NIST SP 1800-16B: Securing Web Transactions: TLS Server Certificate Management I
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Treasury X.509 Certificate Policy [TREASURYCP].” It Only Addresses Where an OLT PKI’S Requirements Differ from the Requirements for Basic Assurance in [TREASURYCP]
UNCLASSIFIED UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE (PKI) X.509 CERTIFICATE POLICY VERSION 3.4 April 27, 2021 PKI Policy Management Authority (PMA) DATE DANIEL W. WOOD 1 UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT VERSION CONTROL Version Date Author(s) Description Reason For Change Bring the Treasury PKI Policy into Department of the compliance with FPKIPA change Treasury PKI Policy in 2.0 January 2008 James Schminky proposal requiring all cross certified RFC PKI Policies to be in RFC 3647 3647 format. format. As a result of mapping the Treasury Errata changes to sections PKI Policy to Federal Policy, a 2.2.1, 2.1 March 17, 2009 James Schminky number of minor changes and 4.8, 4.912, 5.5, and omissions where identified and 7.1.3. corrected. As a result of the PMA annual Errata changes to sections review a number of minor 5.6, and 6.3.2. Change corrections, Federal Bridge proposal changes to 2.4, 2.2 March 11, 2010 James Schminky Certification Authority (FBCA) 4.2.2, 5.1, 5.1.1 5.1.2.1, Policy Change Proposal Number: 5.4.4, 5.4.5, 6.1.6, 6.5.1, 2009-02 and 2010-01, and Treasury and 6.7. Change Proposal Change proposal changes As a result of FBCA Policy Change 2.3 April 15, 2010 James Schminky to 8.1 and 8.4. Proposal Number: 2010-02. Changes Proposal As a result of FBCA Policy Change Changes to 1.3.1.8, Proposal Numbers; 2010-3 thru 8 2.4 March 22, 2011 James Schminky 3.1.1&.2, 3.1.5, 3.2.3.1, and CPCA policy Change Proposal 4.7, 6.1.5, 8.1, and 9.4.3. -
SSL/TLS Implementation CIO-IT Security-14-69
DocuSign Envelope ID: BE043513-5C38-4412-A2D5-93679CF7A69A IT Security Procedural Guide: SSL/TLS Implementation CIO-IT Security-14-69 Revision 6 April 6, 2021 Office of the Chief Information Security Officer DocuSign Envelope ID: BE043513-5C38-4412-A2D5-93679CF7A69A CIO-IT Security-14-69, Revision 6 SSL/TLS Implementation VERSION HISTORY/CHANGE RECORD Person Page Change Posting Change Reason for Change Number of Number Change Change Initial Version – December 24, 2014 N/A ISE New guide created Revision 1 – March 15, 2016 1 Salamon Administrative updates to Clarify relationship between this 2-4 align/reference to the current guide and CIO-IT Security-09-43 version of the GSA IT Security Policy and to CIO-IT Security-09-43, IT Security Procedural Guide: Key Management 2 Berlas / Updated recommendation for Clarification of requirements 7 Salamon obtaining and using certificates 3 Salamon Integrated with OMB M-15-13 and New OMB Policy 9 related TLS implementation guidance 4 Berlas / Updates to clarify TLS protocol Clarification of guidance 11-12 Salamon recommendations 5 Berlas / Updated based on stakeholder Stakeholder review / input Throughout Salamon review / input 6 Klemens/ Formatting, editing, review revisions Update to current format and Throughout Cozart- style Ramos Revision 2 – October 11, 2016 1 Berlas / Allow use of TLS 1.0 for certain Clarification of guidance Throughout Salamon server through June 2018 Revision 3 – April 30, 2018 1 Berlas / Remove RSA ciphers from approved ROBOT vulnerability affected 4-6 Salamon cipher stack -
Using Frankencerts for Automated Adversarial Testing of Certificate
Using Frankencerts for Automated Adversarial Testing of Certificate Validation in SSL/TLS Implementations Chad Brubaker ∗ y Suman Janay Baishakhi Rayz Sarfraz Khurshidy Vitaly Shmatikovy ∗Google yThe University of Texas at Austin zUniversity of California, Davis Abstract—Modern network security rests on the Secure Sock- many open-source implementations of SSL/TLS are available ets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols. for developers who need to incorporate SSL/TLS into their Distributed systems, mobile and desktop applications, embedded software: OpenSSL, NSS, GnuTLS, CyaSSL, PolarSSL, Ma- devices, and all of secure Web rely on SSL/TLS for protection trixSSL, cryptlib, and several others. Several Web browsers against network attacks. This protection critically depends on include their own, proprietary implementations. whether SSL/TLS clients correctly validate X.509 certificates presented by servers during the SSL/TLS handshake protocol. In this paper, we focus on server authentication, which We design, implement, and apply the first methodology for is the only protection against man-in-the-middle and other large-scale testing of certificate validation logic in SSL/TLS server impersonation attacks, and thus essential for HTTPS implementations. Our first ingredient is “frankencerts,” synthetic and virtually any other application of SSL/TLS. Server authen- certificates that are randomly mutated from parts of real cer- tication in SSL/TLS depends entirely on a single step in the tificates and thus include unusual combinations of extensions handshake protocol. As part of its “Server Hello” message, and constraints. Our second ingredient is differential testing: if the server presents an X.509 certificate with its public key. -
