TIMBUKTU Final Evaluation report Draft V-5 1/14/2104

( Food Security Program – TFSI/MYAP)

Agreement No. FFP-A-00-08-00069-00

Submission Date: January 17, 2014

Michael Short, Evaluation Coordinator Yacouba Sidibe (Agriculture), Evaluation Consultant (Timbuktu)

1

Executive Summary

This report presents an assessment of the residual beneficial impacts of Africare/’s Timbuktu Food Security Initiative Multi-Year Activity Program (TFSI/MYAP) that was conducted 20 months after the forced evacuation of project staff from the Timbuktu Region and the suspension of all program activities during Implementation Year (IY4) of this five-year program. Due to extraordinary conditions of insecurity at the end of the project period (IY4), a more complete final evaluation that would have included a random survey and targeted interview could not be completed. This report is based on a limited series of individual and group interviews with local Government of Mali (GoM) officials, community-based volunteers, producer organizations, and beneficiary groups in the Naifunké and Cercles in November 2013. The interviews were conducted over a five-day period (November 2-8, 2013) by an independent expert, Mr. Yacouba Sidibe, based on a USAID-approved Terms of Reference (included as Annex 5.1) and using standardized interview formats developed by a three person evaluation team working in collaboration with senior Africare/Mali program staff previously assigned to the TFSI/MYAP program. (Sample interview forms included as Annex 5.6)

The programmatic focus of the five-year TFSI/MYAP was on these three Strategic Objectives (SOs):

SO1 - The capacity of communities to manage risks and cope with shocks resulting from vulnerability will be strengthened - This included TFSI/MYAP activities related to community- based adult literacy programs, developing and training Early Warning System and Emergency Response (CEWS/ERS) and village Food Security Committees, the distribution of FFP-sourced food commodities to vulnerable households (safety net), the recovery of malnourished infants, and to support Food-for-Work (FFW) and Food-for-Training (literacy) activities.

SO2 - Households’ access to food is improved - Another set of project activities focused on increasing and expanding local agricultural, livestock and fisheries production, including the development of Village Irrigated Perimeters (VIPs), introducing advanced production techniques1 and improved varieties of goats and chickens, improving the skills of volunteer lead farmers and Government of Mali (GoM) agricultural agents, developing community food storage facilities, supporting the formation and training of producer groups, and supporting the expansion of village-managed credit/savings funds. SO3 - Improved health and nutrition of vulnerable populations – A third set of activities focused on improving community and household health and nutrition, with particular emphasis on women and children under five. This included support for project-trained Village Nutrition Educators (VNEs) and Traditional Birth Attendants or matrones (TBAs), community-managed monthly infant growth monitoring and reporting, community-based malnutrition rehabilitation through HEARTH sessions and home visits, VNE activities to improve household practices and behaviors through Information, Education and Communication (IEC) sessions related to health,

1 For example, the System for Rice Intensification (SRI), System for Wheat Intensification (SBI) and a fish culture demonstration project.

2 nutrition, and sanitation, and construction and management of key community water supplies (wells). The evaluation concluded that: The community-based organizations established and trained during the TFSI/MYAP are present and active in all villages contacted. The evaluators agreed that their ability to peacefully adapt to the occupation and to overtly collaborate with the occupiers while covertly circumventing many of their restrictions constituted an active and well-organized resistance movement. Despite extraordinary challenges, village producer groups, with varying degrees of success, were able to continue agricultural production. Those groups farming on Village Irrigated Perimeters (VIPs) and having effective producer groups that were able to access key inputs without any outside GoM or NGO assistance were able to better cope with the occupation and the challenges to food security. Recession agriculture, particularly in the important Lake Télé area, was less productive due the occupation’s restriction on groups and travel. The limitations imposed on women by the occupiers had a severe negative affect on the ability of women’s groups to produce vegetables on community gardens and to be active in the economy. Villages that continued to produce on VIPs reported that harvests during the height of the occupation, the 2012/2013 production season, were the highest seen in the previous five years. The ability to produce on VIPs also had a tendency to stabilize the population, in that fewer community members left as IDPs. Although the fish culture demonstration project failed when the pump and fencing were looted, many producer groups expressed an interest in the practice as future activity. Due to time and travel constraints and the continuing movement of IDPs, the evaluation was unable to neither determine the magnitude of the occupation and conflict on pastoral communities in the project nor determine the impact on animal herds. Village small savings/credit groups (caisses) continued to operate in secret during the occupation and their cash assets were a valuable contribution to sustaining food security in some households and in many cases, where the sole source of cash available to the communities. The village Health/Nutrition Volunteers and Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) supported and trained during the TFSI/MYAP were also active during the occupation, but the complete disappearance of the GoM’s health system, including GoM health agents, CSCOMs, and referral centers, and the lack of basic materials and supplies, severely limited their effectiveness. Access to medical services was severely restricted during the occupation period because of a fear of traveling, restrictions on traveling due to a rebel imposed curfew, the lack of public/private vehicle transportation system, and the need to transport severe cases into the larger towns by treatment by Merlin, the Red Cross, or any remaining private providers. The evaluation concluded that the security situation in the Niafunké, Goundam, and Diré Cercles is much improved. The displaced GoM civil servants have returned and the basic structures of

3 governance, security, and basic services are improving. The security conditions in these three Cercles would allow a restart of targeted recovery activities, and are recommended in the short- term to allow communities to cope with the coming “lean” period, to prepare for 2014/2015 growing seasons, to assist returning IDP households integrate back into their communities, and to re-establish support for health/nutrition volunteers and TBAs. The security situation in , however, remains highly uncertain and program operations outside the city of Timbuktu are not recommended without further consideration of what may still be an extreme risk.

1.0 Introduction

1.1. Context

The original goal of the five-year Africare/Mali’s TFSI/MYAP program was to increase food security in 60 targeted communities in the Timbuktu Region of northern Mali by: (a) enhancing community capacity to deal with risk and vulnerability; (b) increasing levels of agricultural and livestock production; (c) increasing household incomes through participation in commercial agricultural activities; and (d) improving the health and nutritional status of targeted households, with a focus on women and children under five. All of the activities included in the project emphasized the direct participation of targeted communities in all activity planning and implementation through village-level community Food Security Committees.

In early-2012, Mali was severely affected by a food security crisis and like many other areas of the zone, experienced below a normal annual harvest in some areas caused by a period extreme drought and conditions of rainfall variability. In March 2012, FEWS NET reported that the total national cereal production was 27% higher than the 2006-2102 average, but that large parts of the Sahel zone, including northern areas of the Kayes, , the Segou Regions, and the inland delta in the Region experienced an agro-pastoral production deficit as high as 50%. In some localized areas, deficit estimates were as high as 80%. 2 Also, in early-2012, an already fragile food security situation devolved into an extraordinarily complex emergency when simultaneously the country faced a rapidly deteriorating security situation in northern Mali and an unprecedented period of political instability in the south. The 2011 collapse Libyan government sparked a sudden influx of Malian expatriates fleeing the Libyan civil war and fueled a resurgent Tuareg independence movement. The fragile peace established by the Algiers Accords quickly disintegrated when in January 2012, a new group, the secular National Movement for the Liberation of (MNLA), began attacking Malian army camps in northern Mali3 and eventually declared most of northern Mali an independent sovereign nation; the Independent State of Azawad (later, on May 26, 2012, as the Islamic Republic of Azawad). The African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African

2 USAID/FEWS NET, Mali: Mise à jour des perspectives de la sécurité alimentaire, March 2012. 3 In January 2012, initial NMLA attacks on Andéramboukane, Menaka, Tessalit,Niafunkrée, Aguelhoc and Léré, and in February 2012, and Tinzawaten.

4

States (ECOWAS), the European Union (EU), and the United States all rejected the independence declaration and actively sought to maintain Mali’s territorial integrity.

Then on March 21, 2012, a military coup d’etat displaced the democratically-elected government and the resulting power vacuum accelerated the occupation of the major northern cities (Kidal, , and Timbuktu) by rebel and extremist religious groups4 beginning in March 2012. Virtually all Malian government agencies and security forces evacuated the occupied areas and during a severe drought, the supply chains for food, medicines, and relief supplies were completely severed. Schools closed, hospitals shut down, vital electricity communication, and water infrastructure failed, food became scarce, and the imposition at gun point of an extremist version of law began. During IY4 (late-March 2012), the Timbuktu Region, including the town of Goundam, which was the site of Africare’s TFSI/MYAP main field office, was occupied by the MNLA “rebels” and later by extremist elements. The subsequent pillaging and destruction of offices, food storage warehouses, markets, banks, government buildings, communications infrastructure, and many private residences forced the evacuation of all humanitarian assistance and development agencies from northern Mali, including most Africare TFSI/MYAP staff and their families in mid-April 2012. This sudden evacuation brought an early end to the Timbuktu Food Security Initiative (TFSI/MYAP) and in IY4, all program related activities in the Timbuktu Region were abruptly suspended due to the rapidly deteriorating security conditions. Regretfully, the evacuation was so hasty that Africare/Mali was unable to inform many of the project’s targeted communities.

By February 2013, according to UN/OCHA, the drought, the collapse of the local economy, rebel/extremist occupation, and later joint French, Malian, ECOWAS, and Chadian military operations (Opération Serval) to “liberate” occupied areas of northern Mali, had displaced more than 400,000 Malian citizens (167,245 refugees and 227,206 IDPs)5, largely ethnic Arabs, Tuaregs, and Peuhl from northern Mali (including rural areas targeted by the TFSI/MYAP program).

In March 2013, after one year of occupation, the French-led Opération Serval drove the bulk of rebel/extremist forces out of the occupied northern cities and soon after, the international community expressed a common commitment to the stability and recovery of Mali. Under enormous diplomatic, political, and economic pressure, the military junta grudgingly ceded control to a transitional national authority and on June 18, 2013, the GOM signed a ceasefire agreement with Tuareg rebels. On July 1, 2013, French, ECOWAS, and Chadian forces were largely replaced by a UN Peacekeeping Force (MINUSMA)6 and presidential election was held in July/August 2013 and legislative elections in November/December 2013.

