Copyright ©First BlackwellBiackwell published Publishers 2001 Ltd 2001 Blackwell2 4 6 8 l()It)Publishers 9 7 5 3Inc.1 CONTENTS Maiden,BlackvellBlackwell350 Massachusetts Main USAPublishersPublishers Street 02148Ltd All tights reserved. Except forlbr theOxford108 quotation CowleyUK 0X4 Road ofIJFlJF shortpassages for the purposes itii criticismaarettieval mechanical,retrieval and system, rcvies;revies; photocopying, or no transmitted,permission part ofrecording, this of in publication theany orpublisher. form otherwise, ormay by any bewithout reproduced,means, the electronic, prior stored LxceptExcept- in the UnitedUnited. StatesStates ofof America,America, thisthis bookbook is.. sold subject. to the Acknowledgments vu out,conditionomilaramiIaro hinclmgbinding or otherwise condition that oror it covercover shall circulated including other othernot, by thanthan withoutthis way thatthatcondition of intheintrade whichwhich publishers beingor otherwise, itit is isimposed published publishedprior beconsentonlent, the andand subsequent resold, inwithoutwithout any hiredforma internalismEXTERNALISTHilary Kornbhth and Externalism: THEORIES OF A EMPIRICAL Brief Historical KNOWLEDGE Introduction 1 0 [pistemologyLpistcmology :Libiaiy internalisminternalism of Congin.tCsngies andand externalismpurchaser.externalism(Jatalogui©inPublu(Jataloging-in-Publucitiwi // editededited titian byby Data HilaryHilary Kornblith.Kornblith. 2i AlvinTHELaurence INTERNALIST Goldman Bonjour CONCEPTION OFOF JUSTIFICATIONJuSTIFICATION 36.36 ISBN 0—631-22105-00—h3l-22105-0p.Includescm. — (hbbibliographical(hb:(Blackwell salk. alk. paper)paper)readings — — referencesreferences in philosophy; andand index.index. 2) . 3 INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY 68 BDI6I111)161paper)paper) .E625 .E6251. Knowledge,2001 Theory of I.ISBNKornblith,0—63l-22l06-90—631-22106-9 Hilary.Hilary II.(pbk. (pbk.Series.: alk.aPr. 4 HowWilliam INTERNAL P. Alston CAN You GET? 11 1 121 —dc2l -dc2l BritishBntis/iLibrart CataloguoigCataloguing inin Pith/icatwuPithlicatwu Data 2001018134 5 BarryUNDERSTANDINGHilaiy StroudKornblith HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL j... A CIP catalogue record for thisthis hookbook isis availableavailable fromfrom thethe British British Library. Library 6 ErnestRELIABILISM Sosa ANDAND INTELLECTUAL INTELLECTUAL V V'7 IRTI IRI ,.UE 147 ThisbyTypesetMPG Best-set hookPrinted Books inin is Typesetter l0'/2l0'/ printed in Lid,Ltd, on Greaton 12'/? Bodwin,12'/? on Ltd.,Britain acid-free PtPt BaskervilleBaskerville HongCornwall by paperKong 87 FrederickEPISTEMICRichardWHAT Arvi ArtiFoley Schmitt PERSPECTIVISM II TOTO BELIEVE? 180I (3363 INTERNALISMAND EXTERNALISM:EXTERNALISM: A BRIEF HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION Hilary Kornblith A central focus of work in epistemology formore than the last venty years has been the debate between internalism and externalismexternahsm At At issue issue is is the theer er form of an epistemological theory, and withit, competing conceptions of the epistemological enterprise. This reader bringstogether ten essays whichwhich havehave played an important rolerole inin shapingshaping the the debate debate In this introduction,introduction I I pioiide pioide some historical background to help orient the reader 1 The Terms "Internahsm""Internalism" and"Externahsm" The terms 'internahsm'internalismandexternalism'externalismaieale used in philosophy in a variety ofof differentdifferent senses,1 senses, but theiruse in epistemology for anything like the positions which are the focus ofof thisthis bookbook datesdates toto 19731973 MoreMore precisely,precisely, the word "externalism" was introduced in print by David Armstrong2 in his book Belief; Truth and Anowledge3Itnowledge3 inin thethe followingfollowingway According to "Externalist" accounts of non-inferentialknowledge, what makes a true non-inferential beliefa case of knowledge is some natural relation which holdsholds betieenbeteen thethe beliefbeliefstatestate BapBap and the situation which makes the belief true Itis a matter of a certain relation holding between the believer and the world. It is importanttoto noticenotice that,that, unlikeunlike "Cartesian" and "Initial Credibility"theories, Externalist theories arc regularlyregularly developeddeveloped asas theoriestheories ofof thethenature of knowledge generaiy and not simply as theories of nOn-inferentialnan-inferential knowledge.knowledge.