Lawrence of Airpower

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Lawrence of Airpower While one of the most famous people in the world, T. E. Lawrence enlisted under a pseudonym in the RAF. Twice. Lawrence of Airpower By Robert S. Dudney 66 AIR FORCE Magazine / April 2012 By Stuart Reid, via the ImperialWar Museum T. E. Lawrence as an Army officer in 1915. n the epic film “Lawrence of Arabia,” the title character, having left his desert war and gone back to England, is killed in a motorcycle ac- cident. The implication is that T. E. Lawrence died young, soon after the Arab Revolt ended in 1918. IContrary to the Hollywood tale, the real Thomas Edward Lawrence lived for 17 more years, until 1935. Moreover, the legendary figure known as Lawrence of Arabia passed most of those years as an enlisted man in the Royal Air Force, un- der assumed names. The world-famous Colonel Lawrence, sick of celebrity, joined the RAF in 1922 under the alias John Hume Ross (A/C2 No. 352087) and again in 1925 as T. E. Shaw (A/C2 No. 338171). There he stayed until the final weeks of his life. Most of Lawrence’s biographers give limited attention to this period and focus on the earlier exploits of the young, glamorous, Oxford-educated officer as he led Bedouin tribesmen against the Ottoman Empire in 1916-1918. Yet Lawrence’s life after Arabia is remark- able, too. One of recent history’s most charismatic figures, laboring in ano- nymity, made important contributions to Britain’s airpower and did so from the lowly enlisted ranks. Lawrence’s involvement in airpower Bedouin forces celebrate the landing of a Handley long preceded his RAF tours. The public Page bomber at Deraa, convinced that with the ar- knows him as an Englishman in flowing rival of the huge bomber, their war against the Turks white robes and riding a camel, leading would be won. sweeping attacks across the desert. Yet AIR FORCE Magazine / April 2012 67 Historians assert Lawrence individuals, hiding for their lives in was one of the first military every fold of the vast hills. ... The RAF men to use aircraft to support lost four killed. The Turks lost a corps.” ground assaults directly. He Lawrence used his knowledge of had the backing of then-Brig. airpower in the immediate postwar Gen. Geoffrey Salmond, RFC years, when he served in the Colonial commander in the Mideast. Office as a Mideast expert. He did so Lawrence became a committed most openly in connection with the airpower proponent. As he later newly created kingdom of Iraq, a Brit- wrote, “The war showed me ish protectorate. that a combination of armored In 1921, Lawrence advised his minis- cars and aircraft could rule the ter—Winston Churchill—to “hand over desert.” defense [of Iraq] to the RAF instead Air reconnaissance was one of the Army.” His wartime experience key to the revolt’s most famous proved to him that a handful of aircraft victory—at Aqaba. Lawrence’s could control tribal forces, allowing official biographer, Jeremy Wil- London to avoid bloody ground-force son, says that in 1916, while in operations. Air Chief Marshal Hugh Cairo, Lawrence extensively Trenchard, the RAF chief, supported studied air photos of Aqaba, a him on this. port town guarded by Turkish According to Lawrence biographer naval guns. A year later Law- H. Montgomery Hyde, “The new policy rence boldly seized the fortress [was] somewhat contemptuously de- from its landward side, using scribed by Sir Henry Wilson, the chief his detailed knowledge of sur- of the Imperial General Staff, as one of rounding terrain. ‘hot air, aeroplanes, and Arabs.’ ” Despite At Um el Surab, in what is this boots-on-the-ground view, Churchill now Jordan, his force built an accepted the “air policing” plan. Lawrence in 1917, near Aqaba, the site airstrip for a huge Handley “From its creation in 1921 to ... World of his most famous victory. Page bomber. Its arrival caused a “wild- War II, Iraq was a proving ground eyed Bedouin” to ride off announcing for Lawrence’s visionary ideas about Lawrence always was bound up with he had seen “the biggest aeroplane in airpower,” Korda writes. “For several military aviation. the world.” As Korda notes, “Even the decades the principal RAF base at Hab- His attraction to airpower first most skeptical tribesmen were now baniya, outside Baghdad, was one of the emerged in 1915, when he worked convinced that the Turks were done for.” largest military airfields in the world.” in British army intelligence in Cairo. In 1922, Lawrence’s life took a In his recent book, Hero, Michael Hot Air, Aeroplanes, and Arabs strange turn. He moved decisively to Korda reports that the young Lawrence Lawrence, by war’s end, was operat- abandon fame, fortune, and career, pioneered aerial