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Borders, Brexit and Beyond: Fragments on Northern Ireland

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Borders, Brexit and Beyond: Fragments on Northern Ireland Borders, Brexit and Beyond: Fragments on Northern Ireland Frauke Hofmeister Frauke Hofmeister (Leipzig) takes a closer look was mostly on Westminster, Brussels, or at a peripheral region that suddenly took centre possibly Dublin. Reason enough to spend a few stage in Brexit negotiations: Northern Ireland. In pages having a closer look at Northern Ireland revisiting political decision making within and/ itself and at what happened there over the past or concerning Northern Ireland over the past four four years, both regarding Brexit and beyond. years (also, but not only, regarding Brexit), she Of course, I can’t offer a holistic picture, but explores the ongoing significance of geographical, at least a few fragments highlighting that the political and social boundaries in the region. geographical border between Ulster and the Republic of Ireland is not the only relevant n 31 January 2020, the Irish border boundary in Northern Ireland. O closed its Twitter account: “it feels like I won the battle but the war was lost.” (cited Before the referendum… in McClements 2020). For almost two years, an anonymous author had published satirical hat would be the impact of a UK comments on the implications of the UK W withdrawal from the European Union withdrawal from the European Union on the on Northern Ireland – that smallest ‘nation’ Irish land border. Brexit and Northern Ireland (‘region’? ‘country’?) of the United Kingdom, – whoever followed the news over the past which had been created in 1921 with the years (and you couldn’t escape it) grasped that partition of Ireland, because a majority of the the border question had indeed been the major mostly Protestant population wished to remain obstacle in the negotiations. If it hadn’t been for part of the UK instead of becoming part of Northern Ireland, it seems, Brexit would have the new Irish Free State (later to become the been “done” much earlier (and May might still Republic of Ireland)? What would Brexit mean be Prime Minister…). However, the spotlight for this peculiar place, which had seen a violent Page 48 Hard Times 104 (1/2020) Frauke Hofmeister civil war between a Protestant majority and a Catholic minority in the latter half of the twentieth century until the provisions of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 had achieved more or less peaceful stability, with an open border with the Republic of Ireland, a growing number of cross-border institutions, and an (albeit regularly suspended) power-sharing regional government in Belfast. lthough hard to believe from a hindsight A perspective, the future of the Irish border and Northern Ireland’s somewhat complicated constitutional situation featured only very late in the referendum debate and its media coverage – on both sides of the North Channel. Neither Vote Leave nor Britain Stronger in Europe campaign materials even alluded to these issues, and also Better Off Out (2016) - Has anyone seen Northern Ireland? other players neglected Northern Ireland (partly even though the campaign in Northern Ireland completely, as shown by leaflets like Better Off differed from the referendum campaigns in Out’s “Are you British… or European?”, where the other parts of the UK (cf. Doyle/Connolly “British” obviously really means British and not 2017: 2), it seems that the majority of the media “Ukanian” (in Tom Nairn’s terms)). and the electorate did not take the imminent constitutional impact very serious. As Stephen es, there had been warnings, of course. Baker (2018: 94) put it in his analysis of Edward Stourton had explored “The Irish Y Northern Ireland newspaper coverage: Question” in a half-an-hour BBC podcast as early as February 2016. The House of Commons here was a time when a visit by a senior British Northern Ireland Affairs Committee had heard T official to Northern Ireland, especially in the witnesses on issues they “believe[d] should be midst of political turmoil and constitutional crisis, amongst the most relevant to the electors in would have excited a great deal of public comment. Northern Ireland” (House of Commons 2016: Not so during the EU referendum campaign of 3) over February and March 2016 but only 2016, when no less that [sic] one British Prime published their report on 26 May. Tellingly, Minister, two ex-Prime Ministers, a Chancellor of “The Border and Cross-Border Issues” was the Exchequer; the Mayor of London and Nigel only the last of three chapters, preceded (and Farage visited the region to little acclaim and less pagewise clearly outnumbered) by chapters on fuss. “Trade and Commerce” and “Agriculture”. And Page 49 Hard Times 104 (1/2020) Borders, Brexit and Beyond: Fragments on Northern Ireland ell, why should there have been more McCann/Hainsworth 2017). And indeed, the W “fuss” considering that the Northern Belfast Telegraph, the major regional newspaper