Women’s rights in the two Sudans
A study on the adoption of legislation on women’s rights in Sudan and South Sudan
Political Science C, Bachelor’s Thesis Uppsala University, 2020 Author: Joanna Nathanson Supervisor: Pär Zetterberg Word count: 13988
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Abstract
In 2011 the state of South Sudan gained its independence from Sudan and thus became the world’s youngest country to date. During its nine years of existence the country has ratified several major conventions and protocols on women’s rights, whereas Sudan has yet to ratify any. Despite being the same country until barely a decade ago the two authoritarian countries have approached the legislative rights of women in very different manners. Based on a Method of Difference-design, and with the help of process-tracing, this study seeks to answer why this is. By consulting previous research on why authoritarian states advance women’s rights, this study distinguishes three main, indicative theoretical patterns from earlier research which argues under what circumstances authoritarian states advance women’s rights, and when they do not. These patterns include the stability of the government, the work of women’s rights movements and the states relations with the international community. It is concluded that the explanation for the different behaviours of the two Sudans lay mainly in their tactics of governing. South Sudan adopts reforms on gender equality to keep its population content but makes sure to closely control and monitor these reforms. Their women’s rights organisations can be outspoken, and they share the goals of ratifying certain women’s rights conventions. Furthermore, their main donors often include conditions of state-building on their foreign aid, forcing South Sudan to advance on issues such as women’s rights. In contrast, Sudan applies a more violent and oppressing stance against its population, suppress women’s movements and rely mainly on unconditional investments rather than conditional aid from the international community. Furthermore, the women’s movements of Sudan have not expressed a shared goal of ratifying conventions on women’s rights.
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Table of content
Abstract ...... 3 Map ...... 5 1. Introduction ...... 6 2. Purpose and research question ...... 6 3. History ...... 8 3.1. Sudan under colonial rule...... 8 3.2. One Sudan ...... 9 3.3. From the CPA to independence ...... 12 4. Theory: Why do authoritarian states support women’s rights? ...... 14 4.1. An unstable government ...... 15 4.2. Women’s organisations ...... 16 4.3. Legitimacy in the eyes of others ...... 17 6. Results and analysis ...... 20 6.1. South Sudans ratification process of CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol ...... 20 6.2. Sudans process to non-ratification ...... 22 6.3. The stability of the regimes ...... 22 6.4. Women’s movements ...... 26 6.5. International dependence ...... 29 6.6. Discussion ...... 32 7. Conclusions ...... 34 8. Bibliography ...... 36 Appendix ...... 43
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Map
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1 United Nations, ‘Sudan’ (2012)
1. Introduction
In 2011, the international family gained a new member, South Sudan. It is thereby, with its nine years, the youngest country in the world at time of writing. South Sudan parted from Sudan after decades of almost perpetual war and conflict, dividing Africa’s largest country. Since then, the two states have had time to go their own ways in terms of policymaking and development. With this opportunity, they have decided on very different directions regarding the advancement of women’s rights. Since 2011, South Sudan has acted to ratify and implement several major conventions and protocols on women’s rights. These include the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), considered one of the major developments regarding women’s civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights2, as well as adopting its Optional Protocol to CEDAW (CEDAW-OP). They have also ratified the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo Protocol) and created a National Action Plan (NAP) to United Nations Security Council’s Resolution 1325 (res. 1325). In contrast, the Sudan has not ratified a single one of these, nor created a NAP for res. 1325. Why is this so? Why is it that even though these two states were the same nation until just nine years ago, they have in such short time taken very different approaches to the legislation of women’s rights? This is the question this study hopes to answer.
2. Purpose and research question
The purpose of this study is to understand why the Sudan and South Sudan has gone their different ways when it comes to advancing women’s rights policies. To understand this, this study will make use of a design of John Stuart Mills Method of Difference (MoD)3 and the method of process-tracing4. Not only is gender equality one of the UN Development Goals of Agenda 20305, it is essential for development of all kinds. Gender equality and gender equity have been proven to excel state economies and production levels6 as well as increase the
2 UN General Assembly, ‘Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’, 1979 3 J.S. Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, 1882, chapter VIII. 4 A. L. George and A. Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Scienes, 2005. 5 United Nations, ‘Sustainable Development Goal 5’
Today, most of the world’s countries has ratified CEDAW. The Sudan signed the convention in 2008 but have not yet ratified it11. When the country was split into two, birthing the new state of South Sudan, the new country was quick to ratify not only CEDAW but several other legislative documents on women’s rights. All the while, the Sudan remained inactive in its work for gender equality, making progress first in 2020 by banning female mutilation12. This makes the Sudan and South Sudan splendid cases to look closer at in trying to find why some states advance women’s rights and why some do not. Several scholars have researched this topic, and some of their theories will be used in this study, but by looking at the circumstances and experiences from the cases of Sudan and South Sudan we might find new information on how to answer this.
Thus, the question of this study is:
What are the explanations for Sudan’s and South Sudan’s choices to adopt or not adopt legislation on women’s rights?
7 J. Krause, W. Krause and P. Bränfors, ‘Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace’ 985; UN Women, ‘Preventing Conflict Transforming Justice Securing the Peace’, 2015,
There are many legislative instruments that can be adopted to advance women’s rights. To narrow this down, this study will focus on the ratification of CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol as these are considered two of the major women’s rights conventions globally and regionally. This study will first provide a historical background on Sudan and South Sudan to provide an understanding of the question and the context. Following this, theories on why authoritarian states may or may not adopt women’s rights policies will be presented. After operationalising these it will be possible to identify what circumstances ruled in Sudan and South Sudan and determine what may have been the causes for the different paths taken by the two countries. Probable reasons not covered by the presented theories, as well as possible future prospects, will be briefly discussed following the analysis.