Configuring DNS
Configuring DNS The Domain Name System (DNS) is a distributed database in which you can map hostnames to IP addresses through the DNS protocol from a DNS server. Each unique IP address can have an associated hostname. The Cisco IOS software maintains a cache of hostname-to-address mappings for use by the connect, telnet, and ping EXEC commands, and related Telnet support operations. This cache speeds the process of converting names to addresses. Note You can specify IPv4 and IPv6 addresses while performing various tasks in this feature. The resource record type AAAA is used to map a domain name to an IPv6 address. The IP6.ARPA domain is defined to look up a record given an IPv6 address. • Finding Feature Information, page 1 • Prerequisites for Configuring DNS, page 2 • Information About DNS, page 2 • How to Configure DNS, page 4 • Configuration Examples for DNS, page 13 • Additional References, page 14 • Feature Information for DNS, page 15 Finding Feature Information Your software release may not support all the features documented in this module. For the latest caveats and feature information, see Bug Search Tool and the release notes for your platform and software release. To find information about the features documented in this module, and to see a list of the releases in which each feature is supported, see the feature information table at the end of this module. Use Cisco Feature Navigator to find information about platform support and Cisco software image support. To access Cisco Feature Navigator, go to www.cisco.com/go/cfn. An account on Cisco.com is not required. -
V6.5 Data Sheet
Data Sheet Blue Prism Network Connectivity To ensure compatibility with evolving network infrastructures, Blue Prism can be deployed in environments that utilize IPv4 or IPv6 network protocols for all connections as well as those that use a hybrid approach, utilizing a combination of both protocols. This allows all Blue Prism components - Runtimes, Clients, Application Servers - to connect using the preferred or most suitable method. Resource connectivity When establishing connections to Runtime Resources, Blue Prism uses the name specified in the DNS. This is based on the machine name and can either the short name or the Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN). If a Resource has both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in the DNS, the network adapter settings of the connecting device (Application Server, Interactive Client, or Resource) are used to determine which IP address should be used to establish the connection: 1. The connecting device defaults to an IPv6 connection. 2. If an IPv6 connection is not established within 1.5 seconds and if the connecting device has multiple IPv6 addresses listed in the DNS, a connection attempt is made using the next available IPv6 address. 3. If an IPv6 connection is not established, the connecting device automatically attempts to connect using IPv4. 4. If all available IPv4 addresses have been tried without success, the Resource is considered unreachable. Commercial in Confidence Page 1 of 3 ®Blue Prism is a registerd trademark of Blue Prism Limited 6.5 Data Sheet | Blue Prism Network Connectivity Resource connectivity The following diagram illustrates the logic used for connections to Runtime Resources. Commercial in Confidence Page 2 of 3 ®Blue Prism is a registerd trademark of Blue Prism Limited 6.5 Data Sheet | Blue Prism Network Connectivity Application Server connectivity Application Server connectivity Clients and Resources can connect to Application Servers using the host name, IPv4 address, or IPv6 address specified in the connection settings on the Server Configuration Details screen. -
Installing Fake Root Keys in a PC
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Royal Holloway - Pure Installing Fake Root Keys in a PC Adil Alsaid and Chris J. Mitchell Information Security Group Royal Holloway, University of London Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX fA.Alsaid, [email protected] Abstract. If a malicious party can insert a self-issued CA public key into the list of root public keys stored in a PC, then this party could potentially do considerable harm to that PC. In this paper, we present a way to achieve such an attack for the Internet Explorer web browser root key store, which avoids attracting the user's attention. A realisation of this attack is also described. Finally, countermeasures that can be deployed to prevent such an attack are outlined. 1 Introduction As is widely known [10], most web browsers (e.g. Microsoft Internet Explorer or Netscape) have a repository of root public keys designed for use in verify- ing digitally signed public key certi¯cates. These public keys are bundled with distributions of the web browser, and are used to verify certi¯cates for applet providers [13]. Speci¯cally, web-sites may download applets to a user PC without the PC user knowing it. Depending on the security settings selected by the PC user, these applets may be executed with or without further checks. Typically, the browser will only execute the applet if the following conditions are satis¯ed. 1. The applet must be digitally signed, and the signature must verify correctly. 2. -
