Introduction
Civil war is consuming South Africa. The country is embroiled in a violent conflict that may well lead to the death of thousands upon thousands of its citizens. The past two years have established beyond any doubt that the black majority is prepared and willing to pay the price of untold suffering to end apartheid. What is so unconscionable to many Americans is that our own government refuses to use our considerable economic and diplomatic influence to help dismantle apartheid and stave off the spectre of escalating violence in the country. The United States is and for decades has been a willing partner with the South African government in maintaining an immoral, racist policy towards the black population of South Africa. In conducting this policy, the U.S. government betrays the tenets of democracy and morality upon which our country was founded. Our first purpose in preparing this resource is to unveil the real motives that drive U.S. foreign policy towards South Africa. To this end we review U.S. economic interests in South Africa to help explain why the Reagan administration wants to prevent any fundamental change in political relations in the region and we outline the strategic importance of such investments to the maintenance of apartheid. The second purpose of this pamphlet is to review and refute the justifications used by the present and past administrations to rationalize our South Africa policy. During the past forty years, U.S. relations with Pretoria have been justified on three premises: 1) the need to confront the absolute evil and imminent threat of communism; 2) to protect our national security which is defined in narrow, militaristic terms; 3) to stop the region's cycle of war but only by condemning certain kinds of violence ("terrorism") while endorsing others ~ We will examine each of these explanations for U.S. foreign policy and discuss why they have resulted in the United States sustaining the racist apartheid regime.
U.S. Foreign Policy: "A Matter of Interest''
The driving interest behind U.S. involve ment in South Africa has been economic profit. Through the mid-1970's, U.S. invest ments in that country brought a 19% rate of profit. That was almost double the world COMORO ISLANDS average of 11% at that time. These super •.. profits were the natural byproduct of apart , ANGOLA heid's cheap labor and drastic restrictions on the black trade union movement. U.S. economic involvement in South Af rica began during World War I when U.S. investors were eager to join British com panies in exploiting the world's largest gold ...... and diamond deposits. U.S. investment in .South Africa's mining sector continued to grow until World War II when U.S. com panies began developing other industries, such as explosives and chemicals, to support mining activities. The profitability of these investments was reflected in the ability of the United States to acquire 60% of the ATLANTIC Western' worl.d's $33 billion in gold by 1960. OCEAN · While the gold industry continued to provide the backbone of the South African economy, cheap labor and government incentives attracted U.S. investments to new areas of fledgling South African industry. U.S. investors concentrated on automobile production, tires, textiles, and oil refine ment. By 1960 over half of all cars produced on the African continent came from South Africa and most of those were produced by SOUTHERN AFRICA U.S. companies and powered by gasoline refined by U.S. subsidiaries. During this vestments in South Africa, second to Great mutually beneficial arrangement is vital to period, South Africa emerged unquestion Britain's 50%. U.S. capital, however, has apartheid's internal and regional repression. ably as the most important industrial country been concentrated in key industrial sectors. Special attention needs to be directed at in the region of southern Africa. Economic When the United Nations voted in favor of the role U.S. companies have played in development of the neighboring countries an arms embargo against South Africa in developing South Africa's nuclear industry. of Mozambique, Angola, Zambia, Botswana, 1977, some of the over 400 U.S. companies In 1978, the world learned that South Africa and Zimbabwe was tied to and driven by the operating in that country helped the apart was readying its first nuclear weapons test growing economic power of the apartheid heid government to develop its own arma the culmination of almost two decades of regime. Those countries today remain ments, not to mention South Africa's vital oil technological and capital support provided largely dependent on South Africa's refining, and electronics industries. U.S. by American companies with U.S. govern economy to fuel their own economic companies provided technology and capital, ment