Copyright © BlackwellBiackwell Publishers Ltd 2001 First published 2001 Blackwell2 4 6 8 Publishers Inc. 350 Main Street l()It) 9 7 5 3 1 ONTENTS Maiden, Massachusetts 02148BlackvellBlackwell Publishers Ltd 108 Cowley Road USA C All tights reserved. Except forlbr the quotation of short Oxford 0X4 IJFlJF UK passages for the purposes itii criticism and rcvies;revies; noaarettieval partretrieval of this system, publicationmechanical, or transmitted, photocopying, in any form recording, or by any or otherwise, without the prior system, or transmitted, in any form or by any permission of the publisher. may be reproduced, stored means, electronic, - United . . . . Acknowledgments out,condition or otherwise thatamiIar it shallo circulated conditionhinclmgbinding not, by oror withoutincluding way covercoverLxceptExcept of otherthe othertrade inthis publishersthe than thanconditionor United otherwise, thatthat prior inStates inbeing whichwhich beconsent ofimposed itAmerica,it isis in publishedpublished any this form book andand withoutwithout States of America, this book is sold subject to the is sold subject to the lent, resold, hired a internalism and Externalism: A Brief Historical IntroductionHilary Kornbhth vu omilar condition including this condition being imposed Libiaiy of Congin.tCsngies (Jatalogui©inPublu titian Data purchaser.(Jataloging-in-Publucitiwi Data on the subsequent 2i LaurenceEXTERNALIST Bonjour THEORIES OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE 1 0 [pistemologyLpistcmology : internalism and externalism / edited by Hilary Kornblith. p. internalism andcm. externalism — / edited by Hilary Kornblith. (Blackwell readings in philosophy; 2) . 2 AlvinTHE INTERNALIST Goldman CONCEPTION OFOF JUSTIFICATIONJuSTIFICATION Goldman 36.36 111)161 .E625ISBN paper)0—631-22105-00—h3l-22105-0paper) (hb(hb: salk. alk. paper)paper) —— 1. Knowledge, Theory of Includes bibliographical2001 referencesreferences andand index.index. I. ISBN Kornblith, Hilary.Hilary 0—63l-22l06-90—631-22106-9 (pbk. (pbk. II. Series. : alk.aPr. 43 How INTERNAL CAN You GET?WilliamINTERNALISM P. Alston AND EXTERNALISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY EXTERNALISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY 11 1 68 BDI6I121 —dc2l .E625-dc2l BritishBntis/i Librart Cataloguoig in Pith/icatwu Data Cataloguing in Pithlicatwu Data 2001018134 5 UNDERSTANDINGHilaiy Kornblith HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL j... A CIP catalogue record for this hookbook isis availableavailable fromfrom thethe British British Library. Library 6 ErnestRELIABILISMBarry StroudSosa ANDAND INTELLECTUAL INTELLECTUAL V V IRTI IRI UE Stroud '7 ,. 147 Thisby Best-set hook is TypesetTypesetter printed MPGin on l0'/2 l0'/Ltd., acid-free Books on on Hong 12'/? 12'/? Lid,Ltd, paper Kong PtPt Bodwin, BaskervilleBaskerville Cornwall Printed in Great Britain by 87 FrederickEPISTEMICRichardWHAT Arvi Foley Schmitt PERSPECTIVISM I TO BELIEVE? Arti I TO BELIEVE? 180I (3363 INTERNALISMAND EXTERNALISM:EXTERNALISM: A BRIEF HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION Hilary Kornblith

A central focus of work in epistemology formore than the last venty years has been the debate between internalism and externalismexternahsm At At issue issue is is the theer er form of an epistemological theory, and withit, competing conceptions of the epistemological enterprise. This reader bringstogether ten essays whichwhich havehave played an important rolerole inin shapingshaping the the debate debate In this introduction,introduction I I pioiide pioide some historical background to help orient the reader

1 The Terms "Internahsm""Internalism" and"Externahsm"

The terms 'internahsm'internalismandexternalism'externalismaieale used in philosophy in a variety ofof differentdifferent senses,1 senses, but theiruse in epistemology for anything like the positions which are the focus ofof thisthis bookbook datesdates toto 19731973 MoreMore precisely,precisely, the word "externalism" was introduced in print by David Armstrong2 in his book Belief; Truth and Anowledge3Itnowledge3 inin thethe followingfollowingway

