Joint Force Quarterly Issue 41, 2d Quarter 2006

Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University

Integrated Operations

National War College 60th Anniversary Interagency Dialogue: Strategic Planning for U.S. National Security

A Profession a l M i l i t a r y a n d S ecurity Journ a l Inside Issue 41, 2d Quarter 2006

Departments 1 A Word from the Chairman 5 From the Editor

6 Letters to the Editor JFQ 58 Strategic Studies Notes Editor-in-Chief Stephen J. Flanagan, PhD 94 Book Reviews Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies Editor Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF Director, NDU Press JFQ Forum Managing Editor, NDU Press COL Debra Taylor, USA Deputy Director, NDU Press 8 Integrated Operations: Executive Summary Managing Editor, JFQ Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, PhD 10 Planning Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq by Joseph J. Collins Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. 15 Combating Terrorism: A Socio-Economic Strategy by Miemie Winn Byrd Senior Copyeditor Calvin B. Kelley Book Review Editor Lisa M. Yambrick 20 Integrating Partner Nations into Coalition Operations by Barbara Fick Information Manager TSgt Ayanna F. Woods, USAF Design U.S. Government Printing Office Creative Services 26 Are We Ready for an Interagency Combatant Command? by Christopher L. Naler

32 Orchestrating Instruments of Power for Nationbuilding by Henry W. Stratman Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Special Feature Forces, allies, and other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security policy and strategy; efforts to 38 America’s National War College: Sixty Years of Educating Strategic Thinkers combat terrorism; homeland security; and developments in training and joint professional military education to transform America’s military and security apparatus to better meet 40 A School for Strategy: The Early Years by Janet Breslin-Smith tomorrow’s challenges while protecting freedom today. NDU Press produces JFQ four times a year. The 45 The Legend of George F. Kennan by Paul B. Thompson goal of NDU Press is to provide defense and interagency decisionmakers, allies, and the attentive public with attractive, balanced, and thoroughly researched professional publications. 48 International Colleagues at the National War College by Miguel Ricardo Reyes Cordero NDU Press is the National Defense University’s cross- component, professional, military, and academic publishing house. It publishes books, policy briefs, occasional papers, monographs, and special reports on national security strategy, Commentary defense policy, national military strategy, regional security affairs, and global strategic problems. NDU Press is part of the 51 Effects-Based Operations: A Critique by Milan N. Vego Institute for National Strategic Studies, a policy research and strategic gaming organization.

Features This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department of Defense edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted without 60 The “Golden Hour” Standard: Transforming Combat Health Support permission of the copyright proprietors. Joint Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted from or by Guy S. Strawder based on its content.

68 Integrated Coercive Strategies and the Role of the Air Component CONTRIBUTIONS by Merrick E. Krause Joint Force Quarterly welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic 76 Joint Logistics in the Future by C.V. Christianson specialists, and civilians from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address below or by email to [email protected] “Attention A&R Editor” in the subject Interagency Dialogue line. For further information see the guidelines on the NDU Press Web site at ndupress.ndu.edu. 80 Strategic Planning for National Security: A New Project Solarium COMMUNICATIONS Please visit NDU Press and Joint Force Quarterly online at by Mich`ele A. Flournoy and Shawn W. Brimley ndupress.ndu.edu for more on upcoming issues, an electronic archive of JFQ articles, and access to many other useful NDU Press publications. Constructive comments and contributions Recall are important to us. Please direct editorial communications to the electronic feedback form on the NDU Press Web site 87 Custer and Cognition by David C. Gompert and Richard L. Kugler or write to: Editor, Joint Force Quarterly National Defense University Press The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do 300 Fifth Avenue not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, DC 20319-5066

About the covers Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 FAX: (202) 685-4219/DSN 325 The cover shows U.S. Army specialist from the st1 Armored Division conducting a combat security patrol with Email: [email protected] Iraqi police in Tal Afar (1st Combat Camera Squadron/Aaron Allmon). The table of contents depicts Special JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu Forces in Afghanistan (DOD). The back cover features Guatemalan soldiers saluting Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in Guatemala City (1st Combat Camera Squadron/Cherie Thurlby); Multinational convoy operating 2d Quarter, April 2006 in the Pacific, ExercisePanamax ’05 (4th Combat Camera Squadron/Rick Sforza); Marines securing area along Amazon River, Exercise UNITAS ’04 (Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic/Dave Fliesen); F–35 Short Take-off and ISSN 1559-6702 Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant: and Navy’s FSF–1 during test operations (U.S. Navy/Rachel Bonilla). ndupress.ndu.edu

A Profession a l M i l i ta r y Download cover as computer wallpaper at ndupress.ndu.edu. a n d S ecurity Journ a l A Word from the Chairman

The Chairman and Secretary of Defense teleconference with GEN George W. Casey, USA, Commander, Multi-National Force–Iraq, about the success of Iraqi elections

DOD (Helene C. Stikkel)

ooking back on my first 6 months interagency, coalition, and nongovernmental guidance to the Joint Staff (published in JFQ, as Chairman, I am impressed partners to succeed. issue 40, 1st quarter 2006), we must marshal with the ability of our Soldiers, My predecessor, General Richard the enablers of organizational agility, collabo- L Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Myers, coined the term integrated opera- ration, and outreach if the Nation is to win Coastguardsmen, who confront challenges tions to emphasize that the military must act the war on terror. such as counterinsurgency and nationbuild- in concert with a wide variety of actors to Although the opening examples come ing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, attain national objectives. Indeed, we must from recent contingencies, integrated opera- earthquake relief in Pakistan, and hurricane seek out new partners—governmental agen- tions are not new. Counterdrug operations in relief in our own Gulf States. Though seem- cies, nongovernmental organizations, allies, Latin America provide a more mature look ingly disparate, these operations share an industry, and the private sector—to defeat at integrated operations in that they enjoy important characteristic: they all require modern transnational threats. I wholeheart- the strength of established relationships and the coordinated efforts of a wide range of edly endorse this approach. As I stated in my standing organizations, such as the Joint ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ  relief operations in late 2005, economic and infrastructure recovery considerations clearly dominated the effort. In fact, most national- level concerns fell squarely on other agencies with portfolios such as health, housing, transportation, energy, and the environment. Beyond disaster relief operations, diplomatic, informational, and economic considerations often determine success in preconflict and postconflict operations abroad. Second, mission requirements often dictate the need for diverse skill sets and authorities. The Intelligence Community offers an excellent example of this point. The Central Intelligence Agency, for example, provides intelligence collection and all-source intelligence analysis (centered on human intelligence), while the National Security Royal Netherlands sailors arriving Agency was chartered to supply primarily in Biloxi, Mississippi, to support technical intelligence collection (signals Hurricane Katrina relief intelligence). The Services also employ intel- ligence assets specifically tailored to their operational needs and missions. Finally, other groups—even those outside the formal Intelligence Community— may enjoy expertise and relationships that impart valuable information. Each of these diverse partners reveals a piece of the larger intelligence puzzle. In Iraq, we have brought them together to enhance the intelligence picture from the tactical to the strategic level. Similarly, the success of JIATF–S flows from an ability to harness the agency with the right expertise and authority to accomplish a particular aspect of the larger counterdrug mission. For example, the law-enforcement components of JIATF–S retain greater author- ity to conduct search and seizure operations, unlike the supporting military components.

Combat Camera Group, Pacific (Michael B. Watkins) Combat Camera Group, Providing the right authorities and leverag- ing the agency or organization with the appropriate authority also played a key role in Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF–S). benchmark to guide our efforts in prosecut- hurricane relief efforts in the fall of 2005, in This task force formally links diverse interests ing the war on terror and in other operations. postconflict operations in Iraq and Afghani- from the Department of Defense, Depart- Cultivating and leveraging broader stan, and in the war on terror. ment of Homeland Security, Department partnerships are crucial for several reasons. Third, integrated operations allow of Justice, and other Federal agencies, such First, we recognize that the nonmilitary the United States to leverage a wider array as the Central Intelligence Agency and the aspects of an operation may define the ulti- of resources and expertise in supporting National Security Agency. Furthermore, mate success or failure of a national effort. national goals and objectives. For example, JIATF–S works with regional partner coun- We have long recognized the importance of our Dutch partners sent an “un-watering” tries on a day-to-day basis. These habitual integrating the instruments of power: diplo- team to assist the U.S. Army Corps of Engi- relationships and shared experiences facilitate matic, informational, military, and economic neers with the removal of floodwaters from a comprehensive approach to containing the (and more recently financial, infrastructure, the New Orleans area in the aftermath of illicit drug problem and integrating all the and law enforcement). While providing more Hurricane Katrina. Thanks to the geography instruments of national power and a variety than 70,000 Active and Reserve Component of its native Netherlands, this team provided of partners to help achieve national objec- troops and immense resources from all the unmatched expertise and specialized equip- tives. We should look for ways to use this Services in support of Hurricane Katrina ment to the effort. Other partners helped

 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu President Bush talks about the war on terror with members of his national security team

DOD (Helene C. Stikkel) reduce the load on already stressed resources; operations. Because integrated operations tant role in capturing the operational and during Katrina recovery operations, the promise greater effectiveness than disjointed strategic lessons of World War II, providing Republic of Singapore Air Force flew more efforts by individual agencies, we must look for the postwar joint education of our Armed than 80 sorties, transporting more than 800 for ways to formalize these relationships and Forces. Today, that mission remains essen- personnel and moving 540 tons of material. response procedures in the national security tially unchanged: to prepare future leaders of These cases represent two of the countless structure. Organizations such as JIATF–S the Defense Department, State Department, examples of international support in the wake represent the first step in this process, but and other civilian agencies for high-level of Katrina. more must be done. We should explore policy, command, and staff responsibilities Perhaps the most striking example cross-agency planning guidance, much like by conducting a senior-level course of study of leveraging resources comes from Iraq. our own Unified Command Plan and Con- in national security strategy and national We collaborated closely with industry in tingency Planning Guidance, which provides security policy. our punch-counterpunch fight to limit the the framework for interdepartmental plan- As a National War College graduate effectiveness of improvised explosive devices, ning and execution. Habitual relationships in and former President of the Marine Corps helping to save lives by bringing cutting-edge education, training, and exercises should also University, I firmly believe the professional technology to the field quickly. In all these follow. As you read the JFQ Forum articles, military education system serves as an cases, external expertise and resources posi- consider the questions they raise and the important source of strength for the Armed tively affected outcomes. implications for our organizations and oper- Forces. I am encouraged by efforts to expand Over the last 20 years, the Armed ating procedures as we seek to achieve unity interagency and multinational participation Forces met the challenge of establishing a of effort in future operations. and dialogue in our schools, and I encour- joint perspective and building joint warfight- This issue also provides an opportunity age you to seek out these nonmilitary and ing organizations. In many ways, we now face to recognize the National War College on the coalition participants and engage them in a similar challenge as we seek to integrate occasion of its 60th anniversary. Established the classroom or in the field during exercises better a wider community of partners in our in October 1945, the college filled an impor- or contingency operations. These partners ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ  bring a wealth of experience and unique and organization of our forces to meet the Again, my thanks to you, military insights that often challenge our conven- challenges of a dynamic security environ- professionals and interagency partners; it is tional wisdom and lead to new and innova- ment. I encourage you to read the articles, through your efforts that we will prevail in tive approaches to the operational and stra- think about them, question them, and build this long war while simultaneously shaping tegic problems we face daily. To the faculty on them. Debate these ideas within your tomorrow’s force. JFQ and staff of the National War College, thank organizations and with other security profes- you! Your service remains key to our successes sionals, regardless of uniform or agency. Your in the war on terror and in meeting the future insights, as well as lessons identified in the PETER PACE tests in this demanding security environment. field, will help shape departmental and even General, United States Marine Corps Your expertise and instruction are unparal- broader national initiatives to strengthen Chairman, leled and your results proven. integrated operations and enhance the ability Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Force Quarterly provides a pow- of all partners to contribute fully to the erful venue to explore the mission, roles, achievement of national objectives. New Titles from NDU Press...

McNair Paper 69 Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran Judith S. Yaphe and Charles D. Lutes conclude that Washington may have little choice other than to live with a nuclear-armed Iran. Revisiting an earlier (pre-9/11) study, this reexamination takes into account the 2001 terrorist attacks, U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2005 elections in Iran, and new evidence of Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons-related technology. Available from the U.S. Government Printing Office at $8.50 per copy. Stock number 008-020-01552-1

Strategic Forum 219 Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging Threats David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb make a case for restructuring U.S. special operations forces to improve their strategic capability to defeat current and emerging global threats. Available from NDU Press only

Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction Occasional Paper 4 Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” In this extensively researched study, Dr. W. Seth Carus summarizes how the term weapons of mass destruction has been used differently in disarmament talks, U.S. security policy, Soviet and Russian military doctrine, and American political discourse. He assesses the key policy issues associated with alternative definitions, and proposes a definition appropriate for the Department of Defense. Available from NDU Press only

Institute for National Strategic Studies Occasional Paper 3 A Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region The Black Sea region is increasing in importance as an energy supply conduit and a barrier against transnational threats. However, as Eugene Rumer and Jeffrey Simon point out, some littoral state agendas conflict with NATO member interests. The authors argue that the Alliance could engage these states by identifying common security concerns and ideas for cooperative activities, including better integration of Partnership for Peace and European Union programs. Available from NDU Press only

Institute for National Strategic Studies Occasional Paper 4 China Goes Global Phillip C. Saunders notes that economic imperatives and strategic challenges are driving China to expand its international activi- ties into different regions of the world. His study examines the rationale, drivers, and To order copies: U.S. Government Printing Office, extent of this phenomenon, and assesses the implications for the United States. call (202) 512-1800 (facsimile (202) 512-2250), or write Available from NDU Press only to Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402- 9328, or online at: ndupress.ndu.edu

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 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu From the Editor

e have a rare hail and farewell at National Defense University (NDU) Press this quarter. In late 2005, Colonel David Gurney, USMC, came to NDU Press as Deputy Director and JFQ Managing Editor—the first Marine W on the JFQ staff. Colonel Gurney just completed an eventful tour at U.S. Southern Command as Deputy Director of Operations and commanding officer of its Marine Corps element. He is a former Harrier squadron commander, an Industrial College of the Armed Forces graduate, and the man who turned out the lights in Panama as J–3 of Joint Task Force–Panama. We are already dazzled. JFQ also bids farewell to our NDU Press Managing Editor, Colonel Debra Oliver Taylor, USA, who is retiring after 26 years as an intelligence leader. A 2001 National War College grad- uate, Colonel Taylor has been critical to Joint Staff J–2 efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom, JFQ held an important O–6 command in the Republic of Korea, and was an integral part of the postwar stability team in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. We wish Colonel Taylor and her Gen Peter Pace, USMC Publisher family the best and look forward to a long association with her as a JFQ contributing editor. Advisory Committee This issue presents a unique theme for our Forum section: integrated operations. JFQ Lt Gen Michael M. Dunn, USAF National Defense University introduced this term in the first quarter of 2005, and attentive readers will notice that the BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) Office of the Chairman thread has run through each issue since. There is nothing magical about integrated operations. A. Denis Clift Joint Military Intelligence College The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense, and the President have all sug- RADM Patrick W. Dunne, USN Naval Postgraduate School Maj Gen Robert J. Elder, Jr., USAF Air War College gested that in today’s complex, post–Cold War strategic environment, the U.S. military must Col George E. Fleming, USMC Marine Corps War College cooperate closely with new partners to accomplish national objectives. These partners include Brig Gen (S) Randal D. Fullhart, USAF Air Command and interagency, international, private sector, industry, nongovernmental organizations, and chari- Staff College ties to synchronize security efforts among the various instruments of national power. The term MG David H. Huntoon, USA U.S. Army War College RADM Richard J. Mauldin, USN The Joint Staff integrated operations recognizes these new partners and the need to cooperate closely and effec- Col Walter L. Niblock, USMC Marine Corps Command and tively, from planning through execution to whatever comes next. Staff College In the 20 years since the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which established Maj Gen Teresa M. Peterson, USAF National War College much of the joint organization and training within the Armed Forces, joint operations have MG Kenneth J. Quinlan, Jr., USA Joint Forces Staff College become the baseline. Although each Service retains unique core competencies and maintains LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA The Joint Staff RADM Jacob L. Shuford, USN Naval War College pride in its colors, the Armed Forces as a whole have embraced the concept of joint warfight- BG Volney J. Warner, USA U.S. Army Command and General ing and are actively working to improve and transform to be more effective. Though necessary Staff College in the new American way of war, joint operations alone are not sufficient to address the entire MajGen Frances C. Wilson, USMC Industrial College of the Armed Forces panorama of warfighting, national security, humanitarian affairs, training, planning, and acqui-

Editorial Board sition responsibilities facing today’s combatant commanders and Service chiefs. No one Service, no one instrument of national power, and no one country can defeat all threats in isolation. Stephen J. Flanagan National Defense University Richard K. Betts Columbia University The confluence of rogue states, ease of international travel and communication, prolifera- Col John M. Calvert, USAF Joint Forces Staff College tion of weapons of mass destruction (or at least mass effect), interdependency of the world Stephen D. Chiabotti School of Advanced Air and Space Studies economy, and religious extremists with an unprecedented arsenal of highly destructive weapons Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University have created a critical junction. The stakes are as high as ever. Fortunately, America and its Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University allies believe in the free exchange of ideas and are willing to consider new and unprecedented Alan L. Gropman Industrial College of the Armed Forces strategies to ensure liberty and security. Thus, this quarter’s JFQ Forum is designed to provoke Douglas N. Hime Naval War College debate on integrated operations and the complexity of integrating new partners across organi- Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College Daniel T. Kuehl Information Resources Management College zations, borders, and instruments of power. Col Anne E. McGee, USAF Industrial College of the Armed Forces JFQ emphasizes people over things and provocative, reasoned security strategy writing Thomas L. McNaugher The RAND Corporation over dogmatic opinion. We are adding shorter articles to increase readability while continuing Kathleen Mahoney-Norris Air Command and Staff College to demand the same high-quality, postgraduate level of scholarly research. Please look for two William H.J. Manthorpe, Jr. Joint Military Intelligence College new departments in this issue: Executive Summary and Security Studies Notes. Remember, too, John J. Mearsheimer The University of Chicago to bookmark our Web site, ndupress.ndu.edu, where you will find a useful source of additional LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) Hudson Institute online content, access to many other NDU Press publications, and information on special events Col Thomas C. Skillman, USAF Air War College COL Robert E. Smith, USA U.S. Army War College such as the Chairman’s Strategic Essay Competition, scheduled for May 2006. JFQ Lt Gen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) Harvard University Col Gary West, USAF National War College Colonel Merrick E. Krause, USAF Director, National Defense University Press A Profession a l M i l i ta r y Editor, Joint Force Quarterly a n d S ecurity Journ a l

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ  To the Editor—In “Defining Integrated Oper- Letters to the Editor ations” (Issue 38, 3d Quarter 2005), Richard Downie provided definitions for what he con- To the Editor—Chuck Harrison’s article, “How worked shoulder to shoulder with the Marine sidered integrated operations, which included Joint Are We and Can We Be Better?” (Issue landing support platoon to rig and hook integrated operations, combined integrated 38, 3d Quarter 2005), which appeared as a up external loads to CH–53E (Marine) and operations, and multinational integrated link on the Army Knowledge Online homep- CH–47D (Army) aircraft. We had different operations. Each definition included a set of age, is right on the mark. LTC Harrison’s unit SOPs, terminology, and equipment, but Services, agencies, and other elements that thoughts on the lack of a system to enforce we figured out how to get the job done at our would be engaged in operations. To buttress joint training echoed my experiences as a level (helped by the fact that the services use his definitions, Colonel Downie appealed to junior officer. the same field manual for external hookups). statements from General Richard Myers, then Harrison evaluates an operational Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. level joint exercise and notes, “We should With all due respect, we believe that ask just how joint the exercise was and at Colonel Downie’s effort fails in several what level.” Different levels of leaders see respects. To be sure, operations he described training through their own lenses and their as integrated do contain the elements he own positions. What looks joint to general included. Recent operations, particularly officers or brigade commanders is far dif- those that are often categorized under the ferent than what appears joint to an Army catch-all phrase military operations other than or Marine company commander or platoon war, have involved the participation of every leader/commander at the tactical level. As Service in the U.S. military, forces from other Harrison points out, tactical training should nations, American governmental agencies, “not become entangled with the Goldwater- nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and Nichols Act, which addressed strategic issues international governmental organizations and joint operational level training.” Put (IGOs). To call the tsunami relief effort an more bluntly, Goldwater-Nichols means little “integrated operation,” however, is a consid- to sergeants, lieutenants, and captains focus- erable misuse of the word integrate. ing on joint tactical training. Senior officers Indeed, all of the entities involved in a who point to Goldwater-Nichols for joint mission may have the same goal. But their training should ask sergeants and lieutenants cultures and capabilities differ in degrees, what they know about Goldwater-Nichols. I Once the 22d MEU left, my platoon became sometimes considerably. Moreover, the term believe they would get blank stares more than responsible for the Tarin Kowt field landing integrated operations, as defined by Colonel half of the time. strip as well, and received, unloaded, and Downie, connotes a degree of command or Harrison points out that “what has not uploaded USAF C–130 aircraft. Working control over these organizations, especially been created is a system to ensure that joint with Marine CH–53Es and Air Force C–130s NGOs and IGOs, that exists neither by defini- training is taking place at the brigade and was not a mandated predeployment JMETL tion nor spirit. Thus, while there may indeed battalion level.” A building block in creating task. Junior leaders from all Services are be unity of effort, achieving the desired end- that system is to identify and broaden the figuring out this and hundreds of other joint state through an “integrated operation” may definition of the joint mission essential task tasks on the ground while deployed. well be chimerical. list (JMETL) and gates that we expect small In summary, LTC Harrison’s article The concept of integrated operations units—platoon and companies—to be pro- is right on target. A system to enforce joint becomes even more remote when one moves ficient in. We know that we need to train in tactical training needs to ensure that junior to the operational level of war. The differences close air support, but there is much more that leaders have input into training needs other in warfighting cultures and doctrines (or the we need to be proficient in, joint-wise, prior than close air support. Our joint experi- lack thereof), and the presence of coalition to deploying. However, our leaders at the ences while deployed can help units—from partners whose national interests will at some division and brigade levels cannot necessarily the bottom up—identify JMETL tasks that point detract from both unity of command define all of these tasks for us at the tactical need to be trained on back at home station. and unity of effort, serve to render integration level; these must be bottom-up tasks that From there, senior leaders are back to LTC impossibile. This is often exacerbated by the platoon sergeants, platoon leaders, company Harrison’s focus: building a system that is in personnel policies of the various Services. and even battalion commanders identify. A place to ensure that the joint training actually Varying rates of personnel turnover can result good example is my Army infantry support happens. in instability and personality clashes that platoon’s experience in Operation Enduring CPT Mike Baskin, USA could detract from the proper coordination of Freedom-V while our battalion, 2d Battalion, 2d Battalion, 5th Infantry, operations, let alone integration. 5th Infantry Regiment, was attached to the 3d Interim Brigade Combat Team Humanitarian operations render the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) for 25th Infantry Division notion of integrated operations even more 6 weeks in Uruzgan province. My platoon Schofield Barracks, Hawaii fanciful. Downie used General Myers’ defini-

 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu tion of multinational integrated operations To the Editor—Congratulations to John ity and veracity of information used to make and cited the tsunami relief effort in Indone- Hurley for so eloquently describing what is decisions within military organizations. sia as an example. Experience throughout the emerging as a key element in the revolution Technological enhancements in the form of post–Cold War period, ranging from Somalia in military affairs: cross-functional working Web portals for sharing information—espe- through stability operations in Iraq, indicates cially for posting critical updates or changes, that at best one may achieve a degree of coor- coupled with real-time collaboration tools dination that will contribute to the success of that allow coordination in virtual meeting the operation. rooms—have freed us from many of the Integration, or more realistically simple shackles imposed by time and space. coordination, becomes virtually impossible to One statement in LTC Hurley’s article, achieve with NGOs. The radical differences however, raises a caution flag. He states, in organizational culture, methodology, and “Each action officer receives identical guid- purpose, not to mention the sheer mutual ance, so there is no opportunity for a primary distrust between NGOs and military organi- staff section officer to miscommunicate zations, render even the most rudimentary it.” Don’t believe it! Experience tells us that type of cooperation hard to attain. individuals interpret inputs differently, even We suggest that coordinated opera- if their inputs are exactly the same. Just look tions is a much more useful term to define at the differences in accounts of eyewitnesses the activities Colonel Downie described. to an accident. Differing interpretations of an Although understandably Service-centric in event is a part of human nature, so we must its orientation, Air Force Doctrine Document take them into account and mitigate their 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, provides a good effects. Good staff work and strong manage- baseline for understanding the types of oper- ment of meetings are not obsolete. ations Downie spoke of: “The proper appli- groups (“Cross-Functional Working Groups: All in all, Hurley’s is an excellent article. cation of a coordinated force can produce Changing the Way Staffs Are Organized,” He managed to capture in just a few pages effects that exceed the contributions of forces Issue 39, 4th Quarter 2005). As the senior some real nuggets that others should study employed individually.” From this, perhaps analyst at Battle Command Training Program and consider implementing in their own we can develop more useful definitions of the Operations Group Delta, I have witnessed organizations. types of operations we will be conducting in working groups emerge over the past 5 Thomas E. Ward II, PhD at least the near future. years acting as key enabling components of Senior Analyst, Operations Group LtCol Roger L. Morin, USMC information-sharing and knowledge manage- Delta Battle Command Training Dr. Richard L. DiNardo ment. Integrated working groups, combining Program USMC Command and Staff College expertise from multiple staff sections, have Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Quantico, Virginia enabled a marked increase in both the veloc-

NEW from NDU Press for the Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Defense Horizons 52 Creating a NATO Special Operations Force David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith suggest the time has come for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries to work together to develop a small, selective special operations forces capability for the Alliance. Defense Horizons 51 Custer in Cyberspace David C. Gompert and Richard L. Kugler reexamine the Battle of the Little Bighorn using the new concept of battle-wisdom—the blending of reliable intuition with timely reasoning in complex, dynamic, time-critical, and information-rich environments. They find implications for today in the recruitment, development, retention, training, and education of military leaders.

For more information on these and other CTNSP publications, visit ndupress.ndu.edu or

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ  j f q F o r u m Integrated Operations Executive Summary

ew of our readers know that summarizing bullets, but rather to address international nongovernmental organiza- Joint Force Quarterly is deliv- the So what? question behind the editors’ tions, and private or public local agencies is ered to every general and flag assessment that these submissions are truly not as important as the intent: to maximize F officer within the Department of worth readers’ time. efficiency and legitimacy in achieving Defense, as well as to senior leaders through- Like Generals Shelton and Myers before national security objectives. While this has out the executive branch of the U.S. Govern- him, General Pace has placed great emphasis been done in an ad hoc fashion for years, ment. For decisionmakers, executive sum- on the importance of U.S. military leaders the potential value added is so great that, maries are an essential daily element of time integrating their plans and operations “with a like “jointness,” this concept is in need of management in the face of heavy responsi- wide variety of actors” in an effort to achieve formal approaches, starting with institutional bilities and tight schedules. JFQ is mindful national objectives in a more holistic fashion. adaptation. that national security professionals at every Whether this involves military organizations Our first Forum article, “Planning level face competing demands for their atten- from more than one country combined with Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq,” focuses tion. The purpose of this executive summary one or more U.S. or foreign governmental on the contemporary security threat and the is not to reduce the Forum’s content to a few agencies, private volunteer organizations, way in which leaders plan and orchestrate

 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu j f q F o r u m

diplomatic and military instruments of laborating with nontraditional partners is a rity Council should serve as an aggressive power to meet this threat. Hailing back to necessary component of a successful coun- arbiter of interagency equities in the war on Integrated Operations the Clausewitzian admonition to understand terterrorism strategy. Major Byrd criticizes terror and force greater synergy on Federal the nature of the war in question, Joseph inflexible planning and other traditional mil- agencies with contrasting cultures, incen- Collins focuses on the critical importance of itary organizational problems as enemies of tives, and perspectives. In the aftermath of interagency partnership in planning for, and innovation in the economic arena. Regional the 1986 Tower Commission’s investigation subsequently addressing, the fractured envi- combatant commanders must anticipate a of the Iran-Contra affair, many drew the ronments produced by blunt military power future in which more businesses find com- lesson that the NSC should serve only as contests. Dr. Collins argues that involving petitive arenas in underdeveloped nations staff and never as an operational agency, the interagency community in the military and seek to cultivate their partnership in closing the door on any suggestion of a aspects of the planning process is essential to defeating terror. standing integrated combatant command achieving security objectives in the postcon- Our third Forum feature, “Integrating headquarters. Colonel Naler points out that flict (or postcrisis) return to normalcy. He Partner Nations into Coalition Operations,” the immediate chain of command for such an concludes with eight practical recommenda- outlines the techniques, mechanisms, and organization is a contentious issue, but so is tions to improve mid-range planning. integrated operations successes used by the leadership of the command itself. The second Forum article, “Combat- U.S. regional combatant command with the Henry Stratman’s case study, “Orches- ing Terrorism: A Socio-Economic Strategy,” fewest resources to perform its mission: U.S. trating Instruments of Power for Nation- addresses the economic instrument of Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). building,” concludes the Forum and takes the national power in the war on terror and the This dearth of assets and a perceived absence opposite approach by focusing on individual relationship between economic prosperity, of strategic threat have inspired great inter- leaders organizing staffs and liaison ele- stability, and terror. Miemie Winn Byrd agency and partner nation coordination to ments to overcome myriad impediments to posits that the traditional argument that bring, as General Pace noted in his message integration and coordination (the “clash of “market-based solutions cannot lead to earlier, a greater array of resources and cultures”). In this case, the dual challenge poverty reduction and economic develop- expertise to bear on the increasing transna- is nationbuilding in parallel with counter- ment” is no longer plausible and that col- tional threat. As in other regional areas of insurgency operations. General Stratman responsibility, USSOUTHCOM is working suggests that perhaps separate but equal with its partners to mitigate a growing pan- agencies with clear mandates and cooperative orama of security threats that exploit vast leadership can achieve better results through ungoverned territories and border seams. careful interaction than a single integrated Major Barbara Fick addresses the deliber- agency with organic interagency expertise. ate training and exercise activities that pay The general is careful to point out that the dividends in smoother integrated operations successes he reports were not attributable to during crisis. Notably, USSOUTHCOM is doctrine, but were products of age-old unity the first regional combatant command to of effort between the chief of mission and the incorporate the State Department Office combined force commander. Should we draw of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and the conclusion that multiple independent Stabilization in its exercise program. For his agencies working cooperatively outperform a part, the coordinator is working with the single, truly integrated combatant command? Western Hemisphere Affairs Bureau on Cuba Unity of effort is essential to successful inte- to develop a framework for U.S. strategy grated operations. for the period immediately following Fidel Castro’s death. Events will clearly demand In his guidance to the Joint Staff, even more efficient integrated operations in General Pace underscored the need to the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility, “harness elements of national power” by inte- and the implications for state, Federal, and grating and coordinating Defense Depart- international agencies who deal with mass ment efforts with the work of others. The migration, foreign disaster assistance, and challenge of integrated operations is to build even homeland defense, are legion. trust, synergy, and momentum in realizing In the fourth article, “Are We Ready national security objectives, but the devil is for an Interagency Combatant Command,” in the details, and efforts to complement and Christopher Naler argues that, because the strengthen other elements of national power National Security Council (NSC) is not depend on leadership, habitual interagency optimized for daily strategy implementation, relationships, and reliable vehicles for com- every regional combatant command should munication. JFQ D.H. Gurney be reorganized as an integrated combatant command. In this serial debate, previous

U.S. Navy authors have opined that the National Secu- Download as wallpaper at ndupress.ndu.edu.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ  j f q F o r u m Planning Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq By J o s e p h J. C o l l i n s

Bradley Fighting Vehicles in Sadr City

55th Signal Company (James P. Johnson) Download as wallpaper at ndupress.ndu.edu.

or planners and bureaucrats, the so-called postconflict phase; we have had Operation Iraqi Freedom. With 3 years of Afghanistan and Iraq appear to severe problems with local and international hindsight, it was clear that these shortcom- present a puzzle. In Afghanistan, support; and the outcome, although looking ings included: on one hand, we had little time up, is still in doubt. F n for planning; we did lots of innovative things A wag might conclude from the above ineffective planning and preparation on the cheap; our relatively small, interna- that Americans should avoid planning at all for stability operations tional force has taken few casualties; we have costs. It brings bad luck, stifles creativity, n inadequate forces to occupy and had great local and international support; and interferes with our penchant for achiev- secure a country the size of California and we are, by most accounts, on the way to a ing success through our normal standard n poor military reaction to rioting good outcome.1 operating procedure: the application of great and looting in the immediate postconflict On the other hand, in Iraq, we had amounts of material resources guided by bril- environment over a year to plan; our national policy has liant improvisation and dumb luck. n slow civil and military reaction to a been expensive and often unimaginative; a While the wag’s conclusion is flawed, growing insurgency relatively large, primarily American force has problems in planning indeed contributed n problematical funding and contract- taken over 18,000 casualties, most of them in to serious shortcomings connected with ing mechanisms that slowed reconstruction n failure to make effective use of former Colonel Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.), is a Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College. Iraqi military forces He was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations from 2001 to 2004.

10 JFQ / issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Collins

n slow initial development of Iraqi security forces n inability to provide enough trained civilian officials, diplomats, and aid workers to conduct effective stabilization and recon- struction activities n slow creation of an interim Iraqi authority that could have minimized the perception of occupation and enhanced the perception of liberation.2

Successful innovation and favorable circumstances on the ground made the war in Afghanistan markedly easier than the one in Iraq, but the planning problems in both cases have had much in common with Seabees rebuilding other complex contingencies in recent years school in Pakistan Space Communications Squadron (Barry Loo) Space Communications Squadron th

(Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo). 30 All of these cases have demonstrated the limitations of our stovepiped, single innovative but oriented on conventional the perception of a Pyrrhic victory or an agency planning systems. Thus, in the future, operations, have been slow to adapt to this insensitive policy. Intense media scrutiny, we will have to adapt planning to a dynamic new kind of war, a problem we have seen moreover, raises the stakes. security environment and numerous chal- many times in our history, albeit under dif- Today, interagency solutions are lenges. Not only will we have to do better in ferent circumstances. In Iraq, some of our needed for problems that involve armed mid-range interagency planning, but we will combat divisions had no plans for what to forces. The military has also become a player also have to develop and refine new capa- do after major combat operations ceased. in what are normally civilian activities, such complex contingencies in recent years have as humanitarian assistance, stabilization activities, civil governance, and reconstruc- demonstrated the limitations of our stovepiped, single tion. The dividing line between civil and agency planning systems military enterprise is further blurred by the presence of contractors who may be per- bilities to deal with the nonmilitary aspects In Afghanistan, it took over a year to adapt forming formerly military functions. of contingencies. In turn, this will require to the requirements posed by stabilization Third, in Afghanistan and Iraq, unlike changes in the organizational cultures of the and reconstruction in a counterinsurgency in Bosnia and Kosovo, there was no discrete Armed Forces and the Department of State. environment. postconflict phase. In both of the current The first step in understanding this In general, not only are American conflicts, conventional war A was followed challenge will be to appreciate the environ- planners often surprised by the “What kind by unconventional war B. In turn, war B was ment in which it will take place. of war is this?” questions, but they also complicated by the need to conduct simulta- find it hard to think beyond the last bullet neous stabilization and reconstruction activi- Security Environment of a climactic battle. In the Cold War and ties. Neither soldiers nor diplomats were First, U.S. conventional military power thereafter, the United States has consistently ready for this development. To be ready in is unparalleled. No country or nonstate done poorly at bridging success in battle and the future, they will have to change how they actor in its right mind seeks conventional victory in war. organize, plan, and train for conflict. battle with the United States. Operation Second, in recent years, the United Fourth, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iraqi Freedom demonstrated that the Armed States has only entered into conflicts in areas the insurgents decided after a few months Forces, with minimal allied help, can attack that were undergoing some sort of humani- that they had to defeat reconstruction in a significant opponent at a 1:6 force ratio tarian crisis, which has either been a focal order to force the evacuation of coalition disadvantage, destroy its forces, and topple point of the war effort or a critical factor in forces and discredit the people who had a mature, entrenched regime, all in a few winning the hearts and minds of the local worked with the coalition. In both conflicts, weeks. Iraqi Freedom also showed that populace. counterinsurgency, stabilization, and recon- victory in war is much larger and more In these operations, winning the war struction have become threads in the same dearly obtained than success in military and solving the humanitarian crisis both cloth. This requires a combined, interagency operations. had to be first-priority activities, especially approach in theater, not just in Washington. For our enemies, guerrilla tactics and since the armies of developed nations have Fifth, for the soldier, the media have terrorism (preconflict, postconflict, and the will and technology to protect civilian gone from intrusive to omnipresent, if not outside of conflict situations) are the order of populations. A humanitarian disaster—a embedded. In this respect, conflicts such as the day. At the same time, the Armed Forces, human tragedy in its own right—could create those in Afghanistan and Iraq are much more ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 11 pla n n i n g l e s s o n s

affected by the media than the small wars of Commanders at Afghan the early 20th century.3 National Army training site The ugly realities of low-intensity conflict continuously stream into Western living rooms. The sense of gain or loss, or the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of operations, is magnified by the work of relentless jour- nalists, whose editors and producers freely admit that “if it bleeds, it leads.” Activities such as police training or well digging lose out to grisly combat scenes. The nature of media coverage makes policy execution more difficult and time- sensitive. With intense media scrutiny, gov- ernments have to get it right early and keep things moving in a positive direction. Where governments once had years to experiment with solutions to overseas problems, they now have months or weeks before the steady drumbeat of “all is lost” begins to sound. Signal Company (Kevin P. Bell) Signal Company (Kevin P. th

Better mid-range planning is essential for 55 a media environment that is intolerant of missteps. The aftermath of 9/11 saw the creation blocked a National Security Council (NSC) The future is likely to present a set of of a Department of Homeland Security, a staff attempt to publish a new contingency challenges that will require significant insti- Homeland Security Council, and a National planning policy, all in the name of preserving tutional and cultural adaptation. In the next Counterterrorism Center, as well as a set of the freedom of action of Cabinet officers and decade, the United States must prepare to: Intelligence Community reforms. There are keeping civilians out of the contingency plan- joint interagency coordination groups in ning business. More input into contingency n continue stability operations, as well some regional commands, and the Depart- planning from civilians, of course, is not the as stabilization and reconstruction activities, ment of State now has a senior Coordinator problem; it may be a key part of the solution. in Afghanistan and Iraq for at least another for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) War plans are rarely briefed outside 5 years to improve planning. In the Department of military channels. Inside the Pentagon, only n execute counterterrorist operations in Defense (DOD), a new directive on stability a handful of civilians have access to them. the Middle East, Africa, and Asia operations is being implemented under the This prohibition may make sense for major n support international peace close supervision of an energized Secretary conventional war plans, and it certainly operations in the Middle East (Gaza? Golan of Defense. The 2006 Defense budget was makes sense for security purposes. However, Heights?) and Africa (Darfur?) amended to emphasize counterterrorist when conflicts do not end when the last hill n manage system shocks from regime and stability operations at the expense of is taken, and include activities such as stabili- failure or radical changes in some regional high-tech conventional warfare. In Iraq and zation and reconstruction that we want civil- powers (North Korea? Cuba?) Afghanistan, there have been highly success- ians to lead, there must be a broader sharing n deter or manage traditional threats, ful improvements in counterinsurgency and of contingency planning responsibilities. The state proliferators of weapons of mass security assistance operations. The elections 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review’s recom- destruction, and future peer competitors in both countries were major accomplish- mendation for a new interagency document n improve homeland defense against ments in themselves. Military and diplomatic called “The National Security Planning Guid- terrorist groups, including those who might teams in both Afghanistan and Iraq are ance” is clearly a step in the right direction. use weapons of mass destruction. working together much more closely than Second, every executive department even a year ago. should insist on interagency experience for In the next decade, the need for The following eight recommendations its most senior civilians and make it manda- effective joint, combined, and interagency will build on these improvements and help tory for promotion to the senior executive planning will remain significant. Major planning in the future. or foreign service. Interagency experience institutional planning changes will require First, we need a new charter for should count as the equivalent of joint expe- complementary changes in organizational complex contingency planning. The Clinton rience for military officers. cultures. administration’s oft-ignored bible on plan- Too often, the best and brightest avoid ning for complex contingencies, Presidential interagency assignments where the hours are Improving Mid-Range Planning Decision Directive 56, was headed in the terrible and the rewards are less than those The U.S. Government has already right direction. Early in the first term of at the home agency. Too many junior and begun improving mid-range planning. President George W. Bush, the Pentagon inexperienced personnel occupied the NSC