Ireland Secretary Theresa Villiers had insisted in with a unionist tradition (although read by parts April 2016 that “the land border with Ireland of the Catholic population as well) also argued can remain as free-flowing after a Brexit vote as it clearly for Remain on 22 June 2016: “Europe is is today” (ctd. in Cunningham 2016)? Think of deeply flawed, but we’d be lost without it”, they Tony Blair and John Major what you like, but at wrote, and then drew up a long list of projects least they took the border (or “no-border”) issue supported by EU funding and other economic seriously, when they appeared together at Ulster benefits. Yet by suggesting that economic (dis) University in Derry to stress constitutional advantages were all that was at stake, the problem impacts of a Leave-Vote in June 2016. of the land border specific to the Northern Irish context was neglected once more. n any case, for much of the campaign period, I other matters had preoccupied Northern The referendum results Irish media (and the public) – first and foremost the assembly elections on 5 May. But when it t was also in the Belfast Telegraph that Fionola comes to party stances on the referendum, it is I Meredith summed up the referendum results worth noting that support for either side was in the following terms: “It’s not all about us” not aligned to the usual nationalist-unionist (Meredith 2016). Indeed, while 55.6 % of divide: the only major party campaigning for voters in Northern Ireland had cast their vote Leave was the DUP under Arlene Foster, while for Remain, the ‘Northern Ireland issue’ seems the second most important unionist party, the to have hardly played a role for voters across UUP, supported Remain alongside Sinn Fein, mainland Britain. However, having a closer the SDLP, the Alliance Party and the Greens look at the results suggests that the clear Remain (for more information on party stances see majority was mainly due to the – unsurprisingly EU referendum results in Northern Ireland (based on Garry 2018) Page 50 Hard Times 104 (1/2020) Frauke Hofmeister Road sign close to the border. Photo © Eric Jones (cc-by-sa/2.0) – overwhelming support of the Catholic and/ suitability as a representative for EU-favouring or nationalist population: 85% of those who Northern Ireland was questioned by several identify as Catholic (compared to only 40 % of people from the Remain camp, and Sinn Féin Protestants) and 88% describing themselves as quickly called for a border poll under the (Irish) nationalist (compared to 37% identifying arrangements of the Good Friday Agreement) as unionists) voted to stay in the EU (cf. Garry and from the general public. The signs close to 2018). Although the more diverse voting the border protesting against an “EU frontier behaviour of Protestants/unionists has also in Ireland” were surely among the most visible been explained by ‘left behind’-factors (ibid.), symbols of the significance of the result for pro- the results made clear that Northern Ireland is Remain Northern Ireland. far from being a united society, about 20 years after the Good Friday Agreement. And this was owever, for quite some time, nothing to become even more obvious in the following H much happened, apart from a general years. run on Irish passports by Northern Irish citizens (a move which had been advised even by Ian … after… Paisley!). f course, the referendum result sparked ndeed, as politicians in Westminster tried to O a number of instantaneous reactions I figure out what Brexit actually meant, life both from politicians (Brexiteer Arlene Foster’s went on in Belfast almost as usual. The power- Page 51 Hard Times 104 (1/2020) Borders, Brexit and Beyond: Fragments on Northern Ireland sharing Executive collapsed in early 2017 – Arlene Foster. As the Conservative minority something which had happened several times government now suddenly depended on the before and was thus not really uncommon. This 10 DUP MPs, it became truly impossible time, it was caused by the so-called Cash for to integrate the wide range of stakeholders’ Ash scandal – a totally failed renewable energies priorities in Brexit negotiations. Leaving incentive scheme overseen by Arlene Foster, the Single Market and customs union while who had by then become First Minister. Various adhering to the Good Friday Agreement and disputes over language policies, abortion and keeping Northern Ireland wholeheartedly civil rights loomed in the background of this within the Union? Very tricky indeed! breakdown. I find it remarkable that, at least on the surface, the failure of government had he sudden centrality of the ‘national issue’ nothing to do with pending constitutional T has never been visualised better than on issues. However, the clear pro-Brexit stance of @BorderIrish’s Twitter account on 8 February Arlene Foster and her DUP certainly did not 2018: “There’s me at the Brexit negotiations,” encourage Sinn Féin to find a different way out says the border – and we see a photo of a very of the situation.
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