According to "Externalist" accounts of non-inferentialknowledge, what makes a true non-inferential beliefa case of knowledge is some natural relation which holdsholds betieenbeteen thethe beliefbeliefstatestate BapBap and the situation which makes the belief true Itis a matter of a certain relation holding between the believer and the world. It is importanttoto noticenotice that,that, unlikeunlike "Cartesian" and "Initial Credibility"theories, Externalist theories arc regularlyregularly developeddeveloped asas theoriestheories ofof thethenature of knowledge generaiy and not simply as theories of nOn-inferentialnan-inferential knowledge.knowledge.(157) 2 HILARY KORNBLITH A BRJEFBRIEF HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 33 5. So in Armstrong's usage, "externalism""externalism" isisa view about knowledge, and it is rated the current use of the terms "externalism" and the view that when a person knows that a particular claim p is true, there is "internalism." Laurence some sort of "natural relation" which holds between that PersoI'Sperson's belief that Bonjour's "Externahist"Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge"1Knowledge"presents anai argu- p and the world. One such view, suggested in 1967 by Alvin Goldman, ment against accounts which identify knowledge with reliablyproduced true belief. But while Bonjour claims to be followingArmstrong's use of the term was the Causal Theory of Knowledge.4 On this view, a person knows thatp "externalist,""externalist," andand whilewhile hishis paperpaper isis entitledentitled "Externalist"Externalist TheoriesTheories ofof (for(for example.example, thatthat it'sit's raining)raining) whenwhen thatthat person'sperson's beliefbelief thatthat pp waswas causedcaused by Awu'l-Know!- edge"[my [my italics], italics], Bonjour'sBonjour's use of the term the fact that p. A relatedrelated view,view, championedchampioned byby ArmstrongArmstrong andand laterlater by term is,is, inin fact,fact, importantlyimportantly different from Armstrong's. For Bonjour, what is important Goldman as well, is the Reliability Account of Knowledge, accordingto which about the theories he is tar-tar- geting is thatthat theythey seemseem to to offer offer — a person knows that p when that person's belief is both true and, in some whether their authors put it in these termsterms or notreliability theoriestheories ofof just justficatzon. ffication. Theterm "externahisrn.""externalism." asas BonBonjour jour sense, reliable;reliable: on some views, the belief must be a reliable indicator that p;p; on others, the belief must be produced by a reliable process, that is, one that uses it, primarily applies to accounts of justified belief, and only derivativelv to accounts of knowledge. Thus, Bonjour notes:notes; tends toto produceprod,ice truetrue beliefs. beliefs. Frank Frank Ramsey3 Raniseywas a pioneer in defending a reliability account of knowledge. Particularly influentialwork in developing such an account was also donedone byby BrianBrian Skyrms,°Skyrms,° PeterPeter Unger,7Unger,' andand Fred When viewed from the general standpoint of thewestern epistemologi- Dretske.5 F cal tradition, externahismexternalism representsa very radical departure. It seems safesafe toto saysay thatthat untiluntil veryvery recentrecent times,times, Accounts of knowledgeknowledge whichwhich arcarc exterriahist externalist in Armstrong'ssense mark no serious philosopher of knowl- edge would have dreamed of suggesting that an important break with tradition, according to which knowledge is a kind of a person's beliefs might hebe justified,justified. true belief. OnOn traditionaltraditional epistemically justified simply in virtue of factsor relations that were accounts, in part because justification is I external to his subjective conception. an essential ingredient in knowledge, a central task of epistemology is to Descartes, for example, would surely have been quite unimpressed by give an account of what justification consists in. And, according I the suggestion that hishis prol)-prob- to tradition, lematic beliefs about the external world what is required for a person to bejustified in holdinga belief is for that person were justified if only they were in fact reliablyreliably relatedrelated to to the the world world ——whether to have a certain justification for the belief, where having aa justificationjustification is or not he had any reason for thinking this to bebe so.so. ClearlyClearly hishis conception,conception, and typically identified with being in a position, insome relevant sense, toto pro-pro- and thatthat ofof genera- tions of philosophers who followed, duce an appropriate argument for the belief in question. \Vhat is distinctive was that such a relation could play about cxternahistexternahist accounts ofof knowledge,knowledge, as Armstrong a justificatory role only if the believer possessed adequatereason for as Armstrong saw it, was that thinking that it obtained.'2 they do not require justification, at