12 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Collins staff in the last two administrations. National Other arrangements are possible. war plan lingo) are the key to victory. They Security Council personnel at the director Getting this issue right should be the subject are every bit as important as the ability to level should optimally be members of the of wargames and experiments conducted move, shoot, and communicate in battle, senior executive service or at least colonel or by cooperating agencies and supervised the normal preoccupations of the soldier. GS-15–level personnel. by Joint Forces Command and the State However, studies of postcombat planning It is often said that we need a Goldwa- Department’s Office of the Coordinator in Iraq show that Phase 4 planning did not ter-Nichols reform for the interagency com- for Reconstruction and Stabilization. The receive the attention it deserved. munity.4 The first step would be to improve United States is not likely ever to favor a This recommendation will entail a the quality of agency personnel across the “viceroy” system, but more effective and major change in training and culture. Occu- board and increase the number of the best efficient arrangements that offer more unity pation, stabilization, reconstruction, and and brightest who have lived and worked in of command are possible. We cannot afford other issues associated with nationbuilding the interagency world. situations where ad hoc arrangements on the must be better integrated into the curriculum Third, we need a better system for ground or in Washington stand in the way of staff and war colleges. Language and cul- exporting interagency groups to the field. of effective national policy. tural studies will become more important for Interagency coordination in Washington For its part, S/CRS at State—which military officers. Wargames and experiments is possible, but in the field during complex will have the national lead in reconstruction also need to focus more on stability opera- contingencies, it usually results in either a and stabilization operations—must have an tions. None of this is meant to imply that the system in which one cabinet department in Active and a Reserve response corps, full of military should take over critical postcombat Washington is nominally in charge, such as interagency and civil specialists. This will activities from the State Department and the the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitar- take hundreds of millions of dollars per year, U.S. Agency for International Development ian Assistance or the Coalition Provisional which Congress has thus far been unwilling (USAID); the opposite is true. Authority, or a more cooperative system, to appropriate. Fifth, the Department of State and such as we have in Kabul and Baghdad. This Fourth, the military establishment USAID personnel and organizations need cooperative system features a senior mili- needs to focus its planning more on victory to become more operational (that is, able to tary officer and a senior diplomat working in war, not on success in climactic battles. lead in the management of grand enterprises together, with neither having overall charge This is cultural change, and it will be difficult. in unsafe and austere environments). of U.S. policy, and both answering to their It is folly to pretend that success in the final General Tommy Franks had it right: respective superiors in Washington. Today, battle leads directly to victory. Particularly after the battle, you need lots of “boots” and in both Kabul and Baghdad, the arrange- in cases of regime change or failed states, lots of “wingtips” on the ground.5 Absent the ments are working well. postcombat stability operations (Phase 4 in wingtips, the boots in Iraq have had to do

Soldiers quelling civil unrest in Mosul Signal Company (Michael Bracken) d 982

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Marines conducting stability and meant to prevent human rights abuses. It is security operations in Afghanistan tempting to say that these dysfunctional legal provisions should be waived or eliminated. This should only be done, however, after a full assessment of the rationale behind each of them. Eighth, to gain legitimacy and promote better burdensharing, the United States should make its most powerful allies full partners in complex operations. We have run two operations in which many allies were brought into the plan after the action began. This did no great damage in Afghanistan, where the international perception of legiti- macy has been high. In Iraq, however, the United States continues to pay a stiff price for its decisive actions in 2003. History will judge the wisdom of these decisions, but in Marine Division Combat Camera (Justin M. Mason) d 2 the future, bringing the allies in before the takeoff may make for a more complicated much more than they should under optimal begun and should be increased. It needs a flight but a smoother landing. JFQ circumstances. This problem continues to the healthy budget, which will be a problem in present day, where, for lack of civil presence, a poorly funded department that is usually NOTES there is still too much military supervision focused on current policy, not mid-range of reconstruction and governance issues. In contingency planning. 1 For a negative view on stability operations Afghanistan, the Provincial Reconstruction Sixth, for the State Department and in Afghanistan, see Kathy Gannon, “Afghanistan Teams, which include State and USAID per- USAID to become more operational, they Unbound,” Foreign Affairs 83 (May/June 2004), 35–46. sonnel, have mitigated the “too many boots, must be better funded across the board. Their 2 For a popular but incomplete analysis of the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization should become planning failures, see James Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” Atlantic Monthly (January/February the centerpiece for interagency planning and exercises 2004), 52–74; and my reply in Atlantic Monthly, April 2004, 14; also see Michael Gordon and too few wingtips” problem that hampers systematic underfunding is the single greatest Bernard Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of coalition operations in Iraq. impediment to effective planning, diplomacy, the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: While there have been significant developmental assistance, reconstruction, Pantheon, 2006). exceptions, State and USAID personnel have and stabilization. State cannot be equipped 3 Even without CNN and other media generally been restricted to relatively secure only with good ideas while Defense has all the outlets, misbehavior and scandal in past conflicts compounds in Afghanistan and Iraq. This money and hard assets. This is a prescription caused problems for the military. See Max Boot, Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of fact is often attributed to the “tyranny” of the for an unbalanced national security policy. American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002), local Regional Security Officers (RSOs), who As long as there are few wingtips 120–125, for the story of how U.S. war crimes in appear determined to apply peacetime rules on the ground, the boots will be forced to the Philippines embarrassed the Armed Forces and to conflict situations. RSOs will likely blame move into the vacuum. As long as State is a helped end the early 20th-century military opera- the rules that come down from Washington. budgetary midget, it will play second fiddle tions there. However, the media’s daily impact on In any case, there are too few foreign service to the Pentagon colossus. If we want to fix today’s operations has no precedent. officers and USAID professionals in field planning for complex contingencies, we 4 See the ongoing study by the Center locations. The personnel strength of State must fund State and USAID as major players for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and USAID is clearly inadequate to meet and not poor relatives. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a their expanded roles in the war on terror. Seventh, to get better at planning New Strategic Era, “Phase 1 Report” and “Phase At the national level, the Bush admin- and executing complex contingencies, we 2 Report” (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2005), avail- able at, for Phase 1, , lished the neophyte Office of Reconstruction that hobble the Departments of State and and for Phase 2, . and ensure that this good idea becomes a now, if State begins to operate in the field 5 Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New powerful center of excellence. This office on large-scale postconflict stabilization and York: Regan Books, 2004), 422. should also become the centerpiece for inter- reconstruction problems. Many of these legal agency planning and exercises throughout provisions serve only to protect congressio- the Government. Interagency staffing has nal committee prerogatives. Still others are

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Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Busan, South Korea AP/Wide World Photo (Toru Yamanaka) AP/Wide Photo (Toru World Combating Terrorism A Socio-Economic Strategy

By M i e m i e W i N n B y r d

he increased risks and modation, restaurant, postal services, and While uncontained terrorism is costly uncertainties of terrorism insurance industries are particularly sus- for all economies, it could impose a dispro- reduce consumer willingness ceptible. Regions and economies where portionate cost in trade and income growth T to spend, particularly on these industries are concentrated suffer in Asia-Pacific countries. Most developing discretionary items and major consumer most, both in falling output and employ- economies in the region depend heavily on durables, thereby reducing investment in ment, but the threat of terrorism reduces trade flows, particularly with the United consumer goods industries and depress- overall investment and retards economic States. Many of these economies rely on ing growth. The travel, tourism, accom- growth across the board. foreign direct investment inflows. Insurance companies may impose higher premiums on cargoes and vessels traveling to and from Major Miemie Winn Byrd, USA, is the Deputy Economic Advisor, U.S. Pacific Command, and has participated in these countries due to the inadequacy of civic action projects throughout Southeast Asia as an Army Reserve civil affairs officer. local security. For instance, Lloyd’s of London ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 / JFQ 15 j f q F o r u m recently increased its premiums on ships benefits of peace, they hopefully will work to The Bottom of the Pyramid traveling through the Malacca Strait. Cur- inhibit local support for terrorist activities. In the words of General Charles F. Wald, rency exchange rate volatility can devastate Sound economic development policies can be USAF, Deputy Commander, U.S. European the whole region’s economy. A case in point is one element to fulfill the 9/11 Commission’s Command: the Asian financial crisis in 1997, initiated by recommendations of identifying potential a sudden Thai bhatt depreciation. terrorist sanctuaries and preventing them The tools of businesses are often better from becoming operational spaces for the suited to diminishing the causes of terrorism Combating Terrorism actors of terror.1 and influencing the democratization of key New counterterrorism measures A comprehensive U.S. counterterrorism regions by providing investment and employ- require one-time investments, which lead strategy should include economic policies ment that lead to long-term improvement in to short- to mid-term increases in the costs that encourage development, more open quality of life.2 of doing business. These costs should be societies, and opportunities for better living. “Eradicating poverty through profits” involves finding a way to alleviate poverty for Indonesian tsunami survivors unload relief supplies from Navy helicopter those at the bottom of the economic pyramid through collaboration among the poor them- selves, civil organizations, governments, and private firms.3 This approach is widely known as the bottom of the pyramid (BOP) concept. The successfully built BOP markets are a sus- tainable way to improve economic conditions that in turn will alleviate poverty. As C.K. Prahalad states:

Historically, governments, aid agencies, non- governmental organizations, large firms, and the organized business sector all seem to have reached an implicit agreement: Market-based solutions cannot lead to poverty reduction and economic development. The dominant logic of each group is different, but the conclusions are similar.4

The private sector’s increased participa- tion in a BOP-oriented market is disman- tling this old paradigm. Such U.S. business

U.S. Navy (Stephanie Lynne Johnson) U.S. Navy (Stephanie Lynne institutions as the University of Michigan Ross School of Business, University of North viewed as an investment that will pay divi- Igniting and sustaining economic growth Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School, dends through reduced risk premiums and in the poorest areas require creativity and and Cornell University Johnson School of increased trade efficiency. In addition to the cooperation. Regional stakeholder nations Management are actively monitoring and advantages of reducing exposure to terror- and organizations should pool resources tracking case studies associated with sustain- ism, technological advances that enhance able enterprises servic- security are likely to boost the efficiency as the population recognizes the economic ing and operating at the of cargo handling and people movement, benefits of peace, they will work to inhibit bottom of the economic lowering trade costs and making trade flows pyramid. These schools more efficient. The benefit of preventing local support for terrorist activities are extracting and devel- reduced trade flows and encouraging invest- oping lessons learned, ment is continued regional and global eco- and capabilities to address this challenge. best practices, and business principles that nomic growth. Cooperation among cross-disciplinary make these enterprises successful and teach- Expansion and prosperity would enable organizations such as the United Nations ing this thinking to a new generation of nations and organizations to fund economic Development Program, governmental aid undergraduate and graduate students. development policies and activities, which agencies and militaries, nongovernmental What are the incentives for the private would create opportunities and expand a organizations (NGOs), and private businesses sector and large firms to service the BOP? new middle class in communities that have is vital. Although economic development can According to Prahalad, “The BOP market traditionally supported terrorist groups. As inhibit terrorism, it alone cannot eliminate potential is huge: 4 to 5 billion (80 percent the population recognizes the economic the problem. of humanity) underserved people and an

16 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Byrd economy of more than $13 trillion PPP [pur- The military also furnishes disaster prepared- ment . . . with the intent to coordinate our chasing power parity].”5 ness mitigation assessments for many coun- civil affairs activities with USAID programs.” Studies show that traditional products, tries throughout the Asia-Pacific region and On March 30, 2005, USAID announced services, and management processes do relief efforts in areas prone to natural disaster that it had created the Office of Military not work. The firms must be innovative to such as Bangladesh—the most recent being Affairs (OMA) to synchronize with the mili- succeed in this sector. For multinational for the 2004 tsunami. The rapid tsunami tary. Until then, the agency was ambivalent corporations, BOP operations can become a response was possible in part because an about such coordination due to the differing source of innovations for developed organizational cultures and a perceived markets as well. In today’s increasingly perceptions of incompatibility between ideological gulf. The dominant logic competitive business environment, NGOs and for-profit companies are in the past was that military activi- these corporations must continuously ties were incompatible with USAID maintain their competitive advantage. disappearing humanitarian efforts. However, the cre- Therefore, experimenting in BOP ation of the OMA and Admiral Fallon’s markets is becoming a compulsory rather Army civil affairs team was in the Banda statement point toward the loosening of the than a philanthropic activity. Companies Aceh area conducting an assessment for mindsets within these two organizations. beginning to operate successfully in the BOP water sanitation projects. Based on the new cooperation between include:6 During the tsunami relief effort, the the Armed Forces and USAID, the Economic military worked hand in hand with the Advisor’s Office at USPACOM now recog- n Proctor & Gamble: Nutristar, Nutride- Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, an nizes an opportunity to alleviate poverty light (nutritional drink), Pur (water purifier) arm of the U.S. Agency for International and create sustainable economic growth in n Unilever: Hindustan Lever (detergent Development (USAID), the lead agency for areas that are vulnerable to terrorist influ- for the poor in India and Brazil), Annapurna helping countries to recover from disas- ence. Ways must be found to consolidate (iodized salt for the poor) ter, fight poverty, and initiate democratic and synchronize command efforts, USAID n Shell: affordable solar power in India reform. The agency supports long-term and programs, NGO charitable contributions, and n ABN–AMRO: Banco Real (micro- equitable economic growth and advances the private sector’s need for new markets to credit in Brazil) foreign policy objectives by supporting eco- improve economic conditions at the BOP in n Hewlett-Packard: solar powered nomic growth, agriculture and trade, health, areas vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, such digital cameras in India and community democracy, conflict prevention, and humani- as Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philip- information systems tarian assistance. The combined effort pines. This will require fresh thinking by all n Coca Cola: program in South Africa during the tsunami relief demonstrated the parties. The 9/11 Commission criticized U.S. to help entrepreneurs enter the supply chain significant benefits derived from interagency Government agencies for their lack of imagi- and profit from new business ventures coordination, combination of resources, and nation prior to the attacks in New York and n Suez: “Water for All” program to peri- applying differing core competencies toward Washington. In the post-9/11 world, we have urban areas in Brazil. a common problem. no choice but to think creatively if we are to U.S. Pacific Command sought to create win the fight against rising terrorist threats. Perceptions of incompatibility between a formal partnership with USAID to syn- NGOs and for-profit companies are disap- chronize humanitarian and civic activities Organizational Challenges pearing. Recognition that all mankind at a strategic level in January 2004. As the The military faces significant challenges depends on the same limited resource pool, command began to realize the importance of to fostering innovative thinking. It suffers and that most share the same hopes for a environmental aspects of the war on terror, from all the obstacles that most bureaucratic better future, is causing the gradual break- it saw routine activities as a partial solution organizations confront in regard to systems, down of the cultural barriers that prevented (that is, providing some basic needs for the structures, entrepreneurial thinking, poli- unlike organizations from working together local populace). Moreover, command efforts cies and procedures, people, and culture. in the past. were isolated, one-time occurrences in these The current organization has rigid systems, communities. For example, the command top-down management, absence of innova- Civil-Military Operations constructed a school in a remote village, but tion goals, long and complex approval cycles, Few are aware that the U.S. military it remained empty because the villagers could short-term orientation due to frequent conducts a variety of humanitarian assistance not afford supplies, teachers, or building personnel turnover, and paralysis resulting and civic action projects around the globe. maintenance. Therefore, the local populace from a risk-free culture within the ranks of In fiscal year 2005, U.S. Pacific Command failed to benefit. USPACOM approached decisionmakers. (USPACOM) alone budgeted $5.5 million USAID, with its long-term vision and exper- Systems. Military organizations have a in humanitarian and civic funding. Projects tise in building community and development rigid formal planning system with long cycles include building schools, hospitals, roads, programs. Admiral William Fallon, Com- in combination with inflexible budgeting and community centers; digging wells and mander, U.S. Pacific Command, stated in systems. Once a plan is approved, it is diffi- irrigation ditches; conducting water sanita- a congressional hearing on March 8, 2005, cult to change. Budgets are set at least 2 years tion projects; providing rudimentary health “We are working to build a relationship with in advance, and redirection is close to impos- care; and training local medical personnel. the U.S. Agency for International Develop- sible. Funding streams and categories are ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 17 S O CI O -EC O N o m I C S T R ATEGY based on congressional budget allocations, at bringing order and consistency to the address the environmental and other condi- so funds designated for specific purposes everyday operational needs of the organiza- tions that are the root causes of terrorism. cannot be redirected without congressional tion. The approval cycles are long and require approval. For example, USPACOM staff many managerial layers. Action officers at Using the BOP Concept components have been struggling to change USPACOM often complain that they spend Until now, the U.S. Government has not tapped into the power and capabilities of the initiatives to fight a new kind of war get bogged down by private sector in the war on terror. Indeed, existing policies and procedures most businesses are unlikely to engage in any activities unconnected with profits. Yet a the way humanitarian assistance funds can much time presenting what they plan to do handful of companies such as FedEx, Western be utilized. It is a congressional mandate that and obtaining approval from various layers of Union, America Online, and Wal-Mart have the moneys are only for disaster mitigation management and little time actually accom- been voluntarily assisting Federal agencies purposes. In the Asia-Pacific region, the staff plishing goals. Therefore, initiatives to fight since the 9/11 attacks. For example, FedEx believed the funds would have greater long- a new kind of war, such as the war on terror, has mobilized its 250,000 employees to watch term effect if they were put toward capacity- get bogged down by existing policies and for threats, developed an internal computer building and reconstruction. procedures. Short windows of opportunity system to report suspicious activity directly Structures. Military tradition usually are easily missed. to the Department of Homeland Security, dictates that those at the top make policies People. Generally, military personnel installed radiation detectors to sniff for dirty and those below implement them. It is dif- have a short-term perspective because most bombs at overseas facilities, and opened its ficult for action officers to get their points rotate every 2 to 3 years. Not only is it costly vast international shipping database to the across to those at the decisionmaking level. to destabilize an organization purposefully, U.S. Customs Service. If three more such Several layers of screening, review, and but it also causes individuals to favor objec- companies participated, a million more approval must be crossed. Therefore, many tives that will show concrete results during people would be actively looking for threats. ideas get snuffed out early. As Williamson the time of their assignments. Accordingly, it Aguas de Amazonas, a subsidiary Murray stated, “Rigidity is undoubtedly a fact is difficult for the military to focus its people of Suez Environnement, a world leader of life in many military organizations—one on such long-range concerns as shaping the in water-related services, teamed up with which has exercised a consistent and baleful environment or confronting the underlying French and Brazilian NGOs for a pilot project influence over institutional capacity to causes of terrorism. called Water for All to demonstrate that the innovate.”7 Culture. Across the U.S. Government, company can serve poor communities and Inflexible structure combined with rigid every agency, including the military, is grow its customer base at the same time. culture has created silos among different seg- acknowledging that innovation is needed. Raising the community’s awareness of the ments in the military. The ability to integrate The military clearly recognizes that the non- need for safe water was the key social dimen- perspectives and methods across organiza- traditional counterterrorism tools required to sion of the project. The NGOs’ experience tions is severely limited. Common phrases “deny sanctuary” and “diminish underlying with the community and understanding of include “It’s out of my lane” or “You are in my conditions” are nonmilitary. According to the local social structure and culture proved lane.” Rigidly led organizations typically shut General Richard Myers, former Chairman of essential in achieving this objective. The off alternative paths that might ease the way the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we must NGOs showed that they could bring value to for military operations. the company as facilitators in the process of Entrepreneurial Thinking. There is a transform our military competencies from joint adapting water services to the specific charac- general lack of commitment to the principle operations to integrated operations that reflect teristics of low-income communities.11 of institutionalized entrepreneurship because the new partners we must coordinate with to The company’s goal was to provide most senior leaders lack experience beyond defeat terrorists, such as other U.S. agencies, water and sanitation services to the 1.5 the military or government environment, allied militaries and governments, nongovern- million inhabitants of the remote city of which is not known for entrepreneurial mental organizations, and private industry.9 Manaus, Brazil. That was considered an thinking. This creates leadership that is ambitious goal, considering that 60 percent “typically cautious, suspicious, or completely General Wald recognizes that a nontra- of the people live in “informal settlement” unaware of efforts to break with tradition and ditional military solution to the root causes of on an income of less than $1 per day. Most capitalize on opportunity.”8 terrorism, while “outside the military’s lane,” lacked access to clean water, while some Since middle- and lower-level leaders is necessary to fight the war on terror.10 Yet used treated water from pirated connections. take their cues from the top, the careful the military is not willing to use it, reflecting Leveraging the core competencies of partner leadership style permeates the organization, a mindset and culture that prevent thinking NGOs, the company worked with the creating influencers who are well versed in outside the box. targeted communities, assessing the needs the art of survival and self-advancement, but Other examples could be given under as well as the ability and willingness of the not in taking the necessary risks to further each of these categories of obstacles. The populace to pay for services. Considerable organizational objectives. bottom line is that the Armed Forces have an effort was made to help people understand Policies and Procedures. Within the uphill battle to initiate the search for ways for the value of treated water and to appreci- military, policies and procedures are aimed a nontraditional/nonmilitary partnership to ate that paying for legal connections would

18 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Byrd

and explained how it can help address the underlying conditions of terrorism by provid- ing sustainable, grassroots-level economic development. U.S. Pacific Command plans to continue exploring this concept in counterterrorism conferences and other forums. The command will invite business leaders to spawn new thinking throughout the military and among decisionmakers about the connection between the war on terror and the private sector. The private sector must understand that the U.S. Government and the international community need their business expertise in creating prod- ucts, services, and jobs for those at the bottom of the economic pyramid.

As businesses become more aware of how their efforts at operating successfully in the BOP arena could contribute to fight- Officials from UN, USAID, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, and Disaster ing terror, we will be able to mobilize this Assistance Response Team coordinating untapped opportunity. The business sector aboard USS Abraham Lincoln can provide grassroots-level, sustainable

U.S. Navy (Elizabeth A. Edwards) microeconomic development and create a needed force multiplier. JFQ ensure a reliable supply at lower prices than private sector can be an effective component NOTES they paid to independent providers. of the war on terror strategy. The success of the project largely 1 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report depended on the genuine mobilization of the The Way Ahead of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks inhabitants in favor of the initiative and the The military must mobilize to seize Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 367. development of effective community man- opportunities in the private sector. Com- 2 Charles F. Wald, “U.S. European Command agement of water services. The results were panies need not take drastic and proac- and Transformation,” Joint Force Quarterly 37 (2d surprisingly good both for the community tive actions like the FedEx exercise; they Quarter 2005), 26. and the company: 74 percent of the targeted can simply do what they do best—create 3 C.K. Prahalad, The Fortune at the Bottom 5,000 households were connected to a water products, services, and jobs. Leveraging of the Pyramid: Eradicating Poverty through Profits network. There was an 80 percent bill collec- the emerging BOP concepts and the multi- (Philadelphia: Wharton School Publishing, 2005), 4. tion rate, compared to 54 percent for the national corporations’ need to expand their 4 Ibid, 9. rest of Manaus. markets could inspire the business sector to 5 Ibid., 21, 61. The U.S. military could easily fit into operate in areas where economic develop- 6 Stuart L. Hart, “Addressing the Underlying a similar project. Civil affairs units are ment is desperately needed. Conditions that Foster Terrorism: Lifting the Base conducting well construction and water Government agencies, including the of the Pyramid” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, June 9, 2005). sanitation projects in remote villages in Indo- military, should participate in business 7 Williamson R. Murray, ed., Military Inno- nesia, the Philippines, and Bangladesh. With association meetings and conferences. Civil vation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cam- innovative thinking and imagination, the affairs and USAID personnel must be edu- bridge University Press, 1996), 322. partnership among the private sector, NGOs, cated regarding these emerging concepts and 8 Michael H. Morris and Donald F. Kuratko, USAID, and the military could work together trends in the business sector. Conversely, the Corporate Entrepreneurship: Entrepreneurial Devel- in targeted areas that are vulnerable to ter- military should invite business leaders and opment within Organizations (Mason, OH: South- rorist recruiting to improve living conditions, decisionmakers to counterterrorism confer- Western, 2002), 175. provide foundations for a sustainable eco- ences and seminars. 9 Richard B. Myers, “A Word from the Chair- nomic stability and growth, and create hope For instance, USPACOM cosponsored man,” Joint Force Quarterly 37 (2d Quarter 2005), 5. 10 and opportunities. Such partnership with a conference with the U.S. Army War College Wald, 26. 11 businesses can provide continuity to many and the National Intelligence Council in “Suez—Aguas de Amazonas Water for All in Brazil,” Case Study, World Business Council aid and humanitarian projects and hinder June 2005 to explore ways for Federal agen- for Sustainable Development, available at . The above case studies show that underlying causes of terrorism. Stuart Hart, teaming up with unlikely partners such as the an expert on the BOP, introduced the concept ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 19 j f q F o r u m Integrating Partner Nations into Coalition Operations

By B a r b a r a F i c k

Ships from the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Spain, and Uruguay participate in USSOUTHCOM- sponsored Exercise UNITAS 06

Fleet Combat Camera Group, Atlantic (Michael Sandberg)

ithin 48 hours of tion, deployment, and integration of operations around the world demonstrate Haitian President Jean- coalition forces saved the lives of many a growing capability in the Western Bertrand Aristide’s Haitians, prevented mass migration Hemisphere for participation in joint, W resignation and depar- during a time of rough seas, and facili- interagency, intergovernmental, and mul- ture on February 29, 2004, Chilean forces tated transition to the process of restabi- tinational operations, such as those cur- deployed and integrated into a multina- lization. Chile continues to deploy forces rently required in Afghanistan and Iraq. tional interim force to help secure and as a member of the UN Stabilization The U.S. Southern Command stabilize the small, impoverished island Force Haiti (MINUSTAH), led by Brazil (USSOUTHCOM) has been a key enabler of nation. Days after the passage of United and comprised mostly of Latin American this growing capability, supporting a tailored Nations (UN) Security Council Resolu- troops. While many challenges continue exercise and theater security cooperation tion 1529, Chile, Canada, France, and the in Haiti, the success of initial security program that has encouraged partners such United States established a multinational and stabilization operations, continued as Chile, Brazil, and El Salvador to develop force responsive to and capable of coor- support to MINUSTAH, and the sig- skills in the conduct of integrated operations. dinating with international authorities nificant contribution of Latin American The fruits of this program, borne out through and aid efforts in Haiti. The rapid reac- and Caribbean nations to peacekeeping examples such as the mission in Haiti and support to Operation Iraqi Freedom, also Major Barbara Fick, USA, is Army Special Assistant to the Commander, U.S. Southern Command. provide valuable lessons and extensive

20 JFQ / issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Fick partner nation experience that may be drawn country’s troop contribution to Operation in Haiti, Iraq, and around the globe—paired upon as the United States develops doctrine Iraqi Freedom to the General Assembly, with a growing tendency in Latin America for integrated operations. stating, “El Salvador suffered a prolonged and the Caribbean toward international internal conflict, and thanks to the support cooperation—show the enormous potential Emerging Doctrine of the international community, it achieved of these nations as partners and contributors The attacks on September 11, 2001, led a lasting peace. . . . We believe it is time for to the development of integrated operations to a general consensus in the U.S. Govern- us to put our experience to the service of doctrine, procedures, mechanisms, and train- ment regarding the need to reform national other peoples.”2 In addition to having lived ing for future crises. The security environ- security architecture to meet current and through a period of conflict, negotiated peace, ment today in Latin America and the Carib- emerging 21st-century threats, particularly and transition to democracy, El Salvador has bean coincides with what most refer to as the in the areas of interagency coordination and maintained close military-to-military rela- new 21st-century global threat environment. coalition operation capabilities. Operations in tionships with the United States since 1992. It encompasses transnational terrorism, nar- Afghanistan and Iraq have further high- coterrorism, illicit trafficking, forgery, lighted the need for new doctrine and current U.S. Government approaches money laundering, kidnapping, urban mechanisms to facilitate interagency emphasize American structures and gangs, radical movements, poverty, coordination, as well as cooperation corruption, natural disasters, and mass with other nations. This has led to new processes across agencies rather than migration. Many of these threats have directives and multiple efforts within multinational aspects of integration existed in the region in some form the Federal Government to explore such and to varying degrees long before the concepts. Each of these efforts gives rise to Long-term participation in international United States shifted its focus from the Cold its own set of terms, structures, procedures, military education and training and other War bipolar paradigm to transnational ter- and doctrine. For the purposes of this article, training and exercise programs sponsored rorism and the elements that support it. combined integrated operations are those by USSOUTHCOM have been central to Recognizing the post-9/11 security that include multiple military services and enhancing interoperability and coalition context, Honduran Minister of Defense Fed- government-level entities from more than capabilities for participation in multinational erico Breve Traveso has cited the aftermath one sovereign country, and multinational peacekeeping or stability and reconstruction of Hurricane Mitch (November 1998) and an integrated operations are those that include efforts. increase in illicit trafficking within the region military forces and governmental agencies A tangible return on the U.S. invest- to frame regional security challenges from from many nations, nongovernmental orga- ment in this relationship has been the contin- the Central American perspective: nizations, international governmental organi- ued support of El Salvador in Operation Iraqi zations, and private industry partners.1 Freedom. In August 2003, for example, 360 We have had to redefine the term security as Current U.S. Government approaches soldiers of El Salvador’s Cuscatlán Battalion we know it, for it is no longer simply a matter to the development of doctrine, organization, deployed to become part of a Central Ameri- of winning on the military battlefield. The new and procedures for combined and multi- can Battalion within the Spanish-led Plus battlefield is ungoverned spaces being exploited national integrated operations emphasize Ultra Brigade. Since then, the country has by illicit traffickers; the new battlefield is American structures and processes across deployed more than 1,600 troops in support poverty and lack of opportunities that draw agencies, rather than the multinational of Iraqi Freedom. The Salvadoran troops are our youth towards international gangs; the aspects of integration. Little work has been assigned reconstruction and humanitarian new battlefield is the international criminal done formally to incorporate representatives, duties. They have overseen over 130 humani- cartel that seeks the legal seams that exist perspectives, and practices from potential tarian projects worth in excess of $7.6 million between borders. For these reasons, I feel con- partner nation military, civilian, and nongov- and ranging from a medical center, to potable fident in saying the nation must rally together ernmental entities who may offer significant water treatment facilities, and to schools, to protect our sovereignty and national inter- insight on the process of integration into bridges, roads, and electrical projects. ests—but in coordination and cooperation with coalition efforts led by or involving the U.S. Operationally, they have been instrumental in our neighbors, who are also facing these same Government and its forces. This is par- checkpoint and convoy security, unexploded transnational and elusive threats.4 ticularly the case with respect to developing ordnance disposal, and security detail duties, nations, who may contribute unique experi- including the protection of the Coalition Pro- Greater collaboration toward integrated ences and approaches to operations in less visional Authority in Najaf, as well as training approaches in support of common security stable and underdeveloped parts of the world. and equipping the Iraqi Civil Defense Forces interests, as expressed by Minister Breve, is in Najaf and Al Hillah—all to increase the recognized by many nations in Latin America Latin American Experience and security and internal development of Iraq. and the Caribbean, and this recognition coin- Partners As a testimony to El Salvador’s contribution, cides with more recent developments in the El Salvador is an excellent example of six Salvadoran soldiers earned Bronze Stars, U.S. focus on global security. a nation that has lately achieved democracy, presented by Secretary of Defense Donald having emerged from a 12-year civil war Rumsfeld in November 2004.3 American Interests in 1992. In a visit to the United Nations, Advances in regional interoperability, as The U.S. focus on Latin America President Antonio Saca explained his demonstrated through support to operations and the Caribbean has shifted through- ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 21 in t e g r a t in g p a r t n e r n a t i o n s

New Mexico Air National Guard F–16s and the Caribbean, are fairly well known. participate in Exercise Salitre 2004, hosted by Cooperation for security, stability, and the Chilean Air Force well-being of citizens, on the other hand, is less familiar. Within Central America, however, there is one notable example of a subregional integration effort to address these issues. The Central American Integration System, created in 1991 to develop common policies and strategies to serve the Central American public, includes all seven nations of the sub- region. In recent declarations during summits held in February and December of 2005, the presidents of member states agreed to take concrete steps to deal with a broad range of transnational issues in a transnational way—from health, to trade, to security. Most notable is the commitment expressed by the national presidents to the development of a regional security model and mechanisms to provide for democratic security, including further study of the gang issue, a regional border security strategy, and the creation of a regional rapid reaction force to deal with 5

Communications Squadron (Matthew Lohr) Communications Squadron narcoterrorism and other emerging threats. th

355 The leaders and citizens of these nations have shown the will for integration and laid out history. In the second half of the 20th and partner nation entities have been coop- the foundations for cooperation to address century, the region was viewed as a Cold War erating and strengthening the relationships common security concerns. battleground. After 1989, U.S. concerns and necessary to develop procedures for working Additionally, the governments of four resources there focused more on counterdrug together on such problems as drug-traffick- Central American countries chartered the initiatives and humanitarian action. By 1998, ing, mass migration, and natural disasters Conference of Central American Armed many saw the region as a success in terms of for some time. Current data indicate that Forces (CFAC) in 1997 to develop confi- an increase in democratically elected dence-building measures and promote governments, perceived stability, and U.S. and partner nation entities have regional military integration. The lack of state-on-state violence. Notwith- been cooperating on drug-trafficking, CFAC mission is to “contribute to the standing positive trends, Colombia’s security, development, and military 40-year insurgency-turned-narcoterror- mass migration, and natural disasters integration of the region with an end ist conflict persisted in the countryside; for some time result of realizing permanent and sys- counterdrug initiatives continued tematic cooperation, coordination and and expanded; and emerging democratic these threats have intensified, become more mutual support among the armed forces, and institutions struggled to consolidate, in spite interconnected, and grown beyond the region collegial study of areas of common interest of the poverty, inequality, and corruption in scope and reach. They are no longer trans- and to provide an optimum level of defense threatening to undermine the elements of national within subregions of the hemisphere, against threats to democracy, peace, and good governance. During this period, U.S. but transnational with a global impact. liberty.”6 Since its inception, the conference Government priorities and resources contin- has worked closely with the Coordination ued to concentrate on counterdrug activities, Regional and Subregional Integration Center for Natural Disasters in Central necessitating continued and greater coopera- Many leaders in Latin America and America and other local, national, and inter- tion between the interagency community and the Caribbean have recognized that regional national organizations to provide collective the governments of those nations plagued by cooperation must link the efforts of all support for flood and hurricane relief, as an increasingly transnational threat. nations, creating a system for regional level well as assistance in combating outbreaks The perceived stability and lack of coordination of the governmental and non- of dengue fever that have plagued the area. strategic threats Washington attributed to governmental approaches undertaken within The CFAC was quick to show its collective the region, and consequent lack of attention each country. Bilateral, multilateral, and solidarity after September 11 and has since and resources available, have led to increased subregional organizations, agreements, and taken steps to enhance regional cooperation interagency and partner nation coordination initiatives for political unity, and economic in the war on terror. Most recently CFAC has to use limited resources more efficiently. U.S. integration throughout the Latin America developed a plan of action to strengthen its

22 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Fick

U.S. Navy dive team working with Panamanian

coast guard, Exercise Panamax 05 Pierce) (Veronica Communications Squadron th 355 capacity to support international peacekeep- operations geared toward the current regional tance Program and disaster relief exercises. ing operations through the U.S. Global Peace- and international environment. USSOUTH- The participating nations and these sub- keeping Initiative. COM humanitarian assistance/disaster relief regional organizations are exceptionally missions, peacekeeping operations, and well developed for multinational integrated Exercising for Integrated Action counterterrorism exercises, in particular, have operations, providing humanitarian assis- The current regional posture toward provided opportunities to train both U.S. and tance and disaster relief. The FA–HUM integrated approaches to the shared chal- international forces and organizations for the exercise paid significant dividends during lenges in Latin America and the Caribbean, stability and security mission. 2005, when hurricanes and tropical storms as well as the experience derived from opera- affected millions of people in Mexico and tions and exercises in a traditionally asym- Partner Nation Preparedness Central America. metrical threat environment, represents a Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias (FA– In Guatemala, Hurricane Stan affected substantial return on the security cooperation HUM), or Humanitarian Allied Forces, is a 960 towns, leaving over 1,500 dead or missing investment in the USSOUTHCOM area of regionally oriented disaster relief command and 390,877 displaced. Immediate relief responsibility. It also presents an enormous post and staff exercise, involving military included support to 647 operational shelters opportunity for the evolution of strategic and civilian agencies from throughout for 108,183 occupants, delivery of 331.5 tons and operational approaches to combined the Caribbean and Latin America. These of relief supplies, and search and rescue. Joint and multinational integrated operations agencies include the Coordination Center Task Force Stan, charged with executing with developing partner nations. The U.S. for Natural Disaster Prevention in Central humanitarian assistance and disaster relief Southern Command exercise program has America (which falls under the umbrella of in Guatemala, achieved seamless integra- been a particularly effective security coopera- the Central American Integration System) tion with U.S. and Guatemalan interagency tion tool for working within existing regional and the Caribbean Disaster Emergency efforts, working closely with local and mechanisms to leverage common security Response Agency, two organizations with national government officials, Guatemala’s interests and develop or enhance collective a long history of participation in the U.S. national disaster coordination agency, and capabilities for multinational integrated Southern Command’s Humanitarian Assis- ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 23 in t e g r a t in g p a r t n e r n a t i o n s

2003, Cabañas focused on operational and tactical level tasks. The discontinuation of this exercise represents its success in having enhanced partner nation unit capabilities to train national forces and maintain profi- ciency in UN peacekeeping tasks. Current PKO North and PKO South exercises focus on operational and strategic level planning and execution of multinational integrated operations, with emphasis on UN integrated logistics, communications interoperability, information flow, decision- making, and directives within a UN multi- national peacekeeping framework. Thirteen nations, all of which have participated in USSOUTHCOM exercises, contribute mili- tary and/or police personnel in 14 of 17 UN peacekeeping operations around the world, Salvadoran minister of defense meeting comprising almost 10 percent of the total with Iraqi officials in Al Hillah number of peacekeepers operating under Signal Company (Arthur Hamilton) th

55 a UN mandate. Nine of the 20 nations that make up the MINUSTAH force in Haiti the Guatemalan military, police, and first The program has also funded software for are from Latin America and the Caribbean, responders. national and regional coordination center comprising over half of the total manpower. The success of multinational integra- connectivity and information-sharing The CFAC nations are working together to tion was a direct product of partner nation to come online in June 2006. This year, form an integrated peacekeeping battalion for preparedness resulting from opportunities FA–HUM (April 2006) will include inter- future participation in multinational opera- to train and operate together as a part of agency policymaker-level participants from tions. Coalition participation in Operation FA–HUM exercises and other regional initia- 21 countries—as well as regional disaster Iraqi Freedom by the Dominican Republic, tives such as the Humanitarian Assistance coordination centers, the Coordination El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua (and Program sponsored by USSOUTHCOM. The Center for Natural Disaster Prevention in continued support by the El Salvador contin- FA–HUM exercise began showing tangible Central America, and the Caribbean Disaster gent) have demonstrated not only the value benefits in 1998, when the drill’s scenario Emergency Response Agency—to improve of peacekeeping exercises to prepare partner simulated a hurricane in the region. The regional crisis response procedures, humani- nation forces for future operations, but also exercise allowed the Guatemalan interagency, tarian information-sharing, and coordination their value in training the U.S. interagency local nongovernmental organizations, and with the international community. community and forces to integrate with private organizations to meet (in some diverse nations and capability sets. Regional instances for the first time), share contact Keeping the Peace forces have brought a high level of multi- information, and discuss organizational capa- Participation in peacekeeping opera- national integrated operations experience bilities in a humanitarian assistance/disaster tions (PKOs) is a source of immense national to the USSOUTHCOM exercise program, relief scenario. Shortly thereafter, Mitch, pride in the USSOUTHCOM area of where lessons learned in real-world opera- the second deadliest hurricane on record, responsibility and a testimony to the capabili- tions are incorporated and exchanged among followed the track of the exercise storm ties return on investment in peacekeeping participants. and made landfall in Central America. The exercises in the region. The command has Guatemalan president cited the FA–HUM sponsored multinational peacekeeping exer- Security Operations exercise as being a significant factor in his cises in the form of situational and field train- Tradewinds and Panamax are integrated government’s ability to respond. ing exercises and staff and command post multinational exercises designed to improve Since Hurricane Mitch, the FA–HUM exercises since 1996, when the first Cabañas regional interoperability for contingencies exercise has incorporated efforts of U.S. exercise was executed with a multinational that may involve terrorist attacks on symbolic Southern Command’s Humanitarian Assis- peacekeeping focus. PKO North (Central targets or key infrastructure. They represent a tance Program to review National Emergency American and Caribbean nations) and trend toward operationalizing multinational Operations Center humanitarian and disaster PKO South (South American nations) have exercises while more fully incorporating plans and establish prepositioned supplies been held since 1997, alternating each year interagency and nongovernmental entities. throughout the hemisphere. A semiannual between situational and field training and Caribbean nations have participated in the Central American Disaster Preparedness command post formats and including up to Tradewinds exercise for 20 years, demonstrat- Seminar was conducted in Guatemala City 23 nations and 7 international, regional, and ing a long history of cooperation. This exer- and focused on national and regional plans. nongovernmental organizations. Last held in cise trains and prepares maritime and ground

24 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Fick forces to coordinate with civil authorities in transnational terrorism, these threats have geographical combatant commands and the response to man-made or natural disasters. necessitated close interagency coordination international interagency community, much In 2005, the exercise was operationalized for many of the command’s activities in the in the way the Joint Staff–sponsored Mul- by linking it to a real-world event. During region. Building on its inherent interagency tilateral Planning Conference for Coalition 3 years (2005, 2006, and 2007), the exercise experience, USSOUTHCOM is the first Operations has brought together potential is being used to train and prepare specific combatant command to incorporate fully the coalition partners from around the world. regional forces for security operations in Department of State’s Office of the Coordina- A similar forum for multinational develop- support of the 2007 World Cup of Cricket. tor for Reconstruction and Stabilization ment of doctrine and training would present This multinational event will test the region’s (S/CRS) into its operational exercise pro­ an opportunity for collective approaches collective ability to conduct security and gram. Through participation in a 3-year to the development of future multinational disaster response operations. Tradewinds also series of command exercises, the office (as integrated operations. Current and emerging integrates joint, interagency, intergovernmen- well as the combatant command staff) has 21st-century threats will demand increased tal, and multinational participants, includ- been able to gain experience, knowledge, and global cooperation not only for stability, ing 19 countries, the U.S. Office of Foreign lessons learned that will impact integrated security, transition, and reconstruction in a Disaster Assistance, the U.S. Defense Threat operations development. The USSOUTH- postconflict environment, but also for conflict Reduction Agency, and Caribbean organiza- COM partnership with S/CRS has been at prevention. The United States must therefore tions, such as the Eastern Caribbean Regional the forefront of developing planning and continue to cultivate partnerships and capa- Security System. execution procedures within the U.S. Gov- bilities for joint, interagency, intergovernmen- Panamax, an integrated multinational ernment for future multinational integrated tal, and multinational operations. JFQ exercise focused on maritime interdic- operations. Through this cooperation, the tion and security of the Panama Canal, is two partners have been implementing the NOTES designed to exercise principles and guid- the interoperability Panamax is designed to ance set forth in the 1 These terms are defined by Richard D. of nations with a recently published Downie, “Defining Integrated Operations,” Joint exercise the interoperability d critical interest in the National Security Force Quarterly 38 (3 Quarter 2005), 10. 2 Unofficial translation of the statement of Panama Canal. Chile, of nations with a critical Presidential Directive the President of El Salvador, Elías Antonio Saca, to the fourth largest 44, Management of interest in the Panama Canal the United Nations General Assembly, 59th Session, user of the canal, has Interagency Efforts New York, September 22, 2004. Original in Spanish taken an active leadership role in developing Concerning Reconstruction and Stabiliza- available at . security forces from at least 15 nations. The Directive 3000.05, Military Support of Stabil- 3 Information provided by U.S. Military exercise scenario posits a terrorist threat from ity, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Group, San Salvador, El Salvador. sea and land to the canal’s critical infrastruc- Operations. 4 Minister of Defense Federico Breve ture, whereby the Panamanian government The U.S. Southern Command theater Traveso, “Honduran Security: Central American requests international assistance through the security cooperation and exercise programs Challenges and Opportunities,” keynote address United Nations. Formed under the author- have greatly enhanced regional partner to the Hemispheric Strategic Objectives for the Next Decade Conference, sponsored by the Latin Ameri- ity of a UN Security Council resolution, a nation capabilities for combined and multi- can and Caribbean Center of Florida International combined joint task force of 14 nations is led national integrated operations in real-world University, U.S. Southern Command, and the by the commander, U.S. Navy South (a com- contingencies. They have also been tailored to Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War ponent of USSOUTHCOM), and a Chilean incorporate the unique integrated operations College, March 17–19, 2005. deputy commander. Subordinate combined experience of partner nation regional and 5 See Summit Declaration dated February joint task forces, operating within the ter- global experience from coalition operations 1, 2005, available at ; and Summit Declaration dated and the United States. The Panamax exercise, inclusion of the S/CRS and other agencies December 2, 2005, available at . 6 Unofficial translation. See CFAC Mission the enhancement of collective capabilities for cant contributions and relevance for further Statement (in Spanish), available at. ble to a wide variety of contingencies within integrated operations to meet the needs of the region and around the world. today’s security environment. Security threats in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility have gener- The examples described above offer On target,on time: ally been considered unconventional or, in models for other combatant commands and some cases, nonmilitary. Ranging from insur- suggest the likelihood of similar experi- Subscribe Today! gency, drug and illicit trafficking, and natural ences in other regions. The next step in ndupress.ndu.edu disasters, to the more recent recognition of this evolution is to expand the effort across ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 25 j f q F o r u m

Army civil affairs interaction with Iraqi tribal leaders Signal Company (Kevin P. Bell) Signal Company (Kevin P. Are We Ready for an th 55 Interagency Combatant Command?