Quantitative Verification of Gossip Protocols for Certificate Transparency
QUANTITATIVE VERIFICATION OF GOSSIP PROTOCOLS FOR CERTIFICATE TRANSPARENCY by MICHAEL COLIN OXFORD A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY School of Computer Science College of Engineering and Physical Sciences University of Birmingham December 2020 2 Abstract Certificate transparency is a promising solution to publicly auditing Internet certificates. However, there is the potential of split-world attacks, where users are directed to fake versions of the log where they may accept fraudulent certificates. To ensure users are seeing the same version of a log, gossip protocols have been designed where users share and verify log-generated data. This thesis proposes a methodology of evaluating such protocols using probabilistic model checking, a collection of techniques for formally verifying properties of stochastic systems. It also describes the approach to modelling and verifying the protocols and analysing several aspects, including the success rate of detecting inconsistencies in gossip messages and its efficiency in terms of bandwidth. This thesis also compares different protocol variants and suggests ways to augment the protocol to improve performances, using model checking to verify the claims. To address uncertainty and unscalability issues within the models, this thesis shows how to transform models by allowing the probability of certain events to lie within a range of values, and abstract them to make the verification process more efficient. Lastly, by parameterising the models, this thesis shows how to search possible model configurations to find the worst-case behaviour for certain formal properties. 4 Acknowledgements To Auntie Mary and Nanny Lee. Writing this thesis could not have been accomplished after four tumultuous years alone. -
Configuring SSL for Services and Servers
Barracuda Web Application Firewall Configuring SSL for Services and Servers https://campus.barracuda.com/doc/4259877/ Configuring SSL for SSL Enabled Services You can configure SSL encryption for data transmitted between the client and the service. In the BASIC > Services page, click Edit next to a listed service and configure the following fields: Status – Set to On to enable SSL on your service. Status defaults to On for a newly created SSL enabled service. Certificate – Select a certificate presented to the browser when accessing the service. Note that only RSA certificates are listed here. If you have not created the certificate, select Generate Certificate from the drop-down list to generate a self-signed certificate. For more information on how to create self- signed certificates, see Creating a Client Certificate. If you want to upload a self-signed certificate, select Upload Certificate from the drop- down list. Provide the details about the certificate in the Upload Certificate dialog box. For information on how to upload a certificate, see Adding an SSL Certificate. Select ECDSA Certificate – Select an ECDSA certificate presented to the browser when accessing the service. SSL/TLS Quick Settings - Select an option to automatically configure the SSL/TLS protocols and ciphers. Use Configured Values - This option allows you to use the previously saved values. If the values are not saved, the Factory Preset option can be used. Factory Preset - This option allows you to enable TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 protocols without configuring override ciphers. Mozilla Intermediate Compatibility (Default, Recommended) - This configuration is a recommended configuration when you want to enable TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 and configure override ciphers for the same. -
Log-Management-Tenshi.Pdf
Network Monitoring and Management Log Management Network Startup Resource Center www.ws.nsrc.org These materials are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) Log Management & Monitoring • Keep your logs in a secure place • Where they can be easily inspected • Watch your log file • They contain important information – Many things happen – Someone needs to review them – It’s not practical to do this manually Log Management & Monitoring On your routers and switches And, on your servers Log Management • Centralize and consolidate log files • Send all log messages from your routers, switches and servers to a single node – a log server. • All network hardware and UNIX/Linux servers can be monitored using some version of syslog (we use either syslog-ng or rsyslog for this workshop). • Windows can, also, use syslog with extra tools. • Save a copy of the logs locally, but, also, save them to a central log server. Syslog Basics Uses UDP protocol, port 514 Syslog messages have two attributes (in addition to the message itself): Facility Level Auth Security | Emergency (0) Authpriv User | Alert (1) Console Syslog | Critical (2) Cron UUCP | Error (3) Daemon Mail | Warning (4) Ftp Ntp | Notice (5) Kern News | Info (6) Lpr | Debug (7) Local0 ...Local7 | Centralized Logging Configuring Centralized Logging Cisco hardware – At a minimum: logging ip.of.logging.host Unix and Linux nodes – In syslogd.conf, or in rsyslog.conf, add: *.* @ip.of.log.host – Restart syslogd, rsyslog or syslog-ng Other equipment have similar options – Options to control facility and level Receiving Messages – syslog-ng • Identify the facility that the equipment is going to use to send its messages. -