photography for map- ing his own small air force east of the become a humble RAF aircraftman, making and intelligence. According to Jordan River. He controlled “X flight,” and simply vanish. Korda, “He devised his own system of airplanes devoted to specific missions. In January 1922, Lawrence opened laying out aerial photographs in a grid These included bombing Turkish rail secret negotiations to enlist under an pattern to use them as the basis for a lines, taking aerial photos, and raid- assumed name. In July, a reluctant map and taught pilots how to take the ing Turkish positions. Lawrence even Churchill approved Lawrence’s plan. pictures he needed.” Lawrence served learned to fly; he had pilot friends and Trenchard, by that time a friend of as liaison between Royal Flying Corps took the controls while airborne. He Lawrence’s, insisted that he enter as photographers and surveying teams. He claimed he had 2,000 flying hours. He an officer, but Lawrence refused. To took part in experiments in early 1915. told the war historian, B. H. Liddell Hart, Lawrence, a colonel in the Army, it When his ideas were successfully tested he made only one landing, in which he was the enlisted ranks or nothing. at Gallipoli, aerial surveying soon came tore off the aircraft’s undercarriage. Trenchard finally gave in. On Aug. 30, into widespread use. Lawrence was much impressed by 1922, Lawrence, using the alias John In 1916, Lawrence entered the field an RAF attack on Sept. 21, 1918. The Hume Ross, presented himself at the as British Army liaison to the army Turkish 7th Army was caught flee- RAF recruiting office, Covent Garden. of Sharif Hussein of Mecca. He soon ing east toward the Jordan. “For four He failed the medical exam, had began to make heavy use of aviation. hours,” said Lawrence, “our aeroplanes no birth certificate, and aroused great Lawrence focused on ways to incor- replaced one another in series above suspicion. porate British aircraft (and armored the doomed columns: Nine tons of There was never a doubt he would cars) into his tactics. He became an small bombs or grenades and 50,000 get in, though. A top Air Ministry of- innovator in what military men now rounds [of small-arms ammunition] ficial (who was in on the secret) told refer to as “combined operations.” were rained upon them.” the recruiting officer to get “Ross” into Lawrence swiftly integrated British He went on, “When the smoke had the RAF “or you’ll get your bowler pilots and their aircraft into his hit-and- cleared it was seen that the organization hat”—RAF-speak for “you will be run campaigns using horses, camels, of the enemy had melted away. They discharged.” Within hours, Lawrence/ and infantry. were a dispersed horde of trembling Ross was officially sworn into the RAF. 68 AIR FORCE Magazine / April 2012 Why did Col. T. E. Lawrence, World The RAF decided the publicity was War I’s greatest hero, chuck it all and bad for discipline. Ross was summarily become Aircraftman 2nd Class Ross? discharged. Lawrence quickly enlisted in Lawrence gave various explanations. He the Royal Tank Corps, hoping he could told Trenchard he wanted to write a book parlay this into a quick transfer back to about the RAF. When another officer the RAF. He took a new name, 7875698 asked why he joined, Lawrence said, “I Private T. E. Shaw, arriving at RTC think I had a mental breakdown, sir.” At Depot, Bovington, on March 23, 1923. other times, he said he liked the cama- Lawrence loathed each of his 29 raderie or that he simply didn’t know. months in khaki. “The Army,” he said, Others had psychological explanations. “is muck, stink, a desolate abomination.” The author Robert Graves, Lawrence’s In 1924 and 1925, he pressed high-level friend and biographer, said the hero had friends, including Trenchard, to get him come to regard his part in the Arab revolt back in the RAF. As of mid-1925, he as dishonorable, and he wished to avoid had had no luck. Wilson, the official further publicity and praise. biographer, reports “Lawrence’s mental “There was a tendency among Law- state was now deteriorating rapidly and rence’s contemporaries to see his deci- he had begun to think that ... re-entry sion to shed his rank and join the RAF as into the RAF would be the only future a form of penance, but he always denied worth living for.” that,” notes Korda. “His service in the In June 1925, a despondent Lawrence RAF, once he was past recruit training, sent a letter that its recipient interpreted would prove to be the happiest time of as a suicide threat. Fearing a huge scan- Aircraftman T. E. Shaw (Lawrence) at his [adult] life.” dal if Britain’s great war hero were to RAF Miranshah, India.
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