By CHRISTOPHER L. NALER

s the United States conducts and deter terrorist and conventional threats. tary combatant command is the model for the war on terror, it is evident Is the Nation agile enough to respond glob- the United States to deter and defeat adver- from experience, doctrine, and ally, short of a major theater war? The opera- saries and engage regional partners in the A strategy that the conflict will tions conducted after September 11, 2001, in 21st century. Properly structured to include not be resolved solely through either military the Philippines and Central and Southwest interagency representation, a combatant strength or diplomatic maneuvering. The Asia prove that we can respond, but are commander’s headquarters and associated combination of all instruments of national we postured to sustain this war and, at the staff would provide the nucleus for inter- power allows the United States and its allies same time, prepare for future conflicts? This agency reorganization. the full spectrum of options to respond to article argues that an integrated civil-mili- The Interagency Process Lieutenant Colonel Christopher L. Naler, USMC, is a G–3 operations planner with the II Marine Expeditionary The Armed Forces routinely participate Force. in interagency operations in the United States

26 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Naler and abroad. Early inclusion of interagency capacities of the U.S. military on that battle- would reside in one organization empowered considerations in military assessments, field were finally the realization of the dream to plan, execute, and assess complex contin- estimates, and plans would facilitate civil- that was the Goldwater-Nichols Act.”3 gency operations with the full measure of the military integration of effort. The interagency The U.S. Government is now ready to combined instruments of national power. process in the United States, under the follow the DOD lead and embrace unify- National Security Council, focuses on the ing legislation that extends this integration Instruments of National Power appropriate functions for military and non- beyond the military. General Pace continues As a direct result of the terrorist attacks military participants and facilitates unified his challenge to the interagency through the of September 11, the National Security action in pursuit of national objectives. lens of 30 years of observation: “In the 1980s, Strategy for Combating Terrorism outlined Deterrence and engagement are we had the best Army, the best Navy, the an expanded version of the instruments of dynamic responsibilities tasked primarily to best Air Force, and the best Marine Corps national power: unified combatant commanders through the in the world, but they did not work jointly. National Military Arguably today, we The struggle against international ter- Strategy and Joint an integrated civil-military have a great State rorism is different from any other war in Strategic Capabilities combatant command is the Department, a our history. We will not triumph solely or Plan. The Depart- great Department even primarily through military might. We ment of State, model for the United States to of Defense, a great must fight terrorist networks, and all those Central Intelligence deter and defeat adversaries Department of who support their efforts to spread fear Agency (CIA), and Treasury”4 that are around the world, using every instrument of other agencies are and engage regional partners not working jointly. national power—diplomatic, economic, law the key players; General Anthony enforcement, financial, information, intel- each can become lead Federal agencies in the Zinni, USMC (Ret.), former commander of ligence, and military. Progress will come National Security Strategy (NSS). The single U.S. Central Command, offers a correspond- through the persistent accumulation of suc- entity that coordinates these efforts is the ing perspective: “In Washington there is no cesses—some seen, some unseen.6 one place, agency, or force that directs inter- National Security Council (NSC), the Presi- agency cooperation. The only such coop- The traditional diplomatic, information, dent’s principal forum for considering national eration is on an ad hoc, person-to-person military, and economic instruments are listed, security and foreign policy matters with his or group-to-group basis. So if you have a but the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the senior national security advisors and cabinet problem like putting Iraq back together after role of the Department of Justice and this is officials. The NSC also serves as the President’s Saddam . . . there’s nowhere to start.”5 General evident in the purpose of the legislation: “To principal arm for coordinating these policies Zinni’s comment coupled with General Pace’s deter and punish terrorist acts in the United among various government agencies.1 challenge coalesce the observations of two States and around the world, to enhance law former combatant commanders on where enforcement investigatory tools, and for other This 1949 construct may have been suf- problems exist and potential remedies might purposes.” This expanded horizon for the ficient in the Cold War, but the 21st century be found. Justice Department illustrates the acknowl- requires greater agility to respond to both An integrated civil-military combat- edgment of capabilities that have historically domestic and foreign threats. The NSC is ant command is the model for the United existed but were not stated in the NSS. the correct model for planning and assess- States to deter and defeat adversaries and Absent from the list is the acknowledge- ing our national security strategy, but it is engage regional partners in the 21st century. ment of U.S. health care and environmental not optimized to coordinate and implement Properly structured to include interagency capabilities. As a leader in these areas, the this strategy on a daily basis. General Peter representation, a combatant commander’s United States provides a breadth of knowl- Pace, USMC, as Vice Chairman of the Joint headquarters and associated staff would edge to assist regional partners in preserving Chiefs of Staff, pointed out that there was provide the nucleus for reorganization. Inte- life and natural resources. This capability is no one underneath the President who could grating interagency representatives into key beyond the common perception of deter- follow through on decisions and order dif- leadership and staff positions would create rence, but it could serve critical needs if coor- ferent agencies to accomplish what must be a cohesive group that would feel the pulse dinated with other instruments of national accomplished. He asked, “Do we then need of the region and be guided by the NSS to power. This is the heart of regional engage- a Goldwater-Nichols—like event for the follow the President’s intent. This operational ment, and it could be the vanguard for U.S. interagency?”2 headquarters would serve as the strategic engagement in Africa and Asia. The success of the Goldwater-Nichols interpreter for subordinate units and institu- A more inclusive list of instruments Department of Defense Reorganization tions within the area of responsibility (AOR). of national power should include diplo- Act of 1986 is evident when an empowered The geographic and functional combatant matic, informational, military, economic, unified combatant command leads a coali- commanders would possess the infrastruc- law enforcement, financial, and health and tion of over 40 countries in multiple regions ture and resources to assemble an integrated environmental. Recognizing the additional executing the war on terror. The intent of the civil-military staff that incorporates the capa- instruments of power would bring supple- act has come to fruition in less than 20 years. bilities into a model for unity of effort. The mentary agencies into the overall effort for In Iraq, for instance, “the capabilities and characteristics of each interagency partner both domestic and foreign activities. The ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 27 INTE R A G E N C Y C o m B A T A N T C o m m AND

traditional J–1 and J–4 sections. The direc- Proposed Interagency Command Structure tor is a DOD Human Resource SES–2 and the deputy is a DOD O–7. The director- Combatant Commander ate conducts joint and interagency billet management as a primary function similar Military Deputy Civilian Deputy Commander Commander to the current supervision of joint billets within DOD. Each agency is responsible for recruiting, selecting, and managing quali-

Personnel Information Financial/Economic Legal and fied personnel. The directorate works with Cultural and and Development and Environmental Communications the military components and participating Resources Intelligence Requirements/Acquisitions Health agencies in prioritizing resources with a foundation stemming from the traditional Strategy Standing Joint Force Joint Interagency categories of military supplies. The prioriti- and Headquarters Element Coordination Group Operations zation of these resources, in support of the commander’s engagement strategy or crisis response, provides the interagency staff and subordinate units a unified effort at the regional headquarters. representation of each instrument in an inte- tentious. One solution is legislation authoriz- The Directorate of Financial/Economic grated combatant command would link the ing the Secretary of Defense oversight of Development and Requirements/Acquisi- operational headquarters to the individual agencies outside of his department, allowing tions would combine the J–7, J–8, and J–9 agencies’ strategy within a regional construct. the chain of command to remain intact and staff functions in current unified combat- Equipping regional combatant com- provide unity of effort. The commander’s ant command structures. The director is a manders with the full spectrum of inter- oversight would be similar to a tactical Department of the Treasury or Department agency representation would create agile, control relationship, directing the other agen- of Commerce SES and the deputy a DOD engaged, and responsive organizations. The cies only in the roles and missions prescribed O–7. Experimentation, transformation, and ability to interpret and execute strategy at the by their cabinet level secretaries. research and development would reside at operational level headquarters would provide Deputy commanders are congruent U.S. Joint Forces Command. The directorate continual engagement through all agencies with the Army model of an assistant division maintains the traditional budgeting require- represented in the headquarters and afford commander (support) and assistant divi- ments of the command, but economic devel- all participants a role in responding to con- sion commander (maneuver). The civilian opment is its key function. The directorate flicts and contingencies. Representatives or deputy commander is drawn from the State has the expertise and ability to communicate teams would maintain communication with Department’s Senior Executive Service (SES). with regional partners to engage all facets their respective agencies and communicate The deputy is an experienced State executive of the economic environment (such as relevant information through the integrated or, in the case of U.S. Northern Command, infrastructure, agriculture, banking, market staffs to the combatant commanders, which a Department of Justice executive. The State economy, currency valuation, and trade would lead to greater agility and diversity of Department position fulfills the prerequisite imports/exports) that assist the Nation in perspectives on the combatant commanders’ to assignment as a bureau director. The regional and potential global market par- staffs and increase problem-solving capabili- deputy is concurrently the ranking State rep- ticipation. This economic element is a core ties accordingly. resentative and the director of the Joint Inter- capability that complements the daily engage- agency Coordination Group. In the absence ment strategy of a combatant command. As a Headquarters and Staff Concept of the commander, the deputy would fill the barometric instrument that measures the eco- A typical unified combatant command billet and operate within Title 10 parameters. nomic environment, the directorate provides headquarters, circa 2005, has a traditional The military deputy commander is a a wealth of information to the commander, structure that reflects the principal staff DOD O–9 and would serve in accordance his staff, and the associated agencies as they directorates. Using this structure as the with current Title 10 requirements. He would monitor the AOR. baseline, I propose the staff concept shown be required to perform the duties of the com- The Directorate of Strategy and Opera- the figure above, which would incorporate mander in the event of vacancy. tions would merge the J–3 and J–5 responsi- interagency representation into the direc- Principal Staff. Principal and deputy bilities. Its director is an O–8 and the deputy torates. Each of these new staff sections is directors would include a combination of is a DOD SES–2. The directorate contains described below. civilian and military personnel. The command the traditional current operations, future Command Group. The combatant com- group, in conjunction with the assistant operations, and plans sections as well as an mander would be retained in the current departmental secretaries from the various exercise division. Additionally, it possesses structure with a four-star general or admiral. agencies, would provide nominees to maintain the hub for staff action in the Operational The commander’s responsibilities would parity in the staff composition (see figure). Planning Element, which facilitates all plan- remain as written in Title 10, United States The Directorate of Personnel and ning requirements pertaining to exercises Code. Who the commander reports to is con- Resources would combine the functions of and operations. The element is a cross-func-

28 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Naler tional planning cell of military and civilian career diplomat as director, with a DOD O–8 directorate provides expertise throughout expertise. Each directorate would have as deputy. The director is a unique feature the spectrum from personal to institutional representation in planning and execution of of this integrated staff. The Secretary of health issues. The assistant director has exper- the command’s mission, directed by Strategy State appoints this position as a capstone for tise in environmental concerns ranging from and Operations and orchestrated through the grooming executive leaders and Ambassa- conservation to development. The deputy Operational Planning Element. dors. The ability to combine regional exper- director has oversight of U.S. legal issues The Directorate of Information and Intelligence would combine the J–2 and J–6 combining information and intelligence into functions. The director is a CIA SES–2 and one directorate provides efficiency in the analysis and the deputy an O–8. Intelligence is fused from multiple sources and authorities: dissemination to decisionmakers

n Title 10, Armed Forces (DOD) tise with mature diplomatic relationships pro- in conjunction with regional requirements n Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Proce- vides unmatched access for engagement in through close coordination with the director dure (Justice) the AOR. Subordinate staff directors fill such of cultural communications. The deputy’s n Title 22, Foreign Relations and Inter- billets as coalition support groups, political primary duty consists of the traditional staff course (State) advisers, and religious and tribal envoys. The judge advocate and legal adviser roles. n Title 50, War and National Defense director coordinates with area Ambassadors The Standing Joint Force (SJF) Head- (CIA) intelligence resources. and chiefs of mission and conducts liaison quarters Core Element would be an addi- with nongovernmental, private volunteer, and tional duty for one of the Directorate of Strat- Combining information and intel- international organizations to balance the egy and Operations deputies. The director is ligence into one directorate would provide regional network and information exchange. a DOD O–7 and leads the SJF headquarters efficiency in the analysis and dissemination The Directorate of Legal and Envi- to augment the designated Service compo- to decisionmakers. Management of band- ronmental Health would focus on legal and nent command to form the initial nucleus width is collocated with the highest volume health issues in the AOR. The director is a for the joint task force (JTF) staff. Interaction consumers. Department of Health and Human Services with the integrated staff provides unmatched The Directorate of Cultural Com- SES–1 assisted by a DOD O–7 staff judge synergy for the JTF commander through munications would employ a State SES–2 advocate or a Justice Department SES. The direct access to all appropriate

State Department representative and Marines working with citizens in Al Anbar Marine Division Combat Camera (James J. Vooris)

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 29 INTE R A G E N C Y C o m B A T A N T C o m m AND

Refugees International officials meeting with Pakistani military during Operation Lifeline, December 2005 Space Communications Squadron (Barry Loo) Space Communications Squadron th 30 agencies in one headquarters. This core various positions would be the responsibil- tary qualifications of joint specialty officers. element corresponds with current joint doc- ity of individual agencies. Recruiting and Prospective directors would take a capstone trine, but staff representation would allow selecting could thus require personnel to equivalent course to prepare for SES-level the JTF commander to focus on operational depart from traditional career paths. DOD, service in a regional or functional combatant and tactical issues by reducing some strategic within the interagency construct, would need command. layers in the current staff model. to broaden its intermediate and top-level A complementary solution to inter- The Joint Interagency Coordination Service schools to ensure that its personnel agency education, similar to the National Group would be organized in accordance appreciate the newly included agency’s cul- Defense University, would be a National with current doctrine. Staff representation tures, roles, and mission within the NSS. All Security University that mirrors the format provides the JTF commander with resident agencies would need to adjust their formal and intent of the George C. Marshall Euro- expertise in the headquarters and facilitates education, and, ideally, civilian undergradu- pean Center for Security Studies. Students unity of effort throughout the command ate and graduate schools would follow suit as from the interagency community, instead of by integrating interagency members into they prepared candidates for civil and mili- other nations, would participate in tailored, the staff and eliminating the necessity for tary professions. professional education and research and dia- multiple reach-back nodes once deployed. Similar to current requirements to logue, and in thorough examination of issues The interagency composition of the head- educate DOD personnel, the interagency confronting client agencies. Students would quarters allows the group to focus on tactical community would call for additional quotas have an opportunity to identify common coordination and direct support of the JTF. to established Service and joint schools, such values, create interagency friendships, work The combatant headquarters works the seam as the Army Command and General Staff toward common understandings, and build a between operational authorities and strategic College and Joint Forces Staff College. Selec- more peaceful and cooperative political and diplomacy. This affords the JTF commander tion of candidates for a combatant command security environment. The National Security a strategic shield and allows a focused effort would focus on personnel who, like their University structure would allow an open on the current crisis. military counterparts, are in mid-level man- forum for security development, as opposed agement, providing seasoned individuals to the focus of defense-oriented institutions. Professional Education confident in their agencies’ capabilities and The organization of the staff as shown who are recognized experts in their agencies’ Budget Wars in the figure would provide the framework communities. Completing tours in combat- Aligning multiple agencies within the for interagency integration. Sustaining the ant commands would furnish occupational Government should create efficiencies and billets and grooming the right individuals for designations for civilians similar to the mili- reduce redundancy. Each agency would need

30 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Naler to review its roles and missions, a process An Investment capabilities. The entity that could conduct similar to the Quadrennial Defense Review. The Goldwater-Nichols Act helped this type of coordination is an integrated, The entire interagency community would move the Department of Defense toward a interagency unified combatant command. highlight seams and overlaps. Infrastructure, more effective joint approach to warfighting, communications, and redundant person- where instead of merely deconflicting, the The headquarters and staffing model nel skills would be the first candidates for Services were to work together in ways that outlined here provides a framework for effec- consolidation. In a study at the Center for created power beyond the sum of their indi- tive deterrence and engagement. Empower- Strategic and International Studies, a team of 190 experts concluded: one could argue that the executive branch is stovepiped much like the Services were 20 years ago the U.S. national security apparatus requires significant reforms to meet the challenges of vidual capabilities. To achieve that joint warf- ing the combatant commander with all the a new strategic era. As part of its transfor- ighting capability, each Service had to give instruments of national power will allow mational efforts, the Department of Defense up some turf, authorities, and prerogatives. unprecedented capabilities. Inherent in the must adapt not only to the post–Cold War, Today, one could argue that the executive structure is accountability of civil-military post-9/11 security environment but also must branch of Government is stovepiped much cooperation, but that natural tension is har- cope with many “hidden failures” that, while like the four Services were 20 years ago. nessed into a model that maximizes unity of not preventing operational success, stifle neces- In 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald effort. JFQ sary innovation and continue to squander Rumsfeld emphasized to the 9/11 Com- critical resources in terms of time and money. mission the success of military institutions NOTES Many organizational structures and processes that looked beyond their hallowed pasts initially constructed to contain a Cold War and gained more than they invested. Such 1 National Security Council, National Secu- superpower in the Industrial Age are inappro- landmark legislation as the Goldwater- rity Council’s Function, available at . 2 tion Age.7 unify the interagency community. The effect Jim Garamone, “Pace Proposes Interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act,” American Forces Press of Goldwater-Nichols on DOD has proven Service, September 7, 2004, available at . unity of effort. This type of change is feasible, Using this construct as an interagency model 3 Ibid. and all participants must recognize that their provides the type of internal transformation 4 Ibid. historical contributions to the Nation, while required for external integration. Former 5 Chris Strohm, “Former Commander Calls valued, may not be efficient going forward. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General for New Military-Civilian Planning Organization,” Various actions would help implement this Henry Shelton, USA (Ret.), in his congres- December 7, 2004, available at . 6 Kosovo, highlighted the need for interagency The National Security Strategy of the United n A legislative watershed event similar integration before and during conflict States for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, available at . to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 would resolution: 7 Clark A. Murdock et al., Beyond Goldwa- serve as the catalyst for the interagency com- ter-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic munity to adopt this integrated construct. We all must move forward with our efforts to Era, Phase I Report (Washington, DC: Center for n Achieving balance in the command achieve increased levels of integrated inter- Strategic and International Studies, March 2004), 6, positions, key principal staff billets, and agency planning now. To better support other available at . action officer positions throughout the agen- agencies, DOD needs to give greater consider- 8 Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint cies would maintain viable parallel career ation to political, diplomatic, humanitarian, Chiefs of Staff Posture Statement before the 106th tracks. economic, information, and other nonmilitary Congress, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Ser- n Incorporation of agency policies and activities in defense planning. In addition, the vices, February 8, 2000. procedures into the combatant command’s U.S. Government must establish dedicated standard operating procedures would mechanisms and integrated planning processes facilitate synthesis of agency cultures and to ensure rapid, effective, well-structured, mul- perspectives. tiagency efforts in response to crises.8 n Recruitment and selection of person- nel through professional education must An investment in personnel and educa- Subscribe target unity of effort. tion would allow agencies to communicate n Shifting resources throughout the and coordinate in an unprecedented manner. to JFQ: interagency community by capitalizing on the It is not enough to synchronize during efficiencies gained through combining capa- complex contingency operations; the inter- ndupress.ndu.edu bilities would eliminate redundancy. agency community must integrate into a team with a common focus and complementary ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 31 power for nationbuilding

Ambassador John D. Negroponte leaving Kirkuk Business Center after meeting with local officials in 2004

Orchestrating Instruments of Power for Nationbuilding U.S. Air Force (D. Myles Cullen) U.S. Air Force

By H e n r y W. S t r a t m a n

ccording to the former political culture that foster voluntary coopera- nizations: the U.S. Embassy Baghdad, which senior adviser to the Coali- tion and the limitation of state power; and the replaced the CPA, and the Multi-National tion Provisional Authority provision of general security, to establish a safe Force–Iraq (MNF–I), which replaced A (CPA), Larry Diamond: and orderly environment.1 Combined Joint Task Force–7. MNF–I was established as a combined, multinational, Any effort to rebuild a shattered, war-torn He goes on to say that all these components and joint four-star headquarters to exercise country should include four basic components: are interrelated, serving as the pillars upon the command, control, and integration of political reconstruction of a legitimate and which a new nation and government must political and military efforts at the strategic capable state; economic reconstruction, includ- be built. level. Coordinating and synchronizing efforts ing the rebuilding of the country’s physical Following the transfer of authority from between the U.S. Embassy and the multina- infrastructure and the creation of rules and the Coalition Provisional Authority to the tional force—given “philosophical and opera- institutions that enable a market economy; Iraqi Interim Government on June 28, 2004, tional differences of civil-military institu- social reconstruction, including the renewal (or the orchestration of these four components tions” (the clash of cultures)—was one of the in some cases, creation) of a civil society and became the responsibility of two new orga- greatest challenges facing the leaders of these organizations, Ambassador John Negroponte Major General Henry W. Stratman, USA, served as Deputy Chief of Staff for Political-Military-Economic Integration for Multi-National Force–Iraq, Baghdad.

32 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Stratman and GEN George Casey, USA, respectively, did not create them. [The U.S. Government, the CPA) to a State Department lead and on their arrival in June 2004.2 however,] did much to make things worse. It the establishment of a traditional Embassy. Both Ambassador Negroponte and did not prepare for stability operations before The team’s main goal was to ensure “a close General Casey recognized the need to the war, did not carry them out as needed and mutual partnership between the Chief nurture the fledgling government, reestab- during the war, and had to improvise both of Mission . . . and the Commander, Multi- lish an infrastructure capable of providing nation building and counterinsurgency opera- national Force–Iraq. . . . Furthermore, the essential services to the people, and prepare tions once the war was over.3 team was to continue the spirit of ‘jointness’ the Iraqi Security Forces to take on increas- as it support[ed] implementation of the plan ing responsibility for domestic security The pre-war planning effort showed that the within the [State Department] and DOD.” 5 while dealing with a persistent and ruthless Department of State could coordinate an The Interagency Transition Planning insurgency. Meeting these needs and building analysis of Iraq’s problems with reasonable Team’s work informed the development of the U.S. Embassy and the initial Joint both Ambassador Negroponte and General Casey Manning Document of MNF–I while also recognized the need to nurture the fledgling government establishing policies and procedures for clear and effective command relationships the four pillars necessary to support a secure, competence, but it had almost no operational and rapport between the Embassy’s Chief of stable, and democratic nation would require capability to develop effective plans for nation Mission and the commander of the newly an extraordinary level of teamwork and coop- building and was unready to coordinate such formed multinational force.6 eration between the U.S. Embassy and MNF– activity with military security and counter- I to ensure that efforts were coordinated and insurgency activity. Both the Department of Organizing for Integration Effects complementary, not in competition. Defense and [U.S. Agency for International In recognition of the fact that security This article describes the situation in Development] staffs of the State Department efforts were linked to diplomatic, informa- June 2004 and the means by which General dealing with political and economic aid lacked tional, and economic efforts, Ambassador Casey organized his staff to overcome expertise . . . in dealing with the planning, Negroponte and General Casey in July 2004 these challenges and ensure integration analysis, program development, contracting, chartered an interagency strategy review and cooperation between the U.S. Embassy and management burdens of a large country.4 to perform a strategic assessment of the and the multinational force. Furthermore, it highlights the ongoing interaction and synchronization of efforts between the two to build a stable and secure Iraq while concurrently conducting counterinsurgent operations against a multifaceted enemy intent on derailing these efforts. This is not a doctrinal solution, as the situation defies a lockstep approach. Rather, it is presented as a case study that might inform interagency planning and cooperation for future efforts in the war on terror.

Synchronization before Transfer Published accounts have noted the significant problems and challenges that plagued the predecessors to the U.S. Embassy and MNF–I in dealing with nationbuilding Polish Civilian-Military Cooperation Group challenges during the occupation phase. touring new Al Diwaniyah police station Anthony Cordesman, for instance, was par- 55th Signal Company (Arthur Hamilton) ticularly critical of the management of the postconflict period and ad hoc nature of the These criticisms, along with observa- nature of the insurgency in order to refine coordination between the various agencies of tions from other national security pundits, the MNF–I Campaign Plan and the U.S. the U.S. Government. He observed that many did not fall on deaf ears. In the months before Embassy’s Mission Performance Plan. of the problems facing Iraq are the legacy of the transfer of sovereignty to the Interim In July 2004, the team reported: its formation as a state, exacerbated by the Government and the concurrent dissolution negligent and oppressive rule of Saddam of the CPA, the Departments of State and the insurgency is much stronger than it was 9 Hussein. Defense established an Interagency Transi- months ago and could deny the Iraqi Interim tion Planning Team to lay the groundwork Government legitimacy over the next 9 While the invasion did expose the ethnic, polit- for the shift of sovereignty from a Depart- months. In response, the coalition must find ical, economic, and infrastructure problems, it ment of Defense (DOD)-led effort (through ways to strengthen the Iraqi Interim Govern- ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 33 power for nationbuilding

Commander of Task Force Thunder passing colors to Iraqi officer in Makhmur Signal Company (Clydell Kinchen) th 55 ment in all dimensions of national power for the planning of political and economic examined how the multinational force could (political/economic/security) and facilitate effects, the team concluded that the various best advance implementation of the MNF–I political reconciliation. Otherwise the insur- economic and reconstruction programs Campaign Plan. This team determined that gency will grow more violent and the election planned or under way were not likely to there was a key role for the military in overall and constitutional process will be endangered.7 achieve the desired results. political and economic effects planning to Finally, the team determined that support the establishment of a legitimate The assessment team recognized that American civilian agencies had limited permanent government, but found that the MNF–I was more mature than its political penetration into Iraq’s social infrastructure, mission was not well understood and that and economic capabilities and that all three while the military had substantial penetra- there were no traditional mechanisms or were hampered by the lack of a unifying tion into Iraq’s political and social landscape organizations to manage this important area. strategy, inadequate intelligence, ineffective at regional and local levels. The military, The team also concluded that such an organi- however, had little insight zation could support the commander’s cam- the nature of the insurgency radically into the political process in paign plan by identifying the effects MNF–I changed the operating environment Baghdad. In short, internal forces were generating in strategic cities, con- systems and processes ducting coordination and analysis of efforts strategic communications support, and the aimed at producing certain political and to achieve desired effects, and facilitating an embryonic nature of [Interim Government] economic benefits were proceeding without interagency process to coordinate economic counterparts.8 overall integration. The Ambassador and and governance efforts of both the force and Commanding General of MNF–I published the U.S. Embassy.9 The team also found that the economic and a Joint Mission Statement that articulated Based on these strategic assessments, governance plans developed by the Coali- shared vision and goals and specified politi- General Casey reorganized the MNF–I staff tion Provisional Authority had assumed a cal, security, and economic tasks that would to achieve greater integration and coordina- much more permissive security situation; be the focal point of integrated efforts tion of diplomatic and economic strategies however, the nature of the insurgency radi- mounted by the U.S. Embassy and the multi- between the force and the Embassy, creating cally changed the operating environment. As national force. a new staff element to that end: the deputy a result of the new environment and the fact A follow-on analysis by a U.S. Joint chief of staff, political military economic that no element of the CPA or the Embassy Forces Command team, led by General Gary (DCS PME). The purpose of this organiza- was organized to integrate military support Luck, USA (Ret.), in August 2004, further tion was to oversee MNF–I policy develop-

34 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Stratman ment, political-military interactions and to teamwork given tangible expression by that General Casey instilled in the multina- integration of governance and economic lines the chief of mission and the Commanding tional force. of operation with coalition embassies, the General working together, the establishment Complementing this high-level com- Embassy’s Iraqi Reconstruction Management of forums for robust information exchange mitment to integration was the professional Office (IRMO) and Project and Contracting and planning, and the optimal organization relationship established between the Embas- Office, the Corps of Engineers Gulf Region and integration of large staffs. sy’s political-military counselor, Ambassador Division, and the Iraqi government. Of these factors, the commitment Ron Neumann, and the DCS PME, Major General Casey charged commanders between General Casey and Ambassador General Hank Stratman, USA. In addition, with supporting reconstruction and commit- Negroponte to establish a close working PME developed a working rapport with the ted resources for it. The Gulf Region Engi- relationship is the most important. General Embassy’s political and economic counsel- neers, in coordination with the IRMO, inte- ors and the IRMO director. Their frequent grated efforts to support the $18.4-billion Iraq the real mechanics of contact and coordination have enabled Recovery and Reconstruction Fund program. interaction take place at a high degree of integration and synergy At the strategic level, DCS PME worked to between MNF–I and Embassy actions. This fill the gaps in this program, recommending the action officer level relationship was enhanced when the Embassy the use and prioritization of other funding populated its political-military section with sources, where feasible and acceptable, to Casey acknowledged as much in testimony experienced political officers who were com- support the execution of priority projects. As to the Senate Armed Services Committee on fortable working with the military and by the security became an increasing emphasis, dif- June 24, 2004: placement of a liaison officer from DCS PME ficult reprogramming decisions for the project within the staff. Additionally, the Embassy appeared. DCS PME played an integral role in The Commander, MNF–I, and the U.S. established a two-person State embedded establishing the priorities for reprogramming Ambassador will work closely in formulating team for each division to liaison with the funds from electricity and water to security strategic direction and ensuring unity of effort Embassy and work directly for the division and justice requirements. The teaming rela- in support of the Interim Government of Iraq. commander. tionship was critical to integrating MNF–I Creating a secure and stable Iraq requires Although a commitment to teamwork reconstruction efforts and maximizing the careful coordination of military operations and is vital to an environment of integration, the benefits to the Iraqi people and economy.10 objectives with other elements of U.S. national real mechanics of interaction take place at In addition to the DCS PME, the power, including economic, political, diplo- the action officer level, which requires robust reorganization of the MNF–I staff included matic, and informational objectives. Establish- forums for information exchange and plan- the formation of a deputy chief of staff for ing a close and effective working relationship ning. As with any large organization, there strategic communication to create synergy with the new Ambassador and the government are recurring meetings in the daily routine. between public affairs and information agencies working out of the U.S. Embassy is Both the Embassy and MNF–I staffs were operations and to integrate coalition informa- a priority goal for me. I will also serve as his able to integrate, synchronize, and coordi- tion operation efforts with those of the Iraqi principal military advisor.11 nate issues, ideas, and actions by inviting government. Additionally, the deputy chief participants from the other organization. Not of staff for operations was relocated to the These were not hollow platitudes, but a com- only did this promote inclusion and build Embassy compound to synchronize effects mitment to a “one team, one fight” approach teamwork between Embassy and MNF–I staff within the multinational force and to provide an interagency strategic operations center. With these new organizations, General Casey would achieve the integration of MNF–I actions with those of the U.S. Embassy. The Embassy, in turn, would have a single coor- dinating point for a wide variety of issues at the MNF–I, corps, and major subordinate command levels.

