New Historical Review

Volume 85 Number 4 Article 2

10-1-2010

Journey to the "Outside": The U.S. Army on the Road to the Southwest

Janne Lahti

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Recommended Citation Lahti, Janne. "Journey to the "Outside": The U.S. Army on the Road to the Southwest." Historical Review 85, 4 (2010). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr/vol85/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in New Mexico Historical Review by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]. "The More of Them Are Killed the Better" RACIAL IDENTIlY AND NONCOMBATANT IMMUNIlY IN CIVIL WAR NEW MEXICO

James M. Bartek

" Excuse my bad writing for I am in a very great hurry," artillerist Frank Starr apologized to his father in early October 1861. "It is rumored that we march next monday-where to I do not know but I suspect towards New Mexico." Penned with palpable anticipation from Camp Sibley outside , Texas, this briefletter presaged a significant expansion of the , which most Americans assumed would last no more than a few weeks when the conflict started in April. Stalemated in the East, some Southerners looked to the Southwest for the decisive encounter that would secure the independence of their country, the Confederate States ( of America. , which included all of present-day Ari- zona, seemed ripe for the taking. The subsequent campaign to expand the Confederate empire, however, did not go unchallenged. Union volunteers blunted the rebel advance at the Battle of in March 1862 and eventually secured the territory for the .' Unsurprisingly, the conduct, if not overall strategy, of the seemed to mirror in large degree the events taking place in the East: Americans fought Americans and make-shift hospitals overflowed with casualties. Historians even retroactively dubbed the single climactic encoun­ ter at Glorieta Pass the "Gettysburg of the West." As in the East, the ethos of "civilized" warfare among the combatants tempered the ferocious fighting:

James M. Bartek is an instructor of History at the University of Kentucky in Lexington, where he received his PhD in 2010. His dissertation, "The Rhetoric ofDestruetion," explores the issues of race and noncombatant immunity during the American Civil War. 324?NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME85,NUMBER4

Prisoners of war were granted quarter, the wounded were tended, and soldiers often ruminated on the inherent humanity of their enemy. At least in one glaring regard, however, the New Mexico campaign differed drastically from the events unraveling on the other side of the River. A policy of military restraint toward civilians, however tenuous, continued to hold sway in the East, at least through 1863. Anglo American soldiers encountering enemy civilians tended to adopt, with important exceptions, relatively mild retributive policies. Despite inflammatory rhetoric demanding that the enemy's country be laid to waste, Union and Confederate soldiers stopped far short of total devastation. In New Mexico and , however, Union and rebel troops encountered not Anglo Americans but Hispanic Americans among the civilian population. Both armies, in effect, became occupiers of a "foreign" land, and the multiracial Southwest ultimately exposed the shal­ lowness of Anglo notions toward "civilized" warfare. Uniformly denounced as treacherous "greasers" or "indolent" peons, native New fell prey to Northern and Southern volunteers who plundered and destroyed with abandon. Far from pillaging for the sake of pillaging, volunteers were in fact making a profound social statement concerning the values and ideals of mid-nineteenth-century Anglo America.'

The Southwest in 1860

In 1860 the preponderance of U.S. Army regulars were scattered in company­ sized detachments throughout the West. Chasing down Indians only oc­ casionally interrupted an otherwise monotonous life of road building, fort construction, and parade drill. The secession crisis demanded soldiers play a much greater role. In response to the rebellion, the federal government transferred a significant number of troops to the East. Some forts were completely abandoned while others were handed to hastily raised volunteer units. The inevitable confusion left the remaining Union defenders vulner­ able. With all eyes fixed on eastern battlefields, federal help would not be forthcoming should a crisis arise. Some Southerners, Texans especially, deemed New Mexico Territory too great a prize not to exploit. Annexing the territory would bring the South one step closer to becoming a continental nation. With New Mexico secured, so went the conventional wisdom, it was only a matter of time before threw in its lot with the Confederacy- significant discontent with the federal government among Californians lent plausibility to the scenario-or was conquered in turn. Already stretched thin on the Atlantic Coast, the would be hard pressed to blockade Pacific ports effectively, leaving the FALL2010

South with virtually unfettered access to international trade. The capture of southwestern gold and silver mines would guarantee a steady flowof precious metals at the expense of the Union war effort. Most importantly, significant gains in the Southwest might win the foreign recognition Southern leaders so desperately sought. If the plans seemed grandiose, they at least corresponded with an overall Confederate national strategy of winning independence from the Union. A few ambitious Texans considered the conquest of New Mexico merely the firststage of an even grander design: the creation of a Confederate empire in Latin America.' The philosophy of expansionism was a potent force during the 185os. As the rancor of sectional politics increased, Texans' historical yearning for territorial aggrandizement neatly coalesced with a more general Southern desire to expand the institution of slavery. For many proponents, expansion seemed the only way to ensure slavery's survival. The drive for the expan­ sion of slavery gained urgency after the election of 1860, which brought to power a Republican administration that advocated immediate containment as a road to eventual abolition. If safeguarding slavery required expansion, federal opposition to slavery's extension required southern secession. In October 1860, the Weekly Sun in Vicksburg, Mississippi, insisted, "The Southern States once constituted as an independent Republic, the acquisi­ tion of Mexico, Central America, San[to] Domingo, and other West [Indies] Islands would follow as a direct and necessary result." The newspaper's editor concluded that the Gulf of Mexico could be made into a "Southern lake." For Texas nationalists, the prospect of unhindered expansion was equally attractive, although advocates invariably couched the benefits in more provincial terms. "We must have [the northern Mexican states of] Sonora and ," declared James Reily, a future officer for a Texas volunteer regiment. "With Sonora and Chihuahua we gain Southern Cali­ fornia, and by a railroad to Cuaymasrender our State of Texas the great highway of nations." The improbability of the success of such schemes did not prevent them from gaining widespread acceptance, and the possible extent of southern power appeared limited only by the imagination. Not by accident, the Knights of the Golden Circle, a secretive organization dedicated to the creation of a slavery empire in Latin America, found its greatest support in Texas." The desire to expand slavery to the west and south was simply one component of the much larger phenomenon of . Hardly limited to Southerners, the belief that American values and institutions were destined to spread across the North American continent and perhaps the hemisphere had been a driving force since the United States' inception. 326?NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME85, NUMBER4

Americans touted their country as a paragon of republicanism or democracy and an exemplar of freedom. Other peoples, they assumed, would only benefit from American tutelage. But as might be expected of a country that simultaneously espoused the equality of man and tolerated racial slavery, its philosophy about its continental destiny was rife with tensions and contradic­ tions. Civilizing the savage and enlightening the ignorant too often equated with intolerance, subjugation, or extermination. Nor would those peoples subjected to American "enlightenment" have much choice in the matter. The United States ruthlessly demonstrated what manifest destiny meant in regard to Mexicans in 1846. Upon seizing all of northern Mexico, Americans determined that uplifting such an "indolent" people might not be possible or even desirable. In 1848, Lorenzo Thomas, a U.S.-Mexico War officer and future Civil War general, surmised, "The people are addicted to gaming, & robbing is common to the mass-men take office here for plunder, so that all have become corrupt, and it is very evident that they are incapable of good government." He continued: "It is perfectly evident to me that this people are doomed to pass off, and at no distant day.... The hardy and nobler northerners are destined ... to over run [sic] this section of North America, even if peace now should be made." Thomas spoke not of enlightenment but of indefinable extinction. An inferior and feeble "race" (Mexicans in this case) would simply "pass off," leaving the country in the hands of "hardy" Anglo Americans. Immu­ table racial flaws made Mexicans incapable of improvement and therefore unworthy of the land they possessed. This rationale, popularized during the in the mid-idjos, justified an aggressive war for ter­ ritory in 1846, underpinned racially motivated atrocities against Mexican civilians, and later served as the basis for relegating Mexican Americans to second-class citizenship. Above all, then, manifest destiny stood for racial exploitation and Anglo supremacy.' The hostilities between Texas and Mexico that began in the mid-1830s and those that started between the United States and Mexico a decade later left Anglo Americans with a decidedly negative image of their southern neighbors. The Civil War reinforced that view. Union volunteers, dismissive of native New Mexicans, often treated them more as a hostile population than asAmerican citizens. Hispanic peoples had not "passed off" as predicted but neither had they been fully assimilated into American society. Indeed, for many soldiers, New Mexico appeared much too similar to Old Mexico. Meanwhile, Confederate volunteers, with Texans in the vanguard, clearly meant to assume the mantle of expansionism that had seemingly been cast aside by the United States during the 185os.6 FALL2010 BARTEK +327

A Degraded and Indolent Race

Although preoccupied with the rigors of an active campaign, the volunteers who descended on the Southwest in 1861 and 1862 still found ample time to ruminate on the Hispanic people they encountered. Whatever their political, social, or ideological differences, Northern and Southern soldiers found com­ mon ground in their estimation of Mexican Americans, looking upon them with condescension or outright contempt. Volunteers scrutinized everyaspect of Hispanic culture and often concluded that it was not much of a culture at all. That opinion heavily influenced their subsequent treatment of their Hispanic hosts. California volunteer Eli W. Hazen, for example, managed to dismiss the entire territory of Arizona as a place where "every bush had a thorn, every toad a horn, and every woman was a whore and every man was a lying Gambling horse thief." Santa Fe, the capital of New Mexico, particularly struck Coloradoan Alonzo F. Ickis as an especially unsavory place. "[F]ound it a poor town of 10,000 Greasers," he wrote his brother. "The town supports one Presbyterian and two Catholic churches but I do not think they exercise anygoodinfluence over the people. Santa Fe isone grande (excuse the expres­ sion) brothel." Confederates were no more forgiving. "From the day we left Mesilla all eyes were strained to get a peep at Santa Fe," wrote a Texan in early 1862. "Imagine our astonishment! Instead of a fine city, a group of mud cabins-instead of neatness and beauty, loathsomeness and filth,-instead of intelligence, the grossest ignorance. What a capital for a great nation.'? Such opinions were widespread, and those who proffered them expressed certainty that the shortcomings they observed had everything to do with a flawed New Mexican character. While Confederate brigadier general Henry H. Sibley outfitted his near San Antonio in September 1861, many of his volunteers, especially the East Texans, used the opportunity to explore the historic town. Regardless of its cosmopolitan attractions, Pvt. W. Randolph Howell of the Fourth Texas Mounted Vol­ unteers thought San Antonio suffered from a drawback: "It has the worst mixed population I have ever seen -Americans, Germans, Mexicans, and any sort of people you want to see." He continued, "They look like a greatly degraded people, the most of them- The Mexicans especially." The notion of Mexican degradation-that people of Mexican descent were somehow tainted, corrupted, or impure-was a common pronouncement. The source of that degradation wasracial miscegenation. Ovando J. Hollister, a volunteer in the First Infantry, rather disdainfully hypothesized that New Mexicans represented "a cross between the Spaniard and Indian, though the latter greatly predominates." 328-+ NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME85, NUMBER4

Whatever their racial origins-and soldiers speculated voluminously on this point-Mexicans clearly stood apart from the Anglo race. Custom, culture, religion, language, and especially skin color and physical appearance branded them as different and inferior. "Mexicans," declared Texan Ebenezer Hanna, "have a certain degree of civilization in their manners and appearance which does not exceed the common class of the half-civilized Indians of the Indian Territory." Labeling New Mexicans as half-civilized, however, was not meant to explain their condition. The expression merely served as another way to describe their situation, to accentuate and exaggerate the differences between Anglo and Mexican Americans. Coloradoan George Aux made abundantly clear that soldiers considered the chasm virtually unbridgeable. After a white lieutenant of a New Mexican regiment ordered several members of the First Colorado tied to a wagon for killing an ox, Aux declared that inflicting such punishment on American volunteers was unacceptable. "If I had been one that ... was tied, the Liut would not tied a nother after he had tied me," he boldly informed his wife. "He is Leut of a Mexican Colmpany] and he thinks that we ar [sic] all greesers [sic], I think he will soon find out that we ar not greesers but whit [sic] men."? As some of the previous comments suggest, one of the most enduring and prominent images clouding the Anglo mind in regards to Mexicans was that of the "indolent" Mexican, an obvious counterpoint to the "industrious" American. Accusations of laziness often accompanied a litany of other condemnations, but it seemed a principle cause of Mexican backwardness. Hollister could only attribute the poverty he saw before him to intentional Mexican sloth. "One would almost think they scrimped themselves to save work," he insisted. "They seem destitute of ambition or enterprise. Laziness is their most marked characteristic." Yet even the laziest of people require some means of survival,and according to volunteers, the primary vocations of most New Mexicans were gambling, cheating, thievery, or outright banditry. Soldiers contended that ignorance also seemed to be a pervasive problem. For some, it appeared that Mexicans lacked the mental capacity to appreciate fully their own plight-a circumstance often attributed to a domineering and oppressive Catholic Church. To Anglo volunteers, the prevalence of Catholicism among native New Mexicans was another peculiarity that marked them as a lesser people. They derided the Catholic faith witnessed in New Mexico as mere "superstition" and its practitioners as "heathens."? Regardless of the pervasiveness of the church in Hispanic culture, Anglo soldiers still discerned a great deal of immorality among New Mexicans, an accusation common to racialist thought. Sexual promiscuity, in particular, seemed endemic. "This is a decidedly fast town by moonlight," Ickis FALL2010 BARTEK -+ 329 complained of Santa Fe. "Licentiousness is deemed a virtue and but few Mexicans are without sexual disease in some form. I believe there are but few but what inherit disease." The Anglo charge of moral failings among New Mexicans hardly originated with objective observation but rather stemmed from a Mexican culture that clashed with soldiers' own Victorian sensibilities. As a way to distance themselves further from a half-civilized people, Americans passed moral judgments on what were in fact nonmoral situations (such as public bathing), imputing to Mexicans an immorality and lewdness that bolstered their own sense of virtue. The stereotypical image of the lascivious Mexican woman, a construction of the prudish American mind, became the stuff of legend. That stereotype was at once alluring and repulsive, romantic and erotic." Despite this ambivalence, or perhaps because of it, encounters between soldiers and local women occurred regularly, according to the soldiers who described them. One Confederate insisted that Texans never "appropriated" a woman without her consent. Union sources, too, admitted to the intimate relationships that developed between soldiers and senoritas. Nevertheless, no matter how cordial or consensual the relationship, soldiers tended to objectify in sexual terms the women whom they encountered. While Coloradoans denounced the entire territory as a "grande brothel," Texans often "appropriated" women as they would a mule. Union and Confederate soldiers who left written records almost always.viewed them as objects of sexual revulsion or desire, condemning them as sexual deviants or coveting them as spoils of war." This attitude produced predictable results.A Unionist native New Mexican noted with despair the rowdy conduct of Confederate John Baylor'S men soon after they entered the territory in August 1861 and "hoisted their dirty banner." Although the Texans guaranteed that the citizens would be safe, the New Mexican discovered thatthe pledge was "granted, in word only, because the same night all of their creatures went around forcing open doors, raping women and girls, and the least they have done to us is plunder us until we have nothing left." His testimony is notable, not least because Baylor's men have heretofore enjoyed a reputation for orderly conduct. Similar charges also arose against both Sibley's Texans and the Union volunteers who ex­ pelled them, suggesting a pattern of sexual abuse and violence against New Mexicans. Comparable reports of Confederate and Union forces (excluding guerrilla units) preying on Anglo women were practically nonexistent. Gender norms among Anglo soldiers in the Southwest varied little, particularly in regard to properly conducting themselves toward women, but their behavior was complicated by the issue of race. In the eyes of white troops, not only did 330~ NEWMEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME 85, NUMBER 4