3. History
3.1. Sudan under colonial rule From 1898 to 1956 Sudan was ruled by a mix of Egyptian and British governing and during this time, a sense of differentiating the southern parts of Sudan from the remaining two thirds of the country was already noticeable. For instance, in form of the Closed District Ordinance Act of 1920 in which movement between the northern and southern parts of Sudan was prohibited13. The northern and eastern parts of Sudan was considered Arabic and Muslim whereas the south consisted mainly of African people following traditional religions or Christianity14. Note that this is a great generalisation of the actual conditions since Sudan contains a wide range of cultural and regional beliefs and interpretations of religions. With power emerging from Khartoum in the North, the south rarely got the attention of the colonialists and thus remained greatly under-developed. Most of state expenditure went into northern development, and soon all government facilities, along with all facilities on higher education, were located in, or close-by, Khartoum. During the 1950s, preparations for possible independence of Sudan from its colonial ruling started brewing, and already at this time the South asked to become an autonomous region of Sudan. When that was not accepted, they
13 C. Metelits, ‘“The Elephant Is Not Yet Dead”:’, Inside Insurgency, NYU Press 2010, p. 38
3.2. One Sudan In 1956, Sudan, as a whole, gained its independence, making it the largest state in Africa. It hosted a wide range of ethnic groups and some suggest that more than 400 languages and dialects existed within Sudan’s borders at time of independence. This is one of the reasons Sudan proved difficult to govern, and during the country’s first thirty years no less than three different military officers chose to overthrow elected governments. Because of the social division already in place between north and south in Sudan, and the fact that leaders in Khartoum had done nothing to overbridge this, Sudan was yet to experience two civil wars16. The first one took place from 1955 to 1972 and was fought by the southern Sudanese with the intention to part from the north and becoming a country in its own. This first civil war ended in the Addis Ababa Agreement in which the south did not reach its goal of becoming an independent state, but it did lead to the south attaining a higher degree of regional autonomy. This meant that southern Sudan received its own parliament and a High Executive Council (HEC)17.
This could have been an appreciated solution, but the Addis Ababa Agreement was undermined by Sudan’s then president Nimeiri and under his rule the divisions between communities increased, creating competition for resources and in September 1983 he eroded the south’s autonomy greatly by making Islamic law (Shari’a) the basis of Sudanese law18. This meant that even though as much as one third of Sudan’s population was non-Muslim, Shari’a was imposed on them all. Furthermore, president Nimeiri often interfered with the procedures of the HEC and failed to involve southern leaders in decision-making19. Not unexpectedly, this led to the increased activities of rebel groups in the south, and as the situation worsened Khartoum sent John Garang, an officer in the Sudanese army to mediate. Garang however ended up joining the rebels and overtime he became the leader of this insurgency20 that in 1983 developed into Sudans’ second civil war. It began following the
15 Metelits (n 13) 39. 16 Copnall (n 14) 3. 17 Sudan, Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan’, 1972. 18 Metelits (n 14), 40. 19 Ø. H. Rolandsen, Guerrilla Government: Political Changes in the Southern Sudan during the 1990s, 2005, 26. 20 ibid. 9 forming of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and its political wing Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). This group was founded by deserters and refugees from the south who disagreed with the ruling emerging from Khartoum and it was led by Garang. The SPLA/M followed a vision of what Garang called “A new Sudan”21. This was the hope that Sudan would remain united but become more widely and evenly developed, and to not identify as a divided country but to embrace its multi-racial, multi-religious and multi-ethnic demographic22.
To end this war in the south was an important matter on the governmental agenda in Khartoum and in 1989 a peace agreement started to develop. Only weeks before this agreement was to be realised a coup was staged by military officers from the Sudanese army, led by Omar al-Bashir. al-Bashir and the other leaders of this coup sympathised with the National Islamic Front (NIF), one of the country’s three major political parties at the time, and it became clear that Islamic fundamentalism would play a part in shaping the policies of the regime. A Revolutionary Command Council was instated, with al-Bashir holding the positions of Commander-in-Chief, Minister of Defence and Prime Minister, and among the new administration's first actions was to close media outlets, ban political parties and dissolve the parliament. al-Bashir also brought an end to the peace negotiations with SPLA/M. After this coup, Sudan’s relations with western governments started to devolve, partially because al- Bashir was moving towards a seemingly extremist form of Islam, but also due to an increasing number of reports of the government disrespecting provisions of human rights law23. Something neither the west, nor Sudan’s neighbours, appreciated. In 1995, the US cut all bonds with Sudan and recalled their ambassador from the country.24
SPLA/M also had its fair share of internal disputes and differences, but under Garang’s leadership they became the most influential of the southern insurgent groups and came to control the insurgency. However, there was a lack of transparency and Garang was accused of leading the group in a dictatorial manner. Furthermore, Garang still fought for his vision of a New Sudan, whereas many others in the group wanted independence for South Sudan. This
21 Copnall (n 18), 43. 22 ibid. 23 C. Fluehr-Lobban & R. Lobban, The Sudan Since 1989: National Islamic Front Rule, 2001
During the 1990s there were changes in dynamics of the actors in Sudan. For instance, the relations between Khartoum and Sudan’s neighbour governments in Ethiopia and Eritrea began to worsen as the Islamist agenda of the NIF in Sudan did not match the more west- oriented developments of its neighbours. This urged the SPLA/M to change behaviour and becoming a democratic alternative, thus opening the possibility to receive support from Sudans neighbours. They toned back on the violent coercion of civilians considerably. They decreased their abuses on human rights, addressed the marginalisation of southerners and acknowledged the need for democracy. During this period, the SPLA/M implemented a variety of new structures, extending participation opportunities in decision making and strengthening the role of local leaders. SPLA/M took extra care to include underrepresented groups and designated 25 percent of the local leadership positions to women. They helped villages and communities to arrange elections and to participate in the civil society. These changes positively affected the relationship between SPLA/M and the local communities. Furthermore, SPLA/M had radical changes in its rhetoric, lifting issues of democracy and civil society26. It is however difficult to determine if these changes came from the group itself or if it was merely an attempt to gain international attention and support. It must also be pointed out that during this time, roughly from 1984-1994, due to poor communications and non-transparency, there are gaps in the information on what exactly was going on within the SPLA/M and its splinter groups.