Although relative political stability is returning to southern Mali, the security situation in the three northern Regions remains somewhat precarious. The MNLA, now blended with many

4 Including: Extremist groups, the Ansar Dine and MUJAO (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West ), a secular Tuareg independence movement called the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA), and elements of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM). 5 UN/OCHA report, Feb 13, 2013. 6 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

5 former Ansar Dine elements, continues to press for greater political autonomy in northern Mali and in Kidal, has continued an active political and civil resistance against the reestablishment of GoM control. One AQIM-linked extremist group in particular, the MUJAO, continues to attack civilian and military targets in northern Mali that has killed several civilians and UN Peacekeepers.

In November 2013, two journalists from Radio France Internationale where kidnapped in Kidal and killed by AQIM elements. In violation of the June 2013 accord, armed MNLA “fighters” were reported to be still openly patrolling Kidal and protesters tried to prevent a scheduled handover of administrative offices and a radio station to the GoM. Later, on November 28, 2013, the MNLA claimed that Malian soldiers had fired on a large group of protesters that prevented the Malian Prime Minister’s aircraft from landing in Kidal. On November 29, 2013, and the Vice President of the MNLA declared the incident an act of war and threatened that "wherever we find the Malian army we will launch the assault against them. It will be automatic. The warnings are over."7

The renewal of the war has yet to materialize (and likely will not with the presence of the UN Peacekeeping and French forces), but recent events are clear indication that the conditions of instability and insecurity are likely to continue in some parts of northern Mali. The slow spontaneous and assisted return of more than 100,000 IDPs and refugees back to northern communes that started in June 2013 continues8, but in November 2013, the Commission Movement de Populations reported that there are still another 250,000 persons still internally displaced (120,700 are from the Kidal, Timbuktu, and Gao Regions) and according to UN/OCHA, another 167,000 Malian refugees resident in , , and .9

The perhaps overly detailed description above of events up to late-2013 is only intended to set the scene for the period of the final evaluation. The final evaluation of the TFSI/MYAP activities in the Timbuktu Region, including the field visit (November 2-10, 2013) by a member of the evaluation team, Yacouba Sidibe, was conducted during this very uncertain period. Before the evaluation, very little information was available about the 60 villages targeted by TFSI/MYAP (IY1-IY4) in the Niafunké, Diré, Goundam, and Timbuktu Communes before the program’s forced shut down in April 2013.

Among Africare field staff and the evaluation team, there was a great deal of uncertainty whether or not travel in some project areas would be dangerous. Africare/Mali senior staff had not been able to visit the area during the period of the occupation nor at any time since the end of Opération Serval. During the week of planning for the evaluation mission, security conditions in the project area were questionable, NGOs had not yet resumed operations, travel by vehicle was greatly restricted, a curfew was in effect, military check points were set up around all northern

7 AFP article, “Tuaregs declare return to war against Mali army”, November 29, 2013. 8 La Commission Movement de Populations, “Rapport sue les Mouvements internes de Population”, November 28, 2103, reported that the number of Malian IDPs decreased from 283,726 persons in October 2013 to 254,822 persons (39,245 households) in November. This is down from the peak of more than 350,000 in June 2013 (22% IDPs are in ). The report also notes an increase in the number of refugees and IDPs returning to several northern communes (Abeibara, Boghasa, Tinzwatene, Adjeloc, Tessalit, and Timtaghene.) 9 UN/OCHA, Mali: Aperçu humanitaire, November 30, 2013, reported 167,927 refugees in Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso, including another umber 254 in Togo and .

6 cities, and there was still a large presence of UN Peacekeeping Forces. Malian government officials had been ordered to return to their posts and most in the project area were present, but it appeared that the “normal” function of government and essential services had really not yet fully restarted. This report is a final evaluation Africare/Mali’s TFSI/MYAP completed 20 months after the forced evacuation of project staff, but may also be one of earliest post-conflict assessments in the project area.

1. 2. Objective of the Evaluation

Africare/Mali conducted baseline and supplemental mid-term survey (sMTE)10 as part of the TFSI/MYAP project, and planned a final quantitative and qualitative study at the start of the fifth implementation year to measure the level of achievement against project indicators. The sMTE was conducted in late-2011 as security conditions began to deteriorate. For the final evaluation in November 2013, completing a detailed and full-scale quantitative assessment was simply not feasible in the Timbuktu Region during the conflict and occupation period (January 2012-June 2013) due to the extraordinary security situation, the severe restrictions on travel and access, dangerous operating conditions, armed occupation by rebel/extremist religious groups, the effective suspension of all GoM administration, and the continuing displacement of tens of thousands rural and urban households in and out of the project areas.

The TFSI/MYAP was implemented in two different areas of the country as two distinctly different program types and two separate final evaluations were required. The 5-year TFSI/MYAP was suspended during in the Timbuktu in April 2012 and was then restarted at the beginning of IY5 (October 2012) in the of western Mali as the reprogrammed TFSI/MYAP Nara Emergency Assistance Program. This report describes an abbreviated final evaluation of the TFSI/MYAP conducted 20 months after the project shutdown in the Timbuktu Region and based on a qualitative assessment of some aspects of the first four years of the TFSI/MYAP. A separate report describes the final year of the TFSI/MYAP in the .

From the outset, the evaluation team assumed that completing a quantitative post-project evaluation to gauge the activity impact would not be possible. It was further assumed that any TFSI/MYAP program benefits in the Timbuktu Region would certainly have been diluted or even erased during the 20-month period when targeted communities experienced military conflict, occupation, retribution, the suppression of social and cultural life, drought-related food insecurity (2011/2012) , a suspension of basic government services, widespread loss of household assets and productive capacity, severe market disruptions, and massive population displacement. The evaluation team did assume, however, that through interviews with local officials11 and any remaining beneficiary community organizations and volunteers could reveal their experience after the forced end of the TFSI/MYAP, during the 1-year occupation, and during this early post-recovery period.

10 Payet, Pascal, Africare/Niger, Supplemental Mid-Term Evaluation Report for the Timbuktu Food Security Initiative Multi-Year Activity Program (MYAP/TFSI), February 2012. 11 The GoM officials interviewed in Goundam and Niafunké were also absent during the occupation period, but their interviews were valuable in describing many aspects of the early-conflict, post-occupation, and early-recovery periods.

7

The primary focus of the evaluation is on the observable results of TFSI/MYAP program efforts to strengthen the resilience of beneficiary groups and communities and their apparent ability to adapt, respond to, and implement community-scale activities in a context influenced by a “double crisis” of the drought- induced food insecurity and the civil and military conflict/occupation period. This includes organizations such as village-level food security committees (CEWS/ERS), producer groups (cooperatives and Federations), credit/savings associations, and individual Volunteer Nutrition Educators (VNEs). This final evaluation also assesses the value and role of these community groups in managing the challenges of the occupation period and their potential future role in accelerating the post-conflict recovery period.

The evaluation attempts to identify and assess the particular elements of the TFSI/MYAP that enhanced the resilience of these community-based organizations and to assess the conditions and circumstances that caused any other community-based organizations to not continue activities “fail”. To that end, the final evaluation focused on the TFSI/MYAP accomplishments of in qualitative terms and its impacts on the food security of the target population by:

- Assessing beneficiary perceptions of TFSI activities during the four year period;

- Assessing the adequacy of project implementation strategies and approaches during the Life of Project (LOA), including their respective performance in relation to the achievement of objectives, community participation, and project ownership by beneficiaries.

- Identifying and analyzing the implementation constraints, lessons learned, and best practices related to organizational capacity building, including those identified by project beneficiaries, partners, staff, and other stakeholders; and

- Recommending the direction and priorities of any future program activities.

This final evaluation was conducted by a multi-disciplinary team comprised of two consultants (one international and one national) and in collaboration with Africare/Mali’s administrative and field staff. Africare’s experience during the first four years with the TFSI/MYAP was assessed using a qualitative approach based on telephone interviews and “in person” interviews with individual project beneficiaries/households, supported village groups, local implementing partners, government administrative and technical agencies, and project staff.

1.3. Brief description of project

In November 2013, Africare/Mali contracted three independent consultants (Michael Short, Doumbia Margara, and Yacouba Sidibe)12 to conduct a final evaluation of Africare/Mali’s Timbuktu Food Security Initiative Multi-Year Activity Program (TFSI/MYAP). The TFSI/MYAP was supported by USAID/DCHA’s Office of Food for Peace (FFP) and was to be implemented from June 2008 to April 201213 in four administrative sub-regions (Cercles) in the Timbuktu

12 Michael Short was the lead evaluation consultant. Yacouba Sidibe is an agricultural engineer and coordinator for the Timbuktu portion of the evaluation. Doumbia Magara is a medical doctor and coordinator of the Nara portion of the final evaluation. 13 Two USAID-approved “no cost” extensions in 2013 have reset the end date of the project to Jan. 31, 2014.

8

Region of the Republic of Mali. The goal of this five-year program was to enhance food security in 60 targeted vulnerable rural communities (40 new14 and 20 earlier GFSI15 targeted villages) through the activities under these three Strategic Objectives (SOs): SO1 - The capacity of communities to manage risks and cope with shocks resulting from vulnerability will be strengthened;

SO2 - Households’ access to food is improved; and

SO3 - Improved health and nutrition of vulnerable populations. The TFSI/MYAP project expanded Africare/Mali’s GFSI (phases I and II) program activities in the Diré and Goundam Cercles into an additional two sub-region; the Timbuktu and Niafunké Cercles. Africare/Mali’s base of operations for the implementation of TFSI/MYAP field activities was in the town of Goundam (81.3 kms southwest of the regional capital city of Timbuktu). The majority of the population in the project area is concentrated in areas along the seasonally-flooded tributaries and lakes of an inland delta filled by an annual flood of the (September to May). Household livelihoods in all four of the largely rural Cercles (see Table 1) are based primarily on floodplain recession farming16 and irrigated agriculture for the production of rice and wheat, vegetable gardening, pastoralism, and fishing. In the past four decades and with increasing frequency, these predominantly rural areas also experience periods of wide-spread, climate change-related food insecurity, but also still have a significant development potential based on expanded irrigated agriculture and pastoralism:

Table 1 - TFSI/MYAP Target Areas in the Timbuktu Region of Mali Total 2009 2009 Number % Cercle Population Cercle of Targeted Rural in Targeted Communes Population targeted Communes Cercle 17 communes , , Diré 5 109,661 81.4% 23,803 , , and , Tonka, , Goundam 6 151,329 99.9% 104,072 M'Bouna, Télé, and Goundam , Banikani-Narhawa, Niafunké 3 175,442 100.0% 78,646 and Timbuktu 1 127,328 57.1% 12,912

14 During in implementation, reduced to 37 new villages. 15 Africare/Mali’s earlier USAID/DCHA/FFP-supported Goundam Food Security Initiative Phase I (FY98 – FY02 and Phase II (FY 02 – FY 07). 16 Floodplain recession farming is practiced widely in the Sahel and the production of crops at the margins of large seasonally flooded low lying areas. In the project area, this includes many of the large seasonal lakes, such as Lake Tele, that are flooded annually by the spate of the Niger River. 17 INSTAT (Institut National de la Statistique), Republique du Mali, 4ème Recensement Gènéral de la Population et de l’Habitat du Mali de 2009 (RGPH 2009), Resultats Definatifs, Tome 1: Serie Demographique, November 2011.