Factors Influencing Integration Since the founding of the Embassy and MNF–I, the Iraqi people and the Interim and Transitional Governments have enjoyed many accomplishments through their coordinated efforts, not the least being the successful election in January 2005. That level of integration between two inherently Soldiers and U.S. State Department official at reopening of the Najaf Teaching Hospital disparate organizations is attributable to three key factors: the high-level commitment G. Martens) Pacific (Edward Fleet Combat Camera Group, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 35 power for nationbuilding sections, but it also fostered ownership for between the civil/diplomatic and military which there is full respect for political and actions and decisions resulting from these cultures of the Embassy and the MNF–I and human rights.” 13 meetings. are important venues for stimulating strategic Perhaps the most substantive dem- The most notable of these routines decisionmaking, communication exchange, onstration of interagency integration and include the MNF–I daily Battle Update and integration. teamwork between the Department of State Assessment, chaired by the multinational and DOD is found in a classified cable from force Commanding General and attended by Key Outcomes the Secretary of State titled “U.S. Government the deputy chief of mission, the political/mili- One of the first products of the team- Position on Political/Security Principles, tary counselor, and the IRMO director; the work and integration between the U.S. and Priorities for Iraq Reconstruction.” 14 Embassy Country Team meetings, chaired Embassy and MNF–I was the publication of Although drafted in Washington, the political by the chief of mission and attended by the the Joint Mission Statement on August 16, and security objectives and priorities aligned DCS PME and his policy division chief; and 2004. While it remains classified, the docu- precisely with the priorities of the chief of the IRMO daily senior consultant meetings ment was crucial to Embassy and MNF–I mission and Commanding General. and weekly program reviews, attended by the efforts and probably unprecedented in its scope. As General Casey Integration and the Government noted in his letter transmit- A capable and representative govern- ting the document to subor- ment is clearly priority one for Iraq. Thus, dinate commands: there has been a logical shift of MNF–I focus to the governance and economic lines of Recognizing that the Multina- operation. During its existence, the Interim tional Force’s effort in Iraq is Government, with assistance from the coali- inextricably linked to that of tion, worked to form the basics of a govern- the U.S. Embassy . . . this doc- ment and prepare for elections. Reconstruc- GEN George Casey, USA, ument is intended to facilitate tion and economic development were modest Commander of Multi-National unity of effort by focusing all as the insurgency increased in intensity, and Force–Iraq, transferring Husaybah to Iraqi forces elements of U.S. and coali- now the Transitional Government faces much tion power and influence in greater challenges. Not only must it continue the theater on executing our the efforts of the Interim Government, but it 2d Marine Division Combat Camera (Neill A. Sevelius) counterinsurgency effort. also must take the lead in the counterinsur- PME policy division. These forums provide gency fight while learning how to deal with the senior Embassy leadership and the While the title of the document might an increasingly influential parliament, draft- MNF–I situational awareness of operations suggest a missive of limited scope, the Joint ing a constitution, and preparing for another and actions across all lines of operations: Mission Statement was much broader. It constitutionally-based national election. security, governance, economics, and focused Embassy and MNF–I priorities and Building capacity and helping the communicating. identified the political, security, and eco- Interim Government succeed will require As the Iraqi governing body evolved nomic tasks required to achieve the desired continued coordination and engagement with from interim to transitional, the campaign strategic effects detailed in the campaign plan the government. The centerpiece of the U.S. plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom grew and mission performance plan.12 Embassy and MNF–I engagement strategy is increasingly complex, requiring an even Due to the evolutionary nature of the to work with the various leaders and minis- greater degree of integration in the gover- operating environment, the Ambassador and tries of the Iraqi government. The Embassy nance and economic lines of operation. Two the Commanding General revised the Joint and the force maintain frequent contact and new forums were established to facilitate Mission Statement following the election work closely with the prime minister, deputy information exchange and planning between in January 2005. The chief of mission and prime minister, and cabinet-level ministers the Embassy and MNF–I. In February 2005, the Commanding General recognized the and ministerial advisers. This work can only the IRMO director, economic counselor, and need to articulate the way ahead in order to succeed if the actions of both bodies are fully DCS PME began meeting twice a month to build the government’s capacity to lead the integrated and their interlocutors are speak- assure situational awareness on the issues, nation. Entitled “A Plan for the Year Ahead: ing with one voice to the Iraqi government. strategies, and priorities regarding the recon- Transition to Self-Reliance” and published The interaction with the govern- struction of key infrastructure and the provi- in February 2005, this second Joint Mission ment is highlighted by the actions of the sion of essential services to the Iraqi people. Statement communicated the primary and Embassy and the Multi-National Force–Iraq Starting in March 2005, the chief of mission mutually supporting goals of helping the in providing guidance and mentorship to and the Commanding General established a Transitional Government diminish the insur- the deputy prime minister and the national Strategic Mission Council forum to enhance gency and prepare Iraqi Security Forces and security adviser. The Embassy and MNF–I unity of effort, which provides a forum for the government to begin accepting the coun- have developed recommended policy guid- issue resolution on matters impacting the terinsurgency mission lead and to complete ance on a variety of significant security, political and military situation in Iraq. Both the timetable laid out for achieving a “federal, governance, and economic issues. The DCS of these forums have proven effective bridges democratic, pluralistic, and unified Iraq, in PME has prepared numerous coordinated

36 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Stratman

talking papers for the Commanding General Marines patrol market area to help Iraq’s political leaders analyze issues of Port-au-Prince, Haiti and promulgate the policy decisions to address the problems and challenges facing this burgeoning democracy, thereby putting an Iraqi face on the solution while building the capacity to govern. Working together, the U.S. Embassy and MNF–I promote management strategies to enable the govern- ment to assimilate the multitude of issues and information commensurate with the establishment of governmental capacity in the security, governance, economic develop- ment, and communication realms. Integration with the Interim Govern- ment was particularly noteworthy in the battle to eradicate insurgents in Fallujah in November 2004. Forces on the ground communicated to MNF–I that various Marine Division Combat Camera (Eric C. Ely) d security measures restricting movement and 2 enforcing curfews on the citizens of Fallujah were needed to protect military and civilian be built from scratch and refined over time as U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 108th lives and to ensure mission success. MNF–I capacity grew and new challenges surfaced. Congress, 2d session, April 22, 2004. worked with the Embassy to refine these U.S. Embassy and MNF–I organizations 6 U.S. Mission Baghdad Interagency Plan requirements and obtain Iraqi government will continue to adapt to provide nation- brief, May 4, 2004. 7 approval of emergency decree restrictions, building requirements to Iraq’s transitional Building Legitimacy and Confronting Insurgency in Iraq, team report, July 15, 2004. integration with the Interim Government was particularly 8 Ibid. 9 L. Hawley, “An Analysis of the DCS for noteworthy in the battle to eradicate insurgents in Fallujah Political and Economic Effects,” August 19, 2004. 10 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region which provided the optimum operational and constitution-based governments while Division Organization and Budget brief, June 27, flexibility. The government’s commitment serving U.S. Government interests. The 2005. to see politically sensitive operations such lessons learned from the Iraqi experience 11 U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, as the elimination of the Fallujah safe haven apply to future endeavors requiring the inter- “Advance Questions for General George W. Casey, through to completion set the conditions for agency efforts of a U.S. Embassy staff and a Jr., U.S. Army, Nominee for Commander, Multi- a free and fair election. joint or coalition force headquarters. JFQ National Force–Iraq,” available at . Dialogue, cooperation, and teamwork N otes 12 MNF–I/Embassy Joint Mission Statement, are necessary elements of the relationship February 7, 2005. 1 Larry Diamond, “What Went Wrong between the U.S. Embassy Baghdad, Multi- 13 United Nations Security Council in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs 83 (September/October National Force–Iraq, and the Interim Gov- Resolution 1546, “The Situation between Iraq and 2004), available at . resolved many of the difficulties cited prior APR 05, SECSTATE 6360, U.S. Government Posi- 2 Joint Publication 3–08, Interagency Coor- tion on Political/Security Principles and Priorities to the transfer of authority on June 28, 2004, dination During Joint Ventures, vol. I, available at for Iraqi Reconstruction. and established the foundation on which to . There was no doctrine outlining the 3 Anthony Cordesman, U.S. Policy in Iraq: A steps to accomplish this team relationship. It “Realist” Approach to its Challenges and Opportuni- was achieved through initiative and a high- ties (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and level commitment to teamwork, through International Studies, August 6, 2004), 2–3, avail- JFQ direct robust forums for information exchange and able at . to you! 4 Ibid., 27. This cooperation did not occur simply by 5 Marc Grossman, “The Iraq Transition: throwing the organizations together, nor did Obstacles and Opportunities,” testimony before the ndupress.ndu.edu it happen overnight. With the exception of the resolve for teamwork by many, all had to ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 37 s p ecia l F E A T U R E America’s National War College Sixty Years of Educating Strategic Thinkers

n the summer of 1946, Roosevelt cadre set about creating a “high level school in an issue of Joint Force Quarterly focus‑ Hall, named for President Theodore to prepare selected ground, air, and naval ing on “integrated operations,” since joint Roosevelt, changed from the Army officers for the exercise of command and has become the baseline for the United IWar College to become the home of the performance of joint staff duties in the States military, and security strategies that the National War College (NWC). Begin‑ highest echelons of the Armed Forces, and integrate other agencies and international ning in fall 2005, the National War College’s to promote the development of understand‑ partners are essential for America and 60th Anniversary began by commemorating ing between high echelons of the Armed its allies in the current dynamic strategic the events of the fall and winter of 1945 Forces and those of other agencies of environment. when military and Federal officials decided government which are an essential part of a The National War College is com‑ that military education needed to include national war effort.” It is fitting, therefore, prised of students and faculty representing the study of “grand strategy.” The initial that 60th Anniversary special feature occur all the U.S. military Services, Coast Guard, Reserve Component, senior civilians in the Major General Teresa Marné Peterson, USAF, is the 25th Commandant of the National War College. Department of Defense and other agencies,

38 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Peterson America’s National War College Sixty Years of Educating Strategic Thinkers Eric Shinseki (1986), General Ed Eberhart (1987), General Peter Schoomaker (1989), General Norton Schwartz (1989), General Mike Moseley (1990), Ambassador to Thailand William Itoh (1991), and Admiral Bill Fallon (1992). Since 1986, the college has also had a hand in educating interna‑ tional military officers, under the National Defense University International Fellows Program. Many of these students have returned home to serve as Ministers, Chiefs of Defense, and Chiefs of Service, and are honored in the International Fellows Hall of Fame. In commemoration of our 60th Anni‑ versary, my predecessor, Rear Admiral Richard Jaskot, USN (Ret.), launched the celebration with a series of distinguished lectures beginning with Colin Powell in September and concluding with a lecture program marking the anniversary of D‑Day in June. We also launched the George F. Kennan evening series, which will be three lectures in the area of foreign affairs and national security, and National War College is continuing the noteworthy Empires evening series, which examines historical imperial powers with an eye toward the strategic security issues now facing the United States. I hope readers enjoy the essays by

NDU Special Collections current faculty and an international alumnus Download as wallpaper at ndupress.ndu.edu. in this 60th Anniversary National War as well as international fellows. Students Graduates of NWC have risen to the College joint professional military educa‑ are senior military officers and government highest levels of the Armed Forces and tion special feature. They should provide an officials—leaders all—who spend 10 months government and include Senators, Service appreciation for the professional, graduate- studying, reflecting, and debating security Secretaries, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs level programs that prepare future leaders to strategy and the most relevant issues of the of Staff, Service Chiefs, Combatant Com‑ succeed with tomorrow’s most demanding day. This unique learning facility’s mission manders, and Ambassadors. Those cur‑ national security challenges. JFQ is as critical as ever. The current curriculum rently serving or who have recently left the contains classical history, which, through government include Senator John McCain constant update of articles and speakers, is (1974), General/Secretary of State Colin Marné Peterson tied to understanding how the United States Powell (1976), General John Jumper (1982), Major General, USAF is making history today in Afghanistan General Hugh Shelton (1983), General Commandant, National War College and Iraq, globally in the war on terror, and Peter Pace (1983), General Joe Ralston through international security cooperation. (1984), General Jim Jones (1985), General

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 39 s p e c i a l F E A T U R E A School for Strategy The Early Years By JANET BRESLIN-SMITH

ashington was in a tary of the Navy, General Hap Arnold, and season of “transition and Vice Admiral Harry Hill had proposed the uncertainty.”1 Emerging creation of a new senior-level college. This W as the unmatched global National War College would: power, supreme in military accomplishments and technological dominance, America was n prepare selected ground, air, and naval caught short by the emergence of a menacing officers for the exercise of command and

adversary, one that did not mirror the char- NDU Special Collections performance of joint staff duties in the highest acteristics of past opponents. Vice Admiral Harry Hill, USN, first commandant of echelons of the Armed Forces National War College While there was little shared knowl- n promote the development of under- edge about the enemy, there was a unique standing between high echelons of the Armed determination among senior military and to anticipate peace and prosperity and savor Forces and those other agencies of govern- political leaders to study and carefully the reward for years of sacrifice and loss. ment which are an essential part of a national analyze the character and conduct of this Yet by that same spring, some key military, war effort.3 threat. There was also a determination to diplomatic, and political officials had already consider grand strategy and assess the “inter- come together to prepare a new generation Building on the work of the Army and relationship of military and nonmilitary of leaders to meet the next challenge to Navy Staff College, established in 1943, the means in the promulgation of national international stability and America’s posi- new school would have a unique structure policy” to meet this challenge.2 tion in the world. and mission. Both its faculty and student It was early spring 1946, and the General Dwight Eisenhower, Army body would represent all Services and the Nation was relaxed in the postwar glow of Chief of Staff, Admiral Chester Nimitz, Chief Department of State. A tenth of the students victory and returning troops. It was a time of Naval Operations, James Forrestal, Secre- would be assigned from State, and the Deputy Commandant would be a senior Foreign Janet Breslin-Smith is a faculty member in the Department of National Security Policy at the National Service officer. War College.

40 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Breslin-Smith

were reviewing suggestions to consolidate the Departments of War and Navy, create an independent air force, improve and central- ize the intelligence function, and provide the President with a National Security Council. Achieving institutional change in the form of government reform is a challenge that can weary the most courageous warrior. Studies can be done and recommendations can be received, but without strong leader- ship and agreement among critical players, the result is stillborn. But the confluence of shared experi- ence in World War II, the prospect of America’s new role in the postwar world, a need to study strategy, and the importance of interservice coordination and international cooperation were acknowledged by key leaders. The power of these shared experi- ences and conclusions overcame conventional stumbling blocks to change. The creation of the National War College required exquisite timing, personal

NDU Special Collections leadership, and a delicate balance of institu- tional interests. The Army War College had Study would focus on strategic/politi- and bureaucratic politics. It is also a reminder been closed during the early years of the war, cal doctrine—the interplay of the military, of how government came together to educate and plans for reopening were in limbo. Eisen- economic, and political policies of a state. and organize to meet a strategic challenge. hower agreed not only to suspend the college, As the first Deputy Commandant for but also to remove it from Fort McNair, take Foreign Affairs, George F. Kennan, noted, The Idea over the building, and use the appropri- “It was the first time the United States Calls for “joint” professional military ated funding for that school to establish the Government had even prescribed this area education began following World War I and National War College. It was a remarkable of inquiry for study in an official academic intensified during World War II, when the feat in the rough political terrain of Washing- institution.”4 As the Secretaries of War and most senior military leadership was seized ton power politics. the Navy wrote to James Byrnes, Secretary with this need. General Hap Arnold, Com- General Eisenhower and Admiral of State, in 1946, “We both feel that the manding General of the Army Air Forces, Nimitz were able to negotiate balancing recent war has demonstrated a necessity General George Marshall, Army Chief of arrangements to protect the interests of all for close coordination between Services. The National War the State Department and the course study would focus on strategic/political College was initially commanded Armed Forces. Accordingly, we doctrine—the interplay of the military, by Navy flag officer, with Deputy have included in the curricu- Commandants representing the lum, in addition to the military economic, and political policies of a state other services. The Armed Ser- aspects of joint operations, a vices Staff College, for mid-level study of the integration of our foreign policy Staff, and Fleet Admiral Ernest King, Chief officers, was located on the Naval Base in with the capabilities of our Armed Forces.”5 of Naval Operations, were early architects of Norfolk, Virginia, while the War College was As the National War College marks the idea. Initially, the Joint Chiefs established on an Army post. its 60th year, the commitment to this core the Army-Navy Staff College in April 1943 to But the concept behind the college went mission distinguishes it from the maze of the train selected officers for command and staff beyond teaming the Army and Navy training national security institutions. The program duty in unified or coordinated commands. efforts. As stated earlier, the school was also developed in 1946 is remarkably respected By 1944, the Joint Chiefs endorsed to have the active participation of the State today. Debate, openness to new ideas, and proposals for joint education at the highest Department. There was an acknowledgment interagency and interservice interaction mark levels to develop officers capable of formu- that, in Eisenhower’s words, the military the vitality of the college. As the Nation faces lating strategic concepts and commanding needed “a little training in diplomacy.” This a new global threat, a reflection on the cre- large-scale operations. These proposals came was echoed by Vice Admiral Hill, the first ation and early years of the college is timely. on the heels of the larger effort to rethink and Commandant, at the opening ceremonies in In the War College tradition, it offers a lesson restructure the institutions of national secu- 1946: “Never before had the need for mutual on the interplay of personality, institutions, rity. Both Congress and the executive branch understanding and teamwork between the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 41 t h e ear l y years

State Department and the Armed Forces been and the intention is that each student would the goal, the faculty had to be adept in the so necessary.”6 have some working relationship with every subtleties of adult professional education. other student in each year’s class. If this was to be “a community of soldier/ The Early Years There was an active community of statesmen,” the faculty had to share the Planning for the structure and instruc- learning at Fort Lesley J. McNair. Seven desire for the best wisdom. tional content of the War College began members of the command team resided on Although hampered by the constant in earnest by early 1946. The Joint Chiefs’ post. The Commandant and deputies hosted turnover of both military and civilian support was clear. The Commandant was frequent “at home” luncheons and dinners personnel, the college was able to provide to be a lieutenant general or vice admiral, faculty continuity by carrying over a number serving a 3-year tour, with two deputies at almost 80 percent of the of visiting professors in the early years. The the two-star level, representing all Services military students went on key to stability, however, was in the structure in the mix. The Deputy Commandant for of the educational program and the content Foreign Affairs would be a senior Foreign to earn flag rank of the curricula. Service officer. To reinforce the value of this joint for faculty, students, and outside speakers. The Curriculum command tour, many senior leaders at the There were monthly dinner dances for the Admiral Hill began a process of out- college went on to distinguished careers college leadership, faculty, and students. reach and consultation, sending a proposed within their home Services, achieving supe- Beginning with the class of 1946, team curriculum to experts selected “because of rior ranks, including Chief of Staff of the sports and intercollege competition with their competence in the general field of edu- Army and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the Industrial College of the Armed Forces cation, their knowledge of world affairs, and of Staff. became an important part of the War College their expressed interest in the betterment of The student body selected for the first experience. understanding between the military and civil- class was also remarkable. Almost 80 percent The faculty has always mirrored the ian world.” This group first provided advice of the military students went on to earn flag mission and nature of the school. Civilian on the college program and then was formed rank. There were similar accomplishments and military instructors were selected for into the first Board of Consultants. The first for the civilians from the State Department their ability to “lecture effectively, handle year’s group included James Baxter, President and other agencies. discussion groups and seminars, and super- of Williams College, Arnold Wolfers of Yale, The National War College admitted its vise and direct research on all phases of Calvin Hoover of Duke, Walter Wright of first class within 12 months of the conclusion power factors.”8 Princeton, and William Langer of Harvard. of World War II. Its 100 students included 30 The faculty initially included 16 officers The board met yearly to review the Army colonels, 24 Navy captains, 6 Marine from all 4 Services, a number of Foreign total War College program and make recom- colonels, and 30 Army Air Force students, of Service officers, and 4 visiting professors mendations to the Commandant. By 1955, which 8 were general officers. Students had from other universities and colleges. The it included the Chancellor of the University a wide range of backgrounds, from infantry first group of civilian academics included of California, the Presidents of Brown and officers, to Marine fighter pilots, to political Professors Hardy Dillard of the University of Purdue, the Deputy Under Secretary of State, officers in the Foreign Service. The youngest Virginia, Bernard Brodie and Sherman Kent Bernard Brodie of RAND, and General Omar was 36 years old and the oldest was 48. The of Yale, and Walter Wright, Jr., of Princeton. Bradley, USA. first class also included two observers from This was not to be a traditional research The initial 10-month instruction was Great Britain and one from Canada. university; there would be no office hours divided into 2 semesters. The fall term was From the outset, the intention was and absent faculty engaged in off-campus designed to “increase knowledge on general to enhance interservice and interagency study. The faculty would be practitioners matters of international political importance, exchange. Five years into this experiment, the and operators, as well as educators. The [and] to examine problems of U.S. foreign annual report of the War College concluded War College was not to be a setting for con- policy and its making.”10 The second term that “the mixing of students from different ventional instructor/student roles. As Vice program considered “military elements of departments and agencies, with their wealth Admiral Hill asserted in his opening address national power as a means of attainment of of experience, results in an obvious growth to the class in 1946: United States policy objectives.”11 Throughout in understanding, tolerance, and objective the year, the class was confronted with a judgment.”7 The college is a collection of men engaged in series of foreign policy or military problems. Understanding the value of network- common pursuits. . . . It is not the intention Working on those strategic dilemmas cul- ing relationships, the architects of the War that a group of men here with more knowledge minated with a consideration “of the general College organized a student experience will teach a group of men with less knowledge. problem of security of the United States and that included seminar and committee study Instead, it is our wish that all of us as a group the nature of a future war.” groups, social activities, and an active sports will, by consultation and discussion, develop In the first year, the War College offered program. Students were rotated between the best wisdom of the entire group.9 the following courses: Security in the Atomic committee and seminar groups and traveled Age, Basic Economics and Domestic Politics, together to domestic military bases and on If developing “the best wisdom,” Basic Factors in International Relations, overseas field studies. This emphasis remains, thereby producing wise policymakers, was Objectives and Capabilities of the Principal

42 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Breslin-Smith

President Harry S Truman presented diplomas to the NWC Class of 1949 NDU Special Collections

Powers, Strategic Area Studies, Strategy the students an opportunity to develop them- Indeed, there was electricity in the air Analysis, Strategic Concept of Operations, selves rather than providing a predetermined during that first year at the War College. Science and the Armed Forces, the National and predigested course of instruction. Second, George Kennan describes a period of Military Establishment, and Future War and the nature of the studies, being of current experimentation and intellectual engagement: the Security of the United States. No matter matters very much alive and subject to change, “Senior officials from both the military and what the course mix, “the school’s academic requires a flexibility and adaptability in course civilian echelons of the Government as well program has always centered on a core planning which precludes long-range academic as people from the legislative branch attended curriculum taken by all students. National establishment of course schedules and coverage our lectures and occasionally lectured them- security strategy provided the organizing and further requires the utmost alertness on selves.”15 He noted that the Secretary of the principle of the core, though the components the part of the permanent staff and faculty.13 Navy and, later, Secretary of Defense James of that study have varied.”12 Forrestal regularly sat in, and even President As the mix of lecture, readings, Harry Truman attended a lecture on the Methods of Instruction exercises, and seminars evolved, there was Soviet Union. “The college came to provide a Although outside lecturers dominated constant concern with student development: sort of academic seminar for the higher ech- the early program, work in seminars and “The basic philosophy of the National War elons of governmental Washington generally,” committees had the most lasting impact. College has always been to increase students’ recalled Kennan. By the end of the 1940s, the Commandant capacity to think broadly, conceptually, ana- To maintain candor and intellectual concluded: lytically, and critically as they involve them- rigor, the college cultivated a unique profes- selves in the grand strategy and the United sional climate. The leadership wrote in 1954, First, the outstanding quality of the student States national security policy—its formula- “This institution has always taken great pride body demands an unusual technique, affording tion and implementation.”14 in the fact that it has no ‘party line’ and will ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 43 t h e ear l y years not tolerate doctrinaire approaches in the ognize, in short, that the device of military 5 Joint letter from Secretary of War and analysis of any subject. Every aspect of the coercion could have, in the future, only a Secretary of the Navy to James Byrnes, Secretary program is not only conducive to freedom of relative—never an absolute—value in the of State, January 26, 1946, Special Collections, National Defense University Library, Washington, thought and uninhibited expression, but has pursuit of political objectives.”19 DC. also been intentionally planned to furnish a Thus there was a need to study “the 6 Vice Admiral Harry W. Hill, opening forum for the dissemination and evaluation ambitions of the adversary,” understand the address to first class, National War College, of new ideas.” To maintain this climate, the enemy, and consider the mix of military and September 3, 1946, Special Collections, National college initially classified political instruments Defense University Library, Washington, DC. all lectures, discussions, there were intense policy of state that national 7 The National War College, Annual Report and written exercises. exchanges between the objectives called for. 1951–1952, Special Collections, National Defense With confidentiality Kennan embraced the University Library, Washington, DC, 16. protected, “there is every college and policymakers War College course 8 The National War College, Annual Report encouragement for on strategic/political 1946–1947, 4. 9 candid, straightforward, ‘let-the-chips-fall- doctrine and savored the teaching experi- Hill. 10 George J. Stansfield, History of the National where-they-may’ approaches, even as regards ence. He described the students as “mature, War College 1946–1956, unpublished manuscript, the most sensitive problems, and which may thoughtful, keen . . . they were a joy to teach. Special Collections, National Defense University 16 20 be of great current concern in government.” One learned from them as one taught.” This Library, Washington, DC, 10. As the years progressed, the classification sentiment would be echoed by today’s faculty, 11 Ibid. policy was relaxed and confidentiality was engaged with students coming from combat 12 Tom Keaney, The National War College, protected by a rigorous nonattribution in Iraq and Afghanistan, diplomatic posts unpublished manuscript, 1997, Special Collections, policy. The spark of debate in seminars has around the world, and Washington bureau- National Defense University Library, Washington, remained. cratic contests. DC. The achievements of these early classes 13 The National War College, Annual Report could be measured in many ways. There were In this 60th year of the National War 1949–1950, Special Collections, National Defense intense policy exchanges between the college College, the Nation again is challenged to University Library, Washington, DC. 14 James Keagle, “A Summary of Major and policymakers, and the work of the com- develop a strategy for our day. Although the Activities and Their Evolution, Academic Year mittees was sought out by officials at the new intimacy of late 1940s Washington is gone— 1946–1947 through Academic Year 1989–1990,” Department of Defense. Students went on to the days of extended luncheons debating unpublished manuscript, 1989, Special Collections, leadership roles in the diplomatic and mili- policy and Cabinet Secretaries sitting with National Defense University Library, Washington, tary communities with a shared background students in lectures—the vision for the War DC, 2. and appreciation of each others’ professional College could be described today as it was by 15 Kennan, 306. experience. Many came back to the War the Board of Consultants in 1951: 16 The National War College report to College to lecture or join the faculty. the Middle States Association of Colleges and Moreover, those first years of the War The College remains what it has been from the Secondary Schools, December 15, 1954, Special College brought new approaches to the outset—a broad-gauge institution, wide open Collections, National Defense University Library, concept of national security strategy. As to different and often conflicting viewpoints, Washington, DC, 7. 17 Kennan, 310. George Kennan explained in his memoirs, and dedicated to the training of officers in the 18 Ibid. Kennan goes on, “To occupy [Russia] the advent of new technology, especially cooperative work so essential to the National exceeded our physical possibilities, even on the 21 JFQ atomic weaponry, called for rethinking the Security. most optimistic estimate. And it exceeded our traditional American concepts of total war political and moral possibilities as well. We were and unconditional capitulation. In his analy- NOTES not set up to govern, even temporarily, great sis, the application of these concepts, “while numbers of people in other parts of the world.” successful in the immediate military sense, 1 George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925–1950 19 Kennan, 310. had complicated—very gravely indeed—the (Boston: Little Brown, 1967), 306. 20 Kennan, 307. 2 problems of peace.”17 Ibid., 307. 21 The National War College, Annual Report 3 Kennan’s own assessment of the stra- The National War College, Annual Report 1951–1952. 1946–1947, Special Collections, National Defense tegic challenge the Soviet Union presented University Library, Washington, DC, 1. in this new atomic age required students to 4 Kennan, 308. Kennan went on, consider “the fact that Russia was simply not JFQ: the professional’s occupiable,” that technology had changed the we had . . . virtually nothing in the way of an preference strategic environment, and that “if weapons established or traditional American doctrine we were to be used at all, they would have to could take as a point of departure for our thinking be employed to temper the ambitions of an and teaching. It was the mark of the weakness of Subscribe Today! adversary, or to make good limited objectives all previous American thinking about international against his will—not to destroy his power, or affairs that there was almost nothing in American his government, or to disarm him entirely.”18 political literature of the past one hundred years on Details at: ndupress.ndu.edu He concluded that “man would have to rec- the subject of the relationship of war to politics.

44 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu special feature The Legend OF George F. Kennan

By P A U L B. T H O M P S O N

undergo at least 2 revi- with great dedication, and steadfastly setting sions. The date was a noble course for future strategists. January 24, 1947, and the essay was one of The Next Mr. X 17 works that prolific Since 1946, National War College writer composed during student warriors have indeed pursued a 7-month period at the Kennan’s strategic trail, offering variations on

NDU Special Collections National War College. the policies of ways to win the peace. Their A later version of essays have addressed such issues of the day that treatise was published as nationbuilding, peacekeeping, humanitar- lone warrior, recently in the July 1947 edition of Foreign Affairs, ian missions, multiple uses of the military, returned from his post attributed to an anonymous Mr. X. That and ways to design interagency decisionmak- in war-torn Moscow, sat article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” ing entities of the first order. If students have A reflectively at his solid oak propelled its author, the warrior and states- needed inspiration, a bronze plaque on the desk in the northwest corner of Roosevelt man George F. Kennan, to the center of the hallowed wall summarizes in short shrift the Hall, set quill to parchment, and, with debate among policymakers concerning the deeds of George F. Kennan. New students great deliberation, wrote concerning Nation’s strategic course during the early note it in passing and wonder if there really is the “The Soviet Way of Thought and Its Cold War. By then, Kennan had departed the anything new in their universe about which Effect on Foreign Policy.” Drawing on National War College to rejoin the policy- they can write as they consider the challenge years of operational experience tempered making arena as the head of the new Office of becoming the next Mr. X. by service as Deputy Commandant of the of Policy Planning at the Department of State, Sixty years of strategic thinking in peace National War College, he explained the an assignment to be sought by future gradu- and war is a long time in the life of a national expansionist threat of the Soviet Union ates of the college. For the next six decades, security institution such as the National and suggested military-political measures Kennan would remain intellectually engaged War College. Kennan was around for 59 of to contain it. Over the next hour, he in the art and science of grand strategy, filling those years and remained influential until crafted a 5,000-word draft, which would senior positions in government and academia his death in 2005 at age 101. Because of his contributions to the strategic thinking of his Commander Paul B. Thompson, USN, is a Professor of National Security Studies at the National War College. time—to the concept of containment and the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 45 l e g e n d o f g e o r g e F . k e n n a n

Truman Doctrine—Kennan will always have at Roosevelt Hall with many operational follow his footsteps in thinking about the a presence at the War College. He was there experiences and a number of profound if nature of war and the role of the military at the commencement of academics, helped unfocused thoughts and transitioned into the instrument of statecraft. design a relevant curriculum, and unilaterally consummate strategist: “I realize now that it There remained a significant role for set the standard for intellectual contribution. was at that time—in the background reading, the military, Kennan concluded, but its tra- Writing in his 1967 memoirs, he described in the attendance at lectures by distinguished ditional use would no longer work. Interned for months by the Germans, then serving there was an implicit promise that the college would as the Charge d’Affaires in Moscow during engage in conceptual thinking about war World War II, he knew first-hand the power of that violent instrument of statecraft. It was the original mission in 1946, when he and outsiders, in the agonizing over my own lec- his hope, even in 1946, that the War College his colleagues prepared the curriculum for tures—that some of the ideas were conceived would senior-level students of national policy: “We that have been basic to my views on Ameri- could, through our activities, contribute in can policy ever since.”6 become a major center for not just teaching a way that no previous institution could do Newfound clarity enabled Kennan alone but for wide-ranging, conceptual think- to the thinking about problems of national to articulate his thoughts on the topical ing about war itself as a feature of the inter- policy that was going on all over Washington issues of the day, which he did with great national life of our time, about the role of the in that winter of transition and uncertainty.”1 zeal. “The seven months of residence and Armed Forces as institutions of our national The work of those founders could work at the War College, from September life, and about the relationship of these forces, have missed the mark in the open market of 1946 to May 1947, were the occasion for a whether actively employed or only in being, in national security ideas following World War veritable outpouring of literary and forensic the national interest and to the remainder of II, but it was a seminal moment in the history effort on my part. I look back today with a our national life.8 of the National War College, and Kennan slightly horrified wonder on the energies envisioned a substantive role for the school in this frenzy reflected.”7 He found that by After 46 years, the need was greater the national debate over strategy: immersing himself in the academic mix of than ever to consider that “war itself, the college, he could simultaneously con- conducted under the concepts that have A strategic-political doctrine would have to be tribute to it and benefit from it. The strate- prevailed in the past, can no longer serve as devised for this country which gave promise not gic atmosphere he created transformed him a rational and useful alternative for anyone simply of expanding the material and military even as he was laying the foundation for at all.”9 power of a single nation but of making the others to do the same. The Kennan Chair recognized the strength of that nation a force for peace and stabil- Since that exciting first year of intel- accomplishments of a statesman and scholar. ity in international affairs and helping, in particu- lectual synthesis, hundreds of distinguished But, more importantly, it represented lar, to avoid the catastrophe of atomic war.2 students have partaken of the experience in Kennan’s commitment to going beyond mere strategic thinking. Modern warriors arrive teaching and learning by faculty and students Kennan immediately sought to bring as operators and leave as strategists 10 alike. There was an implicit promise, which the appropriate measure of gravity to build- months later. They deal with the pressures of he clearly articulated on the stage in 1993, ing a national security institute and was retaining operational and tactical expertise that the college would engage in conceptual pleased with the progress, noting that “the for their next assignment while seeking the thinking about war. He explained that program of that first experimental year intellectual foundation for the longer voyage moved forward . . . smartly, smoothly, and to senior flag and ambassadorial rank. Their developments in . . . the nature of our inter- with great élan.”3 Based on the prodigious rise to the strategic level of thinking causes national environment and in the qualities output of speeches and articles and the them to contemplate the state-building and potential uses of modern weaponry, have resulting curriculum, Kennan clearly led the capacity of the United States, the future of fundamentally altered the basis for much of the charge into strategic territory. He concluded the nation-state, and the nature of gover- traditional thinking about the ways we can or his association of that time by declaring, “All nance overall. cannot employ our Armed Forces and about in all, I have never known a more enjoyable the relationship of these forces to the problems professional experience.”4 Following in His Footsteps of the remainder of our national life . . . there is A significant development was that Kennan returned to the War College 46 now a lot of hard thinking to be done on these Kennan himself experienced an intellectual years after he wrote the X article. Traveling subjects. This thinking will of course have to go evolution, brought on by the curriculum by train from Princeton, arm in a sling, he on in a great many places other than this one, he was creating. He thus bore witness to a appeared for the last time, taking the stage in but, for many of the aspects of it, I can think of remarkable aspect of the War College experi- Arnold Auditorium to celebrate the creation no place more suitable than this college.10 ence whereby the learning process applies to of an academic chair in his name and to state all who engage it, faculty as well as students. again what he considered one of the essential But how does one maintain and cul- Indeed, he noted that the highly motivated missions of the institution. His thoughts on tivate an institution of strategic thinking? students taught the faculty as well as the that day, September 8, 1993, were charac- It takes an engaging faculty and a receptive reverse. 5 By his own account, Kennan arrived teristically direct, as he challenged others to student body, each with both an academic

46 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Thompson

Roosevelt Hall, site of the National War College NDU Special Collections NDU Special Collections and operational mix. And it requires space cific proposals to contain terrorism, attack it, follow the further course of this innovation for thinking beyond the strategic to the and defeat it. And guardians of the current with higher hopes . . . than the man by whose visionary level. It further requires students curriculum need to keep it on a trajectory to name, deservedly or otherwise, the new Chair to think beyond how to use current instru- enable that level of strategic thinking. is to be known.”11 JFQ ments of statecraft in their next assignments and to write the next Mr. X strategic essay Part of Kennan’s distant yet abiding NOTES on using military capabilities, along with impact is that he did not overstay his tenure. diplomatic, economic, informational, and He arrived a warrior, did intellectual battle, 1 George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925–1950 legal means, to achieve homeland security and left a strategist. He had an answer for (Boston: Little Brown, 1967), 308. 2 and otherwise make a better world. Kennan his time and found a way to deliver it. That Ibid., 307. 3 Ibid. would contain the temptation to revert to tactic should resonate well for any period, 4 Ibid. tactical or operational discussions and urge and his life achievements and legend should 5 Ibid. that practitioners do what he did: come from evoke varied responses. The contrast between 6 Ibid. an operational experience directly relevant Kennan’s status as a War College founder and 7 Ibid. to the cause of the day and conceptualize his potential relegation to obscurity is mani- 8 George F. Kennan, remarks at the National those operational insights. For instance, fest in the fact that his chair, still symbolically War College, September 8, 1993. envisioning initiatives against terrorism in located in that corner office but now next to a 9 Ibid. the framework of their personal experiences, synthetic desk with a word processor, stands 10 Ibid. added to experiences and insights from peers empty. Kennan’s final words to the college 11 Ibid. and faculty, students must then make spe- were, “I can assure you that no one will ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 47 special feature International Colleagues at the National War College

NDU President Lt Gen Michael M. Dunn, USAF, talking with Col Ihor Pastus Hyn, Ukraine Air Force at 2005 NDU graduation ceremony NDU

By M i guel RICARDO Reyes CORD E RO

arl von Clausewitz proposed that the U.S. civilian and military instructors and successes achieved by all the components the study of the nature of war be and students; second, American society as a of this modern strategic triad, it is appropri- approached in three parts—the whole; and third, the international students ate to examine each in turn. C people and their emotions, the themselves. The program of international student militia with its tactical creativity, and the Each of the three elements interacts participation at National Defense Univer- government with its politics. In this article, I with the others, generating an interde- sity began in 1984. To date, 522 officers use a similar three-part analogy to examine pendency that has yielded important and from different parts of the world have been the international fellows program at National surprising results during the two decades of trained at the component colleges. About Defense University (NDU), and specifically international student participation. To gain half have studied at NWC. As the college is at the National War College (NWC): first, a better understanding of the great benefits celebrating 60 years of educating U.S. mili- tary and civilian leaders, it should be noted Colonel Miguel Ricardo Reyes Cordero, Army of Ecuador, is Joint Forces International Affairs Chief and was that a third of its life span has included the a 2004 graduate of the National War College. participation of international military and

48 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Reyes

civilian personnel. These guest students U.S. Armed Forces have conducted around hension of the subjects covered daily. The have enjoyed academic exploration with the world. The contribution of an interna- staff and faculty are a fundamental element their U.S. colleagues, shared life experiences, tional colleague, whether a classmate or a in the solid structure and prestige earned International Colleagues and exchanged opinions in the classrooms, graduate of another class year who has main- over many years by NDU in general and all of which have generated brotherhood tained close ties with instructors, is often able NWC in particular. among all involved. to satisfy an American friend’s need. Many Ambassadors, technicians, specialists, and U.S. Society at the National War College American Instructors and Students other personnel from various government Since the international students The first element of the triad, the agencies and institutions have had the good program emanated from the Department of American instructors and students, is the fortune to obtain assistance in their duties in Defense (DOD), it has enjoyed the collabora- most important since the curriculum is a another country through the help of an inter- tion and participation of all the entities under basic part of the professional career training national colleague. DOD jurisdiction and many other institu- of both military officers in each of the Armed Many U.S. officers and their families tions and agencies that are involved in the Forces and of civilian leaders from various have shared pleasant experiences with program to varying degrees. U.S. Government agencies and institutions. foreign colleagues and their families, creat- But the greatest contribution is from friendships U.S. students have cultivated with their American society as a whole since the cur- riculum includes numerous visits into the international colleagues have facilitated undertakings the interior of the United States, where foreign Armed Forces have conducted around the world officers have the unique opportunity to become acquainted in detail with various All U.S. participants arrive with exten- ing friendships that will endure for genera- facets of political, economic, industrial, sive and unique experience and knowledge tions. Visits, lasting correspondence, and tourist, business, social, and military life. to share with a diversity of people who, from other examples of affection and fellowship Even more intimate insights come when the first day of instruction, will be their col- strengthen ties not only between individuals the officers live with host families as part leagues in the classroom, seminars, research and families, but also between the respective of a magnificent effort by the Defense tasks, field trips, and other academic, social, armed forces and countries. Orientation Conference Association, which athletic, and cultural activities throughout nearly a year of intense work. This combina- Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tion tests many qualities—such as willing- General Richard B. Myers, USAF, congratulates Col Salah Afifi, Egyptian Army, at the 2005 ness, patience, leadership, a capability for NDU graduation synthesis, judgment, and many others—that will enable students to emerge as leaders capable of handling the delicate respon- sibilities demanded by future duties and assignments. American students and instructors share unity and friendship with their U.S. colleagues and even more with the interna- tional students. Arriving in a new environ- ment, the international students, with the help and collaboration of their U.S. peers, are able to advance in their studies and complete them. It has become clear that through the international students program, strong, long- lasting ties of friendship are formed between the U.S. and international students. The interaction that occurs during NDU seminar sessions, with the contributions of all participants, makes the international stu- In parallel, the entire staff of executives, does an unparalleled job of supporting and dents feel like valued members of the group professors, advisors, and personnel who strengthening relations between the United who can share their knowledge and opinions handle NDU’s administrative, teaching, and States and the countries represented by the about the various subjects that make up the academic tasks deserve gratitude and admira- students. NWC curriculum. tion for their effort, dedication, and impartial The opportunity to thoroughly study Many of the friendships U.S. students devotion to the benefit of all students. Full- each industry, business, farm, household, or have cultivated with their international time guidance and assistance make it possible tourist location enables the foreign officer colleagues have facilitated training events, for all participants to advance in the learning to see first-hand and properly understand operations, and other undertakings that the process with sufficient clarity and compre- the U.S. citizen’s philosophy of life, from

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 49 international colleagues

Preparing Brazilian table with its excellent staff of highly trained and at International Fellows friendly professionals, plays a major role; luncheon at NDU tirelessly helping in the varied and often exacting requests of the students under its responsibility. After completing an exhausting school year and graduating from their respective colleges, international students retain in their minds and hearts this fond and professional tie with everything that involves NDU and U.S. society as a whole. Back in our own countries, the moments we experienced continue to live in memory, and we seek to multiply these positive effects by reciprocat- ing where we can, and making any effort when the opportunity arises as a show of gratitude for everything received during our stay as students.