25 Metelits (n 14), 50. 26 ibid, 55. 11
Øystein Rolandsen has weighed together information from various sources and thus created an overarching picture of the events in these years. Rolandsen divides the overall development of SPLA/M into different periods, where 1984-89 the main task was the installation of a standard system of military and civil administration. Later, in 1989-91 there was presumably a time of relative peace, with aid organisations working in the south and trade networks emerging. These achievements were undone, and the south once again fell into a time of conflict after the split of the SPLA/M in 199127. In the mid-1990s, the SPLA/M was severely weakened and there was intense fighting going on between them and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Despite this, the SPLA/M managed to hold its second National Convention in 1994. This convention signified a political turning point for the party as it created political programs and resolutions which granted more participation from local administrative units, and for the first time held elections for top positions within the group28. These changes, indicate that the party was attempting to move away from its militaristic label and to advertise itself as a democratic group. Perhaps most importantly, the purpose of SPLA/M changed. Garang confirmed that the vision was no longer a united Sudan, but self-determination for the south29 . This change of objective caused splinter groups to re-approach the SPLA/M, several of them merging back into their group of origin30 and in 2002 a peace agreement was signed between SPLA/M and SPDF, uniting them under the name of SPLA/M. This created a strengthened SPLA/M and a hard blow to the Sudan governments divide-and-rule tactics31. This agreement, referred to as the Machakos Protocol32, would later be part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), marking the beginning of the end of Sudan’s second civil war33.
3.3. From the CPA34 to independence The CPA was signed on January 9th, 2005 by SPLA/M and the Government of Sudan, officially declaring an end to the civil war. This would not mean that there was a total absence of conflict between north and south, but the clashes were sporadic and did not reach the threshold of a
27 Rolandsen (n 22), 71. 28 ibid, 56. 29 ibid, 53. 30 Metelits (n 14), 66. 31 ibid, 71. 32, Sudan Machakos Protocol, 2002. 33 Metelits (n 14), 72. 34 Sudan – South Sudan, Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005. 12 full-scale armed conflict35. The CPA is built by six agreements, all addressing different areas of importance related to the conflict: autonomy, power sharing, wealth sharing, conflict resolutions and security arrangements. On the issue of self-determination the CPA stated that there would be an interim period of six years, during which the newly established institutions and mechanisms of the CPA would reign, much like Garang’s old vision of the New Sudan. When the six years had passed, the people of South Sudan would vote on either remaining with Sudan or invoking their right of self-determination, becoming a new state. After the signing of the CPA, Garang briefly served as the president of the semiautonomous government of South Sudan, as well as vice president under al-Bashir in Sudan, before dying in a helicopter accident only a few months after36. Garang’s successor was his long-time deputy, Salva Kiir Mayardit. Kiir and Garang had worked closely within the SPLA/M for a long time but were believed to differ in opinion regarding South Sudan’s ultimate status, as part of Sudan, or as an independent state. Kiir continued Garang’s work, upholding the CPA and the improving relations with al-Bashir and the north37. In 2010, Kiir was sworn in as elected president of South Sudan in the first multi-party election in Sudan in nearly 25 years38 and became the first elected head of state for South Sudan ever39. However, it was an election process surrounded by abuses on human rights, such as arbitrary arrests and intimidation of political opponents40. Barely a year later, in January 2011, it was time for South Sudan to vote on independence. During this referendum, the South Sudanese government promised to protect women’s rights and ratify CEDAW, something Sudan had so far proven unwilling to do41. The election participation level was high, with almost 98% of registered voters voting, and the result showed that nearly 99% were in favour of separating from Sudan42.
35 To be officially classified a Non-international Armed Conflict a certain degree of intensity is required, as presented in Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and the Second Additional Protocol of the Geneva Conventions. 36 ‘Sudan’s Garang Dies in Copter Crash’ Al Jazeera (2005)
4. Theory: Why do authoritarian states support women’s rights?
After the split in 2011, one Sudan suddenly became two. And with this, a possibility for them to evolve after their own will followed. This led to one country ratifying CEDAW, the Maputo Protocol and several other women’s rights instruments within the coming nine years, whilst the other country remained unchanged. To understand why states chose to promote women’s rights and implement legislative changes in support of this is a complex matter. Not only are there many possible reasons contributing to the decisions, the human factor in each crossroads makes it nearly impossible to be certain of any ultimate, determinant reason. There is a fair amount of research conducted on this issue, but uncertainties remain as well as ongoing scholarly discussion on what could be determinant when it comes to authoritarian states adopting policies on women’s rights. However, some patterns have gained more attention than others and it is these patterns we will take a closer look at to possibly determine why the cases of the Sudan and South Sudan are what they are. Since neither the Sudan nor South Sudan can be considered democracies, the impact that democracy may have on the advancement of women’s rights will not be of interest in this case. Instead, this study will focus on theories connected to authoritarian states, being more applicable to the contexts of the two Sudans. Research suggests that many of the most politically closed states have indeed made great progress in the advancement of women’s rights43. Even though authoritarian states seldom has women’s rights per se at heart but rather uses them to realise other political objectives and maintaining power, it is shown that the formal adoption of women’s rights is common. Furthermore, there is an ongoing discussion on the role of religion in the adoption of women’s rights. Some scholars argue that religion is of great importance while others suggest that this is not at all the case and the rights of women can vary greatly across countries regardless of its religious status44. Because of these differing opinions, and the uncertainties, religion will not be used as a possible explanation in this study of Sudan and South Sudan.
Instead, this study will look closer at three patterns frequently argued by earlier research and supported by several case studies. The first pattern regards the stability of an authoritarian
43D. Donno and A.K. Kreft, ‘Authoritarian Institutions and Women’s Rights’, 2019, Comparative Political Studies, 2; J. Lorch and B. Bunk, ‘Gender Politics, Authoritarian Regime Resilience, and the Role of Civil Society in Algeria and Mozambique’, 2016, 7. 44 A. M. Tripp, Seeking Legitimacy: Why Arab Autocracies Adopt Women’s Rights, Cambridge University Press 2019, 9. 14 government, arguing that if the incumbent leadership is threatened from domestic occurrences such as riots or coups, the adoption of women’s rights can secure the regime in such instances. The second pattern shows that the presence and work of women’s movements and organisations can contribute to advancement on women’s rights, if these organisations are not connected or driven by the government. The third distinguishable pattern is how the state relates to other countries and international organisations. It is dependent on the country’s goals and dependencies on other international actors. These three patterns will be further explored in the coming sections.
