University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Great Plains Quarterly Great Plains Studies, Center for Winter 2002 The Beginning Of The End The Indian Peace Commission Of 1867~1868 Kerry R. Oman Southern Methodist University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsquarterly Part of the Other International and Area Studies Commons Oman, Kerry R., "The Beginning Of The End The Indian Peace Commission Of 1867~1868" (2002). Great Plains Quarterly. 2353. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsquarterly/2353 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Great Plains Studies, Center for at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Great Plains Quarterly by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. THE BEGINNING OF THE END THE INDIAN PEACE COMMISSION OF 1867~1868 KERRY R. OMAN In 1867, in an effort to avoid the high costs of Miniconjou, Yanktonai, Hunkpapa, Blackfeet, war and protect overland transportation Cuthead, Two Kettle, Sans Arc, and Santee routes, Congress passed a bill authorizing a bands of Lakota Sioux. Their efforts helped commission to establish peace with the Plains end Red Cloud's War upon the Northern Indians. In less than two years, what proved to Plains, and, as a result of their reports and be the last major commission sent out by the recommendations, they greatly influenced fed­ government to treat with the Indians met and eral Indian policy. Yet, despite these accom­ signed treaties with the Kiowa, Comanche, plishments, Congress failed to quickly fulfill Kiowa-Apache, Northern and Southern Chey­ the treaty stipulations, and instead of initiat­ enne and Arapaho, Crow, Navajo, Eastern ing an era of peace, the commission com­ Shoshone and Bannock, and the Brule, Oglala, menced a decade of war and bloodshed throughout the Plains.! The origins of the Peace Commission can be traced to the early morning hours of 29 KEY WORDS: American Indian Treaties, In­ November 1864, when the Third Regiment of dian Peace Commission, Lakota Sioux, Red Colorado Volunteers, led by the reckless Col. Cloud, 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie, William John M. Chivington, massacred a friendly band Tecumseh Sherman of Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians along the banks of Sand Creek in eastern Colorado. As Kerry R. Oman is a doctoral candidate in history at Southern Methodist University specializing in western military and newspaper accounts spread con­ American history, Native American history, and cerning the nature of the attack and the hor­ Spanish Borderlands. He received an Andrew W. rific mutilation of the bodies that followed, Mellon Foundation Fellowship and has published in several governmental agencies launched inves­ The Journal of the Indian Wars and Montana: The tigations into the incident.2 One such investi­ Magazine. gation, created by Congress in March 1865, called for a special joint committee, headed [GPQ 22 (Winter 2002): 35-51] by Sen. James R. Doolittle, to inquire into the 35 36 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, WINTER 2002 condition of the Indian tribes and the actions of the civil and military authorities of the United States. The "Doolittle Report," as it came to be called, took nearly two years to complete and contained a mass of documents over 500 pages in length. Among its findings, the committee described in detail the deterioration of the Indians' condition and the causes of Indian hostility, which they believed could largely be traced to the "aggressions of lawless white men." The report also condemned the actions of Chivington at Sand Creek and called for the creation of five boards of inspection of Indian affairs that could annually visit the Indian tribes within their districts in an effort to better comprehend their conditions and avoid future military conflicts.3 In July 1867, while Congress brewed over Doolittle's findings, they received a report from another special investigating committee re­ garding the annihilation of Lt. William J. Fetterman's command near Fort Phil Kearney FIG. 1. General William T. Sherman, ca. 1860- on 21 December 1866 and Gen. Winfield S. 1865. Photogapher, Mathew Brady Studio. War Hancock's destruction of a Cheyenne and Department, US Army, Office of the Chief Signal Lakota Sioux village in April 1867.4 Fort Phil Officer. National Archives at College Park, MD. Kearney was one of three forts located along Photograph no. NWDNS-ll1-B-1789. the Bozeman Trail, a route that intersected the Powder River Basin as it took miners to the goldfields of Montana. Both the fort and trail existed on Indian lands set aside by treaty all railroad working parties. In other words, and were in the heart of the last remaining fifty hostile Indians will checkmate three thou­ hunting grounds in the Northern Plains. Along sand soldiers." Making sure the secretary of with documenting Fetterman's loss and criti­ war understood him, he proclaimed that "it cizing General Hancock's actions, the report makes little difference whether they be coaxed called for the creation of two reservations out by Indian commissioners or killed," but where the Indians could be induced to take up the government needed to get the Indians out pastoral and agricultural pursuits. Just how this as soon as possible.s was to be accomplished was the problem. As a result of the Sand Creek Massacre, Lt. Gen. William T. Sherman, a grizzled along with the impact of the Doolittle Report, Civil War veteran and a relentless advocate of the investigation into the actions of Lieuten­ total warfare, had his own ideas of how to deal ant Fetterman and General Hancock, and with the Indians. In a letter to the secretary of other conflicts on the Plains, a bill proposing war on 17 June 1867, and included in the pre­ a commission "to establish peace with certain vious report, General Sherman made it clear hostile Indian tribes" came before Congress that "if fifty Indians are allowed to remain on 15 July 1867.6 The bill called for a new between the Arkansas and Platte we will have reservation scheme with the ultimate aim be­ to guard every stage station, every train, and ing the "concentration" of all Plains Indians THE INDIAN PEACE COMMISSION OF 1867-1868 37 onto two reservations-one lying north of the that the Indian shall take his place among state of Nebraska, west of the Missouri River, other men and accept the march of civiliza­ and east of the routes to Montana, and an­ tion, as he must ultimately, or there is noth­ other one located in a district south of the ing except his destiny that awaits him, state of Kansas and west of the state of Arkan­ which is extinction.lo sas. 7 The removal of the Plains tribes onto reservations was not just an effort to establish The overriding attitude centered on their in­ peace, but more importantly was an attempt sistence that the Indians not be permitted to to secure the safety of overland transportation stand in the way of "civilization" and routes. Within the Senate, the bill went "progress," or, as Senator Henderson pro­ through a long series of debates over a four­ claimed, if nothing but extermination would day period that often looked past the specifics do, then the Indian's "termination must of the proposed Peace Commission and cen­ come."ll Congress's prevailing drive to pro­ tered on what several senators referred to as tect the efforts of the railroad, as well as other the "Indian question."8 overland routes, enhanced their determina­ In 1867 Congress faced a critical point in tion to remove or exterminate the Indians. the history of the country. The question raised The bill, which passed both houses of Con­ within the Senate was whether the govern­ gress on 20 July 1867, called for a top-ranking ment should attempt to assimilate, concen­ seven-man commission with the aim of estab­ trate, or exterminate the Indians. This was an lishing peace with the Plains Indians. It would old argument, and a highly contentious one at consist of four civilians and three generals, all that, but this time it became centered on the having a sincere interest and competence in high price of fighting "hostile" Indians. Ac­ dealing with Indian affairs. The goal was to cording to some members of Congress, it cost establish permanent peace between the Indi­ the government nearly $1 million for every ans and whites, and thus the bill gave the com­ Indian killed during the present campaign, and missioners power to call together the chiefs of from $1 to $2 million a week just to defend the those Indian tribes then considered to be wag­ frontier populations. Many feared that unless ing war against the people of the United States. they acted quickly the current operations The commissioners were instructed to make would burden the treasury for nearly $100 treaty stipulations that could secure the over­ million before the end of the year, causing the land lines of transportations, and most spe­ typically soft-spoken Sen. John B. Henderson cifically the property of the railroad. It also of Missouri to stand in front of Congress and required the commissioners to select a district forcefully demand that "if we can make peace or districts that, after being approved by Con­ with the Indians we had better do it."9 gress, would be sufficient to receive all the Reaching consensus that it was better to Indian tribes not peacefully residing on per­ make peace than war, the discussion moved to manent reservations and living east of the the old and highly controversial question of R(Jcky Mountains. Congress believed the com­ assimilation.