Mexican women flout acceptable behavior with their alleged licentiousness, but their status as the non-Anglo "other" undermined any defenses that their gender might have afforded them. Volunteers, especially Texans, entered New Mexico under the banner of manifest destiny, carrying with them a sense of entitlementto the land and its resources. Many Union and Confederate soldiers viewed the appropriation of Mexican women as their racial prerogative." Just as Mexican women appeared to lack some crucial element of femi­ ninity, so too did Mexican men seem to be missing an integral component of masculinity. Charges of cowardice and rank opportunism went hand in hand. As early as August 1861, Union colonel Edward R. S. Canby doubted that native New Mexicans would assist their country in defending the ter­ ritory. One of his majors, William Chapman, complained that they were "more afraid of the Texans than they are of death, and in case of an attack ... I cannot rely upon them." Union volunteers who might have expected New Mexican help to repel the Confederate invasion quickly came to the same conclusions. The people simply lacked the fortitude necessary to protect themselves. As a detachment of the First Colorado Volunteers approached one village, Hollister observed panicked residents who could not distinguish whether the impending force represented friend or foe. "We struck the river just below an outlandish Mexican town; whose inhabitants fled, like any other cattle, and hid in the corn," Hollister recorded with contempt. Confederate soldiers disparaged Hispanic New Mexicans at an even higher pitch. One volunteer, in a letter to a local paper, warned his countrymen against complacency in the coming conflict: "Texans may have easily con­ quered the Mexican and Savage foe by their dauntless valor, but the case is far different now." Although the Mexican resistance might be easily brushed aside, conquering New Mexico would require the besting of a much more formidable white American foe. One participant noted, for example, "our enemy has the same Norman blood-greatly exceeds us in numbers, and will be thoroughly disciplined before giving us battle.'?' Treachery, not bravery, represented the flip side to Mexican cowardice. For Union volunteers, treachery usually signified nothing more than banditry. For Confederate Texans, who used the term with far more frequency than Union volunteers did, it was a pejorative heavy with historical baggage. The phrase "treacherous Mexican" conjured images not of simple banditry but of past cruelties inflicted by Mexicans upon Texans, including the Alamo, the Goliad massacre, the debacle and torment of the Texas Santa Fe Expedition of 1841, and the Cortina Wars in 1859 and 1861. The image was synonymous with barbarity, inhumanity, and murder, all threats to the very foundations of Anglo Texan civilization. FALL2010

The symbolism of the Texas Revolution and the specter of Mexican treachery remained powerful motivational forces for Sibley's volunteers. As they gathered in San Antonio, the launching point of the campaign, they acknowledged the historical significance of the place. "[We] pitch our Camp on Alamo Plaza," noted Pvt. William W. Heartsill, "and immediately in front of the old Alamo Church, where Davy Crockett and his brave comrades were inhumanly butchered by the Greasers." The Texas volunteers' discovery of Union authorities in New Mexico recruiting native Hispanics raised their ire to new heights. "We did not care to fight the New Mexicans," one participant insisted, "but they have dared to raise their arms against us.... Those who have read the stirring history ... can easily appreciate the feelings of Texans who find the same men in arms against us. They will call upon their patron saints in piteous tones to save them from the just indignation and vengeance of the 'Tejanos.'" Unlike Union volunteers, Confederate Texans clearly had a score to settle with Nuevomexicanos. Although they did not go into battle crying "Remember the Alamo," they clearly recalled that their ancestors had done so. Vengeance, then, served as a significant force in their actions toward New Mexicans." Obviously, many Anglo soldiers considered New Mexicans a degenerate people beyond redemption. Not only did they seem culturally and racially inferior, but their existence posed an obstacle to the march of Anglo American progress. "This valley ifsettled by whitecitizens. .. would be one of the richest Valleys in the world," declared Texan Frank Starr, "but if it remains peopled by this degraded race of Mexicans and Indians, it will forever remain in its present condition." For those soldiers holding such a belief, the next logical step was the dislocation, subjugation, or even eradication of the Mexican American population. At the least sign of resistance, Anglo volunteers could completely dehumanize New Mexicans as "brute beasts" or "treacherous" cowards, transforming even a minor annoyance into a virulent threat. When Coloradoans apprehended a New Mexican who they suspected of spying for Sibley's Confederates, an incredulous Ickis reported: "He is a greaser and 'plays insane.' Perhaps stretching his neck would have the desired effect. It would be no sin if he was an insane Mexican for the more of them are killed the better the country is off." Too often, however, what volunteers considered "resistance" was simple survival to New Mexicans. With no profound attachment to the United States and a bitter enmity toward Texas, New Mexicans rightly feared two unsympathetic Anglo armies flowing into the territory, consuming scarce supplies, impressing livestock, and creat­ ing the inevitable hardships that always followed in the wake of a military carnpaign.v 332~ NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME 85, NUMBER 4 TheNew Mexico Campaign

When General Sibley petitioned Confederate president for permission to undertake the campaign in New Mexico, he predictably put the best possible face on the venture to assuage any doubts his commander­ in-chief might hold. Sibley insisted that the federal army was in disarray and that the region was filled with Anglo secessionists who would readily support the Confederate cause. He even suggested that the Hispanic population would gladly contribute provisions and recruits to the southern effort. Furthermore, the conquest of the Southwest could be completed with minimal expense to the Confederate government. The Texas army, Sibley noted, could simply live off the land and the supplies captured from Union forces. The promise of great success with little sacrifice was too good to be true, but it did not prevent Davis from granting Sibley a commission as brigadier general and sanctioning the campaign." While Sibley trusted that New Mexicans would support the Confederate cause, Union leaders doubted that Hispanics would enthusiastically rally behind the United States. In June 1861, reports of a planned New Mexican uprising specifically against Anglos reached U.S. authorities. Although the rumored date for the rising passed uneventfully, the credence given to such stories betrayed the uncertainty of federal officials. "The Mexican people have no affection for the institutions of the United States," Canby warned in January 1862. "They have a strong, but hitherto restrained, hatred for the Americans as a race, and there are not wanting persons who ... have secretly but industriously endeavored to keep alive all the elements of discontent and fan them into flames." Canby considered Mexicans to be an "ignorant" and "impulsive" people prone to the machinations of Southern sympathizers, but he failed to take into account that a long-standing hatred of Texans far outweighed whatever general ill will they harbored against Americans. Just as Texans bitterly recalled past examples of Mexican treachery, New Mexicans recollected instances ofTexan "barbarity."The Santa Fe and Mier expeditions of 1841 and 1842, in particular, remained effective rallying points. Federal territorial authorities, who urged men to volunteer not out of loyalty to the United States but to protect their families from the dreaded "Tejanos," used the image of the savage Texan with great success. IS Most New Mexicans made no secret oftheir hatred forTexans, and ifSibley genuinely expected the population to support his cause, he must have been disappointed. Although a few native New Mexicans joined Colonel Baylor's command early on, some twenty-eight hundred Hispanic men had enlisted in Union regiments by February 1862. Whatever Sibley wished to believe, FALL2010 the decision of a Southern-sympathizing oligarchy of ricos (rich landowners) and Anglos to create a Confederate Territory of Arizona hardly represented the majority will. The failure to recognize that the conquest of New Mexico also required a conquest of hearts and minds was a colossal mistake, one compounded by yet another false assumption: contrary to Sibley's assertion, it would be extraordinarily difficult for an army to live off the land in the arid Southwest. Given the low regard in which most Confederates held New Mexicans, they probably did not possess the wherewithal or patience to convince the Hispanic population of their struggle's righteousness. The Confederates ruthlessly foraging with impunity virtually guaranteed that New Mexicans would fight against them rather than rally around their cause.'? Nevertheless, Sibley appeared to start his campaign in the right direction. InDecember 1861, shortly after his army crossed into New Mexico, he issued and published in English and Spanish a seemingly magnanimous decree to the people ofthe territory. The Confederate Army of New Mexico, he assured the native population, came not as conquerors but as "liberators" who sought to relieve the people of the "iniquitous exactions" of the U.S. government. Had Confederates acted in the spirit of the proclamation, they might have wooed Hispanic support to their cause. The reality of Confederate policies was closer to occupation than liberation. Although Sibley promised salvation from a "military despotism," Confederate-occupied portions of the territory remained under martial law during his campaign, citizens were forced to swear oaths of loyalty to the Confederacy, and the "iniquitous exactions" of the United States were replaced by Confederate equivalents in the form of confiscations. He pledged to protect private property, but Sibley also made clear that New Mexicans had to make available on the "open market" the forage and supplies necessary to sustain his army and accept payment for the goods in Confederate dollars at "fair prices." He promised stiff penalties for subterfuge: "If destroyed or removed to prevent me from availing myself of them, those who so co-operate with our enemies will be treated accordingly, and must prepare to share their fate."Byfailing to distinguish between civilians who concealed supplies in order to aid the Union and those who did so to prevent starvation, Sibley turned nearly everyone in the territory against the Confederacy." From the time they entered the territory, Sibley's men acted as a hostile army in a foreign country. Categorizing New Mexicans as an inferior people helped justifytaking , animals, clothing, and other property. One Union informer thought the Texans resembled a mob more than a disciplined army: "They have acted about El Paso in such a manner as to enrage the whole community against them. All Mexicans are down on them, and they will 334~ NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME85, NUMBER4 find very little sympathy when they return.... Blankets, onions, wine, and everything they can lay their hands on they carry off." Nor was property their sole interest, as the actions of one hapless volunteer killed by enraged citizens demonstrated. "The [authorities] said that [he] had assaulted or insulted a Mexican woman in her house, that she ran out of the house screaming," reported a doubting comrade. The episode did little to improve relations between Texans and New Mexicans. With great effort, Confederate officers convinced their men not to burn the town in retribution for their compatriot's murder. The El Paso informer corroborated reports of unruly behavior: "The officers have no control over them, and they do just as they please, and you know what men off a long trip please to do; females neither in nor out of their houses are safe."2! Confederate brigandage in El Paso was but a prelude. Around Mesilla, New Mexico, individual soldiers, enforcing their "fair price," stole what they needed, grazed their horses in New Mexican wheat fields, and cheated vendors already reluctant to accept Confederate money. Confederate depredations in southern New Mexico put local residents on guard everywhere, and supplying the army turned increasingly difficult for Sibley's quartermaster and commissary officers. Civilians who initially welcomed the opportunity to sell what little surplus they possessed now shied away, unwilling to have their goods stolen, confiscated, or paid for in worthless scrip. Frustrated Texans, who assumed New Mexicans would provide for them, forcibly quartered themselves in houses of reluctant hosts and coerced village officials into providing basic commodities such as firewood. Many Texans believed - correctly in part- that New Mexicans concealed their goods at the behest of federal authorities, but the more immediate worry of the local population was protecting itself and private property from the ravenous horde of Confederates. William Davidson of the Fourth Texas recalled: "My special duty was to ... scour the country for food and provisions.... The enemy moved everything to eat out ofthe country and persuaded the Mexicans to hide their corn and wheat and drive their cattle and sheep beyond our reach." In a period of three days, Davidson managed to secure over one hundred bushels of wheat, two hundred bushels of corn, and several mules. Such excursions continued asthe Army ofNew Mexico wound itswayup the Valley. Confederates confiscated goods in excess of three thousand dollars, teams of oxen, and a sizable flock of sheep near Valverde, New Mexico. At Santa Fe, they seized thirty thousand dollars worth of "government property" as residents scrambled to conceal personal possessions." Yet, hunger constantly plagued Confederate forces no matter how efficiently they foraged. With the loss of their supply train at the Battle FALL 2010 BARTEK ~335 of Glorieta Pass, Confederates faced the unpleasant choice of starving or retreating. In the end, they did both. "Our army cannot be subsisted here," admitted a Texan following the disaster, "and the enemy has only to wait a few weeks till famine runs us out, to possess the country quietly again." Sibley's plan to support his army through foraging proved both impractical and counterproductive. Colonel Baylor remarked that the actions of Sibley's troops destroyed the "good will" of the people. Other observers agreed. A resident of Mesilla reported, "[T]he Southern soldiers ... have consumed and destroyed everything, even to the growing crops. The people here are with their eyes open toward the North, in the hope of being relieved from the devastation of these locusts.'?' Texans, in turn, blamed "ignorant" New Mexicans for sabotaging the campaign, failing to acknowledge that their own abuses attributed much to the New Mexicans' passive and active resistance. Starr insisted that New Mexicans "looked upon us with fear, having been told that we had come to revenge the treatment of the Santa Fe Prisoners [of 1841]. They will favor the most powerful side, and all the time that we were there they doubted our ability to hold the country, and took every opportunity to keep the enemy well informed ofour proceedings and movements." Sibley, too, was widely censured for the failure; he spent much of the campaign confined to an ambulance-drunk, according to rumors. As the commanding general, Sibley could escape the wrath of his soldiers, but New Mexican civilians could not. "My troops," he keenly observed, "have manifested a dogged irreconcilable detestation of the Country and the People."?' Ragged and hungry, harried by Union forces, and disgusted with officers and civilians alike, the disillusioned volunteers eventually succumbed to panic, and the Confederate retreat to Mesilla in spring 1862 devolved into a nightmare of deprivation and desperation. The army had stripped the valley of food and supplies during the northern advance, leaving little to sustain them on the return trip. Still, the Texansforaged with zeal. Confederate troops confiscated livestock, wheat, corn, whiskey, tobacco, and even strings of red chile peppers. A resident of Las Lunas, New Mexico, reported that soldiers stole four thousand dollars worth of his property. Toward the end, the army practically dissolved into a mob. An EI Paso merchant who observed the withdrawal described its utter defeat and desperation to General Canby: "The Second Regiment [Colonel 's Fifth Texas Mounted Rifles] is scattered in parties of 15 or 20 along the road ... committing outrages upon the inhabitants they meet [on] the highway. They are almost on the point of starvation .... The Mexican population are much enraged against them on account of their rude treatment." The Army of New Mexico cleaned out 336~ NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME85, NUMBER4 the Mesilla Valley so thoroughly that the merchant feared that famine might stalk the people." Emboldened by the Confederate defeat and retreat, New Mexicans refused all Confederate scrip and demanded hard currency. Texans' foraging expeditions sometimes led to bloody clashes that aggravated the animosity between Texans and New Mexicans. If volunteers still subscribed to the idea of Mexican "indifference," that belief was rudely dispelled. In April a citizen surrounded the camp of a dozen Texans near the village of Los Padillas. Taken by surprise, one ofthe volunteers dropped his pistols to signal his surrender. The militiamen ignored the gesture and shot him through the chest. In the ensuing firefight, another Texan was killed and one wounded. Word of the encounter enraged the Texans. "We heard this morning that two of our men were killed last night sometime, or this morning, by the citizens ... and a company was sent back to demolish the town," reported Alfred B. Peticolas of the Fourth Texas Mounted Rifles. "Before they left the place," recounted another, "they [avenging soldiers] sent a few greasers to their father, the devil, in payment for their treachery.'t" By May, Sibley had fled the territory, leaving his tattered army to fend for itself. For the next several months, the remainder of the volunteers continued to battle with civilians as they made their way to Mesilla and then across the scorching plains of West Texas toward San Antonio. "Instead of fighting Yankees since Sibley left, we have to fight the Mexicans," declared a volunteer. "They refused to let us have transportation, and we went to press them into service, thereby creating a civil war with them." Near the village of Isleta, Texas, a forage party rounded up what cattle they could find and, having nothing to offer in exchange, simply seized them. When a village official threatened to attack if they did not return the livestock promptly, the Texans took cover and prepared for a fight. They shot and killed a civilian rider, whom they surmised was running for help, and later made their escape under the cover of darkness. In early July at Mesilla, a clash between New Mexicans and another foraging party left one officer and six soldiers dead and as many as forty civilians killed or wounded. The fighting had been close and personal, and a Confederate lieutenant allegedly stabbed three civilians with a bowie knife." Perhaps the most violent confrontation between civilians and soldiers occurred in Socorro, Texas. This tiny village in the far western part of the state unfortunately sat directly in the path of the retreating Confederate army. In mid-June, an officer of the Seventh Texas requisitioned a number of beeves from the citizens and refused to pay when they were delivered. A gunfight followed, leaving several Confederates wounded. The incensed FALL2010 BARTEK ?337

Texans trained their on the village. "We killed 20 and wounded a great many," wrote one soldier, "besides destroying their church and otherwise damaging the town." Several weeks later, another detachment of foragers visited Socorro, but wise to the waysof the Texans, a mob of some fiftycitizens quickly ran them OUt. 28

