Edgeworth's Hedonimeter and the Quest to Measure Utility
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Edgeworth's Hedonimeter and the Quest to Measure Utility by David Colander June 2007 MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 07-23 DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE MIDDLEBURY, VERMONT 05753 http://www.middlebury.edu/~econ Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 21, Number 2—Spring 2007—Pages 215–225 Retrospectives Edgeworth’s Hedonimeter and the Quest to Measure Utility David Colander This feature addresses the history of economic terms and ideas. The hope is to deepen the workaday dialogue of economists, while perhaps also casting new light on ongoing questions. If you have suggestions for future topics or authors, please write to Joseph Persky, c/o Journal of Economic Perspectives, Department of Econom- ics (M/C 144), University of Illinois at Chicago, 601 South Morgan Street, Room 2103, Chicago, Illinois 60607-7121. Introduction Economic thought progresses in fits and starts as promising avenues of research are explored, and then backed away from as researchers change their focus to other, seemingly more promising avenues of research. Then, as still other developments raise questions about these new avenues or as technological devel- opments occur, the older avenues of research become more attractive and are reexplored with new understanding and new knowledge. That pattern of ebb and flow seems to be happening with economists’ study of the foundations of utility theory and measurement, which increasingly is attracting the attention of modern researchers (Easterlin, 2002; Kahneman, Diener, and Schwartz, 1999; Layard, 2005; Camerer, Lowenstein, and Prelec, 2005; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006; Reder, 2006; Bruni and Porta, 2005). In this article, I discuss some earlier debates about the foundations of utility and its measurement, focusing on the contributions of Francis Y. Edgeworth (1845–1926), a famous British economist who was a leader in the development of y David Colander is the Christian A. Johnson Distinguished Professor of Economics, Middle- bury College, Middlebury, Vermont. His e-mail address is ͗[email protected]͘. 216 Journal of Economic Perspectives a more mathematically structured economics in the late 1800s, and Irving Fisher (1867–1947), one of the first quantitative U.S. economists, best-known today for his work on the quantity theory and interest rate theory. Edgeworth argued that utility was directly measurable and that new developments in “physio-psychology” would make it possible to develop a “hedonimeter” that would allow economists to develop a firm physiological underpinning of utility. Fisher, while agreeing with Edgeworth that it was important to have a workable measure of utility, disagreed with Edgeworth about the possibility of doing so with a hedonimeter and, hence, of having any physiological underpinnings of utility. He argued that instead of search- ing for physiological underpinnings of utility, economists should instead rely upon backward induction from observed behavior to measured utility. Neither of these views about the possibility of utility measurement carried through, and attempts to measure utility were abandoned in the 1930s, when utility measurement and happiness considerations were determined to be outside the purview of economics. There are, of course, many aspects of the debate about the dimensionality and measurability of utility. In this paper, I focus on the historical debate over whether economists should be searching for a direct measurement of utility or an indirect measurement of utility. I do not enter the historical debates about ordinal and cardinal dimensions of measurement, the additive aspects of utility functions, or the issues surrounding indifference curve analysis. Discussions of these topics can be found in history-of-thought books, such as Blaug (1996), and in Stigler’s (1950) classic discussion of the history of utility theory. Edgeworth’s Hedonimeter In the 1870s, economics was moving away from classical theories of value based on labor or cost, and moving toward neoclassical theories, which were associated with a mathematization and formalization of economics, a process that gave greater focus to utilitarian foundations of value. In this context, the measurability of utility became a central topic. Edgeworth entered the discussion when in Mathematical Psychics (1881 [1961]), his most famous book, he responded to some pessimistic views about the measur- ability of utility that had recently been expressed by William Stanley Jevons (1835– 1882).1 Edgeworth posited the development of a hedonimeter that would measure utility, which he felt was necessary for the extension of utility analysis to the real world. To posit this hedonimeter, he first had to develop precisely what was meant by a unit of pleasure, which he does in Appendix III of Mathematical Psychics. Edgeworth admits (p. 98) that there is “much difficulty here” and that “hedonism 1 It is often very difficult in the history of thought to specify an author’s views unambiguously, both because those views