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300 Years of Leibniz's Monadology

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300 Years of Leibniz's Monadology H-Ideas 300 YEARS OF LEIBNIZ'S MONADOLOGY Discussion published by Owen Anderson on Monday, May 5, 2014 300 YEARS OF LEIBNIZ'S MONADOLOGY 12th-13th May 2014, University of Edinburgh Leibniz's enigmatic Monadology, written in 1714, is rightfully recognised as one of the most important and interesting texts in the history of philosophy. It is Leibniz's most succinct and systematic outline of his metaphysics of monads and it includes highly influential discussions pertaining to mereology, modality, theology, and the philosophy of mind. This conference will be dedicated to celebrating the 300-year anniversary of this crucial work by exploring its legacy and reception through an examination of several philosophers who have attempted to develop his system. To register for the conference, please go to the University of Edinburgh ePay Site: http://www.epay.ed.ac.uk/browse/extra_info.asp?compid=1&modid=2&deptid=69&catid=10&prodid =... The deadline for registration is 7th May Please note that discounted registration fees for this conference are offered to British Society for the History of Philosophy members. To join the Society, visit: http://www.bshp.org.uk/membership The conference is generously supported by the Aristotelian Society, the British Society for the History of Philosophy, and the Scots Philosophical Association. Provisional Programme (Please note change of programme). Monday, 12 May 2014 09:30 - 10:00 - Registration and Coffee 10:00 - 11:00 - Pierfrancesco Basile (Bern): "Learning from Leibniz: Whitehead and Russell on Mind, Matter and Monads" 11:05 - 12:05 - Emily Thomas (Groningen): Citation: Owen Anderson. 300 YEARS OF LEIBNIZ'S MONADOLOGY. H-Ideas. 05-05-2014. https://networks.h-net.org/node/6873/discussions/25398/300-years-leibnizs-monadology Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 1 H-Ideas "British Idealist Monadologies and the Reality of Time: Oakeley Against McTaggart et al") 12:05 - 13:50 - Lunch 13:50 - 14:50 – Jeremy Dunham (Edinburgh): "Félix Ravaisson's Theory of Substance: Leibnizian Metaphysics in Nineteenth-Century France" 14:55 - 15:55 – Mogens Laerke (ENS de Lyon/Aberdeen): "Monads and worlds in Deleuze's Le Pli" 15:55 - 16:30 - Coffee 16:30 - 17:30 - Paul Lodge (Oxford): "Heidegger on the Being of Leibniz's Monads" 19:00 - Dinner (Spoon) Tuesday, 13 May 2014 09:00 - 09:30 - Coffee 09:30 - 10:30 - Richard Fincham (American University of Cairo): "Reconciling Leibnizian Monadology and Kantian Criticism: The case of Maimon and Schelling" 10:35 - 11:35 – Roberto Gronda (Scoula Normale Superiore de Pisa) Monadology between Epistemology and Metaphysics: Seth's Protest against Absolute Idealism. 11:35 - 12:00 - Coffee 12:00 - 13:00 - Jo Edwards (UCL): "Perception, Physics and Metaphysics 1714-2014" For further details see: http://www.ppls.ed.ac.uk/events/view/three-hundred-years-of-leibniz Citation: Owen Anderson. 300 YEARS OF LEIBNIZ'S MONADOLOGY. H-Ideas. 05-05-2014. https://networks.h-net.org/node/6873/discussions/25398/300-years-leibnizs-monadology Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 2.
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