approval. We must ask against whom growth. while the South African government pro such weapons would be used if not South Direct U.S. investments have accounted vided tariff and tax incentives and, of course, Africa's own people and its closest African for approximately 20% of total foreign in- an abundant source of cheap labor. This neighbors. Page 2 U.S. economic involvement in South Af rica has made a vital contribution to preserv ing the apartheid state beyond fueling the strategic sectors of the South African econ omy. Massacres of black people at Sharpe ville in 1960 and Soweto in 1976 taught the United States and other Western nations how to help stabilize the South African economy in times of political upheaval such as the country is embroiled in today. One key aspect of such stabilizing programs is indirect economic assistance througn a variety of loan mechanisms involving private banks and international lending agencies. Currently, however, despite the assistance of Western investment, the South African economy is in a profound crisis. Profit rates have fallen from 20% a decade ago to 5% today. The increasingly militant labor move ment in South Africa has gained broader rights and is forcing concessions from mine and factory owners. The growing pressure from the American public to disinvest from Pretoria's friends in the U.S. consistently try to cloud the issue. South Africa renders past and present in vestments in the country increasingly ten East-West struggle by asserting that South Botha, has met privately with President uous. This growing threat to the consider Africa is containing the communist threat Reagan, no leader of the African National able financial interests of U.S.-based banks posed by the governments of Angola, Mo Congress has been received by our gov and corporations is an important factor in zambique as well as the anti-apartheid lib ernment. It is foolish for both Washington guiding the Reagan administration's policy eration movements of Namibia and South and Pretoria not to recognize that the ANC of "constructive engagement" in the region. Africa. holds the key to achieving peace in southern The overriding objective of our government The U.S. government has reinforced the Africa. is to protect U.S. investments in that country apartheid regime's depiction of South Af U.S. administrations have consistently dis while thwarting the progress of the legiti rica's internal opposition as communistic in torted the South African struggle as one of mate liberation movements in southern an effort to shift attention from the inherent communism against capitalism while black Africa in order to maintain a "pro-Western" immorality of apartheid to renewed cold South Africans know it as a struggle for political climate in the region. war hysteria. Washington has exaggerated freedom from white supremacy. In a 1985 the link between South Africa's under memo from Chester Crocker, Assistant Sec Smoke and Mirrors ground liberation movement, the African retary of State for African Affairs, to Secre National Congress (ANC) and the exiled tary of State George Shultz, Crocker claims As this overview illustrates, U.S. economic South African Communist Party (SACP). that "the chief threat to stability and coop interests in South Africa are very broad and Administration officials portray the ANC as eration in Southern Africa is the pressure • longstandi.ng. . Yet such economic interests a vehicle for expanding Soviet influence and influence of the Soviet Union and its are seldom referred to when our govern and interests in southern Africa. In April of allies." However, as South Africa's April 1986 ment discusses our policy towards the 1986, the Reagan Administration put their bombing of three neighboring countries apartheid regime. To talk about U.S. opinion on record by stating, "It is our view demonstrates, South Africa is the most ser corporate superprofits made possible by an that any group that is supported by the ious threat to regional stability. The apart inhumane system of racial oppression would Soviet Union does not have freedom as one heid government has demonstrated repeat hardly satisfy the moral concerns of the of its objectives and we would not agree edly a determination to dominate its own American public. For this reason, other that the ANC are freedom fighters." people as well as its neighboring countries rationalizations have been developed dur The irony of the administration's state through economic, political, and military ing the past 40 years to make the U.S. ment is that the failure of the United States aggression. presence in South Africa more acceptable to address the historic grievances of the The narrow cold war reading of events in to the public at large. We now turn our black majority under apartheid