4.1. An unstable government One reason to why authoritarian states may choose to advance women’s rights is if the regime itself is unstable and perhaps threatened by rebel groups disagreeing with the current government. Agreeing to promote women’s rights could then serve as a method of gaining support from women, who statistically make up about half of the population. Thus, advancing women’s rights becomes a way of maintaining power45. Legislating laws on women’s rights and gender equality presents an image of a progressive, open-minded state, giving the people hope of further inclusive development, and yet does not threaten the stability of the authoritarian regime. If suppressed, it would affect economic growth as well as turn the public opinion against the government, and if provided, they would present little to no risk for the regime’s survival46, thus it is a relatively simple method of remaining in power. Even though promoting women’s rights could be a form of survival tactics, and a way to secure incumbent power, there is still a question on why some authoritarian states do more than others in this matter. To answer this, one should take a closer look at the government’s goals and capacity. How gender equality policies are prioritised largely depend on the country’s domestic situation. Mainly to what extent they need support from its population, and its possibilities of co-opting women to support the regime47. Even though an authoritarian regime does not need support from its people in the same way a democracy does, a certain level of public content is required to lessen the risk of uprisings overthrowing the regime. A less established leadership in a state, which enjoys little support from its population, has a lot to gain by introducing women’s rights, as it will oblige the people and stay revolutions. In contrast, a
45 Donno and Kreft (n 43). 46 B. Bueno de Mesquita and G. W. Downs, ‘Development and Democracy’, 2005, Foreign Affairs. 47 Donno and Kreft (n 46), 9. 15 more established authoritarian regime with support and resources may not put these kinds of changes on the top of their priority list, as they feel secure in their power position.
Should this be true for the cases of the Sudan and South Sudan, this would mean that South Sudan had less support from its population, and a need to establish themselves and solidify their rule. Therefore, adopting policies on women’s rights. In contrast, the Sudan would have a more stable and established government, not necessarily in dire need, or interest, of gaining popularity.
4.2. Women’s organisations The second distinguishable pattern concerns women’s rights organisations. If autonomous, these could play a great role in pressuring the government to adopt legislation on women’s rights48. In this study the use of the phrase autonomous means autonomous from the state, but also from political parties. The reason autonomy is important is that when women organise, they can set priorities and goals reflecting their experiences as women. The movement set the agenda, and the agenda consists only of issues on women’s rights. Thus, these rights do not get subordinated to other goals49. If not autonomous from the state, the organisations can be used as tools by the regime to gain political and international support. If regimes establish their own organisations on women’s rights, they could simply work in favour of the regime by mobilising voters, spreading the ruling party’s agenda and preventing other, autonomous, movements on women’s rights to emerge and spread50. An example of this can be found in Tanzania, where the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) introduced gender quotas. Since the party itself controlled the biggest territory and was an extensive organisation it had no problem picking women loyal to the party to fill these positions. Thus, the CCM was able to gain in popularity amongst women without risking its dominance51. In some cases, this has also granted the regime international support for their women’s movements, thus indirectly supporting the continued existence of the regime52. In fragmented countries, whether this fragmentation finds its base in ethnicity, religion or other, the prioritisation of
48 M. Htun and S. L. Weldon, The Logics of Gender Justice: State Action on Women’s Rights Around the World Cambridge University Press, 2018, 55. 49 ibid, 54. 50 Lorch and Bunk (n 43) 9. 51 Z. Smail Salhi, Gender and Diversity in the Middle East and North Africa, Routledge, 2010, 48. 52 Lorch and Bunk (n 46), 9. 16 women’s rights tends to decrease, as there are other issues crowding the discussion53. Similarly, discussions on gender equality sometimes overlap with nationalist discourses in post-independence states as nationalist movements exploit cooperation with women’s rights groups to gain support from the international community which could have a negative impact on the autonomy of women’s rights movements54. This is something that will be further discussed in the coming section on international support.
Since this study seeks to answer why specific women’s rights policies has been ratified by South Sudan and not the Sudan one must also look at the goals of the feminist organisations. Women’s movements not pushing for the ratification of CEDAW or the Maputo Protocol are evidently much less likely to get these ratified than movements specifically designated to these goals. This reconnects to the autonomy of the groups, and their ability to set their agenda freely.
When applied to the cases of South Sudan and the Sudan, we should be seeing autonomous women’s organisations, without connections or dependence on the government, nor being simply branches of other parties or movements, pushing for ratification of women’s rights legislation in South Sudan. Whereas the Sudan should either have less autonomous groups, or groups that do not specifically strive towards the ratification of these policies.
4.3. Legitimacy in the eyes of others A study on why the countries in the Maghreb area (Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco) advanced in women’s rights, diverging from the Arab Middle East, countries with which they share religion, language and historical rulers55, shows that not only do the aforementioned reasons, women’s movements and unstable regimes, aid the advancement of women’s rights. Projecting the picture of a modern and advancing country to the outside world is just a big of a reason. As Zahia Smail Salhi describes it, it could “brighten up the image of the state”56, and by introducing women’s rights authoritarian states can portray a sense of moving towards democratisation57, which is often appreciated by a large part of the international community.
53 Donno and Kreft (n 46), 9.
54 Smail Salhi (n 54), 48. 55 Tripp (n 47), 7. 56 Smail Salhi (n 54), 49. 57 Lorch and Bunk (n 46), 8. 17
Status on women’s rights can be viewed as an effect, or indication, of economic, social or cultural conditions of a country or to present a state’s preferred image by being indicative of future conditions. For instance, having many women in politically important positions has been linked to countering corruption58. Thus, the status of women’s rights in a state can signal many things about it, making it possible to use women’s rights in a way that benefits the image said state wants to present, tweaking it to fit target members of the international community. By this logic, the Sudan’s non-advancement on women’s rights would be meant to appease other countries that may not have accepted CEDAW or Maputo Protocol, or aiming to receive aid without restrictions or demands. In contrast, South Sudan would try to placate countries that have adopted these policies or do what is necessary to receive certain funding.