9

All of these activities were implemented in the four targeted Cercles (Niafunké, Diré, Goundam, and Timbuktu) from June 2008 to March 2012 by Africare/Mali field staff based in Goundam working in collaboration with local elected officials, appointed GoM administrative authorities, agents from the GoM technical services, community volunteers and groups, and beneficiary communities. TFSI/MYAP implementation in the Timbuktu Region was terminated when project staff and their families were evacuated in April 2012 following the occupation of the entire project area by armed rebel (MNLA) and religious extremist groups (Ansar Dine and AQIM).

1.4. Evaluation Methodology

As noted earlier, the evaluation team assumed that completing a quantitative post-project evaluation would not be possible and simply not be able capture the real impacts and benefits of the TFSI/MAYP project in any meaningful and measureable way. The evaluation team did assume, however, that through interviews with local officials18 and any remaining beneficiary community organizations and volunteers could reveal their experience after the forced end of the TFSI/MYAP, during the 1-year occupation, and during the early post-recovery period. The current security situation, the lack of communication with beneficiary villages, restrictions on travel, and a need to minimize the risk of operating in the project zone did not allow for deployment of several survey teams. During the first week of the evaluation, the level of uncertainly about circumstances the project’s target zones in the Timbuktu Region was high and there was very little information available about any village groups or the GoM officials. The final evaluation was based on the following steps:

Literature review - The lead consultant completed a review of available literature, including project progress reports, field assessment, ARRs, and GoM reports. The list of literature reviewed is included as Annex 5.4.

Survey Forms - The three-person evaluation team working with Africare/Mali’s senior TFSI/MYAP Program staff developed a set of interview questionnaires based on similar instruments used during the supplemental mid-tern evaluation (sMTE) conducted for TFSI/MYAP in the Timbuktu Region at the end of 2011. Separate interview questionnaires, which are included in Annex 5.6 of this report, were developed for:

- Project Partners (individual interviews): Elected and appointed GoM officials, and GoM Technical Service agents and officials. - Community Groups (group interviews): Food Security Committees, producer groups, and village savings/credit groups - Community Health/Nutrition Volunteers: (Individual interviews) - Producer Groups (group interviews)

18 The GoM officials interviewed in Goundam and Niafunke were also absent during the occupation period, but their interviews were valuable in describing many aspects of the early-conflict, post-occupation, and early-recovery periods.

10

Itinerary Development - A suggested itinerary and travel plan for the field mission was developed for the evaluation coordinator of the Timbuktu portion of the final evaluation, Yacouba Sidibe. The plan called for the evaluation coordinator to conduct interviews (where possible) in the Niafunké, Goundam and Timbuktu Cercles. However, the final selection of villages, producer groups, and officials to interview would be finalized in the field at the discretion of the evaluation coordinator. He was directed to work closely with local officials and informants to gauge the most recent security conditions and to avoid any dangerous or insecure areas. The itinerary was deliberately left tentative because the fluid and uncertainly security conditions, and the sporadic rebel activity, areas with unexploded ordinance and/or land mines, and ongoing MINUSMA/French/Malian military operations. To guide the field mission, the evaluation team and Africare/Mali TFSI/MYAP senior staff developed a priority list of beneficiary villages, organizations, and contact information that were representative of the range of TFSI/MYAP-supported activities (i.e., producer cooperatives, PIVs, recession agriculture, SRI, village gardens, and village caisses (saving/credit groups). Interviews - The evaluation coordinator accompanied by the TFSI/MYAP coordinator for capacity building, Ibrahim Maïga, traveled to the project zone in a rented civilian vehicle via Timbuktu to conduct “in person” interviews in confirmed secure areas or attempted to make contact with project-supported community groups by cellular telephone. The interview program, which was conducted from November 2 to 8, 2013 and supported at various points by six former Africare village animateurs, started in the western part of the project zone, the Niafunké Cercle, and then proceeded eastward through the and finally back into the Timbuktu Cercle. The persons contacted, village visited, and groups interviewed are discussed throughout the text of this report. Yacouba Sidibe, the evaluation coordinator, is familiar with the project zone and was skilled in the local languages. The TFSI/MYAP coordinator for capacity building helped arrange meetings and interviews for the evaluation coordinator. The overall goal of this interview exercise, through interviews, site visits, and questionnaires, is to capture the experience of any remaining project-supported community groups and their capacity in managing and adapting to the 2012 drought crisis and the 2012/2013 occupation period.

In the field, the evaluation coordinator conducted the following interviews:

Table 2 – Interviews Conducted during the TFSI/MYAP final evaluation mission (Nov. 2013)19 No. of interviews Category and group sessions Project Partners (individual interviews) - Elected and 7 appointed GoM officials and GoM Technical Services Community Groups (group interviews) - Food Security 25 Committees, producer groups, village savings/credit groups Community Health/Nutrition Volunteers and 11 Traditional Birth Attendants

19 All of the interviews were conducted in the Niafunké and Goundam Cercles. In those two areas, the evaluation team encountered security forces, but were able to travel freely in rural areas. However, in the Timbuktu Cercle, the security situation was much less certain and the evaluation mission was advised not to travel outside of the city of Timbuktu.

11

D. Follow-up telephone calls - After a debriefing meeting in Bamako and a preliminary review of the competed, the lead evaluation consultant, Michael Short, contacted several of the officials interviewed to verify and clarify information included in the questionnaires.

2. Evaluation Findings

2.1 Strategic Objective SO1: The capacity of communities to manage risks and cope with shocks resulting from vulnerability will be strengthened

SO1 Summary Description - The overall implementation strategy of the TFSI/MYAP applied a participatory approach intended to directly engage beneficiaries to the maximum extent possible in the implementation of all project-supported activities that benefited individual communities. The activities supporting SO1are intended to build the organizational capacity of community groups to plan, manage, and evaluate in an inclusive and transparent way their own development path and to cope collectively to periodic shock and emergencies. This community capacity building effort focused on establishing, training, and supporting Food Security Committees (FSCs) in each of the 57 beneficiary villages to serve as the interface between the targeted communities and the TFSI/MYAP, that could plan, manage, and evaluate a development path defined the communities themselves, and be a collaborating organization in the Community Early Warning System and Emergency Response (CEWS/ER). This project activity was intended to build the role of the community, through a skilled Food Security Committee, and increase their Diréct engagement in the development and implementation of:

 Community food security action plans linked to the communal Plan de Développement Economique, Social et Culturel (PDSEC).

 Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) between each village FSC and the TFSI/MYAP project describing the roles, responsibilities, and activities of each and to then serve as operational protocols sanctioned by local government administration and communal authorities.

 Closer cooperation and more formal collaboration with GoM technical services (i.e., Agriculture, Health, Education, Livestock, and Social Development) based on the sanctioned MoUs.

 Project-supported and community-managed Food-for-Work activities during the lean seasons (periodes de soudure).20

 Synergies with other stakeholders (i.e., NGOs, other projects and government programs). The development of skilled Food Security Committees also compliments GoM policies related to the decentralization of governance. Since 1992, national legislation and related regulations have

20 The “lean season”, also referred to as the “hungry months” and locally in French as the “periode de soudure” , is the annual period when food insecurity tends to be its highest point as household stocks of food from the previous years’ growing season are depleted and before the next year’s crop is ready to harvest.

12 sought to shift downward many aspects of the decision-making process from the centralized national government into the hands of locally-elected representatives and councils at the Commune-level. National legislation has decentralized democratic governance in Mali, but structurally and operationally, it stops at the Commune-level. Africare/Mali’s approach to building effective Food Security Committees can also be seen as an attempt to push decentralized governance, engaged participation, transparency, and accountability right down into each village. The members of the each village committee are selected and approved during village general meetings. These committees, when effective, can be considered that last step in the decentralization of governance directly linking rural populations to locally-elected and appointed officials at Regional, Cercle, and Commune levels. This does so while attempting to preserve the traditional patterns of authority and governance at the local level (i.e., village chiefs).

Strategic Objective 1 – Strengths and Weaknesses

Local Conditions during the occupation - During the occupation, which began in March 2012, most lived in fear of the occupiers, travel was severely restricted, community groups of any kind were banned, and a nightly curfew was imposed. Cultural expression through music, art, public celebration, and handicraft making was also banned. There was also widespread looting by the “rebels”21 and many community assets, such as equipment and stored grain, were taken. According to the village contacted during the evaluation, the “rebels” had looted between 9 and 17 MT of paddy rice and another 9 to13 MT of bulgur stored in village cereal banks. The flow of commerce was severely limited, banks and FMIs were closed, and it became difficult for households to access cash and basic medical care and supplies. Key agricultural inputs were expensive and very difficult to obtain, particularly diesel fuel for irrigation pumps, and markets, government offices, hospitals, cereal banks, communication infrastructure (mainly cellular telephone equipment), and transportation networks were destroyed. Armed occupiers in all- terrain vehicles regularly patrolled rural areas in the project target zones and would periodically visit each village to ensure that the restrictions imposed by the occupation’s strict religious fundamentalism was being observed. Many of the respondents interviewed described various conditions:

Table 3 - Local Conditions during the occupation period (extracted from individual and group interviews, November 2013) Dieudonné Sangara, Sous-Prefet (Central), Goundam (evacuated during occupation)

During the project, the Prefet assigned me to be the liaison between the project and the administration. The (TFSI/MYAP) project ended when the occupation began. I was there when the MNLA looted the grain held in Africare's warehouse facility. The MNLA took everything and then demanded even more. Mahamadou Sall, 1st Assistant Mayor, Goundam (evacuated during occupation) Our office was destroyed during occupation. They took everything. All the paperwork is gone, and the office building was looted and damaged by the rebels. The cereal bank was also destroyed.