NDU This article is part of an initiative aimed at capturing the experiences of international the farmer to the executive, from the high- The International Students students at the colleges of the National ranking soldier to the young recruit. This As stated above, over 500 foreign Defense University. It is difficult to interpret apprenticeship, in addition to that gained guests have graduated since the beginning the feelings of each individual, but the effort academically at the university, serves as a of the international student program. Each has been made to present thoughts that are very real point of reference to the hopes, acted as a student ambassador, representing generally common to all participants. objectives, and goals of the American people, his country to colleagues, professors, and In addition, this article is intended to as well as to the negative aspects that must authorities throughout NDU. express admiration and appreciation to the also be analyzed. International students thus Insecurity and lack of knowledge of National War College on celebrating 60 years get to see both sides of the coin. the United States and its customs make of institutional life as a guide and a trainer These experiences with the broader foreign students seek out the support and of military and civilian leaders, a source U.S. society make foreign officers more con- understanding of their U.S. colleagues when of excellent professionals, and a teacher of fident in relating to their American friends, they first arrive. In most cases, Americans the strategists of new generations who, in and in turn, U.S. citizens see officers from other parts of the world as being not unlike international students retain this fond and professional tie themselves, with qualities and flaws and with NDU and U.S. society as a whole feelings of friendship that are common to all nationalities, even when customs, religions, have shown great willingness to guide their common with their international friends and and cultures are diametrically opposed. This visitors in performing academic and other colleagues, will attempt to make the world a fosters a climate of camaraderie, openness, exacting tasks effectively in a language other more harmonious place, free of the egotisms and sincere and lasting friendship. Above all, than their own. and problems that so greatly affect humanity. it generates a commitment from both sides to Participating in trips around the As long as there is a former NDU cement fraternal ties, not only with individu- country, personally experiencing many student in any country in the world, there als, but also with their, countries. aspects of American life, being helped will be a friendly heart beating, one ready to As an international student, I found everywhere in an extraordinary manner, be of use to its college, its university, and its it interesting to observe how deep inside and having many concerns satisfied have eternal American friends. This is the senti- the United States, perhaps in the homes of all created in each foreign student a respect ment of all of us who have traveled America’s hosts, souvenir plaques were displayed, some and admiration for the achievements of the roads and worked conscientiously in its many years old, with photographs of inter- United States in all aspects of its national classrooms to obtain the education needed national friends who were participants in development. to face the challenges of the future in each of the program. This was very encouraging and In addition, NDU allows foreign our nations. JFQ clearly showed the appreciation and fond- students to participate in athletic, cultural, ness achieved in multiple contacts between and social events individually and often extremely different cultures. These friend- with their families, enabling them to always ships are a multiplier of good will that may find friendly faces and doors open to any one day unite the world in a single entity of concerns. In this respect, the university’s peace and harmony. International Students Management Office,

50 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu COMMENTARY

Effects-based operations (EBO) and their associated planning constructs are controversial topics in the Armed Forces today. U.S. Joint Forces Command has been developing this concept for over 5 years, and, to the same degree as the Standing Joint Effects-Based Force Headquarters established in each of the regional combatant commands, integration and application vary widely. While this may Operations: be considered normal for military cultural evolution, EBO is especially thorny because of its work force demands and complexity, A Critique which even U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center admits to being “convo- luted.” The roots of EBO can be traced to the pre-World War II Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field—and in truth, not much in the concept is new. In fact, some insist that it is merely a supplemental methodology. Acceler- ating technological capabilities have permit- ted leaps in both information management and precision applications of force, perhaps enabling new strategies and certainly facilitat- ing faster and more accurate actions. Nev- ertheless, as in the interwar years, resources are scarce and devoted to many initiatives, highlighting the need to balance effectiveness with efficiency. This said, the “concept” of EBO has remained largely just that—a conceptual con- struct. Joint Doctrine, bound by a paradigm Planning close air support mission that limits doctrinal treatment to extant capa- in joint terminal attack controller bilities, has introduced the idea of effects and qualification course an effects-based approach to planning and Communications Squadron (Kevin J. Gruenwald) th

99 assessment in mature revision efforts to key publications (Joint Publications 3-0 and 5-0). It By M i l a n N. V e g o has addressed the construct as “small letter” variants, far short of the larger EBO construct. The point of selecting Professor Vego’s critique is to elevate debate and encourage adaptation. There are at least two sides to ffects-based operations (EBO) effects. This increasing trend toward using every story, and we hope that JFQ readers are a spin-off of network-centric various metrics to assess essentially unquan- can benefit from the best aspects of this warfare (NCW). Hence, many of tifiable aspects of warfare only reinforces operational practice. Letters to the editor are its premises are largely unproven, the unrealistic views of many that warfare encouraged as this Commentary selection is E expected to catalyze thought and precipitate if not outright false. EBO and NCW pro- is a science rather than both an art and a ponents essentially see war as a business. science. EBO proponents also claim that other views of this “emerging doctrine.” They do not share the Clausewitzian view of their concept is based on the tenets of D.H. Gurney the nature of war and have also embraced a operational warfare. However, EBO is in deeply flawed systems approach for assessing fact the antithesis of operational thinking situations and identifying centers of gravity. and practice. Operational terms are used as are redefined to emphasize effects in lieu of The effects-based approach to warfare ornaments rather than in ways that articu- objectives and tasks. is heavily dependent on mathematical late their true meaning. Worse, various well methods for predicting and measuring understood and commonly accepted terms Objectives and Tasks The terms aims, goals, and objectives Milan Vego is Professor of Operations in the Joint Military Operations Department in the Naval War College. are often used interchangeably. Aims and ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 / JFQ 51 E f f ECT S - B A S E D O P ERAT I ON S : A C R I T I QUE goals are by nature ambiguous, open-ended, or strategic level. The objective is the prin- Proponents differentiate between direct and difficult or impossible to measure. cipal factor in determining the method of and indirect effects. Direct effects can be Accordingly, military planning and execution combat force employment (tactical actions, physical, functional, collateral, and physi- cannot be based on them. Moreover, they major operations, and campaigns). Opera- ological. Indirect effects can be functional, lack elements that can be used to measure tional and strategic objectives are normally collateral, cascading, systemic, cumulative, progress toward their ultimate accomplish- accomplished through major operations and physiological; they can also be second-, ment. Aims and goals must therefore be and campaigns, respectively. The objective third-, or fourth-order effects. Predicting replaced with something much more specific: also determines the content of, and mutual direct first-order effects is difficult enough; objectives (or objects). relationships among, individual elements of going several steps farther to try to predict An objective is composed of compo- operational warfare, such as concentration, second-, third-, or fourth-order effects, as nent parts—called tasks—that collectively critical factors and centers of gravity, maneu- EBO proponents do, is a practical impos- lead to its accomplishment. Tasks are those ver, fires, point of culmination, deception, sibility. There are simply too many variables. measurable entities that allow the com- sequencing, synchronization, branches and A slight change in the conditions of a single mander to determine the rate of progress. sequels, and reserves. entity can generate unpredictable effects, A task answers the question of what needs desired and undesired. to be done, while the objective (or purpose) Effects versus Objectives Advocates explain that the first step answers the why. The linkage between the In contrast to the objective and tasks, in effects-based operations is to determine objective and its constituent tasks cannot effects are far less specific; thus, like aims objectives, and the next is to designate the be arbitrarily severed without serious and goals, they cannot serve as the basis effects necessary to accomplish the objec- consequences to the ability to accomplish for military planning and execution. For tives. The last step is to determine tasks, the objective. Because of their large scope instance, effects to be attained cannot be used variously defined as actions that generate and complexity, operational or strategic as the basis for planning when one intends to effects or as directing friendly actions.1 To objectives are usually divided into groups seize a geographic location such as a capital, make room for effects, EBO advocates have of related main tasks, each of which is island, or territory. Nor do effects have arbitrarily changed what is commonly under- composed of component (or partial) tasks. attributes that are associated with objectives, stood as the task. Another problem is the Determining too few tasks is bound to lead such as destroying, neutralizing, annihilating, insertion of effects between the objective and to the failure to accomplish the objective. defending, controlling, seizing, capturing, or what they call actions. The logical thing is to Adding new tasks without changing or maintaining. These attributes in combination predict effects after—not before—the accom- modifying the objective or having larger with tasks are reliable indicators of whether plishment of the objective (see figure 1). resources leads to so-called mission creep, actions are unfolding as planned and the The most difficult prediction is what which, in turn, leads to a disconnect objective is being accomplished. EBO pro- physical actions must be accomplished to between ends and means and could have ponents also ignore the fact that any military generate desired behavioral effects over a fatal consequences. objective, once accomplished, would generate period of time. This is especially complicated One of the most important tenets of certain effects, in terms of space and time, on at the operational and strategic levels of operational warfare is having an unwavering enemy, friendly, and neutral sides. war because of the dynamic mix of tangible focus on accomplishing the objective. Almost all aspects of operational warfare are related either directly or indirectly to the objective Figure 1 to be accomplished. Therefore, reducing its importance or arbitrarily changing its Effects-Based Approach Objective-Based Approach content will reduce warfare to simply firing at selected targets or target sets. It would ulti- 3 2 mately not only eliminate operational art but also tacticize both policy and strategy. This A E 3 CA USA negative trend is well under way in the U.S. LI L NK military today. E ACTION 2 In determining a military objective, 1 1 E F

F the enemy’s factors of space, time, and ACTION E

A E O O C

T force must be fully taken into account. S Strategic/ ACTION Objective Once the objective is chosen, it must be Operational E Objective properly balanced with one’s own factors Main of space, time, and force, collectively called Tasks A USAL CA K operational factors in planning a campaign LIN Effects or major operation. The objective to be Actions Component (Partial accomplished—not the level of command, Tasks) as is often assumed—determines whether the war is fought at the tactical, operational,

52 JFQ / issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Vego and intangible elements. The effect of one’s The effect of the physical destruction Rolling Thunder. They believed the threat of actions on the enemy’s political leadership or of the enemy’s infrastructure or military industrial devastation would compel Hanoi operational commander cannot be predicted power is hard to anticipate and even harder to end the war.2 accurately. Neither can one precisely antici- to measure. In the American air bombing The biggest problem with effects at pate the psychological effect on the enemy’s of North Vietnam from February 1965 to the operational and strategic levels is that will to fight or the attitude of the populace, October 1968 (Operation Rolling Thunder), they are the levels where intangible elements particularly when the enemy’s political and there was a disconnect between predicted are the most critical for success. Tangible military culture is different from one’s own, and actual effects, indicators, measures, elements of the situation are normally (although not always) possible to quantify. in Operation Rolling Thunder, there was a disconnect Intangibles are hard or impossible to quan- between predicted and actual effects, indicators, measures, tify with certainty. Nowhere is that more true than at the operational and strategic analysis, and feedback levels, where intangibles encompassing not only military but also nonmilitary sources as seen in Afghanistan and in the postcombat analysis, and feedback. The desired effect of power abound. At the strategic level, the phase of the war in Iraq. Intelligence simply was to compel the North, under the pressure degree and robustness of public support for cannot predict key aspects of the enemy’s of aerial bombardment and hindering the the war, the leadership’s will to persevere, strategic behavior. flow of men and materiel through attacks and alliance or coalition cohesion cannot be The duration and intensity of the against the transportation system, to cease satisfactorily quantified. effects cannot be easily determined, much its support to the Vietcong insurgency. Some less measured. Like operational and strategic 90 percent of the effort was against trans- Traditional versus Systems Approach surprises, the duration of effect is relatively portation-related and interdiction targets. The tactical, operational, and strategic short. But unlike most surprises, planners Yet despite all the efforts, in January 1968 military situations are differentiated based on will most often be unaware of the effect of an estimated 70,000 North Vietnamese and the scale of the objective. Any military sce- a certain action at the time when quick and Vietcong launched the Tet offensive. Opera- nario consists of three overlapping and inter- decisive action is needed to take advantage tion Rolling Thunder had failed to effectively related situations: the enemy’s, one’s own, of the newly created situation. Even when reduce the flow of men and supplies the and the neutrals’. The larger the objective, the objective is used as the basis for opera- enemy needed to support operations in the the larger and more complex the situation. tional planning, the effects of actions on the south or to compel the North Vietnamese Furthermore, the military situation is com- adversary are highly unpredictable and can leadership to cease its support of insurgents posed of tangible and intangible elements. be detrimental to one’s strategic purpose, as there. The operation damaged the North’s Nonmilitary aspects of the situation are with the German invasion of Poland in Sep- small industrial base and rudimentary always present, especially at the operational tember 1939 and the Japanese surprise attack transportation system, but it did not achieve and strategic levels (see figure 2). on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. its stated objective. Both the civilian and In contrast to the traditional approach, military leadership miscalculated the effect of EBO advocates insist that the best way of evaluating the military situation is what they call a systems approach.3 They do not Figure 2 distinguish situations based on the objectives to be accomplished. Instead, they use the e Situation System of Systems Analysis term operational environment, as defined in Joint Publication 5–0, Joint Operation Planning (OE): “the air, land, sea, space, and INFORMATION Vulnerabilities Dependencies associated adversary, friendly, and neutral of Inter ELEMENTS OF Area est THE SITUATION systems (political, military, economic, Respon Political of sib ea ili SOCIAL Diplomatic r ty social, information, infrastructure, legal, and A INFRASTRUCTURE Military NEUTRALS Economic NGIBLES Links ECONOMIC others), which are relevant for specific joint Financial TA ASPECTFRIENDLY Strengths Social operation.” Informational Ethnic Nodes Currently, an operational environment Religious ENEMY ANGIBLES INT Cultural ASPECT POLITICAL is composed of political, military, economic, Linguistic Relationships Legal MILITARY social, infrastructure, and information Other (PMESII) systems. Each system, in turn, is THE OBJECTIVE Weaknesses Tactical broken into two primary elements, nodes and Operational Strategic links. Nodes are defined as tangible elements (people, materiel, facilities) within a system that can be targeted. Links are the behavioral and functional relationships between nodes, establishing interconnectivity between them, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 / JFQ 53 E f f ECT S - B A S E D O P ERAT I ON S : A C R I T I QUE

of system. Humans are not encompasses a detailed analysis of both machines. The enemy has military and nonmilitary elements of the his own will and may not situation. Adding SoSA while at the same behave as one wishes. He is time retaining the JIPB process will make bound to respond to one’s decisionmaking processes not simpler and actions. He is not devoid more effective, but just the opposite. of emotions. He can react Supposedly, depicting node-link rela- unpredictably and irratio- tionships graphically helps planners discover nally. Thus, in fact, EBO decisive points against which the joint force proponents are trying to can act. Actually, the nodes are these decisive take the art out of warfare points, a fact that apparently escapes the and substitute it with EBO proponents. By depicting a system’s science. This is the best capabilities as a combination of intercon- proof that the entire EBO nected nodes and links, analysis can enhance approach to warfare rests joint force commanders’ understanding of on faulty foundations. which capabilities are most critical to system performance or behavior and, in turn, which Operational are most vulnerable to friendly influence. Decisionmaking However, the nodes might be wrongly deter- EBO proponents are mined; such a mistake might affect the use of also drastically changing one’s power against other nodes, or it might the methods traditionally not generate a ripple effect. In addition, the used to reach a sound strength of the links could be improperly decision. Many advocates assessed initially, or links and nodes might rarely consider the proven undergo changes during combat that are not Bust of Saddam is removed from process of the command- noticed by the planners in timely fashion. presidential palace converted to er’s estimate of the situa- In the effects-based approach, a major Coalition Provisional Authority tion. By inserting and then part of the mission analysis seems to center headquarters highlighting effects, the on determination of effects. This step is made Combat Camera Squadron (Reynaldo Ramon) st 1 content of several steps unnecessarily complex and difficult. More- of the estimate has been over, many elements of the mission analysis which allows functioning as a system to significantly changed. To make matters have nothing to do with it. For instance, the achieve specific behavior. Analysts link nodes more complicated, proponents have added mission analysis, as the title implies, should with sufficient detail to inform the joint force what they call system-of-systems analysis not include determination of the friendly commander of potential key nodes—those (SoSA) to the joint intelligence preparation and enemy’s (or “adversary”) centers of nodes that, when acted on, are likely to of the battlefield (JIPB) process as part of the gravity. Proponents highlight the need to use produce systemic effects in the operational commander’s estimate of the situation. language that clearly distinguishes effects environment. Key nodes will probably be Proponents claim that JIPB and SoSA from objectives and tasks. Yet they define linked to, or reside in, multiple systems. EBO have identical purposes: to give joint force objectives for “prescribing goals” while tasks advocates believed that every system can be commanders sufficient situational aware- “direct friendly action.” However, both analyzed by using node-link analysis. ness of the operational environment to definitions differ from those traditionally EBO proponents assume that so-called accomplish their missions. The differences accepted and commonly known. They also nodes and links can be determined with certainty and that the effect of one’s actions EBO proponents are trying to take the art out of warfare on enemy nodes is more or less linear. and substitute it with science They believe these actions can be precisely calibrated to produce desired effects. The are primarily a matter of scope, emphasis, confuse the purpose and objective as two dif- effects-based approach to warfare is not and form; JIPB supposedly focuses more ferent things, when they are in fact identical. much different from the failed “geometrical” on enemy military capabilities and geogra- Another major problem with adopt- or “mathematical” school that dominated phy, while SoSA expands its assessment to ing the effects-based approach is that the European military thinking in the late 18th nongeographic dimensions and can extend traditional content of the mission statement century. A system-of-systems view of the beyond the battlespace to the political, eco- is fundamentally changed. Normally, any situation resembles an architectural design nomic, informational, and other domains. well-written mission statement is composed rather than a description of the real world, SoSA devotes more analysis to subjects of of two parts: the tasks, followed by the which is highly complex and dynamic. Yet interest to the entire interagency community, purpose (objective). By redefining tasks as the military situation cannot be viewed, especially with regard to human behavior.4 actions and inserting effects, EBO advocates much less properly analyzed, as some kind However, JIPB, when properly conducted, make the mission statement far more dif-

54 JFQ / issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Vego ficult to articulate concisely and clearly. of gravity for sound planning. The third the same meaning. Proponents also explain The mission will be composed of a mix of a draft of Joint Publication 5–0 correctly that a center of gravity would typically specific purpose with far fewer specific ele- defines center of gravity as comprising “the encompass a number of key nodes and links ments—effects. In short, advocates would characteristics, capabilities, and/or sources that comprise a subsystem within a system. fundamentally change the principal product of power from which a system derives its The number and strength of links to a node of the mission analysis—the restated mission, freedom of action, physical strength, and or set of nodes can be indicators of a poten- as well as the commander’s intent, which is will to fight.” Despite this sound defini- tial center of gravity. They also clearly imply based on the restated mission. Articulating a tion, EBO proponents’ understanding of that there are numerous centers of gravity. sound mission statement and commander’s what constitutes center of gravity is deeply Nowhere do EBO proponents link the objective to be accomplished with the cor- a center of gravity cannot be considered in isolation from responding center of gravity. Yet a center the objective of gravity cannot be considered in isolation from the objective. It is the objective that intent is often poorly done. The effects- flawed. They have essentially adopted the determines the situation and subsequently based approach will not make it easier. This systems approach of Colonel John Warden, the level and scope of the analysis of enemy problem is compounded by the apparent USAF (Ret.), and his “five-ring model.” and friendly critical strengths and weak- confusion on the part of many EBO propo- Like Warden, EBO proponents, with their nesses. A center of gravity is invariably found nents on which elements are tasks, effects, PMESII construct, believe that there are among enemy or friendly critical strengths, and objectives; they are often understood and multiple centers of gravity in any system. not critical weaknesses or critical vulner- expressed almost identically. The purpose of SoSA is to identify what they abilities. Hence, a center of gravity is not In the effects-based approach, course call adversary and friendly centers of gravity, location/place, some critical weakness/vul- of action development encompasses not to include key systems, nodes, and links and nerability, or decisive point. Nor is it found only the development of friendly courses of their relationships to each other. In the view among those critical strengths that lack the action, but also the analysis (wargaming of of EBO proponents, centers of gravity in a ability to physically or otherwise endanger friendly and enemy courses of action), com- given system may consist of what they call a the enemy’s center of gravity, such as logis- parison, and selection of the most optimal key node, but typically they will encompass a tics; command, control, communications, course of action. Clearly, too many steps of number of key nodes and links that comprise computers; and intelligence; and nodes. the estimate of the situation are crammed a subsystem within a system. The EBO pro- If center of gravity is disconnected into a single step, complicating the process ponents assert that key nodes are related to from the objective to be accomplished, significantly. “a strategic or operational effect or center of as in SoSA, there is no larger purpose to gravity.” To make the situation more confus- which everything must be subordinate. In Systems Approach and Center of ing, they claim that key nodes “may become fact, objectives serve to limit the number of Gravity decisive points for military operations”5 (see centers of gravity against which major parts EBO advocates apparently believe figure 3). In short, they imply that effects, of one’s efforts must be directed. The higher in the great value of the concept of center centers of gravity, and decisive points have the level of war, the fewer are the objec- tives to be accomplished and the fewer the centers of gravity. In a campaign, there is a Figure 3 single theater (or military) strategic center of gravity because there is a single ultimate strategic objective. For each intermediate-

Concept of Critical Factors and Centers of Gravity SoSA and Centers of Gravity operational objective in a campaign, there is a single operational center of gravity. The entire concept of center of gravity loses its SITUATION Tactical meaning when a major part of one’s effort is Operational INFORMATION Strategic OBJECTIVE(S) not focused against specific centers of gravity. The proper application of this concept also CRITICAL FACTORS INFRASTRUCTURE MILITARY ensures the application of the principle of “CONCRETE” “ABSTRACT” Link (Tangible) (Intangible) SOCIAL economy of effort. Node

CRITICAL CRITICAL STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES Operational Planning and Execution

CRITICAL POLITICAL EBO advocates propound a different CENTER OF VULNERABILITIES GRAVITY ECONOMIC approach to campaign planning. The regres- sive (or inverse) method used for planning OPERATIONAL COG STRATEGIC COG campaigns and major operations based on the objectives to be accomplished is, for all practical purposes, abandoned. The focus is given almost exclusively to effects, not to ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 / JFQ 55 E f f ECT S - B A S E D O P ERAT I ON S : A C R I T I QUE intermediate (operational or major tacti- ners devise a framework consisting of the social structure, and information and infra- cal) and ultimate (strategic or operational) elements comprising each effect. After the structure networks. ONA relies on a com- objectives and other elements of operational quantifiable measures have been applied to prehensive system-of-systems understanding design, such as balancing operational factors the effects, tasks are assigned to subordinates. of the operational environment’s PMESII and identifying enemy and friendly critical Campaign phasing will be based on the analysis.6 ONA uses various quantitative and factors and centers of gravity. Normally, for effects achieved not dependent on the accom- qualitative measurements to assess whether a campaign or major operation intended to plishment of the intermediate-operational predicted effects are actually achieved and end hostilities, the highest political leader- objectives. Effects identified for enemies, one’s actions are progressing as intended. ship issuing a strategic guidance should also friendlies, and neutrals would supposedly be Quantitative measurements are actually include the desired strategic endstate. The latter is defined as a set of diplomatic, infor- a serious deficiency of the assessment concept is its almost mational, military, and economic aspects total lack of sound intellectual framework of the strategic situation that the Nation’s or alliance/coalition’s leadership wants to used as criteria for entering the next phase of preferred because they are supposedly far less see after the end of hostilities. Expressed in a campaign. Normally, accomplishing inter- susceptible to subjective judgment. Yet the EBO terms, the desired (strategic) endstate mediate objectives in a campaign determines fact is that both quantitative and qualitative is in fact the strategic effect that should be phasing. Why the effects on neutrals should measurements are equally subject to political achieved to bring political victory in a con- be a major factor in phasing one’s campaign manipulation, mirror-imaging, and biases. flict (see figure 4). The desired endstate, in is difficult to explain or understand. A more serious deficiency of the assessment turn, serves as a starting point to determine concept is its almost total lack of sound intel- strategic objectives, which are also part of Effect Assessment lectual framework. EBO proponents assume strategic guidance. The combatant com- The principal methods used for the that the effects of one’s actions could be pre- mander normally determines theater-strate- analysis of PMESII systems is the so-called cisely measured and almost instantaneously gic objectives based on the military strategic operational net assessment (ONA)—a known to decisionmakers. This is highly objectives determined by the national leader- process and product that integrates people, unlikely. This heavy reliance on various ship. However, experience shows that the processes, and tools by using multiple infor- quantifying measurements and fast feedback politico-military leadership in issuing its mation sources and collaborative analysts to raises the issue of the utility of the effects- strategic guidance rarely if ever provided the build a shared holistic knowledge based on based approach, especially at the operational theater commander what can be understood the operational environment. ONA suppos- and strategic levels of war. as the desired (strategic) endstate. edly provides a more comprehensive view In contrast, EBO proponents intend to of the commander’s area of responsibility; it An effects-based approach to warfare use a different logic in the planning process. allows the commander to gain better insight in its essence represents application of the They say that in designing a campaign, into complex relationships, interdependen- targeteering approach to warfare across a combatant or component commander cies, strengths, and vulnerabilities within and all levels. It has proven highly successful provides objectives that describe the desired throughout the adversary’s political struc- in attacking various components of the effects. Once these effects are defined, plan- ture, military capabilities, economic system, enemy’s infrastructure, such as the land transportation network, maritime trade, and the electricity grid. It makes perfect sense Figure 4 to attack not all potential tangible elements of a certain network, but only those nodes that, if destroyed or neutralized, would cause National or STRATEGIC GUIDANCE Step 1 Alliance/Coalition National or Alliance/Coalition Leadership a ripple or cascading effect throughout the Desired End State Leadership Resources network. The effects-based approach can Constraints Limitations Restraints } also be highly effective in attacking enemy Step 3 Step 2 information systems, and computer networks in particular. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE DESIRED END STATE Political Political However, things are significantly Diplomatic Diplomatic Military Military more complex when using the effects-based Economic Economic Social Social approach at the operational and strategic Informational Informational Environmental Environmental levels of war. The mix of tangible and intan- Other Other gible elements, combined with ever-present uncertainties, friction, and the unpredict- Step 4 Step 5 ability of the human element, makes the MILITARY (OR THEATER) effects-based approach largely irrelevant. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE STRATEGIC CENTER OF GRAVITY Tactical methods and procedures cannot be successfully applied at the operational and strategic levels. The accomplishment of a

56 JFQ / issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Vego strategic or operational objective requires dif- dently, unpredictably, and even irrationally. and, to some degree, at the tactical level. The ferent methods of combat force employment EBO proponents apparently ignore these higher the level of war, the more difficult it and, therefore, different methods of planning well-known facts. is to apply these methods as a guide for the and execution. Properly applied, traditional decision- commander’s decisions and subsequent plan- By inserting effects along with proce- making and planning processes incorporate ning. JFQ dures for their prediction and measurement all the supposed advantages of the effects- between the objective and the tasks, EBO based approach. EBO proponent claims that NOTES advocates have in effect weakened the impor- operational planning as currently applied tance of objectives in the decisionmaking cannot ensure the synchronized employment 1 Joint Warfighting Center, USJFCOM, Com- and planning process. Yet unless the link of both military and nonmilitary sources mander’s Handbook on an Effects-Based Approach between objectives and subordinate tasks is of power are only partially true. Current to Joint Operations, draft version (Norfolk, VA: maintained at all times, there is no proper planning procedures are designed to ensure Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate, forthcoming), III–5. way to measure progress toward mission that all instruments of national power are 2 Donna Lucchese, The Relationship of Center accomplishment. Hence, it is simply wrong properly sequenced and synchronized in a of Gravity Analysis, Targeting for Effect, and Mea- to sever that link by inserting effects and campaign. Because these procedures may not suring Success (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army redefining the task as an action. Based on be followed or may be poorly applied does War College, 1998), 7–8. logic and common sense alone, it is hard to not mean they need to be abandoned. 3 Proponents define a system as a network of see the value of placing inherently ambiguous The increasing emphasis on metrics nodes and links within a battlespace that represents effects between far more specific and measur- and indicators is a trend in the wrong direc- any combination of people, material, facilities, and able objectives and tasks. tion. Even at the tactical level, it is difficult information and their relationships to one another. The highly complex situations found to predict, much less precisely measure, A system is also understood as any organized at the operational and strategic levels of war effects because of the mix of tangible and assembly of resources and procedures united and cannot be arbitrarily and artificially reduced intangible elements in the situation and regulated by interaction or interdependence to accomplish a set of specific functions. A system to six or more systems, with these systems human actions and reactions. The progress of systems is defined as grouping assemblies of further reduced to what EBO enthusiasts call of a major operation or campaign cannot be resources, methods, and procedures regulated by nodes, links, vulnerabilities, and interdepen- precisely measured by using various quantifi- interaction or interdependence to accomplish a dencies. As with any machine, any errors in able methods, no matter how advanced the set of specific functions. Vulnerability is described determining nodes or links (and errors are methods might be. Apparently, advocates of as the characteristics of a system that cause it to inevitable) would cause ripples and largely effects-based operations learned little from suffer a definite degradation or inability to perform undesired effects throughout the so-called the pitiful experiences of the United States the designated mission because of being subjected system. An attack against a specific node in using various mathematical methods to to a certain level of effects in a manmade hostile carried out at the wrong time or in an inap- assess the progress of the war in Vietnam. To environment. A model is described as the intel- propriate way could also generate unwanted be sure, there is value in applying mathemati- lectual construct, composed of sets of categories, consequences. Moreover, the enemy has cal analysis in many areas, but that is primar- assumptions, and postulates, that helps one to sort and examine the relationship between elements a will of his own and could react indepen- ily true in the design of weapons and sensors, of data and predict the course of events. However, if a model does not somehow correspond to what it claims to represent, it will have limited utility because it fails to mirror reality faithfully. Lewis Ware, “Some Observations of the Enemy as a System,” Airpower Journal (Winter 1995), 87–93, available at , 2. A system is a functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of elements that interact as a whole; Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Series, Pam- phlet 7, Operational Implications of Effects-based Operations (EBO) (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, November 17, 2004), 2. 4 Joint Warfighting Center, Commander’s Handbook, II–3. 5 Joint Publication 5–0, Joint Operation Planning (OE), IV–11; Joint Warfighting Center, Commander’s Handbook, III–3 and III–4. 6 Joint Warfighting Center, Operational Implications, 9. 2,000-pound GBU–10 laser-guided bomb being dropped from F–16 Fighter Weapons Squadron th 86

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 / JFQ 57 strategic studies notes

Dear JFQ Readers:

National Defense University (NDU) has started a more aggressive international and domestic outreach program. We did so to share ideas with global counterparts and to help combat terrorism with ideas and information. The importance of this rapidly growing program is reinforced by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, in his guidance in Shaping the Future: We can both learn from and help others through a proactive outreach program to nontraditional partners. Academia, indus- try, think tanks, and a host of other organizations possess a wide range of expertise and insights invaluable to finding solutions to our most pressing problems. Our Coalition partners have significant insights to share with us as well. Our friends at home and abroad are our natural allies in this war, and we should seek to partner with them at every opportunity. My goal as president of NDU is to communicate worldwide with every military educational institution and other great organiza- tions via email and to facilitate better and more open dialogue. By doing so, we will improve not only subject matter expertise but also the ways in which we educate military officers and civilian officials in defense and security matters. This network, with approximately 10,000 members—and growing rapidly—will be an important tool for promoting global strategic thinking by disseminating research and publications. Also, we have begun an innovative program called Communities of Practice (COP), which links professional educators from military academic institutions around the world in order to share ideas, news articles, curricula, and educated opinions on nearly 30 relevant topics, such as countering and combating terrorism, leadership and ethics, multinational operations and issues, and Islamic radicalism. While we started with only U.S. institutions, we now have many organizations from other countries that have joined. To date, we have connected some 300 institutions in 90 countries. We have also expanded the list of subjects (listed below). Many American edu- cational institutions have up to 12 people in a single subject area or community and there is no limit to the number of participants. The rules I established were simple and straightforward:

n build a forum of experts among n serve as a sounding board for n participate in the network various institutions around topical subject topics of discussion voluntarily areas n collaborate on new ideas and n feel no obligation to respond n create opportunity for an informal, integration of topic areas into existing n encourage network growth—that nonattribution network to exchange ideas curricula is, spread the word. and curricula and to discuss current issues

The expanded COP list now totals 27 topics and will continue to grow as our global participants desire. There is virtually no limit on subjects or membership to this dynamic program. Our current list:

n Acquisition n Countering/Combating Terrorism n Leadership/Ethics n Africa n Effects-Based Thinking/Operations n Logistics n Asymmetric Warfare n Energy n Military History n China n Environment n Multinational Operations and n Civil-Military Relations (foreign n Homeland Defense/Security Issues and domestic) n Information Operations and Infor- n National Security Law n Combating Weapons of Mass mation Assurance n North Atlantic Treaty Destruction n Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Organization n Command and Control n Intelligence n Postconflict/Stability Operations n Consequence Management n Interagency n Transformation n Corporate Risk Management n Islam and Islamic Radicalism

I encourage you to take part in this effort and help us widen the network. We would welcome all of you to join one or more of the COPs and to identify other individuals or groups who should be on the list. My point man at NDU for this project is Alan Roberson. Please contact him for assistance at [email protected] or call him at 202–685–3032. All the best, Michael M. Dunn Lieutenant General, USAF President, NDU

58 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu strategic studies notes The Joint Advanced Warfighting School: Creating World-Class Joint Planners

n April 2004, the Chairman of the who are all carefully chosen by their Services, to operate in tomorrow’s fast-paced, often Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) announced must be eligible to fill joint planning billets chaotic, and multitasking environment. establishment of the Joint Advanced on graduation, possess appropriate clear- Exercises, simulations, case studies, IWarfighting School (JAWS) at the ances, and be able to perform in a demanding extensive readings, and several research visits Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Vir- academic environment. JAWS qualifies as a are key components of the program. Students ginia. The decision followed months of study Service intermediate- or senior-level college have multiple opportunities to analyze and and discussions involving the Joint Staff, as well as single-phase joint professional mil- apply joint doctrine, emerging concepts, and Services, and members of the military educa- itary education. It is also accredited to award recent lessons learned, while honing plan- tion community. The first class ended June a Master of Science degree in Joint Campaign ning and decisionmaking skills. In addition, 2005, and the second cohort is under way in Planning and Strategy. they conduct individual research, write a its unique 46-week joint professional military Two seminars contain about 12 stu- formal thesis examining a contemporary education experience. dents apiece. Each seminar normally consists joint issue, and defend their findings as part The mission of the program is to of about four Army, four Air force, three of a final oral comprehensive exam. produce conceptual, adaptive, and innovative Navy, one or two Marine Corps, and two JAWS is envisioned to provide joint graduates who can create campaign-quality interagency students. In the next academic headquarters with planners and warriors who concepts, employ all elements of national year, it is anticipated that multinational understand the 21st-century battlefield and power, accelerate transformation, and students will join the student mix. The view warfare through a joint, multinational, succeed as joint force operational/strategic small “purple” seminars are supported with and interagency lens. Graduates should planners. JAWS is an essential component of high-quality faculty, first-class instructional become a nucleus of joint planners in much the Chairman’s efforts to create skilled war­ technologies, and a complete collabora- the way the advanced military studies pro- fighters who are “strategically minded” and tive information environment. Significant grams of the Services generated highly skilled adept at “critical thinking.” facilities modernization was completed to and sought-after planners and thinkers. As JAWS matures, it will populate the support the JAWS educational approach As JAWS expands beyond its two-seminar Joint Staff and combatant commands with with a true “seminar collaborative learning construct, it will contribute more skilled officers trained in joint planning processes platform” classroom. The location enables innovators and joint planners to the joint who can perform critical analysis in applying a high degree of ongoing collaboration with specialty officer population and more agents all aspects of national power across the full nearby Joint Forces Command, the Joint of transformation. If the reports received range of military operations. Graduates will Warfighting Center, Allied Command Trans- from graduates are any indication, the need be capable of synergistically combining exist- formation, and a host of other joint, Service, for JAWS-educated personnel will increase ing and emerging capabilities in time, space, support, and contractor activities in the sharply in coming years. The future of the and purpose to accomplish operational and Tidewater area. program promises to be one of learning, strategic objectives. Of the 25 graduates from The curriculum focuses on high- growth, and innovation. JFQ the inaugural class, 18 were immediately end operational art and transformational assigned to key billets at combatant com- thought. This specific and concentrated For more information contact: mands and on the Joint Staff. Several are emphasis allows in-depth immersion and already leading campaign planning efforts at applied rigor. The curriculum further COL Fred Kienle, USA various joint headquarters. These graduates endeavors to strike a balance between opera- Joint Advanced Warfighting School will bring their education and broad experi- tional and strategic studies, and between Joint Forces Staff College ence to the joint community and contribute warfighting and war preparation. The inter- Phone 757–443–6300 their talents throughout their careers. In related core courses—Foundations in Theory Email: [email protected] essence, they will be agents for innovation of War, Strategic Foundations, and Opera- Online: JAWS educates selected O–4s and O–5s developmental framework. By emphasizing in the art and science of joint, interagency, problem solving and decisionmaking within and multinational planning and warfighting the specific context of the joint operations at the strategic-operational nexus of war as concepts, emerging transformational ideas, directed by the CJCS Officer Professional and adaptive planning, JAWS will strive to Military Education Policy. The students, produce world-class joint planners prepared ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 59 FEATURES The “Golden Hour” Standard

Trauma surgeons treating patient at Camp Taqaddam

Transforming Combat Health Support U.S. Marine Corps (Jim Goodwin)

By G u y S. S t r a w d e r

ontinuous improvement in last. At the heart of that conviction is the hour. While this standard may have formed immediate, life-saving treatment standard to which the entire brotherhood of the foundation of the Nation’s civilian emer- on the battlefield is an institu- military medicine must hold itself person- gency medical service, it is forever rooted C tional obsession within military ally accountable: the golden hour, broadly in the battlefield experiences of the military medicine. Combat medics, corpsmen, nurses, the first 60 minutes following trauma or the health system (MHS) in the previous century. and surgeons return from contingency onset of acute illness. The chances of survival Military medicine’s commitment to missions determined to save lives in future are greatest if surgery or advanced trauma high standards and its mission, along with wars that were just beyond their reach in the life support can be provided within that the experience derived in combat, has consis- tently produced major contributions to the Lieutenant Colonel Guy S. Strawder, USA, is Director of the Prime Operations Division, TRICARE larger body of medicine and increased under- Management Activity. standing in advanced trauma care, burn

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therapy, and emergency surgery. According effectively reduce mortality and morbidity. trauma life support. Actually, 67 percent to the U.S. Surgeon General, Vice Admiral Unfortunately, we have yet to achieve the die within the first 30 minutes, creating Richard Carmona, a former Special Forces attributes of a genuine joint system that even more urgency for rapid access of the medic in Vietnam: takes full advantage of all Service capabili- wounded by level I and II medical person- ties. Despite incremental improvements, the nel.4 An estimated half of the total die due to Military medicine has led civilian medicine in medical forces in the Services continue to exsanguination (bleeding to death). Success many ways; particularly since World War II, function more as a composite, contingency remains firmly affixed to bringing the full when the generation before us first developed organization rather than a single, seamless, measure of medicine to bear within that first ways to provide combat casualty care as close interoperable CHS system. 60 minutes. to the battlefield as possible. . . . Military We continue to collect and process the surgeons in all branches since the Civil War The Current System medical lessons learned from Operations have led the way in improving the health of Creating this transformed joint CHS Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, but the Nation through their wartime experiences. system must begin with a common vision two themes are clearly emerging. First, in From sanitation to infectious disease and and a standard objective. First and foremost, spite of the outmoded design and struc- combat casualty care, this country owes the military a huge debt of gratitude.1 there remains a disconnect between the increased sophistication of our treatment capabilities and the combat More recent MHS efforts have empha- sized advancements in communications, health support system that employs them information technologies that facilitate decisionmaking, the miniaturization of diag- it should emphasize structuring our opera- ture of the CHS system, we are gradually nostic and therapeutic equipment to increase tions and doctrine around the golden hour as migrating toward increased emphasis on our capabilities in austere environments, and the center of gravity, because the 60 minutes deliberate joint operational planning and the advanced training of combat medics to following trauma remain the principal execution. Second, our Service operational enable them to function more independently standard that dictates the system’s ultimate planners are organizing medical resources in saving lives. Despite these profound success or failure. Historically, wound data with increasing regard to the actual point enhancements in military medicine, however, and casualty rates indicate that more than 90 of injury and adopting a philosophy of far- there remains a disconnect between the percent of all casualties die within the first forward placement of assets—in essence, to increased sophistication of our treatment hour of severe wounding without advanced beat the golden hour. Both of these evolu- capabilities and the combat health support (CHS) system that employs them. Figure 1 The current CHS architecture is gen- erally planned and arrayed in five distinct Levels of Combat Health Support levels for a contingency operation, which FLOT FLOT may extend from the forward line of troops Level I. Includes self-aid, buddy aid, and combat lifesaver skills. Also includes Transforming Combat Health Support (FLOT) all the way to the “brick-and-mortar” emergency medical treatment provided by combat medics and corpsmen and advanced military and Veterans Affairs hospitals trauma management provided by physicians and physician assistants. Highest level treatment capability: Army medical platoons (battalion aid stations) and USMC shock

located in the United States. Each higher I

trauma platoons. ncreasing T level represents an increased sophistication Level II. Includes physician-directed resuscitation, advanced trauma management, in treatment capability, but a decreasing emergency medical procedures, and forward resuscitative surgery. Supporting capabilities may include basic laboratory, radiology, pharmacy, dental, limited blood

capability with regard to tactical mobility and re ivability products, and temporary patient holding facilities. Highest level treatment capability: at v survivability. Joint and Service doctrinal defi- Army division-level medical support, USMC Level II asset is the surgical company, ment C nitions for each level of care vary marginally and USAF EMEDS Basic and EMEDS +10. lity/Sur ap

due to Service-specific support requirements, bi Level III. Includes resuscitation, initial wound surgery, postoperative care, and more ab

Mo advanced ancillary services. May also include restoration of functional health but they essentially complement one another. il l (definitive care). Highest level treatment capability: Army combat support hospitals, ity & P Each level is characterized by the features ca Navy and USMC fleet hospitals, and USAF EMEDS +25.