has led the the region by U.S. administrations has at attention to the justifications which the U.S. ANC to seek support and allies elsewhere least three important ramifications-Wash government has used to veil its support for including the Soviet Union. Until the United ington has repeatedly misrepresented the the apartheid regime. States unequivocally sides with the majority goals and character of the ANC; it has tacitly of South Africa's people, it will remain in the supported the South African government's contradictory position of promoting the propaganda campaigns to characterize black 1. The "Anti-Communist'' Soviets' reputation in southern Africa. South Africa's struggle for justice as com The ANC is the most widely respected munist-inspired; and it has enhanced the Argument political organization among black South Soviet Union's role in supporting the strug Administration spokespeople constantly Africans. In June 1985, The Sunday Times of gle for liberation of the black majority. On all . proclaim America's distaste for apartheid London conducted a black opinion poll counts, our government's ill-conceived ef yet, in the same breath, they portray South inside South Africa. Forty-nine percent of forts "to halt communist expansionism" in Africa as the bulwark against communist the surveyed blacks supported Nelson southern Africa are afienating the United expansionism in southern Africa. U.S. policy Mandela, the ANC's imprisoned leader, as States from South Africa's black population makers have long argued that the Pretoria the future president of their country. While and allying us ever closer with the Pretoria government is an irreplaceable ally in the South Africa's foreign minister, Roleof regime. Page3 2. The "Strategic Interest" Argument Over the last forty years the U.S. gov ernment has defined its geopolitical interests chiefly in terms of U.S.-Soviet rivalry for vital areas of the world. In southern Africa, the overriding concern for U.S. policymakers is rooted in a fear of losing South Africa as an economic ally-having her fall out of the family of Western trading partners. South Africa, however, is the most industrially advanced nation in Africa and the most thoroughly integrated into the Western economic alliance. A liberated South Africa would be just as concerned with building international trade and fostering a strong domestic economy as the present rulers in Pretoria are. There is no basis for asserting that a black-led government would not welcome extensive economic relations with the United States, providing the United Miners drilling for gold 20 miles south of Johannesburg. States government does not continue to alienate South Africa's future leaders. liberately exaggerated to justify continued "strategic" argument for the simple reason U.S. participation in the apartheid economy. that black South African labor is very cheap. The Minerals Chromium, for example, is primarily used Government policymakers use this rationale for decorative purposes and not for strate because it helps to justify U.S. interests in ' A related "security" argument has de gically sensitive ones. Manganese, used in stabilizing the apartheid regime. veloped around South Africa's strategic min steel production, can be easily acquired erals and her geographic location. American from other countries such as India, Australia policymakers repeatedly contend that South and Brazil. Vanadium exists throughout The Geography Africa's strategic importance necessitates a North America and our demand is on the friendly relationship with the apartheid gov decline. Platinum-group metals could be Because of her geographical location and ernment. acquired from Zimbabwe and our own excellent naval facilities, South Africa is an South Africa possesses four minerals Stillwater Complex in Montana as well· as attractive naval partner for the United States. which the U.S. government claims are being recycled after catalytic use. The apartheid government has benefited strategically essential either because of their Moreover, since 1939 the United States from the Cape Sea Route's strategic position importance to American industry and de has been committed to the stockpiling of vis-a-vis the Indian Ocean and ultimately fense or because they are available only in essential minerals "so as to sustain the U.S. the Middle East. In recent years the South South Africa. In 1981 President Reagan for a period of not less than three years." It African government has cultivated the myth posed the. rhetorical question, "Can we would take no more than two to five years that the region constitutes a new theater of abandon a country that strategically is es to generate domestic production of essential the Cold War drama. By exaggerating the sential to . t~e free world in its production