21 During the evaluation, it was interesting to note that some villages reported that the “rebels” involved in the looting and early occupation were not armed groups of unknown people from outside the region, but rather local people from the immediate area that were well known to the communities that were more likely taking armed advantage of the situation. If this local dynamic was widespread, it warrants additional attention as it has may very important implications to any longer-term, community-scale peace and reconciliation. 13

Drissa Coulibaly, Adjoint Prefet, Niafunké (evacuated during occupation) The administration was not present during the occupation. Aboubacar Moussa Diallo, Head of the Agriculture Service, Goundam (evacuated during occupation) The rebels banned groups of any kind and people were very afraid. Normally, people go out to their fields (on Lake Télé) for several weeks at a time, but under the occupation, women were restricted to their households. So, one male from each family would have to go up the lake each day to work and then had be back home in Goundam before the curfew. Bagadaji Food Security Committee (Douekiré Commune) During the occupation, there was a general fear of cultural expression (music and crafts production) and there were limitations on local travel. The organization did not have contact with GoM officials or NGOs during the conflict. We felt that we could do nothing about the occupation and collaborated with the occupiers. We were fearful of their anger. Aldjanabangou Food Security Committee (Soboundou Commune) During the occupation, the village did not have any contact with GoM or NGOs. During the occupation, we had to stop the literacy courses. N’gourouné Food Security Committee (Soboundou Commune) Our village was not really impacted during the occupation. None of the community members were displaced and during the occupation, we had some contact with only one government official; an agriculture service agent. Douegoussou Agricultural Cooperative (Douekiré Commune) During the occupation, the group had poor local sales of grain because they were no local buyers, and the price of diesel fuel for irrigation pumps increased from 80,000 FCFA per barrel to 150,000 FCFA per barrel. About 25% of community members were displaced by the conflict, but about half of them have returned. Our organization had some contact with local elected officials and with the agriculture service. Tendé Food Security Committee (Soboundou Commune) About 25% of the community was displaced by the conflict, but everyone has returned. During the occupation, we had no contact with government officials or NGOs. We did not resist and did whatever they asked us to do. Cereal Bank Group (Goundam) To support our FFW activities, were waiting for the 45 MT (of bulgar) usually provided to the community by Africare, but it was intercepted by the rebels in Diré and never arrived in Goundam. Cooperatif Agricole Multifunctionale (Goundam) The rebels banned meetings and groups, and men could not travel to work together in the fields. Dab Cooperative (Soboundou Commune) The rebels took 817 sacks of rice and 70 sacks of bulgur. The rebels also tried twice to blow up a key bridge in Dabi (on the road between Niafunké and Léré) to prevent its use by the Malian Army. Korienze Hausse village, Health/Nutrition volunteer (Soboundou Commune) Travel at night was forbidden by the rebels. The local markets were held less frequently. N’goussou village, Health/Nutrition volunteer (Soboundou Commune) The greatest constraint to travel was the fear of being stopped by the rebels or retribution. N’Gourousou Credit/savings group During the occupation, we had no contact with the MFI and the local representative of the MFI was absent. The occupation period limited or stopped the transportation of commercial goods and stopped all project activities.

In the rural villages, the occupation was enforced by periodic “rebel” visits and there seemed no constant occupation presence. The community members that left as IDPs and that later returned,

14 however, seemed to be more profoundly affected by the occupation and conflict as many returned destitute and have lost all of their household goods, livestock, and productive assets.

A. Food Security Committees (FSCs) - TFSI/MYAP reporting recognizes village-level Food Security Committee as fully functional when communities are able to: 1) organize themselves to mobilize internal resources based on contributions of members to newly established village banks and grant loans to their members with a schedule for its reimbursement, 2) identify solutions for their food security problems, 3) plan activities in a general meeting with the participation of all groups in order to discuss the concerns of all segments of society, 4) implement, monitor and evaluate their action plans, and 5) seek funding from external partners such as a microfinance institution (MFI). All of the TFSI/MYAP training and capacity building efforts targeting village organization sought to develop this competence in all beneficiary communities.

The final evaluation concluded that:

Food Security Committees Remained Active - The final evaluation, conducted 20 months after the suspension of TFSI/MYAP activities in the Timbuktu region, found active Food Security Committees in all of the villages contacted and/or visited. Although some of the Food Security Committees filled different roles during the occupation period, the organizational skill sets gained during the TFSI/MYAP project were important assets used by communities to cope with and adapt to (in varying degrees) the conflict, droughts, and occupation period. During this period, Food Security Committees operated fully independently and most had very little if any contact with GoM officials and none of the individuals and groups interviewed indicated any direct NGO support.22

The evaluation team found that even during the occupation, Food Security Committee (and their associated producer groups) in the villages contacted served a variety of roles. The actual role certainly varied from village to village, but most served in at least one or more of these key roles:

 Protected community assets (i.e., grain stores, cash, motor pumps).

 Served as the interface between the village and the rebels, and helped communities developed strategies to peacefully cope with the occupation.

 Continued to organize, either overtly or covertly, the agriculture sector and some health/nutrition activities.

 Maintained contact with community members outside the occupied zones to access resources.

 Served as links between communities and GoM during the early recovery period.

22 Many respondents, however, noted Merlin and/or the Malian Red Cross provided medical assistance during the occupation after GoM hospitals were looted and CSCEWs were abandoned. The occupiers restricted medical services to major towns.

15

Quite understandably, however, the FSCs did not continue their role in the formal CEWS/ER and the commune-level PDSEC system, which depends on an active exchange of information with government agencies. It appears that all community-level literacy activities in the surveyed villages were halted. This TFSI/MYAP activity targeted 57 villages with adult literacy training through a network of 81 project-trained, community-level trainers with technical and educational support from Africare/Mali staff and the Timbuktu Education .

Food Security Committees (FSCs) able to adapt to the restrictive conditions of the occupation - In some villages, the Africare-trained Food Security Committees played a key role in a community’s ability to peacefully adapt to the restrictions of the occupation period and to overtly collaborate with the occupiers. Covertly, however, FSCs continued to meet in secret to manage and plan community activities, and to devise a common strategy to peacefully cope and adapt. According to the evaluation coordinator’s interviews, some FSCs were actually instructing community members on the appropriate behavior and demeanor to exhibit when rebel patrols visited their villages. The members of the evaluation team agreed with the general conclusion that many of the Food Security Committees and other community group trained and supported during Africare’s TFSI/MYAP constituted an organized resistance movement that quietly defied many of the restrictions imposed by the occupation.

Table 4 - Village Food Security Committees strategies during the occupation period (extracted from individual and group interviews, November 2013) Aboubacar Moussa Diallo, Head of the Agriculture Service, Goundam (evacuated during occupation) During the occupation, the organization system based on Unions/Federations continued to function. Bagadaji Food Security Committee (Douekiré Commune) The Food Security Committee continued to meet secretly at night on the first Sunday of each month, but the frequency of participation by some members was variable. The Food Security Committee still coordinates and organizes community agriculture, and is active in the preparation of fields for wheat production and vegetable gardening. Bankani Village Food Security Committee (Tonka Commune) During the occupation, the group’s 12 members met sometimes, but really had no concrete activities during occupation. During the conflict, the Food Security Committee met 2 or 3 times and member attendance was variable. Aldjanabangou Food Security Committee (Soboundou Commune) The Food Security Committee continued to meet during the conflict on the 15th of each month, but in secret at night, and all the committee members regularly attended the meetings. During the occupation, the Food Security Committee met regularly for village blessings, to maintain community unity, and to build community consensus. N’gourouné Food Security Committee (Soboundou Commune) The Food Security Committee continued to meet a night on the first Sunday of each month, but participation by some members was variable. Douegoussou agricultural cooperative (Douekiré Commune) The Food Security Committee group continued to meet during the conflict/occupation once per month, and all organization members attended regularly. Tendé Food Security Committee (Soboundou Commune) The Food Security Committee met regularly at night in secret.

Although living in great fear and uncertainty, villages Food Security Committees helped communities cope peacefully with the occupiers by minimizing conflict and feigning

16 compliance. None of the interviews reported any specific acts of violence against any of the individuals that remained in their communities.23 In the rural villages, the occupation was enforced by periodic “rebel” visits and without a constant occupation presence. The community members that left as IDPs and that later returned, however, seemed to be more profoundly affected by the occupation and conflict as many returned destitute and had lost all of their household goods, livestock, and productive assets. 24

These two accounts illustrate the role and adaptability of project-trained FSCs:

In Niafunké, a Crisis Committee was formed by the membership of several FSCs to serve as the interface between the occupiers and the community. In the Niafunké Cercle, for example, all of the food banks had been looted by the occupiers and all grain and stored bourgou taken. Occupiers also took motorized irrigation pumps used to support community Village Irrigated Permieters (VIPs). Village Food Security Committees worked through this ad hoc Crisis Committee to negotiate with the occupation authorities directly, and although the looted bourgou was never recovered, the FSCs managed to recover 8 of 10 irrigation pumps taken by the occupiers. Some cooperatives had 2 pumps, but when one on VIP was taken, many managed to hide the second reserve pump. In Goundam, the Food Security Committee and the Producer Cooperative (Télé Multifunction Agricultural Cooperative) learned that “rebels” coming into the area had been looting the cereal stores of other villages. Rather than lose their stock, the cooperative immediately distributed all 7 MT of the stored grain in small amounts to different cooperative members to hide in their homes. When the “rebels” arrived they were shown an empty grain bank. Secretly, the members kept the grain bank operating, making loans of cereal to members of the community, and kept records of each transaction. During his mission in the Timbuktu Region, the final evaluation consultant found that members had begun reimbursing the borrowed grain and that 1 MT was back in the grain bank with a full reimbursement was expected as the harvest progressed.