2 acti listed in figure 1. at

Level IV. Includes rehabilitative and recovery therapy for those who may return to ie The CHS system is represented by duty if convalescence from injury does not exceed the established theater evacuation nt M policy. This level of care is becoming less prevalent in contemporary warfare and this architecture and the sum total of all the ovement

ncreasing T ncreasing battlefield patient management. Highest level treatment capability: Army field I military’s structures, personnel, assets, and hospitals, general hospitals, and combat support hospital echelon above corps. equipment organized for the purpose of C O N U S maintaining a fit force, preventing casual- Level V. Includes the full range of acute convalescent, restorative, and rehabilitative ties, and treating the wounded.3 Ideally, this care. Highest level treatment capability: permanent military or Veterans Affairs hospitals or civilian hospitals that have committed beds for the National Defense system should be able to exploit technologies Medical System. and advanced practices—both medical and otherwise—and apply them in battlespace at the appropriate point and time to most

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tions, however, can be largely credited to Respiratory therapist checking Iraqi the creativity of commanders at the tactical soldier at Air Force theater hospital and operational levels, who must often plan at Balad Air Base, Iraq around the inefficiencies of the present CHS system design. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in a speech on transformation at the National Defense University in January 2002, cited the success of the German military, which was technically only “10 or 15 percent transformed,” with its use of Blitzkrieg in World War II: “What was revolutionary and unprecedented about the Blitzkrieg was not doctrine continues to work in contradiction to innovations the new capabilities the Germans employed, but rather the unprecedented and revolution- ary way that they mixed new and existing capabilities.”5 The essential components for a revolu- tionary change in the combat health system are similarly achievable today. In instances during Iraqi Freedom where units were thinking far-forward and joint, the successes were monumental and were responsible for a died-of-wounds rate of about 1 percent. The Air Force changed its doctrine to configure any available airframe in theater to transport casualties and went so far as to conduct aeromedical evacuations directly from level II facilities in the brigade area of operations. Far-forward surgery enjoyed unprecedented success. Forward Resuscitative Surgical Squads supporting the Marine Corps lost none of the casualties they received. For the first time ever, the Army attached a forward surgical team with every brigade commit- ted. In certain circumstances, surgical assets were collocated with battalion aid stations.

Some Army medical evacuation aircraft News (Lance Cheung) Air Force were positioned closer to maneuver units to facilitate immediate launch and move- ment of casualties from collection points to where the value of modernizing each compo- stated, we have to become “light, lean, and definitive care facilities. Information systems nent is maximized. Genuine transformation responsive.” Over recent years, this has were fielded as far forward as the level I and means changing the shape, design, and even become a euphemism for force reduction. level II units to provide surveillance against functional processes to respond to global Yet a strong case can be made within the emerging medical threats throughout the shifts in technology, environment, and geo- context of current strategic requirements theater. Improved equipment and therapeu- politics. The charge against the military has that medical personnel (along with military tics, including the use of fibrin-impregnated always been that we continue to fight the last police, engineers, and civil affairs) should bandages, were credited with saving lives that war. Transformation requires the vision to expand. Whether the requirement is for once would have been lost. see the next war and the boldness to pursue humanitarian assistance, stability opera- Unfortunately, doctrine continues to the changes necessary to ensure success. tions, or intense combat, a robust medical work in contradiction to these innovations. It As Lieutenant General George capability has become indispensable for is possible to arrive at a point in every system Taylor, the Air Force Surgeon General, has every contingency.

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Nonetheless, the present system has Soldiers providing first aid to victim not changed remarkably since World War after attack in Tal Afar, Iraq II. Largely designed by Colonel Edward Churchill, USA, around his concept of wound management, the medical support system “allowed forward hospitals to be more mobile, and concentrated more resource- intensive casualty care far to the rear in secure base areas where evacuation hospi- tals [would not be] required to move with changing tactical situations.”6 The primary objective of this concept was to maximize the number of Servicemembers we could return to duty in theater and was embedded in an operational precept that valued mass over speed as a principal of war. Today, we need medical units that are capable of rapid force projection and, once in theater, can enjoin an operational tempo that adversaries cannot sustain. We need flexible and adaptable units that can morph and function as commanders choose to dictate conditions and tempo on the battlefield. By creating this high-velocity environment, we can control the enemy’s decision cycle and force him to wage a war he Fleet Combat Camera Group, Pacific (Alan D. Monyelle) ultimately cannot win. To accomplish this, every battlefield operating system must be able to meet these preconditions of speed and enable the CHS system to catch up with the gies envisioned by the Army Medical Depart- adaptability. Without substantial change, the other battlefield operating systems. The most ment will undoubtedly improve operational current combat health support system will disturbing finding was: capabilities and save lives, but their effective- not meet that challenge. ness will be limited if they are incorporated In 2003, RAND completed a study The fact that the HSS [health service support] into an outmoded organizational design. The that followed several Army transformation assets available to the future force UA [unit organizational structure for combat health support must be engineered to meet the there is perhaps no function on the battlefield with known and expected challenges of planned more potential for exploiting joint capabilities than the contingencies, yet flexible enough to respond to less predictable scenarios. The design that combat health support system is currently welded into the Army’s transfor- mation plans has been adequate for the past exercises to assess “the medical risks associ- of action] battalion in this scenario (that is, two decades but does not seem sufficient to ated with emerging Army operational con- all brigade assets, a CHS at division, and all meet the demands of the near future. cepts and the capacity of the Army Medical the aerial medical evacuation assets allocated Department to mitigate these risks.”7 In to the division) were probably more than Transform and Perform essence, RAND’s charter was to determine what would reasonably be expected suggests For purposes of describing a general if the envisioned CHS system was adequate that the HSS systems portrayed in these three concept of CHS transformation, the model for future Army combat operations. Their workshops, even in optimized and undegraded proposed here uses the Army’s maneuver conclusion was, “Probably not.” In the states, were inadequate.8 brigade as its organizational structure; exercises they followed, the CHS system was however, it likely is equally applicable to the overwhelmed with scenarios that introduced The most recent transformation efforts Marine expeditionary brigade. The three only modest casualties. Critical capabilities of the Army Medical Department include main recommendations below are especially such as surgical capacity, evacuation assets, plans for a more robust command and relevant to the Army’s vision in the creation and logistics were quickly exhausted. Further, control structure for brigade-level medical of brigade units of action. Ultimately, these the health service architecture evaluated CHS, but, by and large, the fundamental brigades will replace the division as the represented a “best-case scenario,” and under elements do not appear to have changed primary Army warfighting unit, and the more realistic circumstances the outcomes from 20 years ago. If we truly desire brigade- CHS system that supports them must be would have been even worse. In fact, the centric organizations, the medical support reengineered to support this doctrinal shift. exercises required an operational pause to structure must be enhanced. The technolo- All the battlefield operating systems in these ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 63 the “ g o l d e n h o ur ” sta n d ar d brigades must have command and control lary services, such as preventive medicine, prevention of casualties (such as medical capabilities to operate independently, unit dental support, laboratory, and radiology. intelligence reports and digitized surveillance architecture that allows them to deploy flex- A generic organizational design proposal is of the area of operations), and providing a ibly, and subordinate units that can project provided in figure 2. more effective life-saving capability for his rapidly and sustain significant combat power. This direct command relationship wounded Soldiers or Marines. Moreover, this redesign must support the would provide the maneuver brigade com- A more subtle but no less important ability to perform in a more joint fashion. mander with a comprehensive treatment and advantage in this transformational design There is perhaps no function on the battle- surgical capability allowing him to function is the mentoring and professional develop- field with more potential for exploiting joint independently from the forward support bat- ment that a medical battalion commander capabilities than the CHS system. talion. He owns the assets. Additionally, the provides to junior medical operations Expand level II medical support. medical battalion commander would have a officers in the maneuver brigades. Today’s Brigadier General Edward Usher, USMC, vantage that allows him to view and direct all medical company commander must be able the Commanding General of the 1st Force available medical assets consistent with the to: predict areas of casualty density, evaluate Service Support Group, I Marine Expedi- brigade maneuver plan in order to weigh the routes of evacuation and plan casualty collec- tionary Force, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, main effort of the operation and to reposi- tion points for use during the fight, deconflict has praised the performance of the forward tion them in real time as conditions change airspace management for aeromedical evacu- resuscitative surgical squads that accom- on the battlefield. Above all, a medical ation routes with the brigade aviation liaison panied their level II medical units in direct battalion commander provides a seasoned officer, determine how to tailor limited support of Marines engaged in combat: “I leader on the brigade staff to integrate the resources while still supporting the main didn’t want to take them to war, but now I combat support planning into the maneuver effort, evaluate and coordinate the necessity wouldn’t go to war without them.”9 Every plan. He is also directly accountable to the for additional corps assets, plan and operate combat unit that directly witnesses a fully brigade commander for the plans and poli- communications networks, precoordinate all equipped and prepared medical support cies that maintain a healthy and fit force (for fixed and rotary-wing aeromedical evacua- force at work can immediately appreciate its example, vaccinations and dental readiness), tion support, synchronize the efforts of every overwhelming value. I propose an organizational design that would include a medical battalion as organic Figure 2 to the maneuver brigades. Medical platoons need to expand to company-sized elements. Proposed Organizational Design for Combat Health Support These medical companies would provide suf- in the Brigade Units of Action ficient personnel to:

n outfit the rifle companies with a full complement of combat medics n increase evacuation assets to support multiple casualty collection points SURG n adequately staff a battalion aid station to execute split-team operations OPT n provide medics for widely dispersed operational areas with regular support to DENT scouts, mortars, and antitank units (which are not currently authorized organic medical support) BH n transition the company’s mission to area support for humanitarian civic assis- tance actions following combat operations. TMT TMT TMT

LEGEND Each of these medical companies Command & Control EVAC EVAC EVAC would continue to maintain a direct support Operational Alignment relationship to the maneuver battalions as TMT Treatment (Advanced Trauma Life Support) the medical platoons do now, but they would EVAC Evacuation CM CM CM ultimately come under the command and CM Combat Medics control of a medical battalion commander BH Behavioral Health on the maneuver brigade commander’s staff. OPT Optometry Services DENT Dental Services Assets under the immediate control of the SURG Surgery medical battalion commander would include a forward surgical capability and other ancil-

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Sailors evacuate wounded Iraqi soldier during Operation Steel Curtain Marine Division Combat Camera (Michael R. McMaugh) st 1 Download as wallpaper at ndupress.ndu.edu. medical platoon and section in the brigade for combined arms operations, and tech- 2010/2020. While the operational concepts area of operations, and other activities—all nologies along with it, but the CHS system of that effort have had some influence on before the first shot is fired. It is a daunt- remains largely ensconced in the more dated subsequent operations, the force structure of ing responsibility for a young captain who paradigm. level III medical facilities has not experienced likely has received little mentorship from a The shortcomings in level III hos- commensurate change. seasoned medical service corps officer during pitals have become increasingly apparent The Force Health Protection compo- his career. Clearly, the operational constraint as combat operations and tactics advance. nent of Joint Vision 2010 advocated a single of the golden hour separates combat health After-action reviews from Afghanistan and joint theater hospital design that could be support from every other logistic function. Iraq, from both medical leadership and the adopted by all Services. This new level III Establish the joint theater hospital. This line, continue to lament the lack of modular- facility would be capable of providing essen- emphasis on the golden hour and level I ity and scalability of hospitals. The current tial care in theater, as opposed to the more and II units does not suggest a diminished design of Army combat support hospitals comprehensive care that could be gotten role for level III hospitals. It does, however, and Navy fleet hospitals is a Cold War relic: from existing combat support hospitals and point to a fundamentally different and more massive unit assemblages that are incapable fleet hospitals. The concept offers countless dynamic role than present doctrine allows. of rapid force projection, immobile once advantages over the current design. By focus- Five levels of care have been historically they arrive in theater, incapable of echeloned ing on essential care of casualties, a joint arranged, both tactically and operationally, movement to maintain continuity of support theater hospital could dramatically reduce to support a large, static, and linear theater for maneuver units, and designed so rigidly weight and cubic volume of its equipment of war and to displace casualties accord- that it is virtually impossible to tailor them and supplies to facilitate more rapid deploy- ing to the severity of their conditions. The to changing conditions on a high-tempo ment in support of contingency operations. primary objective of the present CHS system battlefield. A conceptual design for a joint Furthermore, a joint theater hospital is to maximize the return-to-duty rate to theater hospital was outlined by the Joint must assume a modular design that enables maintain as many warfighters in the combat Staff in 1997, the product of an enormous tri- the unit to deploy in echelons. This pro- zone as possible. Doctrine has since changed Service effort under the rubric of Joint Vision vides two advantages. First, a small level III ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 65 the “ g o l d e n h o ur ” sta n d ar d capability could be quickly inserted with aeromedical evacuation assets that provide maintenance are more easily facilitated when rapid deployment combat forces to provide more sophisticated clinical capability for en the whole CHS system is operating under a surgery, patient hold, and a more definitive route care. Recent experiences in Operation common set of requirements. The greatest care capability consistent with requirements Iraqi Freedom, however, indicate that the Air benefit is the potential to leverage the entire for the combat force buildup. Second, once Force may be prepared for this challenge. inventory of medical personnel across the a hospital is fully deployed in theater, it can New changes in aeromedical evacuation MHS to staff these hospitals. Service-specific requirements are less pronounced beyond once units across all Services are equally equipped, the division rear boundary. The unit of trained, and functioning as joint hospitals, productivity is essentially the same—treating the wounds and saving the lives of individual any Service could support the casualty flows from Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. Once brigade medical units units across all Services are equally equipped, trained, and functioning as joint hospitals, move in sections (or echelons) to support doctrine, equipment, and organization are any Service could support the casualty flows the advance or other offensive operations well synchronized with the demands of this from brigade medical units. of combat forces. This creates a tactical transformed combat health system. Streamline five levels of care to three. advantage that is impossible under existing A single joint design also enhances By expanding the resources of level II units, designs. It also offers greater flexibility to interoperability between the Services. creating a more dynamic level III capability, commanders for quickly tailoring medical Combatant commanders and staff, as well emphasizing en route patient care to sustain units for a broad range of contingencies— as strategic movement planners, would now stabilized patients, and using definitive fixed whether humanitarian assistance actions, recognize a lone menu of options for hospital facilities outside of the combat zone, we can stability operations, or more intense combat support, irrespective of Service color, to now pare the five-level system to three levels. operations. support the different phases of a given opera- Level I would represent brigade (division) The joint theater hospital, by necessity, tion. Medical logistic support, biomedical level medical support, with no distinction would be more dependent on responsive maintenance repair, and general support between the battalion aid station and medical

Soldier and medic preparing for security convoy, Operation Iraqi Freedom Combat Camera Squadron (Sarayuth Pinthong) Combat Camera Squadron st 1

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company capability since the full Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter visiting complement of advanced trauma Marine at National Naval Medical Center in and surgical care is organic to Bethesda, Maryland the medical battalion and can be employed wherever the battlefield dictates. Level II would represent the stabilizing care capability pro- vided by the joint theater hospital. Level III would provide definitive care and is represented by any fixed facility positioned beyond the combat zone.

Tenets for Critical Thinking Transformation of any system must begin with a vision. General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has stated, “I will tell you categorically that if we change none of our toys and simply change the way we think about how to apply them, we will have transfor- mation on a very, very fast pace.”10 It 1st Combat Camera Squadron (Sarayuth Pinthong) would be easier to continue on our current path and accept incremental change casualties can be furnished by all medical tion, Medical and Rehabilitative Care,” Force Health to the current design, particularly given our evacuation teams (ground and air), both Protection Capstone Document, available at . 4 CHS transformation will invite controversy. care can be given by fixed facilities positioned Russ Zajtchuk and Gordon R. Sullivan, An article in Army Magazine stated, “Army outside the combat zone. “Battlefield Trauma Care: Focus on Advanced Tech- nology,” Military Medicine 160 (January 1995), 2. leaders must create an environment where n We must beat the clock. We have only 5 Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Remarks as Deliv- critical thinking is the norm and reasoned recently explored the advantages of forcing ered by the Secretary of Defense, National Defense 11 debate replaces unspoken dissent.” the full impact of American medicine into University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, Can those who represent the MHS find that first 60 minutes following trauma on January 31, 2002,” available at . experience, and intellect to create a dynamic every minute is golden. 6 Thomas E. Bowen, Emergency War medical system that will more effectively Surgery: Second United States Revision of the Emer- serve the next generation of warfighters? Every attempt to press the limits of gency War Surgery NATO Handbook (Washington, Ideally, this discussion will provide a point these tenets will result in a more responsive DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), 1–2. 7 of departure for further discourse, but and joint CHS system that meets the chal- David E. Johnson and Gary Cecchine, perhaps most will agree on at least the fol- lenges of the golden hour standard. The true Conserving the Future Force Fighting Strength: Findings from the Army Medical Department Trans- lowing tenets: benefit will be the lives saved. JFQ formation Workshops, 2002 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), xiii. n NOTES The design of the combat health 8 Ibid., 29. support system must be capable of enjoining 9 Joel Lees, presentation as delivered on the 1 an operational tempo commensurate with Richard H. Carmona, “The Role of Mili- I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Warfighters that of the combat forces we support. tary Medicine in Civilian Emergency Response,” Medical Lessons Learned, Operation Iraqi Freedom n We must commit ourselves to becom- available at . VA, September 24–25, 2004. 2 See Department of the Army, Field Manual 10 a seamless system that leverages Service Rumsfeld. 8–10–6, Medical Evacuation in a Theater of Opera- 11 core competencies for the entire theater and David A. Fastabend and Robert H. tions: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Washing- maximizes economies of scale for competen- Simpson, “The Imperative for a Culture of Inno- ton, DC: Government Printing Office, 2000), 1–8 vation in the U.S. Army: Adapt or Die,” Army cies that are not Service-specific. through 1–10. See also Joint Publication 4–02, Doc- Magazine 54, no. 2 (February 2004), available at n Medical assets must be planned and trine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations, . ation allows. dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp4_02.pdf>. n Essential care must be provided in 3 The Joint Staff, “Force Health Protection: theater; effective en route care that sustains A Healthy and Fit Force, Prevention and Protec- ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 67 f e a t u r e s Integrated Coercive Strategies and the Role of the Air Component

AV–8B launching from F–15E banking after strafing USS Kearsarge in the target, Exercise Excalibur Persian Gulf

USS Kearsarge (Finley Williams) 48th Communications Squadron (Jessica Struble)

By M E R R I C K E. K R A U S E

n the late 19th century, Hans Delbrück ment, and particularly joint aerospace power, military force is deep-seated in contemporary described war in terms of annihilation is a vital tool for coercing enemy decision- American culture. Embedded reporters in and exhaustion.1 A century later, after makers. Then it proposes a simple model that Iraq and the administration’s measured Ithe advent of airplanes, access to space, leaders and strategists might consider when response after the 9/11 terrorist attacks computers, nuclear weapons, computers, and planning coercive campaigns. This treatment provide compelling evidence. the information revolution, strategists intro- is not a debate over decisiveness or Service The United States did not rush head- duced a new paradigm, effects-based opera- roles and missions. long into battle. Military and civilian leaders tions. This concept suggests a new national If one accepts Carl von Clausewitz’s alike attempted to limit direct and unin- objective: control of an enemy. Control is a idea that war is politics, then political reali- tended negative impact on innocents while contemporary, efficient, and humane goal. ties must bound the use of force. So, assum- destroying regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. It stands in stark contrast to the traditional ing that the United States will be forced into The targets were the enemy government’s and perhaps dogmatic military objectives of conflicts in coming years, the most likely dis- pillars of power, not the populace. Wholesale annihilating an enemy’s army or engaging in putes will be characterized by limited means destruction of civil infrastructure and wanton costly wars of attrition.2 and ends. Today, the air component—joint killing of innocent civilians were avoided Given the current constrained fiscal and coalition aerospace power—often pro- through careful planning, adaptive training, environment and limited goals as features vides lower-cost and lower-risk coercive and precise execution. U.S.-led coalitions of the most likely future conflict scenarios, action. thus toppled two hostile rogue regimes in 2 this article provides a simple conceptual lens Difficult strategic situations require years; then, in a uniquely American way of through which to plan or analyze coercive decisionmakers to use limited means to leading war, vast amounts of humanitarian operations. Keeping the objective of control change an adversary’s behavior. It is not support were provided to the people while in mind, it asserts that the military instru- hyperbole to state that the use of limited military operations were engaged against ter- rorists, enemy combatants, and rogue regime Colonel Merrick E. Krause, USAF, is Editor of Joint Force Quarterly and Director of National Defense leaders, often simultaneously. University Press.

68 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Krause Integrated Coercive Strategies and the Role of the Air Component

AH–64 providing close air support, FA–18s and F–14 in Operation Enduring Freedom combat mission over Iraq

1st Combat Camera Squadron (Aaron Allmon) 125th Fighter Wing (Lee O. Tucker) Download all 4 photos as wallpaper at ndupress.ndu.edu.

This emphasis on exhaustive analysis, against innocents in an age of rapid commu- power—hence the need to orchestrate the careful planning, and limited force is a result nication, travel, and proliferation of advanced instruments of national power. of tradition, American values, alliances, weapons technology. A fanatical disregard for cooperative security responsibilities, global- the safety of their followers or compatriots Instruments of Power Bound ization, politics, and the complexity of the and a desire to kill innocents make today’s Many senior U.S. Government and current strategic environment. Fortunately, terrorists and rogue leaders dangerous and military leaders recognize that coercion will technology enables more discriminating difficult to thwart. be achieved more effectively by coordinating combat power for those willing to invest in For American leaders and command- a variety of instruments of national power. it. Regardless of technical marvels and super- ers, balancing risk with national interests, Each case is different, but contemporary power status, however, today’s enemies seek international political concerns, media, and international confrontations, at least on the nothing short of the destruction Western side, are unfail- of the Western way of life—a leaders attempted to limit direct and ingly bounded by political critical planning factor when unintended negative impact on innocents while restraints, both domestic and comparing will and popular coalition. Military strategies support and considering useful destroying regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq must therefore consider a potential strategies against variety of political factors enemies. other factors is ultimately trumped by the to avoid international condemnation or Although the stakes are high, Americans threat posed by weapons of mass destruction long-term diplomatic and economic reper- prefer limited means to achieve carefully and the real potential for rapid escalation of a cussions while recognizing the necessity to selected objectives. However, a limited war regional conflict. Depending on the situation protect U.S. vital interests. The bounds of for the United States may be a total war for and specific national interests threatened, current political acceptability and American an adversary. Since contemporary enemies, a tailored application of limited force can ethics are necessary elements of any respon- terrorists, and the states that support them contribute to efforts to coerce an adversary sible discussion of the limited employment are not constrained by concern for human life while actually reducing the potential for of U.S. power. and civil rights, strikes against any American escalation.3 In sum, a limited conflict can be Political boundaries limiting military interest or ally are possible. Extremists and a high-stakes contest because of the realities options are not new. Hans Delbrück, a rogue state supporters encourage attacks of modern global politics, economics, and student of Clausewitz, noted this idea a

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Norwegian F–16 over former Yugoslavia, larly useful for destroying objects to produce Operation Allied Force desired effects, it is likely that use of joint or coalition aerospace power would produce a materiel loss for an enemy. This loss could include eliminating individuals in leadership command positions, as well as destroying fielded or garrisoned military forces and, in some cases, civil or military infrastructure. Aerospace power is emphasized in this treatment because the range, speed, surprise, and power of weapons used in that medium enable them to attack directly and affect an adversary’s pillars of power with incredible accuracy and at relatively low military and political risk. For example, what is commonly considered the opening shot of Operation Iraqi Freedom was an airstrike in Baghdad against a leadership target. It was at least partly successful even though the battle damage estimate was inconclusive. This same

U.S. Air Force (Gregg L. Davis) airstrike, however, also served to cause con- fusion and fear in the minds of the leaders, reducing their grip on power—a difficult century ago: “After a careful consideration Working in a coalition environment, effect to measure but one that was never- of all circumstances—the aim of the war, the when moving from the political, diplomatic, theless observable. The reduction in Iraqi combat forces, the political repercussions, economic, and informational realms to the command, control, and communications the individuality of the enemy commander, military instrument, low-risk and low-cost capabilities certainly contributed to the rapid and of the government and people of the options are particularly important to main- dissolution of the military. enemy, as well as his own—the general must tain cohesion and avoid rapid, divisive esca- Military force, aerospace power in decide whether a battle is advisable or not.”4 lation to large-scale war. This is why aero- particular, is well suited to cause the adver- Thus, when a U.S. leader elects to space power force projection options, such as sary to react with fear. Initially, it is fear of employ military force to support national precision strike and bombardment (but not an attack, whether a preemptive strike or a interests, in concert with other response to provocation. Then the instruments of power, wide- the key to an effective operational fear changes to a dread of further ranging approaches exist to change strategy is understanding the mechanisms actions. Both mechanisms are an adversary’s behavior.5 Among inexorably linked. As Clausewitz them are many combinations of that effect desired behavior said, “The effects of physical and diplomatic, informational, military, psychological factors form an and economic responses. The coercive meth- excluding supply and humanitarian assis- organic whole . . . in formulating any rule odology depends on the desired endstate tance), are so attractive to leaders as relatively concerning physical factors, the theorist must and, more immediately, near-term objec- low-risk, low-cost military actions—they are bear in mind the part that moral [morale] tives. Furthermore, the international envi- akin to dipping a toe into a shark tank. The factors may play in it.”6 ronment shapes American responses and the key to an effective operational strategy, then, The modern U.S. interpretation of the weight of the emphasis of each instrument is understanding the mechanisms that effect fear mechanism does not imply terrorizing of power. desired behavior, tempered with the knowl- the populace or collapsing a country’s civil American leaders prefer to operate edge that war is not surgery and 500-pound infrastructure. Fear in this context functions under the auspices of the United Nations or bombs are not scalpels. in the minds of the enemy leadership, and a coalition to effect changes in the behavior it influences their decisionmaking process of adversaries. Operating within the bounds Two Mechanisms and behavior. Those who resist using the of coalition and international politics pro- Reducing coercion through force to its fear mechanism fail to understand modern vides legitimacy for decisions and increases essence, the military instrument brings about American employment. They rely on the domestic and international support. This change in an adversary or its leaders’ behav- tired canard, “One man’s terrorist is another inoculation may inhibit some short-term ior—control in the new parlance—through man’s freedom fighter,” a vacuous retort objectives, but coalition-building generally two fundamental mechanisms: fear and loss. arguing for moral relativism. Terrorizing favors a sustainable long-term strategy by Since the first acknowledged offensive force civilians is unacceptable in the contemporary garnering popular support and educating the arrives by air (even if that airpower is trans- American psyche and in the coalition against public to the risks of inaction. ported by sea), and airpower itself is particu- terror, while creating fear and uncertainty in

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or defensive position. In a democracy, it also depends on the will of the people and civilian leaders. For example, since Operation Delib- erate Force in Bosnia in 1995, some state and nonstate adversaries have used human shields (innocents or prisoners held as hos- tages to deter U.S. military action). This strat- egy specifically targets a perceived American weakness: valuing human life. In these cases, aerial bombardment may be physically pos- sible but not politically or ethically viable, so another instrument may be more useful. Also, nonlethal or indirect options may be available to cause politically acceptable attri- tion, though international law prohibits some modern nonlethal technologies. Loss may also directly affect an adversary’s military or economic capabil- ity, removing an enemy leader’s options by reducing his military power, wealth, or Marine during battle damage influence. However, it is critical to determine assessment mission in Fallujah if the enemy is vulnerable to the politically Marine Air Wing (Richard A. Hilario) d 3 acceptable and legally supported use of aerospace power. Therefore, intelligence and diplomatic efforts are essential to make an the minds of enemy leaders is acceptable. The the attrition or depletion of a commodity ultimatum or conditions clear to the adver- fear mechanism, then, necessarily focuses on or item that is valuable to the enemy. This sary while permitting a response tailored influencing adversary leaders, not crushing deprivation is typically quantifiable, and to compel the outcome with minimal cost, or exploiting an already oppressed and pre- measures of merit or effectiveness are often effort, and loss of life. sumably powerless civilian populace. straightforward. Some call a strategy empha- The need to minimize civilian casual- The enabler of this stratagem is tech- sizing this mechanism denial.7 Others speak ties, collateral damage, and negative political nology, a distinct asymmetric American in terms of counterforce or countervalue consequences may inhibit the ability to advantage. Technology permits joint and targeting, depending on the goal.8 Simple coerce or use airborne weapons.11 Bombing is coalition aerospace power to provide pin- attrition may also of limited use if civil- point accuracy only dreamed of in the 1930s, be part of a strategy aerial bombardment may ians are at risk or the when the Army Air Corps hotly debated emphasizing punish- be physically possible but not targets are located strategic bombardment and industrial web ment, or military where unacceptable theory. America and its allies have since destruction intended politically or ethically viable collateral damage modernized their practices to exploit new to send a message of would be unavoid- capabilities and, as a result, saturation resolve, or even actions to encourage civilian able. In cases where the loss of life would be bombing and fire bombing of cities are not disaffection, revolution, or a coup. Loss is minimal, or the interest is particularly vital, required or desired to achieve necessary not viable as a stand-alone strategy under air attacks can prove effective. effects. As a result, U.S. policy can emphasize the modern U.S. construct that promotes life In scenarios short of an unlimited war avoiding civilian and unnecessary military and liberty; it simply describes a mechanism for national survival, the mechanism of loss casualties on both sides. This desire to mini- that creates desired effects and changes in has a practical need to focus primarily on mize death and widespread destruction may adversary behavior that lead to achieving destroying enemy forces and military targets. result in increased risk to American military specific objectives under a more comprehen- Infrastructure and leadership targets may be personnel and limit the ability to achieve sive national strategy.9 acceptable to attack if the political climate desired objectives. Thus, the mechanism of Regardless of the moniker and the allows. Yet enemies who possess fanatical fear is not terrorism; there is no intent to specific targets chosen, the desired effect of a ideologies or who, in their calculus, have no attack innocents (unlike the aims of such strategy emphasizing loss is reducing, deplet- acceptable options may not be susceptible groups as al Qaeda) but instead a deliber- ing, or wearing down something the enemy to coercion by loss. They may fight to the ate attempt to reduce national disruption leadership values.10 Furthermore, adversaries’ death. To avoid this endgame, Sun Tzu through influencing adversary leaders. susceptibility to coercion through attrition recommended leaving a bridge behind an The Mechanism of Loss. The most basic using aerospace power depends on their enemy. Ultimately, however, attrition pro- and obvious coercive mechanism, loss is desire to retain their troops, materiel, wealth, duces strategic effects by force and results in ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 71 IN t e GRA t e D C O E RCIV E S T RA t e GI E S

and psychological, a strategist might exploit Spectrum of Choices for Aerospace Power Application the enemy leaders’ fears to coerce them. Furthermore, if what they value is vulner- Relationship of Fear and Loss Mechanisms able to a politically acceptable attack by air forces, then relatively low-risk coercion by Attacks against military targets in aerospace power may be possible. Desert Strike, Desert Fox, Allied Force Assassinating an Contemporary Politically Viable Targets enemy leader Strategy and Targets Battle eld preparation during Desert Storm The loss and fear mechanisms are not A discrete; they overlap and synergistically con- G E tribute to a coercive strategy. A commander D manipulates these mechanisms, under the Fear B Loss Boundaries of auspices of a strategy designed to achieve Political Acceptability H C specific effects, by targeting enemy (and F Nuclear attack to axis—entities supporting the enemy) assets eliminate all and capabilities intended to create an envi- Attacking a presidential front-line troops palace or terrorist camp B–52 strikes against elded ronment favorable for coercion. Informed Taliban troops during and careful selection of targets for kinetic and Enduring Freedom Iraqi Freedom integrated air-land campaign nonkinetic attack will be more likely to lead to

Strikes against command the achievement of desired effects at accept- and control targets in able costs than wanton destruction or annihi- Iraqi Freedom lation of convenient, or all, enemy forces. When considering how to achieve desired effects, it is important to recognize that attacking/influencing certain targets Delbrück’s exhaustion of an enemy’s ability is attrition. But if that country values the port can produce unintended consequences, and to fight effectively. The cost, however, may be greatly, attacking selected port targets while some targets or methods of attack are physi- too high for modern Western sensibilities in threatening its long-term viability through cally possible but fall beyond the realm of most likely conflicts. diplomacy, psychological operations, and current political mores. Indeed, the essence The Mechanism of Fear (Morale or demonstrated military capability could be of effects-based operations is to determine Will). Realists anticipate that enemies use more efficient in the long term than destroy- desired effects and select the best ways to a cost-benefit analysis. Adversaries believe ing the entire facility and then rebuilding it.12 produce them under the given national they can benefit from war or they would not fight. A calculus may appear obscure to a unlike assassination, a politically acceptable option may be Western observer but seem perfectly logical attacking enemy command and control nodes to a fanatical adversary, based on culture, extremist values, brainwashing, indoctrina- For the adversary, this decision leverages the policy and strategy. Considering where the tion, or a unique situation. Intelligence tem- fear of future loss. planned conflict sits in relation to other pered with sensitivity to cultural differences Conversely, attacking fielded forces actions is a useful exercise for leaders, plan- is imperative during an analysis of intentions might be simple attrition. But destroying a ners, and strategists to bound the possible and motivations. Though fear is difficult to leader’s elite personal guard is a selective, with the approvable or likely. quantify, a qualitative analysis (incorporat- deliberate elimination of a valued military ing bounded rationality, game theory, or unit that reduces the adversary’s power Relationship of Fear and Loss prospect theory) can produce insights into beyond a statistical casualty count. Psycho- Mechanisms the decisionmaking process. The mechanism logical and information operations can build Threatening or attempting to kill an that deters aggression is fear—of material a synergy in these situations. This targeting enemy leader affects the fear mechanism loss, death, or loss of power. This mechanism strategy may effectively leverage the mecha- directly (figure, point A).13 It is not the killing can also help restrain escalation if deterrence nism of fear in regard to the leaders’ or the itself but the fear of death that may produce proves ineffective. remaining fielded forces. It is therefore a a coercive effect. If an enemy leader is killed, Destruction of different or fewer targets more indirect coercive mechanism than loss. the replacement knows his potential fate if he may be required to affect the fear mechanism To use the mechanism of fear, the remains recalcitrant. If the leader is not killed, rather than to affect the loss mechanism strategist must understand what adversary fear still increases the security demands of the through direct attrition. Moreover, it is more leaders value and fear. Strategists gain adversary leaders and complicates or disrupts economical than exhausting an enemy’s this information through intelligence, their decisionmaking process. military before one’s own forces or political analysis, and non-ethnocentric role-playing Such a direct approach, however, will are spent. For example, destroying a (wargaming or red-teaming). By deducing typically is not politically possible under the country’s principal port and all the ships in it an adversary’s vulnerabilities, both physical current policy and U.S. force employment

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B–2 operating in the USPACOM area of responsibility Communictions Squadron (Cecilio Ricardo) th 36

Download as wallpaper at ndupress.ndu.edu. paradigm. Attacking a militarily significant can cause significant material attrition as well Desert Fox operation degraded Iraq’s capabil- target that threatens a leader’s life directly as psychological effects against the adversary ity to threaten its neighbors while simultane- carries an implied message. Yet it might also leadership and fielded forces alike. Extensive ously sending a message of resolve. Neither eliminate the leader himself and hasten a new battlefield preparation with heavy bombers is of these actions was a stunning success, but strategic situation. For example, unlike assas- politically acceptable and can be devastating the extended air campaign over Serbia in sination, a politically acceptable option may physically and against enemy morale, as evi- 1999, Operation Allied Force, ended more be attacking enemy command and control denced by Operations Desert Storm in 1991 conclusively. In this operation, coalition nodes, such as command bunkers in presiden- and Enduring Freedom in 2001 and 2002 aerospace power reduced enemy military tial palaces or a terrorist camp headquarters (figure, point D). capability through attrition, forced disper- (figure, point B). The effect of disruption If planned well, a strategy balancing the sion, and eroded the will of adversary leaders is manifest, and a lucky strike may end the two mechanisms can generate the command- enough to force capitulation before invasion conflict. But a systemic collapse requires early er’s desired effects. Both the fear and loss became necessary. consideration and preparation, as do branches mechanisms are affected when a strategy calls In late 2001, Operation Enduring caused by unintended consequences, such as for attacks against targets in this overlapping Freedom demonstrated the employment reported or actual civilian collateral damage. region, though the strategy remains bounded possibilities of a new variety of aerospace A nuclear strike against fielded forces by shifting political restraints (figure, point and special operations forces (SOF) partner- intended to destroy an adversary’s military E). Retaliatory aerial attacks during the 1996 ing. This included heavy payload B–1 and capability and resistance is an extreme Desert Strike operation against Iraq serve B–52 bombers delivering huge amounts example of exploiting the loss mechanism as an example where loss through bombing of ordnance against Taliban fielded forces. (figure, point C). A brute force strategy this was intended, as was the fear of future loss Smaller payload joint surface attack and drastic is currently not a politically feasible or of a valuable resource. In this case, surface- fighter aircraft, often with the assistance of desirable use of American power in any but to-air missiles were the valued commodity. SOF ground troops, selectively reduced capa- the most profound circumstances. Moreover, a fear of further strikes (and the bilities, particularly in populated or urban Conventional weapons, delivered in resultant potential for future attrition) was areas (figure, point F).14 This was attrition large quantities with tremendous accuracy, intended to inhibit aggression. The 1998 through ground-assisted aerial bombard- ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 73 IN t e GRA t e D C O E RCIV E S T RA t e GI E S ment, and here the fear component was used tions, depending on the circumstance and the tainable expense. For example, some believed both to influence the enemy directly and to adversary’s value system. The selection of any that the Kosovo air campaign, Allied Force, deter other governments from harboring and strategic target, however, remains bounded would last just 3 days—though airpower supporting terrorists through the psychologi- by political constraints and the desired planners were dubious. As days turned into cal impact of near–real-time television and endstate. Moreover, some adversaries will be weeks, reality forced reassessment, and graphic images of coalition successes. more susceptible to one coercive mechanism the strategy necessarily shifted. The use of However, concomitantly with the than another. The specific targets identified regular North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- application of destructive force, the coalition to affect that mechanism depend on the tion ground forces, previously taken off the used nonkinetic aerospace power effectively. adversary’s governing system, leadership, table, had to be reconsidered, though it was This included psychological operations, and other contextual factors. The strategic art ultimately not necessary. Iraqi Freedom, on continual surveillance, communications, and resides in determining how to effect change the other hand, shows that the United States can still accept casualties for an extended aerospace power, other escalating military options, and period when the populace deems the objec- other instruments of national power must be tive valuable. Pervasive media and an around-the- coordinated to remain digestible to domestic clock news cycle, international law, and the and international audiences values of American citizens—casualty-sensi- tive if not casualty-adverse—influence both navigation, and distribution of humanitarian through manipulating all the instruments of the desired outcome and the mechanism aid. These noncombat functions demon- national power and the enemy’s vulnerabili- decisionmakers choose to exploit. Therefore, strated that bombardment was coordinated ties to them. the outcome and intermediate objectives to an unprecedented extent not only with must all be obtainable and legitimate. The SOF but also with other instruments of Tailored Strategy Basics mechanisms must be tailored to affect the national power. When planning or evaluating a coercive adversary in ways that are least costly and Operation Iraqi Freedom blurred strategy as a whole, it is important to remem- most beneficial to the coalition. The effects the traditional phasing of a conventional, ber the enemy’s perspective, avoid mirror- must directly relate to the targets chosen and limited war: an extended air campaign, imaging, and wargame the plan, considering should always relate to the strategy employed offers for diplomatic recourse, refusal, a land moves from friendly, enemy, and interested and the desired endstate. The synergistic campaign, then a period of stability under third-party perspectives. Fundamentally, effects of aerospace power, other escalating arms. Mere hours before the ground assault a successful coercive strategy must follow military options, and integration with other from the south, a precision weapon airstrike a careful analysis to determine if what the instruments of national power must be attacked a command and control target in adversary possesses is vulnerable to attack skillfully coordinated to remain palatable to Baghdad. Whether intended as a decapitation before deciding the means or medium. Iden- domestic and international audiences. or attrition strike against principal enemy tified effects, and then targets (or target sets), When contemplating force in a coercive decisionmakers by the coalition, it sent a must be established that would exploit the strategy and considering options led by the message exercising their fear component. coercive effects in the given situation. air component, leaders and commanders Although aerial bombardment did not kill Once the adversary’s values become must ask if aerospace power is the right the Iraqi dictator—the central command and evident, strategists should target or threaten tool. Analysis may indicate that the applica- control hub—he was rapidly rendered inef- selected, politically permissible items to max- tion of a tailored aerospace power strategy, fective. That disruption was apparent days imize the effects of limited allied resources. when coordinated with other instruments, later when Baghdad fell. Striking fleeting However, for the best long-term solution, can result in the change of the adversary’s targets with precision weapons was a dem- military force must be part of a coherent behavior. However, an analysis may also onstrated capability. Once the Iraqi Freedom strategy, usually in concert with diplomatic conclude that aerospace power, particularly ground thrust began from the south, com- actions, a strong economy, and a well-coor- aerial bombardment, is the wrong tool to manders were largely successful in integrat- dinated information campaign. The threat effect a change; therefore, alternative strate- ing land, sea, and air components on an of friendly casualties and international law gies are needed. The endstate, mechanisms, unprecedented scale (figure, point H). Other may limit the strategy and reduce acceptable and both domestic and international political simultaneous countrywide operations were target sets. In cases where threats or threaten- considerations are important topics to evalu- synchronized with the southern push, includ- ing attacks will not work, where “sending a ate in order to avoid using the wrong means ing joint air attacks supported by joint special message” is judged to be ineffective, attacks to achieve coercive ends. Even if aerospace forces in western Iraq and an extraordinary emphasizing attrition may produce coercive power is not the most effective tool for a airdrop of infantry forces in northern Iraq. effects, but at more cost in political capital given situation, its limited footprint and Strategists may choose to attack certain and national fortune. risk make it tempting. And as technology targets primarily to create fear and others to The willingness of the United States to improves, and when America’s joint air com- destroy materiel, devices, or troops to reduce accept casualties varies with the interests and ponent has a large uninhabited aerial vehicle an adversary’s military capability. Targets principles involved.15 Targeting thus varies element, leaders will be even more attracted produce loss and fear in different propor- with the situation, acceptable risk, and sus- to the perceived lower risk and cost option.