UnionDefense of NewMexico

Although New Mexicans suffered plundering, violence, and some deaths at the hands of their Texan "liberators," they were treated little better by the Union forces. Union officialswere unclear about or doubted the loyaltyof the New Mexican citizens, particularly wealthy families. Union leaders enacted harsh policies designed to police a suspect population as much as to counter a Confederate invasion. Like General Sibley, Union colonel Canby, and later Col. James H. Carleton, ordered New Mexicans to make draft animals, forage, weapons, and other supplies available for purchase, or they might be seized outright. Men were pressed into service a full year before military conscription became national law.Territorial officialsexhorted men to defend their families from the Texans. Scattered evidence suggests the impressment policy wassometimes brutally implemented by Union authorities and widely resented by New Mexicans. In early January 1862, Ickis noted the conspicuous absence of men from a village in the northern part of the territory. "There are no men in the town," he wrote. "They are skulking over the Mts to keep out of sight of the Territorial pressman who are knabbing [sic] every man who.is able to carry a musket and into the militia they go." Hispanic men of fighting age were hesitant to leave their families unprotected and reluctant to join the poorly equipped and scantily paid militia. They were commonly branded as cowards, and unwilling recruits frequently clashed with the Union military. One would-be Union recruit recounted his story to Peticolas, who recorded: "They [federals] knocked him down, and he showed us a bayonet wound where they stabbed him trying to force him along anyhow. He told us that there was many a man sick that they had forced into the service, but that no one was allowed to stop or rest on that account, but was forced along by the federals.'?? These recruiting practices implied that Union officials looked upon New Mexicans as less a people to defend than a resource to exploit. Nowhere was this attitude more apparent than in the widespread foraging by Union troops during the campaign. Suffering from the same subsistence problems that plagued Confederates, Union volunteers gobbled up all the supplies 338-+ NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME85, NUMBER4 they could locat~. The plundering committed by the Colorado volunteers in particular rivaled the thoroughness of the Texans. When word of their depredations reached , one soldier explained to the RockyMountain News: "Rumors have probably reached you, with a thousand tongues, of the jay hawking propensities of the members of the Colorado First. ... Our duty was onward, and onward we marched, seizing all that was necessary to assist us in preventing the traitor's foot from impressing the soil of New Mexico, and in doing it, though it might inflict individual losses, we believed we were doing our duty." Ickis admitted frankly in his diary, "the Col ist are death on chickens and sheep or beef. [T]hey steal all they see along the road. [T]hey stole an entire store in Los Notres. [T]here was about $1000 worth of goods in it." Their racial conceptions of New Mexicans undoubtedly shaded the reasoning of many Coloradoans. One volunteer stated, "[T]hey say if the Mexicans will not fight for their country they must support those who will." The notion that New Mexicans were cowards, traitors, cheats, and thieves deserving such treatment was a common refrain among Colorado volunteers. Ovando J. Hollister, who helped sack the Pueblo of Sandia, absolved his conscience by declaring that he and his comrades were no worse than the native population. "A man that won't steal," he quipped, "has no business in New Mexico."30 The departure of Sibley's Texans and the arrival of Colonel Carleton and his restored a modicum of order to New Mexico Territory. Martial law, however, remained in effect until the end of the war. Citizens forced by Sibley to swear an oath ofloyalty to the Confederacy were now compelled to proclaim their allegiance to the Union. The army also confiscated the property of suspected Confederate collaborators, forced men to labor on fortifications without compensation, and ordered citizens to sell their crops to the at the ridiculously low price of three dollars per fanega (about one and a half bushels) or risk their confiscation. The policy to concentrate foodstuffs in the hands of the federal military met with much civilian resistance. This backlash prompted one of Carleton's subordinates to declare all residents found with more than a two-month supply of food stores as enemies of the United States. Rather than comply with the directive, many New Mexicans simply abandoned their lands and carried their surplus crops into Mexico." All these federal"policies were designed to thwart future armed incursions from Texas. Carleton did not intend to tyrannize the population, but he made perfectly clear his willingness to sacrifice native New Mexicans to preventsuch a recurrence. He ordered his lieutenants to counter the Texans with a scorched­ earth campaign in the event of another invasion. As a last-ditch impediment FALL2010 BARTEK ?339 to a future Confederate incursion, Carleton also urged New Mexicans to wage a people's war against the Texans. "Remind the Mexicans of how they were robbed before," he exhorted his subordinates, "and animate them ... with a settled determination to attack the enemy from every cover.?" Carleton's vision was an explosive proposition. An inherently blood­ thirsty method, irregular warfare became all the more brutal when fanned by racial animosity. The sporadic guerrilla actions at the end of Sibley's New Mexico campaign indicated that a renewed conflict with the Texans was likely to become an extraordinarily bloody affair. Indeed, the excessive and indiscriminate violence engendered by guerrilla war had motivated Northern and Southern leaders alike to condemn the practice, decry guerrillas as "brigands" and "outlaws," and support their summary execution when captured. That Carleton felt justified in calling for partisan action when leaders in similar straits balked at such a drastic measure is not surprising given his reputation for ruthlessness toward national enemies-be they Texans or Indians. Carleton may also have assumed that he was merely sanctioning the inevitable; New Mexicans had already demonstrated their readiness to oppose Confederate depredations. Regardless, his willingness to exploit their passions evidenced a startling disregard for the pyrrhic consequences. That New Mexicans, rather than Anglos, would bear the brunt of Confederate reprisals doubtless made his decision more palatable." Fortunately for New Mexicans, the high tide of the Confederacy in the Southwest had passed with Sibley's retreat, and the extreme measures advocated by Carleton became unnecessary. New Mexico's strategic importance and an ongoing Indian threat, however, ensured that a large military presence and the problems attending it remained. In August 1862, Maj. Arthur Morrison, an Anglo officer in a New Mexico volunteer regiment, complained of a seemingly regular occurrence at Polvadera, a hamlet situated between Socorro, New Mexico, and Albuquerque. "Government trains passing up and down this route," Morrison complained, "commit depredations on private citizens in turning cattle into their fields and destroying their crops or only subsistence, maltreating animals, occasionally killing one without necessity." Pillaging and foraging by individual soldiers also continued, despite the best efforts of conscientious officers to stop the practice. After 1 January 1863-the day U.S. president 's Emancipation Proclamation took effect-soldiers began to "steal" people, freeing peons from their Hispanic patrons and putting them to work in their camps. The relationship between Union volunteers and Mexican Americans remained uneasy throughout the occupied Southwest. American resentment against "greasers," and Mexican wariness about the intention of soldados (soldiers) always held the potential for and sometimes erupted in violence." 340~ NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME 85, NU MBER 4

Reprise of Manifest Destiny

The New Mexico Campaign of1862 generated severalsignificantconsequences for the Southwest. The defeat of Sibley's Texans effectively ended the Confederate bid for a transcontinental empire. The influx of Anglo soldiers, particularly Californians and Coloradoans, wrought important cultural and demographic changes in the Southwest. Once considered a national backwater, the territory of New Mexico and future territory ofArizona received a good deal of publicity during the campaigns and battles from late 1861 through summer 1862. Many Union volunteers permanently settled there, and their letters and descriptions of the territory (more generous than those of the beaten Texans) attracted thousands of settlers and contributed to the "Americanization" of Hispanic New Mexico. The most visible result of the campaign was the widespread devastation between Mesilla and Santa Fe and the famine that followed. Magdalen Hayden, mother superior of Loretto Academy in Santa Fe, reported: "Our poor and distant territory has not been spared. The Texans without provocation have sacked and almost ruined the richest portions and have forced the most respectable families to flee from their homes." The war hit Socorro County, south ofAlbuquerque, particularly hard. In 1860 it boasted a population of 5,700 residents. Three years later, that number had dropped to less than 3,700. Some villages, whose residents were unable to sustain themselves, virtually disappeared. "The population of this district, until last year, was much larger than at present," noted a Union officer who conducted a census in 1863. "In every town there are houses locked up and their owners having left in search of food.'?' This devastation occurred rapidly and early in the Civil War. The morality of widespread "foraging" was hotly disputed in early 1862 but by 1864 the zeal with which Confederate and Union soldiers plundered the countryside was legendary. The war escalated for three years before Union major general William T. Sherman could justifyhis march of destruction through . New Mexico experienced no comparable grace period; pillage, murder, and destruction came immediately. Although starvation motivated Confederate plundering and violence in the final stages of the campaign, it does not explain their mob-like behavior during their firstweeks inMesilla. Similarly, although hunger may account for why Coloradoans resorted to foraging and looting, it explains neither why they did so with such apparent glee and self­ righteousness nor their continuing propensity to run roughshod over New Mexican sensibilities even after the Confederate threat had been blunted. The notoriously poor discipline among volunteers certainly explains some of the unrestrained behavior, but this answer is unsatisfying. FALL2010 BARTEK ?341

Soldiers' reactions to the depredations shed some light on the matter. This author has not discovered a soldier-Texan, Coloradoan, or Californian­ who expressed even a little regret over the hardships inflicted on New Mexicans. This omission is especially striking when one considers how Sherman's men or Confederate general Robert E. Lee's troops in Pennsylvania often managed to sound sincerely remorseful, although they insisted on the necessity and righteousness of their actions. For example a Confederate officer who entered Pennsylvania determined to avenge the destruction of his own home was incapable of acting on his anger after he came face to face with terrified civilians. "Though I had such severe wrongs and grievances to redress ... when I got among these people I could not find it in my heart to molest them," he confided. "They looked so dreadfully scared and talked, so humble, that I have invariably endeavored to protect their property."An officer in an Ohio regiment, plainly aware of the devastation caused by the army as it maneuvered toward Atlanta, Georgia, in the summer of 1864, expressed similar sympathies. "I don't see what the people in this country are going to do next winter," he pondered to his wife. "There will not be anything left for them to live upon.... I sometimes feel sorry for the poorer class as they were not to blame in bring[ ing] on this war. There is more of what is called poor white trash than I had any idea of." The expression of pity assumed that volunteers could empathize with their victims. Empathy required the recognition of some commonality with their victims, a prerequisite that volunteers campaigning in the alien culture of New Mexico were hard-pressed to meet. Hence, while the plight of the Pennsylvania "Dutch" and Georgia's "white trash" evoked genuine concern from the soldiers, starvation among New Mexican "greasers" met only with their indifference." Just as a common Anglo identity bound the belligerents, common assumptions of New Mexican identity influenced their actions. To understand the implications fully requires viewing the campaign in a wider ideological context. Despite Sibley's reassurances to the people of New Mexico, the invading Texans cared little about "liberating" them from a tyrannical government. The Texans came, as numerous sources attested, to realize their manifest destiny. Union forces,too, cared little about the New Mexicans. They seemed more determined to protect the fruits of their own manifest destiny, realized some thirteen years earlier when the United States first acquired the territory after the war with Mexico. Economic exploitation and Anglo hegemony informed the American philosophy of expansionism. Given these assumptions, historians should not interpret pillaging and excesses carried out by volunteers as acts of desperation or a failure of discipline but as the military application of racial assumptions shared by Anglo Americans in the 342~ NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME85, NUMBER4 mid-nineteenth century. Simply put their sense of entitlement to the land and contempt for its people drove their actions." The echoes of manifest destiny motivated both Confederate and Union soldiers in the southwestern theater, making it a unique location in the war. That particular mandate for continental expansion had little bearing on common troops elsewhere. Historians have long recognized manifest destiny's racialist component, an unpalatable reality of Anglo culture prominently displayed in New Mexico. This tradition of racialism creates space for more general conclusions, especially in relation to the ongoing debate over the "restraint" of the Civil War and the character of the soldiers who comprised the bulk of its armies. The destructive tendencies of the volunteers, some argue, were tempered by a keen sense of morality and justice. Union men discriminated between the "guilty" (wealthy slaveholders) and the "innocent" (yeoman farmers, women, and children), and favored the destruction of public over private property. Such civilities, however, were extended only to members of the same "American" (white) community. Where racial differences came to the fore, restraint evaporated. A recent study by historian Mark E. Neely [r., although agreeing with this premise, vigorously asserts that race, not morality, was the determining factor in how soldiers treated civilians. This work further suggests that compared to the abuse suffered by civilians at the hands of Americans in other wars, such as the conflict with Mexico or the Indian wars, much of the violence traditionally assigned to the Civil War has been grossly exaggerated. In many ways, the actions of volunteers in New Mexico support Neely's conclusions.f Although enlightening, a similar comparative approach to the New Mexico campaign also poses special problems. Such a comparison establishes a false dichotomy that tends to obscure as much as it illuminates. To Anglo volunteers, New Mexicans clearly served as the racial "other." Yet,according to treaty laws and the territorial constitution, they were in fact legitimate citizens who theoretically possessed all the rights and privileges of a Boston Brahmin-unlike blacks and Indians. To separate the war in New Mexico from the "greater" conflict in the East or to highlight the violence that soldiers inflicted on Mexican Americans merely to reveal the restraint they exercised toward white Americans is to propagate the same artificial division imposed by the volunteers." If historians are to address honestly the question of restraint, they must include the New Mexico campaign in any overview of military-civilian relations during the war, and it deserves to occupy a place next to Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania and Sherman's march through Georgia. Rehabilitated from its sideshow status, the campaign's integration into Civil FALL2010 BARTEK ~ 343

War historiography makes readily apparent that any claim touting the war's restraint must be seriously qualified. The lofty ideals ofliberty and freedom and defense of home and hearth - ideals for which soldiers professed to be fighting-were inextricably bound to oppression, intolerance, and the maintenance of white privilege. The idea that volunteers by and large directed their wrath only toward the "guilty,"limited their destruction ofprivate property, and respected civilians in general and women in particular would surely have come as a revelation to the "liberated" residents of the Mesilla valley.

