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Beyond Encrypt Everything: Passive Monitoring Discussions of Pervasive Monitoring Within the IETF Have Focused on Large-Scale Passive Monitoring of the Internet

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Beyond Encrypt Everything: Passive Monitoring Discussions of Pervasive Monitoring Within the IETF Have Focused on Large-Scale Passive Monitoring of the Internet Mark Donnelly Sam Hartman January 15, 2014 Beyond Encrypt Everything: Passive Monitoring Discussions of pervasive monitoring within the IETF have focused on large-scale passive monitoring of the Internet. The most straight-forward objective in combating pervasive passive monitoring is to encrypt more. This paper explores what happens when we succeed. What will the residual threats look like? Where will the pressure exerted by those who want to monitor the Internet move? What can we do to respond to the new pressure? We believe that this broader analysis will help as we examine mitigations for pervasive monitoring. In looking at pervasive monitoring we consider the sorts of passive attacks that are being included in the Internet Threat Model 1 as well as more active pervasive actions designed to monitor the Internet. Together the pervasive passive monitoring as well as the more active monitoring initiatives directly impact confidentiality and privacy. Credentials collected as well as indirect compromises impact integrity and potentially availability of the Internet. We propose the following goals. First, increase the difficulty of monitoring without the knowledge of the parties being monitored. Second, provide users of the Internet better tools to understand their risks of monitoring. Finally, increase the probability that attempts to monitor a given interaction will be detected. These goals are consistent with those discussed at the PERPASS BOF at IETF 89 2. Encryption and its Limitations A lot of initial focus has been on encryption. We've seen that encryption increases the difficulty of an actor attempting to monitor a connection. Without encryption of some kind, Internet traffic is trivially vulnerable to passive monitoring. The questions tend to focus around whether a particular approach to encryption provides significant value in a certain context. The IETF is in the process of describing the interactions between encryption protocols and pervasive monitoring. As an example, Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) could prevent an attacker from monitoring a conversation even if the attacker knows the long-term private key used by a server. For TLS-based protocols, Achieving PFS requires selection of a compatible TLS cipher suite as well as properly discarding ephemeral keys. Similarly for some applications, encrypting the conversation even when neither side of the connection is authenticated may provide a significant defense against passive monitoring. However, such opportunistic encryption is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. In cases such as attacks on signaling protocols such as SIP, mounting large-scale man-in-the-middle attacks may provide significant value to an attacker and may be technically feasible Off the Record (OTR) 3 is an example of an encryption system with relatively good usability that provides significant defense against passive monitoring. OTR works to provide PFS for chat clients. The encryption is between the two endpoints of the chat and does not rely on encryption at the chat server layer. If the chat server does not mount a man-in-the-middle attack, then the encryption provides confidentiality. Optional authentication facilities can detect man-in-the-middle attacks. OTR also demonstrates some of the residual risks of encryption. OTR is unable to protect identity; someone who can monitor the connection with the chat server can tell which two parties are chatting even though they cannot detect what is said. Encryption between the client and chat server would provide some additional privacy. However, the IP addresses of involved parties would leak much of the same information. 1 http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-trammell-perpass-ppa-01 2 http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/88/minutes/minutes-88-perpass 3 https://otr.cypherpunks.ca/ In general, statistical analysis of the traffic can reveal significant information about what encrypted resources are transferred 4. As an example, it is often possible for an attacker to observe traffic and determine whether a particular document is requested even when the traffic is encrypted. The TOR Project 5 works to combat traffic analysis, hide location and provide anonymous browsing. It accomplishes this at a significant performance and scalability cost. Work on TOR and other anonymity research has shown that many IETF protocols are easy to fingerprint 6 and leak information even when encryption is used. One of the goals of the TLS 1.3 standard is to minimize parts of the exchange that are not encrypted 7. However, this will not provide a defense against statistical analysis as a way to detect which objects are requested. Even so, encryption can significantly increase the work and decrease the reliability of information collected by those monitoring the Internet. Certificates