Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2. Nov/Dec 2019 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2. Nov/Dec 2019

For Odilile Ayodele, information infrastructures constitute a strategic pathway to Ecologies of Change: an Editorial „governmentality' where information and communications technology infra struc tures evolve into infrastructural power that connects biopolitics and tech Ecological and agricultural change, technological changes, economic policy, gender nopolitics. For this reason, infrastructural power is proposed as a conduit for de- transitions and the dynamics of a developmental state including accountable peripheralising Africa in the world experiencing development-enhancing digital intelligence services, people-oriented foreign policy implementation are among sub revolutions. Thus, she redefines and re-presents the idea of conduit power in ways jects that are in this journal edition. These are subjects that have long been in mega that illuminate implications – challenges and prospects- of digital transformations discussions about strategic political dynamics of southern Africa and Africa. They for Africa. are about thinking afresh on questions that have a bearing on the lives of the 450 Very strategic also for the region is the assessment of gender policies as in million people of the region. These are discussions that focus us on the age-old pur struments of empowerment and transformation rather than mere window- suit of a state that responds to human needs. These issues cannot be addressed dressing. Amupanda and Thomas critically analyse the 50-50 gender policy of the without research that seeks to clarify what these needs are and what this desired governing SWAPO in on the basis of data from parliament in order to state might be, research that reflects on what work has been done in these understand the value derived in this regard. They argue that SWAPO has promised directions. more than it has delivered simply. Of course, true gender transformation require In this edition, the authors also thus contribute to the much-needed expansion more fundamental transformation of politics as a practice and art. of what strategic studies in Africa would entail, that it would imply much more Lona Gqiza and Olusola Ogunnubi provide a critical historical analysis of than an outgrowth of military or war studies as it unfortunately has been in Euro continuities and changes in the manner in which the ANC-led governments have centrism. The expanded purview of strategic studies concerns us with human implemented ‟s foreign policy. This show greater amount of interests, social welfare, environmental justice and technological innovation for continuity than change although the geopolitical environment regionally and inter human good as much as it focuses on questions of hard power, security and the nationally has been evolving in ways that require careful navigation of established state. priorities, principles and practices. Still on South Africa, Sandy Africa provides a Elias Phaahla looks at how the relationship between a thriving competitive party wide-ranging and engaging analysis of the state of accountability systems and me politics and an advancing developmental state project has played out in the island chanisms on intelligence services in South Africa in the face of major debate about state of , showing how the party system is geared towards social causes accountability gaps in the SA state system. linked to development needs of the country. ‟s success in balancing multi Taken together, these articles provide food for thought in relation to expanded party democracy with the pursuit of socio-economic development is also at the conceptions of strategic studies, enabling us to ask new questions about what are centre of Mabutho Shangase‟s discussion of how to upscale regional economic challenges and prospects underpinning strategic dynamics in Africa and southern integration pivoting on the Southern African Customs Union on the basis of a Africa. This should stimulate research and discussions on such issues as digital tran holistic macro-economic convergence across the region. The instruments of public sitions, ecological justice, risk analyses, and institutional effectiveness in the region policy that have people‟s interests at heart are critical in this regard. The subject of a and beyond. The hope is that this edition will stimulate further research into the developmental state as the basis of a developmental regional integration envisioned region we want, an Africa Africans desire. in the SADC RISDP is that requires case studies of the nature presented in these We invite retorts, responses, rejoinders and debate articles designed to engage two articles. with some of the articles in this edition. ‟s pursuit of agricultural development and food security in the context of I take this opportunity to report that there has been growth of the editorial ecological change is the subject of Bryson Nkhoma‟s historiographical essay. It board over the past year as reflected in the first page of this journal. We welcome shows how historical analysis has evolved from modernist to developmentalist, pro new members representing a blend of experience and youthful energy as well as a viding insights into how colonialisation disrupted indigenous patterns of food variety of disciplinary backgrounds. production in ways that outlasted colonial rule . It also shows that current efforts may fail if they are not sufficiently comprehensive and strategic to reverse this curse of Berlin on Africa‟s food situation.

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We thank the associate editor, Prof. Everisto Benyera, and book review editor, Prof. Kgothatso Shai, for their dedicated service. Mauritius’ Competitive Party Politics and Social Democratic Welfare Outcomes after Independence Siphamandla Zondi Editor-in-Chief Elias Phaahla November 2019 Department of Political Studies University of Cape Town, South Africa

Abstract

Mauritius has cast herself as an outlier on the African political landscape, having hosted peaceful, free and fair elections since the advent of independence in 1968 without fail. The island state of Mauritius, which lies over 2000km off the coast of East Africa, boasts a multiplicity of political parties which have added to the vi brancy of political culture in that country. Election season tends to be a hotly contested period in which various political parties, by virtue of their claims as custodians of collective and national centre left interests, jostle one another for dominance under the banner of pro-poor development. This essay considers Mau ritius‟ status as a social democratic welfare state by drawing the relation between the country‟s competitive political culture and development successes against the backdrop of its democratic election experiences from 1968 to 2005. While election outcomes elsewhere on the continent tend to reflect the maturity of democratic spaces in which political spaces exist, in Mauritius they continue to serve as a litmus test to ascertain the level of commitment to the social cause by the ruling incumbents and aspirants alike. 1. Introduction

And they (the political parties in Mauritius) seem to recognise that, at the end of the day, they will be left with what they started with: an agricultural colony, created by empire in an empty island and always meant to be part of something larger, now given a thing called independence and set adrift, abandoned imperial barracon, incapable economic or cultural autonomy. They (the Mauritians) have such con fidence in their rights, their votes, and the power of their opinions (Naipaul 1972). Elections seldom exist in a vacuum. They are a result of a system entrusted with se lection of leaders that will make decisions on behalf of the society electing them. Upon election of the political elite into power, a social contract comes into exis tence in which the elected assume not only a position of state control, but equally

3 4 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2. Nov/Dec 2019 E. Phaahla Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2. Nov/Dec 2019 E. Phaahla so, become entrusted with the responsibility to make policy decisions in the interest safeguarding of a state-led social agenda. of electors to complete what can be termed the “process of con sent” (Janowitz The reasons the IMF conditionalities had the opposite effect on Mauritius are and Marvick 1955:381). In many countries, elections have routinely been used as manifold, but chief among these were the partial imposition of the structural the penultimate gauge to measure the level of democratic maturity, serving only the adjustment measures. Thanks to the unflinchingly „here and no further‟ stance by purpose of „box ticking‟ in a bid to give the state some modicum of legitimacy. the political leadership of Mauritius that the country‟s welfare sector became Under these circumstances, the tangible impact of elections on the material liveli insulated from the domineering policy prescriptions by the IMF as an untouchable, hoods of voters is seldom taken into consideration, resulting in progressive policies thus putting political pressure at home at bay. It becomes apparent that the survival likely to be relegated to the side-lines of the policy discourse. of the welfare state in times of economic difficulty in Mauritius relied as much on That elections can act as a powerful tool of expression for ordinary citizens is the political will of the incumbent government as it did on the competitive political not in doubt. However, in Mauritius, the power of elections extends beyond the culture that had become characteristic of the island in the post-colonial period. narrow confines of electing those with political authority to consolidate state craft. This article considers Mauritius‟s status as a social democratic welfare state by Voting is an important component of the Mauritian social fabric, one which a zooming in on the relation between the island‟s competitive political culture and ccords citizens with the power to choose policies that speak to their material needs development successes against the backdrop of its democratic election experiences and the island‟s national identity as a bastion of social democracy in Sub-Saharan in the post-colonial era. The island state of Mauritius, which is packed away over Africa (SSA). Indeed, as a nation that boasts a Gross National Income (GNI) per 2000km off the coast of East Africa, has managed to host peaceful, free and fair capita of USD$9,630, and a Gini Coefficient of .35 (World Bank 2016), there is no elections every five years since the advent of independence without fail. It exists, un doubt that it is a developmental success. It is the embodiment of democracy in doubtedly, as one of the few outlier cases on the African political landscape where action, in which civil liberties and human progress are spoken in the same breath as a multiplicity of competitive political parties tends to gear the governing elite into to be seen and considered mutually reinforcing attributes that cannot be split action in favour of improving the material conditions of those who live on the asunder. margins of society. Similarly, Mauritius‟s commitment to universal social wage, through its pro The rest of this paper shall proceed in the following order. It begins by laying the gressive tax system, flies in the face of convention given its relatively wealthy status context of the volatile nature of Mauritius‟s post-colonial political landscape, which as an upper middle-income country. The universal approach to social wage in necessitated the continuation of the colonial welfare structure to quell racial ten Mauritius, which puts a premium on non-contributory social assistance, mainly in sions that had the potential to denigrate the island into an intractable political the form of Basic Retirement Pension (BRP), remains the pride of the modern- quagmire. Herein, it becomes evident that the leftist rhetoric of self-proclaimed day welfare state in that country as it had prior to the dawn of independence in centre left political parties that ushered in Mauritius‟s independence had to be cast 1968. Ordinarily, unfailing commitment to social wage is rarely the concern of aside to make way for a more market leaning macroeconomic approach in order to countries belonging to this bracket of prosperity since the notion of a social wage sustain the welfare state. It proceeds to recount the rise of ultra-left political move is often considered a befitting intervention against economic shocks by govern ments that came out of the belly of the ruling coalition of 1968, which shook not ments in less wealthier countries. only the foundations of the establishment, but also laid the foundations for a Most pressing of all is the unique resilience of the welfare state even during the competitive culture that succeeded in assimilating progressive policies into the most economically precarious of times. The structural adjustment programmes social fabric of post-colonial Mauritius. The competitive nature of Mauritius‟s (SAPs) imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1980s proved political parties and their impact on the sustenance of the progressive welfare con the extent to which the universal welfare approach retained by the post-colonial sensus during the epoch of economic adjustment is also mooted. The experience state got sealed as a sacrosanct aspect of the post-colonial Mauritian society. Where of Mauritius‟s welfare paradigm with the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) as they proved to be a curse elsewhere on the continent and other low income during the dispensation of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) imposed in countries with resultant jettisoning of the welfare state and public expenditure cuts, the 1980s is given due consideration here. I argue that the encounter of Mauritius‟s in the case of Mauritius, structural adjustments strangely became a blessing that not governing elite with the IFIs marked a critical juncture moment that cemented the only kicked off the country‟s development ascendancy, but helped ensure the country‟s pro-poor approach to alleviating the plight of the suffering as a quin

5 6 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2. Nov/Dec 2019 E. Phaahla Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2. Nov/Dec 2019 E. Phaahla tessential social democracy. It was a watershed moment that entrenched the uni for the country to sever ties with Great Britain. It is was at this point that it became versal social wage approach deeper into the social fabric of post-colonial Mauritius apparent that ethnic cleavages had permeated the social fabric of the island more as to serve as a reference point for future policy considerations. deeply than the leaders realised. Economically marginalised groups, mainly the Lastly, the question of Mauritius‟s changing fortunes after the economy jumped Creole sect of the population, rebelled against the „impending‟ Hindu hegemony out of the backwaters during the mid-1980s will also be addressed. Herein, we take that would marginalise them further once they take over the government given the notice of the policies that were adopted in the social welfare sector, which resulted fact the latter were a majority and wealthier compared to the former group in a public backlash that culminated in the ousting of less progressive parties out (Simmons 1982). To put this reality into perspective, the distribution of wealth was of power through the ballot. The periods in question here are the mid-1990s, ex skewed in favour of one percent of households (whites) who earned 46.7 per cent tending all the way to the turn of the century when the MLP/MMM coalition of the national income whereas the poorest 20 per cent received just 4 percent. came into power. Ultimately, the foregoing considerations will serve to answer the These ethnic riots went to reveal the fragility of Mauritius‟s political landscape, following question: is there an association between competitive elections and however relatively peaceful it may have seemed before, as they sent out clear war retention of a social democratic welfare consensus? nings that not taking decisive actions to bridge the widening inequality gap would imperil further the little that was remaining of the island‟s political stability. All in 2. The Welfare Consensus in the Post-Colony all, 29 people perished from these incidents, and 2 473 arrests were made, while a total of 597 houses were burnt, which left over 700 families displaced (Brautigam Mauritius had all the makings of a nation-state not poised for a smooth transition and Diolle 2009:10). from colonial rule at independence. Like most of its African counterparts after in Nevertheless, these political upheavals remained raw in the memories of the dependence, it faced bleak economic prospects. The economic situation, however, new leadership in government led by the MLP. Indeed, for the leadership, there was particularly dire, as it was facing a Malthusian economic trajectory, viz. was an ever pressing need to revive the economy so that the welfare state continues exponential population growth and a contracting economy that was incapable of to exist sustainably. To do so it was imperative that the economy reduces depen absorbing the country‟s workforce. James Meade, an economist based at the dence on the sugar commodity, which accounted for 99 per cent of the country‟s London School of Economics (LSE) and a Nobel Prize winner for his exa export revenue (Chernoff and Warner 2002:5) The political leadership also discovered mination of Mauritius‟s economic trajectory prior to independence, expressed the early on that under Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) strategy, which they following sentiments regarding the significance of keeping the welfare state intact adopted upon taking office, this ambition was far from being realised. Mauritius‟s in the post-colonial period: “[…] the welfare state becomes indispensable if the po poor economic status only meant that there was little internal market to sustain pulation at large is to be assured a share of the country‟s output” (Meade & Others such a strategy and the absence of domestic capital to kick start in-ward looking 1961:269). industrialisation only meant that a post-colonial economic revival would remain a But for an economy as fragile and resource deprived as Mauritius, retaining the pipe dream. welfare state simply because it is expedient to do so is never an easy undertaking. It The ISI would soon be replaced by the more outward looking Export Oriented becomes particularly untenable a commitment to make more so when considering Industrialisation (EOI) strategy in a bid to spur growth through export processing a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 1 per cent, a GDP per capita that plum zones. To this end, legislation was passed, designed to facilitate this shift in meted to $190, a balance of payment deficit that reached alarming proportions, approach, which culminated in the passing of the Export Processing Zone Act of and a sky-rocketing inflation, which caused the cost of basic commodities to be be 1970 to declare every part of Mauritius an export processing zone. Companies yond the reach of many civilians (Srebrnik 1999:7; Srebrnik 2000). were given tax incentives to participate in this process while the Mauritian Deve For the Labour Party-led coalition government, however, retaining the welfare state lopment Bank (MDB) offered loan assistance to start-up companies that wished to became a necessary form of intervention to cushion the effects of an ailing eco tap into the EPZ sector (UNCTAD 2001; YeungLamKo 1998; Kearney 1990). nomy. At first glance, it is expected of self-proclaimed social democratic parties of While this might, at first glance, appear to be a sound approach towards nudging MLP‟s pedigree to adopt this line of approach in order to remain „true to form‟. Mauritius on a successful growth trajectory, it was a calculated move to court inter Beneath the surface, however, the reasons ran deeper than that. Mauritius had just national investors, by way of projecting Mauritius as an investment destination of survived potentially destabilising elections of 1967, which served as a referendum

7 8 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2. Nov/Dec 2019 E. Phaahla Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2. Nov/Dec 2019 E. Phaahla choice. unpalatable to be joining hands with a party of such pedigree, despite it having These ambitions necessitated some political alignments to shape up soon after changed its name to Parti Muricien Sociale Democrate (PMSD) following their merger the Mauritian Labour Party came into power. While the leadership perceived with the Mauritian Trade Union Congress (MTUC) as a symbol of commitment facilitating these changes as a necessary step to help Mauritius jump out of a basket to social justice (Phaahla 2015). The pragmatic left within the MLP-led coalition case status, there is no doubt they came at a hefty price for the party in power. adopted an indifferent approach towards addressing these concerns, resulting in the These political alignments saw new players entering the politicking space of Mau ultra-Marxist faction breaking away to form a party of their own that came in the ritius, thus increasing the nature of party competition around the subject of form of Militant Mouvement Mauricien (MMM) (Wellisz and Philippe 1993). progressive social policy framework. The following section lays out these dynamics. I argue that the emergence of the radical MMM on the political landscape of Mauritius marked a significant turning point that served to cement the values of 3. The Rise of the Radical Left and Increased Political social democracy within the socio-political fabric of the island. Previously, no Competition political party could challenge the Mauritian Labour Party hegemony as the de fender of centre left principles. Even after Parti Mauricien’s name change to PMSD, Until 1970 the Mauritian Labour Party (MLP) managed to assert itself most pro the MLP remained without a challenger that would bring to an end its dominance, foundly as the custodian and champion of social democracy and pro-poor since the former continued to experience difficulty shedding its „out of touch‟ development in Mauritius. Thanks to their commitment to the welfare state, which image amongst the voters. Certainly, the MMM‟s bold evocations of Marxist ideo made provision of free health care, primary school education, and universal old age logies projected it as a strong alternative that would shake up the MLP‟s pragmatic pensions to the elderly citizens that it managed to bolster trust amongst the voters. approach towards policy formulation within the state apparatus. Nevertheless, the That soon changed, however, when upon assuming office they decided to close position of the MLP-led coalition government remained unchanged, with one ranks and form a government of national unity (GNU) with parties that had built a Minister of Agriculture, Mr Satcam Boolell, expressing pragmatic sentiments that reputation for being less in support of the welfare state. The party in question is were reflective of the general position of his party: the Parti Mauricien, which represented the white sugar barons and rich Creoles of European heritage, who also opposed the idea of independence in the run up to “I am a socialist, and for me, the class struggle continues: capitalist against workers the 1967 general elections. Nevertheless, the leadership of the MLP understood […]. However, for me as for other, the overriding interest of the country comes the formation of a GNU with such an unlikely partner to be a very important step first. That interest today is to eliminate unemployment, hunger, destitution. My towards engendering the spirit of reconciliation that would sweep across the condition is that the large sugar employers, the groups of the Mauritius Sugar Producers Association, give a formal guarantee that they will employ the un diverse ethnic make-up of Mauritius (Mannick 1989). Similarly, the new leadership employed, those who have been laid off since the introduction of wage councils, in government believed that such a step would be expedient to help dissuade and that they will start up other projects. I will support the coalition if it leads to widely-held assumptions that the MLP was only serving the interests of the Hindu work for everyone”. (Brautigam and Diolle 2009:10) community, whom the party relied upon for electoral support. There is no doubt that the haunting memories of the 1967 riots featured pro If the fructuous divisions within the governing coalition failed to shake up the minently in the decisions adopted by the new leadership in government to go the MLP out of complacency, the by-elections of 1970 undoubtedly did. Hence, in the GNU route. However, courting a pro-capital, and pro-establishment political party important by-elections of 1970, less than a year after the inception of the MMM, as Parti Mauricien was as much a reconciliatory step as it was a calculated business everyone was taken by surprise when a candidate representing the latter political move for an administration faced with the insurmountable challenge of convincing party won an overwhelming victory by gaining 76 per cent of the votes. This investors to stay put. This decision proved to be a big game changer that opened a victory not only caused consternations within the Mauritian political landscape, it whole new chapter of competitive politics in Mauritius. also served to send a warning to the ruling party that radical reforms were The radical left in the MLP-led coalition that brought Mauritius‟s independence necessary and needed to be carried out with urgency. were bemused by this decision, resulting in the creation of two factions that con Up until this point, the government had not taken major steps to advance the stantly locked horns over ideology (Brautigam and Diolle 2009). They perceived it social security system they inherited from the colonial government, apart from keeping it intact after taking over the reins of power. The old welfare framework 9 10 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2. Nov/Dec 2019 E. Phaahla Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2. Nov/Dec 2019 E. Phaahla only made provision of old age pensions to the elderly, whilst other population 4. Structural Adjustments and the Resilience of the Welfare groups that lived on the margins were left at the mercy of sporadic piecemeal Consensus measures of the state – also inherited from the colonial state. With the MMM entering the political scene, and having caused major upsets in the by-elections of The year 1980 marked the official date of the imposition of the Structural 1970, the government moved with haste to reform the social security system by Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in Mauritius by the World Bank (WB) and the extending the scope of the Basic Retirement Pension (BRP) through the passing International Monetary Fund (IMF). This period, however testing it may have of the National Pensions Act of 1976. Through these new reforms the orphaned been, also marked the critical juncture moment for the welfare state in post-colonial and the disabled were entitled benefits, compared to previously when the BRP period. Elsewhere, I argued that no period in Mauritius‟s post-colonial history remained only the preserve of elderly citizens once they had reached the age of depicts the resilience of the welfare state better than the early 1980s (Phaahla 2015). retirement (Ulriksen 2003). To say the economy was in distress would be an understatement. In 1981, the It is also worth mentioning at this stage that the rise of the MMM on the budget had a deficit of Rs. 983 million and by the end of the financial year, it had political landscape coincided with significant changes that took place in the realm climbed over the Rs. 1 billion mark. Inflation also peaked at a record high of 42 per of Mauritius‟s economy. Thanks to a combination of preferential access of cent in 1980 with the number of unemployed persons retreating back to 1968 Mauritius‟s sugar exports into the European Economic Community (ECC) as well levels of 20 per cent (Dommen and Dommen 1999). a burgeoning EPZ sector, the economy managed to grow from just 1 per cent in Even in these circumstances, Mauritius refused to bow down to the co the 1960s to 10 per cent towards the end of the decade of the 1970s (Sandbrook nditionalities of the IMF which called for reduced spending in public expenditure. 2005; Sandbrook et al 2007). Without a doubt the introduction of the EPZs as the The central principle underlying these measures were that government spending second sector of the economy certainly took off quite successfully, all in all had to undergo severe cuts as they were deemed the primary cause of the e managing to contribute 35 per cent towards the country‟s total export revenue. conomic woes of developing countries. Public officials were determined to pursue These were encouraging and much needed results indeed since Mauritius‟s poor re what they termed a “human-faced” adjustment as they feared that rolling back the source endowment and over-dependence on a single commodity (sugar) increased social wage budget would spell a “social revolution” in a country battling to over the need for diversification on an industrial scale. Furthermore, the country‟s come class and ethnic divisions. At least the broad-based consultative app roach to successful industrial take off in the EPZ sector, and the impressive revenue policy making was employed by the MLP to have a sense of what the society contributions that accompanied such growth, stood the welfare state in good stead. perceived as a priority. The MLP government consulted with the trade unions, But Mauritius‟s economy would soon fall on hard times, threatening the very business as well as NGOs and Community Based Organisations (CBOs). From existence of the welfare state that had been in existence for just under a quarter of these consultations, the MLP deemed social security, education, health care and a century. The 1979 oil crisis sent the economies of most developing countries into food subsidies on rice and flour as „untouchables‟ that were not to be disposed of. a tailspin, and the effects could not have been different for countries as hy For the MLP government the effects of the adjustment were too severe to still persensitive to exogenous economic turbulences such as Mauritius. Adding to these be able to retain voter confidence. For instance, the devaluation of the Mauritian challenges, Mauritius‟s sugar sector (still the backbone of the economy), was hit Rupee, which came as part of the Adjustments, eroded the purchasing power of all two cyclones (in 1975 and 1979), which served to compound the country‟s Mauritians with the impact felt mostly by the poor (Bunwaree 2007). Frankly economic challenges (Brautigam 2004; LeungLamKo 1998). In the next section, I speaking, the dire economic times which characterised the era Adjustment in demonstrate the resilience of the Mauritian welfare state during times of economic Mauritius were enough to throw any governing party in the firing line of intense distress. I argue that while the welfare state became evidently unaffordable, never public criticism, eventually culminating in having the ruling incumbents being theless, the competitive political culture of Mauritius, compounded by robust and shown the door at the polls. politically active civic networks, prevented such potentially catastrophic measures Hence, general discontentment was rife within the society with scathing from being adopted. accusations levelled against the MLP for not doing enough to “sweeten the pill” for the low-income groups. The situation also served a window of opportunity for the rival MMM in a campaign trail leading to the general elections of 1982 by painting