of minerals. purported East-West conflict unfolding in minerals we all must have?" Despite the facts, American corporations the region, the government hopes to over The strategic importance of South Africa's and the Pentagon assert that this country shadow the evils of apartheid. Moreover, by minerals (chromium, vanadium, manganese, will continue to "depend" on South Africa's couching conflicts in the region as part of and platinum-group metals) has been de- minerals. U.S. corporations reinforce the superpower rivalry the apartheid govern ment disguises Pretoria's military aggression aimed not at the Soviet Union but at neigh U.S. Import Dependence on Four Key Strategic Minerals boring African countries. Defenders of the U.S. alliance with Pre Mineral u... l'.S. Net Import Relianct>• Import Sour<-.s ( 1978-81) toria drastically overstate the strategic im 1980 1981 1982 (I of total l 1.S. imports) portance of South Africa's geographic posi Most important .-is in 911 88S Chmmit°' South Africa (441), tion. Policymakers often contend that a manufacturt of steel. Oiromium ll.S.S.R. (18), Philippines (17), alloys are used in the aerospace, other (21). liberated South Africa would be closely def.....,. transportation, and Ferrochromium: South Africa allied to the Soviet Union and, in turn, pow.,.·generation industries. (71 ), Yugoslavia (II), Zimbabwe (6), Br.,il (3) , other (9) . would allow the Soviets to control the Cape A derulfurizing and deoxidizing 98 98 99 Ore: Gabon (321), South Africa sea route. agent in steel production. Also (24), Au
The U.S. government has taken it upon 1905-1910-Ford Motor Company and Otis Elevator initiate American Corporate invest itself to determine which forms of violence ment in South Africa. California goldminers help open South African gold fields. are legitimate and which are "terroristic." For ideological and chauvinistic reasons, Dec., 1952-U.S. abstains on first U.N. resolution condemning apartheid. administration officials have condemned 1954-South Africa joins the U.S., Britain, and European states in forming the Inter the armed struggle waged by the ANC and national Atomic Energy Board. the South West African Peoples' Organiza tion (SWAPO) as illegitimate while claiming 1955-Simonstown Naval Cooperation Agreement guarantees the United States access the anti-government rebels in Angola are to South African naval and air facilities in time of war, whether or not South Africa is a freedom fighters and worthy of U.S. military belligerent. support. 1957-U.S. and South Africa sign a 20 year agreement providing for cooperation in the The majority of South Africans live daily field of nuclear research. with the violence of apartheid. The ruthless tactics of South Africa's military and police March, 1960-After Sharpeville massacre in South Africa, the U.S. steps up its verbal are well known. South Africa's violence is condemnation of South Africa's policies and joins a unanimous U.N. resolution also embedded in her statute books in the condemning apartheid as a threat to world peace. form of pass laws, the Group Areas Act, the June, 1962-An agreement is announced between Washington and Pretoria whereby Homelands policy, and a racist constitutional the U.S. is allowed to set up a military space-tracking station in South Africa in return for arrangement. In response to many forms of agreeing to sell South Africa arms "for use against Communist aggression." repression over the course of generations, the African National Congress has adopted 1967-The U.S. refuses to join the U.N. Council for Namibia. armed struggle as one of its tactics. In the 1969-Kissinger writes National Security Study Memo #39, placing economic and minds of the ANC's leadership, passive strategic interests in South Africa above human rights concerns. means of resistance have been rendered insufficient and inappropriate by the re 1974-Kissinger approves a program of covert intervention in Angola. peated government-sponsored attacks and 1976-Passage of the Clark Amendment prevents U.S. interference in Angola. massacres. , Oct., 1977-U.S. vetoes U.N. motion to impose general economic sanctions against South Africa. Nov., 1977-U.S. supports arms embargo against South Africa. SepL, 1978-U.N. passes resolution 435 regarding plan for Namibian independence. Dec., 1979-U.N. adopts by large majority 17 anti-apartheid resolutions. U.S. votes no on 8, abstains on 3. June, 1980-U.N. Security Council calls for full implementation of the arms embargo. U.S. abstains from vote. Jan., 1981-Two weeks before Reagan's inauguration, his ex-campaign manager, John l 'M g.t..iTU\IG 'TIIE SOVll Feb., 1983-Chester Crocker admits that the U.S. Government, not the South African, came up with the idea of linking Namibian idependence to Cuban withdrawal from Angola. Jan., 1984-American Friends Service Committee report asserts that the Reagan Administration has allowed more commercial military sales ($28 million) than in the last 30 years combined. SepL, 1985-Public and congressional pressure forces President Reagan to impose an executive order forbidding bank loans to the SAG and limiting computer and nuclear trade with South Africa. Feb., 1986-The Reagan administration commences a covert military aid program to the l'Jl.RE$1~N& N'~EIDIN anti-government rebels in Angola known as UNITA. 