Notes

1. Frank Starr to Father, 2October 1861, Camp Sibley, Texas,in "New Mexico Campaign Letters of Frank Starr," ed. David B. Gracy, Texas Military History 4 (fall 1964): 171. 2. Historians have written a number of excellent works on the New Mexico campaign, although none of them look specifically at the role race played in the contacts be­ tween soldiers and civilians. For the campaign, see Martin Hardwick Hall, Sibley's New Mexico Campaign (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1960); Alvin M. Josephy [r., The Civil War in the American West (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991); Donald S. Frazier, Blood and Treasure: Confederate Empire in the Southwest, Texas A&M University Military History series, no. 41 (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1995); and Flint Whitlock, Distant Bugles, Distant Drums: The Union Response to the Confederate Invasion of New Mexico (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2006). Likewise, there are several superb studies of Anglo-Mexican race relations, but few address the issue in the context of the American Civil War. See Martin Hardwick Hall, "Native New Mexican Relations in , 1861-1862," The Jour­ nal of Arizona History 8 (autumn 1967): 171-78; Mario Barrera, Race and Class in the Southwest: A Theory of Racial Inequality (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979); Darlis A. Miller, "Hispanos and the Civil War in New Mexico: A Reconsideration," New MexicoHistorical Review 54(April 1979): 105-23; Arnoldo De Leon, They Called Them Greasers: Anglo Attitudes toward Mexicans in Texas, 1821-1900 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983); Jerry D. Thompson, Mexican Texans in the UnionArmy,Southwestern Studies, no. 78(El Paso:TexasWestern Press, 1986); David Montejano, Anglosand Mexicans in the Making ofTexas, 1836-1986 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987); and Tomas Almaguer, Racial Fault Lines: The Historical Origins of White Supremacy in California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994)'Finally, Paul Foos, A Short, Offhand, KillingAffair: Soldiers and Social Conflict during the Mexican-American War (Chapel Hill: University of Press, 2002) is a detailed study of the actions of American volunteers in the U.S.-Mexico War and has significant implications for this investigation. 3. [osephy, The Civil War in the American West, 18-19; and T[revanion]. T. Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign-Its Objects and the Causes ofIts Failure," in Battlesand Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 2, NorthtoAntietam, ed. Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel (New York: T. Yoseloff, 1956),2:700. Trevanion T. Teel, a Confederate officer in the New Mexico campaign, later insisted that Confederate brigadier general Henry H. Sibley planned to conquer not only California but 344~ NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME 85, NUMBER 4

also the northern states of Mexico. See also Frazier, Bloodand Treasure, 21. For a general study of Southern expansionism, see Robert E. May, The Southern Dream of a CaribbeanEmpire,1854-1861 (Baton Rouge: State University Press, 1973)' For a specific example of Texans' territorial ambitions, see A. G. Nicholson to Major De Morse, 23 June 1861, Honey Grove, Texas, in the Clarksville (Tex.) Standard, 29 June 1861. 4. Vicksburg (Miss.) Weekly Sun, 29 October 1860; James Reily to John H. Reagan, 26 January 1862,, Texas, in U.S. War Department, TheWarof the Rebellion: A Compilationofthe OfficialRecords of the Unionand Confederate Armies, 4 series, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1886--1910), ser. 1,vol. 50, pt. 1,pp. 825-26 [hereafter OR]; and Roy Sylvan Dunn, "The KGC in Texas, 186cH861," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 70 (April 1967): 543-73- 5. Lorenzo Thomas to Friends, 12January 1848, Mexico City, Mexico, folder 1, box 1, Lorenzo Thomas Collection, Manuscripts Division; Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. For race and American expansionism, see Ronald Takaki, Iron Cages: Raceand Culture in Nineteenth-Century America (New York:Alfred A. Knopf, 1979); Richard Drinnon, Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980); and Reginald Horsman, Race and ManifestDestiny: The Origins ofAmerican RacialAnglo-Saxonism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981). 6. The idea of a Confederate manifest destiny was often made explicit in the South. See DallasHerald, 29 February 1860; and Clarksville (Tex.) Standard, 12May 1862. 7. The Civil War in Apacheland: Sergeant George Hand's Diary; California, Arizona, West Texas, New Mexico, 1861-1864, ed. Neil B. Carmony (Silver City, N.Mex.: High-Lonesome Books, 1996), 113; De Leon, They CalledThem Greasers, 16; Eli W. Hazen, Diary, 26 June 1862, in "The California Column in the Civil War: Hazen's Civil War Diary," ed. Konrad F. Schreier [r., The Journal of San Diego History 26 (spring 1976),https:l/www.sandiegohistory.org/journaI/76spring/civilwar.hbn; Alonzo Ickis to Brother Thos., 14May 1862,Camp Mischler, New Mexico, in BloodyTrails along the Rio Grande: A Day-by-Day Diary of Alonzo Ferdinand lckis, 1836--1917, ed. Nolie Mumey (Denver, Colo.: Old West Pub. Company, 1958), 30; and W. H. S., letter to the editor, Houston Telegraph, 10April 1862,reprinted in the Clarksville (Tex.) Standard, 14June 1862. 8. W. Randolph Howell to Home Folks, 1 September 1861, San Antonio, Texas, in Westward the Texans: The Civil War Journal of Private William Randolph Howell, ed. Jerry D. Thompson (EI Paso: Texas Western Press, 1990), 114; and Ovando J. Hollister, Colorado Volunteers in New Mexico, 1862, ed. Richard Harwell (Chicago: R. R. Donnelley and Sons Company, 1962), 245. 9. Martin H. Hall, ed., "The Journal of Ebenezer Hanna," Password 3 (January 1958): 22-23; and George Aux to Wife, 10May 1862,folder 1,box 1,Civil War Miscellaneous Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 10. Hollister, Colorado Volunteers in New Mexico, 245-47; William A. Bushnell, Diary, 10 November 1865, http://freepages.genealogy.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~steelquist/ WmBushnell.html; Ickis, Bloody Trails, 51, 72; Hall, "The Journal of Ebenezer Hanna," 23;Charles Porter's Accountof the Confederate Attempt toSeizeArizonaand New Mexico, ed. Alwyn Barr (Austin, Tex.: Pemberton Press, 1964), 2; and Vidette, letter to the editor, San Francisco Daily Alta, 23 July 1862. FALL2010 BARTEK ~345

11. Ickis, BloodyTrails, 62-63; Vidette, letter to the editor, San Francisco Daily Alta, 29 June 1862; and Hollister, Colorado Volunteers in New Mexico, 21l. 12. Walter A.Faulkner, ed., "With Sibley in New Mexico: The Journal of William Henry Smith," West Texas Historical Association Year Book 27 (October 1951): 140; Hall, Sibley's New MexicoCampaign, 56;and Ickis, BloodyTrails, 64. 13. Diego Archuleta to Senor Don Lorenzo Labadi, 15 August 1861, Rio Bonito, New Mexico, in When the Texans Came: Missing Records from the Civil War in the Southwest, ed. John P.Wilson (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2001), 159. Several historians have noted that Confederate colonel John Baylor's men were generally respectful toward New Mexicans, at least in comparison to Sibley's troops. See Martin H. Hall, "Native Mexican Relations in ConfederateArizona, 1861-1862," 171-78; and Frazier, Blood and Treasure, 136. Important studies of gender include Anne Firor Scott, The SouthernLady: FromPedestal to Politics, 1830-193° (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); Suzanne Lebsock, The Free Womenof Petersburg: Status and Culture in a SouthernTown, 1784-1860 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1985); Reid Mitchell, "She Devils," in TheVacantChair: The Northern SoldierLeaves Home (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 8'j-113; and Drew Gilpin Faust, Mothers of Invention: Women of the Slaveholding South in the AmericanCivil War, Fred W. Morrison Series in Southern Studies (Chapel Hill: Universityof North Carolina Press, 1996). Discussions of Mexican American women as well as their relationship with Anglo Americans can be found in De Leon, TheyCalledThem Greasers; Montejano, Anglosand Mexicans in the Making of Texas; Neil Foley, The White Scourge: Mexi­ cans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture, American Crossroads series (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); and Deena J. Gonzalez, Refusing the Favor: The Spanish-Mexican Women of Santa Fe, 1820-1880 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 14. Col. to Gen. John C. Fremont, 16August 1861, Santa Fe, New Mexico, in OR, ser. 1, vol. 4, p. 65; Maj. William Chapman to Col. Edward Canby, 2 August 1861, Fort Union, New Mexico, in When the Texans Came, 69; Hollister, Colorado Volunteers in New Mexico, 221; Joseph McC. Bell, "The Campaign of New Mexico, 1862," in War Papers: Being Papers Read Before the Commanderyof the State ofWis­ consin, MilitaryOrderof the LoyalLegionof the UnitedStates,Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, 4 vols. (1891; repr., Wilmington, N.C.: Broadfoot Publishing Co., 1993), 1:54; Cavalry, letter to editor, Clarksville (Tex.) Standard, 27 July 1861; and CharlesPorter's Account, 13. 15. William W. Heartsill, 8 May 1861, San Antonio, Texas, in Fourteen Hundred and 91 Days in the Confederate Army: A Journal Kept by W. W. Heartsill for Four Years, One Month, and One Day;Or, Camp Life, Day by Day, of the W. P. Lane Rangers {Tom April19,1861, to May 20,1865,ed. Bell Irvin Wiley (1876; repr., Jackson, Tenn.: McCowat-Mercer Press, 1954), 1-2, 11; and (La.) Daily Picayune, 27 March 1862, quoted in Hall, Sibley's New Mexico Campaign, 57-58. See also Phil Fulcrod, "From Albuquerque to Glorieta," in Civil War in the Southwest: Recollec­ tions of the Sibley Brigade, ed. Jerry D. Thompson, Canseco-Keck History series, no. 4 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001), 90; M. L. Sims to Miss Belle Gordon, Clarksville (Tex.) Standard, 25 May 1861; Miss Mary B. Breeding to the Academy Guards, Bellville (Tex.) Countryman, 5 June 1861; Mrs. E. F. Gibson to Capt. William G. Twitty's Company of Cook County Volunteers, DallasHerald, 346~ NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME85, NUMBER4

14August 1861; and "Declaration of Causes: February 2, 1861; A Declaration of the Causes which Impel the State of Texas to Secede from the Federal Union," http:// www.tsl.state.tx.us/ref/abouttx/secessionhfebI86I.html. Some of the Texans in Sibley's army were veterans of the Cortina Wars (or "Cortina Troubles"), which stemmed from racial tensions and land disputes between Anglo and Mexican Texans. Rancher Juan Cortina commanded Mexican Texan irregulars who skirmished at turns with Texan, federal, and Confederate forces. 16. Frank Starr to Dear Father, 12 May 1862, Fort Bliss,Texas, in "New Mexico Campaign Letters of Frank Starr," 184; and Ickis, Bloody Trails, 72. 17. [osephy, The Civil War in the American West, 52-53. 18. Miller, "Hispanos and the Civil War," 106---1); and Edward Canby to the Adjutant General ofthe Army, 13 January 1862, Belen, New Mexico, in OR, ser. I, vol. 4, pp. 84-85. For the specifics of the Santa Fe and Mier Expeditions of 1841 and 1842, see W. C. Binkely, "New Mexico and the Santa Fe Expedition," Southwestern Histori­ cal Quarterly 27 (October 1923): 85-107; Sam W. Haynes, Soldiers of Misfortune: The Somervell and Mier Expeditions (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990); and Gary Clayton Anderson, The Conquestof Texas: Ethnic Cleansing in the Promised Land, 1820-1875 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005), 196---1)9. For native New Mexican loyalties, see Loomis M. Ganaway, New Mexico and the Sectional Controversy, 1846-1861 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1944); and Mark J. Stegmaier, '''An Imaginary Negro in an Impossible Place'?: The Issue of New Mexican Statehood in the Secession Crisis, 1860-1861," New Mexico Historical Review 84 (spring 2009):263---1)0. 19. Hall, "Native Mexican Relations," 171-72; and Miller, "Hispanos and the Civil War," 107. 20. "Proclamation of Brigadier General , Army of the Confeder­ ate States, to the People of New Mexico," 20 December 1861, in OR, ser. I, vol. 4, pp. 88-89. Sibley's proclamation also appeared in the Mesilla Times in Spanish and English. "Proclamation of Brigadier General Henry Hopkins Sibley, Army of the Confederate States, to the People of New Mexico," Mesilla (N.Mex.) Times, 15 January 1862. 21. Unnamed correspondent, 21 February 1862, forwarded by U.S. Consul Richard L. Robertson to Gen. George Wright, 18 April 1862, in OR, ser. I, vol. 50, pt. I, pp. 1012-13; and William Davidson, "The March to New Mexico," in Civil War in the Southwest, 15-16. 22. William Davidson, "From Socorro to Glorieta," in Civil Warin the Southwest, 78-79. For additional accounts of Confederate behavior, see Mesilla (N.Mex.)Times, 15 Janu­ ary 1862; Don E. Alberts, ed., Rebels on the Rio Grande: The Civil WarJournal of A. B. Peticolas, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984), 52, 88; Faulkner, "With Sibley in New Mexico," 137; Hall, "The Journal of Ebenezer Hanna," 26;and Mother Magdalen Hayden to Sister, 7 May 1862, Santa Fe, New Mexico, in Loretto: The Sisters and TheirSanta Fe Chapel, ed. Mary J. Straw Cook, rev. ed. (Santa Fe: Museum of New Mexico Press, 2002), 19-22. See also Frazier, Bloodand Treasure, 136; and Hall, Sibley's New Mexico Campaign, 56. 23. W. H. S., letter to the editor, Houston Telegraph, 10April 1862; W. H. S., letter to the editor, Clarksville (Tex.) Standard,14June 1862; From Desert to Bayou: The Civil WarJournal and Sketches of Morgan WolfeMerrick, ed. Jerry D. Thompson (EI Paso: FALL2010 BARTEK ~ 347

Texas Western Press, 1991), 31; and Report of I June 1862 included in a letter from Gov. Henry Connelly to Gen. Edward Canby, 15 June 1862, in OR, ser. I, vol. 50,pt. I, pp. 1140-41. 24. Frank Starr to Dear Father, 12 May 1862, Fort Bliss,Texas, in "New Mexico Campaign Letters of Frank Starr," 184; and General Sibley to General S[amuel]. Cooper, 4 May 1862, Fort Bliss, Texas, in The Civil War in West Texas and New Mexico: The Lost Letterbook of Brigadier General HenryHopkins Sibley,ed. John P. Wilson and Jerry Thompson (EI Paso: Texas Western Press, 2001), 142. 25. Miller, "Hispanos and the Civil War," 56;Report of unnamed correspondent, n.d., included in a letter from Gen. Edward Canby to the Adj. Gen. of the U.S. Army, 21 June 1862, Santa Fe, New Mexico, in OR, ser. I, vol. 9, p. 678. 26. Col. William Steele to Insp. Gen. , 12 July 1862, EI Paso, Texas, in OR, ser. I, vol. 9, pp. 721-22; Alberts, Rebels on the Rio Grande, 103; and Capt. Jerome B. McCown, letter to editor, Bellville (Tex.) Countryman, 7 June 1862, quoted in Frazier, Bloodand Treasure, 241-42. 27. John A. Kirgan, letter to the editor, Houston Tri-Weekly Telegraph, 18August 1862; and Frazier, Bloodand Treasure, 281. 28. Kirgan, letter to the editor; and San Antonio (Tex.) Semi-Weekly News, 21 July 1862. 29. Ickis, Bloody Trails, 60; and Alberts, Rebels on the Rio Grande, 58. 30. Union [solider]' letter to the editor, Denver(Colo.) Rocky Mountain News, 5 April 1862; Ickis, BloodyTrails, 99; and Hollister, Colorado Volunteers in New Mexico, 221. 31. Col. Joseph West to Acting Assistant Adjutant General Benjamin Cutler, 23Septem­ ber 1862, Mesilla, New Mexico, in OR, ser. I, vol. 50, pt. 2, pp. 132-33; Col. Joseph West's General Orders No. 24,2 December 1862, in OR, ser. I, vol. 50, pt. 2, p. 239; and Miller, "Hispanos and the Civil War," 116. 32. Col. Joseph West to Maj. William McMullen, 27 November 1862, Mesilla, New Mexico, in OR, ser. I, vol. 50,pt. 2, pp. 232-33; and Gen. James H. Carleton to Col. Joseph West, 18 November 1862, Santa Fe, New Mexico, in OR, ser. I, vol. 15, pp. 599-601. 33. For additional information on Gen. James H. Carleton, see Durwood Ball, ", New Mexico, and the Southwest Indian Wars, 1854-1884," New Mexico Historical Review 73 (April 1998): 161-67; and Adam Kane, "James H. Carleton," in Soldiers West: Biographies {rom the MilitaryFrontier, ed. Paul Andrew Hutton and Durwood Ball, zd ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009),122-48. 34. For an overview of the resulting devastation in the region, see Jerry D. Thompson, '''Gloom Over Our Fair Land': Socorro County during the Civil War," New Mexico Historical Review 73(April 1998): 99-119; Arthur Morrison to Acting AssistantAdjutant General, I August 1862, quoted in Thompson, "'Gloom Over Our Fair Land,''' 106; Carmony, TheCivilWarin Apacheland, 82,134, 145-46; and J. Ross Browne, "ATour through Arizona," Harper's New Monthly Magazine, January 1865, p. 149. 35. For an account of Californians' influence on the territory, see Darlis A. Miller, The California Column in New Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982); and Andrew E. Masich, The Civil Warin Arizona: The Storyof the California Volunteers, 1861-1865 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006). Mother Mag­ dalen Hayden to Sister, 7 May 1862, in Loretto, 19-22; and Hugh L. Hinds, "Census Report for Fort Craig District N.M.," April 1863, quoted in Thompson, "'Gloom Over Our Fair Land,''' 111-l2. 348~ NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME 85, NU MBER 4