11 12 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2. Nov/Dec 2019 E. Phaahla Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2. Nov/Dec 2019 E. Phaahla the MLP as a party that was no longer beholden to egalitarian principles and thus out of touch. It also contended that it had drifted away from championing the cause of the lower classes and that it should take the blame for failing to cushion the effects of Adjustment for the poor (Bunwaree 2007). Consequently, the MLP lost the elections of 1982 to MMM, marking an end to its 14 year stay in power. However, in government the MMM came to face-to-face with the reality of the economy, causing it to continue with the same austerity measures it had vilified its predecessors for. It was compelled to retain the broad- based consultative approach of the MLP government as to not be perceived out of touch. For MMM‟s government, however, consultations with societal orga nisations on policy were particularly important as they served as strategy to reject the idea of downsizing in the face of external pressure. Also refusing to adopt the SAPs in full proved to have had quid pro quo implications simply because policy guarantees won the incumbents in government electoral votes. In the words of Goldsmith, policymakers in Mauritius “made their economic and social gains within a framework of civil rights and open political competition” (Goldsmith 1999:522). For instance, most of MMM‟s supporters demanded the retention of Source: Joynathsing, (1987: 139) education budget whilst health was also deemed by the government as a non- Although Table 1 shows that the Social Security and Welfare received quite a negotiable (Phaahla 2015). sizeable financial backing, details do not exist demonstrating how much of it went It was also during this period of Adjustments that the old age pension schemed towards keeping the old age pensions scheme afloat. Nevertheless, Joynathsing came under the spotlight. Herein, pensions began to feature more prominently in (1987), Brautigam (2004), and Willmore (2003) echo the sentiment that social progressive caucuses more than any welfare intervention offered by the state. Policy security was oriented more towards looking after the wellbeing of the elderly, makers were of the view that there was an unwritten law that regardless of how especially through the preservation of the old age pension scheme. bleak the economy was, pension were not to be subjected to any cuts or be dis persed on means-tested basis (Willmore 2003). The table below captures the trends Table 2: Annual increases in old-age pensions proportional to the Consumer Price Index of government expenditure during the Adjustment period. Education received the (CPI), 1978 to 1985 lion‟s share of the social expenditure, followed by that of Social Security and Welfare, which in the mid-1980s overtook the one earmarked for the former, albeit by a marginal difference.

Table 1: Government Expenditure on Social Welfare, 1981/1982 to 1984/1985

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The split of the MMM led to the elections of 1983, which saw the MSM rising to power within a year after its formation. It would go on to retain its position by win ning three consecutive elections until 1995 when the MLP-led coalition took over. Between 1983 and 1995, the MSM would not be confronted by major social challenges or unrests as the quality of life underwent major improvements. According to Meisenhelder (1997) during this period, infant mortality dropped significantly, life expectancy improved significantly, whilst public budget deficits rates remained between 3 and 4 per cent. Indeed, it was due to the state‟s commit ment to the welfare state that Mauritius‟s inequality gap narrowed quite significantly, as the Gini coefficient improved from .50 in 1965 to .37 in 1987 (Brautigam 1997). Mauritius was able to achieve this level of success in the welfare sector due to the success of the economy which improved markedly from the mid-1980s, thanks to the expansion of the EPZs, the Free Ports and offshore business activities, which received a major investment boost, mainly from Hong Kong. Hence of all foreign investments in Mauritius‟s EPZ sector, those from Hong Kong accounted for 79 per cent in 1985 and 27 per cent between 1985 and 1990 (Darga 1996). The EPZ expanded at an annual rate of 30 per cent, leading to the rise of the employment rate in the EPZs from over 25,000 workers in 1983 to not less than 90,000 in 1990. Indeed, by the end of the decade Mauritius was no longer facing challenges of unemployment. Instead, it was being confronted with the problem of labour shortages, prompting government to import contract workers from China in droves. Against this backdrop, the MSM‟s uninterrupted 12 years in Source: Phaahla (2015: 186) government give credence to Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier‟s claims that “good times keep parties in office, bad times cast them out” (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier As shown in Table 2 above the yearly increases in the value of pensions since the 2000:183). economy started emitting signs of difficulty in 1978 was set to be over a 10 per However, as the mid-1990s approached the economy started contracting, cent mark on average in keeping with the yearly changes in consumer price index resulting in the GDP plunging from 10 per cent to below 5 per cent levels. High (CPI). A cursory look at the precedence of the pension scheme in Mauritius during wages, soaring rise of competitors within the global textile and garment the 1980s makes for an interesting observation. Willmore (2003) purports that manufacturing industry, increasing public debt and rising deficit in balance of government‟s prioritisation of pensions was popular and easier to finance com payments, which resulted in a high closure rate of EPZ firms (Brautigam 2004). pared to other social programmes. However, one gets a sense that they were The question of the sustainability of the welfare state, including universal old age intended by policymakers to serve as income guarantee with households living with pensions, resurfaced. The MSM began buying into the recommendations of the the elderly in a bid to mitigate the effects of poverty. World Bank (WB), which suggested that the economy be liberalised wholesale However, just months after taking over, cracks within the MMM government alongside the privatisation of social development programmes. The government began to show. The testing economic times had divided the party into two groups resolved to “move from its role as a provider of economic opportunity and of over ideology as there were calls within the party that favoured pragmatism in the public services to a facilitator of internationally competitive activity, a guarantor of interest of creating a conducive environment for investors. The MMM eventually fair competitive practices and a last resort for the most disadvantaged” (Week-End underwent a split with the dissenting faction going on to form the Mauricien Socialist 1996). Movement (MSM), which advocated for liberalisation of the economy to spur Plans to retrench the welfare state outlined by the MSM government were met growth (Miles 1999).

15 16 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2. Nov/Dec 2019 E. Phaahla Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2. Nov/Dec 2019 E. Phaahla with public backlash, led by the trade unions and intellectuals, which culminated in be implemented over a period of ten years. Secondly, the government decided to nationwide protests against austerity. During its time in office, the MSM had grown introduce means-tested pensions which were restricted to those earning less than in popularity for being out of touch, despite it being commended for sound Rs. 20 000 per month, a far cry from the non-discriminatory system that had been management of Mauritius‟s economy, which saw the economy picking up strongly in place since the colonial days (Willmore 2003). from the mid-1980s and maintaining a steady rise all the way to the mid-1990s. These changes prompted a reaction from the social alliance which was led by the Indeed, these strikes served to conscientise Mauritian voters about the policy Mauritian Labour Party (MLP). It was able to garner the support of the unions and misdemeanours of the government, which saw MSM losing power and making the civil society, to rally against retrenchment of the pension scheme (Bunwaree way for the MLP-led coalition to take over the government. 2007). It certainly raised an awareness about the MSM/MMM‟s less protagonist But problems of Mauritius‟s post-colonial economy would not end with the stance towards the notion of universal social wage which culminated in the Labour MLP coalition coming into power. The end of the 1990s were trying times for the Party being voted back in power during the 2005 elections. On the other hand, Mauritian textile and garment industry as they were struggling to compete with Bunwaree is reluctant to attribute the change in government to the public‟s cheap Indian and Chinese competition for European markets due to the phasing disapproval of pension reforms. She then contends that a confluence of factors out of the Multi-Fibre agreement, which previous allowed it preferential access to including an ailing economy, rising inflation, and budget deficit, and a soaring European markets. The results were far-reaching as the EPZ sector shed jobs on unemployment rate, lost people‟s confidence in the government (Bunwaree 2007). an incalculable scale. For example, in the first quarter of 2001/02 financial year, the According to her, reforms in the social security sector added to people‟s manufacturing sector laid off 5 600 workers and an additional 4 000 workers frustrations but they only had a secondary effect influencing the voters about the during the 2002/03 financial year (Sandbrook et al 2007). This officially saw the party they want in government. In other words, one cannot attribute the constant level of unemployment rising from naught in 1990 to 5 per cent in 1995 and even change of government after less progressive reforms had been imposed by the tually 10 per cent at the turn of the century. Consequently, the Mauritian Labour incumbents. Party found difficulty retaining credibility in the eyes of the electorates as a party Scratching beneath the surface, one discovers that Bunwaree (2007) made the that would recuperate the economy from its ailing state (Sandbrook 2005). mala fide mistake of underestimating the influence pensions wield on the political The next section outlines the consequences of Mauritius‟s ailing economy in the voting platform of Mauritius; hence, they are considered to be “public pro social sector, especially on the old age pension scheme. It shows the disastrous perty” (Johnson and Williamson 2006). For instance a 2002 opinion poll conducted electoral consequences which followed the MSM/MMM decision to retrench the by the Centre for Applied Social Research (CASR) found that 88 per cent of welfare state after they took over from the MLP-led coalition during the elections respondents wished for the government to spend more on social security, whilst 78 at the turn of the century. per cent proposed that the rich be taxed more so that wealth can be redistributed more evenly (Sandbrook et al 2007). However, important to bear in mind is that 5. Era of Austerity and Electoral Retributions voters in Mauritius are sensitive to changes to social security. The MSM/MMM welfare reforms reeked as a betrayal of the social contract which was defined The MSM/MMM coalition government entered office with plans to save the throughout the course of history by the universal approach towards social pro economy from free-fall through cuts in government expenditure, especially vision. Voting a government out of power for not pursuing the progressive cause pensions. At the time Mauritius experienced an ageing problem since an average in Mauritius served a two-pronged approach. Firstly, it is protective and retributive. Mauritian male was expected to live another 15 years and females 20 years (Central Not voting a government out of power after imposing the means tested format of Statistics Office 1999). Already costing the economy 3 per cent of its GDP, the disbursing the Basic Retirement Pension (BRP) would leave a precedent that would pension scheme was projected furthermore by more than 10 per cent in 2050 redefine the welfare consensus that had stood the test of trying economic times. (Vittas 2003). However current government expenditure on pensions has sur Indeed, the effects would be far-reaching. The politicians would eventually feel they passed the Bank‟s projections 8 years ahead of time. In 2012, pensions accounted have leeway to make minimalist policy choices in times of economic instability, not for 5.9 per cent of the social security and welfare budget, and currently it only in the sector of pensions alone, but across the spectrum of Mauritius‟s welfare represents more than 6 per cent (Stats Mauritius 2010).The coalition increased the framework. In essence, the Mauritian voter is overtaken by familiarity and fear, year of eligibility for the old age pension scheme from 60 years to 65 which was to

17 18 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2. Nov/Dec 2019 E. Phaahla Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2. Nov/Dec 2019 E. Phaahla rather than rationality and reason insofar as pensions are concerned. Leaders who Bibliography dare challenge the welfare consensus bear the consequence of their „indiscretion‟ by being replaced by those who promise better social reforms. Secondly, it Brautigam, D (1997), “Institutions, Economic Reform and Democratic Consolidation in inevitably sends a warning on the new incumbents that a half-baked cake cannot be Mauritius”, Comparative Politics, Vol 30, No 1, pp 45 – 62. eaten. Even the World Bank has conceded that “many policies are decided by Bräutigam, D (2004), “The people‟s budget? Politics participation and pro-poor policy”, polling and part alignment, rather than by technocratic professional work” (see Development Policy Review, Vol 22, No 6, pp 657 – 668. Brautigam 1997). Brautigam, D and Diolle, T (2009), “Coalitions, capitalism and credibility: overcoming the crisis of coincidence in Mauritius at independence”. (Available at: https://www.dlprog.org/ publications/research-papers/coalitions-capitalists-and-credibility-overcoming-the-crisis-of- 6. Conclusion confidence-at-independence-in-mauritius, Accessed: 02 February 2011). Bunwaree, S (2007), “The Ballot and Social Policy in Mauritius”, in Bangura, Yusuf (ed), Democracy An association exists in Mauritius between the sustenance of the social democratic and Social Policy. New York: Palgrave MacMillan / United Nations Research Institute for Social welfare consensus and voting trends. Throughout the course of its post-colonial Development. history, the island state of Mauritius was confronted with difficult economic Carroll, B and Carroll, T (2000), “Accommodating ethnic diversity in a modernising democratic challenges that called for major economic reforms to be pursued, as well as taking state: theory and practise in the case of Mauritius”, in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol 23, No 1, pp pro-active steps to keep the welfare state intact. It is quite clear that during times of 23-34. economic difficulty, voters tend to vote in favour of parties that demonstrate Central Statistics Office (1999), “Continuous Multi-Purpose Household Survey”. (Available at: commitment to keeping the welfare state‟s social democratic traditions, presumably http://www.gov.mu/portal/sites/ncb/cso/cmphs/cmphs99.pdf, Accessed: 23 February 2015). because it provides a better safety net and protection against economic shocks. Darga, A (1996), “Autonomous Economic and Social Development in Democracy: An Appreciation of the Mauritian „Miracle‟”, Africa Development, Vol 21, Nos 2&3, pp 79 – 88. The structure of the welfare state, which has kept its universal approach towards Dommen, E (1996), “Meade‟s Sugar Export Tax saved Mauritius”, Week-End, Port Louis, alleviating the plight of the suffering, features prominently in the choices voters Mauritius. make regarding the type of leaders they would like to keep in office. Dommen, E, and Dommen, B (1999), Mauritius: An Island of Success: A Retrospective Study, 1960 – Certainly, Mauritius‟s strength as a vibrant multi-party democracy lies not in its 1993. Chippenham: Pacific Press and James Currey. ability to hold elections routinely, but the ability to get parties to jostle each other in Goldsmith, A (1999), “Africa‟s Overgrown State Recognised: Bureaucracy and Economic the quest to climb the greasy pole. Herein, a contest of most pernicious and Growth”, World Politics, Vol 51, No 4, pp 520 -546. narcissistic nature ensues, and there can be no doubt that less desirable social wage Janowitz, M, and Marvick, D (1955), “Competitive Elections and Democratic Elections: An proposals will be frowned upon and cast aside by voters who are naturally inclined Interpretation of the 1952 Presidential Elections”, Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol 19, No 4, pp 381- to be fastidious. 400. These voting trends make it quite clear that when it comes to policy decisions Johnson, J.K.M, and Williamson, J (2006), “Do Universal Non-contributory Old age Pensions concerning Mauritius‟s pro-poor development, the buck stops with the electorates, Make Sense for Rural Areas?”, International Social Security Review, Vol 59, No 4, pp 13-19. not the politicians. Furthermore, strategic voting is the order of the day in Joynathsing, M (1987), “Mauritius”, in Dixon, John (ed), Social Welfare in Africa. London: Croom Helm. Mauritius. Hence, voters have placed a premium on unfaltering commitment to Kearney, R (1990), “Mauritius and the NIC Model Redux: Or, How Many Cases Make a Model?”, universal social wage, often resulting in governments that are perceived to be non Journal of Developing Areas, Vol 24, No 2, pp 195 – 216. chalant and indifferent towards the progressive cause being replaced without delay. Mannick, A. R (1989), Mauritius: The Politics of Change, Mayfield. East Sussex: Dodo Books. This sort of voting culture has fuelled the dog-eat-dog approach that has charac Meade, J (1961), Economic and Social Structure of Mauritius. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd. terised the body politic of post-colonial Mauritius. In essence, voting does not only Lewis-Beck, M.S and Stegmaier, M (2000), “Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes”, serve to fulfil a constitutional obligation of choosing leaders through a legitimate Annual Review of Political Science, Vol 3, pp 183 – 219. “process of consent”; it also serves the expedient purpose of safeguarding the Meisenhelder, T (1997), “The Developmental State in Mauritius”, Journal of Modern African Studies, island‟s socially inclusive and egalitarian developmental trajectory for gene rations to Vol 35, No 2, pp 279 – 297. come. Miles, W. F. S (2000), “The Politics of Language Equilibrium in a Multilingual Society: Mauritius”, Comparative Politics, Vol 32, No 2, pp 215 – 23.