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7 Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win (Ithaca, Combat air controller calling in airstrike in NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 316. See Fallujah, Operation Iraqi Freedom Charles L. Glaser, “Why Do Strategists Disagree about the Requirements of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence?” in Nuclear Arguments, ed. Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 109–171, for more on counterforce and countervalue terminology, and the effects of targeting what an enemy values. 8 Jesse James and Matt Martin, “Chapter 5: Recommendations on Specific Nuclear Policy Issues,” in Beyond Deterrence: A Global Approach to Reducing Nuclear Dangers (Wash- ington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, July 2001), available at . This report presents a concise summary of the presented terms:

U.S. targeting strategy is based on counter- force and countervalue. Under a counterforce strategy military assets of a hostile state, both conventional and nuclear, are held at risk. A key component in the way we practiced nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, this strategy requires many weapons. A countervalue strategy holds populations, major industry, and leadership of a hostile Signal Company (Charles B. Johnson) d state at risk. It requires fewer weapons than 982 counterforce. Value of the Fear-and-Loss Model Indeed, the art (the “genius” in Clausewitzian 9 Rick Rowlett, “An Effects-Based Approach The value of considering fear and loss terms) required to succeed with a coercive to Joint Operations—Where Are We Now?” A is that the model gives strategists and deci- strategy lies in the leaders’ ability to assess Common Perspective 13, no. 2 (Suffolk, VA: U.S. sionmakers an uncomplicated lens through how, when, and where to exert pressure to Joint Forces Command, October 2005), 9. which to evaluate a variety of stratagems. achieve desired ends. JFQ 10 See Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influ- A strategy leveraging the mechanisms of ence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, loss and fear promotes selectively targeting NOTES 1966), 70–71, for more on brute force, coercion, what an adversary values to achieve limited and compellence. 11 political ends. Loss and fear do not replace 1 Gordon A. Craig, “Delbrück: The Military Stephen T. Hosmer, Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars 1941–1991 effects-based operations. Rather, the simple Historian,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Peter (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), xix–xx. mechanisms of this model help frame what Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 12 Schelling, 3, calls this process “latent effects are likely and useful in the given stra- 1986), 341–342. Delbrück used the terms Nieder­ werfungsstrategie (the strategy of annihilation) and violence.” Not simply the brute force destruction tegic environment. Ermattungsstrategie (the strategy of exhaustion), of a country, but the “threat of damage, or of more Integrating aerospace power in a com- which he also called the two-pole strategy. damage to come.” 13 prehensive and synergistic coercion strategy 2 David A. Deptula, Effects-Based Opera- I am not advocating assassination. Attack- involving other nations and instruments of tions: Change in the Nature of Warfare (Arlington, ing command and control targets, including lead- national power is tempting, which is why VA: Aerospace Education Foundation), 11–18. ership targets, may be permissible depending upon leaders have relied on the air component 3 Author interview with Elaine Bunn, dis- the circumstances in a conflict. 14 to lead most post–Cold War conflicts. A tinguished research fellow, Institute for National Heavy bomber, B–1, B–2, or B–52, final caution, however, is that predictability Security Studies, National Defense University, bombing attacks used dozens of 500- or 2,000- pound bombs dropped in a line over several is a real risk. Until the ground assault in October 19, 2001. 4 hundred yards. This example is in contrast to the Operation Iraqi Freedom, conventional Craig, 342. 5 many precision bomb attacks made by smaller wisdom—including international conven- Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, From Lexington to Desert Storm (Armonk, NY: fighter-bombers, which typically carry a load of 2 tional wisdom, to the degree that such a thing M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 13–14. Drew and Snow note to 12 bombs. exists—assumed aerial bombardment was the 15 that the United States needs objectives that are Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus most likely first U.S. reaction to provocation. simple, morally or politically lofty, and vital to (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 50. Therefore, responding with joint aerospace national interests. power must involve close integration of other 6 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and instruments of national power to increase trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, useful synergy and reduce predictability. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 184. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 75 Joint logistics

Joint Logistics in the Future

Soldiers unload humanitarian supplies in Afghanistan

55th Signal Company (Jerry T. Combes) Leaders win through logistics. Vision, sure. Strategy, yes. But when you go to war, you need to have both toilet paper and bullets at the right place at the right time. In other words, you must win through superior logistics.

—Tom Peters, “Rule # 3: Leadership Is Confusing as Hell,” Fast Company (March 2001)

By C. V. C h r i s t i a n s o n

he logistic capacity of the U.S. will improve the support of tomorrow’s understanding of the purpose of joint logistics. military is unmatched, and joint warfighter. This agreement comes from determining what the Nation’s ability to project The necessity of joint logistics is joint logistics is and why we need it. T military power provides the almost unanimously accepted throughout Joint logistics is the deliberate or impro- joint warfighter unprecedented capabilities. the Department of Defense (DOD) logistic vised sharing of resources by reducing or However, a constantly changing operating community, and most agree that the effective eliminating constraints and restraints and environment and budgetary constraints delivery of logistic support is essential to the developing ways to facilitate this process. demand that we optimize joint logistics joint warfighting commander, the ultimate This is needed because the Services seldom to enhance capabilities. We are at a point customer. Achieving harmony between and have enough resources, especially during where we have the opportunity to advance among Service- and agency-funded systems, initial expeditionary activity. Sharing efforts to design and implement systems, processes, and programs, however, is challeng- resources can optimize the apportionment of processes, and organizational changes that ing. Harmony is only possible with a common assets to provide maximum capability to the supported commander. The overall purpose Lieutenant General C.V. Christianson, USA, is the Director for Logistics on the Joint Staff. of joint logistics is thus to achieve logistic

76 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Christianson

synergy—getting more out of what we collec- Sailors receive combat gear en route to Iraq tively have than we could by ourselves.

The Joint Logistic Environment The war on terror and other threats frame the joint logistic environment. Gone are the days when we had the time and resources to position large stores of assets in response to a stable, predictable threat. Future operations are likely to be distributed and conducted rapidly and simultaneously across multiple joint operational areas within a single theater, or across boundaries of geographic combatant commands. In that environment, force projection operations give the Nation the ability to close the gap between early entry and follow-on combat operations and simultaneous stabilization and reconstruction operations. The require- ment to harmonize force projection opera- tions in a complex operating environment U.S. Navy (Laura A. Moore) offers the greatest challenge to the joint logistician. This article describes the three imperatives that frame that challenge. While must bridge Service, coalition, agency, and of interest. This collaborative network of these imperatives are not goals in themselves, other organizational elements and capabili- relationships should be based on the pre- they define the outcomes of a confederation ties, linking national and tactical systems, eminence of the Services because they are of systems, processes, and organizations that processes, and organizations to enable the responsible to raise, train, equip, and sustain are agile, effectively adapting to a constantly freedom of action the JFC must have. The forces for the joint force commander. Since changing environment to meet the emerging essence of joint logistics is in the operational the Services lie at the heart of the joint logis- needs of the supported joint force com- space, where the work of joint logistics tic network, the joint community of interest mander (JFC). These outcomes are delivered should concentrate. (processes, systems, programs, organizations) within an operating environment that spans The U.S. ability to project and sustain should measure value with the Service com- tactical, operational, and strategic spaces. military power (its campaign quality) comes ponents of the joint commands. Every logis- gone are the days when we had the time tic program, system, and initiative should be viewed within the framework of these critical and resources to position large stores of assets in response strategic relationships, which describe key to a predictable threat strategic interdependencies. The JFC, through his Service com- The effect of joint logistics is freedom from the strategic space. This national system ponents, acts as the commander of joint of action for the JFC. The success of this enables sustained operations over time and logistics in his area of responsibility and as effort must be measured in the tactical space, leverages our most potent force multiplier, the principal focus of the national organiza- where readiness is the principal deliverable. the vast capacity of the industrial base. At tions described below. These organizations Sustained joint logistic readiness enables this level, modern, clearly defined, well- comprise the backbone of joint logistics and freedom of action and results from the syn- understood, and outcome-focused processes provide and sustain logistically ready forces chronization and coordination of all logistic drive efficiencies across Service, agency, and to the supported JFC. These organizations capabilities. The readiness achieved within commercial capabilities. The power of robust may be seen as global providers, responsible the tactical space results from the cumulative and efficient global processes, combined for the end-to-end synchronization and efforts of Services, agencies, and other players with agile global force positioning, gives coordination of processes that deliver out- across the entire operating environment. the Nation the foundation for success. This comes to the supported commander. They There is a high price in the tactical space for system is fundamental to global flexibility in constantly strive to improve their capabili- inefficiencies within the operational or stra- the face of constantly changing threats. ties in concert with each other, integrating tegic spaces. deployment/redeployment, supply, distribu- Operational space is where joint logis- Strategic Framework tion, and readiness processes to ensure that tics must deliver and where the ability to The strategic framework for joint the supported commander receives both integrate logistic capabilities provides the logistics can be built around the roles and forces and logistic sustainment on time and greatest opportunities. Moreover, opera- accountabilities of the global players within where needed. tional space is where the joint logistician the joint logistic domain and its community ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 77 Joint logistics

The Services—which can be viewed as U.S. Transportation Command serves n Shared priorities across the logistic defense readiness process owners—form the as the Defense DPO and is the support- domain drive unity by focusing capabilities foundation of this joint framework and are ing organization to DLA and the Services against the joint warfighter’s most important the supported organizations for logistic read- for sustainment and to USJFCOM for the requirements. Key tasks are the integration of iness. In this role, they are responsible for the movement of force capability packages. The priorities across joint, combined, and inter- life-cycle readiness of their systems and are command coordinates and synchronizes the agency domains and the continuous sorting focused on the product they are chartered to defense distribution system and is focused on of them in space and time. deliver: logistic readiness at best value. its product: time-definite delivery. n Common critical processes drive The Services and the Defense Logistics synergy across the joint force. Understand- Agency (DLA) share responsibilities as Imperatives for Success ing how a joint logistic process works, how joint supply process owners. In that shared The supported joint force commander members of the joint force access it, and how role, they are supporting organizations expects joint logistics to give him freedom of the JFC measures success frames this enabler. to the components of the joint force for action—to enable execution of his mission logistic readiness. The Services and DLA are according to his timetable. The value of joint Domain-wide visibility is the ability to responsible for strategic supply support and, logistics can be measured by how well three see the requirements, resources, and capabili- supported by the distribution process owner joint logistic imperatives are achieved: unity ties across the joint logistic domain. Three (DPO), are focused on their product: perfect of effort, domain-wide visibility, and rapid fundamental enablers frame the ability to order fulfillment. and precise response. achieve this imperative: U.S. Joint Forces Command Unity of effort is the coordinated (USJFCOM) serves as the joint deploy- application of all logistic capabilities focused n Connectivity is access to a network 24 ment process owner and is the primary on the JFC’s intent and is the most critical of hours a day, 365 days a year, to synchronize conventional force provider and global force all joint logistic outcomes. Achieving unity and coordinate efforts of supporting DOD manager. In this role, USJFCOM globally of effort requires the seamless integration of agencies, interagency participants, multina- manages forces to ensure that the supported U.S. joint, multinational, interagency, and tional partners, host nations, contractors, and commander is provided with the forces nongovernmental logistic capabilities and is commercial sector participants. needed to achieve national objectives. The built around three enablers: n Standard enterprise data architecture command coordinates and makes recom- is the foundation for effective and rapid data mendations for the global conventional force n Effective organizational capabilities transfer and the fundamental building block and, supported by the DPO, is focused on its and authorities provide the means to execute to enabling a common logistic picture and product: perfect capability fulfillment. joint logistics. high logistic situational understanding. This

Marines and contractors unloading supplies at Haditha Dam, Iraq Force Service Support Group (Brian A. Jaques) d 2

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Soldiers escort a convoy of trucks bringing supplies to U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq U.S. Air Force (Maurice Hessel)

enabler fosters warfighter confidence by n Reliability is the ability of the supply bridging the national strategic sustainment facilitating visibility across the entire global chain to provide the warfighter predictability base with the complex operational environ- supply chain. of supply or time-definite delivery. When ment in a way that guarantees freedom of n Global focus over the processes that items are not immediately available, the joint action to the supported JFC. Through rigor- deliver support to the joint warfighter is logistic system must provide immediate ous self-assessment, discussion, analysis, and paramount to effective joint logistics. Logistic and reliable estimates of delivery to enable collaboration, significant progress can be support to the joint force is global business, the warfighter to make decisions regarding made toward this objective. and any view of joint logistics that operates mission options. Programs and initiatives that truly below this level will suboptimize processes n Visibility is closely aligned with speed support joint logistics must move forward. and deliver less than acceptable readiness. and reliability and is the supply chain feature Planners cannot wait until every issue is that provides rapid and easy access to order resolved to make decisions. Viewing initia- Rapid and precise response, the third visibility information. Fundamentally, this tives through the lens of the imperatives imperative, is the ability of the supply chain tells the warfighter where a shipment is and above should offer a reasonable starting to meet the constantly changing needs of the when it will arrive. point for assessing an initiative’s value. joint force. Lack of key supplies, regardless n Efficiency is directly related to the The challenge of integrating Service- and of the reason, undermines readiness and supply chain’s footprint. In the tactical and agency-funded programs and systems not increases mission risk. The following perfor- operational spaces, where every human designed to support joint operations holisti- mance measures indicate how well the supply resource is limited and every moment spent cally cannot be underestimated. However, chain is responding to the needs of the joint chasing information in the supply chain the importance of this effort must be force: drains these resources, the footprint can be all-prevailing. viewed in terms of the personnel resources Current logistic systems reflect inef- n Speed is the core of responsiveness needed to compensate for the inefficiencies ficiencies, redundancies, and process gaps and its most critical aspect to the warfighter. of the current supply chain. In the strategic that are driving unacceptable risks across the Ideally, all logistics should be immediately space, efficiency can be viewed as measure of joint force. We have a responsibility to the available all the time, but that is not possible the cost per outcome. American people and the next generation of given cost and resource constraints. The Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines to do focus should be on what is quick enough, Joint logistics exists to give the JFC the better. JFQ recognizing that not all supplies are equally freedom of action to meet mission objectives. vital. Items that truly drive readiness deserve It delivers this effect by integrating all logistic special treatment. capabilities within the operational space, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 79 strategic Planning

Strategic Planning for National Security A New Project Solarium

By Michèle A. Flournoy and S h a w n W. B r i m l e y

or a country that continues to the broader Middle East and the U.S. role in new security environment and identifying enjoy an unrivaled global posi- the world; yet there is no integrated planning priorities for policy development, execution, tion, it is both remarkable and process from which to derive the strategic and resource allocation. The articulation of Fdisturbing that the United States guidance necessary to protect national inter- a national vision that describes America’s has no truly effective strategic planning ests and achieve U.S. objectives. purpose in the post–September 11 world is process for national security. Fifteen years While the George W. Bush adminis- useful—indeed, it is vital—but describing after the Cold War, the United States still tration’s 2002 National Security Strategy of a destination is no substitute for develop- lacks a comprehensive interagency process the United States of America did articulate ing a comprehensive roadmap for how the that takes into account both the character of a set of national goals and objectives, it was country will achieve its stated goals. Various the international security environment and not the product of serious strategic plan- institutions in the national security appara- its own ability to deal with future challenges ning. More than 4 years after September 11, tus have attempted strategic planning, but and opportunities. Today, the United States 2001, there is no established interagency these efforts have been stovepiped within is engaged in conflicts that will, whether by process for assessing the full spectrum of individual agencies and have varied in both success or failure, completely transform both threats and opportunities endemic to the approach and quality. There is still no systematic effort at Michèle A. Flournoy is a Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and was strategic planning for national security that Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction and Deputy Assistant is inclusive, deliberative, and integrative. Secretary of Defense for Strategy. Shawn W. Brimley is a Research Associate at the Center for Strategic and David Abshire was correct in concluding International Studies. that the demands of strategic transforma-

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that would ensure that agency budgets reflect address the types of capabilities the United both the fiscal guidance and the national States should develop to deal with future security priorities of the President.2 This challenges. essay looks to the Project Solarium of the Moreover, there is no established Eisenhower era for inspiration, design princi- interagency process for regularly bringing ples, and best practices, while also taking into together senior national security officials to account lessons to be learned from the expe- identify long-range threats and opportuni- rience of other administrations since then. ties and consider their implications for U.S. Our aim is to offer a set of actionable recom- policy and capabilities. While the Intelligence mendations to the President and National Community provides valuable products to Security Adviser that would enhance their policymakers on a regular basis, it has not ability to integrate all the disparate elements been tasked to support a more interactive of national power to enable the United States process in which future trends, possible to meet today’s challenges and be better pre- developments, and wild cards can be dis- pared for those of tomorrow. cussed and debated to inform national secu- rity decisions. Such an interactive process, The Problem in which policymakers would hear not only Presidents, National Security Advis- the Intelligence Community’s consensus ers, and Cabinet Secretaries face a vexing views but also the diversity of views on more challenge from the moment they take office controversial topics, would be invaluable until the moment they leave: how to keep the to senior leaders faced with making tough urgent from crowding out the important.3 choices for an uncertain future. Strategic Planning In the national security arena, “the tyranny Finally, existing processes for ensuring of the inbox” often becomes “the tyranny of that national security policy priorities are managing today’s crises.” For reasons both reflected in how agencies allocate resources President Bush and his national security practical and political, the day’s headlines, are weak. Today’s budgeting processes are for National Security team meet at Executive Support Center meetings with counterparts, actions on largely unchanged from the Cold War era.

Fleet Combat Camera Group, Pacific (Chad J. McNeeley) Fleet Combat Camera Group, Capitol Hill, and crises at home and abroad Agencies generally prepare their own budgets often set the day-to-day agenda for senior in stovepipes. These budgets are keyed to leaders. This focus on today, however, often top-line fiscal guidance from the Office of tion necessitate “structural reforms aimed precludes strategic thinking about tomorrow. Management and Budget (OMB) and to indi- at constructing a ‘rooftop’ that integrates The Government currently lacks both vidual agency priorities, but not always to the several key strategic pillars (diplomatic, the incentives and the capacity to support common strategic priorities as articulated in economic, military, etc.) of American power strategic thinking and long-range plan- the National Security Strategy or other Presi- and influence.”1 The reality is that America’s most fundamental deliberations are made in Presidents, National Security Advisers, and Cabinet an environment that remains dominated by Secretaries face a challenge: how to keep the urgent from the needs of the present and the cacophony of current crises. There must be a better way. crowding out the important Given that the United States has embarked on what is surely another long twilight ning in the national security arena. While dential statements. Furthermore, no consis- struggle, it is past time to make a serious and the National Security Council (NSC) staff tent process exists for developing budgets sustained effort at integrating all the elements may develop planning documents for their across agencies against these policy priorities. of national power in a manner that creates respective issues, they do not have the ability Without articulated priorities against which the unity of effort necessary for victory. to conduct integrated, long-range planning agency budgets can be examined on an inter- This article argues for establishing a for the President. While some capacity for agency basis, the Federal Government has strategic planning process for national secu- strategic planning exists in the Department little means of assuring that the hard choices rity that includes three key elements: a qua- of Defense (DOD), no other department on funding national security missions are drennial national security review that would devotes substantial resources to planning being considered within the context of a par- identify national security objectives and for the long term. Although the Department ticular mission and against the full range of priorities and develop a security strategy and of State’s Policy Planning Office develops a the President’s top goals and objectives. implementing guidance for achieving them; big-picture approach in specific policy areas, OMB is viewed as a dependable, often an interagency process for regularly assessing such as North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- unbiased White House player with expertise the threats, challenges, and opportunities tion enlargement or relations with China, about how programs work and how to pay posed by the international security environ- it focuses (with some exceptions) on issues for them. But it is principally concerned with ment and informing the decisions of senior already on the policy agenda rather than the fiscal dimension of the overall budget. leaders; and a resource allocation process those looming over the horizon. Nor does it This primary task of fiscal control means the

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 81 strategic Planning office lacks the tools to develop, evaluate, current administration faces: how to plan for After working on their positions at the and endorse robust and resource-intensive an uncertain future when the stakes are high National War College throughout June, the policy options. While it is excellent at finding and there is little consensus on how to deal groups convened at the White House on July resources to support Presidential priorities, with a growing strategic threat. 16 for a special meeting of the National Secu- the OMB process alone does not necessarily On entering office, President Eisen- rity Council. Beyond the principal members result in a realignment of resources to reflect hower grew concerned that national security of the council, the meeting included the Joint policy priorities, either within any budget strategy, as articulated in National Security Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries, and function or across functions. Council Memorandum 68, committed the the NSC Planning Board. During the all-day This is a critical problem in an era in country to policies that were not sustainable gathering, each group presented its views which nearly all national security priori- in the long term.4 In the late afternoon of and was questioned by opposing groups ties—from combating terrorism, to prevent- May 8, 1953, in the White House solarium, and the gathered officials. The conversation ing and countering the proliferation of he engaged in an extraordinary debate with coalesced around each group’s more contro- weapons of mass destruction, to homeland his foreign policy advisers on the Soviet versial recommendations. While some par- security—require integrated action on the threat and what an American national secu- ticipants argued that the conclusions of each part of multiple independent agencies. rity strategy should look like. John Foster group were fundamentally incompatible, In sum, the absence of an institutional- Dulles suggested that the President’s focus Eisenhower dissented and ordered the three ized process for long-range planning puts on “talk about ‘liberty’ doesn’t stop people groups to meet to “agree on certain features Washington at a strategic disadvantage. If the from becoming communist.” Eisenhower of the three presentations as the best features replied, “It’s men’s minds and hearts that and to bring about a combination of such must be won.”5 The breadth and intensity of features into a unified policy.”8 While the for- the debate convinced Eisenhower to propose mulation of what would become NSC 162/2 Eisenhower grew concerned that national security strategy committed the country to policies that were not sustainable in the long term

an exercise that would analytically capture took several more months, critical elements the range of options available to the United of the presentations ended up constituting States while preserving the differences and several core strategies. disagreements between them. “Project Solar- Project Solarium owed its success to ium,” as it became known, is a rare example unique features. Unlike most attempts at of useful strategic planning at the highest high-level strategic planning in the executive levels of the executive branch. branch, the project was the direct result of Eisenhower understood from his experi- Presidential leadership. Eisenhower under- ence as a military officer that long-term plan- stood the value of being challenged by his President Dwight D. Eisenhower ning, while necessary, is difficult to sustain advisers on even his most basic assumptions

DOD when daily operations and crises eclipse a regarding the nature of the developing Cold commander’s efforts to keep his eyes on the War with the Soviet Union. He understood United States wants to defeat global terror- horizon. Eisenhower clarified the importance the benefits of disagreement and sought to ism, keep weapons of mass destruction out of of strategic planning early in his administra- institutionalize such a debate in an inclusive the wrong hands, and deal with other threats tion, telling the NSC principals that they had and integrative fashion. Throughout Project to its vital interests, it needs a proactive little time to think through “the best decisions Solarium and the subsequent drafting of national security policy that is sustainable regarding the national security. Someone NSC 162/2, all the institutions with a stake over the long term. Achieving this requires must therefore do much of this thinking in the outcome were an integral part of the building more capacity for long-range plan- for you.”6 Thus, when Project Solarium was process. Moreover, the differences in opinion ning at the highest levels of government and proposed, Eisenhower immediately suggested between both the Solarium groups and the creating incentives for harried decisionmak- that the administration assemble “teams of various secretaries and NSC principals were ers to participate. bright young fellows” who would “take an not watered down to build consensus. Eisen- alternative and tackle it with a real belief hower understood that his job was to choose Project Solarium in it just the way a good advocate tackles a between irreconcilable positions. “I have An example of a truly inclusive and law case.” Eisenhower wanted each team to been forced to make decisions, many of them integrated process of long-term strategic present its findings before the NSC principals, of a critical character, for a good many years, planning in the executive branch does exist, with “maps, charts, all the basic supporting and I know of only one way in which you although one must look back more than 50 figures and estimates, just what each alterna- can be sure you have done your best to make years to find it. President Dwight Eisenhower tive would mean in terms of goal, risk, cost in a wise decision,” Eisenhower recollected in faced a situation in 1953 similar to what the money and men and world relations.”7 a 1967 interview. “That is to get all of the

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060104-n-0696m-014 Fleet Combat Camera Group, Pacific (Chad J. McNeeley) President Bush and his national security team meet at Executive Support Center

060104-n-0696m-137 Fleet Combat Camera Group, Pacific (Chad J. McNeeley) Secretaries of Defense and State outside Pentagon after press conference

0bjq9 DOD President Dwight D. Eisenhower

0muna U.S. Coast Guard Coast Guard patrol s New York Harbor

Coast Guard patrols New York Harbor U.S. Coast Guard

[responsible policymakers] with their differ- methods of Presidential decisionmaking, foreign policy mechanisms. In her influ- ent points of view in front of you, and listen while always important in the final calculus ential Flawed by Design, Amy Zegart to them debate.”9 The value Eisenhower of choice, have tended to eclipse the more concludes that “Under [McGeorge] Bundy, placed on preserving alternative analysis and structured and formal mechanisms that were the NSC staff became a truly Presidential contrarian viewpoints was surely crucial in once equally valued and prominent in the foreign policy staff for the first time. . . . the formulation of national strategy during process. Finally, as administrations focus Rather than serve as the executive branch’s his administration. Ultimately, however, he on crisis management and daily operations, professional bureaucrats, they served as provided the leadership that only a President outside entities such as Congress, other Kennedy’s personal advisers.”11 The job of can exercise. government agencies, and think tanks have managing the President’s daily activities was The Eisenhower administration offers attempted to address the strategic planning surely complicated by the dismantling of the perhaps the best example of long-term stra- deficit, with varying results. These trends run Operations Coordinating Board, a move, in tegic planning in the history of the American deep within the currents of national security Bundy’s words, “to eliminate an instrument Presidency. David Rothkopf considers Project Solarium “not just the work of a good Congress, Government agencies, and think tanks executive or a master bureaucrat or even a have attempted to address the strategic planning deficit, canny politician; it was a magisterial illustra- tion of an effective President in action.”10 The with varying results success of Project Solarium is directly attrib- utable to the ability of President Eisenhower policy and process and have greatly influ- that does not match the style of operation to preserve and nurture long-term strategic enced foreign policy development over the and coordination of the current administra- planning as a basic prerequisite of an effec- last 50 years. tion.”12 In this more nebulous and informal tive and responsible foreign policy. The changes the Kennedy administra- structure of decisionmaking, Kennedy tion made in the national security decision- established a situation room in the White Unlearning Lessons making process radically altered the evolu- House after the Bay of Pigs failure, which The decline of strategic planning after tionary course of the NSC system. Primary was to serve as a “nerve center” that would Eisenhower was largely due to three trends among them, and the most significant give him access to a near–real-time flow of that have transcended the unique features considering the subsequent history of the information. Thus, in contrast to the stated of every modern administration. First, National Security Council, was the merging desires of Kennedy and Bundy to push coor- the Special Assistant to the President for of the Special Assistant for National Secu- dination out to the various lead departments National Security Affairs evolved into a pow- rity Affairs and the NSC Staff Secretary in that would carry out Presidential policy, erful political player who, in turn, has helped 1961. A single adviser became responsible the elimination of much of the inherited push the NSC staff to a dominant position in for both long-term strategic planning and NSC system, combined with the creation the foreign policy process. Second, informal the daily management of the President’s of the situation room, quickly led Bundy ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 83 strategic Planning and his staff to be overwhelmed by the daily formal meetings of the National Security individual agencies to pick up the slack. The operational needs of a very active President. Council to the periphery of decisionmak- problem with strategic planning outside the In dismantling the extensive NSC structure, ing has been created by the rise of informal White House, however, is that it tends to the administration actually became more mechanisms as the primary arena of Presi- be either confined to the purview of indi- reliant on the smaller organization that dential consultation. From Lyndon Johnson’s vidual agencies or vulnerable to the partisan remained. famous “Tuesday luncheons,” to Richard environment in Washington. There are, The process the Kennedy administra- Nixon’s backroom dealings, to Jimmy nevertheless, lessons to be learned from these tion set in motion dramatically altered Carter’s “Friday breakfasts,” and to Ronald efforts. Effective planning requires an inter- the relationship between and among the Reagan’s tiny “National Security Planning agency process that is inclusive, integrative, President’s senior foreign policy advisers. Group,” all Presidents have regularly used and comprehensive and that facilitates the The National Security Adviser became, if informal mechanisms. These procedures unity of effort necessary for success. It is unrealistic to suppose that a perfect organizational structure can be created that would ensure both prescient and consistent strategic planning while cater- ing to the unique preferences of different administrations. It is, however, reasonable to consider what basic structure would best ensure a healthy balance between long-term planning versus daily operations and crisis management. The evolution of the National Security Adviser and the NSC staff from the Eisenhower era to the current administra- tion is characterized by increasing emphasis on daily requirements and crisis manage- Soldiers boarding CH–47 to search for Taliban fighters in Afghanistan ment. The inability of senior decisionmak-

U.S. Army ers to think strategically, to recognize and adapt to new challenges, and to ensure that not a player of equal standing, then very are central tenets of the modern Presidency resource allocation and policy execution much a peer to the Secretaries of State and and should not be dismissed simply because reflect their priorities has contributed might- Defense through proximity to the President they are informal. While these mechanisms ily to the types of failures we have seen in the and an increasing role as manager, advocate, are important features of Presidential deci- post–Cold War period. In the words of the policy spokesperson, and diplomat. Long ago sionmaking, they can never entirely replace 9/11 Commission, “It is therefore crucial to ceasing to be simply an executive secretary of the National Security Council, the National at the outset of a new term, the President Security Adviser has arguably evolved into should designate a senior national security official to lead the central player in the national security decisionmaking process. For these reasons, an interagency process the ability of that office to drive an extended, iterative process of long-term strategic what a formal NSC interagency process can find a way of routinizing, even bureaucratiz- planning has simply been erased from the provide—analytical debate, long-range think- ing, the exercise of imagination.”14 The pre- panoply of duties the position performs on ing, and real policy alternatives derived from vention of strategic failure in the 21st century a daily basis. This evolutionary process has reasoned judgment. depends on the ability of senior national resulted in a significant leadership gap, as no The scarcity of long-term strategic security decisionmakers to drive continuous one individual has primary responsibility for thinking within the NSC system has not gone and extensive efforts at long-term strategic long-term strategic planning in the national unnoticed. Many executive, congressional, planning. security domain. and think tank reports have dealt with the Paralleling the growing importance growing inability of the Federal Government Charting a Way Forward of the National Security Adviser and the to institutionalize imagination. With the In light of this history, and given NSC staff has been a decline of the actual exception of Project Solarium and perhaps today’s complex and critical national security National Security Council as a critical cata- the Carter administration’s attempt at a challenges, we recommend that the President lyst of Presidential decisionmaking. Zegart comprehensive strategic appraisal, the overall and the National Security Adviser take a argues that the NSC staff system has steadily trend reveals a declining ability or willingness number of steps to establish a truly strategic drawn power into the White House for over of the NSC to perform strategic threat assess- planning process.15 Although no approach 50 years, concluding that “the palace guard ments and planning. The result of this dearth can guarantee a successful national security has, indeed, eclipsed the king’s ministers.”13 of strategic thinking at the White House policy, we believe that the mechanisms below Much of the momentum that has pushed has been a growing number of attempts by would substantially enhance any President’s

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Secretaries of State and Defense outside Pentagon after press conference Fleet Combat Camera Group, Pacific (Chad J. McNeeley) Fleet Combat Camera Group,

ability to integrate all elements of national The QNSR should produce two primary ences of opinion and debate. To enable such power to meet present and future challenges. products: the National Security Planning frank debate, the President and the National Conduct a Quadrennial National Guidance described below and the unclas- Security Adviser must create a Solarium-like Security Review (QNSR). Every 4 years, at the sified National Security Strategy already environment in which alternative points outset of a new term, the President should mandated by Congress. As such, it should of view are encouraged, senior officials are designate a senior national security official logically precede, and provide the conceptual not allowed to “shoot the messenger,” and (most likely the National Security Adviser) basis for, agency reviews, such as the DOD discussion is driven toward decisions and to lead an interagency process to develop a Quadrennial Defense Review. tradeoffs that must be made in the QNSR national security strategy and identify the capabilities required—diplomatic, informa- the President’s National Security Planning Guidance tional, military, and economic. Like Project would provide the conceptual basis for the unclassified Solarium, this review should be inclusive, engaging all of the agencies with responsi- National Security Strategy bilities for implementing the strategy, and designed to foster debate and frame key Establish an Interagency Threat Assess- rather than a lowest common denominator decisions for the President on critical issues, ment Process to Support the QNSR. In the consensus. rather than papering over differences to opening phase of the QNSR, the Director Establish Semiannual “Over the reach consensus. of National Intelligence should be tasked Horizon” Reviews. In these meetings, the The review should begin with an to support a series of roundtable discus- Director of National Intelligence would interagency assessment of the future secu- sions for national security principals on the present the deputies (representing NSC, rity environment and the development of threats, challenges, and opportunities posed OMB, and all other agencies involved in national security objectives and priorities. by the future security environment. This national security) with an over-the-horizon The heart of the exercise should be devising a process could build on existing products look at possible developments in the interna- national security strategy for achieving these (for example, the National Intelligence tional security environment in 1 year, 5 years, priorities, identifying the capabilities needed Council’s Global 20XX series) with the aim and 10 years or more. This material would to carry out the strategy, and delineating of identifying future trends, uncertainties, be developed in concert with the broader agency roles and responsibilities. Such a and wild cards as the basis for senior leader Intelligence Community and would highlight process would provide each administration discussions going into the QNSR. Perhaps not only points of consensus but also areas with an opportunity to conduct a strategic the most important design feature of this of uncertainty and debate that should inform review of U.S. security policies and capability threat assessment process would be the focus national decisionmaking. This review would requirements and to define a way forward for on highlighting areas not only of strong com- increase the visibility of longer-term trends, the future. munity consensus but also of strong differ- plausible developments, and wild cards to ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 85 strategic Planning

stimulate more proactive consideration ning would be responsible for coordinating N o t e s of ways the United States could shape the the Quadrennial National Security Review, international environment and prevent or drafting and staffing the President’s National 1 David Abshire, Comprehensive Strategic mitigate crises. Security Planning Guidance and the National Reform: A Panel Report for the President and Con- Establish an Annual Table-top Exer- Security Strategy, working with the Direc- gress (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of the cise Program for Senior National Security tor of National Intelligence to prepare the Presidency, 2001), 4. Officials. This exercise program would serve semiannual over-the-horizon reviews, and 2 This article is drawn from a longer several functions. First, it would allow senior overseeing the annual national security exer- paper commissioned by the Princeton Project on national security officials to manage a crisis cise program. National Security, available at . 3 This section is drawn from work originally world costs and risks. Second, each exercise Reviews. For high-priority mission areas, done by Michèle A. Flournoy, Anne Witkowsky, would enable officials to identify courses of such as combating terrorism or homeland and Christine Wormuth at the Center for Stra- action that might prevent or deter a crisis security, mission area reviews should be tegic and International Studies (CSIS) and first as well as responses to explore and develop conducted to systematically identify gaps, presented in Clark A. Murdock and Michèle A. further. Identified courses of action could duplication, or misalignment of effort among Flournoy, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Govern- be more fully developed and explored in the agencies. Because of the challenges inher- ment and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, wake of the exercise, possibly for presenta- ent in the budget process, this strengthened Phase 2 Report (Washington, DC: CSIS, July 2005). tion at the next session. Finally, these simula- review procedure—with NSC focusing on 4 Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman, tions would enable participants to identify the President’s policy guidance and OMB Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring critical gaps in U.S. capabilities and task on fiscal guidance—should be confined to Cold War Strategy (New York: Oxford University development of action plans to address them. specific mission areas drawn from the most Press, 1998), 124. 5 Ibid., 125. Progress in implementing these plans could critical Presidential priorities and requiring 6 NSC memorandum of March 19, 1953, be reviewed in subsequent exercises or as coordinated implementation across multiple quoted from Fred I. Greenstein and Richard H. part of the biannual National Security Plan- Federal agencies. Immerman, “Effective National Security Advising: ning Guidance process. For specific high-priority mission Recovering the Eisenhower Legacy,” in Political Create a Classified National Security areas, budgets would be presented to Con- Science Quarterly 115, no. 3 (2000), 340. Planning Guidance.16 The President’s gress not only in the traditional form, but 7 Bowie and Immerman, 125. National Security Planning Guidance would also as a crosscut. Such a presentation would 8 Eisenhower, quoted in Bowie and Immer- articulate the White House’s national secu- help the executive branch to defend its sub- man, 138. 9 rity objectives and the strategy and capa- missions based on the rationale with which Eisenhower, quoted in Greenstein and bilities required to achieve them. It would they were developed. Immerman, 344. 10 provide authoritative planning guidance David Rothkopf, Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and under the President’s signature, directing The United States is at a crucial point, the Architects of American Power (New York: Public the National Security Adviser and Cabinet facing new and challenging threats as well as Affairs, 2005), 71. Secretaries to develop particular courses unprecedented opportunities in the national 11 Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The of action and undertake specific activities security domain. Yet at this critical juncture, Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford, CA: in support of the strategy. This document the Government lacks an interagency process Stanford University Press, 1999), 84. would provide the conceptual basis for the to ensure that national security decision- 12 McGeorge Bundy, “Letter to Jackson unclassified National Security Strategy, the making at the highest levels is informed by Subcommittee,” September 4, 1961, reproduced development of interagency concepts of the long view—a considered assessment of in Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security operation for specific mission areas, and the the future security environment and how Council, ed. Loch K. Johnson and Karl F. Inderfurth conduct of interagency mission area reviews the Nation can best protect and advance its (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 82–85. 13 as described below. It would also be the strategic interests, objectives, and priorities Zegart, 87. 14 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks starting point for all of the national security over the long term. Nor does it have adequate Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission departments to develop their own imple- mechanisms in place to ensure that national Report: Final Report of the National Commission on menting strategies, such as the DOD defense security resources are actually allocated and Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: strategy. This guidance would be issued in spent according to the President’s policy Norton, 2004), 344. the first year of a new administration and priorities. The concrete steps recommended 15 Murdock and Flournoy, 26–42. updated biannually. herein draw on the best practices and lessons 16 The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Create an NSC Senior Director and learned from previous administrations. (QDR) recommends the creation of a National Office for Strategic Planning. In support of Collectively, they offer a new way forward Security Planning Guidance (NSPG), aimed at the above recommendations, the National for national security policymaking—a truly directing the development of both military and Security Adviser should establish a small strategic planning process that could make nonmilitary plans and institutional capabilities. but empowered staff devoted to strategic the United States more effective in bringing The QDR advocates an NSPG that would set priorities and clarify national security roles and planning and insulated from day-to-day the full range of its instruments of power responsibilities to reduce capability gaps and elimi- demands and crisis management. The to bear in meeting the challenges of the 21st nate redundancies. proposed Senior Director for Strategic Plan- century. JFQ

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Airman marking target for incoming fighter with ground laser target designator Custer and Cognition National Archives

99th Communications Squadron (Kevin J. Gruenwald)

By D a v i d C. G o m p e r t and R i c h a r d L. K u gl e r

pinions are sharply divided in combat1 to explore what Custer’s case sug- ence. First, 19th-century cavalry action was about whether George Arm- gests about decisionmaking in today’s era of a precursor of the fast-breaking distributed strong Custer was a brilliant networked warfare. warfare that characterizes the network era. Otactician or a compulsive risk- How does this flamboyant 19th-century Cavalry-type missions (reconnaissance, deep taker. Was the massacre at the Little Bighorn cavalry officer relate to information-age strike, disruption) and qualities (speed, flex- the result of his misfortune or his audacity? military decisionmaking? After all, Custer’s ibility) are relevant in current warfare. The This article does not aim to settle the argu- “bandwidth”—binoculars and scouts—was cavalry had to respond to the unfamiliar, ment between admirers and critics. Rather, negligible by today’s standards. Yet there unclear, and unanticipated. More than those it uses a new explanatory model of cognition are good reasons to consider his experi- who directed set-piece infantry maneuvers and artillery bombardments, cavalry com- David C. Gompert and Richard L. Kugler are Distinguished Research Professors in the Center for Technology manders had to make prompt decisions and National Security Policy at the National Defense University. under fluid and ambiguous conditions, often ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2d quarter 2006 / JFQ 87 custer and c o g n i t i o n

victories, and only one was a clear defeat, Figure 1. Last Stand Battlefield suggesting superb decisionmaking and perhaps high self-regard. Yet his cognition failed utterly at the Little Bighorn. The con- trast offers fuel for analysis if we can deduce why and how he made his decisions. We begin by offering a model for effec- tive decisionmaking in combat when time is short, danger is great, and conditions are unfamiliar and dynamic. We call this battle- wisdom. If Custer was battle-wise in earlier battles, why not in his final one? By observ- ing him in that light, we can learn about good and bad decisionmaking in combat as well as about the man who made the Last Stand.