Organization capacity of FSCs to respond to drought demonstrated - Many of the community-scale coping strategies during the 2011/2012 drought and occupation were developed and managed by Food Security Committees and/or producer groups in the absence of any outside assistance from any NGOs or GoM agency. The coping strategies used varied widely and seemed to depend on the type of agriculture generally practiced in the community (i.e., recession or irrigated VIPs). Some villages used coping strategies that are typically used during severe drought periods, such the temporary outmigration of working age adults looking for temporary employment in urban centers or as farm labor in other production areas. Some of the coping mechanisms adopted, especially some that managed to keep local agriculture going, were well- organized, creative, and in some cases, courageous. A more detail discussion of the activities of individual producer groups (cooperatives and federations) are discussed in greater detail in SO2 section of this report.

23 The only exception mentioned reported was a one day protest march against the occupation in the town of Goundam. The occupiers were reported to have quickly fled the town, but returned soon afterwards accompanied by substantial armed “rebel” reinforcements from Timbuktu.

24 One aspect of the FCSs not included in the evaluation was their role, if any, in managing the return and re- integration of IDPs back into their communities during the early recovery period.

17

Table 5 - Food security committees adaptations to the 2011/2012 drought and crop loss Bagadaji Food Security Committee (Douekiré Commune) The strategies used during the drought were planting larger areas and more varieties of crops/vegetables. The organization (FSC) was active during the conflict. Project training in the agriculture practice of using contour mounds was useful during drought. Bankani Village Food Security Committee (Tonka Commune) The strategy used during the drought was to extend household credit through the village caisse at 10% interest and to ask for assistance from our young people that had gone to the city for temporary employment. Aldjanaban Food Security Committee (Soboundou Commune) The strategies used during the drought were to sell off some animals, purchase grain for village stocks, ask for assistance from relatives outside the village, and temporary travel of young people to production areas for seasonal employment. N’gourouné Food Security Community (Soboundou Commune) To resist the drought, the village exploited the VIP (for grain production), large-scale production of beans, off-season production, and some young people out migrated to the cities and put together 1,000,000 FCFA in credit for the purchase of fertilizer. Douegoussou, agriculture cooperative (Douekiré Commune), Strategies to deal with the drought included off-season production, SRI culture of rice, faster growing seed, and storing produced wheat. Tendé Food Security Committee (Soboundou Commune) To resist the drought, the community contacted young people that emigrated to the cities and had helped with a 1,080,000 FCFA fund for an income generating activity for the women’s group.

2.2 Strategic Objective 2: Household Access to Food is Improved

SO2 - Households’ access to food is improved - Another set of project MYAP/TFSI activities focused on increasing and expanding local agricultural, livestock and fisheries production, including the development of Village Irrigated Perimeters (VIPs), and introducing advanced production techniques25 and improved varieties of goats and chickens. The project also incorporated a training/education/extension program to improve the skills of volunteer lead farmers and GoM agricultural agents, and developed community/cooperative food storage facilities. Two other activities, which were assessed during the final evaluation, supported the formation and training of producer groups (cooperatives and federations) and expanded number of village-managed credit/savings funds. The critical agriculture sector in the project zone was severely affected by several factors occurring almost simultaneously: the drought of 2012/2103; the widespread looting of stored grain and production equipment; the complete disruption of commercial supply chains for key inputs (fuels, motor oil, spare parts for irrigation pumps, fertilizer and quality seed); the disappearance of micro-finance institutions and banks that providing credit or that held some cooperatives’ accounts; the destruction of local markets and the transportation sector; the banning of groups of any kind; restrictions on women’s activities; and the severe restrictions on

25 For example, the System for Rice Intensification (SRI), System for Wheat Intensification (SBI) and a fish culture demonstration project.

18 travel. In many cases, their main tangible community asset, the grain stored in village cereals, was looted by rebels in the early stages of the occupation. It had the effect of plunging communities into severe food insecurity. Virtually all the villages/factions in the project zone are almost 100% dependent of small scale- or community-scale agriculture and/or small livestock herds. The production loss during the drought, the loss of community financial assets, the loss of stored grain, and the loss of many small herds26 also meant that the productive assets and financial resources needed for the 2013/2104 growing season had been largely erased. In Goundam, which is one of the larger population centers in the project zone, the constant presence of armed rebel forces made it more difficult to circumvent the occupation restrictions. The rebels banned groups of any kind and this prevented households living in Goundam from accessing their fields on Lake Télé. Normally, whole families move from Goundam to their farmland for several weeks at a time during the production season and live adjacent to their fields. However, during the occupation, groups were banned and out of a fear of being attacked, women were restricted to their households. Production was severely affected because only one male from each family could go up the lake each day to work and had be back home in Goundam each evening before a nightly curfew. Agricultural Cooperatives - The cooperatives contacted during the final evaluation were particularly valuable for many communities during the occupation period, and despite enormous challenges, including the very real threat of violent retribution, many had the organizational skills required to keep local agricultural production going during the occupation (the 2012/2013 season) and in the early recovery period (2013/2014 season). Many of the cooperatives had to work clandestinely, almost like a covert operation behind enemy lines, to circumvent the occupiers. According to the Head of the GoM’s Agriculture Section, the harvest resulting from the 2012/2013 season was the highest seen in the previous five years. During the occupation, many producer cooperatives served in one or more of these key roles:

 Protecting community assets (i.e., grain stores, cash, motor pumps27);  Organizing, either overtly or covertly, the agriculture sector and community farmers;  Providing the logistical support required;  Arranging outside credit from commercial suppliers for key inputs;  Processing and marketing harvested grain; and /or  Managing the distribution of grain to households on a credit basis.

The following table describes some of the strategies described by cooperatives to keep the agricultural sector going during the occupation person:

Table 8 - Extracts from final evaluation interviews with producer groups Douegoussou Agricultural Cooperative (Douekiré Commune) This group exploited a village irrigated perimeter (VIP) during the occupation and produced wheat and

26 Due to time constraints, security restrictions on travel, and the fact a large portion of the displaced pastoralist population had not returned to the project zone, the evaluation team was not able to assess the extent and magnitude of herd losses among pastoralist communities. 27 In some cases, may cooperatives with a “back up” irrigation pump managed to hide the extra pumps in their villages.

19 rice. Working in collaboration with the producer federation, they were able to get fertilizer and diesel fuel from Mopti. The group produced about 300 sacks of paddy rice and sold 200 of the sacks The cooperative played an important role during the occupation, by coordinating VIP production, small commerce, and fishing. The group continued to practice SRI under the occupation. The 2012/2013 production (during the occupation) was lower than the 2013/2014 campaign, which was higher than usual. The occupation had no real impact on stored grain stocks. The fish culture project was lost when rebels took the water pump and fencing, and they could not save any of the fry. Wafakoye Agricultural Cooperative in Korienze-Haousa village (Souboundu Commune) The cooperative continued to produce during the occupation (rice vegetables, okra, gourds, and sorrel.) When the occupation began, the cooperative had stored its surplus from the previous year, but the rebel looted 418 sacks of rice and 130 sacks of bulgur. The cooperative played an important role during the harvest and helped arrange the credit needed for inputs and the marketed the rice in Mopti after the harvest. During the occupation, the group was able to get credit from traders in Mopti for fertilizer (15.8 MT), seed (2 MT), 30 barrels of diesel fuel, 2 cases of motor oil, and fuel filters (for the irrigation pump). The cooperative supported 104 farmers on 52 hectares with a production rate of about 40 sacks of paddy rice per 0.5 hectares. At harvest, each of the 104 farmers reimbursed 9 sacks of paddy rice to pay the group’s debt. However, the trader in Mopti would only accept cash payment. The group had to secretly get a rice huller from Mopti into the village and hull all the rice, which yielded 40 sacks of hulled rice with a value of 225 FCFA/kg. The rice was secretly transported to Mopti by boat and sold in the market. The cooperative paid off 100% of the credit taken from the Mopti traders and brought cash back to the village to support the 2013/2014 season. (Evaluators Note: This processing, sale, and transport took place secretly and without the knowledge of occupiers). The SRI production has many advantages and 25 farmers continued the practice. The total production during the 2012/2013 was higher than usual. Production was lower during the 2013/2104 season because of insufficient rainfall. The environmental team also continued its work during the occupation by monitoring and preventing tree cutting. (They also thought that the fish culture demonstration in Douegoussou was good, and they hoped to start this activity in the future.) Evaluator’s Note: For the 2013/2014 season, the group successfully negotiated a pre- harvest deal with a local trader to get needed inputs and to accept payments in kind (paddy rice). Tende Women’s Multifunction Agricultural Cooperative (Soboundou Commune) The village irrigation perimeter could not be exploited because of the occupation Ngorobougou Producer Cooperative (Souboundou Commune) The group produced on their VIP during the occupation produced rice, okra, sorrel, and beans. The 166 farmers produced on 30 hectares (0.25 hectares each), and the group later sold 85 sacks of rice per hectare, 10,000 FCFA per sack. The proceeds (850,000 FCFA) were used for diesel fuel (for the irrigation pump) and pump repair. The cooperative played an important role during the occupation by arranging credit for inputs and arranging for the transport of fertilizer. They also coordinated the improvement of the small retention dam on the lake. They do not practice SRI. Production during the 2012/2013 was more than usual, but was less than usual during the 2013/2014 season. The cooperative also managed the stock of grain from the last harvest. Before the occupation, the Africare project provided the village with 6 improved roosters, but all of them died. (This group also thought that the fish culture demonstration was interesting, and said they might try it along the river.) Télé Multifunction Agricultural Cooperative in Goundam The group produced on a VIP during the occupation and grew millet, sorghum, beans, and peanuts. The most important role of the cooperative during the occupation was managing the stock of grain and distributing it on credit to the population. They also coordinated the improvement of a small retention dam on the lake. They did not practice SRI because the annual flood (into Lake Télé) was not as high as normal. Production 2012/2013 was less than usual because farmers in (Goundam) were afraid to go to their fields (on Lake Télé). The rebels banned meetings and groups, and men could not travel in groups to work together in the fields. The production of fodder was also not enough to support small livestock herds. Production during the 2013/2014 season was also less than normal because of lower rainfall. The