change and because their views can be interpreted differently in different contexts. As Stigler (1950) points out, stating precisely what Jevons believed about measuring utility is very difficult, since his writings present a number of contradictory views. David Colander 217 may still be in the state of heat or electricity before they became exact sciences, as described by Professor Jevons”; but Edgeworth finds that it is nonetheless useful to “endeavour to gain as clear a view as may be,” and he discusses the quantitative estimates that a person can make of his own pleasure or the pleasure of others. Edgeworth (p. 101; italics in the original) describes in practical terms how a hedonimeter would work. He writes: To precise [sic] the ideas, let there be granted to the science of pleasure what is granted to the science of energy; to imagine an ideally perfect instrument, a psychophysical machine, continually registering the height of pleasure experienced by an individual, exactly according to the verdict of conscious- ness, or rather diverging therefrom according to a law of errors. From moment to moment the hedonimeter varies; the delicate index now flickering with the flutter of the passions, now steadied by intellectual activity, low sunk whole hours in the neighbourhood of zero, or momentarily springing up towards infinity. The continually indicated height is registered by photographic or other frictionless apparatus upon a uniformly moving vertical plane. Then the quantity of happiness between two epochs is represented by the area con- tained between the zero-line, perpendiculars thereto at the points corre- sponding to the epochs, and the curve traced by the index; or, if the correction suggested in the last paragraph be admitted, another dimension will be required for the representation. The integration must be extended from the present to the infinitely future time to constitute the end of pure egoism. Edgeworth (1881 [1961], p. 102) then extends his reasoning to all individuals: “We have only to add another dimension expressing the number of sentients, and to integrate through all time and over all sentience, to constitute the end of pure utilitarianism.” Edgeworth recognized the practical problems of aggregating across individual utilities, but he argued (p. 102) that the “greater uncertainty of hedon- imetry in the case of others’ pleasures may be compensated by the greater number of measurements, a wider average; just as, according to the theory of probabilities, greater accuracy may be attained by more numerous observations with a less perfect instrument.” He further argued that this machine would, in principle, offer recon- ciliation between egoism and altruism, since the pleasure that people take in the happiness of others would be measurable, or as Edgeworth (p. 104) put it, the hedonimeter would integrate into utility “the psychical side of a physical change in what may be dimly discerned as a sort of hedonico-magnetic field.” Edgeworth’s discussion of hedonic measurement was based on developments in psychology, where “psychophysics” was seen as cutting-edge work at the time. Psychophysicists were interested in developing a sensory theory that related exter- nal stimuli to individual feelings. Psychophysics was built on work by Ernst Weber (1795–1878), a professor of physiology at the University of Leipzig who conducted experiments that explored the relationships between physical sensory sensations 218 Journal of Economic Perspectives and external stimuli. For example, Weber blindfolded people who were holding weights, and added additional weights in small increments. He had the individuals indicate when they sensed the increased weight. In doing so, he found that people’s sense of additional weight was proportional to the relative, not the absolute, increase in weight, so that when the weight the blindfolded person was holding was doubled, the threshold for sensing the increased weight also doubled. He found that that this general relationship held not only for perceptions of weight, but also for perceptions of visions and sound. Weber’s work (1834 [1978]) was publicized and extended by G. T. Fechner (1801–1887) in Elements of Psychophysics (1860 [1966]). Fechner suggested a theo- retical explanation for Weber’s observations and put the relationships in functional form, which he called Weber’s Law, but which later psychologists called the Weber–Fechner Law. In mathematical form that law is ϭ ⅐ ͑ ͒ p k ln S/S0 , where p is the individual’s perception of a change, S is the added stimulus, S0 is the beginning stimulus, and k is the relationship parameter.2 Thus, for example, if one were initially holding a large weight, one would need a larger weight added for one to perceive the difference than one would if one were initially holding a smaller weight. Fechner (1860 [1966], p. 7) waxed eloquent about psychophysics, arguing that it can be seen as “an exact theory of the functionally dependent relations of body and soul.” In attempting to develop a theoretical foundation of the relationship, Fechner referred back to Rene Descartes, who saw the pineal gland as the place where body and soul met.