5. Design and method
This study takes inspiration from the Method of Difference (MoD)59, a fitting design when researching cases that share common traits, only differing in one aspect and the outcome60. This applies to the cases of the Sudan and South Sudan as they share history, previous government, economy and many other things, but has since 2011 diverted as countries, and in the advancing of women’s rights policies. This would mean that there has since been one, or more, aspects or variables that is different between the two states and that this would be the variable that explains the different outcomes. The aim of this study is to determine this independent variable, or variables, that led to the different approaches to policies on women’s rights of the two countries.
To decide whether the three theoretical patterns described in the previous chapter are in fact formative for the outcomes of women’s rights legislation in the Sudan and South Sudan, this study will make use of the method of process-tracing61. In the cases of the Sudan and South Sudan common traits of the two countries are previous governance, being authoritarian states, similar natural resources, and coming from a unified relationship with the international community. The dependent variable is the adoption of women’s rights policies and legislation on women’s rights, specifically CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol. This study suggests that the
58 Htun and Weldon (n 51), 44–48. 59 George and Bennett (n 4), ch 8. 60 ibid, 252. 61 ibid, ch 11. 18 reasons for this, the independent variables, are i) an unstable government with threatened leadership; ii) existence of autonomous feminist movements with an agenda of ratifying CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol and iii) a will of being accepted by other international actors. To determine if these are present in the case of South Sudan, and not in Sudan they will be operationalised to more concrete variables, which will then be qualitatively assessed.
Determining the stability of the government will be done with inspiration from the Fragile State Index (FSI). To measure the fragility of states, they use a set of indicators, and four of these will contribute to the understanding of the situations in the Sudan and South Sudan. The first indicator is security apparatus which considers possible threats to a state, such as rebel movements, coups, battle-related deaths and perceived trust in the regime by citizens62. The second category is factionalised elites, considering possible fragmentation within state institutions, whether ethnic, religious or racial. It also measures power struggles, political competition and credibility of electoral processes63. The third indicator is group grievance, measuring possible fragmentation within society. For example, if there are divisions between different groups of the population, or if specific groups are in any way singled out by the regime64. The fourth and last indication on the stability of the regime is state legitimacy which considers the relationship between the government and the citizens. It looks at the ability of states to exercise basic functions, transparency and representativeness of the government, as well as level of confidence in state institutions and processes emanating from the people65. As this is a qualitative study, these indicators and their meanings as explained above will be used to examine the state of the two Sudans, providing a nuanced picture of how the two differ from each other.
Regarding the second line of theory on women’s movements, this will be determined by seeing if there have existed autonomous women’s organisations in South Sudan since 2011, and if so, did they have the ratification of CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol on their agenda. The same will be examined in the Sudan.
62 The Fund for Peace, ‘C1: Security Apparatus’
Lastly, to determine the countries relations with others, the study will focus on financial and political relations with other states. What are the different financial and political relations of the two countries with the rest of the world, and what image of the country do the Sudans want, or need, to present? In short, the study will explore the dependency of the countries as well as possible incentives to portray an image ‘approved’ by the international community of their choice.
Since both Sudans are authoritarian states that have been relatively closed to the outside world, finding reliable data and information is a challenge. There are many differing accounts on how certain events have played out, what incentives groups had at specific times, and the conditions inside the governmental apparatuses. For instance, South Sudan do not possess a governmental website providing official documents and statements. Instead, the study has taken detours to retrieve such information, making use of different online newspapers, online reports on the Sudans, as well as scholarly books and book chapters from library databases. This study has taken care to only include information that has been deemed reliable, either by originating from a reliable source, or by gaining support from other, to each other unrelated, sources. The material presented in this study is thus reliable, but readers should keep an open mind to the fact that some level of uncertainty remains.
6. Results and analysis
6.1. South Sudans ratification process of CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol In South Sudan, the women’s organisations have been many, active and had the ratifications of CEDAW and Maputo Protocol placed high on their agendas. Only a few days after South Sudan gained its independence, the South Sudan Women Lawyers Association (SSWLA) began its work for advancing women’s rights, encouraging the new government to ratify not only CEDAW, but also the Maputo Protocol66. South Sudanese women were largely unaware about their rights, or lack thereof, and so this ratification and the process leading up to it became a source of information and knowledge. As mentioned by Edmund Yakani Berizilious, executive director of Community Empowerment for Progress Organisation (CEPO), a South Sudanese
66 ‘Women Stand up for Their Rights in the New Republic of South Sudan’ United Nations Development Programme (2011)
67 South Sudan Community Empowerment for Progress Organization, ‘South Sudan National Parliament Ratifies CEDAW’ (2014)
6.2. Sudans process to non-ratification In Sudan there have also been movements and grass-root initiatives in support of women’s rights. These have however been met with greater governmental resistance than those in South Sudan, and they have not had ratifying CEDAW and Maputo Protocol as their main goal. Sudan did sign the Maputo Protocol as early as 2008, but has yet to ratify it, meaning that they are not bound by law to adhere to it. They have not signed, and thus not ratified, CEDAW.