19 20 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2. Nov/Dec 2019 E. Phaahla Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 M Shangase

Naipaul, V.S (1972), The Overcrowded Barracoon and Other Articles, London: Deutsch. Phaahla, L.E (2015), Social Forces, Market Forces, and Welfare State-Building in South Africa and Mauritius, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation: University of Stellenbosch. Towards Macro-Economic Convergence in SACU: Sandbrook, R (2005), “Origins of a Democratic Developmental State: Interrogating Mauritius”, The Position of Botswana Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol 39, No 3, pp 548 – 581. Sandbrook, R., Edelman, M., Heller, P., and Teichman, J (2007), Social Democracy in the Global Periphery: Origins, Challenges, Prospects. New York: Cambridge University Press. Mabutho Shangase Simmons, A.S (1982), Modern Mauritius: The Politics of Decolonisation. Bloomington: Indiana University Department of Political Sciences, Press. University of Pretoria, South Africa. Srebrnik, H (1999), “Ethnicity and the Development of a „Middleman‟ Economy in Mauritius: the Diaspora Factor”, The Round Table, Vol 350, pp 297 – 311. Srebrnik, H (2000): “Can an Ethnically-based Civil Society Succeed? The Case of Mauritius”, Abstract Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol 18, No 1, pp 8 – 20. STATS Mauritius (2010), “Social Security Statistics, 2010 – 2050”. (Available at: http:// In light of recent developments such as the African Continental African Free statsmauritius.gov.mu/English/StatsbySubj/Document/Social%/20Security/Social% Trade Area agreement (AfCFTA), incrementalist approaches to regional inte 20security/20statisti cs/2005-2010/toc.htm, Accessed: 22 August 2015). gration that focus on sub-regions seem to have been pushed to the backburner as UNCTAD (2001), “Investment Policy Review: Mauritius”. (Available at: http://unpan1.un.org/ intradoc/groups/public/documents/idep/unpan006648.pdf, Accessed: 17 July 2010). more focus puts the entire African continent at the centre of integration processes. With all its potential, gradual macro-economic convergence has accordingly been Vittas, D (2003), “The Role of Occupational Pensions Funds in Mauritius”. (Available at: https:// pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5d54/2c77a4519d07ca3137c03c3624f4f73f6c84.pdf, Accessed: 17 neglected. Discussions on macro-economic convergence have on the other hand October 2019). been cast over the broader sub-region such as the Southern African Development Wellisz, S and Philippe L.S.S (1993), “Mauritius”, in Frindlay, Ronald and Wellisz, Stanislaw (ed), Community (SADC) where a number of indicators and targets have been Five Small Open Economies. New York: Oxford University Press. identified and pursued closely. Whilst looking at Botswana as a point of departure, Willmore, L (2003), “Universal Pensions in Mauritius: Lesson for the Rest of Us”. (Available at: this paper argues that incremental macro-economic convergence is pivotal to https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=398280, Accessed: 15 July 2009). broader regional integration and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Willmore, L (2007), “Universal Pensions for Developing Countries”, World Development, Vol 35, No provides an ideal stepping-stone. An incrementalist approach to macro-economic 1, pp 24 – 51. convergence as well as broader regional integration should begin with identifying World Bank (2016), „‟World Development Indicators – Mauritius”. (Available at: http:// key formal institutions that serve as custodians of macro-economic policy such as data.worldbank.org/country/mauritius#cp_wdi, Accessed: 17 January 2016). the central banks and departments of finance or treasuries. Using secondary data YeungLamKo, L (1998), “The economic development of Mauritius since independence”. (Available at: www.docs.fce.unsw.eu.ac/economics/Research/.../1998_6.pdf, Accessed: 15 sources, with Botswana as a case study, this paper foregrounds macro-economic February 2015). convergence, macro-economic policy making institutions, and SACU as critical building blocks for broader regional integration. 1. Introduction

It has been contended that convergence among countries with significant diversity or at different levels of economic development, as is the case in Africa, presents a

platform for least developed countries to catch up (Zyuulu 2014). According to this strand of thought, poorer countries on the continent will attain levels of develop ment that may reduce disparities (Zyuulu 2014). Very intricate convergence goals have been set in the past decade with the criteria contained in the Memorandum of Understanding of 2008 as agreed to by the Ministers of Finance of countries in 21 22 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 M Shangase Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 M Shangase the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region (Roussouw 2014). of short -term interest rates (monetary policy) and decisions related to government These criteria had a sturdy monetarist posture as they narrowly put emphasis on expenditure and taxation (fiscal policy) and can include measures designed to single-digit inflation rates; a budget deficit of less than 5 per cent of the Gross influence the external value of the currency (exchange-rate policy) (ibid.). Moreover, Domestic Product (GDP); the nominal value of public and publicly guaranteed Hodson (2015) asserts that macro-economic policies are closely intertwined with debt, as a ratio of GDP, should not exceed 60 per cent; foreign reserves should be structural reforms and financial market policies. Largely, it has been established that equal to three months‟ imports; and central bank credit to the government should the goal of macroeconomic policy is to provide a stable economic environment be less than 10 per cent of the previous year‟s tax income (Roussouw 2014.). These that is conducive to fostering strong and sustainable economic growth, on which convergence goals are thus formulated on the assumption that all is well with the creation of jobs, wealth and improved living standards depend (Dolamore fundamental institutional arrangements and more attention should be paid towards 2014). He further concurs that the key pillars of macroeconomic policy are: fiscal the adjustments and levels of targets. policy, monetary policy and exchange rate policy. This article takes a step back and attempts to interrogate the existence and In order to understand the policy formulation processes, it becomes critical to optimal functioning of institutions such as central banks and departments of explore how social and political institutions of the sort associated with labour and finance or treasuries, the macro-economic policy framework in Botswana as a case capital could structure interactions so as to generate distinctive national trajectories in point; and examines the potential of looking at convergence beyond the macro- (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Botswana attained independence on 30 September 1966 economic epicentre. The long-term goal of macro-economic convergence should, (Turner, 1971:270). For Botswana the new constitution came into effect on 30 therefore, be more holistic as it takes into consideration every area of socio- September 1966, when Bechuanaland became the independent Republic of Bo economic development. With SACU, in particular, the goal should be developing tswana (Proctor, 1967:69). Within SACU, Botswana has an almost similar history institutions and policies beyond customs and exploring the possibility of acce with and the Kingdom of Eswatini (formerly Swaziland) in that the three leration of regional integration goals in areas where SADC has failed. In other are all former British Protectorates whilst Namibia was occupied by South Africa words, full regional integration into an economic and monetary union should be and became an extension of this polity up until 1990. piloted within SACU as SADC has proven to be saddled with numerous in In addition to their slightly similar history, Botswana, Lesotho, and the Kingdom tractable challenges in relation to macro-economic convergence. of eSwatini have been in a customs union with South Africa since 1910. According The failures of SADC have been well documented as a regional economic to Kirk and Stern (2005), the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) dates back community that has exhibited the inability to achieve an economic union and to 29 June 1910, when South Africa, , Swaziland and Bechuanaland sustainable macroeconomic convergence. There has been a lack of activities aimed signed at Potchefstroom. Only Britain and South Africa were involved in the 1910 at promoting policies and strategies through which member countries could work negotiations (ibid). This Agreement lasted until the British protectorates received together to ensure monetary co-operation, secure macroeconomic and financial independence in the mid-1960s (Kirk and Stern 2005:170-171). Following their stability, facilitate intra-regional trade, and promote high employment as well as independence in 1966 and 1968, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (BLS or BLK sustainable economic growth (Zyuulu 2014). Macro-economic convergence should as from 2018) renegotiated the customs union agreement with South Africa (Leith accordingly put the Macro-Economic Framework (MEPF) alongside institutional 1992). This renegotiation with South Africa culminated in the 1969 arrangements at the centre of integration processes highlighting policy goals, policy agreement (Kirk and Stern 2005). The 1969 treaty, with some amendments since, is instruments and the actual developmental, political and economic institutions that one of the key elements of the international economic environment of the BLS form the larger policy landscape. (Leith 1992). Needless to say, throughout its history SACU has been characterised by severe divergences in policies, levels of development, political systems and 2. Macro-Economic Policy Formulation and the Southern administrative capacity (Kirk and Stern 2005). African Customs Union (SACU) Brown et al (2008) point out that the SACU countries differ significantly in terms of their levels of economic scale, structure, and development. Botswana and It has been claimed that macro-economic policy is a province of public policy that South Africa are upper middle-income countries, Namibia and Swaziland are lower has traditionally been closely guarded by national politicians, civil servants and middle-income countries, and Lesotho is the least developed country (Brown et al central bank officials (Hodson 2015:167). Accordingly, it typically entails the setting 23 24 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 M Shangase Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 M Shangase

2008: 462). Moreover, the three countries have continuously been characterised by SADC has agreed to macroeconomic convergence criteria and goals for countries distinctive politics and levels of economic development. The arrangement of the of the region. The SADC Macroeconomic Peer Review Mechanism was launched three countries has, inter alia, been labelled as an integration of unequals (Cobbe in May 2013 in Maputo, (SADC 2016). The purpose of the peer 1980). The three countries are also members of the Southern African Develop review process is to review progress made by individual member States towards the ment Community (SADC). The Southern African Development Community achievement of agreed SADC Macroeconomic Convergence (MEC) targets as (SADC) was formed in 1992 from what was then called the Southern African well as to identify risks to economic outlook and policy actions to mitigate them Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) (Bank of Botswana 2012). (SADC, ibid.). This entails a set of indicators that will allow monitoring of progress SADCC was originally formed by six front-line states but grew in number to the towards convergence (ibid). In this regard, the arrangement involves a single current 15 members when it assumed the new name, mission and objectives (Bank monetary area, encompassing a common currency and a common central bank for of Botswana 2012). Thus, the objectives of the organisation changed over time to Africa by the year 2021 (Mboweni 2003 cited in Rossouw 2006). According to address different challenges facing the region (ibid). SADC comprises 15 states and Maleleka (2007), the development of SADC convergence seemed to be based on a seeks to promote peace, security, and economic integration in the region (Burgess structural framework that was developed for the European Union. The develop 2009). SADC is one of eight regional economic communities formally recognised ment of the EU‟s Maastricht Treaty that came into force in 1992 was to establish by the African Union as building blocks toward achieving an African Economic the stability pact, with emphasis on the economic and monetary union in Europe Community (Burgess, 2009). SADC established the Regional Indicative Strategic (ibid). Accordingly, this therefore involved taking the monetary policy sovereignty Development Plan (RISDP), a document that chartered the direction for SADC from individual country central banks to the European Central Bank (ECB), thus policies, projects, programmes and activities (Bank of Botswana 2012). The implying that countries only had independence on fiscal policy (Maleleka 2007). original RISDP was all-encompassing, with member states committing themselves Progress towards the achievement of these goals is monitored by the Co to “promote common political values, systems and other shared values which are mmittee of Central Bank Governors (CCBG) in SADC (Rossouw 2006: 157). It is transmitted through institutions that are democratic, legitimate and effective”, clear that the BLS countries have overlapping memberships within the domain of according to Article 5 of the SADC Treaty (Bank of Botswana 2012). The SADC‟s regional integration initiatives. It has been argued that the African continent is regional economic integration agenda includes a macroeconomic convergence characterised by numerous co-operation initiatives between countries in different (MEC) programme intended to achieve and maintain macroeconomic stability in regions, but explicit currency arrangements or convergence criteria and goals have the region, thereby contributing to faster economic growth and laying the basis for been set only for the Common Monetary Area (CMA), the two CFA franc zones, eventual monetary union (Burgess, 2009). the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and SADC Burgess (2009) further highlights that regional economic integration and (Rossouw 2006). Accordingly, the CMA comprises South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia macroeconomic stability are preconditions to sustainable economic growth and for and Swaziland (Metzger 2004 cited in Rossouw 2006). The CMA was initially the creation of a monetary union in the region. Thus, in order to achieve and established as the Rand Monetary Area (RMA), with South Africa, Botswana, maintain macro-economic stability within the region, member states shall converge Lesotho and Swaziland as members (ibid). Botswana left the CMA in 1976 and on stability-oriented economic policies implemented through a sound institutional Namibia joined after its independence in 1990. Although member countries have structure and framework (ibid). As Burgess (2009: 4) reports, stability-oriented their own currencies, these currencies trade at par and these countries also apply policies include, but are not limited to, restricting inflation to low and stable levels, similar exchange control regulations, implying that capital flows freely between the maintaining a prudent fiscal stance based on the avoidance of large budget deficits, CMA countries (Nielson et al. 2005: 711 cited in Rossouw 2006). monetization of deficits, and high or rising ratios of public and publicly guaranteed Rossouw (2006: 155) asserts that the South African Rand serves as an anchor for debt to GDP; avoiding large financial imbalances in the economy; and minimizing the currencies of the CMA owing to the dominating role of the South African market distortions. economy in the CMA, and the South African Reserve Bank serves as de facto (albeit Most SADC member states have recorded solid macro-economic performance not de jure) central bank of the CMA. Consequently, South Africa‟s gross domestic in recent years, in general coming close too, and in many cases surpassing, the product (GDP) per capita is, for instance, 1,5 times that of Namibia and nearly six convergence targets specified for 2008 (Burgess 2009). Rossouw (2006) reveals that times larger than that of Lesotho (Masson et al. 2005 cited in Rossouw, 2006). In

25 26 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 M Shangase Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 M Shangase addition, South Africa‟s GDP comprised some 95 per cent of the GDP of the Over the past four decades, Botswana‟s GDP grew on average of 9 percent per CMA in 2002 (ibid). Apparently, no macro-economic convergence criteria have year, which allowed per capita income to rise impressively from US$300 in 1966 to been set for CMA countries, owing to the fact that these countries all adhere to the US$4,400 in 2011 (both in constant 2000 US dollar) (Kojo 2010). The main driver criteria set for SADC (Rossouw 2006). of Botswana‟s remarkable growth has been the abundance of mineral resources, in particular, diamonds, which were first discovered in 1967 (Kojo 2010:2). 3. Policy and Institutional Arrangements within Botswana Accordingly, since the mid-1970s, Botswana‟s economy has been heavily dependent on diamonds as a source of growth, exports and fiscal revenue (ibid.). Due to It has been argued that before the establishment of the Protectorate over progress made, Botswana graduated from the list of 24 least developed countries Bechuanaland by Britain in 1885, no unified government existed in that territory in 1992 (Mogae 2005). According to research, the country introduced sound macro (Proctor 1968). It is shown that the British governed Bechuanaland initially through -economic and sectoral policies and also established institutions to service a a form of 'parallel rule' and later through 'indirect rule', allowing a great deal of modern-day economy, such as the Stock Exchange in 1994 (Mogae 2005:34). The autonomy to eight separate tribal administrations (Proctor 1968:59). With a African Economic Outlook states that Botswana‟s political environment has been population of just over two million spread across a landmass comparable in area to registered as amongst the most stable in Africa and has been supportive of prudent that of Texas, Botswana has been identified as one of the most sparsely populated macroeconomic and poverty reduction policies (AEO 2012). Moreover, it is countries in the world (Kojo 2010:1). Botswana had an estimated total population reported that Botswana‟s political framework is based on a parliamentary of 2.3 million people in 2014 (ECA 2015:vii). In all, 34 per cent of the population representative democratic republic, whereby the President is both head of state and was below the age of 15, while 60 per cent of the population was between the ages government (ibid.). What has also been a major subject of interest amongst of 15 and 64 (ECA ibid.). As 70 percent of its land surface is covered by the scholars has been multipartyism in this small African country (Stevens and Speed Kalahari Desert, water is precious in Botswana, and their currency, the Pula, literally 1977; Wiseman 1977, Mogae 2005). Botswana has consequently maintained an means rain in in the seTswana language (ibid). It has been reported that when extremely stable governmental system against a background of considerable Botswana gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1966, it was rural, economic development (Wiseman, 1977:71). Wiseman (1977) further contends tribal and agriculture-based, and was one of the poorest countries in Africa (Kojo that there seems to be every possibility that these patterns will continue in the 2010). foreseeable future. According to Wiseman (1977) multipartyism in Botswana is far According to the African Economic Outlook for 2012, Botswana‟s economy from being fragile and ephemeral. remains one of Africa‟s success stories, having transformed itself from a Least- Botswana certainly has an impressive track record of peaceful succession Developed Country at the time of independence in 1966 to a Middle-Income through free and fair elections held every five years as a multi-party democracy with Country within three decades (AEO, 2012). Sound macro-economic policies and a parliamentary system of government (AEO 2006). Stevens and Speed (1977: prudent use of diamond revenues have arguably made Botswana one of the fastest 381) once posed the question “why multipartyism has continued to function as a -growing countries in the world over the last 25 years, and it has now achieved fundamental feature of the relatively stable political system of Botswana?”. Indeed, middle-income status (AEO 2006: 139). However, due to her comparatively small a multiparty constitutional democracy prevails, where each of the elections since population, somewhat ethnic homogeneity, and large revenues from diamond independence in 1966 have been freely and fairly contested and held on schedule exports, one is forced to ask whether the country is so „exceptional‟ that it has little (AEO 2012). From the attainment of independence from Britain in 1966 to the to offer by way of example to other African countries wishing to establish a demo present, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has been the dominant party and cratic system (Danevad 1995: 382). Credit has gone to the acquisition of sound they have consistently been re-elected as the governing political party ever since macroeconomic policies, good governance, well-functioning institutions and (ibid.). In the election of 2004, for example, the ruling BDP won 44 out of the 57 judicious management of diamond resources are the hallmarks of Botswana‟s re parliamentary seats, with the remainder going to the opposition parties (AEO markable economic performance (AEO op cit.). The per capita income which stood 2006:146). The opposition parties are weak, fragmented and unable to co-operate, at around US$ 70 in 1966 is currently at about US$6 500, bolstered by the and as a result many voters have lost confidence in them (ibid.). discovery of diamonds (AEO 2012:2). Kojo (2010) attests that Botswana has since transformed itself, becoming one of the fastest growing economies in the world.

