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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _____________________ No. 97-10598 _____________________ GENARO RUIZ CAMACHO, JR., Petitioner-Appellant, versus GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee. _________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas (3:95-CV-2539-G) __________________________________________________________________ April 17, 1998 Before DAVIS, JONES, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Genaro Ruiz Camacho, Jr., a Texas death row inmate convicted of capital murder, seeks a certificate of probable cause to challenge the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The certificate is DENIED; the stay of execution, VACATED. I. In 1990, Camacho was convicted and sentenced to death for the capital murder of David Wilburn. During the guilt phase, as * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. discussed infra, three eyewitnesses testified that they saw Camacho shoot Wilburn; and the State also presented evidence of Camacho’s involvement in the murders, a few days later, of Evellyn and Andre Banks, who had been present when Wilburn was murdered. During the punishment phase, the State presented evidence that Camacho had committed two additional murders. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, Camacho v. State, 864 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); and the United States Supreme Court denied Camacho’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Camacho v. Texas, 510 U.S. 1215 (1994). Camacho filed a state habeas application on 20 March 1995. In mid-April, he moved for an evidentiary hearing; and, in mid-July, he requested discovery and, again, an evidentiary hearing. On 7 August, less than two weeks after the State filed its answer, the state habeas court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that relief be denied. In early October, in an unpublished opinion, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted those findings and conclusions and denied habeas relief. Two weeks later, on 23 October 1995, Camacho filed a federal habeas petition, as well as a motion for stay of execution and an evidentiary hearing. The district court granted the stay and appointed counsel. On 24 November, the State filed an answer and moved for summary judgment. On 26 December, Camacho applied for funds to employ experts; three days later, he moved for leave to conduct discovery. In late May 1996, Camacho filed a supplemental application for funds to employ an expert. On 18 July 1996, the - 2 - magistrate judge denied Camacho’s request for discovery, stating that the discovery sought constituted an “impermissible fishing expedition”. The magistrate judge reported findings of fact and conclusions of law in early January 1997, thoroughly analyzing Camacho’s claims in painstaking detail, and recommended that an evidentiary hearing was not required and that habeas relief be denied. In late April 1997, the district court overruled Camacho’s objections and adopted the findings and recommendation, with only slight revision. The district court denied Camacho a certificate of appealability. But, because Camacho filed his habeas petition before 24 April 1996, the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), pre-AEDPA law applies. See Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115 (5th Cir. 1997). Camacho seeks a pre-AEDPA certificate of probable cause (CPC) from our court. II. In his CPC application, Camacho claims that the district court erred in the following ways: 1. By denying habeas relief on his claims (a) That he was denied due process of law and a fair trial by the prosecution’s failure, in several instances, to disclose evidence favorable to the defense, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (b) That he is entitled to a new trial because of newly discovered evidence which points directly to his innocence of the - 3 - crime for which he was convicted and that, to deprive him of his life without a jury’s consideration of such evidence, will deprive him of his life without due process of law; (c) That the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude from the jury three members of minority races was based on racial grounds in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and its progeny; and (d) That he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury because of the admission of evidence relating to the murders of Evellyn and Andre Banks four days after the murder for which he was convicted and sentenced to death; and, 2. Concomitantly, (a) By refusing to allow discovery, especially as to a recantation concerning the newly discovered evidence; (b) By refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing; and (c) By denying funds to employ experts. Furthermore, except for his Batson claims, Camacho maintains that, because the state habeas judge neither presided over his capital murder trial, nor conducted an evidentiary hearing, the presumption of correctness accorded to state court factual findings, pursuant to pre-AEDPA 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), does not apply. The district court applied AEDPA in denying habeas relief; but, as discussed, we must, instead, consider Camacho’s CPC motion under pre-AEDPA law. Nevertheless, we will, for purposes of this opinion, assume that the presumption does not apply (except, as - 4 - discussed infra, with respect to Camacho’s Batson claims, as to which there are findings of fact by the trial judge). To obtain a CPC, a habeas petitioner must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a federal right”. Lucas v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1069, 1073 (5th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “This standard does not require petitioner to show that he would prevail on the merits.” Drew v. Collins, 5 F.3d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1171 (1994). Instead, the petitioner must “demonstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983) (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because several of Camacho’s claims require consideration of the trial testimony of certain witnesses, that evidence, as presented by individual witnesses, rather than described collectively, is stated in considerable detail as a backdrop to our consideration of Camacho’s CPC application. The facts are also summarized in our court’s opinion affirming Camacho’s federal kidnaping conviction; on appeal from that conviction, Camacho raised some of the same claims he asserts now as the basis for federal habeas relief. See United States v. Jackson, 978 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 930 (1993). Sam Junior Wright testified for the State as follows. On 20 May 1988, at approximately 8:00 a.m., he and his three-year-old - 5 - son, Andre Banks, were upstairs in his residence at 7927 Nassau Street, in the Pleasant Grove area of Dallas, Texas. Wright lived there with Evellyn Banks (Andre’s mother) and her two sons, who had already left for school. After hearing Evellyn Banks, who was downstairs at the time, cry out, Wright looked downstairs and saw a black man, whom he did not recognize, and another man, whom he recognized from prior drug-related dealings as “Gino”. (At the time, Wright did not know “Gino’s” last name; Dallas Police and the FBI later identified him as the petitioner, Genaro Camacho. The black man was later identified as Juan Jackson.) The black man ordered Wright and his son downstairs. When Wright got there, he saw a white man (later identified as George David Cooke) whom he had never seen before. Another “white guy” (later identified as Larry Gene Merrell, referred to in the record as an “Indian”), whom Wright also had never seen before, came in through the back door. Gino did not have a weapon, but the other three intruders were armed. Gino (Camacho) asserted that Wright owed him $20,000, and stated that, if Wright did not get the money, he would kill Evellyn and Andre Banks. Gino then hit Wright. Upon hearing a knock at the door, Gino took a .357 Magnum from one of his accomplices and stood behind the door. David Wilburn, Wright’s driver, entered the house. Gino ordered Wilburn to lie face-down on the floor, and shortly thereafter shot him in the back of the head. Gino told one of his accomplices to handcuff Evellyn Banks. - 6 - Wright escaped through the front door while the intruders were distracted by the sound of the back door slamming. He saw a neighbor, and shouted to her to call the police. He eventually went to Evellyn’s mother’s home and told Evellyn’s brother what had occurred. Evellyn’s brother went to Wright’s house and gave the name “Gino” to the police. Wright later called the FBI and, after his subsequent arrest (for failing to appear for sentencing on a 1985 drug conviction), gave a statement to the FBI. At the time of trial, Wright was serving a 22-year sentence in a federal institution for the 1985 drug conviction and for failing to appear for sentencing. On cross-examination, Wright testified that he had moved for reduction of sentence, but that the motion had not yet been heard.

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