9>Ull\ ~fi21C~ June 18, 1986-The House of Representatives approves by voice vote HR 997, demanding total disinvestment of U.S. companies and a complete trade embargo against ' South Africa. Aug. 15, 1986-The Senate approves 84-14 a selective sanctions bill against South Africa. Page 5 When the American ambassador to the United Nations announced the U.S. decision to endorse a 1963 arms embargo against South Africa, he qualified U.S. adherence to such a prohibition: "The Security Council should be aware that, in announcing this policy, the United States, as a nation of many responsibilities in many parts of the world, naturally reserves the right in the future to interpret this policy in the light of the requirements for assuring the maintenance of peace and security." After some debate, the Carter administra tion resolved to enforce the arms embargo strictly. Between 1979 and 1980, the United States sold virtually no militarily useful equipment to South Africa ($25,000 worth). Between 1981 and 1983, however, exports with military application totaled $28.3 mil lion. The State Department has acquiesced to military sales to South Africa, in the words of an employee at the Colt Arms and Ammunition Company, by "looking the other way when presented with fraudulent export declarations." Several arms ship ments have been quietly forwarded to South Africa after being shipped to other countries. Youths outside Cape Town demonstrate against the government. As of 1979, when a U.S. satellite recorded The Reagan administration and many Much has been made in this country and a double flash in the south Atlantic, South before it have overlooked the historical in South Africa of the violence between Africa has been acknowledged as a nuclear roots of the African National Congress' blacks in South Africa. The South African military power. The Pretoria government, decision to take up armed struggle. The Government and their conservative Amer however, has consistently refused to sign ANC was founded in 1912 and for the first ican allies have pointed to "black on black the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The fifty years of its existence practiced various violence" as proof that blacks are incapable extent of U.S. nuclear collaboration with forms of non-violent resistance and civil of governing the country. The notion is South Africa points to our government's disobedience. It was after the anti-pass racist and narrow-minded. It is widely willingness to contribute to apartheid's most demonstrations in Sharpeville, in 1960, when known that the South African Government strategic sectors. In the words of A.I. Roux, the South African police shot and killed 69 has fostered violence within the black popu President of the South African Atomic blacks (most of them in the back), that lation and several eyewitness accounts es Energy Board, "We can ascribe our degree leaders of the ANC saw non-violent struggle tablish that the South African police have of advancement today in large measure to as futile and decided to launch a sabotage collaborated directly with conservative black the training and assistance so willingly pro • campaign. The South African Defense Force factions. The root cause of the violence is vided by the United States." responded t& sabotage by launching raids apartheid and not barbaric tendencies Since May, 1980, the Reagan administra into the surrounding countries, ostensibly among Africans as Pretoria would have us tion has approved at least seven export to destroy the ANC's military bases. As a believe. licenses for South Africa's nuclear program. result, the apartheid army killed hundreds The call from Washington for peaceful The State Department has accepted without of African civilians in the frontline states. change and a negotiated solution in South question the South African Government's Internally, the Pretoria government only Africa is utterly hypocritical in the face of assurances that exports with nuclear appli grew more repressive as evidenced by the our military alliance with the South African cation will not be used for "non-peaceful Soweto massacre of 1976 and the uncon regime. While the ANC has never enjoyed purposes." trolled repression over the past two years. any assistance from the