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A number of observers have however noted and underscored the elitist and urban areas (ibid.). It has been noted that despite the government‟s efforts, however, paternalistic nature of politics in the country (Danevad 1995). Whilst the politics the economy remains highly dependent on diamond exports, and the country con have been reported to have recognisably become more pluralistic in the 1980s, a tinues to suffer from one of the highest HIV/AIDS infection rates in the world nearly mythical picture has been painted in recent analyses, depicting politics and (AEO 2006:139). Former Botswana President Festus Mogae stated categorically policy-making as dominated by senior civil servants, government politicians, and that he does not agree with the characterisation of the country‟s development cattle owners (ibid.). Stevens and Speed (1977:381) observed that differences experience as a miracle, somehow suggesting some divine intervention or in between chiefs and government have not formed the key conflict in Botswana, at explicable reason for what was achieved (Mogae 2005). He however maintains that least not if the term „conflict‟ implies a trial of strength between or more sides. It natural resources, no matter how lucrative, cannot develop a country without po has been noted that politicians managed to take away many of the traditional litical stability, sound economic management and prudent financial husbandry. This leaders‟ powers without creating serious open conflict (ibid.). Stevens and Speed confluence of historical factors has been attested for by Danevad (1995:386) who (1977) argue that the first step towards the post-independence arrangement was concurs that after prospecting operations had revealed a potential for diamond and the establishment of the House of Chiefs as an advisory rather than a legislative copper-nickel mining, the BDP government understandably allocated a major body and it was followed in 1965 by the Chieftainship Law and the Law share of public spending and administrative capacity to stepping development of establishing District Councils. These early manoeuvres stripped the chiefs of all the mineral industry. their legislative powers and most of their executive authority and established the Additionally, with the availability of resources there was an expansion of the chieftainship as a branch of the civil service (Stevens and Speed 1977). government apparatus, construction of the capital Gaborone, improvement of Generally speaking, Botswana‟s overall performance has been commended as roads, a renegotiated customs union with South Africa and an increase in develop phenomenal in Africa since independence. It has been argued that although many ment aid and revenue (ibid.). The turning point in Botswana‟s history has been countries on the continent are well-endowed with both renewable and non- registered around 1972-3 and this was when the country ceased to rely on support renewable natural resources, it is by no means assured that these endowments will from the United Kingdom to finance recurrent spending, and this was dubbed as automatically translate into broad-based social and economic development (ADB „the achievement of second independence” (Danevad 1995). Botswana had a keen 2016). Thus, resource-based economies face particular challenges, arising from discernment of her geopolitics. Former President Mogae (2005) indicates that they price and market volatility, the fiscal challenges of capturing resource rents, macro- pursued pragmatic economic policies due to their geolocation as such despite their economic impacts of real exchange rate appreciation and governance challenges fundamental disagreement with the racist posture of the then apartheid South that often result in planning failures and corruption (ADB 2016:7). Mineral Africa, and , trade and business relations were resources are also finite and therefore raise issues of intergenerational fairness – maintained. how the proceeds of mineral exploitation should be shared between current and Honde and Abraha (2015) have highlighted that as a land-locked country with a future generations (ibid.). Botswana is accordingly one exceptional country that has small domestic market, Botswana has taken many initiatives to foster bilateral and managed its mineral resources excellently. The country is often cited as an example regional economic integration in order to spur economic growth. It is a member of of a nation that has avoided the adverse impacts of the “resource curse” through the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and SACU and is appropriate policy and governance choices (ADB 2016). participating in the negotiations to create the Common Market for Eastern and Botswana has certainly been acclaimed for the resilience of her democratic Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC) and SADC institutions, a prospering private sector, and healthy public finances whilst also tripartite trade-free area (ibid.). Mogae (2005) asserts that due to the country‟s open attention has been drawn to problematic aspects of the country‟s economic market economic system, Botswana has been a member of SACU, SADC, the growth, notably widespread rural poverty and insufficient diversification (Danevad, European Union/ African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of countries under the 1995:381). According to the 2013/14 annual report of Statistics Botswana, the Lome Convention, now the Cotonou Agreement. As an example, under the poverty head-count ratio at the national poverty line is 19.3 per cent, down from Cotonou Agreement Botswana beef enters the European Union market with a 30.6 per cent in 2003 (ECA 2015: vii). Poverty is higher in rural areas, with 8.4 per 90% rebate of the EU import levy (Mogae 2005:35). cent of the rural population living in extreme poverty, compared to 2.7 per cent in

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4. Macroeconomic Policy income tax for 17.5% in 2015/16. Mineral revenues are projected to increase on account of a more positive outlook for diamond exports (Honde and Abraha, Macroeconomic goals are reflected in a series of five-year National Development 2015:6). Plan, these plans continuously stress macro-economic stability and financial discipline as necessary conditions for long-term growth and poverty reduction 4.2 Monetary Policy (AEO, 2006). The African Development Bank (ADB) confirms that that the frame Monetary policy in Botswana aims to achieve both low inflation and a stable real work for public spending in Botswana is based around National Development exchange rate to enhance international competitiveness (AEO 2006). The Plans (NDPs) and the annual budgeting process (ADB 2016). These NDPs run overarching objective of Botswana‟s monetary policy is to achieve price stability, for five or six years and have been in place since just before independence in 1966. keeping inflation within the medium-term objective range of 3-6%, as well as to The current plan, NDP10, ran until March 2017 (ADB 2016:10). The expenditure safeguard financial stability (Honde and Abraha 2015:6). It is recounted that in side of the government budget is divided into two main components, recurrent 2005, the Bank of Botswana (BoB) lowered its target range for inflation to 3-5 spending and development spending (ADB 2016). The development budget in per cent, from 3-6 per cent in 2004, in part because of lower inflation in principle covers one-off capital items, such as roads, schools, other building Botswana‟s trading partners, mainly South Africa (AEO 2006). Botswana‟s projects, purchases of capital equipment, equity injections to government-owned inflation tracks that of South Africa because of the strong trade ties between the companies, etc. (ADB, ibid.). The implementation of many development projects two countries, South Africa being the source of about two-thirds of Botswana‟s (and the associated expenditure) is spread over a number of years (ADB 2016). imports. Inflationary pressures have eased significantly since 2012 (Honde and 4.1 Fiscal policy Abraha 2015). Honde and Abraha (2015) documented that annual inflation closed at 4.4% in 2014, lower than 5.8% in 2013. Key factors that have helped to Botswana‟s fiscal policy aims to ensure macroeconomic stability (Honde and drive down inflation include the general slowdown in costs mainly of food and Abraha 2015). According to Honde and Abraha (ibid.), the Botswana government transport, as well as base effects of the increase in some of the prices dictated by abides by a fiscal rule that, inter alia, does not allow its expenditure to exceed 40% the government in 2012 (ibid.). Inflation is expected to remain within the BoB‟s of GDP. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) concurs objective range of 3-6% in the medium term owing to weak domestic demand that Botswana maintains a prescribed limit for public debt and debt guarantees of and favourable foreign price developments (Honde and Abraha, 2015). 40 per cent of GDP (ECA 2015). It has been reported that the ratio of expenditure to GDP exceeded the limit in 2009/10 against the backdrop of 5. Conclusion adverse external shocks arising from the effects of the 2008 global economic crisis (Honde and Abraha 2015). Total expenditure has since been contained and This article has demonstrated that Botswana has a policy infrastructure and consistently declined to an estimated level of about 31% in 2014/15, reflecting institutional arrangements necessary for macro-economic convergence with the efforts by the government to rebalance some spending priorities, including reigning rest of her counterparts within SACU. The successful functioning of SACU over in unproductive elements of current expenditure (Honde and Abraha 2015:5). the years provides a sound case for exploring effecting macro-economic con Honde and Abraha (2015:6) indicate that the country‟s fiscal position turned vergence across not only macro-economic policy and its attendant institutions around to a surplus from a huge deficit recorded in the aftermath of the global but also into other socio-political and cultural policy domains. As indicated economic crisis. The 2015/16 financial year is projected to result in a fourth earlier, SADC as a regional body has failed to deliver macro-economic con consecutive budget surplus, of 3.8% of GDP, up from 3.2% for 2014/15, vergence. The discrepancies amongst member states especially with regards to attributable to higher mineral revenue and further expenditure restraint (Honde domestic politics and levels of economic development have encumbered the and Abraha, ibid.). Total government revenue (including grants) is projected at realisation of numerous milestones towards full regional integration. For 33.9% of GDP in 2015/16. Mineral revenues accounted for 34.4% of total re example, SADC‟s regional economic agenda as outlined in its Regional Indicative venue, Southern African Customs Union (SACU) for 29.5% and non-mineral Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), adopted by member states in 2003 has

31 32 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 M Shangase Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 M Shangase failed to yield successful implementation. Whilst the RISDP established a roadmap Hodson, D. (2015), “Policy-Making under Economic and Monetary Union, Crisis, Change, Continuity”, in Wallace, H, Pollack, MA, and AR Young (Eds.), Policy-Making in the European for deepening regional integration over a 15-year period, targets and milestones Union, Seventh Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. such as the stated economic goals which include the creation of a free trade area by Honde, GJ and Abraha, FG (2015), Botswana 2015 African Economic Outlook, 2008, a customs union by 2010, a monetary union by 2016, and a single currency www.africaneconomicoutlook.org. by 2018, have all been missed. It is thus against this backdrop that this article argues Kojo, NC (2010), Small Countries with Volatile Revenue: Botswana and Bhutan, Gaborone: Economic for macro-economic convergence that is based on SACU as a platform. Policy and Debt Department. There seems to be harmony and very cordial relations amongst SACU members Kirk, R and M Stern (2005), The New Southern African Customs Union, Washington: The Services and these positive factors should be exploited to realise successful macro-economic Group (TSG) and World Bank. convergence as a step towards other stages of regional integration such as a Leith, JC (1992), “The Static Welfare Economics of a Small Developing‟s Country‟s Membership monetary union, single currency, free trade area. A Common Market Area (CMA) in a Customs Union: Botswana in the Southern African Customs Union”, World Development, should be enhanced once there is better functioning of all domestic markets and Vol 20, No 7, pp 1021-1028. the rand (ZAR) could be piloted as the single currency for the regional body. It is Mahoney, J and D Rueschemeyer (2003), “Comparative Historical Analysis: Achievements and Agendas”, in Mahoney, J and D Rueschemeyer (eds.), Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social the contention of this article that SACU provides a lot of low hanging fruits Sciences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. towards the realisation of new sub-regional union that could serve as an example Maleleka, D (2007), Macroeconomic Convergence in Southern Africa Development Community, Addis Ababa: for the entire continent. African Economic Conference. Bibliography Mogae, F (2005), “Botswana: „How We Created an African Success Story‟, New African, 439, n.p. Proctor, JH (1968), “The House of Chiefs and the Political Development of Botswana”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 6, No 1, pp 59-79. African Development Bank (2016), Botswana‟s Mineral Revenues, Expenditure and Savings Policy, A Case Study, www.afdb.org. Rossouw, J (2006), South Africa’s Role in Macroeconomic Convergence in SADC, Pretoria: South African Reserve Bank. African Economic Outlook (2006), Botswana 2006, African Economic Outlook, www.africaneconomicoutlook.org. Stevens, C and J Speed (1977), “Multi-Partyism in Africa: The Case of Botswana Revisited”, African Affairs, Vol 76, No 304, pp 381-387. African Economic Outlook (2012), Botswana 2012, African Economic Outlook, www.africaneconomicoutlook.org. Thelen, K and J Mahoney (2015), “Comparative-Historical Analysis in Contemporary Political Science”, in Mahoney, J and K Thelen (eds.), Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis, Bank of Botswana, (2012), Coordination of Macro-Economic Policies in the SADC Region. Gaborone: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bank of Botswana. Turner, B (1971), “A Fresh Start for the Southern African Customs Union”, African Affairs, Vol 70, Blaikie, N (2010), Designing Social Research. London: Polity Press. No 280, pp 269-276. Brown, DK, Kiyota, K, and Stern, R.M. (2008), “An Analysis of a US-Southern African Customs Ward, M (1967), “Economic Independence for Lesotho?” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol Union (SACU) Free Trade Agreement”, World Development, Vol 36, No 3, pp 461-484. 5, No 3, pp 355-368. Burgess, R (2009), “The Southern African Development Community‟s Macroeconomic Wiseman, JA (1977), “Multi-Partyism in Africa: The Case of Botswana”, African Affairs, Vol 76, No Convergence Program: Initial Performance”, IMF Staff Position Note, SPN 09/14. 302, pp 70-79. Cobbe, JH (1980), “Integration among Unequals: The Southern African Customs Union and Zyuulu, I (2014), “Convergence in the SADC and African Economic Integration Process: Development”, World Development, Vol. 8, pp 329-336. Prospects and Statistical Issues”, IFC Bulletin No. 32. Danevad, A (1995), “Responsiveness in Botswana Politics: Do Elections Matter?” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 33 No 3, pp 381-402. Dolamore, R (2014), The Tools of Macroeconomic Policy, A Short Primer, Canbera: Parliament of .

Economic Commission for Africa (2015), Botswana Country Profile, Addis Ababa: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA).

Hall, PA and Taylor, RCR (1996), “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms”, MPIFG Scientific Advisory Board Lecture. Discussion Paper 96/6.

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I argue that infrastructures are an integral part of society's development and the Information Infrastructures: The Conduit Power of backbone of political power (Calhoun 1992; Furlong 2014). Larkin (2013:328) best ICTs in Africa* defines infrastructures as “built networks that facilitate the flow of goods, people, or ideas and allow for their exchange over space”. According to Mann (2008:355), there are two forms of state power: despotic or infrastructural. The former relates Odilile Ayodele to the state‟s ability to act “without consultation with civil society” while the latter SARChI African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy relates to the “capacity of the state to penetrate civil society and implement its University of Johannesburg, South Africa actions across territories”. In other words, infrastructural power relates to the state‟s ability to administer its politics throughout the territory while despotic power relates to the state‟s ability to enforce its will on its territory. Much of the contemporary literature on African states and their engagement Abstract with ICT focuses on their lack of material infrastructure and the structural weaknesses in African governance systems. However, the focus of this article is not In this article, I make a case for considering Information and Communications merely on material infrastructures but on normative infrastructure; specifically, Technology (ICT) infrastructures outside the narrow prism of ICT for develop technological infrastructure related to communications, what I refer to as ment (ICT4D), but rather as an alternate mechanism to exercise political power in information infrastructures, as a pathway to „governmentality'. The study of infra Africa. I refer to „infrastructures‟ rather than „infrastructure‟ because the former has structures and infrastructural power distinctively underscores the intersection a broader definition. Infrastructures may be material, informational or structural. between bio-politics and techno-politics. It is about how transnational relationships Infrastructure relates to the physical and organisational structure and facilities a shape the 21st century. Bio-politics sees the state's power over society much like an society or an organisation needs to function, such as roads, electricity and organism that needs to be regulated through institutions. Rudolf Kjellén‟s (Lemke communication systems. Owing to the inability to overcome weaknesses in state et al. 2011, 9-11) view of bio politics is based in the biological sciences and capacity, the expression of power in the global South often differs from the global perceives the functioning of the state as a pseudo-organism. Michael Foucault North. ICT infrastructure is transnational with power oscillating between state and (2013) refined the concept. According to Foucault, states regulate society through non-state actors but offers African countries a surrogate system of administration the application of political power on all facets of human life. Techno politics refers for individual territories. I draw on the concept of infrastructural power to describe to the nexus between politics and technologies. Hecht (2009,15) describes techno- how a state may harness ICT infrastructure, or information infrastructures, to politics as the “strategic practice of designing or using technology to constitute, increase its influence within its territory and extraterritorially. embody or enact political goals”. My argument is laid out in five parts: first, I explore „infrastructures‟ and 1. Introduction information infrastructures and infrastructural power; then I examine Africa and its The challenge with traditional international political economy analysis is that it is relationship to technology, and finally, I illustrate how Africa could optimise its IP based on a paradigm that is suitable for the global North but does not adequately through information infrastructures. examine the global South. The reasons for this are varied, although a significant 2. The Function of Infrastructural Power: Information reason for the differences relates to historical development paths, which, in Infrastructures developing countries, are also further affected by the history of colonialism. I pose the question of whether ICT infrastructure can be the backbone of Africa political Infrastructures, particularly information infrastructures, reside in the nexus of power in the 21st century. Drawing on the concept of infrastructural power (IP), global-national power relations, which are constantly marked by the ongoing battles this article concludes that ICT infrastructures, particularly technological infra between the „haves‟ and „have-nots‟. The centre of information infrastructures in structures that allow for high-speed Internet, give the state the ability to govern its the 21st century is the ability to connect to the Internet. The Internet is funda territory. mentally a system of interconnected computers, and the backbone is the 35 36 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 O. Ayodele Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 O Ayodele network that connects its various parts; that backbone is the infrastructure. The distinction is unnecessary, and exploring material infrastructure, or Currently, the main modes of Internet connectivity are satellite, which is the infrastructures, does not take away from Mann‟s original concept of infrastructural costliest, and linking to submarine fibre optic cables. The average price of broad power. As Foucault (2010:70) reminds us, infrastructures are crucial because they band services on the African continent is prohibitive. The United Nations are the „apparatus of governmentality‟. Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) reports that “the average fixed price One of the most comprehensive definitions is the one put forward by Edwards is approximately three times the world average of 22.1 per cent” of gross national (2003:186) who contends that “infrastructures simultaneously shape and are income per capita, with only Gabon, Mauritius, , and South Africa being shaped by - in other words, co-construct - the condition of modernity”. He able to offer services at below five per cent of gross national income (UNECA recognises that “this notion of infrastructure as invisible, smooth-functioning 2017:5). For most African states, the only prospect of improving broadband background “works” only in the developed world”. In the global South, norms for accessibility is linked to the ability to garner external funding and material support. infrastructure may not exist (Edwards 2003:188). Nevertheless, although the very creation and diffusion of information tech Edwards, similar to Calhoun (1992: 208), links modernity to infrastructural nology are transnational, it is bound to the rigid boundaries of state. Miller and technologies. Furlong (2014), on the other hand, recognises that the theory of Rose (1990), building on Foucault‟s concept of „governmentality‟, developed the infrastructures lacks transferability because it was created with the assumption that concept of „technologies of government' to describe how technology and political infrastructure provision is universal, and not as precocious as it is in the global realities of authority are interwoven. Governmentality refers to the way the state South. Von Schnitzler (2013) illustrates the mechanics of the politics of governs or administers society. Foucault explains it this way: infrastructure by tracing the movements of the prepaid electricity meter. Her work calls attention to the role of technical artefacts in society, they are neither apolitical “[t]his word [government] must be allowed the very broad meaning it had in the sixteenth century. „Government' did not refer only to political structures or to the nor can ethical considerations be ignored in their deployment. management of states; rather, it designated the way in which the conduct of 2.2 The continuing importance of the state individuals or groups might be directed – the government of children, of souls, of communities, of the sick “(Foucault, 2000, 326). The critical component of Mann's concept of political power, both despotic and

Simply put, states have the authority to develop regulatory mechanisms to govern infrastructural, is territory; the primary concern is how the territory is administered. the use and proliferation of technology within their territory. Yet, although infor As Soifer and Vom Hau (2008: 222) claim, IP underscores the “ability of states to mation infrastructures are a feature of modernity, its availability is not universal carry out their projects is territorially organized and crucially shaped by the (Calhoun 1992; Edwards 2003; Furlong 2014). In Africa, much of the lopsided organizational networks that they coordinate, control, and construct”. This gives infrastructures development relates to its colonial history and the failure to room to comprehend the variations of “the ability of the state to regulate society”, restructure colonial-era infrastructure deployment patterns effectively. which is inclusive of the interplay between the state and non-state actors (Ibid). The authors correctly describe Mann‟s concept as being “relational” (Ibid). 2.1 What are information infrastructures? Nowhere is the concomitant relationship between state infrastructural power and infrastructures as evident as it is in sub-Saharan Africa. The word „infrastructure‟ is loaded with meanings and lacks a set definition as However, much of the discourse around Africa and technology, particularly different scholars, and disciplines, have different views of what infrastructures and information infrastructures, focuses on dearth and how Africa is lagging. At the their dimensions are. Mann's conceptualisation of infrastructure echoes Marx‟s core of the discussion are issues of state capacity and the ability of the state to (2010) idea of a superstructure, which envisions it as the norms, ideology and exercise its power over an extended period. However, in order to fully understand social institutions that are reflective of the „base‟ that controls it. Weber‟s (2013) the functioning of infrastructural power, it is important to identify the base unit of understanding of the structure of society appears to be the one towards which analysis: the state. It is important to appreciate that the state and government are Mann leans. He views the base and superstructure as more reciprocal. The result is not interchangeable terms. that there is a difference between infrastructures, which includes workers and the Nettl (1968) notes the difficulty in appropriately defining the state, particularly means of productions, as well as symbolic superstructures (cultures and norms). with the introduction of developing nations in the international society. Half a