36. William Steptoe Christian to My own darling wife, 28 June 1863, in The Rebellion Record: A Diaryof AmericanEvents,vol. 7, ed. Frank Moore (New York: 1864), 197; and Josiah Dexter Cotton to wife, 5 June 1864,Josiah Dexter Cotton Papers, Manu­ scripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 37. Historian Paul Foos makes a similar argument concerning the actions of U.S. volun­ teers in the U.S.-Mexico War. Foos,AShort,Offhand, Killing Affair, 3-U. Conversely, historians Martin H. Hall and Donald S. Frazier mostly attribute troop behavior in the Southwest during the Civil War to a lack of discipline that stemmed from, as Hall describes it, the "individualism that had always characterized the frontier." Hall, Sibley's New MexicoCampaign, 56;and Frazier, Bloodand Treasure, 30-31.Although their observations are not entirely inaccurate, it is difficult to believe that echoes of manifest destiny had been completely extinguished among soldiers operating in the same region where the U.S.-Mexico War had occurred just over a decade earlier. 38. See Mark Grimsley, The HardHand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Mark E. Neely [r., The Civil Warand the Limits of Destruction (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007)' Forthe contours of the debate over "restraint," see James McPherson, "Was It More Restrained Than You Think?" The New York Review of Books, 14 February 2008, pp. 42-44; Michael Fellman, "Down in the Trenches, Smeared with Blood," CivilWarTimes,April 2009, pp. 30-31; and Mark E. Neely [r., "Observing the Laws and Customs of War," Civil WarTimes,April 2009, pp. 32-33. 39. For the citizenship status of native New Mexicans, see the "No. 24: Organic Law for the Territory of New Mexico, Compiled under the Directions of General Kearny," 22 September 1846, http://scholarship.rice.edu/jsp/xml/r9uIz7098/r/aao0303.tei. html; "Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo," 2 February 1848,Library of Congress, http:// www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/ghtreaty/; and John P.Victory, 1897, CompiledLawsof New Mexico: In Accordance with an Act of the Legislature, ApprovedM arch 16th, 1897.. (Santa Fe: New Mexican Printing Company, 1897),42-43. For a particularly thought­ provoking essay on the function of race during the Civil War, see Mark Grimsley, '''A Very Long Shadow': Race, Atrocity, and the American Civil War," in BlackFlag OverDixie: RacialAtrocities and Reprisals in the Civil War,ed. Gregory J. W. Urwin (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2004), 231-44. Journey to the "Outside" THE u.s. ARMY ON THE ROAD TO THE SOUTHWEST

Janne Lahti

n summer1869, Julia Davis had just returned from a year-long honeymoon I in Europe. She hoped that the U.S. Army would assign her husband, Capt. Murray Davis, to a pleasant station somewhere near their Oakland, California, home where they could raise their infantson insafety and comfort. When the orders arrived, however, they brought unwelcome news. Captain Davis was instructed to take charge of a body of troops and lead it across the desert to . Julia wrote, "I thought of my husband going down and the dangers ofIndian warfare, and being perhaps killed by savages,whilst 1was far away, and 1could not bear it." Worried that the journey and life in Arizona would be too demanding on his wife and child, Captain Davis insisted that they stay in California and left for his new post. Deciding otherwise Julia packed hastily, gathered their son and a nurse, and caught up to her husband in San Diego, California. She recalled: "All my friends of course cried out 1 was mad. 1should die of hardship and fatigue, and my husband would have to bury me in the desert." After some heated arguments with her husband, Julia joined a detachment of the Eighth Cavalry, numbering twenty-four enlisted men and two officers, for the journey of forty-one days and approximately six hundred miles to Camp McDowell, Arizona.'

[anne Lahti earned his PhD in general history from the University of Helsinki, Finland. He specializes in the history of the American West, indigenous peoples, and colonialism. He is currently revising his dissertation, which offers a sociocultural history of the U.S. Army in the 349 post-Civil War Southwest and is under contract with the University of Nebraska Press. He would like to thank John Wunder, Markku Henriksson, Margaret Jacobs, Kevin Adams, Bruce Dinges, Robert Wooster, and Durwood Ball for their valuable help in bringing this article to fruition. 350~ NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME85, NUMBER4

This essay describes U.S. Army journeys to Arizona and New Mexico territories from the end of the Civil War in 1865, when the regular army returned to the Southwest, to the time when the transcontinental railroads crossed the region in the early 1880s. Balancing representations (army stories) and social experience (army actions), this narrative describes how travel methods, social class, and the search for colonial power structured responses to the travel experience. Uncertain expectations, plain ignorance, and the failure of travel comforts plagued the army's pre-railroad era journeys in the Southwest. These factors negatively impacted the representations penned by officers, wives, and enlisted men. Their portrayals express genuine disappointment and shock at both the natural environment and the indigenous, Hispanic, and Anglo societies of the region. These written accounts show how the authors differentiated themselves from the peoples and landscapes that failed to meet their standard of civilization. Travelers supposed they were producing the "truth" in their writings, but in reality they constructed subjective knowledge designed to secure colonial authority and power for the new rule and rulers," In the colonial context, travel was much more than simple movement across space. It was, in fact, a crucial site in the production of colonizer identity and power. Literary scholar Sara Mills argues, "Travel writing is essentially an instrument within colonial expansion and served to reinforce colonial rule once in place." Similarly, anthropologist Mary Louise Pratt concludes that travel writing helped produce "Europe's differentiated conceptions of itself in relation to something it became possible to call 'the rest of the world.?" Travelers assigned specific meanings to themselves, the journeying process, andthe landscapes, peoples, and settlements they encountered. They judged the suitability of the travel region for the purposes of the colonial regime and evaluated it against their norms, while simultaneously constructing specific identities for themselves. Historians of the U.S. West have long been fascinated with a specific form of travel: overland migration. Some scholars have also discussed the experiences of European visitors in the West, such as the famous British explorer Sir Richard Burton. Despite interest in the literary genre, the army remains largely absent in most descriptions of travel in the West.' Within the context of travel, historians have typically focused on army explorers.' Arguably, some have also given attention to "travel" experiences in the field during military campaigns and some have examined the travels of army wives. Nevertheless, scholars have failed to adequately assess the journeys that officers, their wives, and enlisted men regularly embarked on to reach their western stations. White army men and women often traveled from FALL2010 one region to the next and wrote voluminously of their journeys. While the historical literature certainly addresses the army's presence in the West, it rarely includes what army personnel had to sayabout how they got to different locations in the region, and has no journey or subsequent travel writing." By discussing army journeys and investigating army narratives, historians can scrutinize a little-known side of U.S. military history. Most scholarship neither connects western journeys to colonialism nor critically analysestravel asa domain where the travelersproduced their identity and constructed their power. This study links writings generated by officers, wives, and soldiers to the establishment of colonial power and identity. This work also connects U.S. Army history to the worldwide process of European colonialism, which brought much of the globe under the control of western powers during the second half.of the nineteenth century. Because of its intended mission of conquest, the army is an especially valuable subject in understanding the relationship between travel narratives and colonial power. Issues concerning gender and class can also be teased from travel literature. Although some historians have examined the travels of army wives, they have often failed to subject the wives' writings to critical interrogation. Instead of treating the writings produced by army wivesas subjective colonial discourses, scholars have uncritically described the wives "bravery" or "resilience" in the face of "primitive conditions" and "terrible hardships.'? This approach is common among histories of travel in the West and deserves correction. By analyzing class within army journeys, historians can gain a fuller understanding of the main social division separating officers and their wives from white enlisted men. Although military historians have recognized the army's class divide for quite some time, their focus has not been on army joumevs.f Certainly, class defined life inside army posts and in the field during military campaigns. The journey to colonial stations also produced class identity and imparted a sense of social standing to the travelers. In the Southwest, annexed from Mexico in 1848 and 1854, the army represented a congregation of foreigners. Apart from the Native American soldiers hired by the army, all officers, enlisted men, and their dependents in the West originated from other regions in the United States, other countries, and even other continents. White enlisted men generally came from two sources: the urban working class in the East and groups of immigrants from Europe, especially Germans and Irishmen. Officers and their wives were American-born middle-class whites who came mostlyfrom the and had largely rural or small-town backgrounds." In the East, the prospects for an average army officer were rather dismal after the Civil War. The American people were traditionally suspicious of large standing armies 352 ~ NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME 85, NU MBER 4 and were tired of the bloody fighting. They wanted to forget war's horrors and pursue peaceful endeavors. Reflecting this consensus, Congress drastically reduced troop numbers from one million to twenty-seven thousand men between 1866 and 1874.10 The remaining enlisted men and officers were sent either to control the Trans-Mississippi West or to supervise Reconstruction. Consequently, people in the East no longer felt the presence and influence of the army in their everyday lives, and the American public soon forgot that the nation even had a regular army. When an eastern woman was introduced to a colonel of the army in 1885 she remarked, "I supposed the Army was all disbanded at the close of the warl'" Unnecessary and unwanted in the East, army officers and their wives identified with other middle-class Americans after the Civil War. Historian Brenda K. Jackson states that middle-class Americans sawtheir social position decline and economic opportunities disappear in the increasingly industrial postwar United States." Consequently, these families moved west in search of not only wealth but also social prominence. While declining economic opportunities forced members of established merchant and farming families to relocate, army officers moved because U.S. conquest called them west. Although some officers constructed their identities in the West by obsessively recalling the glory of their Civil War service, most, especially of the younger generation, built their identity in the framework of continental conquest." Officers and their wives sought to establish themselves as an acknowledged class of refined and honorable people: a select group of intelligent gentlemen and cultured women who embodied power, respectability, progress, and civilization. They saw themselves as liberators and nation-makers and as the cream of the white middle class. They wanted to lead the civilizing mission by personal example as they transplanted eastern middle-class values, standards, and lifestylesto the West. Officers were among the first white Americans with college-level training to enter the Southwest after the U.S.-Mexico War. When the regulars returned to the Southwest after the Civil War, many officers brought with them personal or family ties to politicians, businessmen, and newspaper journalists in the East. Many officers published memoirs, engaged in extensive personal correspondence, or contributed to professional journals and various local and national papers, thus actively circulating their colonial views and "truths." Officers and soldiers never permanently settled at one army post or in a single territory or state. Instead, they constituted a community of transient conquerors, moving from one station to another, crisscrossing the West, and sometimes the continent, in irregular intervals. The army believed that the term of a unit's service in regions consid~red remote and unhealthy FALL2010 LAHTI? 353 ... Tf··Yi~·ippi"f.'······················ ···T·········· ,...... ,

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MAP 1. BORDER CONFLICT, 1870-86 Map detail from Frontier Regulars: The and the Indians, 1866-1891 by Robert M. Utley (University of Nebraska Press, 1973)' (Courtesy Robert M. Utley) should be between two and four years. Due to this policy, nine out of the ten total army cavalry regiments were represented at one time or another in New Mexico or Arizona between 1868 and 1886. During this same period, contingents from eight infantry regiments served in Arizona and units from six infantry regiments served in New Mexico." In addition to the exchange of army units, officers on leave or on detached service, discharged enlisted men, deserters, and new recruits created considerable army traffic to and from the Southwest. The turnover among enlisted men was high. The army replaced an estimated 25 to 40 percent of the approximately three thousand men stationed in Arizona and New Mexico each year." The army units assigned to stations in the Southwest approached their journey and the alien region that would be their home with preconceptions based on ignorance or fear. In 1866 the Southwest was not entirely unknown to the American people. Anglo merchants, trappers, and explorers, as well as prospectors on their way to California gold fields, traversed the area prior to the Civil War. Since the 1820S, the had lured Anglo merchants and American goods into the Southwest, making Santa Fe a well-established American outpost. Yet, neither ranching nor mining had yet boomed in the Southwest, and the region still lacked an industrial foundation. Consequently, few white Americans or European immigrants lived in the Southwest, had visited the region, or knew much about it in 1866. Before departing for Civil War theaters of war in the East, the army had established a presence in the Southwest and made conclusions about the region. Several officers considered the region unsuitable for Anglo futures. In 1852 New Mexico department commander Lt. Col. Edwin V. Sumner suggested that the United States should abandon the Southwest." It is 354 -+ NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLU ME 85, NUMBER 4 unclear how much the post-Civil War generation of officers, soldiers, and dependents who had not served in the prewar Southwest knew about these earlier experiences in the region. According to Martha Summerhayes, an officer's wife who first entered Arizona in 1874,"old campaigners" in the army "knew a thing or two about Arizona," whereas her younger cohort "did not know." "We had never heard much about this part of our country," she wrote. Another army wife, Frances Boyd, remembered that she and her husband started their "pilgrimage" toward the Southwest in 1869 with "childlike simplicity," completely ignorant of what awaited them. And Lt. Frederick E. Phelps relied on reading a book about New Mexico at West Point Military Academy for information on his assignment." As late as the 1880s, army personnel assigned to the Southwest claimed that they knew little about Arizona or New Mexico before traveling to the area. When Lt. Thomas Cruse received his assignment to Fort , Arizona, he was unable to locate his destination on the maps available to him in the East. Will C. Barnes, a soldier ordered to Arizona, noted in his diary that in his mind Arizona "seemed like a fairyland so far away.?" Many were frightened by rumors and tales of the journey ahead. According to Lt. Col. , "the climate of Arizona had such a bad reputation that I feared for my health," while army surgeon Henry R. Porter was told that it was "hot as hell." Porter also expressed concern over the "troublesome Indians" and Mexicans who "delight in robbing mails and passengers." He was convinced that because of this danger, "no one thinks of going to Arizona without being well armed." For Summerhayes, Arizona was a "dreaded" and "unknown land," and she worried that an "uncertain future was before me."? In the 1880s, Alice Applegate Sargent, an officer's wife, wrote, "We did not much relish the prospect of going to Arizona, for many and lurid were the tales that were told of the dreadful heat, the sand storms, the Gila monsters, centipedes, tarantulas etc., but when Uncle Sam said 'March,' we marched."20 In 1866, when the regular army began returning to the Southwest from the Civil War, the region was not easily accessible. No transcontinental railroad traversed across the Southwest and no water routes, except on the lower , penetrated it. Capt. John G. Bourke wrote, "Arizona was in those days separated from 'God's Country' by a space of more than fifteen hundred miles.'?' Incoming and outgoing troops resorted to a combination of boats, wagons, stage coaches, mules, and horses to reach their destinations. Many enlisted men simply walked. After the nation's first transcontinental railroad was completed in 1869,connecting California to the East via a central route, train travel became an option. When Will Barnes, a private in the Signal Corps, was ordered to Arizona in late 1879, he first used the transcontinental railroad to reach San Francisco, FALL2010 LAHTI ~355