20

Environment team was not active during occupation. (The group indicated that they are not interested in the fish culture demonstration and would rather focus on expanding agriculture)’ (Evaluator’s note: In Goundam, the more severe restriction on women limited their ability to produce and women’s vegetable gardening activities, which are normally done the edge of the Niger River, in bas fonds, and lakes, were curtained out of fear of rebel reprisals or bandit attacks.) Naney VIP Agricultural Producers Cooperative in Dabi village (Souboundou Commune) During the occupation, the cooperative exploited a VIP and produced rice and okra. There were no inputs locally available and the rebels had looted 817 sacks of their stored rice and another 70 sacks of bulgur. The rebels also tried twice to blow up a key bridge in Dabi (on the road between Niafunké and Lere) to prevent Malian army access to the area. For the 2012/2013 growing season, representatives of the producers’ cooperative went to Mopti to arrange credit from local suppliers for a supply of diesel oil and fertilizer. Each of the 112 VIP farmers also contributed 10,000 FCFA to purchase 23 barrels of diesel fuel. The Cooperative President, Arba Haïdara, said the group was only able to make this transaction because of the Africare’s credit management training and the project’s assistance in establishing good relationships with suppliers in Mopti before the occupation. To prevent the entire stock of inputs from being seized by the occupiers, the Cooperative President made several nightly trips using his own boat (pinasse) to smuggle small amounts of inputs back to the village where it was hidden in 4 separate storerooms in four separate locations. Following the production season, the group members made an in- kind reimbursement of 628 sacks of rice to repay the credit. 220 sacks were sold locally in the Attara Market for 10,000 FCFA per sac. Many of the VIP farmers used the SRI method on about 10 hectares. Production during the 2012/2013 was higher than usual and the group attributed it to the SRI technique. The 2013/2014 protection was lower than usual and attributed it to problems with a rice nursery. (They thought that the experience with fish culture was good and suggested they start a fish culture cooperative.) Tiomangal Multifunction Agricultural Cooperative in Gamboutou village (Souboundou Commune) This group exploited a VIP during the occupation and produced rice, okra, sorrel, and beans. At the beginning of the planting season, they had about 1,300,000 FCFA. At a farmers’ meeting, they decided that each VIP farmer would pay an advance of 20,000 FCFA. The 89 farmers paid the advance and the funds were used to purchase diesel fuel, fertilizer, motor oil, and spare parts for the irrigation pump. Their production during the season was about 3 MT/hectare and farmers got about 30 sacks of paddy rice from 0.4 hectares. As reimbursement, each farmer paid 6 sacks of paddy rice, and in total, the cooperative collected 213 sacks of rice. The cooperative then tried to negotiate with a local supplier to accept rice in exchange for diesel fuel. After the harvest, there were very few local buyers of rice, so they brought in a hulling machine, hulled the rice, and transported the finished rice to Mopti for sale. They used the revenue to purchase more diesel fuel and fertilizer and transported it back to the village. SRI was not widely practiced because of the time required for replanting. The total production was higher than usual during the 2012/2103 season, because the price of diesel fuel was more affordable and the rainfall was higher. The harvest during 2013/2104 was lower than 2012/2013 because the rainfall was much less and the diesel fuel required for the pump was much more expensive, as much as 150,000 FCFA per barrel. The occupation negatively affected the cooperative, because there were no local buyers to purchase surplus rice. The environmental brigade was also active during the occupation by monitoring land use and farmer education. (The group thought that the fish culture demonstration was very interesting and had thought about forming a fishing cooperative, especially since fish has not decreased in market value.)

Village banks / income generating activities (IGAs) – During the TFSI/MYAP in Timbuktu, Africare/Mali supported the establishment of village caisses, which are small community- managed savings and credit funds, in 24 targeted villages. Management and operational oversight for each of the caisses was also one important function of the village Food Security Committees. This activity mobilized community financial resources by building a membership of contributors and the caisses enable vulnerable households to access to micro-credit to meet

21 short-term household needs, especially during the annual “lean” period, and were used for investments in small income generating activities (IGA). Through the project, some village caisses also developed links to local micro-finance institutions (MFIs), such as the local Gué푠푖푔푖푠푠표 MFI, and commercial banks (i.e., the Banque Nationale de Developpement Agricole (BNDA)). According to TFSI/MYAP reporting in 2011 and 2012, the repayment rate for the small short-term loans, which usually carried an interest rate of 5% per months, was 100%. In the villages contacted during the final evaluation, these caisses continued to operate despite the threat of having the funds taken by the occupiers. The caisses continued making small loans, but as a security measure in some villages, the fund’s cash assets were divided up among the members and kept hidden from the occupiers in smaller amounts. During the final evaluation, they were often referred to by respondents as “rescue funds”28 and during the period that MFIs and banks were closed and accounts inaccessible, they were often a village’s only source of cash. Every 1-2 months, depending on a particular village, the repayments were collected and then immediately dispersed to other households waiting for small loans. These small loans were often used for household food purchases, to assist to young household members that left area looking for temporary employment in population centers, for the purchase of agricultural inputs, or for emergency medical treatment. The funds became an important element of community food security as it assured continued household access to food as local market prices leaped higher (i.e. 22,000 FCFA for a sack of millet increasing to 37,500 FCFA, and paddy rice increased from 10,000 FCFA per sack to 25,000 FCFA.)

Table 9- Extracts from final evaluation interviews related to villages caisses (community savings/credits groups) and income generating activities Bankani village caisse (Tonka Commune) The group has 115 members and manages a caisse with about 800,000 FCFA. The members received caisse management training from the (TFSI/MYAP) project and earn income for the fund by loaning money with interest. The village caisse continued to function during the crisis period and made loans to members and community groups. The most beneficial aspect of the caisse was that it had cash available. The group had relations with the Guésigisso MFI during the crisis. N’Gourousou village caisse (Saboundou Commune) The group manages a caisse of about 350,000 FCFA with each member paying in 200 FCFA per month. The membership consists of two smaller groups with a total of 93 members. They make loans of 5,000 FCFA or 10,000 FCFA for 2 months at a 5% per month interest rate. The group benefitted from (TFSI/MYAP) project training in credit management. The caisse continued to function during the occupation without significant changes and allowed many households to get necessities. During the occupation, they had no contact with the MFI because the MFI representative was absent during the occupation. Douegoussou village caisse (Doukiré Commune) The village caisse holds about 1,400,000 FCFA and has 86 members (including 16 women). They also received training from Africare and AMSS. The caisse continued to function during the occupation. The caisse made loans for the repair of a group irrigation pump and to purchase of 20 barrels of diesel fuel and barrel of motor oil. They had contact with the Guésigisso MFI and the BNDA (bank) during the occupation. The group had an account with the MFI with deposits of about 1,500,000 FCFA over the last 5 years, but during the occupation, they encountered difficulty accessing their caisse deposits Banikane village caisse (Goundam)

28 In French, caisses de sauvetage.

22

The village caisse holds about 340,000 FCFA and has 97 members. They had also received training from Africare and remained active during the occupation. Their cash was sent to Tonka and some funds were used to support community gardens. They had no contact with an MFI during occupation.

2.3 Strategic Objective 3: Improved health and nutrition of vulnerable population

SO3 - Improved health and nutrition of vulnerable populations - A third set of activities focused on improving community and household health and nutrition, with particular emphasis on women and children under five years old. This included support for project-trained Village Nutrition Educators (VNEs) and Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs), community-managed monthly infant growth monitoring and reporting, community-based malnutrition rehabilitation (HEARTH Model and advisory home visits), VNE activities to improve household practices and behaviors through Information, Education and Communication (IEC) sessions related to health, nutrition, and sanitation, and construction and management of key community water supplies (wells). Prior to the occupation, Africare/Mali worked with GoM community health center (CSCOM) technical directors in the project’s target zone to identify and retrain a network of GoM health agents, village health/nutrition volunteers, and traditional birth attendants (TBAs), also referred to as matrones, in the targeted villages. This improved network supported implementation of the national protocol for acute malnutrition care (PECIMA) for children aged 6-59 months in the project-targeted villages. The SO3 activities focused on developing an improved standard screening, reporting, referral, and home outreach system for young children, and supported the network of community volunteers and GoM agents in the delivery of key messages through Information, Education and Communication (IEC) sessions. The entire health care system in the Timbuktu Region collapsed during the occupation, and left no institutional support for village health/nutrition volunteers and matrones (TBAs). All of the main GoM hospitals and the referral centers for treating cases of malnutrition were looted and closed. The CSCOMs, which are community-scale GoM clinics and the first point of contact for the treatment of referral cases of child malnutrition, were looted and abandoned. GoM health agents, hospital CSCOM staff, hospital personnel, UN Agencies, and NGOs, including Africare, left the occupied area. In the early days of the occupation, some private practitioners remained in larger population centers, but by in large, the health care system disappeared. As the occupation progressed, the Malian Red Cross and Merlin managed to negotiate with the occupiers and re- established medical care (free of charge) in Niafunké, Tonka, Timbuktu, and Diré, but their operations were restricted to the cities and many villages found access very difficult. Village contacted during the final evaluation reported severe illnesses and births were particularly difficult to manage. Most births occur at night and with the curfew, if there were any complications, no one could get in or out of the villages, and the Malian Red Cross and Merlin were not allowed to visit villages. They could access good services if they could get to towns with Red Cross and Medical services, but many of the individuals and groups interviewed indicted that several deaths were attributed to an inability to transport patients and to the prohibition on traveling at night.