Battle-Wisdom We should take a particularly keen interest in military decisionmaking at this juncture for two reasons: information net- working is enabling better decisionmaking, and geopolitical turmoil is making better

Figure 2. The Little Bighorn Campaign, 1876 if Custer was battle-wise in earlier battles, why not in his final one?

decisionmaking imperative. Today, such enemies as al Qaeda are exploiting informa- tion to complicate and confuse our strategic and operational reasoning. Cognitive supe- riority has never been so crucial; indeed, it is the new plane of military competition. But what is it? When conditions are complex and unstable, time is short, and information is abundant, the key to making good deci- sions is to blend reliable intuition with timely reasoning. Intuition is demanded by urgency. Research in many fields (military, emergency room care, firefighting, neonatal intensive care) shows that the greater the time pressure, the more decisionmakers rely on intuition.2 For our purposes, intuition is the mental model, or map, a person brings to a situation, mainly based on experience and only lightly affected by fresh informa- without guidance from higher authority, ill-fated decisionmaking by an individual tion. Intuitive decisionmakers do not weigh much like tactical-level officers in networked under pressure than Custer’s Last Stand. The the risks and rewards of alternative courses warfare. battle offers insights into how and how not of action but proceed down the paths they More generally, how fallible humans to combine experience-based intuition and have been conditioned to believe are right can make sense of information, draw on information-based reasoning, both crucial in for given circumstances. The reliability of experience, analyze options, and make deci- today’s world of uncertainty and abundant intuition depends heavily on whether the sions in the face of danger, urgency, and information. Custer’s thinking worked well circumstances at hand are broadly familiar. uncertainty are questions as old as military during much of his career. Most of the 20- In strange circumstances, therefore, intuition history. There is no more arresting case of plus battles he fought in the Civil War were can be wrong.

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Conversely, reasoning (informed, sionmaking. Custer needed all four at the seasoned cavalry commanders, he believed methodical, logical analysis) is vital when Little Bighorn. that offensive action was key to victory, and complexity and change (unfamiliarity) he practiced the art of rapid mobility. He reduce the utility of experience, on which Massacre at the Little Bighorn earned a reputation for being able to read intuition depends. Reasoning uses new infor- The massacre of Custer and much of terrain quickly, discern the enemy, craft an mation to check and correct intuition and his 7th Cavalry Regiment in June 1876 is one effective plan, and lead troops to success. to consider the merits and costs of multiple of the most perplexing battles in American He also showed skill at changing tactics in options. However, reasoning can be time- history. Why were he and his 210 troops fluid situations and at extracting his forces consuming, so people neglect it when time annihilated? While theories abound, two from peril. One of his brigade commanders is precious, as it is in combat. It follows that stand out: Custer was either a foolhardy summed up his talent: “Custer was a fighting the decompression of time and chance to glory-seeker or a victim of circumstances man through and through. There was in him exploit information is crucial for introducing beyond his control. Both have merit, yet an indescribable something—call it caution, reasoning and for cognitive effectiveness, less neither by itself provides a satisfying explana- call it sagacity, call it the real military instinct, by replacing intuition with reasoning than by tion. While Custer may have been seeking it may have been genius—by whatever name integrating the two. glory, he was no fool. He was a top-notch entitled, it nearly always impelled him to do Those good at integrating intuition cavalry commander, and his tactics that day the right thing.”3 with reasoning should make good military were consistent with the Army doctrine of decisionmakers. They tend to be self-aware— his time. While events mainly broke against Setting the Stage to know or be able to judge dispassionately Custer, that did not make annihilation inevi- Custer’s troubles at the Little Bighorn how much they can count on their intuition. table. The situation was fathered by Custer’s were not due to lack of experience at fighting Before making irretrievable decisions, they own decisions, and he could have saved his Indians on the Great Plains. After the Civil will consider whether their prefabricated command simply by changing course until War, he was made a lieutenant colonel, given mental models are applicable to the situation near the end. command of a single regiment, and sent at hand. If Custer’s tactical decisions resulted to Kansas. He mostly experienced lengthy The way decisions are made during in calamity, why did he make them despite patrols and small clashes, but in 1868, he led operations is crucial. In what we call rapidly several opportunities to make better deci- a big cavalry assault against an Indian village adaptive decisionmaking, self-aware intu- sions and escape disaster? While the truth at Washita, Oklahoma. Attacking at dawn ition is used initially but provisionally when lies buried with Custer, we offer our own from multiple directions, he surprised and both time and information are scarce, thus hypothesis. Early in the battle, he formed a quickly overran the village, killing or captur- gaining time to gather information and mental model, based on his experience and ing a large number of Indians. introduce reasoning to enhance cognition. assessment of the situation, of how the 7th In 1873, Custer led the 7th Cavalry to Such an approach can be taught, practiced, Cavalry should engage the Indians. This a new home at Bismarck, North Dakota. and refined. Four particular battle-wise abilities that Custer failed to use new information, time, and reasoning are especially important in the age of net- to reevaluate his premises and analyze his options worked warfare were also applicable in 19th- century cavalry action: anticipation, decision model, embodied in a hammer-and-anvil During 1874–1875, an onrush of gold speed, opportunism, and learning in action. battle plan that was a proven standard for prospectors into the Black Hills heightened Each aims at gaining and exploiting an oper- cavalry operations, led him to expect victory. tension with the Sioux, who regarded it ational time-information advantage, by which When the plan began breaking down in the as sacred religious territory. Momentum we mean the product of, or synergy between, face of surprises and adversity, Custer failed toward a battle began in early 1876, when time and information. Anticipation can make to use new information, time, and reasoning large numbers of Sioux and Cheyenne time an ally from the outset of hostilities. to reevaluate his premises and analyze his left their reservations to mass along the Decision speed helps control the course and options. Though facing unfamiliar circum- Montana-Wyoming border. The Army tempo of action. Opportunism seizes fleeting stances, he did not question his intuition, reacted by sending 2,400 troops, divided conditions that offer nonlinear gains; when which had served him so well to that point. into 3 columns, to force the Indians back to opposing forces are both vulnerable, the one The idea that Custer was a compulsive their reservations. From Bismarck, General that strikes just when the other is especially risk-taker and poor tactician is belied by his Alfred Terry led 900 troops, including vulnerable can prevail. Learning in action success in the Civil War. From 1863 to 1865, Custer’s 7th Cavalry; from western Montana means getting smarter and adjusting rapidly he led his brigade and division in 23 cavalry came Colonel John Gibbon at the head of and continuously despite complexity and engagements, many of them major battles. 500 troops; and from southern Wyoming confusion—all the more advantageous if the He won most of them decisively; and while came General George Crook, with 1,000 enemy is relying on a script that events have he suffered a few reversals, he never lost in a troops. Army commanders judged that any superseded. Taken together, time-informa- calamitous way. Widely regarded as having of the columns could defeat any Indian force tion superiority offered by these abilities a natural flair for combat, he showed profes- it encountered. Whereas they expected to means that information can be used to defeat sional skill at sizing up complex situations face no more than 800 warriors, in reality urgency, the enemy of sound military deci- and seeming to “know” how to act. Like most a village of several thousand was gathering, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 89 custer and c o g n i t i o n with at least 1,500 who were battle-ready. village on opposite sides of a creek. In addi- also sent another urgent appeal to Benteen On June 17, a large Indian force attacked tion, he sent a battalion of three companies to “come quick.” Custer lost sight of Reno General Crook, sending him into retreat. under Captain Frederick Benteen 3 miles by the time of the latter’s retreat across the Unaware of Crook’s battle, Terry (with westward to reconnoiter terrain there. river, which extinguished all hope of a suc- Custer) and Gibbons met on June 21 in Custer’s decision to divide his force has cessful hammer-and-anvil attack. The Indians southern Montana. Suspecting an Indian been criticized because none of the columns were then free to mass against Custer, whose village was somewhere to the south, they would have enough troops to defeat a large presence became known when he launched decided that Custer would lead his 600 Indian force. But again, he had reasons. a diversionary attack on the village called troops and 35 Indian scouts southward along Custer envisioned a hammer-and-anvil Medicine Tail Coulee. Custer continued the the Rosebud River, which flows a few miles attack in which rapid operations of all three remaining 3 miles to the far end of the ridge, west of the Little Bighorn River. He was to columns would be coordinated, thus striking where his Last Stand took place. march rapidly as far as 125 miles, then turn the Indians from both sides of the village and What happened on Last Stand Hill around and move northward along the Little compelling them to surrender. Custer did not is controversial. Evidently, Custer was not Bighorn. Meanwhile, a column led by Terry imagine that both Reno and Benteen would overrun immediately. Reno and Benteen and Gibbon would march south along the perform poorly, leaving him exposed to the heard heavy firing to the north from 4:25 river with 500 troops, reaching the Little full wrath of the Indians. to 5:10 p.m., but they were too preoccupied Bighorn valley on June 26. Terry hoped that When Custer was within 3 miles of guarding against further attack to ride to even if a pincer attack by both columns was the village at 3:00 p.m., he ordered Reno to Custer’s aid. The next day, 350 survivors on unrealistic, at least one of the columns, most likely Custer’s, would find the Indians and the Indians were free to mass against Custer, 4 win a major battle. whose presence became known when he launched After marching along the Rosebud about 60 miles, Custer discovered Indian a diversionary attack on the village trails leading west, suggesting a village on the Little Bighorn. He promptly turned that way. attack it from the south. As Reno set out Reno Hill were rescued when the Indians left Early on June 25, he arrived at a high point with his troops mounted, Custer proceeded the valley and Terry’s force arrived. overlooking the valley. His scouts detected with his 5 companies on a 6-mile march On Last Stand Hill, archaeological data a large Indian village about 15 miles north. along a steep ridgeline that paralleled the suggest a complex story that did not have Terry and Gibbon were a full day away.5 village on its eastern side, across from the to end in a massacre. When Custer arrived narrow Little Bighorn. He intended to there, Indian opposition was still light. Decisions advance along the ridge, concealed by its Custer could have escaped by marching east Custer’s first big decision was to attack rugged terrain, so he could swoop down on toward open space and then back toward on June 25 rather than the next day. Critics the village from the north, thus bringing Reno and Benteen. He chose to stay on the claim that he rushed to grab all the glory down the hammer on the enemy held by hill, poised to attack, apparently waiting before Terry and Gibbon arrived. Perhaps; Reno’s anvil. He also sent urgent orders to for Benteen. He sent a company down to but he also had other considerations in mind. Benteen to join the main body. the river to find a crossing and waited 20 Early on June 25, he became aware that Much depended on Reno diverting the minutes for it to return. During that time, his presence had been detected by Indian Indians from Custer and on Benteen arriving he could have reviewed his options and hunting parties. Fearful that the Indians promptly. Neither occurred. When Reno chosen a better course. Meanwhile, Indian would flee the village and escape altogether, met resistance, he dismounted his troops, strength at Custer’s end of the battlefield he decided to act immediately. His decision advanced in skirmish formation, and at was building, thanks to Reno’s buckling at had logic, but it also had drawbacks. Had 3:30 retreated into a nearby grove. Twenty the other end. he not been detected, a dawn attack on June minutes later, Reno and his embattled troops Custer’s final decision was apparently 26 could have caught the Indians asleep, for fled the trees in a mad dash across the Little to have his column remain in an offensive their perimeter security was not good. The Bighorn and up “Reno Hill” to establish a posture, but dismounted to fire effectively. attack on the 25th in full daylight caught the defensive position. Meanwhile, Benteen’s Now separated from their horses, the force Indians by surprise but not unprepared.6 force marched slowly, and when it arrived at could no longer flee quickly. They were Custer’s scouts reported that the village 4:20, it joined Reno, not Custer, who by then arrayed into two widely separated wings: contained at least 1,500 warriors, but he was 6 miles away. two companies with Custer on Last Stand still felt that the 7th Cavalry could win if it As Custer made his way along the ridge- Hill and three companies about a mile to the attacked boldly. About 13 miles from the line, he became aware of Reno’s mounting rear. This disposition may have made sense village, at noon, he decided to divide the 7th troubles. Twice Custer paused to get reports, for an offensive strategy, but it was bad for Cavalry into 3 battalions. He kept a battalion which told him of Reno’s dismounting in repelling a serious attack. The force was not of 5 companies with 210 troops under his the face of stiff resistance and then retreating organized into a tight-knit defensive posture personal command and assigned a battalion into the woods. Instead of returning to join of echeloned lines to permit coordinated of 3 companies to Major Marcus Reno. These Reno, Custer hastened northward in hope of fires. This left them vulnerable to attack by two columns were to advance toward the encircling the village as soon as possible. He large numbers of Indians, who used the high

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Library of Congress grass to draw close and deluge the cavalry that Benteen was not going to show. Yet he Yet even if he did not know Reno was in full troops with arrows and repeating rifles. The stayed there in a vulnerable attack posture. retreat, he knew the anvil had not held. This massacre probably began when the right Despite collapsing odds, Custer stuck same information should also have alerted wing suddenly collapsed, sending frightened with his plan. Had he instead broken contact Custer that he was facing a larger and fiercer troops toward Custer’s left wing. Few made and reconstituted his forces, with modest Indian force than he had expected or previ- it. Custer was left on Last Stand Hill with losses, the 7th Cavalry could have remained ously fought. Nevertheless, he proceeded only two companies to fend off hundreds of capable of pursuing the Indians if they fled. with his original attack plan in apparent Indians sensing victory. It was over quickly. The failure to take this option despite mount- confidence that he could pull it off. Custer’s decisions to attack the Indian ing risks of disaster, while hard to explain, As an alternative hypothesis, perhaps village on June 25 and to divide his command may provide lessons of enduring significance Custer judged that the hammer must strike into three dispersed battalions have been concerning cognition in battle. even faster with the anvil cracking. If so, his criticized by historians. But these choices objective in hurrying to the far end of the did not doom him, and there was reasoning Findings village to attack would have changed from behind them. Nor did the failures of Reno We have noted several mistakes by exploiting Reno’s anticipated success to and Benteen seal his fate. Rather, it was his Custer, including, as it turned out, his choice relieving his actual failure. By this interpreta- decision to continue his rapid march along of a plan that splintered his force and his tion, Custer did rely on reasoning once new the ridgeline toward Last Stand Hill after haste in executing it. But the most significant information had shattered his model, as learning of Reno’s troubles and the Indians’ error for our purposes, as well as for Custer, opposed to proceeding chiefly on intuition strength. Even on Last Stand Hill, Custer had was the one that produced the actual massa- and self-confidence. But the reasoning led a chance to break contact when he realized cre. Custer’s plan depended on Reno’s anvil. him back to his original plan, not despite ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 91 custer and c o g n i t i o n

he relied excessively on he was incapable of adapting but because his his mental model, includ- intuition told him he did not need to adapt. ing prompt attack and the To learn why, we must imagine how his experience from which mind worked. it was formed. The best It seems that Custer was both a bril- evidence that he did not liant tactician and a willing risk-taker rather augment his intuition with than one or the other. It was this mix that reasoning is that rational brought him and his troops to their end. Mil- analysis, had Custer taken itary history reveals that the combination of time for it, would almost brilliance and determination can be advanta- surely have revealed that geous when the right tactics are devised. But striking as planned was what if the tactics are wrong, as they can be not his best option. Even for even the smartest commander? It is at this after reaching Last Stand point that risks can multiply and intuition Hill, he could have escaped must be married with reasoning. Otherwise, had he not positioned to the self-confidence and impatience that often attack. Custer’s experience accompany brilliance can be fatal. and intuition failed him It does not appear that Custer suffered because what he faced at the from self-doubt. After all, he went from Little Bighorn was unfamil- last in his class at West Point to general in iar—precisely the point at 2 years, which both reveals and may have which cold, hard reasoning, contributed to a surplus of confidence in triggered by self-awareness his methods and intuition. He had known and new information, must mainly victory, rarely defeat, and never take precedence. disaster. As his career shows, Custer was not Gaining Time-Infor- inflexible by nature, for he had deftly escaped Monument to members of 7th Cavalry mation Advantage. Custer numerous predicaments. At the Little who died at Battle of Little Bighorn did not use information to Bighorn, he might have been less sure of gain time or time to gain complete victory than of being able to cheat information. Moreover, he defeat if his gamble failed. Reno’s failure but because of it. Could the seems to have placed more stress on moving Intuition travels a different cogni- Last Stand have been a heroic attempt to save swiftly than on getting good information. tive route than analysis. Whereas the latter Reno, as opposed to a vainglorious effort to Instead of easing the urgency that precluded involves identifying all interesting options destroy the entire Indian force? reasoned thinking, he intensified it. Of before comparing them and choosing one, While this idea cannot be excluded, course, because he was satisfied that proceed- the former runs rapidly through familiar we remain convinced that Custer relied too ing as planned was the correct choice, he approaches one by one, starting with the much on intuition based on prior experi- ence, and not enough on reasoning based rational analysis, had Custer taken time for it, would on new information. Had he analyzed his almost surely have revealed that striking as planned was options, he might have concluded that a divided force was not the only or best way not his best option to prevail against an enemy now known to be large, aggressive, and able to concentrate did not see himself in need of either more most familiar, until a “solution” appears. The on his small force. The information available information or time. Consequently, he found intuitive decisionmaker’s mental map reveals meant that the risks of trying to help Reno himself critically short of both when what he the path that experience says ought to work. by continuing with the original plan were needed was more of both. This ability can be invaluable, which is why decidedly greater than the risks of reversing Adapting Rapidly. Custer failed a core so many great commanders have exceptional direction and joining up with him. Whatever test of battle-wise ability, learning in action. intuitive powers. That the intuitive map can Custer’s final objective, his cognition never Of all his failures, this is the hardest to under- be right in some circumstances, however, strayed from his original mental map, despite stand, given his reputation for “knowing” does not make the decisionmaker battle-wise. mounting evidence of its disutility and esca- the right thing to do in combat. Custer was The map might be wrong in some situations, lating danger to his troops. neither rigid nor doctrinaire; in fact, his especially strange ones such as Custer faced How does Custer’s decisionmaking record suggests a creative and supple mind. at the Little Bighorn, in which the self-aware measure up to the precepts of battle-wisdom? He had options at the Little Bighorn that decisionmaker must ask whether experience Balancing and Integrating Intuition with were better than the course he took, not just is applicable and intuition is reliable. There Reasoning. Custer was a successful intuitive with hindsight but with the information he is little reason to think that Custer asked decisionmaker. But at the Little Bighorn, had. Custer went with his plan not because himself that critical question—it would have

92 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Gompert and Kugler been out of character—for if he had, he could intuition and reasoning, must be stressed in hardly have affirmed his intuition. Custer’s development and advancement, as should poor self-awareness accounts for his inability key battle-wise abilities. Training and edu- to learn in action. At the very moment when cation should emphasize analysis under intuition from experience was misleading pressure, using intuition judiciously, and him, Custer employed it with gusto. adaptive decisionmaking. The Indian leaders, notably Crazy His impressive record and abilities Horse and Gall, were the ones who gained a notwithstanding, Custer had a fatal flaw in time-information edge at the Little Bighorn, his inability to ask, “Might I be wrong?” In despite having been attacked. They, too, the military personnel system of today, even had options once Reno’s attack failed. After though there may be some place for officers the Indians drove Reno onto his hill, they with such absolute confidence in their intu- could have continued attacking him in force. ition that they leave no room for reasoning However, at about the same time they had and thus little room for error, an officer inca- Reno on the run, Custer tipped them off pable of questioning his intuition should not to his presence by his feint down Medicine hold an important command in an important Tail Coulee. In minutes, they must have conflict. decided to let Reno go, not to buy Custer’s National Portrait Gallery The U.S. military will always have its Ambrotype portrait of George Armstrong Custer feint, and to concentrate their strength where Custers: self-assured, driven, and impatient. they anticipated Custer would make his real Yet it is on other qualities, those that deliver attack. Along with Custer’s failures, this consistent battle-wisdom regardless of cir- reveals the leverage of rapid adaptation. The warfare, when cognitive excellence can cumstances, that the Nation increasingly and Indian leaders managed to strike Custer at provide the decisive edge, this need has vitally depends. JFQ a moment of his maximum vulnerability, become strategically important. But the case created by his failure to use time and infor- of Custer suggests that it will not be an easy NOTES mation to think of a better course of action. goal to achieve. In sum, the explanation for the Last 1 David C. Gompert, Irving Lachow, and Stand was not simply Custer’s reliance on George Armstrong Custer showed Justin Perkins, Battle-Wise: Gaining Cognitive intuition, which had served him well repeat- that military decisionmakers may seem Advantage in Networked Warfare, Defense and edly. The massacre required a specific set of battle-wise in many circumstances but not in Technology Paper 8 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2005). the military needs leaders at every level who can combine 2 Gary Klein, Intuition at Work: Why Devel- oping Your Gut Instinct Will Make You Better at reliable intuition with quick reasoning What You Do (New York: Random House, 2005). 3 For details, see Gregory J.W. Urwin, Custer circumstances, Custer’s poor self-awareness, others, where failing to blend intuition with Victorious: The Civil War Battles of General George and capable Indian leaders. For that moment, reasoning may be disastrous. This suggests Armstrong Custer (Lincoln: University of Nebraska he was the wrong man. a need to track and test performance under Press, 1983). Notwithstanding the specificity of the real or simulated combat pressure. More- 4 For details, see Wayne Michael Sarf, The conditions at the Little Bighorn, the battle over, as with Custer, decisionmakers may be Little Bighorn Campaign, March–September 1876 is instructive today, and not just for senior unaware of the limits of their intuition. This (Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, 1993). commanders. One of the consequences of underscores the importance of inculcating General Terry’s written orders to Custer make clear that Custer could deviate from the original the network revolution and correspond- explicit and objective self-awareness. Finally, plan to march to the Lower Rosebud if he had ing distribution of authority is that many there is a need to develop adaptive decision- “sufficient reason.” Not knowing exactly where more persons up and down the ranks will be making methods and habits to allow reason- the Indians were located, but expecting them to making combat decisions than in the days ing despite urgency. be along the Lower Little Bighorn, Terry evidently of centralized command and control. The Meeting these challenges demands use hoped that Custer’s 7th Cavalry, rather than his lesson of Custer can be applied as readily to of all the tools that affect whether and how own smaller, less mobile force, would fight the the major in charge of a small, mechanized battle-wise leaders end up making decisions battle. column as to the major general in charge of a in combat. These tools lie mainly in military 5 For details, see John S. Gray, Custer’s Last joint expeditionary force. personnel systems and policies. People with Campaign: Mitch Boyer and the Little Bighorn The goal, simply stated, is to have battle-wise potential must be sought in Reconstructed (Lincoln: University of Nebraska battle-wise decisionmakers who are capable recruitment, screened, sorted, and favored Press, 1991). 6 For analysis, see Richard Allan Fox, Jr., of rapidly adaptive decisionmaking. The for line responsibility starting early in their Archaeology, History, and Custer’s Last Battle military needs leaders at every level who can careers. Strong intuition should continue (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993). combine reliable intuition with quick reason- to be favored—but so must analytical skills, ing to gain and exploit time-information which unfamiliar conditions may demand. in battle. As we enter the age of networked Self-awareness, which is crucial to integrating ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 93 tional tools), an approach that will demand an expanded interagency role. According to Gerstein, organizations and agencies wielding soft Book Reviews power—for example, the Departments of Justice, Commerce, Educa- tion, and Health and Human Services—should be engaged in every phase of a spectrum of operations traditionally dominated by hard- s the diversity of articles in this issue’s Forum power elements. In the author’s words, “this is about the commitment suggests, the topic of integrated operations encom- of national power rather than the commitment of force.” passes a wide swathe of operational and tactical Likewise, the documentary foundation on which national A meanings. In his guidance to the Joint Staff, security is based—the U.S. National Security Strategy, the National General Peter Pace refers to the need for collaboration “within Strategy for Homeland Security, and the recommendations of the our own staff, the Department of Defense, the interagency, and Commission on National Security/21st Century and the 9/11 Commis- ultimately with our Coalition partners. . . . Our collaborative sion—is inadequate in this regard. To remedy this deficiency, Gerstein effort with the Office of the Secretary of Defense is critical to recommends the creation of a new National Security Act that will enhancing effectiveness in the interagency and can enable the survey national goals and objectives in the information age environ- interagency to function more like an integrated task force.” The ment and lay out the ways and means to achieve them. authors of the following two readings have adopted this concept as the touchstone for their works, which tackle the issue of “Solving the Interagency Puzzle” what integrated operations are—and what they could or need to by Major Sunil B. Desai, USMC be—in the broadest possible sense. Policy Review 129 (February/March 2005) available at Securing America’s Future: National Strategy in the Information Age Arguing that the stakes are too high to allow by Daniel M. Gerstein poor coordination among the government organiza- Westport, CT, Praeger, 2005 tions wielding the instruments of national power, 288 pp $44.95 Desai champions a shift to a broader interagency ISBN: 0–2759–8877–5 culture akin to the joint military culture created by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Citing four Daniel M. Gerstein, a U.S. Army officer impediments to this shift—the lack of a coordinated and recent military fellow at the Council on doctrine of operations, the absence of a central, inde- Foreign Relations, contends that national secu- pendent authority for training personnel in such a doctrine, the rity strategy, which historically has depended disparity of regional structures used to organize domestic and foreign heavily on the external use of hard (political, policies, and the failure of individual organizations to cultivate an military, and intelligence) power, does not take interagency ethos—Desai shows how the Armed Forces, which over- into account the effects of the world’s transi- came similar obstacles on the road to jointness, can be used as a model tion into the information age or the accom- for success. He concludes that his proposals, if enacted, would “enable panying globalization. To be effective in this actual integrated operations, and not just improved coordination and new age, U.S. security strategy must embrace cooperation” among the entities that comprise America’s instruments the elements of soft power (economic, cultural, social, and informa- of national power. JFQ L. Yambrick

The Military Use of Space: International Regimes for the A Diagnostic Assessment Final Frontier by Barry D. Watts by M.J. Peterson Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Albany, NY: State University of New York Budgetary Assessments, 2001 Press, 2005 130 pp. $20.00 340 pp. $85.00 ASIN: B0006E8UWA ISBN: 0–7914–6501–2 Mastering the Ultimate High Ground: Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics Next Steps in the Review essay by Peter L. Hays in the Space Age Military Uses of Space by Everett C. Dolman by Benjamin S. Lambeth ven in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002 Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003 war on terror, and America’s changed 208 pp. $24.50 193 pp. $24.00 E perception of national security, inter- ISBN: 0–7146–5200–8 ISBN: 0–8330–3330–1 relationships between outer space and global security remain salient and highly charged Lieutenant Colonel Peter L. Hays, USAF (Ret.), is a senior policy analyst with Science Applications issues. Few security challenges elicit greater International Corporation. He has been teaching space policy courses for almost 20 years. strategic expectations or raise more hackles

94 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu than the prospect of significant weapon These findings indicate that the path the advantages and limitations of particular deployments in space or questions about toward space weapons is already a slippery launch sites and satellite fields of view. a separate space force. Despite improve- slope, and they highlight the chasm between Dolman captures this analysis in his primary ments in integrating space capabilities into assigned responsibilities for space control astropolitical dictum: “Who controls low- operations and some work in implementing and capabilities to execute this mission. Earth orbit controls near-Earth space. Who recommendations in the January 2001 Rums- Despite the growing importance and vulner- controls near-Earth space dominates Terra. feld Space Commission Report, the United ability of space systems, Watts concludes Who dominates Terra determines the destiny States still lacks a clear vision for founda- that the United States does not currently face of humankind” (front dust jacket). tional national security space issues and has a strong strategic imperative to weaponize The remainder of the book explains the recently backslid in key organization and space. Although the strategic logic of space- evolution of the legal and political regime acquisition efforts. For example, the October power favors weaponization in the long run, for space that is dominated by the Outer 2002 absorption of U.S. Space Command by and the United States has the largest role of Space Treaty (OST) of 1967, analyzes how U.S. Strategic Command resulted in a signifi- any state in this decision, the critical link in this regime relates to astropolitics, and maps cant loss of focus and emphasis on military the logic chain leading toward this outcome a new path forward. Dolman also presents space; the July 2005 separation of the Depart- is “the assumption that near-earth space will sophisticated social science arguments on ment of Defense (DOD) Executive Agent be an economic and military center of gravity issues such as collective action, the Coase for Space from the Director of the National for the United States in the foreseeable theorem, and the tragedy of the commons, Reconnaissance Office portends the same future. Yet it is precisely this assumption that relating them to how a legal and political deleterious outcomes for black-white space seems open to question—at least between regime for space ought to operate. Not integration; and, worse, almost every current now and 2025” (p. 111). surprisingly, he finds that both the theory major space acquisition program faces large Everett Dolman, a professor at the Air and practice behind the current OST- cost overruns and lengthy schedule delays. Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space dominated space regime are inimical to his The United States needs to reconsider care- Studies, has studied space issues since 1982 astropolitical dicta and have already stunted fully the full range of issues raised by the as a space systems and foreign-area analyst U.S. development and use of space. Dolman works considered here and then reengage for the U.S. Government. Astropolitik, his urges that the United States immediately more effectively to develop and implement intellectual tour de force, discusses grand withdraw “from the current space regime its vision for national security space. strategy and world politics at the highest level and announce it is establishing a principle The Military Use of Space is technologi- by explaining how the physical attributes of of free-market sovereignty in space,” use “its cally well informed and carefully derives an outer space and the characteristics of space current and near-term capabilities...to seize essential foundation for understanding how systems ought to shape the application of military control” of LEO, and establish “a space activities are likely to affect national spacepower. Dolman’s book is intellectually national space coordination authority” to security. Barry Watts is a retired Air Force grounded in the best traditions of geopolitics, “define, separate, and coordinate the efforts F–4 pilot and an experienced defense analyst adds genuinely new and vital contributions of commercial, civilian, and military space and author on military topics. He endorses to the dialogue about space and national projects” (p. 157). Throughout, however, he current U.S. priorities for military space, a security, and develops a compelling vision emphasizes that America’s priorities in space centrist approach unlikely to arouse much for how America could use space to promote must remain balanced and that the goal of enthusiasm but open to attacks by those free-market capitalism and provide global astropolitics who believe the Nation should be doing a lot security as a public good. The first book that more or a lot less. He urges the United States can legitimately claim to present a compre- is not the militarization of space. Rather, the to continue upgrading its ability to provide hensive theory of spacepower, Astropolitik is militarization of space is a means to an end, actionable, real-time intelligence, surveil- easily the most important book on this topic part of a longer-term strategy. The goal is lance, and reconnaissance data directly to since Walter A. McDougall’s The Heavens to reverse the current international malaise warfighters but doubts that force application and the Earth in 1985. in regard to space exploration, and to do so will become a more important space mission Dolman begins by applying geopolitics in a way that is efficient and that harnesses than force enhancement before 2025. Watts to space, deriving the astropolitical dicta that the positive motivations of individuals and also concludes that the United States will guide his analysis. He posits “future lines of states striving to improve their conditions. continue to derive far more military capabil- commerce and military lines of communica- It is a neoclassical, market-driven approach ity from space than will any other state, but tions in space will be the Hohmann transfer intended to maximize efficiency and wealth these benefits will create substantial risks orbits between stable spaceports” (p. 73). (p. 183). and vulnerabilities for transformation and Since Hohmann transfer orbits begin in low- power projection; America probably has yet Earth orbit (LEO)—and all spaceflight must Benjamin Lambeth’s Mastering the Ulti- to realize more than a fraction of space’s traverse LEO—Dolman identifies this orbit mate High Ground returns us to Earth with potential for force enhancement; and growth as the first and most important astropoliti- an insightful analysis of the bureaucratic and in commercial and dual-use space technolo- cal strategic narrow. He also describes the organizational dynamics that have shaped gies worldwide probably will complicate astropolitical importance of the geostation- recent military space efforts. A senior strate- efforts to sustain the asymmetric U.S. space ary belt, the Lagrange libration points, and gic analyst at RAND, Lambeth has emerged advantage. the Van Allen radiation belts, and explains as a dean of modern airpower thought with ndupress.ndu.edu issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 / JFQ 95 his analyses on the transformation of Ameri- advocates better space situational awareness Along the way, he details the development of can airpower and its use over Kosovo. His capabilities as the most important founda- the treaties and agreements that formalized previous work provides an ideal background tion for space control and favors flexible these regimes, including the 1967 OST, the to transcend semantic arguments, review Air negation options but, in conclusion, does not 1968 Rescue and Return Agreement, the 1972 Force perceptions about air and space, and believe the United States or Air Force would Liability Convention, the 1975 Registration analyze the Service’s role in the origins of be well served in the near term by deploying Convention, the 1979 Moon Treaty, and the the Space Commission and implementing its weapons in space. 1988 International Telecommunications recommendations. International Regimes for the Final Union allotment plan for orbit and spectrum The Air Force’s efforts to come to grips Frontier by M.J. Peterson provides insights resources. with space have been molded by its struggles into a final and perhaps increasingly impor- Completion of the last space regime to become a separate Service, the position of tant way to bound and order thinking about in 1988 and increasing commercial and the other Services, domestic and global poli- the interrelationships between space and military space activity facilitate application of tics, technology developments, and the con- national security. Peterson is a professor of Peterson’s analytical approach to more recent ceptual issue of whether air and space should political science at the University of Mas- events. Two trends may be contributing to be viewed as separate mediums. As Lambeth sachusetts and former editor of Polity. His pressures to modify existing space regimes or recounts, during its early years as a separate work examines the formation of interna- create new ones: growth in the number and Service the Air Force centered on the aero- tional agreements on space activity between diversity of major space actors, with com- space concept—the idea that air and space 1958 and 1988 and is the longest and most mercial players potentially becoming more are best seen as one seamless domain that the formal of the works under consideration. significant than all but the most important Air Force should be primarily responsible Peterson evaluates whether rational choice spacefaring states, and the changing locus of for projecting force from and controlling. He theory or social practices best explains space security issues away from the super- explains that the opportunity costs to the Air regime formation by focusing on bargaining powers and toward fora such as the Confer- Force of using the aerospace concept include processes and using space as a case study ence on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. stifling development of spacepower theory rather than emphasizing the space regimes Neither trend seems likely to buttress current due to inappropriately substituting air char- themselves. This approach differs consider- U.S. space policy. A growing number of acteristics and attributes to describe space ably from the other works and is unsuit- diverse and commercially driven space actors and making inappropriate trade-offs when able for those unwilling to wade through are not likely to play the same role as states allocating resources between competing air Peterson’s political theory foundation. Those did during the Cold War; similarly, the U.S. and space systems. who do, however, will be rewarded with a position that the OST regime is all that is These issues, as well as the perception well-developed and supported conceptual needed to regulate space activity may become that the Air Force was an inadequate steward framework about space regimes that also increasingly untenable at the CD and else- of space, prompted creation of the Space provides a way to study regime formation in where. JFQ Commission, a move the Air Force rightly other areas of international politics. perceived as a threat to its current and future Regimes are the sets of rules, norms, space responsibilities. The commission and expectations that guide the behavior report critiqued Air Force performance in of actors in certain issue areas. In political areas such as developing a space cadre and theory, rational choice analyses see actors’ normalizing space operations. However, the pursuit of goals as the primary determinant Distribution: JFQ is distributed to the commissioners recommended holding off of their behavior, whereas social practices field and fleet through Service publications any significant changes in organizational approaches emphasize the role actors distribution centers. Active, Reserve, National structure such as creation of a space corps or perceive themselves playing in shaping Guard units, individuals, and organizations supported by the Services can order JFQ separate Service. They also strengthened the their behavior. Peterson finds that both are through the appropriate activity: Air Force position by recommending that it important, but social practices provide better Army: www.usapa.army.mil (cite Misc. be made DOD executive agent for all military insights into the development of regimes Pub 71-1) space acquisition and that the Commander of for space. He also explains that analogy was Navy: Defense Distribution Depot Air Force Space Command be made a four- a more powerful tool than metaphor and Susquehanna, New Cumberland, Penn- sylvania 17070; call (717) 770-5872, star position independent of the Commander shows, for example, how development of the DSN 771-5827, FAX (717) 770-4360 of U.S. Space Command. space regime as res communis rather than Air Force: www.e-Publishing.af.mil or Lambeth builds on these organizational res nullius was informed by development of email [email protected] considerations to emphasize that increasing the Antarctic regime. Peterson applies his Marine Corps: Headquarters U.S. Marine U.S. commercial and military dependence on framework to the development of all major Corps (Code ARDE), Federal Building No. 2 (room 1302), Navy Annex, Wash- space systems also increases the likelihood regimes that help define the characteristics ington, DC 20380; FAX (703) 614-2951, that these critical nodes will be attacked. This of space and regulate its use: locational clas- DSN 224-2951 means the United States must develop more sification, registration of space objects, rescue Subscription information for individuals and robust space control capabilities, defined as of space crews, liability for damage on Earth, nonmilitary organizations is available at: ensuring its freedom of action in space while military activity in space, exploring and using ndupress.ndu.edu denying the same to adversaries. Lambeth the Moon, and use of geostationary orbit.

96 JFQ / issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu New Book from NDU Press Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods for a New Era by Richard L. Kugler

The U.S. Government will continue to face many difficult decisions in the national security arena. Systematic analysis can help improve the quality of these decisions—sometimes only marginally, but sometimes hugely. . . . This book was written in the hope that it will result in better trained people, sounder analyses, and wiser policies. The Cold War generation has, by now, the benefit of years of experience in this field, but a new generation of young Americans is arriving that lacks such experience. The Cold War has passed into history and an entirely new era has arrived that will demand analyti- cal methods of its own. —from the Preface

Contains chapters on topics such as: n Evaluating Strategies for Multiple Goals n Crafting Strategy for Alliance Leadership n Promoting Economic Progress and Democracy Richard L. Kugler, n Sizing Conventional Forces one of the foremost n Modernizing Affordably practitioners of the critical art of n Forging Defense Budgets national security policy analysis, n encapsulates more than three Designing Nuclear Forces and Missile Defenses decades of his experience in n Creating a New Overseas Military Presence this unique book. He virtually n Forging Investment Strategies . . . and more defines the discipline, breaking down policy analysis into three With more than 60 illustrations, 100 tables, bibliography, and index major components—strategic evaluation, systems analysis, and operations research—and applying the latest methods of each to real-world examples and the daunting issues facing the United States in today’s global environment. Published for the Center for Technology and National Security Policy by National Defense University Press Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2006 650 pages ISBN 1-57906-070-6

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office. Purchase online at: ndupress.ndu.edu coming next in... Focus on U.S. Southern Command Office of Force Transformation Today plus Fingerprints and the Global War on Terror and more in issue 42, 3d Quarter 2006

JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

A Professional Military and Security Journal Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University Press Institute for National Strategic Studies 1070-0692()41;1-S National Defense University, Washington, DC