and Keys Especially as more traffic becomes encrypted, the ability to decrypt this traffic becomes valuable to those monitoring the Internet. With TLS cipher suites that do not provide PFS, learning the server's private key provides an attacker the ability to decrypt all traffic sent to or from that server. Using cipher suites that can provide PFS provides a solution. The server can leak its private key (possibly because of legal requirements) but if the server does not leak the private key and changes it frequently, then a purely passive attacker is not expected to be able to decrypt the traffic. However, an attacker can mount a man-in-the-middle attack. One possibility is to get a certificate issued in the name of the attacked server. Another possibility is to rely on users' willingness to bypass security warnings and go to a site even when the certificate is not valid. The most successful defense against man-in-the-middle attacks is certificate or public key pinning 8; this HTTP extension provides continuity between accesses to a given site. If an attacker mounts a man-in-the-middle attack, they need to always mount that attack to a given target or raise a significant risk of detection. As an example, key pinning could have detected an attack in which the US National Security Agency impersonated Google 9 to gather information. Google Chrome includes pinning for most Google sites; this proved instrumental for detecting fake certificates issued by Diginotar 10. However, if your site doesn't come pinned in the browser distribution, then a man-in-the-middle attack is still possible on first access. Certificate Transparency 11 provides a way for servers to audit which certificates have been issued for their domains. It is hoped that this will significantly increase the chance that an attacker attempting to monitor a site with an improperly issued certificate will be able to do so. In the past we've proposed using approaches like RFC 5056 to leverage existing relationships with sites 12. The hope is that existing credentials can be used to detect man-in-the-middle attacks. However that work does not have much in the way of deployment experience and was not designed with pervasive monitoring in mind. It's worth exploring whether that can help detect unwanted monitoring, but the set of trade offs have become more complex. 4 http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/login.jsp?tp=&arnumber=1004359&url=http%3A%2F%2Fieeexplore.ieee.org %2Fxpls%2Fabs_all.jsp%3Farnumber%3D1004359 5 https://www.torproject.org/ 6 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/experimental-defense-website-traffic-fingerprinting 7 http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/88/slides/slides-88-tls-4.pdf 8 http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-09 9 http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57602701-38/nsa-disguised-itself-as-google-to-spy-say-reports/ 10 https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/08/iranian-man-middle-attack-against-google 11 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962 12 http://www.w3.org/2011/identity-ws/papers/idbrowser2011_submission_9.pdf Target: JavaScript and Shared Resources Attackers have engaged in targeted attacks to collect information. Either bugs in code are exploited or alternatively code is modified so that it can be exploited. Exploitable code is a significant problem whose solution is almost entirely outside of the scope of the IETF and W3C. However standards bodies can play a significant role in making sure that if quality code is available, it is not replaced with code that gives the attacker an advantage. JavaScript, fonts and other web resources are often hosted on CDNs or central servers rather than being duplicated across websites. This provides caching and performance advantages. However, these sites are potentially very interesting targets for those wishing to monitor the Internet. If the code hosted on these sites is changed, then many systems may run code under the control of an attacker wishing to perform monitoring. Policies such as same-origin 13 will require a bit of cleverness from attackers, but leaking data of interest to the attacker is definitely possible. Global changes to code might be noticed. However, another possibility is to make targeted changes to the code only for specific clients. Several mitigations are possible. One is for sites invoking resources from hosted sites to include a hash of the requested resource. This guarantees that the hosting site is not modifying the resource. The subresource integrity specification 14 is a proposal for accomplishing this. This leaves the problem of how a site knows what hash to include. That is, how do they confirm that the version of the resource they have downloaded to evaluate the hash is globally available and not targeted to them. An approach similar to certificate transparency where public logs of resources are maintained can solve this problem. The proposed Transparency Working Group 15 can provide technology to meet this objective. A possible attack on the subresource integrity hash is that a government could coerce a site to replace its usual JavaScript reference with a correctly hashed malicious reference.
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