37 38 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 O Ayodele Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 O Ayodele century later, the concept of state, and statehood, is further complicated by the 3. Transnationalism and Infrastructural Power immense power wielded by some non-state actors. Three points from Nettl‟s conceptualisation of state that may prove useful in our overall analysis: first, the The function of, and access to, infrastructural power is affected by trans state is “a collectivity that summates a set of functions and structures in order to nationalism. Infrastructures are often built, particularly in the face of deficits that generalize their applicability” (Nettl 1968: 562). This infers that the state is a are unable to be met by the state, by a variety of state and non-state actors. member and at the same time independent, which of course has implications for Transnationalism is not only a human migration concern but also has economic legitimacy and sovereignty; second, a state is a “unit in the field of international and cultural dimensions. The concept of transnationalism is important as it details relations” (Ibid: 563); and third, “the state is the gatekeeper between intrasocietal the nature of technological infrastructure in the world economy and provides an and extrasocietal flows of action” (Ibid: 564). He speaks to the autonomous alternate explanation to Africa‟s integration in the world economy. character of the state and the various shifts between the private and public. This is The concept of transnationalism relates to interactions across state boundaries. seen in education, healthcare and commerce, for instance. These interactions are not limited to economic activity but may include political Mann's (1993:55) definition of state power, by his own admission, is more and cultural relations. At times, transnational and non-state are incorrectly used as „institutional‟ than „functional‟. In other words, his definition focuses more on the interchangeable terms. Russo and Chiriatti (2013:4) distinguish between „trans conventions and organisation of the state rather than what the state executes. The national‟ and „non-state‟, positing that the former “identifies a mode of interaction” last two points in his four-point definition recognise that the state is a “territorially” whilst the latter characterises “the agent of interaction”. Their distinction is established area in which it has authority and can enforce its authority using important because it pinpoints subsequent analysis to more than just considering physical force. I take the view that this is not the most appropriate method of the actions of particular agents in the international system. Moreover, focussing assessing the levels of the state‟s infrastructural power. Although Michael Mann‟s merely on cross boundary movement ignores key questions about the nature of 1976 conceptualisation of social power, and infrastructural power specifically, is the relationship between the state and infrastructures, as well as why understanding focused on the global North, Hawkins (2014) extends the concept by applying it to transnationalism is so vital to infrastructural power. developing nations. She observes that through “the application of primary or The politics underlying transnationalism is in no way simple - particularly for secondary data, the trajectory of a country‟s development can be teased out African states that are still developing. For instance, there are issues related to the providing a much needed historical dimension to the study of developing potential reduction in state autonomy and danger of the internationalisation of states” (Hawkins 2014:306). local assets or key points. Most importantly, transnationalism in a globalised However, the challenge for states facing stark infrastructure deficits, what environment questions the very existence of the state itself. Does having a Schoeten (2014) defines as „infrastructures of rule‟ and what Larkin (2008) calls legitimised monopoly of violence or the provision of public goods enough to be „representation of rule‟, is that they underscore the weaknesses in the state recognised as a state? I explore these questions further explored within this article apparatus and trigger the descent towards the use of despotic power (Mann 1984; but what is clear is that transnationalism complicates traditional views of the state Mann 1993; Schoeten 2014). that a plethora of actors are involved. Yet, these actors cannot be disregarded by The tilt towards despotism is at times reinforced extraterritorially. Reno (2001) states as the cost of not adequately engaging with transnational organisations, such underscores the complicity of external actors in shoring up the state in the face of as multinational businesses, particularly for developing countries, can be too steep. feeble bureaucratic systems. Reno (Ibid: 201) refers to Martin‟s (1995) discovery Nye and Keohane (1971b: 725) best explain that transnational relations “affect that between 1963 and 1994, France had deployed troops in thirty separate cases in interstate politics by altering the choices open to statesmen and the costs that must only six states. The purpose was to shore up failing regimes. However, there are be borne for adopting various courses of action”. cases where external support for despotic regimes is not even necessary. For instance, during Nigeria‟s military dictatorship between 1985 and 1993, weakening 3.1 Africa’s infrastructure push institutions led to the state further leaning towards more pugnacious means to Ougaard (2018) argues that “the infrastructure push is an effort by the trans control its territory (Lucas 1998). national state to remedy the infrastructure gap, a major impediment to economic growth, by inducing massive surge in infrastructure investments”. Infrastructure is

39 40 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 O Ayodele Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 O Ayodele undoubtedly Africa‟s Achilles heel with dire consequences for state-society 2018: 64-64). relations, as well as the perceived authority of the state (Foster and Briceño- The ability to address the infrastructure gap was dealt a further blow during the Garmendia 2010; Estache and Garsous 2012; African Development Bank 2018). global financial crisis between 2012 and 2016. The result was that external This insufficiency has grave implications for the amount of infrastructural power, commitment to Africa‟s infrastructure was drastic; commitments of an average of which the state can access. For instance, a 2018 report by the World Bank and US$75 billion declined to US$62,5 billion (Ibid). With regard to ICT, and the need Afrobarometer highlights the relationship between the provisions of social to grow the digital economy, Africa is seriously challenged. On the one hand, basic infrastructure (such as water and electricity) and the improved taxation rates public goods such as roads and electricity need to be built. But on the other hand, (Blimpo et al 2018). bridging the digital divide is needed so as to drive economic growth. Both demands Infrastructures are often acquired in a top-down fashion. Essentially, the state are vital, but the resource pool is limited. decides what infrastructures are to be deployed and where? An extreme example The result of limited ICT infrastructure is that the costs of infrastructure, the of this is Apartheid-era South Africa and its racial spatial development planning cost of Internet and telephone charges is exorbitant. The 2018 African Economic policies (Berrisford 2011). The deployment of material and normative infra Outlook reports that Internet and call charges are amongst the highest in the structures was driven by race-based policies rather than just a focus on economic world. Moreover, the cost of data in Africa costs “an average citizen nearly 18 per growth. A key example was the practice of only deploying telephone lines in cent of average income”, in Asia this figure is only 3 per cent (Ibid: 73). What this primarily white areas during Apartheid. Does that mean that the role of the means is that any hope of closing the gap requires that African countries to look modern state is merely an incubator for economic growth in the global capital towards transnational networks that consist of varied actors. Understandably, this economy? Answering in the affirmative ignores the fact that investing in infra would lead to an inevitable tension between capital poor countries and wealthy structures, particularly information infrastructures, includes many other concerns industrialised countries over the governance of knowledge infrastructures and that go beyond the mere will of the state. specifically specific control of the digital value chain. States and their stakeholders, such as labour movements have to contend with Technology, and the infrastructures that support it, have always leaned towards socio-technical developments elsewhere, forcing the government to decide transnationalism and as such has been impacted by some form of collective between efficacy and political stability. A salient example is the improved capability political authority. However, that relationship has been malleable. An early example of sewbots (textile manufacturing robots). On the one hand, the capacity of is radiotelegraphy in the early 20th century. Behemoths such as the Marconi sewbots means that 800 thousand of T-shirts can be produced daily at the cost of Company and Siemens Brothers led the charge in the provision of the infra only 33 US cents per T-shirt (Zhou and Yuan 2017). On the other hand, the structure that enabled the use of radio technology but could not do so without the potential labour unrest, as human jobs are replaced, means that developing states acquiescence of some form of state authority. Yet, the peculiarity of radio, as with that do not slow down technology-driven growth within its borders have to be Broadband and Wi-Fi in the 21st century, is that it is amorphous, meaning that once prepared to deal with the fallout due to job losses. Still, the inability to produce the basic infrastructure is in place, its actual movement cannot be fully controlled goods efficiently would cause job losses. by the state. Moreover, it is inherently transnational due to the diverse actors that Nevertheless, there would always be some form of recompense. Strange (1976: have to be involved in its development and operation. Soroos (1982) describes this 342) describes this as a “triple trade off” between efficiency, equity and order phenomenon as the „commons in the sky‟, whereas Rikitianskaia, Balbi and influenced by “the input of political direction or authority of the system” (Strange Lobinger (2018) coined the term „mediatzation of the air‟. 1976: 342). This trade-off in African countries is often out of balance due to There has been an extensive push with regard to information infrastructures external political influence. across the African continent. But with the involvement of external actors it is In the aftermath of the Washington Consensus capital allocation to infra uncertain as to how this would play out politically in the long term. A situation to structures declined drastically from the 1990s till the early 2000s when this watch is the recent landing of cables linking Africa to the Americas. African and approach to development had lost favour in Western monetary and financial Latin American countries‟ external communication has historically been via the US circles. However, in Africa, this reduction in infrastructure spending led to an infra or Europe. The development of the South Atlantic Cable System, also known as structure deficit that has been difficult to overcome (African Development Bank the Angola-Brazil cable, is set to bring down communication costs for African and

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Latin American countries (African Research Bulletin 2018: 22012-22013). A further 4.1 Why does the information infrastructures gap exist? boon is that cables are 100 per cent owned by Angola Cables, a private Angolan telecommunications operator. With a reduction in revenue from data and The lack of information infrastructures in Africa, much like other physical international voice calls, how would the traditional powers respond - particularly to infrastructure, is a consequence of both their colonial history as well as missed Angola, a regional actor with a desire to regain its prominence. opportunities by African leaders. Noll (2000: 184-185) notes that in the developing world, telecommunications companies were primarily foreign-owned, with service 4. Africa and information infrastructures concentrating on societies‟ elites such as government officials, wealthy individuals, as well as large corporations. As a result, the infrastructure that was built to support The ability for states to harness their potential IP is low and potential improvement this arrangement was concentrated in the capital city, or other large commercially is hampered by the lack of information infrastructure. The concept of a „digital important cities. This arrangement was a vestige of colonial infrastructure develop divide' or a separation between the information rich and the information poor is ment. For instance, Schwenkel (2015: 526) reminds us that urban infrastructure in mired in controversy as many scholars find the common understandings of the colonial Vietnam, was “marked by the accessibility of resources, in accordance with phrase lack nuance (Warschauer 2004: 297-301). One of the most comprehensive the racialised practices of infrastructure exclusion”. This form of infra structural definitions is that provided by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and exclusion was common all across the colonised world and continued in the Development (OECD): diffusion of telecommunications technology. One of the first telecommunications “[t]he term “digital divide” refers to the gap between individuals, households, technological artefacts developed was the telegraph, and colonial powers saw it as a businesses and geographic areas at different socio-economic levels with regard both way to deepen their engagement with their remote territories (Carey 2008:9). to their opportunities to access information and communication technologies Ultimately, the effect of colonialism went far beyond inequity in the diffusion of (ICTs) and to their use of the Internet for a wide variety of activities” (OECD, infrastructure dependent technology, but it affected the lens in which African 2001: 5). leaders viewed these technologies. This is evident in the manner in which African

This information gap, which is really an infrastructures gap, is one that Africa is still nations engaged the burgeoning communications technologies, particularly as they struggling to close. became independent nations. Arguably, this is a function of previous socialisation. In 1987, McPhail and McPhail observed a widening disparity between the global Larkin (2008: 21) illustrates that British colonialism and its use of technological North and South concerning the importance placed on information and by infrastructure went beyond mere “representation of rule”, it was about creating “a extension, telecommunications. They underscore the fact that information has particular sort of colonial subject”. Larkin's description of the type of subject that become an increasingly important commodity across the globe and the portal in British colonialists expected, is one that is more cosmopolitan, by European which to transmit it, telecommunications, had also become important. However, standards. governments in the global North did not see the value in increasing the tele Over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, many African countries gained in communications capacity, or communications infrastructure available in the global dependence and began to take control of their infrastructure including their South. As one of their examples, they refer to a 1980 report by the Canadian communications infrastructure. The result, however, was lopsided investment in Parliamentary Task Force North-South Relations, which ignores information and maintaining and improving the available infrastructure. For instance, countries communications infrastructure as being important to the growth of developing such as Côte d‟Ivoire merely mimicked the colonial setup and did not actually countries. control its infrastructure, but rather it was controlled from the Afrique Occidentale The discourse around developing nations, particularly African nations, and Française (AOF) in Dakar. access to information infrastructures, has changed in subsequent years. The social The Côte d'Ivoire model is one that many Franco-African countries adopted as and economic mobility of developing nations is linked to their ability to close the a result of their socialisation. In the heat of the anti-colonisation movement, „digital divide'. Franco-African leaders moved towards increased autonomy, as well as increased rights as French citizens (Cooper 2014:68) that stood in stark contrast to the anti- colonial visions of Anglo-Africans. These contrasts are seen in how infrastructures,

43 44 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov/Dec 2019 O Ayodele Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 O Ayodele both material and social infrastructures, were engaged with. Under the AOF, governance risk inherent in WARCIP, the project has progressed with the landing states were not even allowed to build additional infrastructure (Kone 1999:145). stations for the Guinea Bissau leg, set to be constructed in the first half of 2019 The post-colonial relationship to infrastructure, particularly communications infra (Foch 2019). It is unlikely that any of these countries would have been able to structure was different in Anglophone countries. Perhaps as a function of the garner this level of support outside of a regional arrangement. British policy of indirect rule, there was more ownership of the foundations that The capitalist undercurrents of globalisation, in the 20th and 21st century, have were developed previously. At least, Nigeria realised the importance of its telecom made regional economic and political integration and the development of regional munications infrastructure in each of its National Development Plans since the infrastructural networks an imperative for developing nations. Khalili (2017) makes 1960s. However, the civil war, mismanagement and lack of funds, upended the the important argument that liberal capitalism renders the commonly accepted effective implementation of just over 40 per cent of its original targeted telephone distinctions between public and private, foreign and domestic, ineffective. She takes line installations (Ajayi, Salawu and Raji 1999: 164). the view that “we have to take account of how physical and virtual infrastructures Telecommunications prior to World War II was primarily a private enterprise, were crucial to the capitalisation of the economies of the Global South” (Khalili although it enjoyed state support. In the aftermath of WWII, the desire to rebuild 2017:3). lost communications infrastructure led to the nationalisation of telecom I do not take a normative position on whether or not capitalism is good or bad munications; Cable and Wireless Plc, a British company, became a state-owned for the Global South, particularly Africa, but I do agree that the language and enterprise in 1947. Over the same period, there was not a similar drive to accelerate mechanism of capitalism can have either an amplifying or a diminishing effect on infrastructure development in developing nations. states‟ IP. This can be seen in the top-down-bottom-up approach to infra struc tures with the intention of integrating into the global economy (Fromhold- 4.2 Has a transnational outlook paid off? Eisebith and Eisebith 2005; Zawdie and Langford 2000). This approach refers to As previously discussed, Africa has had to take a transnational approach to its projects being state-led or conceptualised, but being executed by the bottom, or information infrastructures. Weiss describes this approach as “governed inter civil society. The structural and political weakness still present in a number of states dependence”. She defines it as: in African means that they have been unable to benefit from globalisation (Bøås, Marchand and Shaw 1999:1062). “The state‟s ability to link up with civil society groups, to negotiate support for its In the African context, the deepening of regional ties, much like the building of projects, and to coordinate public-private resources to that end make up the broad infrastructures, are often top-down in nature. However, regional integration must tapestry of IP” (Weiss 2006:168). not be seen as a challenge to the state‟s power per se but rather offering it a form of

Her argument is in line with Soifer and Vom Hau (2008: 222) who argue that state “international legitimacy” (Gibb 2009: 717). African nations, through the regional capacity, which is at the heart of IP, is “relational”. The ability of the state to economic communities; the New Partnership for Africa‟s Development exercise its power is dependent on its ability to maximise its relationships with (NEPAD); and the African Union (AU) overall has pinpointed ICT infrastructure other actors, including institutions. Vom Hau (2008: 351) explains that “state as being imperative, not only for regional economic integration, but also for socio- infrastructural power is constrained or facilitated by the relationships between state economic development goals. Both the AU and NEPAD acknowledge the emer elites and non-state groups, and relationships between executive authorities and gence of an information society of which ICT was a cornerstone. Paragraph 107 social control institutions”. Although Vom Hau and Soifer are writing from the of the NEPAD document sets out teledensity objectives and is focused on Africa's perspective of local institutions and local government, their perspectives can be e-readiness. More specifically, paragraph 104 points to the belief that ICTs would applied on a much wider scale. Africa's state capacity is bolstered by external in provide the impetus needed to contribute to economic growth and development as volvement. For instance, in 2011, the World Bank approved funding worth well as accelerate African integration and intra-regional trade. To breathe life into US$71,5 million dollars, for the improvement of ICT infrastructure in Liberia, these beliefs, NEPAD adopted the Protocol on Policy and Regulatory Framework for Sierra Leone, São Tomé and Príncipe (Balancing Act-Africa 2011). This is part of NEPAD ICT Broadband Infrastructure for Eastern and Southern Africa, commonly called a larger US$300 million earmarked for the West Africa Regional Communications the Kigali Protocol, in 20086. Infrastructure Program (WARCIP) (Ibid). Despite the high level of political and The staggering number of private and state-led consortiums has accelerated the

45 46 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 O Ayodele Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 O Ayodele development of backbone infrastructure, particularly submarine cables. Yet, these structural issues (Ibid). Carmody and Murphy (2015: 17) warn that mobile relationships are not optimised, and great opportunities are missed. The 2003 products, such as Safaricom's mobile money platform, M-PESA, that is often Eastern African Submarine Cable System (EASSy) developed in 2006 is one such flaunted as evidence of mobiles‟ ability to catapult African development, may in regional project. EASSy was originally envisioned as part of the NEPAD vision for fact “replicate patterns of economic extraversion”. Similarly, authors such as Ya‟u the development of the continent‟s backbone infrastructure (NEPAD e-Africa (2004, 2005) and Cline-Cole and Powell (2004) warn that the Internet and the Commission 2005), and to that end, NEPAD pursued funding for the project Internet for development (ICT4D) is not a panacea for all Africa‟s problems. (Muller 2007). However, Kenya became a stumbling block, as it was not in African leaders appear to have forgotten that although technical infrastructures agreement with having to increase its government‟s regulation of the sector, and it do hold the potential to change the trajectory of the continent positively, they are did not agree with the primacy South Africa enjoys, not only within NEPAD but still beholden to those who control, not only the technical artefacts/infrastructures that of the South African companies within the EASSy Consortium (Gedeye but also those who control the regime that controls the artefacts. As Marx argues: 2007). Eventually, owing to the contentious relationship, NEPAD withdrew from the regime, which he describes as superstructures, reflects the norms and values of EASSy and put forward its own project - Uhurunet. who controls it. In the case of Internet infrastructure, it appears that the interests In Africa, Farivar (2011: 74) reminds us that Internet diffusion across the African of private industry are more important than the needs of developing nations over continent is “subject to many political, economic, and educational obstacles that all. As can be seen with WSIS, and its subsequent review summits, the private need to be overcome”. Infrastructures cannot be considered in isolation; they are a sector is beginning to play a more significant role. sum total of technical artefacts, regulatory regimes as well as cultural norms Already the excitement of submarine and terrestrial fibre optic cable has many (Obertreis et al. 2016:172). Broadband connectivity is critical to Africa's political private sector players, who often participate in multi-stakeholder platforms at an and socio-economic growth. The challenge faced by developing countries, international level, rushing to provide to Africa in particular with physical infra particularly in Africa, is that not only is the current broadband technology pro structure. However, some analysts have already begun to sound the alarm that hibitively expensive but material infrastructure such as fibre networks lag behind there are too many cables being laid and the broadband capacity far outstrips the the rest of the world. In fact, approximately 36,3 per cent of Africa's population projected requirements for the continent. However, there is not as much lives out of reach of an active fibre network (OECD 2017:155). This gives us the excitement in providing electricity infrastructure, with only 43 per cent of people in impression that African states are unable to muster civil society, and harness sub-Saharan Africa having access to electricity (International Energy Agency 2017) international support to improve access to the Internet. But that is not exactly to make use of the high-speed broadband that these cables provide, or even the correct, part of the problem identified by UNECA lies with individual countries. education to utilise these infrastructures adequately. The private sector cannot be National backbone is arguably „the weak link‟ in the African broadband blamed solely for these challenges, as African governments have not optimised the infrastructure value chain (UNECA 2017:6). public-private partnerships. The fact is that as much as many states do not have the The proliferation of mobile network technology has also changed the game financial muscle to institute these projects themselves, they do have the leverage with regard to broadband penetration. Mobile telephony is the primary mode in because they have the legitimacy to regulate the territory. which African countries have access to the Internet. The International Tele communications Union reminds us that mobile network innovations “have made 5. Conclusion connectivity, including to high-speed broadband communication network potentially ubiquitous” (OECD 2017: 148). Mobile global penetration and least The world is only just coming to grips with the societal implications of technology. The speed of socio-political changes, exacerbated by rapid technological advances, developed country penetration rates have reached 99,7 per cent and 72,6 per cent st respectively (Ibid: 143). means that the silhouette of the international systems in the 21 century is But the narrative of improved Internet and consequently improved develop dissimilar to the previous century. I call for the development of other ways to mental outcomes, thanks to improved mobile penetration, is an imperfect narrative. assess infrastructures and IP. Technological infrastructures are changing the di Other than the fact that the Internet may reinforce current inequalities that exist mensions of the world, as we have traditionally understood it. Mann‟s concept of between the haves and have-nots, owing to the cost of infrastructures and other IP works well in underscoring the relational nature of that state power (Soifer and Vom Hau, 2008) even at a global or local level. The challenge, however, with

