An African Perspective: Pointers for Germany's Foreign Policy Direction

An African Perspective: Pointers for Germany’s Foreign Policy Direction in Africa By Abou Jeng, Postdoc Fellow at the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Center for Global Cooperation Research of 26 February 2014 An African Perspective: Pointers for Germany’s Foreign Policy Direction in Africa Bonn, Duisburg, 26 February 2014. A debate has been not in the hands of technocrats but can be found in emerging on the direction of Germany’s global en- community networks, social institutions and public gagement. Foreign Minister Steinmeier and Defence outlets in Africa. Empirical evidence has shown that Minister von der Leyen urged for a more active, deci- when people have the means to pursue their sive and responsible engagement with global crisis dreams, they often utilize them to great value. There and challenges elsewhere. The rhetoric seems to is a compelling need, therefore, for a cooperative suggest that Germany’s long tradition of civil global engagement that will create opportunities, boost engagement is no longer tenable and that appropri- skills and techniques, create and expand labour mar- ating greater responsibility will somehow transform kets. Germany from a ‘reluctant hegemon’ to a potentially Third, a Germany Africa policy must advocate for, active emancipatory beacon. It is not unusual for a and be subsumed from, a sense of prudentiality in new government to roll-out ambitious policy direc- relations. Africa has always served as the abiding tions with a global flair. Yet what appears unsettling template for interventionist western foreign policy. in the pronouncements is the almost unapologetic This is often justified on the basis of national secu- hint at military interventionism. rity and the need to help contain violence and build Germany has had a unique, almost non-tempera- frameworks of rule of law. Mali is mentioned these mental engagement with the world. From this, it has days, as the ‘poster-boy’ of the positive elements of nurtured strong relations driven by a subdued allure intervention. Yet it is often forgotten, that Mali’s of national interests considerations. But adventurist post-coup crisis was pretty much a collateral effect of foreign policy especially one that privileges military the intervention in Libya. Of course, some have al- intervention in Africa runs the risk of eroding Ger- ready argued for the consideration of military inter- many’s respectable neutrality and authority. While vention only as the last resort. This is not enough. I the ethos, and indeed direction, of any foreign policy will go even further to argue that western military is a matter for governments, engagement with Af- intervention must not be the last resort. It should rica must however, be framed around what I perceive not be the resort in any case! There are enough insti- as the three elemental features of a transformative tutional structures in Africa to handle crisis of what- engagement, reformulating the usual western ap- ever scale and nature. What they lack is the resources proaches. to implement their respective mandates. The African The first, mutuality in partnership, is to see Africa Union Constitutive Act of 2002 is one of the most not as a distant land susceptible and receptive to progressive of any international organization. Simi- western interventionism, but rather, engage African larly, the Economic Community of West African states as mutual partners. Doing so has the potential States) has a fairly strong institutional arrangement of shaping a just and fair global order where people which could confront conflicts, famine, and other can live in dignity. Germany should view Africa as a catastrophes. A German Africa policy should help to valuable partner whose inputs and enormous poten- enhance the capacity of regional institutions and tials can be deployed to tackle problems of genuine expand their outreach and operational efficiency. global concern such as climate change, poverty, Germany has much to gain from a revamped foreign disease, energy and trade. Admittedly, Germany’s policy. Transformations in global politics and the soft engagement is often perceived as the receptacle increasing globalisation necessitate a review of for- to mutuality in partnership which could defuse ten- eign policy. In the context of Africa, Germany’s for- sions, mistrust and accusations of hegemonic domi- eign policy should address inadequacies in current nance. It is illogical to abandon this approach for the engagement rather than inaugurate interventionist allures of politically intensive and confrontational grand policies. It is my belief that a reflection of the grand policy ambitions. three elements will generate a more meaningful Second, Germany’s Africa engagement must be relationship with Africa. Perhaps, Steinmeier and von anchored on instrumentality in cooperation. By this I der Leyen need to be reminded also, that Africa is mean the formulation and consolidation of a kind of also going through its own internal self-assurance, an engagement which serves as a means of influence and is becoming increasingly assertive. It will almost and non-military corrective purpose. Indeed, the certainly reject adventurist interventionism. problems and challenges of Africa are vast and their effects increasingly interwoven with larger global Dr. Abou Jeng, Postdoc Fellow, Käte Hamburger challenges. But the solutions to these problems lie Kolleg / Center for Global Cooperation Research. © German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) The Current Column, 26 February 2014 www.die-gdi.de | www.facebook.com/DIE.Bonn | https://plus.google.com/ | www.youtube.com/DIEnewsflash .

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