California, and then, after a week's leave, sailed on a steamer to San Diego, changing boats in Los Angeles. From San Diego he took the stage to Yuma, Arizona, on the Colorado River and then continued by rail to its terminus, which at this time was near Casa Grande, Arizona, some 135 miles distant. After waiting two days for a vacant seat on a stage coach, he journeyed onward to Tucson, Arizona. There, after receiving orders to report to Fort Apache, Arizona, "that far-away, out-of-the-world frontier military post," Barnes took the eastbound stage coach and after a ride of 125 miles changed to a two-seated open buckboard. He reached Fort Grant, Arizona, via roads that were "just as nature made them; a foot deep in dust in dry weather, and often bottomless mud in wet weather." Again waiting a few days, he then journeyed by buckboard to Fort Thomas, Arizona, where, following another delay of four days, Barnes faced a "solemn-faced old government mule," which would carry him the rest of the way to Fort Apache over a rough, steep, and "perfectly awful" trail. After weeks of travel by ocean steamer, train, stage coach, buckboard, and mule, Barnes finally arrived at his new military horne.f Barnes's journey was rather typical in the sense that officers and soldiers, with families, routinely made these arduous journeys across the terrain of the Southwest. While Barnes traveled alone, the majority of soldiers and many of the officers and their wives, like Julia Davis, arrived in sizable army columns. The army penetrated southern Arizona and New Mexico both from the east and the west. Soldiers assigned to New Mexico usually moved overland either via Fort Union and Santa Fe in the northeastern part of the territory or, less frequently, from the south, through El Paso, Texas." To reach Arizona, army personnel and dependents often ventured by way of the Pacific Ocean and California. When departing from the eastern United States for Arizona, the first step was a sea voyage to the Panama Isthmus, followed by further oceanic travel to Pacific seaports such as San Diego and San Francisco. After the advent of the transcontinental railroad in 1869, a trip to San Francisco took approximately nine days by rail when departing from ." Army travelers continued from San Francisco, often by boat, southward either to Drum Barracks outside Los Angeles or to San Diego. In the 187os, both supplies and troops were increasingly transported by steamboat from around Cape San Lucas, the southern tip of the Mexican Baja California peninsula, to the mouth of the Colorado River and then up the river by small steamers to forts Yuma and Mojave, Arizona. The army had first explored and established steamboat traffic on the Colorado River in the 185os, and this water route played a significant transportation role until the Southern Pacific Railroad reached the river at Yuma in 1877. The army also moved 356+NEWMEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME85, NUMBER4 troops and supplies over land through the Sierra and the Mojave and Colorado deserts. Army personnel went from Drum Barracks to Fort Mojave (approximately 285 miles) or alternatively to Ehrenberg, Arizona (293 miles) and from San Diego to FortYuma (200 miles). Forts Yuma and Mojave acted as gateways to points farther east in Arizona. From Mojave the main routes led toward Prescott, Arizona, while Yuma roads went in the direction of'Tucson.f Whether the troops started their journey toward the Southwest from the , the , or east of the Mississippi River, the distances proved enormous. The companies of the Third Cavalry from Territory marched 1,190 miles on average when assigned to the Southwest. Even longer journeys awaited the Twelfth Infantry when sent from Arizona to the East, with trips averaging 2,602 miles.i" Distance was not the only challenge posed by army travel. Overland travel was often conducted in massive columns, making the journeys time­ consuming, slow, and cumbersome. Boyd wrote, "Nothing in my whole army experience wearied me so much as those endless days of slow, monotonous travel." Bourke felt much the same: "Our battalion slowly crawled from camp to camp with no incident to break the dull monotony."27 When the Fifth Cavalry left the Southwest in 1875 and was replaced by the Sixth from Colorado, Indian Territory, and Kansas, approximately 400 to 450 men moved at a time. Slow moving army columns, which consumed vast amounts of water, food, and forage, appeared like moving clouds of dust when seen from a distance. Because ofthe slow pace of travel, these unit transfers often took several months to complete. When the men and women of the Eighth Cavalry from New Mexico exchanged places with the Ninth from Texas, they spent anywhere from eight weeks to four months on the road." Even the relatively "short" trip between San Diego and Fort Apache took six weeks, and in 1866 troops from the Third Cavalry marched for nearly ten weeks from Fort Smith, , to Fort Union, New Mexico." Despite the long and.cumbersome nature of army journeys, officers and their wives considered themselves paragons of Victorian civilization in the West. This image demanded that they maintain a high standard ofliving and sense of refinement during their travels. Ideally, officers and their wives hoped to arrange leisurely journeys. In 1871 "Nannie" Mills, an officer's wife, wrote, "We expect to have a very nice time" en route." In reality, during the pre­ railroad era, trips proved long and arduous, and exposure to the elements was painful and taxing for many unprepared, overconfident, and inexperienced army travelers. As their journeys progressed, officers and their wives became increasingly disappointed with what they experienced, which in turn shaped their representations ofthe region. FALL2010 LAHTI ~357

For most officers and their wives, a successful joumey required the help of servants, either civilians or soldiers. Officers strove to employ maids, body servants, nurses, and other laborers to do much of their physical work and provide for their comfort." No less important to officers and wives was arranging accommodation on boats and wagons that reflected the travelers' class, sense of style and taste, and level of sophistication. In boats they preferred to reside in what Fanny Dunbar Corbusier, an army surgeon's wife, referred to as "very comfortable" staterooms. Books, music, singing, conversations, and games made the days pass quickly. While officers and their families sought to enjoy cheerful leisure in the company of "respectable" people, servants made their beds, hauled travel trunks between the vessel's hold and quarters, and served drinks and meals.F During overland journeys, many officers' families sought to make their wagons comfortable and refined. Capt. Anson Mills and his wife had their wagon covered with white canvas, added an "elegant green blanket to line the top to keep off the heat and protect the eyes," put up curtains for ventilation and privacy, installed removable seats that made room for the bed, and built in little pockets for small articles inside the wagon. The wagon was as "convenient and elegant a thing as one could imagine," and even "a queen might be proud to ride in it." Wagons, then, served as a symbol of class status, especially when officers and wives did not have to drive but instead hired teamsters or assigned drivers from the enlisted ranks." A successful travel experience also entailed a plethora of material comforts. Officers and dependents carried a large supply of different goods including bags, books, cases, baskets, linen, sewing materials, clothes, shawls, china, silver, guns, sabers, fresh and canned fruits, candles, chairs, rocking chairs, mattresses, and matting for the Hoors. Describing the inside of her wagon during the first day of travel, Eveline Alexander, an officer's wife, wrote, "I cannot begin to enumerate the various articles with which I was surrounded." Officers and wives categorized most of the items as necessary for "survival" en route, while the remaining articles were considered critical for home­ making in their new posts. 34 Operating under the assumption that her family could obtain nothing along the way, Julia Davis stuffed her baggage wagon with "linen, books, a bed, pictures, curtains- everything I could think of for house-keeping."35 Generally, the limit of baggage the army allowed one officer was three large army chests, or approximately one thousand pounds. Officers had to pay for any excess weight. Many army families regarded these limits as ridiculously low. They insisted on taking all their belongings and complained that they"could not exist" without them. When told to pack, some army wives, staggered by the weight restrictions, were unable to decide what to take and 358~ NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME 85, NU MBER 4 what to leave and simply stared paralyzed at their belongings. Officers and their wives often left the actual packing to their servants. Summerhayes, for example, confessed that she was utterly helpless in packing and simply did not know how to do it." When camping on the road, officers and their wives aimed to consolidate their class status by displaying style and sophistication. Wives wrote that they took "a passive position" or sought "a comfortable place to rest" by sitting on, for example, "a fine willow rocker" while the enlisted men unpacked and packed the wagons, put up tents, and prepared meals." On one wagon journey, officers and their wives enjoyed a breakfast of coffee, eggs, bacon, bread and butter, condensed milk, and hard bread, while dinner consisted of canned meat, vegetables, bread and butter, coffee, and canned fruits. The presentation of the meals was no less important than the menu. Corbusier remembered that on the road, meals were served on a red and white tablecloth spread on the ground. Officers and their dependents gathered together and sat on boxes with their plates, cups, knives, forks, spoons, and napkins." Boyd described another traveling party which, for its dining pleasure, hauled a special tent furnished with a board floor to offer more comfortable surroundings and to shelter against the wind, dust, and heat." Camp life, the menu, utensils, and the setting demonstrate how officers and their wives cherished specific conventions and tried to observe or apply them even when on the road in the Southwest. Dress was another potent symbol of class status. Julia Davis, adjusting her appearance to the demands of the overland journey, wore a blue serge dress with no hoops or extra skirts, braided her hair in one long tail, and sported a hat large enough to' hide her almost entirely." It seems that Julia was well prepared, wearing what Helen Fuller Davis, another officer's wife, called "sensible clothes for traveling." Other wives prioritized appearing genteel over practical utility. Lydia Spencer Lane, for instance, noted that the dress of many wiveswas more suited to Fifth Avenue in New Yorkthan a six-hundred­ mile ride in an army ambulance." Some unprepared army families took to the road without any bedding or tents, anticipating wrongly that they would sleep at ranches. They actually spent their nights in the wagons or relied on the kindness of those fellow travelers who offered to share space in their tents." Disappointment permeated many army journeys. For one thing, some officers and wives complained about their travel accommodations, grumbling that their tents and wagons were like ovens. Not everyone could secure, or afford, the kind of transportation that they would have preferred. During her trip, Boyd was irritated when she was "refused proper transportation-an ambulance and four mules with driver" and had to FALL2010 LAHTI ?359 settle for "a small, two-seated vehicle and span of horses." Julia Davis was unhappy that her white topped wagon pulled by four horses had nothing but a simple mattress laid in it: "In this we were to live, sleep, and travel.?? Many army wives quickly found that their material comforts did not provide immunity from the heat, sand, and dust of the southwestern roads. Their fine appearance crumbled and their entertainments failed. Heavy clothing suffocated them, and their elegant hats did not shade their heads and faces, which burned and blistered. Summerhayes was disgusted with her "rather fagged and seedy" appearance and regretted not bringing along enough "thin wash-bodices" to battle the dust that covered her from head to toe. Helen Davis was disappointed that, after a day of traveling in the intense heat, her companions were too exhausted to play cards in the evening." In addition, fires, wagon roll overs, and other accidents caused material losses and mental stress.Anygoods or items destroyed could be replaced only through borrowing from others or ordering from the eastern United States." Travel on boats was often equally miserable. Intense heat in the quarters and rooms could sap the energy of army people to the point that no one could maintain conversations or entertainments. High temperatures in the Gulfof California and on the Colorado River made the staterooms so unbearable that officers and families escaped to the deck to sleep during the night. According to Summerhayes, the days were "interminable" and the heat "destroyed both our good looks and our tempers." She had "never felt such heat, and no one else ever had or has since."46 Army travelers wandered around the boat in search of cool spots. Heat was not the only inconvenience for officers and their wives traveling by boat. They also had to contend with seasickness, and a lack of services, amenities, and companionship. Other army people were troubled by the river steamer crews on the Colorado River that were composed mostly of "savage" Indians." The availability and quality of food and drink was also an issue for many officers and their wives traveling by boat. Gen. Oliver O. Howard grumbled that the "cooking was about as bad as it could be." Summerhayes remembered, "The ice supply decreased alarmingly, the meats turned green ... and the odor which ascended from ... [the] refrigerator wasindescribable." After drinking black coffee and "bad warm water" for nine days, she was "longing for a cup of good tea or a glass of fresh, sweet milk." The twelve coconuts she had bought from a group of Mexicans who boarded the vessel to sell fruits and vegetables did not help for long. In Guaymas, Sonora, Summerhayes, by now "desperately hungry and thirsty," went ashore in search of better food and refreshments. She stated, "I mustered what Spanish I knew, and told ... I would pay ... any price for a cup of coffee with fresh milk." 36o~ NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUMES5, NUMBER4

Luckily, she had an ample supply of dollars, and she bought not only coffee with milk, but fresh butter, chicken, creamy biscuits, and more coconuts." Officers, especially those with higher rank and better salary,could oftentimes afford to improve their travel diet by purchasing food at high cost wherever it was available. For example Anson Mills and his wife invested eighteen dollars-more than a month's salary for an enlisted soldier-on apples, lemons, and oranges to refresh their food stocks on their journey." Enlisted men experienced even more arduous journeys than those described by officers and wives. The common soldier sailed on flatboats towed by the steamers on rivers and rode in boxcars or in day coaches aboard trains." Or on overland journeys, when the officers rode in their wagons, the enlisted men, not belonging to the "happy favored" class as one of them sarcastically commented, simply marched. Whatever the mode of travel, the class division between enlisted men and the officers persisted. "Cashuntz," an enlisted soldier, wrote that "after a march of 268 miles we reached this corner of the human garden, .... Yes, here we are, shirtless, shoeless, and I might with propriety add brainless." His unit's marching had been an exhausting ordeal that tore the men to pieces both physically and mentally. The rest periods usually proved too short for the exhausted soldiers, and they had to get up so "barely" past "twelve 0'clock midnight" that the enlisted men dubbed their early breakfast "supper/'" Barnes wrote, "Traveling in the desert those days was a very primitive matter." To the amazement and outrage of the enlisted men, officers sometimes left the men to struggle by themselves. For example John Spring recollected that when his unit marched from Drum Barracks to Yuma officers found the trip "somewhat tedious" in their ambulances and therefore left the columns in charge of noncommissioned officers and rode ahead as quickly as possible to the next resting place? Unlike officers and wives, enlisted men had very few material goods to transport. Enlisted men also lacked the economic means to ease their travel burdens. They had no servants, few personal luxury items, and little money with which to purchase fruits and vegetables to supplement their poor rations. Fresh meat wasa rarityand fresh vegetables were almost never seen. Hardtack, beans, and coffee- standard army fare- kept the enlisted men going. During the journey, some sold or exchanged their clothes for whiskey from locals." Although some officers and wives realized that common soldiers suffered more than they did, they still usually expected enlisted men to serve them, cook their food, make their beds, and erect their tents. Soldiers quickly learned to know their place. One veteran army wife gave the following advice to Summerhayes: ''You must never try to do any cooking at the camp-fire. The soldiers are there for that work.T" FALL2010