least in the traditionalsense. Knowledge merely requires having a true belief which is appropriately connected with the world. Bonjour argues that reliability theories of justifiedbelief —whichhe terms "externalist" theoriestheories of of justification justification —fly But while Armstrong's way ofof viewingviewing reliabilityreliability accountsaccounts ofof knowledgeknowledge fly in the face of important intuitions about justification, andworse, fail even to address thethe mostmost centralcentral issuesissues has them rejecting the view that knowledge requires justifiedtrue belief, Alvin of epistemology Externahist theories of justification Goldman came to offer quite a differentway of viewing the import of relia- are not merely mistaken way of viewing the import of relia- in bilitv theories:theories; in 1979, Goldman suggested that instead of seeing reliability detail, according to Bonjour; they are fundamentally misguidedin conception. accounts as rejecting the claimclaim thatthat knowledgeknowledge requiresrequires justifiedjustified truetrue belief, belief, In the same volume, Alvin Goldman introduces we should instead embrace an account which identifies justified belief with In the same volume, Alvin Goldman introduces the term "internalism.""internahism" reliablyreliably produced belicf.belief.' ReliabilityReliability theoriestheories ofof knowledge,knowledge,on this way of Traditional epistemology . . . hasbeePbeei predominantlypredominantly internalirt,internahst.or ego- understanding them, offer a non-traditional account of what is required for centric. On [this] a belief to he justified. This paper of Goldman's, and his subsequent extended perspective, epistemology's jobjob isisto construct a doxastic principle oror procedureprocedure from the development of the idca,°idea," have been at the center of epistemological dis- from the inside, fromfrom ourour ownown inindi- di- cussion ever since. vidual vantage point. To adopta Kantian idiom, aa [doxastic[doxastic principleJprinciple must not be "heteronomous," or dictated "from without." It The 19801 980 volume volume of of MIdwest Midwest Studies Studies in in P/nlosophj Piniosophjwas devoted to work in mustroust he "autonomous," a law we can give to ourselves and which epistemology and two papers in that volume, both reprinted here,here, inaugu- we have grounthgïound for giving to ourselves. The objectiveobjective optimahityoptimality ofa [doxastic principhej,principlej, 4 righton this only view, itit isis "ccrtitIablc"Jrorndoes"certifiable"frorn not make it zcitliin. wit/un.right. A [doxastic principle] counts as HILARY KORNBLITI-I areareholds guaranteed guaranteed that the to principles toresult result in inofaccurate accuratebelief acquisitionbeliefs beliefs about about which the the worldhe world around around him. him. A BRIEF HISTORICAL INTRODt'CTIONINTRODtCTION comes toto endomcncloi scse fundamentaluntenable.Goldman arguesdistinction. that anGoldman internalistGoldman and conception Bonjour ofthus justification independently and simultaneously named this argues that any tenable theory of justifi- is entirely externalism.reasonbutThis is that lays the foundation for the debateit betweenis internalisminternalisrn and is far more optimistic thanprecisely any philosopher Descartes' has optimism been about the powers of human of'ever since. hunian internalismthatcation any will tenable havewill do.to theorytheor reject ofinternalism:internalisin: justification only will externalism have to reject will do. Bonjour of justification will have to reject externalism; only externalism; only argues figureabout out epistemological which principles problems ofOn reasoning the asas one anyany hand.internalistinternalist Descartes would.would. proceeds HeHe out isis concernedwhich from principles the first-person.first-person, of reasoning thinking appear to be best; he then wishes to appear to be best; he then wishes to concerned ti) ihinkin UIto ncctednectedterminologyoccupied in fundamental centerccntcr was stage coined. ways in episternologicalepistemologicalAs 'lhe'l'hewith the debate debatepapersquestions in overover discussions discussionsthis about thethevolume the properproper everever attest, formsinceformsince this this ofthis ofissue aa theorytheory is ofof justificdjustified beliefbelief hashas very nature and goals apt bit of con- truth.athoroughlytotake careful, the those principles self-conscious, principlesresponsibleprinciples he has and and way:endorsed. andapply apply he calculated is them Innotthem so merely so doing,so asmanner, as toacquiring toDescartes forrr forrr designed belief's belief beliefs forms towhichwhich vi1l-rii1lwill-nilly hisget bclicisbeliefs him confiuicoufilI butathut in the inin in m of epistemological theorizing. 