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Mann‟s definition is his characterisation of a state. Many entities can claim, either Acknowledgement wholly or in part, to be a state according to his definition. For instance, Nigeria‟s *An earlier version of this paper was presented at the FLACSO-ISA Joint own Islamic State in West Africa, otherwise known as Boko Haram, views itself as International Conference, in Quito (Ecuador) on 24 July 2018. I thank Professor T a state even though the wider society views it as a terrorist organisation. Boko Shaw and Dr E Balogun for their comments and suggestions. I have used their Haram has control of a demarcated territory and attempts to enforce their au feedback to strengthen my arguments. thority through the use of force. The group models itself after the Islamic State (IS) in the Middle East who has not only implemented a taxation scheme and other Bibliography forms of revenue collection, but also provides essential services. Unlike IS, there is not yet evidence that Boko Haram provides essential services, but it appears to African Development Bank (2018), African Economic Outlook 2018. African Development Bank. have started a taxation scheme (Campbell 2018; Ogundipe 2018). Africa Research Bulletin (2018), “Economic, financial and technical series”, Africa Research Bulletin, Vom Hau (2008: 339) explains that the principal method for assessing IP is by Vol 55, No 1 , pp 22013-22013. looking at the ability to extract taxation. The challenge with this form of assess Agabi, C (2018), “Don‟t delay signing Africa Free Trade Pact, SA President tells Nigeria”, Daily Trust. (Available at: https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/don-t-delay-signing-africa-free-trade-pact- ment is that; as shown by research economists such as Thandika Mkandawire sa-president-tells-nigeria-260574.html ,accessed 15 July 2018.) (2010), the capacity to extract tax in Africa is uneven owing to its post-colonial Ajayi, G., R. Salawu, and T. Raji (1999), "Nigeria: after a Century of Telecommunications, What development patterns. Thus, bringing forward a question to be explored in future Next?", in Noam, E M (ed), Telecommunications in Africa. Oxford University Press on Demand, studies: if an entity, private or external state power, can extract tax in a demarcated pp 163-77. area, does that make it a state with its own IP? 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property. Both Walby (1990) and Rawat (2014) locate patriarchy within six factors SWAPO’s 50/50 Policy in Namibia’s National seen as the source of exploitation of women. These are: the household, paid Assembly (2015-2018): Full of Sound and Fury employment, the state, male-on-female violence, sexuality and cultural institutions. As will emerge clearly herein, this article is mainly concerned with one factor – the Signifying Nothing? state – although all these factors are interconnected. What is often ignored in the analysis of the women political participation is the Job Shipululo Amupanda & Erika Kahelende Thomas „analysis-within‟ as opposed to the „analysis-without‟. „Analysis-within‟ referees to Department of Political and Administrative Studies the analysis of the work and impacts of the success cases – cases in which, for University of Namibia, Namibia example, there has been progress in facilitating and ensuring women political participation – the post entryism analysis. In this instance, the question is centered, for example, on the role and impact of the women that have managed to enter Abstract mainstream politics. „Analysis-without‟ is a common analysis that can be regarded as face-value „body count‟ on the presence and absence of women. This analysis, In 2013, Namibia‟s ruling party, the South West Africa People‟s Organisation „analysis-without‟, concerns numbers and percentages – descriptive representation. (SWAPO), amended its constitution to implement the 50/50 gender policy. This This article is mainly concerned with „analysis-within‟. It looks at the „inside‟ policy required equal representation of men and women in all its leadership cases of women political participation so as to assess the impacts of the successful structures and in its representation in institutions such as the National Assembly. cases as opposed to merely focusing on proportionality. Futhermore, this article The party had been zigzagging on this policy it had adopted at its 2002 congress. assesses the impact of a gender policy intervention – called 50/50 Gender Policy - Four years since the implementation of SWAPO‟s 50/50, an analysis of the impact by Namibia‟s ruling party SWAPO in the 6th National Assembly. The analysis is of this policy in the National Assembly paints a troubling picture. At the level of limited to the lower house of Parliament, the National Assembly (charged with the substance by looking at parliamentary motions tabled, we find that SWAPO‟s task of principal law-making) and not the National Council (whose task is that of 50/50 policy in the National Assembly – which resulted in increased number of merely reviewing laws from the National Assembly) from 2015 to 2018 women in the legislature - did not lead to meaningful agenda setting in favour of women political participation. This article reflects critically on the gender policy in 2. Patriarchy, Democratisation and Women Political the 6th parliament‟s National Assembly, which is the principal law-making and Participation – What is the Progress? policy-setting arm of parliament with a view to assess whether there have been successes in facilitating women empowerment and participation in a meaningful From the above conceptualisation and from the literature on patriarchy, it becomes way. clear that by disposition, patriarchy contradicts democracy both as a process (procedural democracy that includes elections and primacy of individual choice) 1. Introduction and as a value system (democratic values such as human rights, dignity, freedom of association, political rights amongst others). Ballington (2005: 24) buttresses this There is hardly a discourse of women empowerment that does not make reference point fittingly: to patriarchy. This can be understood for women empowerment discourse is An essential tenet of any democratic framework is the principle of human inherently responding to women disempowerment brought about by patriarchy. rights, including the granting and exercise of the political rights of both men and Patriarchy is defined, in accessible language, by Rawat (2014: 43) as “a social and women. The development of any political agenda that does not include the ideological construct which considers men (who are the patriarchs) as superior to perspectives views and experiences of those who will be affected is not credible… women.” She further adds that “patriarchy imposes masculinity and femininity decision-making and priority setting continue to be largely in the hands of men. character stereotypes in society which strengthen the iniquitous power relations Taking into account gendered perspectives and involving both women and men in between men and women” (Rawat 2014: 43). Walby (1990) sees patriarchy as a decision-making processes are a sine qua non of any democratic framework. Hence system characterised by male authority and domination over women, children and democracy, by definition, cannot afford to be gender-blind. It must strive towards 55 56 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 J S Amupanda & E H Thomas Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov/Dec 2019 J.S. Amupanda & E.H. Thomas equality and representation of women and men in decision-making processes and factors such as violence, poverty, lack of access to quality education and health care, in the opportunities to achieve both these goals. the double burden of paid and unpaid work. And because of these obstacles, we Democratic countries are generally governed through processes determined by are losing a lot of good women leaders and countries and people are suffering from political systems and political institutions of the state. As Rawat (2014) and Walby their absence. This is why it is so important to actively promote women's political (1990) explained, the state is also regarded as one of the locations of patriarchal participation, including through affirmative measures, as appropriate…I believe that exploitation. Because of the above – and in its quest to confront patriarchy – the women's participation is fundamental to democracy and essential to the achieve women empowerment discourse seeks to transform the state to particularly change ment of sustainable development and peace. And there is now data to show that countries with greater gender equality have higher gross national product per capita, institutional arrangements that inhibit women political participation and are thus that women's leadership in the corporate sector results in improved business undemocratic. As such, it became clear that there would be little regard for a state performance. And we know that countries with more women in parliament tend to calling itself democratic yet failing to recognise the rights of women and the efforts have more equitable laws and social programmes and budgets that benefit women to fight against patriarchy in society in general and in the political system in and children and families (Bachelet 2011). particular. These efforts to transform the state have not been limited to states. The United Nations (UN) has also been instrumental in promoting women empower It is important to note, for the purpose of this article, Michelle Bachelet‟s assertion, ment in general and women political participation in particular. Ballington (2005: as provided above, that „countries with more women in parliament tend to have 24) captures this historic role of the UN as follow: more equitable laws and social programmes and budgets that benefit women and

The equal participation of women and men in public life is one of the cornerstones children and families‟. The extent of the applicability of the above assertion to of the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Namibia will be assessed herein. Further on women political participation, Bachelet Women (CEDAW) adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in (2011) argued that a lot still needed to be done at the international level regarding 1979, and in force since 1981… in 1995, the UN Fourth World Conference on women political participation: Women held in Beijing generated renewed pressure for the implementation of the CEDAW provisions: the Beijing Platform for Action identified „inequality between We still have a long way to go because women make up less than 10 percent of men and women in the sharing of power and decision-making at all levels‟ and world leaders. There are only 21 female Heads of State and Government out of „insufficient mechanisms at all levels to promote the advancement of women‟ as 193 UN Member States. Globally, less than one in five Members of Parliament is a two areas of significant concern where action was critical for the advancement of woman. And the 30 percent critical mass mark for women's representation in women. parliament has been reached or exceeded in only 28 countries. Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Bachelet‟s successor, continued to bemoan the state In July 2010, the UN established the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality of women political participation. In 2013, she stated the following during a launch and the Empowerment of Women, popularly known as UN Women. This entity of Women Leading Africa Programme in Windhoek, Namibia: allowed for focused and harmonised work of the UN system on the subject of wo men empowerment in general and women political participation in particular. As a In every country, women are running households. Women are running farms and result, previous entities dealing with women empowerment and gender equality businesses. Women are running community associations and NGOs. Women are such as the Division for the Advancement of Women, Office of the Special running for political office, and more and more of us are getting elected. But when Advisor on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women and the United Nations it comes to making it to the top, whether it is on corporate boards, in public office, Development Fund were all intergrated into this new entity (UN Women, 2018). or in peace talks, there is an imbalance between women and men. Women are under -represented. The scales of justice are not yet balanced. Things are changing, but Although these international policy instruments were widely welcomed and the top jobs are still mostly held by men…Since the end of the Cold War, women heralded as democratic reforms, the challenges of women political participation have represented only four per cent of signatories to peace agreements; less than remained. Former Executive Director of UN Women, Michelle Bachelet, sum three per cent of mediators of peace talks; and less than 10 per cent of anyone marised these challenges at a meeting in Finland on 11 October 2011 as follows: sitting at the table to negotiate on behalf of a party to the conflict (Mlambo- Ngcuka 2013). Today many women cannot participate in politics because they are held back by In its 2017/2018 Annual Report, the UN Women detailed its work in advancing

57 58 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov/Dec 2019 J.S. Amupanda & E.H. Thomas Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 J.S. Amupanda & E.H. Thomas women political participation. In the words of its Executive Director, Phumzile What the above data accounts and demonstrates is that at the international level, Mlambo-Ngcuka, UN Women is “supporting women politicians, electoral of there has been a number of interventions to bring about women political par ficials, voters, lawmakers, civil society activists and many others to claim their equal ticipation. At the same time, there is a subtle admission, particularly by both right to lead and be heard” (Mlambo-Ngcuka 2018: 3). She however, emphasised Bachelet (2011) and Mlambo-Ngcuka (2013), that the intervention metted out that the challenges remain and called for an end to all forms of gender inequality against patriarchy seems not to be yielding the desired results. What is left, for the (Mlambo-Ngcuka, 2018). The table below provides facts and figures on leadership purposes of analysis and further research, is to understand why these interventions and political participation of women in the world as produced by UN Women in have not yielded the needed results. July 2017. At a continental level, in Africa, women empowerment and women political participation generally follows the framework of the UN (Martin 2013). Women Description Percentage/ Year political participation in Africa has not recorded much success when compared, for number example, to the Nordic countries. It is for this reason that the election of Ellen Percentage of national pariamen- 22.8% By June 2016 Johnson Sirleaf as President of Liberia in 2005 and as President of tarians that are women Malawi in 2012 were heralded as historic. To date, post-colonial Africa has only re Number of women serving as 11 Heads of State As of October 2017 corded five female Presidents; Liberia‟s Ruth Perry (1996), Liberia‟s Ellen Johnson Head of State and Head of 12 Heads of Govern- Sirleaf (2006), Malawi‟s Joyce Banda (2012), Central Africa Republic‟s Catherine Government ment Samba-Panza (2014) and Ethiopia‟s Sahle-Work Zewde (2018). Both Samba-Panza States in which women account 38 states As of June 2016 and Perry served as presidents for a short period, serving either as interim for less than 10 per cent of par- president or as head of a transitional government. Banda lost an election leaving liamentarian only Sirleaf to have served two full constitutional terms of office (Ighobor 2015). Percentage of women parliamen- Nordic Countries 41.7 As of June 2017 Although significant, given the Patriarchal nature of Ethiopian society, Zewde‟s role tarians per region % is largerly ceremonial (Wamsley 2018). It is for similar reasons that Rwanda, with Americas 28.1 % the highest percentage of female parliamentarians, is heralded. It is the only Europe (+Nordic) 26.5 country in Africa with more than 50% female parliamentarians (Ighobor 2015). % Apart from following the gender policies and institutional arrangements of the Europe (-Nordic) 25.3 UN, the African Union (AU) has been seized with gender equality and women % political participation issue for a while. As Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the former Sub-Saharan Africa chairperson of the AU Commission, delineates, there has been several initiatives by 23.6% the AU on this question: Asia 19.4% Women make up seventy five per cent of the agricultural workforce. They Arab States 17.4 % constitute the bulk of cross-border traders and still provide for the well-being of The Pacific 17.4 % communities, the workforce and our societies, as well as being custodians of our Percentage of government minis- 18.3% As of January 2017 culture. The continent has taken many decisions towards the emancipation of ters who are women women and gender parity. The African Union‟s gender architecture includes Number of countries with 50 or 2 countries (Rwanda As of June 2017 important documents such as Article 4 (L) of the Constitutive Act of the African more per cent of women in Par- and Bolivia) Union, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People‟s Rights on the liament Rights of Women in Africa, the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa, Source: Data obtained from UN Women (2017) the Fund for African Women, and the African Women‟s Decade (Dlamini-Zuma 2015: 5).

There has been several practical and institutional steps taken to ensure gender

59 60 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 J.S. Amupanda & E.H. Thomas Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 J.S. Amupanda & E.H. Thomas mainstreaming in the affairs of the AU as captured by Martin (2013). In 2002, the Pre-colonial Namibia was not any different. The colonial state did not alter the Women and Gender Development Directorate (WGDD) was created within the existing patriarchal patterns when it established itself in the territory. Instead, the office of the Chairperson of the AU Commission with an objective of capacitating colonial state, through employment laws and colonial policies, reinforced the the AU to effectively deal with the gender and women empowerment question. In existing arrangements (Thomas 2005: Shejavali 2013). The contract labour system 2003, the following year, the Africa Women Committee on Peace and Develop and the employment pattern, including the composition of the colonial army and ment (AWCPD) was transformed into the African Union Women‟s Committee bureaucracy, are cases in point (Soiri 1996; Likuwa 2012; Keulder 2000; Melber (AUWC) to serve as an advisory body to the Chairperson on gender and 2010; Du Pisani 2000). Although often ignored, probably due to patriarchal development. In 2009 and 2010 respectively, the AU approved and adopted the hierarchised discourse, women were present and played an important role during AU Gender policy and Action to crytalise the values, objectives and the implemen the liberation struggle of Namibia. SWAPO had in its ranks and structures the tation by the AU, agencies and member- states. Further, the period between 2010- SWAPO Women‟s Council that played an important role during the liberation 2020 was declared the Women‟s Decade in order to provide the roadmap, led by struggle (SWAPO 1981). In a 1983 paper prepared for the United Nations the WGDD, on how the AU and member- states will meet the objectives and Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the SWAPO aspirations contained in all its policy and institutional instruments relating to Women‟s Council located the place of women in the colonial situation as follows: women empowerment and gender equality (Martin 2013). Namibia is an under-developing country still under South African colonial rule. This account – capturing the debate on patriarchy, democracy and women Namibian women are part of the oppressed Namibian nation. But under the political participation – locates the debate at the global and continental level to present occupation regime they suffer three levels of injustice: first, as part of the assess the progress made to date. It becomes evident that although there is some oppressed nation; second, from the discrimination against them as women (in considerable progress, challenges still remain. There are institutional arrangements, employment and delivery of services as sanctioned by the colonial state machinery); at both the UN and AU, to deal with the question of women empowerment in and thirdly, from oppressive feudal practices which are still endemic in a large general and women political participation in particular. section of Namibian men. This is not specific to Namibia alone. The social and economic relations of the colonial and apartheid state system imposed on the 3. Women and Political Participation in Post-Independence Namibian society which was already well on the road to a centralized feudal state Namibia only intensified the oppression. Customs and values die hard. Many of the then ingrained feudal values and customs are still prevalent among Namibians. It is Before the concretisation of the colonial project during the late 1880s, the present- against some of these oppressive and exploitative feudal values and customs that day territory of Namibia consisted of different nations, organised as independent the present struggle for liberation is aimed at. Only within a socialist restructuring political units (Wallace & Kinahan 2011). One of the common features in these of society can women be liberated from the different forms of oppression and communities is how power and political participation were organised. All these pre- exploitation. In order to achieve equality in practice, women will have to become colonial polities were generally patriarchal societies as was generally the case in active participants in the political, economic and administrative life of the society (SWAPO Women Council 1983: 2-3). many African societies at the time. In these societies, politics was not seen as an arena for women as captured by Shvedova (2005: 44): Three things are important for noting and emphasis from the position of the In many countries, traditions continue to emphasize women‟s primary roles as SWAPO Women‟s Council as stated above. Firstly, women played an important mothers and housewives and to restrict them to those roles. A traditional strong, role in the liberation struggle and occupied an organised position within the libe patriarchial value system favours sexually segregated roles, and „traditional cultural ration struggle. Secondly, women understood that they suffer tripartite oppression values‟ militate against the advancement, progress and participation of women in and were desirous of ending this oppression. Thirdly, they conceived the new any political process. Societies all over the world are dominated by an ideology of „a society, in independent Namibia, as one that will end all these forms of oppression woman‟s place‟. According to this ideology, women should only play the role of and exploitation. In a study looking at gender politics in the liberation struggle, „working mother‟, which is generally low-paid and apolitical. In addition, in some Akawa (2014) corrobolately finds that during the liberation struggle women countries, men even tell women how to vote. suffered double oppression by the colonial state and also by patriarchy that was also

61 62 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 J.S. Amupanda & E.H. Thomas Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 J.S. Amupanda & E.H. Thomas entrenched within the liberation movement, SWAPO. She adds that women thus This desk was later transformed into the Department of Women Affairs (Namiseb fought the struggle not only to end colonialism but to also attain gender liberation. 2008; Haushona-Kavamba 2013; Soiri 1996). In a 2002 interview with Bauer She finds that the end result is that the post-independence state failed women for (2002: 1-2), Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, who served as Director General of the they have been forced back to traditional „women spaces‟ in independent Namibia. Department of Women Affairs and later first Miniser of Women affairs, sum In similar work, Soiri (1996:108-109) arrived at this conclusion: marised this history sequentially:

