Success Stories from Northern Mali

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Success Stories from Northern Mali Facilitating the implementation of a national agreement through local mediation Successful examples of how mediation works to restore security in Northern Mali © EPA-EFE/Nicolas Remene EPA-EFE/Nicolas © In 2015, the Malian Government signed the management framework to better address Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation with the security challenges facing the two re- the two coalitions of armed groups that gions. Despite major clashes between the fought for the independence of Azawad in the State and armed groups having ceased in north of the country, namely the Coordination 2015 and the parties to the agreement having of Azawad Movements (CMA) and the Plat- remained committed to its provisions, an ef- forme. In order to achieve a lasting settlement fective peace remains elusive. The northern to the conflict, the Agreement provides, in regions of the country continued to expe- particular in Article 28, that «local security ad- rience escalating banditry; the peace process visory bodies, comprising representatives of of demobilization, disarmament and reinte- the State, regional and local authorities, and gration of former combatants lost momen- traditional communities and authorities, shall tum; and joint forces, composed of former fi- be established and managed by local execu- ghters and Malian soldiers, were unable to tive heads.” Five years on from the signing of restore stability to large cities in the north of the Agreement, these advisory bodies remain the country. to be set up due to discord at the level of the Peace Agreement Monitoring Committee. After several months of HD-led mediation between authorities, armed groups and com- Peace agreements between states and ar- munities, two frameworks for collaborative med opposition groups, modelled after peace security management emerged: one for the treaties between nations, often remain unim- Timbuktu and Taoudéni regions, in 2017, and plemented and consequently fail to bring the other for the neighbouring region of Gao, peace. The effectiveness of national peace in 2020. The goal of these frameworks is to processes can be jeopardized by a lack of support interim authorities, governorates and adherence to the agreement by traditional prefectures in safeguarding community cohe- elites, fighters and their communities; limited sion. In addition to including representatives awareness of the specifics of the agreement; of the interim authorities, governorates and provisions that are sometimes ill-adapted to prefectures in the frameworks, they also bring local realities; and a lack of trust in justice, together leaders of the signatory armed security and governance mechanisms. groups, the Malian armed forces and reli- gious and community leaders. Only sustained efforts to mediate the imple- mentation of national agreements between all These frameworks for collaborative security levels of the signatory parties and the com- management have helped their members find munities concerned can achieve lasting common ground, in turn leading to the crea- peace. Local mediation, in turn, can lead to tion of joint initiatives to provide security along specific implementation agreements that re- major roads and to communities, to improve flect the spirit of the national peace treaty and collaboration between the signatory armed allow for its effective implementation. groups and the Malian State forces, and to support local conflict resolution efforts. The In 2017, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue end-result has been the concrete strengthe- (HD) was asked by the governors and interim ning of communities’ commitment to the na- authorities of the Timbuktu and Taoudéni re- tional peace building process. gions to help establish a concerted security Securing the roads between Preventing conflict between Goundam and Timbuktu sedentary and Arab youths from Timbuktu and Taoudéni By 2015, the heavily travelled road linking Kidnappings, checkpoints, robberies; since Timbuktu and Goundam had become the 2017, the number of security incidents in Tim- scene of constant robberies and attacks by buktu City and its surroundings has grown unknown armed individuals. As a result, the and continues to feed intercommunity free movement of the region’s population and distrust. Sedentary young people accused accompanying economic activity was seve- their Arab and Tuareg counterparts of being rely hindered. After its creation in 2017, the responsible for these incidents due to their framework for collaborative security manage- affiliation with armed groups. As of 2018, the ment in Timbuktu and Taoudéni committed youth of Mali’s sedentary people and the to setting up military patrols along the road, Arab youth began to challenge each other via though the necessary support from the mili- radio and social networks, fuelling tensions tary authorities based in Bamako was not between the two communities that culmi- marshalled. In early 2019, following an up- nated in clashes in September 2019. surge in robberies that led young people from Goundam and Timbuktu to demonstrate for In October 2019, the HD-supported Collabo- state intervention, discussions began anew rative Security Management Framework of within the framework on how to respond to Timbuktu and Taoudéni organised a dialogue the people’s demand for improved security. between the young people and the field lea- ders of the signatory armed groups in the two Thus, from March 2019, the CMA patrolled regions, with the goal of building bridges and the Timbuktu - Goundam axis twice daily, for easing tensions. At the close of discussions, the span of a month, before State forces took the parties agreed upon a charter of good over the task and begun offering armed es- conduct for youth of the regions and a fol- corts. These patrols, which extend as far as low-up committee of 11 young people was Niafounké, some 250 km south of Timbuktu charged with its dissemination. For their part, via Tonka, succeeded in putting an end to the armed groups agreed to sensitise young robberies, allowing in turn for economic people from their ranks on inter-community acti-vity to resume. However, stability has re- cohesion and to demand the immediate ces- mained fragile. Malian armed forces withdrew sation of acts of violence. from the cities of Tonka and Diré, near Goundam, in early 2020, resulting in a The recommendations were implemented resur-gence of incidents in these localities quickly by the young members of the armed and an ensuing cessation of all patrols in groups and violence by these groups stop- May 2020. ped. Indeed, perpetrators of security inci- dents that have occurred since the signing of the pact of good conduct did not belong to any of these armed groups. With confidence having been restored between young people of the two communities, members of both groups have been able to resume a peaceful coexistence. Preventing banditry with Securing the city of Timbuktu Operation Alafia In October 2019, the regional Collaborative The vacuum left by the absence of defence Security Management Framework under- and security forces in Timbuktu has encou- took, through the intermediary of the Timbuk- raged the proliferation of bandits, who have tu Interim Authority president and the pre- engaged in car thefts, robberies and targeted sident of the CMA, to advocate with the assassinations in the city. Given this, the Col- leaders of his group to commit to fighting the laborative Security Management Framework banditry plaguing the region. In response, an endeavoured to stabilize the city of Timbuktu operation called Alafia (Peace in Tuareg and by creating multiple forums with Bama- Sonrhaï) was launched by the CMA and re- ko-based representatives and the Malian ar- sulted in operations to secure places fre- med forces. From March to June 2019, this quently affected by security incidents around dialogue allowed for the establishment of Goundam, Niafounké, Timbuktu and Ber. checkpoints by the police and the gendarme- Consequently, the region experienced a rie at strategic points in the city and for the sharp decline in cases of banditry and robbe- deployment of a special army force as a de- ry during several months, with some 20 ar- terrent to bandits. Together, these strategies rests of bandits being recorded. Citing a lack resulted in a decrease in the circulation of of material and financial resources, the CMA weapons in the city, as well as a reduction in was forced to halt this project in April 2020. the number of targeted killings and acts of banditry. Due to an absence of additional re- sources, these measures remain short-term. There are no more kidnappings, no more robberies. We are no longer threatened in our own homes. I hope that peace is within our reach. I very much hope so. A village chief from the commune of Ber, circle and region of Timbuktu HD would like to thank Denmark for its support to its activities in Mali since 2011..
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