23

Nevertheless, many village health/nutrition volunteers and matrones, without supervision, technical assistance, access to supplies, nor institutional support, continued to be active during the occupation:

Table 10 - Extracts from interviews with TFSI/MYAP-trained Community Health/Nutrition volunteers and TBAs active during the occupation period. Gombatou - Health/Nutrition volunteer ( Soboundou Commune) The main constraint was that we did not have the materials needed to weigh infants and had to depend on simple, less accurate methods. The community accessed health care through private services and traditional medicine. The principal problem was malaria and diarrhea, and SRO was used to treat diarrhea. The ill had to be carried by donkey cart to get to medical facilities. Gombatou - Matrone (TBA) (Soboundou Commune) I was providing good assistance and helping with births. The major constraint was a lack of means to purchase bleach, soap, gloves, alcohol, bandages, plastic sheeting, and sterile blades (for cutting the umbilical cord.) We worked with the materials that we could get. Dabi - Health/Nutrition volunteer ( Soboundou Commune) I could not weigh infants because we lacked materials, but we did continue sensibilization (outreach/education) activities. We could access medical care through private providers and the Red Cross. The Red Cross treated patients very well. The main health problems were malaria, diarrhea, and no access to medicines. Cases of diarrhea were treated with ORT (Oral Rehydration Therapy) or with traditional local medicine. Access to health care was difficult, because people were afraid to travel and we did not have a cart to carry the sick to the center. Some people died because of a lack of access to medical care Dabi - Matrone (TBA) (Soboundou Commune) I was recording births and continued to assist with births and with referrals to the medical facility in Niafunké. During the occupation, referrals to the medical center were very difficult. I had to reuse some birthing supplies. Korienze Haousa - Health/Nutrition volunteer ( Soboundou Commune) I was working with the community to arrange for cereals, sugar, and milk to feed groups of infants older than over 12 months. For all the complicated cases, infants were referred to the Red Cross and to private providers in Niafunké. The community had access to health care though the Red Cross and Medicins Sans Frontiers. These partners gave medicines free of charge. The major constraint was there was no way move patients to the health center and the government health agent could not get to the population. Travel at night was forbidden by the rebels. Local markets were held less frequently. The community coped with the situation with blessings and through coordination meetings at night. Korienze Haousa - Matrone (TBA) (Soboundou Commune) I also continued working during the occupation and referred complicated cases to the medical center and helped pregnant women. The biggest constraint was that we could not travel at night. Tende - Health/Nutrition volunteer ( Soboundou Commune) I was monitoring infants and referring complicated cases to Merlin. We had no access to birth certificates and no medicines were available, but we could access medical care in Tonka and Niafunké. The main health problems were malaria, coughs, cholera, and diarrhea. We used locally available traditional medicines for treatment. Tende - Matrone (TBA) (Soboundou Commune) I was also helping with proper birthing. One strategy used was for the households themselves to arrange for some birthing supplies (soap, bleach, alcohol, blades, and plastic sheeting). Aldjanabougou - Health/Nutrition volunteer ( Soboundou Commune) I continued sensibilization (outreach/education) of mothers and to weigh infants. Transport to Niafunké was very long and the clinic in Anabebe was closed. The population was afraid to travel to Niafunké.

24

Treatment was local traditional medicine or the transport of the very sick to Niafunké. Aldjanabangou - Matrone (TBA) (Soboundou Commune) I continued to help with proper births, but lacked some materials and sanitary products. The village supported the matrons. Some youth that left the village for the cities donated 1,000 FCFA and the community mobilized local resources by continuing to give 500 FCFA per month. N’gouroune - Health/Nutrition volunteer ( Soboundou Commune) The village continued to support my work during the occupation and 40 families each provided 2 pots29 of sorghum or rice; total 80 pots). Some families also contributed 100 FCFA. The village was able to access health care through the Red Cross during the occupation, but the greatest constraint community’s fear of being stopped by the rebels or retribution. The two greatest health problems were malaria and diarrhea. N’gouroune - Matrone (TBA) (Soboundou Commune) I was available to help with births. The main constraint was a lack of access to the supplies needed for birthing kits. One strategy was for the family themselves to arrange for the materials. Guindigata - Health/Nutrition volunteer ( Commune) I continued to monitor infants and referred cases of malnutrition to the medical facilities in Niafunké and Tonka (Red Cross). I periodically organized a group of mothers to prepare porridge for village infants with community contributions of millet, sorghum, wheat, rice, milk, and sugar. The population had access to medical care in Tonka and Niafunké, but access was difficult because people did not have money30 and could only get there by boat. The most common health problems were stomach ailments, malaria, coughs, a perilous access to medical care, and the great difficulty in evacuating severe cases to Niafunké. Guindigata - Matrone (TBA) (Banikane Narhawa Commune) I continued to work with pregnant women, and when they had complications, I referred women to Niafunké. The main constraints were that I had difficulty to access health care in Niafunké and Tonka. We not have the supplies we needed. The main strategy for many births was evacuation. Bankani - Health/Nutrition volunteer (Tonka Commune) The main access to medical care was the Red Cross. Certain serious illnesses had to be taken to Mopti or Bamako. The main illnesses were malaria, diarrhea, stomach trouble, and back pain. Most illnesses were treated with local traditional medicine. Bankani - Matrone (Tonka Commune) I advised pregnant women and assisted with births, but lacked birthing supplies. Sometimes, I purchased supplies and was then reimbursed by the household.

3.0 Lessons learned and best practices

Overview - Prior the mission in the Timbuktu Region, the members of the evaluation team had very little information about the current post-conflict situation within the TFSI/MYAP area in the Timbuktu Region. We had some unsubstantiated rumors that some villages had continued to produce during the occupation (2012/2013 agricultural season) and in the early recovery period (2013/2014 agricultural season), but very little else. We were quite uncertain whether or not it would even be safe to visit some areas and whether any of the community organizations

29 A pot is a volume measure of grain equivalent recognized standard volume of empty metal can of imported powdered milk. The sawal is also a traditional volume measure and usually is a single wooden container shared by several villages as the communities’ standard unit. The actual size of a sawal can vary, but is usually based on a certain number of standard milk container pots (i.e., a 4-pots sawal in some areas or a 5-pots sawal used by others.) 30 Note: All persons interviewed about health/nutrition confirmed that the health care and medicine provided by the Red Cross and Merlin during the occupation was always free-of-charge. The reference from this respondent more likely applies to the costs of the services of private health care providers or to transportation costs.

25 established and trained by as part of the TFSI/MYAP remained. We hoped that we could detect and describe any remaining community organization.

The evaluation team was astonished to find active Food Security Committees in all of the villages contacted that had been guiding an adaptive community strategy to cope with the occupation. We were also quite surprised to find that several producer cooperatives had managed to overcome extraordinary challenges in order to keep the village’s critical agricultural base in production. In most cases, these organizations secretly developed and organized coping strategies during the occupation crisis in the absence of any outside GoM or NGO technical or material support. It is clear that these community organizations played a critical role during the period of the occupation, and that their skills and experience will prove to be the key community assets needed for an accelerated economic, social, cultural, and political recovery.

Village Food Security Committees - Establishing and supporting village-level Food Security Committees, and reinforcing their organizational capacity builds a real community ownership of project activities. The organizational competence demonstrated by many of the Food Security Committees during the occupation was certainly the result of the skills and experience gained through the participatory approach and community capacity building methods used by Africare/Mali during implementation of the TFSI/MYAP.

Agriculture - Effective producer cooperatives, and the cooperative federation, demonstrated the resilience of the agricultural sector in many TFSI/MYAP project target areas during the 2011/2012 drought period, the occupation, and the early recovery period. The keys to this resilience were:

(a) access to a VIP with irrigation infrastructure (including pumps);

(b) a continuous supply of irrigation water pumped from major tributaries of the Niger River;

(c) an active and competent producer organization;

(d) the ability to access inputs through a credit mechanism (i.e., commercial suppliers in Mopti); and (e) the ability to process and market harvested grain.

These particular conditions were a distinct community advantage during the drought and occupation and the production surpluses and diversity of production enabled communities to better sustain food security. As Mr. Aboubacar Moussa Diallo, the Head of the GoM Agricultural Sector in Goundam noted, the ability of farmers to produce on VIPs had a stabilizing effect on communities in that many fewer household members joined the stream of IDPs or had to send able-bodied adult family members to search for financial resources or temporary employment in larger urban centers.

The recession agriculture and vegetable production areas in the Lake Télé area north of Goundam, although still a very important production area for both for food crops and livestock, proved to be less resilient. Current agricultural practices this area, including recession

26 agriculture, appear to be more susceptible to climate change-driven environmental changes including more frequent drought conditions, a higher variability in rain patterns in space and time, the increased risk of bush fires, and a greater variability in the annual flood of the Niger River. During the occupation, production was also more negatively affected by the occupation’s severe limitations on women’s civic life, the banning of group activities, restricted on travel, and the imposition of nightly curfew. These had the impact of reducing the household labor available for production activities and impairing easy access to farms.

Grain banks - A large number of community and cooperative grain banks, particularly in the Niafunké area, were looted by rebel occupiers in the earliest stages of the occupation. However, grain banks that were able to continue operations during the occupation, sometimes in secret, were a key factor in stabilizing food security during the lean period among vulnerable households. The short-term loans of grain to vulnerable households in the community certainly improved food security during a period when market access and supplies were extremely limited and when the local prices of staple grains sharply increased sharply.

Village Caisses (saving/credit groups) - The village caisses also proved to be important assets during the occupation and in many cases, with the disappearance of banks and the difficulties encountered in accessing accounts in closed MFIs, they became their source of cash. Unlike grain banks, the cash assets of the caisses gave the community more flexibility in planning and implementing coping strategies.

Village Health/Nutrition Volunteers and Matrones (TBAs) - The TFSI/MYAP network of community health/nutrition volunteers, GoM health agents, community clinic (CSCOMs), and referral centers that normally monitor childhood growth and identify and manage cases of malnutrition proved to be one of the more fragile elements of the TFSI/MYAP. Where FSCs and cooperatives were able to operate without GoM or NGO support during the occupation, the network supporting implementation of the national protocol for acute malnutrition care (PECIMA) depends on effective linkages to GoM medical resources. When the GoM medical facilities were looted and destroyed, the GoM medical staff and agents quickly and quite prudently abandoned their posts and the system collapsed.

Nevertheless, community Health/Nutrition volunteers and matrones remained active in all of the villages contacted during the final evaluation and some continued to receive community support and compensation. Many continued monitoring children for malnutrition, but their effectiveness was limited due to a lack of basic supplies such as scales and/or Shakir bands. Some also organized infant feeding sessions with food contributions from the community and continued some IEC outreach sessions. Matrones also experienced shortages of basic birthing supplies and faced extraordinary constraints getting urgent problems cases to medical facilities. The health/nutrition volunteers were also able to adapt and to refer cases of malnutrition to the Red Cross and Merlin facilities.