The participation of women in the Namibian liberation struggle took many At first, after independence, there was a Women‟s Desk in the Office of the different forms. Women were part of the resistance community from the beginning President and people, especially women, felt that only a desk would not have the by supporting the attempts to prevent the colonial take-over of the territory. In the capacity and the mandate that women wanted such an office to have… After some national liberation movement SWAPO women took an active role not only in the time, the Desk was upgraded to a Department but it did not have the status supportive functions but also by performing many tasks traditionally reserved for required. For example, the head of the Department was a civil servant with the rank men… in post-independent Namibia the women‟s situation is characterised by great of an undersecretary. In this way, it was very difficult for women‟s issues to be diversity… although one cannot argue that in post-independent Namibia women articulated either in Cabinet or in Parliament…Later the Department was upgraded are forced “back to the kitchen”, there is a lot of disappointment amongst women such that it was headed by a Director General who had a Ministerial rank. That at their modest participation in the government structures. meant there was the possibility to influence policies, since the Director General, having a Ministerial rank, could sit in Cabinet. The Director General was not a full As stated in the previous section, democratic practices and ethos stand against the Cabinet member and it was made clear that she was there by invitation only… in very logic of patriarchy. This basically means that when Namibia decided to follow 2000 when the President set up the new Cabinet, he also established the Ministry of the democratic path at independence and adopted a democratic constitution, it Women Affairs and Child Welfare. From the time the Ministry was established, one meant that at the state level, a stance against patriachy had been adopted and could see a difference. legislated. At the level of policy intent, the post-independence state has been immaculate and is generally credited for the high-level clarity on gender equality. Following the establishment of the Ministry of Women Affairs and Child Welfare Shejavali (2013) captures the historical strides made in post-indepedence Namibia in 2000, several policy instruments meant to bring about women empowerment in using the constitutional provisions in the Namibian constitution such as Articles 10 general and women political participations in particular began to gain momentum. and 23 that provides for equality before the law and outlawing gender dis At the 2002 Swapo congress, the SWAPO Women‟s Council also began asking for criminations and the affirmative action for women. She further adds that, more women to be included in mainstream politics. It was not only SWAPO that caught the women political participation consciousness and bandwagon. Kaa …the Namibian government has repeatedly stated its support for women‟s rights pama, Blaauw, Zaaruka, & Kaakunga (2007: 38) submit that in the mid-2000s, non- and representation and has enacted, signed and ratified a plethora of laws, governmental organisations led by Sister Namibia had begun lobbying “political conventions and protocols to this effect. Policies such as the National Gender parties, parliamentary committees, line ministries and the media with their Policy, the National Gender Plan of Action, and the ratification of the SADC manifesto and their „50/50‟ campaign for gender equality”. By 2010, the National Protocol on Gender and Development are all testimony to Namibia‟s theoretical Gender Policy, that was first compiled and adopted in in 1997, was reviewed, ex commitment to equal and equitable women‟s representation in leadership and governance, as well as in other social contexts. Practically, however, the country has panded and adopted to run for the period of 10 years, until 2020 (MGECW 2010). th a long way to go to reach the requirements and deadlines to which it has committed On the 17 August 2008, Namibia signed the SADC Protocol on Gender and itself in the said legislation (Shejavali 2013: 2). Development. This protocol, amongst others, stated as an objective to “set realistic, measurable targets, time frames and indicators for achieving gender equality and After independence, President Sam Nujoma established, within his office, a equity” (SADC 2008: 6). One of those targets, as stipulated in Article 12(1), states women‟s desk to deal with women‟s affairs. While some argued that this was an that: indication of the seriousness with which President Nujoma intended to deal with women‟s issues – by locating this desk within his office – there were those who State Parties shall endeavour that, by 2015, at least fifty percent of decision making argue that a mere desk did not represent the seriousness gender equality deserved. positions in the public and private sectors are held by women including the use of affirmative action measures as provided for in Article 5 (SADC 2008: 11).

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By 2017, although considerable progress had been made in terms of a number of women in politics and decision-making position with the increase from 25% to At the 2012 congress, the implementation of the 2007 congress resolution was 47%, Namibia had still not achieved the 50% target it committed to achieve by again not formalised. Instead, the congress resolved to call for an extra-ordinary 2015 (MGECW 2017). The surge in the percentage was due to the SWAPO 50/50 congress dedicated to the amendment of the constitution for this purpose. The policy, adopted in 2013, and saw a significant number of female parliamentarians party then amended its constitution, at this 2013 extra-ordinary congress, resulting entering the National Assembly. It must, however, be noted that at state level, in widespread implications to the SWAPO political machinery. As a result of this Namibia is still without a similar gender equality quota. The quota system is a resolution, all SWAPO structures, from sections, branches, districts, region, national SWAPO policy, and its manifestation at the state level is merely on account that (Central Committee and Political Bureau) and the top leadership now needed to SWAPO is presently the majority party in Namibia. SWAPO‟s 50/50 policy is comply with the „Zebra-style‟ or 50/50 policy. The amendment extended to discussed in detail in the following section. Members of Parliament through the SWAPO parliamentary list (SWAPO 2013; O'Riordan 2014). 4. The Genesis of SWAPO 50/50 Policy This move was seen as a response to widespread calls and lobbying by women groups for gender equality. As already stated, the language of 50/50 and „zebra- As stated earlier, in the early 2000s, gender consciousness and the activism for style‟ was already proposed to women lobby groups as submitted by Hubbard increased women political participation were widespread in Namibia. In 2001, (2001). Clayton (2014: 2) credits lobby groups for SWAPO‟s adoption of the Dianne Hubbard from the Legal Assistance Centre wrote a paper for the Namibia 50/50 policy: Women‟s Manifesto Network, titled „50/50: Options for Namibia‟ in which she made the following proposals: In July 2013, after an intense and protracted civil society lobbying effort and international, regional and domestic legal mandates, Swapo formally agreed to The recommended option for regional authorities is: require that all parties and include a gender quota within its own party structures – a move that, if enacted, associations participating in the elections must put forward equal numbers of male would move the country dramatically toward gender parity in parliamentary and female candidates for each regional election in which they take part…The representation. recommended options at the national level are: (1) National Council: Require that each regional council elect one male member and one female member to sit in the The SWAPO Party‟s Women‟s Council, the chief lobbyist for women National Council (with an exception for unlikely cases where a particular regional empowerment inside SWAPO worked in tandem with women groups such as council was composed of only men or women). This would be likely to ensure a Sister Namibia and Women Action for Development. Furthermore, SWAPO has precise balance of 13 men and 13 women in the National Council…(2) National also disclosed the involvement of the Swedish Socialist Party in actualising and Assembly: Require that the number of candidates of each sex in the lists put implementing the 50/50. Its functionaries have often cited several regional and forward by any participating political party or association must be 50/50 men and international gender equality instruments giving credence to a claim that SWAPO women. Require further that the names of male and female candidates must follow also internalised an external position (IPPR 2014; SWAPO 2013). To adopt such a a zebra-list pattern (Hubbard 2001: 15-16). position is to underestimate the women empowerment discourse within SWAPO. There was, therefore, widespread consciousness for increased women political Accounts from the SWAPO Women Council (1983), Soiri (1996) and Bauer participation. SWAPO was not any different. Following the national mood (2002) indicate that the struggle for women empowerment inside SWAPO started manifesting both inside and outside SWAPO, the party resolved, during its 2002 during the liberation struggle and continued after indepedence. There was, indeed, congress, that 50% of leadership position in the party, government, parliament and resistance and challenges in recording a major breakthrough such as 50/50 policy state-owned enterprises be occupied by women (O'Riordan 2014: Mongudhi over the first two decades after indepedence. Be that as it may, it does not mean 2013). This resolution was, however not implemented. At the 2007 congress, that there was nothing happening inside SWAPO to fight for gender equality. As another resolution was taken to implement and operationalise the 2002 resolution. Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, interviewed by Bauer (2002), has shown, within 10 This congress resolved that the party constitution must be amended to pave the years women fought for representation from a mere Desk of Women Affairs to a way for the implementation of the 2002 congress resolution (Links 2013; Department of Women Affairs – and then from a Department of Women Mongudhi 2013). Affairs to a fully-fledged Ministry of Women Affairs and Child Welfare. 65 66 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 J.S. Amupanda & E.H. Thomas Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 J.S. Amupanda & E.H. Thomas

ignorance and disease (Nujoma 2013: 2-3). This has not been easy. For example, President Sam Nujoma has been part of the As such, SWAPO‟s 50/50 policy is a result of a long struggle by women and fight of women empowerment, sometimes facing rebelion from his male com women groups, inside and outside SWAPO, from the era of the liberation struggle rades. Mongudhi (2013) captures Nujoma struggles for women political par – through the 23 years of independence – to 2013 when it was finally and formally ticipation illustratively: adopted and contained in the SWAPO constitution.

In 2002, the Founding President Sam Nujoma was forced to drop plans to 5. From Party to State - The Implementation of the 50/50 nominate 21 women to the Swapo Central Committee. He was advised that this Policy would be illegal, but those opposed to the moved accused him of displaying dictatorial behaviour by trying to push for more women representation in the party In 2014, Namibia held Presidential and National Assembly Elections. As per the leadership. A resolution was passed at the 2002 congress to increase the proportion proportional representation electoral system, each political party compiles a list of of women delegates to the party's congress up to 50%. If Nujoma had had his way in nominating the 21 women, it would have left only 36 positions available in the Members of Parliament. However, voters do not vote for individual Members of election for the Central Committee. Many party stalwarts, most of them Ministers, Parliament. They only vote for a political party. In the same year, the Namibian feared they would have lost their positions to people who would have been constitution was also amended to increase the number of seats from 72 to 104 “brought in by wheelchair”, an expression widely used by Swapo members. Having (including Presidential appointees). A total of sixteen political parties contested in failed to get 50% female representation, Nujoma, responded to lobbying by some the National Assembly election of which only 10 won seats in the National in the Women's Council leadership, decided to push for a quota on the Central Assembly (Electoral Commission of Namibia 2015). The table below reflects the Committee but once again that did not succeed. number of votes received by each political party and the subsequent seats allocated by the Electoral Commission of Namibia (ECN). President Nujoma was evidently one of the happiest following the passing of the

50/50 policy at the SWAPO Congress in 2013. At an event held in October 2013 by the Pan African Women Organisation, Nujoma located the women struggle and Name of Political Party Number of Votes Number of seats made the following comments about the SWAPO 50/50 policy: All People’s Party 20 431 2 Christian Democratic Voice Party 2 606 0 Women have fully participated in various battle fields against the enemy troops Congress of Democrats 3 404 0 while those who were inside the country not only provided food and shelter but Democratic Party of Namibia 1 131 0 also vital information on the movement and whereabouts of the enemy troops to DTA of Namibia 42 933 5 the combatants of the People‟s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), SWAPO‟s Monitor Action Group 3 073 0 Military Wing. Upon the attainment of our genuine freedom and independence, Namibian women continue to make great contribution in all spheres of human Namibia Economic Freedom Fighters 3 259 0 endeavour. However, their contribution is being hampered by adverse socio- National Democratic Party of Namibia 1 389 0 economic conditions which we inherited from the white apartheid regime with the National Unity Democratic Organisation 17 942 2 triple exploitation of women. These include the continued economic discrimination Rally of Democracy and Progress 31 372 3 and some traditional practices that disregard the contribution of women in our Republican Party of Namibia 6 099 1 society. Against this background, I commend the SWAPO Party for its decision SWANU of Namibia 6 354 1 taken at its recent extraordinary congress held in Swakopmund, to implement a SWAPO Party of Namibia 715 026 77 50/50 gender representation of men and women at all decision-making level, which United Democratic Front of Namibia 18 945 2 will see more female comrades occupying positions of responsibility both in the United People’s Movement 6 353 1 SWAPO Party and the Government structures. Therefore, I appeal to you as Workers Revolutionary Party 13 328 2 leaders of the SWAPO Party Women‟s Council that no efforts must be spared in Source: Electoral Commission of Namibia (2015) ensuring that more women are drawn into the decision-making organs of the Party in order for them to contribute meaningfully towards the eradication of poverty, 67 68 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 J.S. Amupanda & E.H. Thomas Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 J.S. Amupanda & E.H. Thomas

Norah Munsu SWAPO

Of importance to this table is how SWAPO filled its 77 seats in the National Ida Hoffman SWAPO Selma Fillemon SWAPO Assembly. In accordance with the 50/50 policy, these seats were filled with the Paula Kooper SWAPO names of SWAPO members from its parliamentary list that was compiled in equal Jennifer van der Heever DTA measure between men and women. Given that SWAPO had more than 80% of Elma Dienda DTA the parliamentary seats, the party list ended up characterising the National Clara //Gowases RP Assembly. The significance of the 50/50 policy cannot be underestimated. The table below contains the list women in the 5th National Assembly as compared to Source: Parliament of the Republic of Namibia (2018) the 6th National Assembly. From the table above, it becomes evidently clear that SWAPO‟s 50/50 is solely responsible for the increased number of female MPs in the 6th National Assembly. Name of MP in the 5th Political Name of MP in the 6th Political Par- National Assembly Party Parliament ty The table below is a further illustration, developed from the table above, of the impact of the SWAPO 50/50 on women representation in the National Assembly. SWAPO Laura McLeod SWAPO Pendukeni Iivula-Ithana SWAPO Agnes Kafula SWAPO Number of the Na- Number of Female Female MPs from Females MPs from Petrina Haingura SWAPO Lucia Iipumbu SWAPO tional Assembly MPS the Ruling Party Opposition Parties Doreen Sioka SWAPO Priscilla Beukes SWAPO 5th National Assembly 16 15 1 -Amadhila SWAPO Lucia Witbooi SWAPO 6th National Assembly 43 40 3 Priscilla Beukes SWAPO Netumbo Ndaitwah SWAPO Source: Parliament of the Republic of Namibia (2018) Lucia Witbooi SWAPO Johanna Kandjimi SWAPO Angelika Muharukua SWAPO Alexia Manombe-Ncube SWAPO th SWAPO Doreen Sioka SWAPO 6. The Impact of the 50/50 Policy in the 6 National Sylvia Makgone SWAPO Sophia Shaningwa SWAPO Assembly Lempy Lucas SWAPO Juliet Kavetuna SWAPO Juliet Kavetuna SWAPO Christine IIHoebes SWAPO Evelyne Nawases-Taeyele SWAPO Sylvia Makgone SWAPO Most contemporary commentaries on SWAPO‟s 50/50 focus on celebrating the Alexia Manombe-Ncube SWAPO Agnes Tjongarero SWAPO fact that more women have now entered the National Assembly. These analyses Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah SWAPO Anna Shiweda SWAPO begin and end with the numbers – the body count – of women in political struc Agnes Limbo RDP Lidwina Shapwa SWAPO Ndilipo Namupala SWAPO tures. The SWAPO‟s 50/50 policy, in these commentaries, is treated as an end. Maureen Hinda-Mbaziira SWAPO These sentiments are best captured in this writing by Shejavali (2018: 1): Aino Kapewangolo SWAPO Saara-Kuugongelwa- SWAPO Namibia performs well on many gender-equality indicators, including gender Amadhila representation in governance. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2017), Bernadette Jagger SWAPO Lucia Nghaamwa SWAPO Namibia currently ranks 12th globally and fourth on the African continent for the Kornelia Shilunga SWAPO proportion of women in Parliament. Getting to this level of gender representation Anna Hipondoka SWAPO required a number of important changes in recent years, most notably the adoption Priscilla Kavita SWAPO of a 50/50 alternating party list by the majority party, Swapo, which holds 80% of Rebecca Iipinge SWAPO Sophia Swartz SWAPO National Assembly‟s voting seats.

Itah Kandji-Murangi SWAPO Eveline Nawases-Taeyele SWAPO In June 2018, President received the African Gender Award from Becky Ndjoze-Ojo SWAPO the Gender Is My Agenda Campaign. The award was specifically given in recognition Annakletha Sikerete SWAPO Faustina Caley SWAPO of Namibia‟s promotion of women in key decision making structures (Iikela, Emilia Amupewa SWAPO 2018). There seems to be an impression that Namibia, at the level of government, Marina Kandumbu SWAPO has developed mechanism to promote women political participation hence the Loide Kasingo SWAPO 69 70 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 J.S. Amupanda & E.H. Thomas Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 J.S. Amupanda & E.H. Thomas more than 40% women representation in the National Assembly. As outlined structures, religious etc. That would mean amending the Constitution of the earlier, the 50/50 quota system is a SWAPO internal mechanism that finds Republic of Namibia. Until then, no structure of government should be expression in the National Assembly indirectly. If SWAPO is to lose its majority in contaminated by such a populace decision (Walenga 2013). the National Assembly, the gender dynamics may not be the same. Although the Like Shejavali (2015) who problematises the 2015 Regional Councils elections and SWAPO 50/50 policy came into force in 2013, the 2015 Regional Councils elec how they dwarfed women political participation efforts witnessed in the National tions were not impacted by this policy. Shejavali (2015: 2) elucidates this point in Assembly, this article seeks to go beyond the increased number and „body-count‟ that: of women in the National Assembly. Like Walenga (2013) who problematises the During the 27 November 2015 Regional Council elections, 121 councillors were fact that at the state level there are no quotas, going beyond the celebratory body elected across Namibia‟s 14 regions. Only 16% of these regional councillors for the counting discourse, this article goes beyond the 40 percent increased presence of next five years are women (i.e. 19 out of 121) are women…given that nothing exists women in the National Assembly to assess the impact of this demographic in the Regional Councils Act, the Electoral Act, or other relevant legislation to development. To conduct this assessment, the article looks at two areas; agenda ensure a more equal gender representation at this level of governance, it is largely setting and agency in the National Assembly from 2015 to 2018. left to the political parties to ensure their party lists are reflective of Namibian Although parliamentarians are voted mostly as part of a party list system, as is society. For the 27 November 2015 Regional Council elections, only 43 of the 284 the case in Namibia, the role of an individual parliamentarian is as vital as the role constituency candidates across the country were women. That is, 15% of Regional of the parliament as a collective. Both Ong (1976) and Johnson (2005) argue that Council candidates were women. And in the three largest parties – Swapo, DTA the capacity, consistency and content of individual parliamentarian is important in and RDP – 18% of the 232 candidates fielded from these parties were women. the effeciency and effectiveness of Parliament. The Economic Commission for Despite advancing the cause of equal participation of the sexes through a change to Africa, in a study looking at the role of Parliament in promoting good governance, the party‟s constitution that saw women being listed in 50/50 zebra style for the takes a similar standpoint: National Assembly election in 2014, only 23 of Swapo‟s 121 candidates (19%) for the regional council elections were women. Five of these women were guaranteed One of the frequent criticisms of parliamentarians and politicians in general with their seats as constituency councillors as they were standing in the 26 uncontested respect to participation is that they only engage the public during an election constituencies in which only Swapo put forward candidates. campaign, and once elected they lose interest in local concerns. Although this may