U.S. government, The ANC, consequently, announced in Jan Pretoria can attribute its nuclear capability South Africa's Regional Violence uary of 1986 that civilians and military per and its military prowess, in large part, to U.S. and the U.S. sonnel may be killed in the course of their collaboration. guerrilla activity. The "strategic" alliance between South In the United States, the sabotage at Washington and Pretoria: Partners in War Africa and the United States is based on tempts of the ANC are deplored as terroristic more t~an South Africa's geographic p0si while the state terrorism inherent in the The United States has played a role unpar tion and geological resources. The potential system of apartheid has not dissuaded the alleled by any other nation in helping South success of independent nationalist move U.S. from a continued and intimate alliance Africa develop its military capability. This ments in the region of southern Africa has with South Africa. President Reagan has relationship was first formalized in 1951, long troubled the United States govern excused the violence of the South African when the State Department declared South ment. Consequently, Washington has con _police by saying that the State of Emergency Africa eligible to receive reimbursable mili sistently collaborated with the apartheid which South Africa declared in July, 1985 tary aid under the terms of the Mutual state to preserve and further strengthen was necessary to maintain law and order Defense Assistance Act of 1949. The agree Pretoria's upper hand in the region. and to control those "elements" of South ment, which lasted more than a decade, Since 1920, South Africa has occupied African society who "want violence in the made available grants and credit for the Namibia; since 1950 they have done so in streets." acquisition of military hardware. violation of the rulings of the International Page 6 simultaneous raid, killing several unarmed civilians in the process. The apartheid gov ernment claimed to be flushing out dan gerous communist-backed ANC guerrillas from neighboring countries. These acts de monstrate that as the liberation movements in the region grow, Pretoria will not hesitate in unleashing its military forces against any perceived opponent. Moreover, they do so with the explicit support of the most power ful nation in the world. Toward a New South Africa Since the white Nationalist Party of South Africa came to power in 1948, the United States Government has been its most vital ally in the world community. U.S. economic and technological support has been vital to developing the South African economy and, in particular, its arms industry. The U.S. has also played a vital role in stabilizing the apartheid regime during its moments of political and economic crisis. U.S. policy in the region is fundamentally contradictory: it calls for peaceful resolution A black battalion of the South African Defense Force crosses from southern Angola into Namibia. while arming the region's primary aggressor; it talks of protecting our strategic interests in Court of Justice. Currently, the apartheid was that the South African Government halt the region while generating hostility towards regime maintains a virtual state of martial its support for the Mozambican National the United States among the country's fu law in the neighboring territory with over Resistance (the MNR) in return for Mozam ture leaders. It calls for dialogue and con 100,000 troops. Pretoria has extended apart bique's assurances that the ANC would no structive engagement while fueling an in heid to Namibia in order to exploit its longer be given sanctuary in their territory. ternal conflict whose consequences eclipse neighbor's mineral resources, repress its While ANC guerrillas no longer operate out the imagination. It talks of halting the rising population, and launch attacks against An of Mozambique, South Africa continues to communist influence while forcing the black gola with impunity. support the mercenary army which poses a majority to turn, in part, to the Soviet bloc For its part, the United States demanded serious military threat to the Mozambican for support. the withdrawal of Cuban troops from An government. The people of South Africa also turn to gola (the bordering country to the north) as In each case, the United States has col the American public. In order to respond a prerequisite to Namibia's independence. laborated with South Africa. Publicly the we have to address our government's tire By linking -two separate issues in two dif State Department claims it is trying to end less red-baiting, the unfounded claims of ferent nations, the U.S. government has cross-border violence in the region; in "strategic interests" in the region, and the stifled a negotiated settlement in Namibia