2 Descartes' Legacy Rathet;Rathem;assistnot believe him Descartes Descartes in that his he goalbelieves believes has of merely coming that thatBut hehediscovered this hastohas understand shown,isshown, not a all setfrom which ofthe within principles world Descartes his own which claimssubjective to achieve. Dcscartcs does is not all which Descartes claims to achieve. Descartes does as it actuallyactua1l is. seinoem to is.to wayrccentrecentAlthough to coinage, understand thcthe terminology the thequestion debate of at "internalism" between issue is ainternalists longstanding and "externalism" and one. externalists Perhaps is isthe to best a relatively see quitetruth.truth,perspective, remarkable. that these First, principles heIf wouldDescartes must have incould discovered fact havesucceed done in this,getting he himwould have achieved something a set of principles for at thcthe lIeditationc.Medilationc.leinshow the issucissue arose out of theDescartes' failure of Descartes' epistemologyocatcslocates them written understandingthem in squarely a confessional of within the thenature style, first-person presentsof epistemologicalepisternological theperspective.perspective. reader with prob- The didoptimalforming not meet beliefsin getting his ownwhich, at subjective the from truth. his standards. Heown would subjective Second, not form perspective, he would have discovercddiscovered a single belief which appear to Ix'he accuratcaccurateofmistakenDescartes' understanding beliefs concerns: in the Descartes ofpast, the and world recognizes beliefsthus around it should thatthat him, contain he,he, and likelike simplymistakes allall ofof building asas well.well. DescartesDescartes wisheswishes to have is inevitable that his current body us, hasto havehad an an standardstive,healla set ofwould ofwhichthe areprinciples beliefs have in would fact devisedformed objectively which, assure woulda proof,in fact,successful. in factfrom are meetoptimal within The these fact hisin objective gettingthat hiswhich at subjectivestandards. the would truth. assure Thus, that those principles meeting his those principles meeting his own subjective perspcc-perspec- subjective Third. stan- claimhisinvolvcinvolveon theunderstanding beliefs building he on already ofthoseof thethe very world,has,world, mistaken taking hehe resolvesresolves them bcliefs.beliefs. at face-value,to Thus, suspend in order wouldbelief insurely to suspend belief in any to improve any andalldards of certifiable theare necessaryobjectively from conditions withincorrect Descartes' would for objective thus subjective in no validity perspective. would behe Thisfully combina- way depend onon luckylucky ace accidents: iclents; availabkavailable putsagain:Dreamclaim it. whichhe Argument. must might form bcto his wrong;total beliefs suspension this idea leads of belief. Descarteswhich might be wrong; this idea leads total suspension of belief. Descartes must begin anew, "from the very foundation," as he very quickly,quickly byby way of the must begin r areskeptic'stion true. of ownfeatures terms: would Descartes allow him could to effectively conclusively respond to the skeptic prove that his beliefsto the skeptic on the on tht' pcrspcctive,perspective,prjectproject is is that that precisely Descartes Descartes how holds holds itNow thatthat one hehe of cancan the figure interesting out, fromthings this about internal the Cartesian epistemological is that he should go on. Moreovei Descartes out, from this internal S thoughtwouldDescartes' guarantee that optimism he hadhad that discovereddiscovered in thinkingNow principlestheprinciples that problems he had whichwhich discoveredwhich guaranteedguaranteed arise principles forfbr thethe this likelihood.1ikelihod. project \\hichwhich do his beliefs be true. For if Descartes had only not depend upon in some objective HILARY KORNELITH t.I.P A BRIEF HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 7 beliefs,aboutbadlyhave been Imaginegetting and problematic.before at that forming this individual For consider getting at the truth. Rather,sense, thathe cares his beliefs deeply be about true, hishaving position would still any belief, he very carefully scrutinizes his evi- is not someone who is unconcernedan individual who reasons veryvery truetrue areexternalismthisbelief? clearquestion. The enough, debateare