During the pre-railroad era, the western route to Arizona inspired army men and women to write more about their journey into the Southwest than any other arrny path into the region. These travelers used descriptions of the passage from California to Arizona to construct their own identity and power, to differentiate the colonial region from the eastern United States, and to symbolize what entering the Southwest meant for the army. These accounts described a journey to the "outside": a perilous descent from the civilized world into a foreign and remote wilderness. 55 Army discourses never characterized army actions as part of an unjust conquest of other peoples' land. Instead, journeys were portrayed as sites that tested the army traveler's resilience and character and established their superiority in relation to the colonial terrain and peoples. Army travelers often presented the beginning of their journeys as "normal" civilized travel, a quiet prelude that stood in stark contrast to upcoming challenges. Traveling overland, Boyd wrote that she enjoyed civilized San Francisco and charming Los Angeles. During the first days of travel inland from Los Angeles she experienced the most beautiful country imaginable. Roads were good and nights were enjoyed in people's homes with good food and comfortable beds. She felt happy and confident. On the fifth day, however, conditions changed. The column left "civilization" behind and entered the endless track of sand and the terrifying heat of the Mojave Desert. Starting inland from San Diego, Crook traveled the first days over a hilly, mountainous country, before dropping "down into the Colorado Desert." From "there to Yuma it was like being in an oven," Crook wrote." The "uninteresting and monotonous country" of the California deserts appeared to weary army eyes as forlorn peripheries plagued with crushing heat, furnace-like winds that raised dreadful sand storms, and aridity. The desert was generally portrayed as "one vast expanse of sifting sand." Boyd described the Mojave Desert: "In all my frontier life and travel I never saw anything so utterly desolate as was that desert." Nannie Mills confessed that she "had no idea that such a forlorn district was comprised within the limits of the United States." Army travelers saw no lush forests, fertile fields, or even grass. "We never saw anything which, by a vigorous effort of our imagination, could be called a patch of grass," recalled Lt. Camillo C. C. Carr.? Some travelers were further disappointed when they reached the Colorado River. Ellen McGowan Biddle, an officer's wife, described the Colorado as "broad, shallow, and full of quicksands that are constantly changing." Joseph Corson, an army surgeon, called it the "most turbulent" river with a "furious current." For Summerhayes it was an unknown, mighty, and untamed river with a "swift-flowing current" that "sweepjs] by like a mass of seething red liquid, 362 ~ NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME 85, NUMBER 4 turbulentand thick and treacherous." George H. Cranston, an enlisted soldier, was shocked that the river seemed "nearly half sand."58 The army labeled Fort Yuma, the military post on the Colorado River, "the hottest place that ever existed." Almost all travelers tellingly repeated a well-circulated army legend: a soldier who had died at Yuma returned to beg for his blankets, for he found hell too cold a place for his taste." Adding to the distress of new arrivals were the troops whom they saw going the other direction or leaving Arizona. Summerhayes recollected, "From the great joy manifested by them all, I drew my conclusions as to what lay before us, in the dry and desolate country we were about to enter."60 As her husband's column marched inland, Julia Davis became utterly disappointed with the conditions. After leaving San Diego, she sensed that the officers, troops, and dependents "were going farther and farther from civilization." On their route, they encountered only "glaring sand, and alkali dust." There was "not a tree, not a shrub, not a green thing of any kind," and the "monotony" of the landscape was "only broken by rocks, frightful hideous rocks ... You cannot fancy such a country!" Genuinely disquieted she wrote, "Every day the sun came up fierce, unclouded, into the dazzling sky, and burned over our heads, and grew hotter and hotter, and the alkali sands scorched our eyes, and choked us until we gasped for breath, and the heat from the ground seemed greater even than the heat from the sun." Revealing her ignorance of the region, Davis confessed that before the journey started she "had dreamt of a tropical vegetation, and forests and prairies" but now found "a desert-great bare purple rocks, and still more bare tracks of sand."?' Officers and their wives were disturbed by and disgusted with the desert environment. Compared to the farmlands and forests in the East, the southwestern landscapes they encountered seemed like unproductive wastelands. Officers and their wives liked the desert's people no better. According to many travelers the Colorado River area wassettled primarily by a "poor class" of Mexicans, "lazy, more than half-naked Indians," or half-breeds. Officers and their families contrasted local Indian and Hispanic people with Anglo society and deemed the region's inhabitants unintelligent and unproductive. Army personnel felt the locals were unable to tame nature for the sake of industry or build a prosperous and moral society anywhere, let alone in a demanding desert environment. The writings of officers and their wives implied that to develop the Southwest, a better class of white men and women needed to settle the region. With only a handful of white people and few or no middle­ class whites, the area lacked "proper" society and was "foreign" and "inferior." Army men and women saw no prosperous family farms, thriving industrial FALL2010 centers, or small orderly towns built of brick and wood. Similarly they saw no "hard-working" and "moral" middle-class whites dominating the region. Instead, army perceptions of the Southwest were based on places like Gila City, Arizona, once a boom town for silver. Summerhayes commented that the town was "not exactly a city, to be sure" but "a few old adobe houses and the usual saloon." Biddle categorized another Arizona town, Ehrenberg, as "entirely isolated from the world," while Summerhayes wrote that "of all dreary, miserable-looking settlements·that one could possibly imagine, that [Ehrenberg] was the worst. An unfriendly, dirty, and Heaven-forsaken place." For Capt. Guy Henry, Arizona City was "quite a town, balls and shootings being the order of the day." Others painted it as "the home of the bad man" or as "a distinguished village" consisting of two rows of adobe huts along a wide street with no walk, but plenty of villainous dens, and "indeed little else." "Sabre," an army paymaster, observed of Arizona City, "One might travel a long way before seeing a more God-forsaken looking city."62 Army people usually labeled the Indians living near the Colorado River as harmless naked savages and ignorant wretches who lived a stone-age existence.f As the travelers left the Colorado River, their perception of indigenous peoples changed dramatically, and their fear of Indian attacks, especially from , increased. East of Yuma, army people crossed areas occupied by Maricopas or Tohono O'odharns, and farther to the north they entered Yavapai or Pai territory. As they neared the heartland of Apacheria, some army personnel and families, having heard stories of travelers killed and mutilated by Indians and witnessed sites of previous attacks along the route, grew increasingly worried. They imagined that there were Apaches behind every rock ready to attack at any moment. According to Julia Davis, units stuck close together and allowed no stragglers, because "we knew the Indians were watching us, and we never knew when they might attack." Army people reasoned that the Indians did not usually attack because the troops moved in large numbers and the Apaches dared not to confront them.r' Surviving to tell the tales of the "Apache threat" was part of constructing army journeys as struggles that tested officers, enlisted men, and dependents. By casting the local Indians as murderous savages swarming the desert, army personnel validated the army's mission of conquest, established the Apaches' inferiority to the army, and made the army appear heroic and brave. Particularly between the Colorado River and Tucson, Prescott, and other army outposts, army travelers constructed the Southwest as an "empty" region with few inhabitants except those dangerous Indians. "After passing Fort Yuma," Julia Davis wrote, "we were in the Indian country and had quite left all civilization behind." Writing on the same region, Summerhayes felt "as 364~ NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME85, NUMBER4 though we were saying good-bye to the world and civilization." Still others remarked that they had entered total emptiness. Biddle declared, "As far as the eye could reach not a sign oflife could be seen; we seemed to be the only living people on the planet."65 Only a few isolated ranches, many of which functioned as rest stops for the army travelers, dotted this "Indian country," and these were "only low adobe dwellings," not proper civilized homes. Some of the rest stops proved "primitive to the extreme," with apparently unsanitary washing conditions and inadequate eating facilities. Summerhayes exclaimed, "Wretched, forbidding-looking places they were! Never a tree or a bush to give shade, never any sign of comfort or home." Barnes was stunned and appalled when, in the 110 degree heat, he dined under a brush shelter harassed by swarms of hungry flies while waited on by a Yuma Indian woman naked from the waist Up.66 According to army texts, travel conditions for those journeying east were generally at least as bad after the Colorado River as before it. Carr described the principal road from Yuma toward New Mexico as "a dreary, sandy waste of quite four hundred miles." Crook complained that "the heat of the trip up the Gila River was quite as bad as it had been over the desert, and the dust and flies added made it almost unbearable ... the worst feature was that the nights were so hot that it was impossible to sleep, and we would get up in the morning almost as tired as when we went to bed." The continuing uncertainty about water sources added to the suffering. Many travelers also had to pay for water hauled up from deep wells. Yetthe water was barely drinkable and was impregnated with sulfur and alkali.67 For some army travelers, their desert surroundings became almost too much to endure. Katherine Cochran, an officer's wife, wrote, "From the cold, bracing climate of we found ourselves in a few weeks on the arid deserts of Arizona, breathing and almost stifling in the dust that was thrown into the ambulance by the wind that always seemed to blow in the wrong direction.T" In several army discourses, the journey was represented as a battle against a "hostile" environment. The civilized army travelers contended that they were at the mercy of an uncontroliable nature, plagued not only by the "terrible" Apaches but by an arsenal of natural dangers and hardships. In addition to the crushing heat and chronic shortage of water, "dreadful" sandstorms terrified, "blinded and choked the men and mules," and made "traveling impossible."? Even rain, although rare, was presented as dangerous. Torrents soaked the travelers, destroyed their belongings, and washed out the roads. Quicksand and whirlpools in the Colorado River awaited any soldier unlucky enough to fall overboard from a steamer or a flatboat." Furthermore, all vegetation seemed armed with thorns and prongs. Cranston described the terrain from FALL2010

Yuma to Tucson as "just one stream of snakes," and claimed the soldiers killed between fiveand thirty per day." Mirages added to the travelers' misery. According to Julia Davis, heavenly but false images of ships at sea, bustling towns, and cool lakes only "made the heat hotter, and the desert drier, and the sand more choking than ever.?" There are several similarities between the travel narratives penned by army people and those written by white civilian travelers in the Southwest. Admittedly, some civilian boosters painted the Southwest as a land of milk and honey, while whites who married Hispanic and Native American women generally displayed a greater understanding of local inhabitants. Similarly, a few civilian travelers seemed more willing to praise "the picturesque and romantic" qualities of the southwestern landscapes than the majority of army writers. Many civilians, however, tended to affirm the view of military travelers and considered the region to be profoundly different from the "real" United States. They wrote of barren and inhospitable landscapes and noted that material conditions were miserable in the "mud towns." Nonmilitary Anglos also cited their prejudices against Mexicans, homogenizing the local population as ignorant, immoral, and uncivilized. J. Ross Browne, a journalist who resided in Oakland, California, argued that the Southwest was "completely isolated from the civilized world ... more distant from San Francisco and New Yorkthan either of those cities isfrom China or Norway." A correspondent covering the U.S.-Apache conflicts for the Chicago Times in 1881 commented on the "repulsive-looking" adobe structures and the "very unpleasant" local people he encountered in Arizona. According to historian Deena J. Gonzalez, the "images and accounts" of white travelers and newcomers "exhibited condescension and an implied, if not outspoken, sense of superiority.'?' Itseems that many civilians, like army officers,soldiers, and wives, also often sought to justify U.S. conquest. In the 1880s, the transcontinental railroad not only made the army trips easier and shorter than overland or sea travel, but initiated a profound change in army travelers' representations of their southwestern journeys. From the west, the Southern Pacific Railroad came to Yuma in 1877 and crossed Arizona and New Mexico in 1881. From the east, the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad reached the Colorado River near Fort Mojave in 1883. Penetrating New Mexico from the north, the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad connected with the Southern Pacific and the Texas and Pacific near El Paso, at the extreme western corner of Texas, in 1881. This alternative form of transportation meant that the army no longer forced its troops to march most of the way to their destinations. One company returning from , Arizona, to the Pacific Coast in 1882 hiked only 200of its almost 366~ NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUMES5, NUMBER4

1,600travel miles. In 1880 a unit rushing from Indian Territory to join the campaign in southern New Mexico was able to do most of its journey by rail. The rail trip of 1,081 miles took only five days." In 1884 army surgeon William Henry Corbusier journeyed by rail from New Yorkto Bowie Station in southeastern Arizona in only sixdays.Twelve years earlier, his much shorter trip from Nevada to a central Arizona post had lasted fifty-one days." Historian David M. Wrobel has written that in their texts many civilian emigrants drew a stark juxtaposition between travel by wagon and by Pullman Palace Car. Travelers contrasted the demands of the past with the luxuries of the present." The same happened with army travelers. Summerhayes noted, "Remembering the days, weeks, and even months spent in traveling on the river, or marching through the deserts, I could not make the Pullman cars seem a reality." Capt. Frank K Upham shared her sentiment: "When I hear others carelessly mention a trip by rail ... as a journey of few days ... a momentary feeling akin to envy or anger comes over me, and it is difficult to realize that it has been possible for even steam and the locomotive to accomplish such results-to have apparently annihilated the absolute waste and desolation through which we passed so wearily."? To officers, enlisted men, and their dependents, railroads symbolized the power of progress and civilization and the conquest of dangerous lands. The railroads divorced army personnel and families from the "inhospitable and inferior terrain" they so eagerly wrote about. Traveling by train made journeys in the Southwest comfortable, easy, and pleasant; they were no longer a "struggle." In Pullman cars, officers and their wives had a better chance to rest, relax, and enjoy pleasant socializing and leisure. Dust, heat, or lack of water did not regularly disturb travelers, and they were less likely to be exhausted or frustrated. Officers and families could avoid contact with lower-class passengers on trains. Furthermore, army people no longer had to obtain or decorate wagons or worry about their food supplies or the safe arrival of their material belongings. As a result, southwestern journeys lost most of their exoticism and "shock value," and travel to the borderlands became·"normal" and "uninteresting." In fact few army-related authors wrote in length about their journeys to the Southwest during the railroad era. Before the advent of the transcontinental railroad, the journeys of army personnel in the West were characterized by a sense of frustration and struggle and by the construction of difference. First, a strong class division distinguished the travel experiences of officers and their wives from those of enlisted men. Most officers and wives shared a desire to differentiate themselves from the enlisted men, to ensure that their journeys would fulfill FALL 2010

certain class standards, and to display their collective status and level of refinement. Uncertain about what to expect, many first-time travelers hoped to enjoy their time on the road, and, to this end, sought to secure good travel accommodations, an abundant supply of material comforts, and the help of lower-class servants. In contrast the army's underclass, the enlisted men, traveled almost empty handed, had no servants, and consumed a poor diet. They resented marching over rugged terrain, occupying second-class facilities on boats and trains, and being reduced to servant status by their officers and the officers' wives. Second, officers and wives were often disappointed to travel in a level of style and comfort far below the standard they considered appropriate for their class position. The gap between travelers' expectations and the realities of travel conditions and methods in the Southwest caused them to feel disgust towards their surroundings, and even to resent the whole journey. Arduous weeks and months spent on the road took their toll on officersand their wives. Upholding high standards of personal appearance and engaging in social activities befitting their class became difficult as travelers grew frustrated and fatigued. Even first-class accommodations in boats and decorated wagons inadequately sheltered officers and dependents from the heat and dust. Material wealth and servants were paltry compensation when the food was judged poor and the water supply was uncertain, when resting places were miserable, when traveling in the "barren" desert surrounded by seemingly dangerous Apaches and vicious rattlesnakes, or when one was seasick and stuck for days in a boat hit by crushing heat. Also, officers and their wives could not haul all the luxury items they would have wanted, which made them more bitter and miserable. Third, journeys functioned as sites in the production of army power. Army discourses constructed pre-railroad journeys as a transition from the known world to the unknown, a descent into a region outside the nation and civilization in its contemporary condition. By representing the journey not as an unjust penetration of other peoples' lands, but as a struggle and a rite of passage that tested the travelers resolve and made them (successfully) face the "savage Indian danger" and "dangerous environment," officers and their wives celebrated their character and perseverance as a superior group who pushed through all colonial obstacles. These agents of empire were unwanted by and irrelevant to society in the eastern United States. Thus, they sought to make themselves heroic and nationally important by penetrating "dangerous" and "unwelcorning" regions, and opening them to civilization. They also accrued colonial authority and constructed their identity by elaborating on the difference, or constructing even binary opposition, between themselves and 368? NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME85, NUMBER4

the environment, settlements, and peoples they encountered. While traveling through sections of the Southwest, the army's "imperial eyes" deemed the region foreign, inferior, and undeveloped-the antithesis of civilization. In that state, the region offered little to army travelers except immoral and uncivilized societies and untamed and unused nature: hot, sandy, dusty, arid, depraved, stagnant, and empty. Although it initially appears that critical white army travelers dismissed, or at least seriously questioned, the potential of the southwestern terrain for white settlement and industry, there is another side to this appraisal of the Southwest. As lands devoid of proper civilization, these places were also considered ripe for the taking and readily available for liberation and regeneration by civilized forces. By portraying the Southwest as a land of inferior societies and empty places in their writings, army travelers justified U.S. conquest as right and just, and even preferable to leaving the region to the local Indian or Hispanic population. Difference was central to colonial power. Mter railroad companies laid tracks across the Southwest, army travelers no longer differentiated themselves from the region they were traversing, which radically altered the significance and meaning they assigned to their journeys. The railroads, a symbol of civilization, established colonizer control over the travel terrain so that journeys were no longer represented as struggles, and the environment ceased to be "dangerous" or "inferior." When the journeys became "normal," they lost much of their appeal in army eyes and became largely irrelevant as a source for colonizer empowerment.