(157) 2 HILARY KORNBLITH A BRJEFBRIEF HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 33 5. So in Armstrong's usage, "externalism""externalism" isisa view about knowledge, and it is rated the current use of the terms "externalism" and the view that when a person knows that a particular claim p is true, there is "internalism." Laurence some sort of "natural relation" which holds between that PersoI'Sperson's belief that Bonjour's "Externahist"Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge"1Knowledge"presents anai argu- p and the world. One such view, suggested in 1967 by Alvin Goldman, ment against accounts which identify knowledge with reliablyproduced true belief. But while Bonjour claims to be followingArmstrong's use of the term was the Causal Theory of Knowledge.4 On this view, a person knows thatp "externalist,""externalist," andand whilewhile hishis paperpaper isis entitledentitled "Externalist"Externalist TheoriesTheories ofof (for(for example.example, thatthat it'sit's raining)raining) whenwhen thatthat person'sperson's beliefbelief thatthat pp waswas causedcaused by Awu'l-Know!- edge"[my [my italics], italics], Bonjour'sBonjour's use of the term the fact that p. A relatedrelated view,view, championedchampioned byby ArmstrongArmstrong andand laterlater by term is,is, inin fact,fact, importantlyimportantly different from Armstrong's. For Bonjour, what is important Goldman as well, is the Reliability Account of Knowledge, accordingto which about the theories he is tar-tar- geting is thatthat theythey seemseem to to offer offer — a person knows that p when that person's belief is both true and, in some whether their authors put it in these termsterms or notreliability theoriestheories ofof just justficatzon. ffication. Theterm "externahisrn.""externalism." asas BonBonjour jour sense, reliable;reliable: on some views, the belief must be a reliable indicator that p;p; on others, the belief must be produced by a reliable process, that is, one that uses it, primarily applies to accounts of justified belief, and only derivativelv to accounts of knowledge. Thus, Bonjour notes:notes; tends toto produceprod,ice truetrue beliefs. beliefs. Frank Frank Ramsey3 Raniseywas a pioneer in defending a reliability account of knowledge. Particularly influentialwork in developing such an account was also donedone byby BrianBrian Skyrms,°Skyrms,° PeterPeter Unger,7Unger,' andand Fred When viewed from the general standpoint of thewestern epistemologi- Dretske.5 F cal tradition, externahismexternalism representsa very radical departure. It seems safesafe toto saysay thatthat untiluntil veryvery recentrecent times,times, Accounts of knowledgeknowledge whichwhich arcarc exterriahist externalist in Armstrong'ssense mark no serious philosopher of knowl- edge would have dreamed of suggesting that an important break with tradition, according to which knowledge is a kind of a person's beliefs might hebe justified,justified. true belief. OnOn traditionaltraditional epistemically justified simply in virtue of factsor relations that were accounts, in part because justification is I external to his subjective conception. an essential ingredient in knowledge, a central task of epistemology is to Descartes, for example, would surely have been quite unimpressed by give an account of what justification consists in. And, according I the suggestion that hishis prol)-prob- to tradition, lematic beliefs about the external world what is required for a person to bejustified in holdinga belief is for that person were justified if only they were in fact reliablyreliably relatedrelated to to the the world world ——whether to have a certain justification for the belief, where having aa justificationjustification is or not he had any reason for thinking this to bebe so.so. ClearlyClearly hishis conception,conception, and typically identified with being in a position, insome relevant sense, toto pro-pro- and thatthat ofof genera- tions of philosophers who followed, duce an appropriate argument for the belief in question. \Vhat is distinctive was that such a relation could play about cxternahistexternahist accounts ofof knowledge,knowledge, as Armstrong a justificatory role only if the believer possessed adequatereason for as Armstrong saw it, was that thinking that it obtained.'2 they do not require justification, at least in the traditionalsense. Knowledge merely requires having a true belief which is appropriately connected with the world. Bonjour argues that reliability theories of justifiedbelief —whichhe terms "externalist" theoriestheories of of justification justification —fly But while Armstrong's way ofof viewingviewing reliabilityreliability accountsaccounts ofof knowledgeknowledge fly in the face of important intuitions about justification, andworse, fail even to address thethe mostmost centralcentral issuesissues has them rejecting the view that knowledge requires justifiedtrue belief, Alvin of epistemology Externahist theories of justification Goldman came to offer quite a differentway of viewing the import of relia- are not merely mistaken way of viewing the import of relia- in bilitv theories:theories; in 1979, Goldman suggested that instead of seeing reliability