4.0 Recommendations

The time and travel limits of the final evaluation were able to describe some of the experiences and activities of a limited number of agricultural communities in the Niafunké and Goundam

27

Cercles during the period of the occupation, but the evaluation team is certain that a more in- depth assessment with a much wider scope would certainly capture many more valuable lessons learned. This final evaluation did not include an assessment of the impact of any returning IDPs, their vulnerability, or efforts to re-integrate them back into the life of their communities. One enduring question that could not be addressed by this final evaluation, but that certainly warrants greater attention, is understanding the magnitude of the impact of drought, occupation, and conflict on pastoral communities and animal herds.

The evaluation concluded that the security situation in the Niafunké, Goundam, and Diré Cercles is much improved. The displaced GoM civil servants have returned and the basic structures of governance, security, and basic services are improving. The security conditions in these three Cercles would allow a restart of targeted recovery activities, and are recommended in the short- term to allow communities to cope with the coming “lean” period, to prepare for 2014/2015 growing seasons, to assist returning IDP households integrate back into their communities, and to re-establish support for health/nutrition volunteers and TBAs. The security situation in Timbuktu Cercle, however, remains highly uncertain and program operations outside the city of Timbuktu are not recommended without further consideration of what may still be an extreme risk. Programs should also be reminded that security conditions in adjacent areas to the east and north of the Niafunké, Goundam, and Diré Cercles are unstable and precarious, and could, at some point the future, spill into any or all of these three Cercles. Emergency response (1 -2 years, short-term measures) - Restart program activities in the three Cercles focused on an immediate recovery of the agriculture and livestock sector based on community-identified needs and recommendations. Some FSCs have proven to be quite effective and should be given the opportunity to take the lead role in their communities and in their Communes to determine programming needs. Short-term program activities should also work with communities to get vulnerable households and returning IDPs through the coming lean period and prepare for the 2014/2105 agriculture season.

Short-term recovery projects should consider using Food-for-Work (FFW) and/or Cash-for- Work (CFW) resources to rehabilitate (and make more permanent) the existing community irrigation infrastructure and food storage facilities and to finish work on any VIPs that could not be completed before the suspension of program activities. Other project activities should also focus on re-establishing the herds of vulnerable pastoralist families and using FFW or CFW activities to restore/rehabilitate key areas of pasture and, as necessary, improve pastoral water resources. Projects should also include targeted activities that specifically work with communities to accelerate the reintegration of IDP households and support their direct involvement in the recovery of agriculture and livestock production activities. Where programs are considering FFW activities, projects should use any surplus grain stored by local agricultural cooperatives as a source for at least part of the food resources required. Related programming should also focus on rebuilding, resupplying, and strengthening the network of community Health/ Nutrition volunteers and matrones (TBAs). Other non-food project resources should be used to expand community capacity building and training (FSCs and producer groups), make short-term improvements in agricultural and livestock production practices (grain, small livestock, and vegetables), and expand village savings/credit groups, link to returning MFIs and that support small income generating activities (IGAs) based on local activities

28

Any short-term program will need to incorporate a strong a peace building and conflict resolution components into all project elements that improve cooperation and collaboration with villages, between villages, between ethnic groups, and between pastoralists and agriculture communities. As the worst excesses of the occupation period tended to be driven by extreme religious fundamentalism, local religious leaders should necessarily be engaged in this process.

An important and perhaps more difficult aspect of the recovery and reconciliation process will be to rebuild community confidence and trust in appointed GoM authorities, local elected officials, and GoM technical agencies. In interviews during the final evaluation, many communities expressed some resentment towards GoM authorities and strongly believed that those GoM officials that evacuated the area during the occupation should not be allowed to resume their posts. The direct involvement of GoM authorities, local elected officials, and the technical agencies at all levels will be also be critical to the relief and recovery process, and some program resources should allocated to replacing some of the basic government infrastructure, transporta- tion resources, and key communications links.

Recovery (2-3 years, medium-term measures) - Over the medium-term, programming should focus on expanding and diversifying agricultural production based on the VIP model, continue to build the organizational capacity and expand the roles of FSCs, and consider scaling-up the production activities of selected agricultural cooperatives (and the federation) to a commercial scale. At each step, the new project should plan for the impacts of the climate change and variability that is changing the environment in the Sahel.

Improved methods, such as SRI, SBI, and improved vegetable gardening, should be expanded and community-scale production support infrastructure, including irrigation, rainwater retention and storage, and village-managed grain banks, should be made more durable and more permanent. To increase off season production, any future activity should also consider the expanded use of micro-irrigation technologies and if irrigated perimeter wells could be exploited for multiple use approaches to small-scale production. A medium-scale project should also focus on improving local managerial and organizational skills at the community-level, including improvements in literacy and the availability of educational resources for children.

An expanded agricultural and livestock sector will also demand a larger set of services and skills. Building a service sector through a program of skills training tied to a micro-loan program can create the small businesses needed to support an expanding agricultural sector and/or the development of value-added products. This is also an excellent entry point for unemployed and underemployed rural youth, women, and vulnerable households with limited opportunities to participate in agricultural production. A medium-term project should also focus on improving the river transportation services, improve the environmental stewardship of the Niger River, and improve management of riverine fisheries.

To support critical livestock production, a medium term program should focus on improving services related to animal health, improved community-based pastureland protection and recovery, improving market linkages, increasing and improving pastoral water supplies and

29

water management, introducing improved production techniques, including small-scale “zero grazing”, fodder production and harvesting, and supplemental feeding. Wherever possible, agricultural production should be expanded into the period now considered as the “off season” to increase the quantity and quality of locally produced foods and enable competent producer groups to manage an expansion of local production and access local markets for improved inputs (including mechanization) and to sell surpluses and/or alternative crops. This would also require community-level skills for water and environmental management. Economic Development (5-10 years, longer-term measures) - A longer term project (5-10 years) should focus of the development of competent producer cooperatives that can manage the business of larger-scale, mechanized agriculture and expand an economy based on medium-scale manufacturing of value added products from both the agriculture and livestock sector, and build the service sector. The longer term goal should also be the strengthening of civil institutions that are able to manage and expand key public services in the area of energy, health, environments, sanitation, transportation, municipal water supplies, and law enforcement.

5.0 Annexes

5.1. Scope of work for the evaluation 5.2. List of sites/organizations/persons contacted (available upon special request) 5.3. List of MYAP/TFSI Cooperatives, 5.4. List of reference documents 5.5. List of acronyms 5.6. Copy of evaluation questionnaires

Annex 5.3. - Producer Cooperatives/Federations in the Timbuktu

Region supported the TFSI/MYAP

Number of Number of Total Commune Village Cooperative Type/Name Men Women Goundam Cercle Douekiré Bagadadji Aanafas Agricultural Cooperative 160 0 160 Arkawal Women’s Douekiré Bagadadji 0 28 Agricultural Cooperative 28 Douekiré Saobomo Tartite Agricultural Cooperative 153 0 153 -Echegalan Multifunction Douekiré Adina Koira 151 151 Agricultural Cooperative 0 Douekiré Niambourgou Agricultural Cooperative 163 0 163 Douekiré Donghoi Annya Agricultural Cooperative 151 0 151 Douekiré Douegoussou Agricultural Cooperative 147 0 147 Douekiré Katoua Agricultural Cooperative 157 0 157 Kessou Douekiré Agricultural Cooperative 65 34 99 Koraye Kanaye Kanaye Kayniboga Agricultural Cooperative 23 0 23 Kanaye Ibraka I Agricultural Cooperative 36 0 36 Tele Dendedjer Deyber Agricultural Cooperative 44 0 44 Tele Hanagbera Debedji Agricultural Cooperative 34 0 34 Tele Fatakara Agricultural Cooperative 60 0 60

30

Women Gardeners Agricultural Goundam Goundam 30 30 Cooperative 0 Télé Multifunction Agricultural Goundam Goundam Cooperative 20 17 37 COMFIAT Gardeners + Agricultural Goundam Goundam 14 1 15 Input Suppliers Coop. Goundam Goundam Agricultural Cooperative 30 20 50 COPREG Coop. for Revitalization of 60 60 Goundam Goundam 0 Livestock Production Tonka Bankani Agricultural Cooperative 29 0 29 Diré Cercle Bourem Hara Hara I Nanaye Agricultural Cooperative 155 0 155 Sidi Amar Bourem Hara Hara I Women’s Agricultural Cooperative 0 75 75 Sidi Amar Bourem Horogoungou Agricultural Cooperative 56 0 56 Sidi Amar Kondi Findoukayna Agricultural Cooperative 110 42 152 Kondi Morikoira Agricultural Cooperative 29 0 29 Timbuktu Cercle Akoutoulane Agro-pastoral Alafia Ahara 30 30 Cooperative 0 Hondoubomo- Multifunction Agricultural Alafia koina Cooperative 150 0 150 Niafunké Cercle Naney VIP Agricultural Producers Soboundou Dabi Cooperative 84 0 84

Hamma Soboundou Faroussa Agricultural Cooperative 66 0 66 Koira Fafadoboye Women’s Multifunction Soboundou Tende Agricultural Cooperative 18 60 78

Lassaltaraye Women’s Multifunction Soboundou Tende Agricultural Coop. 63 0 63

Korienze Soboundou Wafakoye Agricultural Cooperative 63 0 63 Haousa Tiomangal Multifunction Agricultural Soboundou Gombatou 71 0 71 Cooperative Multifunction Agricultural Soboundou Sibo 120 0 120 Cooperative Soboundou Tomba Agricultural Cooperative 120 0 120

Federation of Agriculture Cooperative Unions of Kessou and the River Area Union Name HQ Location Village Member Cooperatives Bagadadji Bagadadji, Adina Koira, Saobomo, Niambourgou, Kessou Union (Douekiré Commune, Donghoi, COMFIAT (Goundam) Goundam Cercle) Dougoussou River Union Douegoussou, Katoum, Hara Hara I (Douekiré Commune,

31

Goundam Cercle)

32