committed precisely betweenI haveto. whatinternalists While beeneach the intentionallyposition and broad externalists outlinescomes vague to ofattempts is these itselfin saying two toa subjectanswer views just what internalism and issuesandat againstdenceall. indeed, From as fbrfor hardit theto heand theas isinside, againsthe tryingextent can. he very toit.Butis whichawareOr hard.his rather, reasoning heof He tryingis he iscapable; thinkingscrutinizes about epistemological veryvery hard hardability to toform form simply true true beliefs, does beliefs, not andmeet he is not very capable the evidence for and allowaccountsof current it. of controversythese two views It would inin thisthis introduction;thusthusintroduction; bebe aa mistakemistake thethe statestate toto of provideofprovide thethe artart precisewillplecisewill not not thisperfectlyperfectly,heheany believes individual believes reasonable butbut that inin hasthat actual actualobjectivehe fully he fact, met standard.standard. hishe is reasoning Unfortunately,Unfortunately he lives in is reasoning well; he believes that he own subjective standards for good reason- very poorly indeed. Although a fool's paradise: is reasoning reasoning Thepast volumetwentyessays years.containedbegins Reading with here the throughessays show bythe them Bonjour evolution will bringand of Goldman thethis reader debate which up over to placed date. tlie 3 The Essays mistaken.reasoningsubjectiveing, and although sostandards poorly hethat cannot has aNow shownfail itto have very large percentage of his beliefs are throughly to his own satisfaction that his own a real purchase on the truth, he is twotwoP.this different issuedifferent at thekinds kinds center of of internalism:of internalism: epistemologicalAlston, perspecti'al "Internalism"Internahsm perspectival discussion. internalism and internalism Chapter ExternalisniExternalism and3. byand access Williamin access Epistemology,"Epistemology" distinguishes satisfieshimselfpossiblythis in. his showshow Andown that that itsubjective seems he he is quite not Nowstandards in clear theit surely that does he seemsis that there could correct, then we need to know howsurely it seems that there could is not in the very position which our fool finds very position which our fool finds be such annot individual, distinguish and, himcannot. iffrom For our to show that he is that Descartes could belief'sonlyminesomeinternalism.internalism. statestheappropriate justificatory justificatory to According which According sense, status.statusan towithinagent to the ofAlston the thatfirsthas an first agent's appropriateofexamines ofthese, these, beliefs;perspective only the onlyaccess accordingmotivationsfeatures features may whichserve to which thefor to second,second.each deter- of may determine a arc, in either.doesfool, haveandand atoto real showshow purchase that,that, by onNowb histhe iftruthown one doessubjective grants that this is his own subjective standards, he genuinelycorrect, one will have to grant that the not distinguish him from our fool standards, he genuinely I thatthatYouofthese the internalism theGet?," verykinds very coherence Iof coherencefurther areinternalisn-iinternalism in explore seriousof ofthe the andposition andthe trouble."trouble." position arguesmotivationargues depends IndependsIn that,that, chapterchapter behind in inon theonthe an 4, 4, an internalismend,implausiblyend, "How implausibly "existing"existing Internal and strong strongformsforms Can "How Internal Can argue Onwishesformceeded.project the beliefs toother On Descartesform inthe hand, a beliefs wayone attempted hehand,which which has theremanifestsanother fully to satisfy laudable his carry out could not possiblyis have suc- the laudablea kind goal of intellectualin Descartes integrity: to he own subjectivegoal: he standards.wishes to form knowledge,ineral."cal Cartesianimportant enterprise A philosophical premise.andways in chapterStroud from Barry understanding the develops5, "Understanding scientificStroud a examinesview enterpriseofof thethe about natureHumannature the whatof nature understanding ofof Knowledge a knowledgeknowledge successful of the philosophi- in difiCrshuman differsphilo- Geri-Gen- theissomething intcrnalistiiitcrnalistbclic!beliefssomeonesoniconc second. in in like Descartesways who wayshois someone theidentifies identifies whichwhich first thought of whohave thesejustified justified identifieshe goals.had beliefbelief Thejustified withwith belief is someone who identifies justified belief with some objective purchase