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MARTIN KALA 1 2 ESTONIA IN THE EUROPEAN UNION MARTIN KALA 3 4 ESTONIA IN THE EUROPEAN UNION Cover design: Mari Kaljuste © Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, 2008 ISSN 1736–4175 Tallinn, 2008 www.evi.ee Trükikoda OÜ Greif MARTIN KALA 5 Table of Contents Estonia in the EU: from the margins to center stage Martin Kala 7 Europe’s new vanguard or the old ‘security modernists’ in a fancy dress? The Baltic states against the images of Eastern Europe in the EU Maria Mälksoo 31 Why give money to the bear? An analysis of EU assistance to Russia Piret Ehin 61 The Barcelona Process and the Union for the Mediterranean: A critical assessment Tiago Marques 79 What world for EU defence in 2020? Daniel Keohane 95 Reforming the transatlantic defence market Sophie de Vaucorbeil 115 Transatlantic relations: The year of change Andrew A. Michta 133 The emerging cyber security agenda: Threats, challenges and responses Heli Tiirmaa-Klaar 153 Estonian options in climate policy Peep Mardiste 175 About the Authors 189 6 ESTONIA IN THE EUROPEAN UNION MARTIN KALA 7 Estonia in the European Union: From the margins to the centre Martin Kala PART ONE About Europe’s success in the 21th century The European way of thinking has been paralyzed by pessimism, which has its roots in the everyday routine at the heart of a con- temporary democracy. The reasons for the Europeans’ lack of self-confidence are to be found in their own minds. Although we are confronted daily by a variety of political, social, cultural and economical problems, the people’s lack of interest and enthusi- asm in topical politics creates a situation where the peoples of Europe regard the future with apprehension, rather than with a willingness to face new challenges. The achievements and atti- tudes that made Europeans who we are today, unfortunately, are fading, as the citizens of Europe observe that the most vital and impactful decisions with regard to their future are being taken somewhere else, independently from us, and that our democrati- cally elected leaders lack the ability, or the power to influence, these decisions to any significant degree. The democratic style of life that once provided us with a di- rection in life, as well as with a sense of identity, is likewise disap- pearing. Our very model of society, grounded in humanist values and human rights, is today undermined by states which par- ticipate in fierce competition for energy and natural resources, although the very same countries were once at the forefront of the fight against a world order based solely on cynical economic 8 ESTONIA IN THE EUROPEAN UNION interest. The market advantages dearly won during globalisation are quickly dividing the world into those who make economic progress, and those who do not. However, the ones advancing now are those who join the dirty game, not the ones who prefer to stick to their values. Western democracy is like a paper canoe in a stormy sea, while globalisation is making the storm ever stronger – a challenge even for the sturdiest ships. While democracy has made little progress during the past decade, we are witnessing a situation where the democratic norms and capacity are severely tested (and damaged) in places where social developments are slow or even regressive. In this context, the revolutions of different colours in transform- ing societies – Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan – seem like a Mayday call from a sinking ship. The European Union has a strong currency and the largest common market in the world; our technology and methods in- creasingly set world standards. When the euro was being created, the world’s business circles echoed with countless pessimistic opinions, which considered the endevour dangerous for the com- mon market and even a potential grave-digger for the whole European project. Today the situation has dramatically changed: more and more money is being invested in European banks; hun- dreds of thousands of litres of petrol run through our wallets; rich Arab oil importers convert their barrels into euros, rather than into dollars. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, an “anti- imperialist” antagonist of the United States, suggested, while hosting the OPEC ministerial meeting in Caracas in June 2006, that the cartel forsake the weak dollar and switch to the euro for pricing crude (he predicted the “end of the dictatorship of the dollar, currency of an empire that will fall in this century.”).1 Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has called upon the OPEC states to lose the “useless dollar to a solid euro”.2 Even Chinese companies have decided to establish their head offices in London and Paris, rather than in New York. Europe is actually doing a lot better than we might think. 1 “Chavez, blasting weak dollar, wants euro-denominated crude”, www.domini- candaily.com, June 2, 2006. 2 Parag Khanna, “Who Shrank the Superpower?” The New York Times Magazine, January 27, 2008. MARTIN KALA 9 An intriguing essay by American political scientist Parag Khan- na on global politics argues that the world is going to have three major leading powers.3 Besides the United States of America – the ultimate firm rock, although relatively weak at the moment –, the author includes the rapidly developing China and, perhaps surprisingly, the European Union, which he believes will acquire new drive and speed in the near future after the ratification of the Lisbon treaty. After the failure of its ratification in Ireland, there is now much more talk about the immediate future of the EU: either a “Nice-plus” as advocated by Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, meaning institutional changes without the treaty or a smaller “core club” of those Member States who have managed to ratify the treaty and therefore clearly expressed their will to move on with the integration and construction process. Khanna thinks that the United States should be able to find (not hold?) its place between the two other superpowers, the European Union and the People’s Republic of China. Considering the character- istic features of the three postulated leading powers, one can assume that all the other pretenders to the top can be counted out, including Russia despite its abundant natural resources; the Islamic world, which is weakened (although also radicalised) by endless wars; and the giant democracy India, because its develop- ment is still decades behind China’s. It is ironic that Europeans tend to see themselves inevitably as merely the translators and go-betweens in the match between West and East, as actors who do not possess significant force, power or influence in the globalising world, whereas outsiders view us as major competition. Why this difference of percep- tion? Maybe we ought not to consider Europe as a petty broker between the US and China, nor believe that trying to score goals on both sides will lead to successful outcomes. Probably many a reader would like to ask: but what about Russia? How is it possible that Russia is considered a secondary 3 In the 21st century the empires strike back. Parag Khanna argues that the United States, the European Union and China dare not call themselves imperial powers, but they are busy reshaping the globe to suit their interests. The game is afoot, with the natural resources and potential wealth of countries like Ukraine, Turkey and Brazil as the prize. Parag Khanna, The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order, New York, 2007. 10 ESTONIA IN THE EUROPEAN UNION player, not a super-state?4 This is so because the oligarchy, with energy as its present source of money, is nothing more than a degenerating giant. Within a few decades Russia’s resources will be all but finished, its population will be collapsing, its cities de- lapidating. In a word: Russia does not have any reasonable basis for an assertive foreign policy, though that will not stop it from occasionally flexing its muscles in places like Georgia. Estonian historian David Vseviov writes vividly about Mos- cow trying to convince Europe that it should be seen as a huge spider, which holds Europe in a unrelenting deadly grip, whereas it is actually perfectly clear to Russia itself that it really does not have much strength left, and the last thing that it should rea- sonably be spent on, is going after the European Union, a very safe and convenient neighbour. Vseviov’s views are based on what he hears and reads about Russia in Estonia, with numer- ous statements representing it as a huge predator who is able to impose it’s will on its neighbours. “Actually, however (sometimes for better, sometimes for worse), the world is far more layered. Under the visible surface there are many more layers,” Vseviov writes. “The relationship between Europe and Russia is far more complex and the metaphorical spider certainly does not hold all the strands of the web. Thus I would like to hear or read a more in-depth account, to balance all the endless stories dealing with surface ripples.”5 States with a capacity like Russia’s can function as secondary actors, i.e. their behaviour in relation to the three main powers can push the situation into a certain direction, and influence the emergence of one geopolitical market as the most important one during the 21st century. Thus, the more Europe can spread its soft power in the world and the more it manages to surround itself with friendly “other” states, the more assured we can be of 4 According to the survey, this contest is hottest and most decisive in the Second World: pivotal regions in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and East Asia.

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