6.3. The stability of the regimes South Sudan is a splintered country, both within governmental institutions and amongst its own population. The rebel groups are many and there have been uprisings and one civil war, seriously threatening the regime. The conflicts have caused major displacement of people, whose life situations has worsened additionally due to draughts, surviving only by the aid of international organisations and other countries. When looking more closely at the history of SPLA/M, one can establish that even though the group eventually had a common goal of independence it was not particularly unified. To develop a unity in South Sudan has been difficult once this could no longer be based on the opposition of the North. Furthermore, South Sudan is, as mentioned, an incredibly diverse country, with its two major ethnic groups being the Dinkas, who are in majority, followed by the Nuer. Sources differ on the exact demographics, but these two groups make up roughly half of the population and the rest are
73 Amnesty International, South Sudan: Joint letter to President Kiir on accession to CAT, CEDAW and CRC, 2014. 74 Steward Women, ‘Projects’
Kiir remained in the presidential chair during the civil war, and in 2018, following pressure from the international community, a peace agreement was signed along with an agreement on power sharing.79 Machar returned as vice president, and the work to set up a power- sharing transitional government began 80. The political situation in the country today is still far from stable. South Sudan was classified as ‘not free’ in the Freedom House ranking of 2019, scoring merely 2 points on a scale to one hundred, with -2 on political rights81. The peace deal signed by Machar and Kiir has been broken repeatedly from both parties, and smaller rebel groups have not signed this peace deal, resulting in continued insecurity and conflicts
76 CIA Factbook, ‘Africa: South Sudan’ https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/geos/od.html>; Gurtong, ‘Peoples Profiles’
North of the border, in the Sudan, al-Bashir, front-figure of the National Congress Party (NCP), has been president since 1989, having plenty of time to establish a governmental structure working for him, keeping his leadership safe. Nonetheless, there have been protests against him and the NCP, although more effectively quelled than what could be achieved in the South. This was until 2019, when al-Bashir was overthrown after 30 years of ruling Sudan84. Al-Bashir was careful to balance his power and much of his politics relied on a tactics of divide-and-rule, which is why the regime remained for so long despite widespread opposition85. Al-Bashir ruled the Sudan by means of violence and coercion, and during his time of presidency, there were many uprisings and protests. The most known include the Darfur rebellions86 and the violent protests of 2013 which spread across the whole country and led to the government killing and detaining hundreds of people87. Furthermore, the NCP had great control over the media, making sure it provided their version of events. After the coup in 1989, Sudan went from having 134 different newspapers to having only one, the newly created Sudan News Agency. It was clear to many that the state news was not telling the full and true events, yet it served as an obstacle for people to rebel, since they were kept in the dark on many of the governments doings. During the Arab spring however, out of fear it would spread to Sudan,
82 ibid. 83 Metelits (n 14), 59. 84 M. Lindstam, ‘Bekräftat: Omar Al-Bashir Gripen Av Militär’ (Stockholm, 11 April 2019)
Since the split of the two Sudans the north’s economy has wavered. Losing much of its income from the southern oil fields, the government started raising food prices and dropping fuel and sugar subsidies. The economic deterioration led to many of the governments patronage networks disappearing almost overnight92, making the economic situation even more strained. In 2018, there was a developing shortage of bread which sparked riots and demonstrations throughout the country. The focus shifted and the uprisings instead became a movement to overthrow the regime. The government’s response was arresting hundreds of protesters and then, rather effectively, silencing local and international media. As the economy steadily deteriorated, the protests increased both in size and in numbers, and would often get violent93, causing Al-Bashir to ban all unauthorized rallies. An unsuccessful tactics, since al-Bashir was removed from office in April 2019 and arrested by the state military. Following this, a transitional government has been set up, with no less than four female ministers94. This transitional government came into power in September 2019 and will remain in power over a 39-month long transition period after which new elections will take place. The uprising in 2019 may not have been possible if not for the women involved. Women made up a substantial part, often a majority, of the participating protesters. This may partly have been
88Moss (n 92), 1009–1010. 89 ‘Divisions in Sudan’s Ruling Party and the Threat to the Country’s Future Stability’ (2011). 90 I. A. W. Mohamed, The Political Parties and the Military Rule Experience in Sudan (2013) 179. 91 ibid 173. 92 ibid 170. 93 A. A. Sikainga et al., ‘Sudan under Bashir’, Encyclopedia Britannicaedia Britannica (Encyclopedia Britannica, inc 2020)
Neither of the Sudans has had an easy, un-contested rule, and neither have the full support of its people. To say that the regimes were unstable is almost an understatement, as clarified by the Fragile State Index where both countries has remained in the world’s bottom ten on issues of security and trusted governments96. However, the two countries have chosen different ways of dealing with this. The South has indeed made use of the benefits of non-coordination goods97, following the theories on advancement on certain policy issues to remain in power. They have provided the image of a country trying to advance democracy and caring about its people. If this is truly the intentions of Kiir and the SPLA/M is hard to determine, but nonetheless they have successfully kept their population content by advancing certain policies and using a certain rhetoric. Sudan on the other hand, does not seem to be as bothered of what its population thinks of the government. Instead, al-Bashir has used a method of suppressing media and organisational rights, as well as making rebellion and other joined efforts difficult to plan and follow through. History has also shown that to protest against al- Bashir and the NCP comes with high risk, as the government has shown little restraint when it comes to killing, abusing and detaining protesters. During his 30 years of presidency, he has focused on tweaking governmental institutions to secure his rule. Instead of keeping the public happy to prevent uprisings, al-Bashir focused on making the uprisings themselves difficult and costly. He has also made sure to get rid of possible enemies from within the NCP, reducing the risk of a coup. These different approaches to quelling rebellions show why the Sudans has acted differently when it comes to advancing women’s rights. South Sudan has done so to placate the public, whereas the Sudan has focused on hindering the public from doing anything about the nonrecognition of these rights.