on the truth. The externalist, on the other hand, something like satisfying with beliefs satisfying beliefs satisfying theInnalistthatsophical chapter case neither rivals forunderstanding 6, traditionalacan "Reliabilismkind provide ofof virtuevirtue Cartesianof a human satisfyingand epistemologyepistemology Intellectual viewsknowledge account about whichwhich Virtue," would knowledge of blendsblendsknowledge entail. Ernest botl1both nor Stroud Sosa rivalsintheirinternahist general. makes extcr-exter- can provide a satisfying account of knowledge in general. argues rejectedjustifiednotgoal so. automatically beliefasbelief And well. ifwhichwhich ititBut is satisfies notwhereanswers so. thenthen the to bothsecondshouldthe ideaof these that is not so, then the idea that weanswers might to have both a ofconception these goals of simultaneously must be a proofas well.that whatever But it now satisfies seems the that wefirst that locate is the concept of justifiedwe might have a conceptiongoals simultaneously of must be "WhatFoleyignoreandand externalist externalistdevelops Ameither I to of Believe?"elements. an theseelements. internalistinternalist two FoleyOn Ondimensions Sosa's perspective perspecti'eSosa'sargues view; view,that of no theonepistemic no successful epistemologymost successful fundamental appraisal. epistemology epistemology in chapter questionsRichard can 7,7, can 8 HILARY KORNBLITH or 11 Laurence BonJoui A BRIEF HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 9 tifySchmittegocentric,in epistemology justified presents perspective. belief a must thorough with inevitably Inbelief chapter account somehow be8, of "Epistemicaddressed the sanctioned fromPerspectivism," by thethe first-person,agent's Frederick many different views which iden- perspec- 1312 AlvinIbid.,Studies 56.Goldman, in Philosophy, "The 5 Internalist(1980), 53--73. Conception ofof Justification,"Justification," ,lJidnect .lIidzectin Stude'cStudi'c Philosophy, in 5 (1980), 53-73."Externalist Theories ofof EmpiricalEmpirical Knowledge."Knowledge." 3)Iidueci liduect in takendetail,presentsGoldmantive. up butSchmitt aby ofcase arguesEarl fundamental arguesagainst Conce that thatinternalism internalismand conception.none Richard of facesthese in Feldman chapterThe insurmountableviews case inis9, in defensible.chapter"Internalism favor problems, of10, internalismAlvin "Internalism Exposed." not Goldman only is of not only of Philosophy, 5 (1980), 32. atpursuingagainstDefended." the end it. this of Internalism, theissue volume. in more they detailThcre argue, should is ansurvives extensiveconsult the the literature Further Reading on this subject, section and many assaults mounted anyone interested in 1 Aside from their use in epistemology, these terms are used as labels for quite Notes first-personsubjectmentalanddiflrent mind.ofcontent, thispairs perspective The reader of now issuepositions very is which epistemically widely in moral divides discussed, philosophy privileged internalist is not and from entirely in philosophy externalist unrelated of theories language to the of both hinge on questions about the extent to which the but neither is it identical 32 lishedArmstrongwith it. work. gives credit to Gregory O'Hair for introducing the term in unpub- 1-1 AlvinDavid1973). Goldman, Goldman, M. Armstrong, 'A ' Causal Belief Theory Truth of Knowing,"and Knowledge 7ourna1ofPhiiosophy, (Cambridge University 64(1967), Press, I. Armstrong, Beliof Truth and Knowledge (Cambridge University Press, Causal Theory of Knowing," journal of Philosophy, 64(1967), 65 (1967),BrianFrank357—72.1931). Skvrms,Skyrms, 373 Ramsey,Ramscv. 89. "The"'flc' The Explication ExplicationFoundations ofof Mathemotus, 'X'X knowsknows thatthat and p',"p'," Other journalJournal Logical of of Philosophy, EssaysPliilosop/ij, (Routledge, 6464 of Mathematus, and Other Logical Essqys (Routledge, B7 FredPeter115 --22,--22. Dretskc,Dretske,7--70,7--70.Unger.Unger, '\n "Conclusive"Conclusive Analysis of Reasons," Reasons," Factual Knowl Australas?an Australasian ed ge" journal7ournal journal of of of Philosophy, Philosophj', 49 Philosophy, 49 65(1968), (1971).(1971), ()9 Press,SeeAlvinIiiolede:Iinozc/ede: especiallyespecially Goldman, Sen Alvin "WhatStudies Goldman, Isni Justified Ejnsfeniology Belief?,"Belief?," in inand G.G. cognition Pappas.Pappas, ed., ed.,(Harvard Justification justificationI 936.986. University and A-eu' Studies in Epistemology (Reidel, 1979), 1—23. Alvin Goldman. Episte,noloy Epistemology (Reidel, 1979), and cognition 1 -—23. (Harvard University and