet Nam for irregular migration and migrant smuggling in Viet Nam (U.S. Department of State, 2010; Tucker "ere is a clear need for further research regarding et al., 2010; Nozina, 2010; Krebs & Pechova, 2008; migrant smuggling in Viet Nam. "is lack of infor- Asia Foundation, 2008). mation concerns all aspects of the phenomenon in- cluding irregular migration and tra$cking &ows. No Parental-decision making in Viet Nam may also fuel general conclusions on Vietnamese migrant smug- the internal and international migration of young gling can be drawn from reviewed empirical studies, women in Viet Nam. It is argued that speci!cally as the little information available is mainly limited to young women in Viet Nam are perceived as an addi- smuggling into to the UK and the Czech Republic. tional source for generating remittances (Vijeyarasa, "e gaps in knowledge speci!cally concern: 2010). t the pro!les of smugglers; t the pro!les of smuggled migrants; t migrant-smuggler relationships; 10) Conclusions t the organization of migrant smuggling; t the modus operandi of migrant smuggling; a) What we know about migrant smuggling in t the fees paid to smugglers and their mobiliza- Viet Nam tion; and t the factors that contribute to irregular migration Empirical studies on migrant smuggling in Viet and smuggling. Nam are scarce. In addition, studies that do high- light some aspects of the phenomenon do so merely within the context of Vietnamese organized crime in References destination countries, such as the UK and the Czech Republic. As a result, no general conclusions can be Arnold, D. and Hewison, K. (2005). Exploitation drawn from literature at hand. in global supply chains: Burmese workers in

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Mae Sot. In: Journal of Contemporary Asia, United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human 35(3), pp. 319–340. Tra$cking. (2010). !e Mekong region human country datasheets on human tra"cking 2010. Asia Foundation. (2008). Combating human tra$ck- Bangkok: UNIAP ing in Vietnam: lessons learned and practical ex- periences for future program design and imple- Vijeyarasa, R. (2010). "e state, the family and lan- mentation 2002-2008. Hanoi: Asia Foundation. guage of ‘social evils’: Re-stigmatising victims of tra$cking in Vietnam. In: Culture, Health Kim, W. B. (2004). Migration of foreign workers and Sexuality, 12(SUPPL. 1), pp. 89–102. into the Republic of Korea: From periphery to semi-periphery in the global labor market. In: Asian Survey, 44(2), pp. 316–335.

Neske, M. (2006). Human smuggling to and through Germany. In: International Migra- tion, 44(4), pp. 121–163.

Neske, M. (2007). Menschenschmuggel. Deutschland als Transit- und Zielland irregulärer Migration. Stuttgart: Lucius and Lucius.

Neske, M., Heckmann, F. and Rühl, S. (2004). Men- schenschmuggel. Bamberg: European Forum for Migration Studies.

Nozina, M. (2010). Crime networks in Vietnam- ese diasporas: "e Czech Republic case. In: Crime, Law and Social Change, 53(3), pp. 229–258.

Regional "ematic Working Group on International Migration Including Human Tra$cking. (2008). Situation report on international mi- gration in East and South-East Asia. Bangkok: International Organization for Migration.

Silverstone, D. and Savage, S. (2010). Farmers, facto- ries and funds: Organised crime and illicit drugs cultivation within the British Vietnamese com- munity. In: Global Crime, 11(1), pp. 16–33.

Tucker, C., Kammel, K., Lehman, H., & Ward, E. (2010). An Analysis of Human Tra$cking for Sexual Exploitation in Vietnam and a Com- prehensive Approach to Combating the Prob- lem. University of California Davis Journal of International Law and Policy, 16(2).

United States Department of State. (2010). Tra"ck- ing in persons report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State.

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31 Creswell, J.W. (2009). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches (3rd ed.). "ousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

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