NXLOG Community Edition Reference Manual for V2.9.1716 I
Ed. v2.9.1716 NXLOG Community Edition Reference Manual for v2.9.1716 i NXLOG Community Edition Reference Manual for v2.9.1716 Ed. v2.9.1716 Ed. v2.9.1716 NXLOG Community Edition Reference Manual for v2.9.1716 ii Copyright © 2009-2014 NXLog Ltd. Ed. v2.9.1716 NXLOG Community Edition Reference Manual for v2.9.1716 iii Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Overview . .1 1.2 Features . .1 1.2.1 Multiplatform . .1 1.2.2 Modular architecture . .1 1.2.3 Client-server mode . .2 1.2.4 Log message sources and destinations . .2 1.2.5 Importance of security . .2 1.2.6 Scalable multi-threaded architecture . .2 1.2.7 High performance I/O . .2 1.2.8 Message buffering . .2 1.2.9 Prioritized processing . .3 1.2.10 Avoiding lost messages . .3 1.2.11 Apache-style configuration syntax . .3 1.2.12 Built-in config language . .3 1.2.13 Scheduled tasks . .3 1.2.14 Log rotation . .3 1.2.15 Different log message formats . .4 1.2.16 Advanced message processing capabilites . .4 1.2.17 Offline processing mode . .4 1.2.18 Character set and i18n support . .4 2 Installation and quickstart 5 2.1 Microsoft Windows . .5 2.2 GNU/Linux . .6 2.2.1 Installing from DEB packages (Debian, Ubuntu) . .6 2.2.2 Installing from RPM packages (CentOS, RedHat) . .6 2.2.3 Configuring nxlog on GNU/Linux . .6 Ed. v2.9.1716 NXLOG Community Edition Reference Manual for v2.9.1716 iv 3 Architecture and concepts 7 3.1 History . -
Load Balancing for Heterogeneous Web Servers
Load Balancing for Heterogeneous Web Servers Adam Pi´orkowski1, Aleksander Kempny2, Adrian Hajduk1, and Jacek Strzelczyk1 1 Department of Geoinfomatics and Applied Computer Science, AGH University of Science and Technology, Cracow, Poland {adam.piorkowski,jacek.strzelczyk}@agh.edu.pl http://www.agh.edu.pl 2 Adult Congenital and Valvular Heart Disease Center University of Muenster, Muenster, Germany [email protected] http://www.ukmuenster.de Abstract. A load balancing issue for heterogeneous web servers is de- scribed in this article. The review of algorithms and solutions is shown. The selected Internet service for on-line echocardiography training is presented. The independence of simultaneous requests for this server is proved. Results of experimental tests are presented3. Key words: load balancing, scalability, web server, minimum response time, throughput, on-line simulator 1 Introduction Modern web servers can handle millions of queries, although the performance of a single node is limited. Performance can be continuously increased, if the services are designed so that they can be scaled. The concept of scalability is closely related to load balancing. This technique has been used since the beginning of the first distributed systems, including rich client architecture. Most of the complex web systems use load balancing to improve performance, availability and security [1{4]. 2 Load Balancing in Cluster of web servers Clustering of web servers is a method of constructing scalable Internet services. The basic idea behind the construction of such a service is to set the relay server 3 This is the accepted version of: Piorkowski, A., Kempny, A., Hajduk, A., Strzelczyk, J.: Load Balancing for Heterogeneous Web Servers. -
Enabling HTTP/2 on an IBM® Lotus Domino® Server
Enabling HTTP/2 on an IBM® Lotus Domino® Server Setup Guide Alex Elliott © AGECOM 2019 https://www.agecom.com.au CONTENTS Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................... 3 Requirements .................................................................................................................................................. 3 About HTTP/2 ................................................................................................................................................. 3 About NGINX .................................................................................................................................................. 3 How this works ................................................................................................................................................ 4 Step 1 – Install NGINX .................................................................................................................................... 5 Step 2 – Setting up NGINX to run as a Windows Service ............................................................................... 6 Step 3 – Update Windows Hosts File .............................................................................................................. 8 Step 4 – Add another local IP Address ........................................................................................................... 8 Step 5 - Creating SSL Certificate Files