practice the United States has facilitated distorted arguments of legitimate violence. for the past two years. South Africa's aggression against its neigh We will only do so, however, if we are able U.S. interference in Angola dates back to bors in the name of preventing purported to build an enduring and deeply rooted 1974-1975, during the country's war for Soviet expansion in the region. movement which works for Washington's independence from Portugal, when the South Africa's regional aggression has recognition of the ANC as a legitimate voice CIA was supporting the National Union for resulted in approximately $10 billion in for the South African majority as well as U.S. the Total Independence of Angola (UNIT A) damages, according to the Southern Afri condemnation of South Africa's regional and the National Front for the Liberation of ca Development Coordinating Conference violence and her internal policies. It will, Angola (FNLA)-considered the most pro (SADCC). 1985 offers several examples. In of course, be the South Africans them Western of factions in the conflict. Despite January of that year, 200 soldiers from the selves who eventually win their own liber buttressing from both Washington and Pre South African Defense Force (SADF) con ation but all Americans committed to peace toria, neither group had succeeded in over ducted an insurgency mission in northern and social justice must expose the way in throwing the Angolan Government by 1976 Angola several hundred miles from the which the United States has been hypo when the U.S. Congress passed the Clark South West African border. In September, critically and dangerously accomplice to Amendment, preventing any U.S. involve the Angolan Defense Ministry reported apartheid. Ending such complicity is the ment with armed groups in Angola. How bombing raids by the South African Air greatest contribution we can make to a new ever, in July 1985, Congress repealed the Force. Spokespeople for the apartheid gov" South Africa based on the full political and Clark Amendment and by February, 1986, ernment also admitted sending 500 soldiers economic participation of all its people. UNITA's leader Jonas Savimbi was a redis into the North Cabinda region of Angola covered hero of the American Right and a ostensibly in "hot pursuit" of SWAPO Written by Matthew Walker, Southern Africa covert program of military aid to UNITA was rebels. Project Coordinator, who gives special thanks to once again underway. But Angola has by no means been the the following for their patient guidance and edit In Mozambique, the United States takes only target of recent cross-border raids; in ing: Jean Sindab, William Johnston, Stephanie great pride in having brokered the 1983 May of 1986, the SADF attacked the nations Urdang, and William Minter. Nkomati Accord. The intent of the Accord of Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Zambia in a Page 7 Interfaith Center on Corporate The Washington Office on Africa Resources Responsibility 110 Maryland Ave., NE, Suite 112 475 Riverside Drive, Room 566 Washington, DC 20002 New York, NY 10115 (202) 546-7961 (212) 870-2293 Organizations Investor Responsibility Research Center Literature The American Committee on Africa 1755 Massachusetts 'Ave., NW 198 Broadway Washington, DC 20036 General New York, NY 10038 (202) 939-6500 (212) 962-1210 Eminent Persons Group. Mission to South Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Africa. Joseph Hanlon. Apartheid's Se American Friends Service Committee Under law cond Front. Phyllis Johnson and David 1501 Cherry St. The South Africa Project Martin. Destructive Engagement. Joseph Philadelphia, PA 19102 1400 "Eye" St. NW, Suite 400 Lelyveld. Move Your Shadow. Richard (215) 241-7169 Washington, DC 20005 Leonard. South Africa at War. James (202) 371-1212 The African National Congress North. Freedom Rising. 801 Second Avenue TransAfrica New York, NY 10017 545 8th St., SE U.S.-S.A. Relations (212) 490-3487 Washington, DC 20003 Kevin Danaher. In Whose Interest. The (202) 547-2550 The Coalition for a New Foreign Study Commission. SA: Time Running and Military Policy The United Nations Center .2!!!.· Elizabeth Schmidt. Decoding Cor 712 G Street, SE Against Apartheid porate Camouflage. Ann Seidman. U.S. Washington, DC 20003 United Nations Plaza Multinationals in Southern Africa. - (202) 546-8400 New York, NY 10017 (212) 754-6674 The ANC and Black Politics Episcopal Churchpeople for a Free Southern Africa The United Nations Council on Namibia Tom Lodge. Black Politics Since 1945. 339 Lafayette St. United Nations Plaza Nelson Mandela. The Struggle is My Life. New York, NY 10012 New York, NY 10017 Eddie Roux. Time Longer Than Rope. (212) 477-0066 (212) 754-5400 Donald Wo9ds. Biko. 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