6.4. Women’s movements South Sudan has many women’s movements working for gender equality, an end to gendered violence and supporting female representation in various fields. Not only are there extensive efforts and specific programs in action from international organisations as Women for Women
95 M. Hassan and A. Kodouda, ‘Sudan’s Uprising: The Fall of a Dictator’ (2019) Journal of democracy, 99. 96 The Fund for Peace, ‘Fragile State Index - Comparative Analysis’
The feminist forces in the Sudan are strong as well, and women played a large role in the dethroning of al-Bashir. They are however still struggling on issues of representation and civil rights, as can be seen by the non-recognition of women’s rights policies and legislation by the government. Women’s groups faced a lot of resistance from the al-Bashir government, with groups working for the rights of women being repeatedly banned and female activists being detained100. Overall, the Sudan has been highly suspicious of civil organisations, including those in favour of women’s rights. The state sees them as a threat to the regime and makes sure to keep close control over them101, sometimes requiring organisations to add members of the NCP in order to be registered at all102. The women’s movements in the Sudan have still managed to stay active, organising several protests against a variety of governmental policies. Protests which the government responded to in a violent and repressive manner, arresting, detaining, harassing and sexually abusing protesters. Even peaceful protests have been met with violence by the government, and sometimes students engaged in civil society groups
98 Government of South Sudan, Relief and Rehabilitation Commission Act, 2016. 99 ibid 7(13). 100 J. Henry and Human Rights Watch, ‘“Good Girls Don’t Protest”: Repression and Abuse of Women Human Rights Defenders, Activists and Protesters in Sudan. 101 E. Grawert, Forging Two Nations Insights on Sudan and South Sudan (Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern & Southern Africa (OSSREA) 2013). 102 Henry and Watch (n 104). 27 have been targeted at their campuses103. The government of the Sudan has, much like South Sudan, put in place a legal order helping them to stifle activism, often by using vague wordings and descriptions such as forbidding actions “contrary to the public morals”104. The persecution of women’s rights activists has led to women’s organisations keeping a low profile, trying to stay under the governments radar. This includes not openly discussing issues that may be deemed sensitive by the government, one of these sensitive issues being the ratification of CEDAW105. Even if CEDAW was not marked a sensitive subject however, it is not certain that this would be the goals of the Sudanese women’s movements as there is an ongoing debate whether these conventions are compatible with the country’s ruling shari’a. There are Islamic forces on one side arguing that they are not, and that they destroy family values, whereas other Islamic forces argue that the articles of CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol can be implemented alongside shari’a106. There are several feminist activists arguing that shari’a is good for women, but it has been interpreted in a discriminatory way by the men in charge. The discussion on ratification of CEDAW is mostly held by the Sudanese elite while the majority of the country remains uninvolved, feeling the discussion fails to adhere to their basic needs. Another issue is that the discriminatory interpretation of shari’a is very set in the lives of Sudanese women, it is habit, attitude and value system, and even feminist activist can sometimes find it difficult to change their life this drastically107. To great extent, Sudanese feminists do not want a ‘western feminism’ as formulated in, for instance, CEDAW. Instead they seek an Islamic feminist ideology and interpretation of shari’a108. When looking at the goals and projects of major civil society groups working for gender equality such as Sudanese Organisation for Research and Development (SORD) and Girifna, they are about societal change, but there is no mention of CEDAW or the Maputo Protocol. Therefore, suggestions on ratifying the conventions with reservations on parts not compatible with shari’a is the proposition argued by most in the Sudan.
103 ibid, 8–9. 104 Sudan: The Criminal Act 1991 para 152. 105 Henry and Watch (n 104) 16. 106 L. Tønnessen, ‘Competing Perceptions on Women’s Civil Rights in Sudan’ (2007) CMI Brief, 3. 107 L. Tønnessen, ‘Gendered Citizenship in Sudan:Competing Perceptions of Women’s Civil Rights within the Family Laws among Northern and Southern Elites in Khartoum’, 2007, 3-4. 108 CMI, ‘Contesting Women’s Rights in Sudan’ (2011)
Both Sudans have indeed had their fair share of active and reasonably autonomous women’s movements, although the Sudanese women’s groups have met a lot more resistance from their government. Furthermore, the goals of the feminist movements are different in the two countries, with the South Sudanese putting more effort in the ratification of CEDAW and the Maputo protocol and the Sudanese striving towards goals of their own making. The Sudanese protests of 2018 and 2019 were mainly led by women and feminist movements, and after the transitional government was instituted advancements on women’s rights were quick to follow. This suggests that their existence has in fact made a difference and that the reason women’s rights were not advanced under the presidency of al-Bashir is connected to the fact that they had to work in the shadows and did not get the opportunity to openly discuss ideas and proposals on development. To this, al-Bashir and the NCP showed little interest in hearing the civil rights movements, and more interest in silencing them.
6.5. International dependence South Sudan have decent relations with several other countries, and many times these have indeed been the populations, if not the country’s, lifeline. The US has been one of South Sudan’s biggest financial supporters, contributing with humanitarian aid to Sudan in the turbulent times of the 1990s, and continuing to do so still. Since independence in 2011, the US has aided more than 9,5 billion USD to South Sudan, most of which has been used for humanitarian purposes109. Alongside the US, Norway and the UK have also been deeply involved in the development of South Sudan. They were engaged in the development of the CPA, and alongside the EU and African countries they invested heavily in capacity- and state building. The countries have consistently urged South Sudan to address its governmental and state building issues, pressing on the need to further develop infrastructure and promote human rights. Norway, for instance, has the requirement that its foreign aid is always implemented in a gender-equal manner110, and the UK offers assistance only if it is used with the goal of poverty relief, including the underlying causes of poverty, and if done in a way that contributes to reducing gender inequality111. The relationship between South Sudan and the
109 ‘South Sudan’ (Foreign Assistance)
US has deteriorated since 2011, mainly due to Washington’s disapproval of the governments support for certain rebel groups, insufficient efforts to combat corruption and human rights violations112. They do, however, remain South Sudan’s overall biggest supporter in humanitarian aid113. China has invested in South Sudan’s oil sector and in 2017 owned 40 percent of the country’s oil fields but has remained relatively uninvolved in the state building of South Sudan 114. Overall, despite possessing the third largest oil reserves in sub-Saharan Africa115 South Sudan is among the poorest countries in the world and 82% of its population lived in poverty in 2016116. Not surprisingly, the country relies heavily on financial support from outside actors and must therefore secure the funding received from the UK and other western donors. One indicative event of South Sudan’s willingness is that the country early on committed itself to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), even though their prospects of achieving them looked somewhat grim at the time117.