Notes

I. "For This I Had Left Civilization': Julia Davis at Camp McDowell, 186C)-187o," ed. Jim Schreier, Journal of ArizonaHistory 29 (summer 1988): 185-88. 2. Postcolonial studies have shown that colonial power was gained not only in battle or through economic imperialism, but that it was constructed and sustained by the discourses the colonizers produced of colonial peoples, places, and projects. See, for example, Edward W. Said, Orientalism(New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds., Tensions of Empire: ColonialCultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); and Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories, Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History series (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993)' 3. Sara Mills, Discourses of Difference: An Analysis of Women's Travel Writing and Colonialism (New York: Routledge, 1991), 2; and Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculiuration (New York: Routledge, 1992),5. 4. For example, historian Martin Padget ignores a vast number of army texts and uses only Lt. -Iames Simpson's account of his exploration during a military expedition FALL2010

to country in 1849. Martin Padget, Indian Country: Travels in the American Southwest, 1840-1935 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2004)' The account used by Padget is reprinted in Navaho Expedition: Journal of a Military Reconnaissance from Santa Fe, NewMexico, totheNavahoCountry,Made in 1849 by James H. Simpson,ed. Frank McNitt, rev. ed. with a new foreword by Durwood Ball, American Exploration and Travel (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003)'On overland migration, see John Mack Faragher, Men andWomenon the OverlandTrail (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979); and John D. Unruh, The Plains Across: The Overland Emigrants and the Trans-Mississippi West, 1840-60 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1979)'For a recent article on European travelers in the West, see David M. Wrobel, "The World in the West, the West in the World: Friedrich Cerstacker, Richard Francis Burton, and Isabella Bird on the Nineteenth-Century Frontier," Montana:The Magazineof Western History, spring 2008,24-34. 5. Two such examples are William H. Goetzmann, Anny Exploration in the American West, 1803-1863 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959); and William H. Goetzmann, Exploration and Empire: The Explorer and the Scientistin the Winning of the American West (New York:Alfred A. Knopf, 1966). 6. See, for example, Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United StatesAnny and the Indian, 1866-1891 (1973; repr., Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984); and Michael L. Tate, The Frontier Anny in the Settlementof the West (Norman: Univer­ sity of Oklahoma Press, 1999)' Some biographies of officers discuss army travel over western terrain. See, for example, Charles M. Robinson III, General Crook and the Western Frontier (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001). 7. See Patricia Y. Stallard, Glittering Misery: Dependents of the Indian FightingAnny (Fort Collins, Colo.: The Old Army Press, 1978), 16-23; Anne Bruner Eales, Anny Wives of theAmerican Frontier: Living bytheBugles (Boulder, Colo.: Johnson Books, 1996),6-8,16-33; and DarlisA. Miller, introduction to Cavalry Lifein Tentand Field, by Mrs. Orsemus Bronson Boyd [Frances Boyd] (1894; repr., Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), v-xiv. 8. The most thorough investigation of class in the army is Kevin Adams, Class and Racein the Frontier Anny:MilitaryLife in the West, 1870-189° (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009)' See also Edward M. Coffman, The Old Anny:A Portrait of the American Anny in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); and Sandra L. Myres, "ArmyWomen's Narratives as Documents of Social His­ tory: Some Examples from the Western Frontier, 1840-1900," New Mexico Historical Review 65 (April 1990): 175-98. 9. After the Civil War, approximately 50 percent of enlisted men were immigrants, while almost 40 percent of officers came from New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. Coffman, Old Anny, 219, 330. 10. Utley, Frontier Regulars, 10-11, 15. I!. Ibid., 5

14. See "Position and Distribution of Troops" in the Annual Reportof the Secretary of Warfor the years 1866--1886. For the limit on consecutive service, see Maj. Gen. J. M. Schofield, "Report of Major-General Schofield," in Annual Reportof the Secretary of War,1872,42d Cong., 3d sess., 1872-1873, H. Ex. Doc. no. 1, pt. 2, serial 1558,p. 66. 15· Utley, Frontier Regulars, 23· 16. This perception of the Southwest did not necessarily change after the Civil War. The Commanding General of the Army, William T. Sherman, urged settlers and soldiers to withdraw from the Southwest in 1870. Only the arrival of railroads changed the mind of skeptical Sherman, who recognized the area's mining potential. For Sumner's and Sherman's views on the Southwest, see Robert Wooster, '''A Difficult and Forlorn Country': The Military Looks at the American Southwest, 1850-189°," Arizona and the West 28 (winter 1986): 339, 341, 349-50. For the pre-Civil War army, see Dur­ wood Ball, Army Regulars on the Western Frontier, 1848-1861 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001);Robert M. Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue:The UnitedStates Armyand the Indian,1848-1865 (New York: Macmillan, 1967);and Robert W. Frazer, Forts and Supplies: The Roleof the Armyin the Economyofthe Southwest, 1846--1861 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1983)' 17· Martha Summerhayes, VanishedArizona: Recollections of the Army Life of a New England Woman, rev. ed. with a new introduction by Dan L. Thrapp (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979), 46; Boyd, Cavalry Life in Tent and Field, 95; and "Frederick E. Phelps: A Soldier's Memoirs," ed. Frank D. Reeve, New Mexico Historical Review 25 (January 1950):40. 18. Thomas Cruse, "From Hembrillo Canyon to Chevelon's Fork," in Struggle for Apacheria, ed. Peter Cozzens, vol. 1 of Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, 5 vols., ed. Peter Cozzens (Mechanicsburg, Penn.: Stackpole Books, 2001),262; and Will C. Barnes, 16 December 1880, Fort Apache, Arizona, diary 59, box 9, series 3, Will Croft Barnes Papers, 1878-1945, MS 0017, Arizona State Historical Society, Tucson, Arizona [hereafter ASHS]. 19. General George Crook: HisAutobiography, ed. Martin F. Schmitt (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960), 160; Henry R. Porter to Father, 6 July 1872,San Francisco, and Porter to Mother, 31July 1872,San Francisco, in "A Soldier with Crook: The Let­ ters of Henry R. Porter," ed. Gene M. Gressley, Montana:The Magazine of Western History, July 1958, 35; and Summerhayes, VanishedArizona,19. 20. Alice Applegate Sargent, Following the Flag: Diaryof a Soldier's Wife (Kansas City, Mo.: E. B. Barnett, 1919),13. 21. John G. Bourke, On the Border with Crook, Classics of the Old West series (1891; repr., Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1980), 3. 22. Apaches and Longhorns: The Reminiscences ofWill C. Barnes, ed. Frank C. Lockwood (Los Angeles: The Ward Ritchie Press, 1941), 3-32. 23. For narratives of military travels to New Mexico, see An ArmyWife on the Frontier: The Memoirs ofAliceBlackwood Baldwin,1867-1877, ed. Robert C. Carriker and Eleanor R. Carriker, , the Mormons, and the West series, no. 6 (1929; repr., Salt Lake City: Tanner Trust Fund, University of Utah Library, 1975),46--63; Phelps, "Soldier's Memoirs," 40-43; and Cavalry Wife:The Diaryof EvelineM. Alexander, 1866--1867; Beinga Record of HerJourney from NewYork to Fort Smith to Join HerCavalry-officer Husband,AndrewJ. Alexander, and HerExperiences with Him onActiveDuty among FALL2010 LAHTI ~371

the Indian Nations and in Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado, ed. Sandra L. Myres (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 37-76. 24. Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona,182. For sea voyage, see John Spring's Arizona,ed. A. M. Gustafson (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966),26-28. 25. Lt. Col. George Crook, "Report of Colonel Crook," in U.S. Congress, House, An­ nual Report of the Secretary of War, 1871, 42d Cong., zd sess., 1871-1872, H. Ex. Doc. no. 1, pt. 2, serial 1503, p. 77; Quartermaster General M. C. Meigs, "Report of the Quartermaster-General," in US. Congress, House, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1872,42d Cong., 3d sess., 1872-1873, H. Ex. Doc. no. 1, pt. 2, serial 1558, p. 153; and Tate, Frontier Anny in the Settlement of the West, 73-74. The army tried an alternative route to bring supplies from California to south~rn Arizona Territory. They traveled by water to Guaymas in Sonora, Mexico, and then overland to Tuc­ son, Arizona Territory. With the army came mule and ox teams leading large herds of livestock and many wagons loaded with supplies. For military supply during and after the Civil War, see Darlis A. Miller, Soldiers and Settlers: MilitarySupply in the Southwest, 1861-1885 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1989). 26. "Table showing princip-al movements of troops," in US. Congress, House, Annual Reportof the Secretary of War, 1882,47th Cong., zd sess., 1882-1883, H. Ex. Doc. no. 1, pt. 2, serial 2°91, p. 352; and "Table showing principal movements of troops," in U.S. Congress, House, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1883,48th Cong., ist sess., 1883-1884, H. Ex. Doc. no. 1, pt. 2, serial 2182, p. 536. 27. Boyd,Cavalry Lifein Tentand Field, 240--41; and Bourke, On the Border withCrook, 3. 28. W. H. Carter, From Yorktown to Santiago with the Sixth US. Cavalry (1900; repr., Austin, Tex.: State House Press, 1989), 174-78; and Boyd, Cavalry Life in Tent and Field, 241-48. 29. Frank K. Upham, "Incidents of Regular Army Life in Time of Peace," in Struggle for Apacheria, Cozzens, 85; and Alexander, Cavalry Wife, 37-75. 30. "Nannie" [Hannah] Mills to Mother, 5 March 1871, [Drum Barracks, California,] in Anson Mills, My Story, ed. C. H. Claudy (Washington, D.C.: Published by the author, 1918), 137. 31. For servants in the army, see Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona; and Julia Davis, "For This I Had Left Civilization." 32. Fanny Dunbar Corbusier, Recollections of HerAnny Life, 186g--1908, ed. Patricia Y. Stallard (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003), 27; Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona,22-25, 38; Oliver O. Howard, My Life and Experiences among Our Hostile Indians: A Record of Personal Observations, Adventures, and Campaignsamong the Indiansof the GreatWest, with SomeAccountof their Life, Habits, Traits, Religion, Ceremonies, Dress, Savage Instincts, and Customs in Peace and War, rev. ed. with a new introduction by Robert M. Utley (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972), 125; and Joseph P. Widney to Mother, 29 January 1867, Drum Barracks, California, file 14, box 2, Gustav van Hemert Schneider Papers, 1876-1949, MS °715, ASHS. 33. "Nannie" [HannahJMills to Mother, My Story, Anson Mills, 136-37. For an example of travel by wagon, see Helen Fuller Davis, "An Account of a roth Cavalry March with Gen. B. H. Grierson from Ft. Davis to Ft. Grant," in The Colonel's Lady on the Westem Frontier: The Correspondence of AliceKirk Grierson, ed. Shirley A. Leckie, Women in the West series (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 158-59. 372~ NEWMEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME85, NUMBER4

34. Alexander, Cavalry Wife, 37-38;Soldier, Surgeon, Scholar: The Memoirs of William HenryCorbusier, 1844-193°, ed. Robert Wooster (Norman; University of Oklahoma Press, 2003), 71; Fanny Dunbar Corbusier, Recollections of Her Army Life, 26;and Boyd, Cavalry Life in Tent and Field, 92-93. 35. Julia Davis, "For This I Had Left Civilization," 188. 36. Summerhayes, VanishedArizona,19-20;Fanny Dunbar Corbusier, Recollections of HerArmy Life, 26;and Leckie, Colonel's Lady on the Western Frontier, 175. 37. Boyd, Cavalry Life in Tentand Field, 98;and Helen Fuller Davis, "Account of a roth Cavalry March," 159-60. 38. Fanny Dunbar Corbusier, Recollections of HerArmy Life, 30. 39. Boyd, Cavalry Life in Tent and Field, 245. 40. Julia Davis, "For This I Had Left Civilization," 188. 41. Helen Fuller Davis, "Account of a rothCavalry March," 159; and Lydia Spencer Lane, I Married a Soldier: Or Old Days in the Old Army (Philadelphia; J. B. Lippincott, 1893), 43. For travel clothing, see also James C. Worthington to Dan Worthington, 16July 1880, Fort McDowell, Arizona, box 1,Worthington Letters, 1879-1880, MS 089o, ASHS. 42. Fanny Dunbar Corbusier, Recollections of HerArmy Life, 29-30. 43. Boyd, Cavalry Life in Tent and Field, 92---<)3; Julia Davis, "For This I Had Left Civi­ lization," 188; and Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 54. See also William Henry Corbusier, Soldier, Surgeon, Scholar, 71. 44. Summerhayes, VanishedArizona,25, 59;and Helen Fuller Davis, "Account of a roth Cavalry March," 159. 45. See Summerhayes, VanishedArizona, 188---<)0. 46. Summerhayes, VanishedArizona, 36-39. 47. Joseph Kirby Corson, Reminiscences, ca. 1878-1910, AZ 257, Special Collections, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona [hereafter Corson Reminiscences, UASC). 48. Howard, My Life and Experiences, 125; and Summerhayes, VanishedArizona,24-27. 49. "Nannie" [Hannah] Mills letter, 9 March 1871, in My Story, Anson Mills, 138. 50. William Henry Corbusier, Soldier, Surgeon, Scholar, 70; Barnes, Apaches and Longhorns, 4; and "Sgt. Neil Erickson and the Apaches; With a Description of Fort Craig," ed. C. B. Benton, The Westerners Brand Book (Los Angeles; Westerners Los Angeles Corral, 1948); 123. 51. Gashuntz [pseud.], "On the March to Fort Yuma," in Struggle for Apacheria, Coz­ zens, 53-56. 52. Barnes, Apachesand Longhorns, 9; and Spring, John Spring's Arizona, 34. 53. Fanny Dunbar Corbusier, Recollections of HerArmyLife,28.The standard history of enlisted men in the post-Civil War frontier army is Don Rickey, Forty Milesa Day on Beansand Hay; The EnlistedSoldierFighting the IndianWars(Norman; University of Oklahoma Press, 1963)' Rickey details the hardships enlisted men encountered during their service in the West. 54. Summerhayes, VanishedArizona, 50,see also 53-54, 61; and Julia Davis, "For This I Had Left Civilization," 189. 55. Many army personnel referred to the journey from southern Arizona and New Mexico to the states as "going inside." Following this logic, the trip to the Southwest was a journey to the "outside." See, for example, Corson Reminiscences, UASC; William FALL2010 LAHTI ~373

Henry Corbusier, Soldier, Surgeon, Scholar, 73, 87; and Fanny Dunbar Corbusier, Recollections of HerAnny Life, 66. 56. Boyd, Cavalry Lifein Tentand Field, 84,90--91, 95-97; and Crook, HisAutobiography, 162. See also "Nannie" [Hannah] Mills letters, 9 March 1871, 12 March 1871, and 21 March 1871, in MyStory,Anson Mills, 137-40. 57. Guy V.Henry, "CavalryLife in Arizona," in Struggle for Apacheria, Cozzens, 97;Crook, HisAutobiography, 162; Boyd, Cavalry Lifein Tentand Field, 102; "Nannie" [Hannah] Mills letter, 21 March 1871, in My Story, Anson Mills, 40; and Camillo C. C. Carr, "The Days of Empire-Arizona, 1866-1869," in Struggle for Apacheria, Cozzens, 20. 58. Ellen McGowan Biddle, Reminiscences of a Soldier's Wife (Philadelphia: Press ofJ. B. Lippincott, 1907), 146; Corson Reminiscences, UASC; Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona,36,43;and George H. Cranston to Father, 27April 1867, Fort Grant, Arizona, in "A New York Private in Arizona Territory: The Letters of George H. Cranston, 1867-187°," ed. Bruce J. Dinges, Journal of Arizona History 26 (spring 1985): 59. 59· Summerhayes, VanishedArizona, 33; Henry, "Cavalry Life in Arizona," 97; Mrs. M. A. Cochran, Posie: Or, from Reveille to Retreat; An Anny Story (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke, 1896), 38;and Boyd, CavalryLife in Tent and Field, 107. 60. Summerhayes, VanishedArizona, 32. 61. Julia Davis, "For This I Had Left Civilization," 189, 192. 62. Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona,41-42, 193, see also 135-75; Biddle, Reminiscences of a Soldier's Wife, 150; Henry, "Cavalry Life in Arizona," 97; Fanny Dunbar Corbusier, Recollections of HerAnny Life, 28, 39; and "Sabre" to Los Angeles Star, 26 February 1872, Fort Yuma, and 27 February 1872, Gila City, in "Tour in Arizona: Footprints of an Army Officer," ed. Henry Winfred Splitter, Journal of the West I (July 1962): 74-75. See also Corson Reminiscences, UASC. 63. See Biddle, Reminiscences of a Soldier's Wife, 147-51; "Nannie" [Hannah] Mills letter, 21 March 1871, in My Story, Anson Mills, 140-41; and Howard, My Life and Experiences, 125-3°. 6+ Julia Davis, "For This I Had Left Civilization," 18

72. Julia Davis, "For This I Had Left Civilization," 190; and Spring, John Spring's Arizona, 45. 73. J. Ross Browne, Adventures in the Apache Country: A Tour Through Arizona and Sonora, with Notes on the SilverRegions ofNevada (New York: Harper and Broth­ ers, 1869), 258; John F. Finerty, "On Campaign after Cibicue Creek," in Struggle for Apacheria, Cozzens, 237; Deena J. Gonzalez, Refusingthe Favor: The Spanish­ Mexican Women of Santa Fe, 1820-1880 (New York:Oxford University Press, 1999), 47, see also 45-55,69-70; and Padget, Indian Country, 17, 32-45. 74- Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell, "Report of Major-General McDowell,' in U.S. Congress, House, Annual Reportof the Secretary of War,1882,47th Cong., zd sess., 1882-1883, H. Ex. Doc. no. 1, pt. 2, serial 2091, p. 117; and A Dose of Frontier Soldiering: The Memoirs of Corporal E. A. Bode, Frontier RegularInfantry, 1877-1882, ed. Thomas T. Smith (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 130-31,139-42, 212-13. 75. Fanny Dunbar Corbusier, Recollections ofHerArmy Life, 129; and William Henry Corbusier, Soldier, Surgeon, Scholar, 70-72. 76. David M. Wrobel, Promised Lands: Promotion, Memory, and the Creation of the AmericanWest (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002),104-7, 77. Summerhayes, VanishedArizona,220;and Upham, "Incidents of Regular Army Life in Time of Peace," 85.