During the presidency of al-Bashir, the relations with many western societies, as well as with the Sudan’s neighbours has deteriorated. Two times since the 1956 independence, the diplomatic relations between the Sudan and the US has been suspended and in 1997 USA imposed sanctions on Sudan. The relationship between Sudan and the US did not recover for a long time, but in 2017 the sanctions were finally lifted118. Sudan does however remain on the US list of states sponsoring terrorism119. Despite these long-term sanctions and political differences, the US has been a major donor of humanitarian aid to Sudan, providing food to civilians during famines and draughts120. A much-needed aid since 2011 when, as mentioned
112 C. Mutasa and K. Virk, ‘Building Peace in South Sudan: Progress, Problems and Prospects’. 113 ‘South Sudan 2020 (Humanitarian Response Plan)’ (Financial Tracking Service)
121 UNSC Res 1556 2004; UNSC Res 1591 2005; UNSC Res 1945 2010. 122 Sudan (Republic of Sudan) Country Study Guide Volume 1 Strategic Information and Developments (n 124) 56. 123 China’s Foreign Aid 2011, 14. 124 China’s Foreign Aid 2014, 1. 125 J. Hammond, ‘Sudan: China’s Original Foothold in Africa’ (The Diplomat, 2017)
Neither of the two Sudans have had a stable or successful economic development in the last nine years. Both countries have a high degree of poverty and corruption129 and rely on aid and investments from others. The main difference between the two Sudan’s relationships with the outside world is probably from where they seek and receive their support. The South wants to distance themselves from the Sudan and their values, and thus seek support mainly from western societies. Promoting women’s rights is an effective way of gaining positive attention from these countries as it shows progressiveness and hints of democratisation, something widely appreciated by the west. Also, since many western countries, among them the US, has not been the biggest fans of the Sudan, everything the South can do to not be like their northern neighbours will make them the country of choice for western donors. This relationship works both ways however, not only does South Sudan seek to please the west, the west also puts restrictions on the aid that the South can receive by making the aid contingent on the forms of development in certain sectors. In contrast, the Sudan has looked to the east in search for support. Befriending countries like China and Russia, who invest greatly in Sudans oil and mining industries without putting pressure on political change in the country. As mentioned by Sudan’s energy Minister Awad al-Jaz: “With the Chinese, we don’t feel any interference in our Sudanese traditions or politics or beliefs”130. To this, most of the economic inflow from foreign actors, not consisting of humanitarian aid, come to Sudan in the form of investments which puts less importance on the political and social status of Sudan. Thus, Sudan does not have the same incentives or needs to change policies to appeal to their donors.
6.6. Discussion Even though the Sudan and South Sudan have many similarities, they divert on the three theoretical paths outlined in previous sections. Both states have experienced uprisings, rebellions and protests from their population, but have handled these differently. The Sudan, with al-Bashir and the NCP in the lead, have had a long time to establish their institutions to work in their favour, not necessarily in the favour of the people. They have made mobilisation and unity among the people difficult and quelled uprisings with violence and detainment. This contrasts from the much younger leadership of SPLA/M in South Sudan, who have not had
129 ‘Corruption Perceptions Index’ (Transperancy International, 2019)
As mentioned, there are some insecurities in the reporting from the regimes, a lack of official sources, and overall diverting accounts on events. Furthermore, the resources available for this study has not allowed for an all-covering analysis of the two Sudan’s. This will be a task for future researchers. The results presented in this study is thus not the whole picture, but merely a pixel in it. The conclusions of this study could be complemented by extensive field studies in the two Sudan’s, conducting interviews with state officials, civilians and women’s
33 civil movements. Due to the limited scope of the study, not all possible explanations have been explored, it has however presented three of the more probable lines of theory. These do not act independently but are intertwined, and together they help shape the futures of women’s rights in the two countries. Within these, there are lines of arguing that has not been explore in this study but could have affected the development of women’s rights in the countries. One such line of theory could be the timing of the women’s organisations. It is suggested that for women’s movements to have the largest impact they must act at a sort of turning point or juncture, in the state of things131. These junctures could be during the transitioning periods between war and peace, they could be during major times of reforms, they could be at a change in leadership or when a country gains independence. Indeed, the independence of South Sudan in 2011 could have served as one of these critical junctures. As noted by the women’s groups active in this time, South Sudan was in the process of drafting its new constitution, thus calling for a breaking of the silence and an increased advocacy process for CEDAW132. The Sudan under the rule of al-Bashir has had no such obvious juncture, but the overthrowing of al-Bashir, and the drafting of a new constitution, may well pave the way for advancement on women’s rights in Sudan.
7. Conclusions
This study sought to identify explanations for why the two Sudans choose to adopt, or not adopt, legislation on women’s rights by following three lines of theory addressing the stability of the regimes, the autonomy and purpose of their women’s movements and their relations with the international community. Conclusively, the main difference between the two countries are their tactics of safeguarding their rule, something that can be observed throughout all three lines of theory.
It shows that Sudan and South Sudan both had issues of legitimacy from their population, both had active women’s movements, and both countries are far from financially self-dependent. However, the two countries responses to these three circumstances has been almost the opposite of each other, creating widely different contexts. Where South Sudan sought to gain recognition and acceptance from its people, giving them rights as long as it did not interfere
131 Tripp (n 44) 45–48. 132 Tesfaye (n 41). 34 with the ruling of the regime, the Sudan instead made sure that the people had no easy way of opposing the non-recognition of these rights. There is however reason to believe that these changes would not have come to be were it not for the SPLA/Ms confidence in its ability to monitor and control these. Furthermore, the South mainly seeks recognition and support from western countries and organisations who tends to put political prices on their aid, whereas the Sudan turn to financial donors who interfere less with the governments domestic matters and policies. Lastly, autonomous women’s movements have indeed been active in both Sudans, thus, their mere existence seems to have little impact on the advancement on women’s rights. It is their goals, and mobilisation around these, that do. Not to mention the responses from the regime. In a regime that incites fear and danger should civil society speak up, as Sudan does, the possibility for women’s rights reforms shrinks. In countries as South Sudan however, where the organisations share a common goal and where the states permit these organisations to exist relatively freely, change can happen. It can therefore be determined that the reason Sudan and South Sudan has gone from being the same country, to greatly diverting in the advancement on women’s rights in less than 10 years depends on the ruling tactics used by the regimes. In the end, al-Bashir was overthrown in a revolution mainly led by women. It would therefore seem that legislating women’s rights is not only beneficial for women, it might also be beneficial for authoritarian governments.
35
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Appendix i.
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