It is not clear if those heralding Namibia for SWAPO‟s internal mechanism have not always reflect the reality of the way some elected representatives work, but it is a powerful perception among the citizens in most African countries… Thus, effective looked at the gender politics at Regional Council level as illustrated above. In 2013, and efficient public participation in decision making requires the political will on the few months after the passing of 50/50 policy in an implementable fashion, John part of the executive, the parliament and individual MPs to utilize their Walenga, a traditional leader and SWAPO politician expressed strong views representational function and the array of tools at their disposal optimally regarding his party‟s 50/50 policy and importantly illustrate the gap that at state (Economic Commission for Africa 2012: 55). level there are no clear corresponding instruments to promote women political participation: As will become clear below, it would seem that although female SWAPO parliamentarians went into the National Assembly on account and drive of women A half opened door is the same as a half closed door. A 50% women empowerment, they have since lost interest in the gender politics that accounts for representation is the same as 50% representation for men. The only difference here their ascendancy. As outlined by the Economic Commission for Africa (2012) is that members do not want to compete in one playing field, a field where above, these parliamentarians similarly failed to utilise their representational everything will become transparent; they have rather chosen to compete on two function and arrays of tools at their disposal optimally. The following four (4) different playing fields where not all qualities are projected for everyone to see. The party is for everyone and everyone can be a leader, and leaders need qualities and tables below are developed from the official record of the National Assembly sum qualities are earned not awarded. Such a policy is only limited to Swapo structures marising the annual activities of the assembly from 2015 to 2018. Each year a total and not to Parliament or Cabinet. If for some reason I am wrong, then the same number of motions table in the National Assembly is provided and distinguished principle should be extended to the whole public structure, private sector, traditional firstly between SWAPO and opposition parties and also between SWAPO female parliamentarians and their counterparts in the opposition. The statistics below are 71 72 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 J.S. Amupanda & E.H. Thomas Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 J.S. Amupanda & E.H. Thomas sourced from Parliament of the Republic of Namibia (2018). Statistical description Total Number Number of Motions tabled in the National Assembly from Sixty (60) Motions Statistics on motions tabled in the National Assembly in 2015 (Parliament of the Republic 2015 – 2018 of Namibia, 2015). Number of Motions related to Gender equality and women Five (5) Motions political participation tabled in the National Assembly SWAPO Opposition SWAPO Female Opposition Female from 2015 – 2018 MPs MPs Number of Motions by female parliamentarians tabled in Fifteen (15) Motions Total Number of Motions 6 (Out of 12) 6 (out of 12) 1 (out of 12) 3 (out of 12) the National Assembly from 2015 – 2018 Number of Motions tabled by SWAPO female Parliamen- Five (5) Motions Gender and Women politi- 0 (out of 12) 0 (out of 12) 0 (out of 12) 0 (out of 12) tarians from 2015 – 2018 cal participation Motions Number of Motions tabled by opposition female parliamen- Then (10) Motions tarians from 2015 – 2018 Statistics on motions tabled in the National Assembly in 2016 (Parliament of the Republic Number of motions on gender and women political partici- Zero (0) motion of Namibia, 2016). pation tabled by SWAPO female parliamentarians in the National Assembly from 2015 – 2018 SWAPO Opposition SWAPO Female Opposition Female Number of motions on gender and women political partici- Three (3) motions MPs MPs pation tabled by opposition female parliamentarians in the Total Number of Motions 5 (Out of 19) 14 (out of 19) 1 (out of 19) 2 (out of 19) National Assembly from 2015 – 2018 Gender and Women politi- 0 (out of 19) 2 (out of 19) 0 (out of 19) 1 (out of 19) Source: Parliament of the Republic of Namibia (2018)

cal participation Motions

Statistics on motions tabled in the National Assembly in 2017 (Parliament of the Republic of Namibia, 2017). What the table above indicates is that there is a serious contradiction between the much celebrated entrances of women in the National Assembly and the re SWAPO Opposition SWAPO Female Opposition Female presentation of the national women community. Over the past four years, female MPs MPs parliamentarians only tabled 25% of the motions in the National Assembly. Total Number of Motions 2 (out of 13) 11 (out of 13) 2 (out of 13) 2 (out of 13) Scandalously, of the motions tabled over the past four years, motions related to Gender and Women political 0 (out of 13) 3 (out of 13) 0 (out of 13) 2 (out of 13) gender equality and women political participation only accounted for 8%. More participation Motions scandalously, SWAPO, the party that is lauded, and by implication Namibia, for in Statistics on motions tabled in the National Assembly in 2018 (Parliament of the Republic creasing women political participation particularly in the National Assembly, did of Namibia, 2018). not see a need – neither did any of its female parliamentarians – of tabling any motion that relates to gender and women political participation. The opposition SWAPO Opposition SWAPO Female Opposition Female parties, despite accounting for less than 20% of the seats in the National Assembly, MPs MPs Total Number of Motions 2 (out of 16) 14 (out of 16) 1 (out of 16) 3 (out of 16) scandalously lead in the tabling of motions. The only instances where SWAPO Gender and Women political 0 (out of 16) 0 (out of 16) 0 (out of 16) 0 (out of 16) MPs have made a contribution to the subject matter is through the executive bra participation Motions nch via ministerial announcements, notifications, statements and submissions by the Minister of Gender Equality and Child Welfare. The nature of these announ There are several conclusions that one can draw from the tables above. One of the cements and submission are a mere description of bureaucratic and government obvious conclusions is that despite the inclusion of more women into the National activities and not necessarily in the purview of the legislative branch of the state. Assembly, as a result of the SWAPO 50/50 policy, there is little to show in terms Weylandt & Wolf (2018: 10) studied parliamentary questions in the National of the motions tabled in the National Assembly, outside ministerial submissions Assembly, albeit only for 2017, and arrived at similar conclusions: and announcements. The statistics paint a scandalous picture that is best explained by the table below amalgamating statistics on the motion tabled in the National After the 2014 election, the National Assembly saw an influx of women MPs, Assembly from 2015 to 2018: mostly due to Swapo‟s 50-50 gender policy, which meant that the party nominated equivalent numbers of men and women. In 2017, women held 47 of 104 seats of

73 74 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 J.S. Amupanda & E.H. Thomas Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 J.S. Amupanda & E.H. Thomas

the National Assembly, or 45 percent. Forty-nine percent of SWAPO MPs were demands by women within and outside SWAPO. It is clear that the SWAPO women, while the opposition percentage stood at 20 percent. In terms of political elites always used gender transformation for the purposes of tokenism and questions, 38 out of 159 (24%) were asked by women. Only 4 of the 17 questioners to appeal to an international audience. – or 23 percent – were women… It turns out that the underrepresentation of In summary, although SWAPO‟s 50/50 policy was met with loud cheering – women‟s voices is a result of SWAPO MPs‟ apparent reluctance to ask questions. both locally and internationally – and led to an increased number of women in the The women MPs of opposition parties are fully represented: each woman MP National Assembly, this did not lead to substantive issue-raising and agenda-setting from the opposition asked at least one question in 2017 (for a total of 38, as noted for the national women community. Female parliamentarians, particularly of above). As SWAPO MPs do not really engage in the process of asking questions, SWAPO, have performed dismally in raising gender and women political the low percentage of women questioners mirrors the percentage of women MPs among the opposition. None of SWAPO‟s 21 women backbenchers asked a participation issues. It is for this reason that 4 years since its implementation, the question in 2017… Women‟s issues were underrepresented in the questions asked. same policy directives had not been adopted by the Namibian state which is under Only 3 out of the 159 questions in 2017 focused on women‟s issues. It is worth the control and stewardship of SWAPO. Therefore, the SWAPO 50/50 policy, noting that written questions are not the only way Parliament debates issues – oral although important in the fight against patriarchy and for women political questions and motions, which are not studied here, may have seen a more participation, has become vulnerable, at the substance level, to a tale full of sound prominent focus on gender issues. In terms of formal questions, however, gender and fury signifying nothing. A new, renewed activism – similar to the pre-50/50 era was a marginal issue. – is required to activate those who were demobilised on account of 50/50 given the new evidence and understanding that this policy is a mere means, and not an These findings are disturbing in a country that constantly receives international end in itself. This renewed activism for gender and women political participation accolades in gender equality. The findings bring into question the extent to which must seek to transcend gender entryism (and developmental feminism) to move Namibia is making inroads in containing patriarchy and bringing about a demo away from statistical agenda to qualitative agenda setting. Said differently, a new cratic society wherein men and women are provided an equal opportunity both in brand of activism is required that will marry quantity with quality. Without this, form and substance. What emerges clearly – also the thesis of this article – is that SWAPO‟s 50/50 policy will remain a tale full of sound and fury but signifying Indeed, it would seem that women political participation is a mere „body-count‟ of nothing. female politicians in the ruling party circles who have now secured their salaries, and are not interested in bringing about policy and legislative framework for Bibliography widespread women political participation. If patriarchy was to be a crime, these female parliamentarians, particularly SWAPO female parliamentarians, are Akawa, M (2014), The Gender Politics of the Namibian Liberation Struggle. Basel: Basler africa candidates for characterisation for the „crime‟ of commission – participating in Bibliographien. patriarchal spaces without lifting a finger to fight patriarchy. They are, therefore, as Bachelet, M (2011), “Women‟s Political Participation”. 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Parliament of the Republic of Namibia (2018b), December 27). “National Assembly of the Likuwa, K M (2012), Voices from the Kavango: A study of the Contract Labour System in Namibia, 1925- Republic of Namibia: All Members”.Available at: http://www.parliament.na/index.php? 1972. Bellvile: University of the Western Cape. option=com_contact&view=category&id=104&Itemid=1479&limitstart=20. Links, F (2013), “Gender Revolution”. Available at: http://www.insight.com.na/gender- Pohamba, H (2010), Foreword: National Gender Policy 2010-2020. In Ministry of Welfare, revolution/. National Gender Policy (p. 3). Windhoek: Ministry of Gender Equality and Child Welfare. Mama, A (2004), “Demythologising Gender in Development: Feminist Studies in African Pringle, M, Roller, J & Smith, J (1986), “Demysifying Feminist Criticism: A Response”, The Antioch Contexts”, IDS Bulletin, Vol 35 No 4, pp 121-124. Review, 44 (2), pp 231-241. Martin, O (2013), The African Union’s Mechanisms to Foster Gender Mainstreaming and Ensure Women’s Rawat, PS (2014), “Patriarchal Beliefs, Women‟s Empowerment, and General Well-being”, Political Participation and Representation. Stockholm : International IDEA. Vikalpa, 39 (2), pp 43-56. Melber, H (2010), “Economic and Social Transformation in the Process of Colonisation: Society SADC (2008), Protocol on Gender and Development. Gaborone: SADC. and State Before and During German Rule”. In C. Keulder, State, Society and Democracy: A Reader Shakespeare, W (1868). Macbeth. Leipzig: Bernhard Touchnite. in Namibian Politics (pp. 16-48). Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia. Shejavali, N (2013), Gender Politics in Namibia Beyond the numbers. Windhoek : IPPR. MGECW (2017), Strategic Plan 2017-2022. Windhoek: MGECW. Shejavali, N (2015), A Thorn in The Flesh For Gender Equality: How the gender gap in Namibia’s regional Ministry of Gender Equality and Child Welfare (2010), National Gender Policy (2010-2020). council elections undermines the country’s otherwise impressive gender equity gains at other levels of governance. Windhoek: MGECW. Windhoek: IPPR. Mlambo-Ngcuka, P (2013), “UN Women Executive Director stresses importance of women in Shejavali, N (2018), Though a leader in gender representation, Namibia still has work to ensure full equality. leadership positions”. Available at: http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2013/10/ed- Windhoek: Afrobarometer. speech-at-women-leading-africa-programme. Shvedova, N (2005). “Obstacles to Women's Participation in Parliament”, In Ballington, J & A. Mlambo-Ngcuka, P (2018), “The Time is Now. In UN Women”, UN Women Annual Report 2017- Karam, Women in Pariament: Beyond Numbers (pp. 33-50). Stockholm: International IDEA. 2018 (pp. 2-3). New York: UN Women. Soiri, I (1996), Radical Motherhood: Namibian Women's Indepedence Struggle. Uppsala: Nordiska Mongudhi, T (2013), “Iivula-Ithana says 50/50 is her highlight”. Available at: https:// Afrikainstitutet. www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=111201&page=archive-read. SWAPO Women Council (1983), Namibian Women in the Struggle for National Liberation, Indepedence Namiseb, T (2008), “Women and law reform in Namibia – Recent developments”, In Ruppel, O and Reconstruction. Lubango: SWAPO.

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SWAPO (1981), To be Born A Nation: The Liberation Struggle for Namibia. London: Zed Press. SWAPO (2013), “SWAPO Constitution comes into force on Monday”. Available at: http:// www.swapoparty.org/swapo_constitution_comes_into_force_on_monday.html. Financial Oversight of the Civilian Intelligence Thomas, E K (2005). Political empowerment of women in Namibia since Independence. Windhoek: University of Namibia. Services in South Africa UN Women (2017), “Facts and figures: Leadership and political participation”. Available at: http:// www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/leadership-and-political-participation/facts-and-figures. Sandy Africa UN Women (2018), “About UN Women”. Available at: http://www.unwomen.org/en/about-us/ about-un-women. Department of Political Sciences University of Pretoria, South Africa Walby, S (1990). Theorizing Patriarchy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Walenga, J (2013), “Swapo's 50/50: A populace decision against competitiveness”. Available at: https://www.thevillager.com.na/articles/5040/Swapo-s-50-50--A-populace-decision-against- competitiveness/. Wallace, M, & J Kinahan, (2011). A . From the beginning to 1990. London: Hurst & Abstract Company. Wamsley, L (2018), “Ethiopia Gets Its 1st Female President”. (Available at: https:// The article assesses the state of oversight of the budget and expenditure of the www.npr.org/2018/10/25/660618139/ethiopia-gets-its-first-female-president, accessed: 12 South African civilian intelligence services (now called the State Security Agency). February 2019). The roles of various structures, including the National Treasury, the Executive, the Weylandt, M, & Wolf, N (2018). Parliamentary Questions in Namibia: Asking, Answering and Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) and the Auditor-General, during Accountability. Windhoek: IPPR. the period 1995 to 2014, are examined. The article argues that whilst the system of financial oversight has strengths, there are systemic weaknesses which have resulted in uneven levels of financial accountability over the years. The article therefore

proposes that measures to strengthen the system of oversight are needed to improve financial accountability. These include reforming the relevant legislation and providing more robust powers to the oversight actors.

1. Introduction

In a world of increasingly complex and contested understandings of national security, the ability of states to anticipate security challenges with the necessary discretion and caution required in a democracy, is important. Intelligence services play a central role in such efforts, but do not enjoy carte blanche. To ensure that they are effective, they are usually accorded extensive and often intrusive powers of inves tigation. In a constitutional democracy, this may result in trade-offs being made between individual liberties and national security imperatives. Like other state institutions, intelligence services cannot function without public funds. Assessing whether they utilise these funds in a responsible and accountable manner is usually difficult, because access to the relevant information is often limited on the grounds of national security (Africa 2006). In most countries, classified budget details are withheld not only from members of the public but also from members of Par liament, thereby limiting the role of legislatures to play an effective oversight role. 79 80 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 S Africa Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 S Africa

However, with the heightened potential for abuse of funds allocated, oversight of National Academy of Intelligence (SANAI) and the Electronic Communications intelligence budgets has proved in some countries to be an important safeguard of Security (Pty) Ltd (now known simply as COMSEC), which were established by these resources, which ultimately come from the public purse (Wills 2012). law in 2002. These components were all subsumed under the banner of a single The 2019 release of a Review Panel Report on the State Security Agency (SSA) agency, the SSA, in 2009, shortly after Jacob Zuma became President of South underlined the need for an overhaul of the intelligence services (RSA, The Pre Africa (RSA 2009a). sidency 2019). The nine-member panel made up of civilian experts in law, politics, security, human rights and the media, found that that the SSA had deviated from 2. The legal framework for financial oversight of the the original mandate of the post-apartheid intelligence services. A statement intelligence services released by the Presidency noted that a “key finding of the panel is that there has been political malpurposing and factionalisation of the intelligence community During the political transition of the 1990s, a major public policy challenge was over the past decade or more that has resulted in an almost complete disregard for how to make the „security services‟ of the South African state as a whole (the Cons the Constitution, policy, legislation and other prescripts” (RSA, The Presidency titution defines these as the defence force, police services and intelligence services) 2019). more transparent and accountable to legitimate civilian authorities, and how to The aim of this qualitative study is to assess a single dimension of the oversight prevent them from abusing their powers, as had happened during the apartheid architecture of the civilian intelligence services, namely the financial oversight period (Africa 1992; Breytenbach 1992; Hough 1992; Nhlanhla 1992; Southall system. The article discusses the roles of the National Treasury, the Ministry for 1992). Several studies have documented the processes and analysed the challenges State Security (or Ministry for Intelligence Services as it was previously called), the of building the intelligence ethos and professionalism envisaged by the Cons Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) of parliament and the cons titution and described in the White Paper on Intelligence (Shaw 1995; McCarthy titutionally independent Office of the Auditor-General. It is argued that the 1996; Khanyile 1997; Netshitenzhe 2005; Dlomo 2006; Jansen van Rensburg 2006; intelligence services were meant to be subject to the constitutional and legislative Hutton 2009; Faizel 2009; Nathan 2010). Much of the literature has had a framework of the state‟s overall public finance management and oversight normative orientation, focusing on „what ought to be‟, as an alternative to the status framework. At the same time there were provisions in the legislation governing the quo. Some commonly shared values in these analyses have been the need to subject intelligence services that qualified this control framework. The article focuses on intelligence services to the rule of law, to inculcate in them a respect for human the period 1995 to 2014, a period coinciding with the first four administrations of a rights, to hold them accountable through appropriate instruments, lawmakers, and democratic South Africa. The article highlights some of the challenges and the executive, and to strike an appropriate balance between secrecy and trans contestations around financial accountability that have arisen in the efforts to parency. balance the countervailing imperatives of secrecy and accountability in South A framework for the oversight of budget of the civilian intelligence services in Africa‟s young democracy. It is hoped that the paper will contribute to a further South Africa has been in place since 1995; however, its implementation has been discussion on how to strengthen the financial accountability mechanisms of the uneven; in addition, there are systemic weaknesses that hinder detection and security sector, particular those of the secret intelligence agencies. correction of the maladministration. On a positive note, the oversight framework includes provisions in the South African Constitution for the following: In discussing the South African „intelligence services‟, this article limits itself to the civilian intelligence services of the state, thereby excluding discussion on the  The right of access to information, contained in Chapter 2 (Bill of Rights); intelligence budgets and expenditure of the South African Police (SAP) and the  The provision for multiparty oversight of the security services stipulated in South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Where the article makes Chapter 11 (Security Services); reference to civilian intelligence services in the plural, this is only a reflection of the  The establishment of a robust financial management framework as outlined fact that the long-standing predecessors to the State Security Agency (SSA), which in Chapter 13 (Finance); and came into existence by way of a Presidential Proclamation in 2009, were several  The creation of an independent audit authority to report on the accounts, institutions: the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the South African Secret financial statements and financial management of state institutions as set out Service (SASS), which were established by law in 1994, and the South African in Chapter 9 (State Institutions supporting Constitutional democracy) (RSA 1996).

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The roles, responsibilities and powers of the major actors involved in the post- Negligent head officials can face strict disciplinary sanctions, including dismissal. apartheid intelligence dispensation were spelt out in three principal acts passed by Public Service regulations, which include performance-based evaluation of head Parliament in 1994. These were the Intelligence Services Act (Act 38 of 1994), the officials, reinforce the approach taken in the PFMA. The intelligence services of National Strategic Intelligence Act (Act 39 of 1994) and the Intelligence Services South Africa are exempt from none of the requirements of the PFMA, which Oversight Act (Act 40 of 1994). With a battery of constitutional and legislative require their accounting officers, who are appointed in terms of the Public Service provisions in place, a substantial degree of transparency around the intelligence Act (Proclamation 103 of 1994), to account fully for the funds allocated to them, services‟ budget could rightfully have been expected. However, reports emanating according to the policy directions and plans for expenditure set out by the Minister. both from structures such as the Auditor-General and the JSCI, and from media In addition, financial statements of the intelligence services are audited annually reports, suggest that there were inadequate controls over the budget. by the office of the Auditor-General, an independent (Chapter 9) constitutional In a robust system of public financial management, the budget process entails body that reports to Parliament. Regarding the auditing of the intelligence services, four stages: drafting of the budget by the executive; approval by the legislature; the Auditor-General Act (Act 12 of 1995) states that: execution or implementation by the bureaucracy or state agencies; and audit and “The Auditor-General shall report on accounts established by: evaluation ideally by authorities who act independently and objectively (CABRI and AfDB 2008). Using this comprehensive definition, the system of intelligence a) The Security Services Special Account Act, 1969 (Act 81 of 1969); oversight in South Africa has not yielded proper accountability for financial b) The Defence Special Account Act, 1974 (Act 6 of 1974); c) The Secret Services Act, 1978 (Act 56 of 1978), resources allocated to the civilian intelligence services. The next sections of the article discuss this claim and the implications thereof. with due regard to the special nature of the accounts and shall limit such reports to Financial oversight of the intelligence services is framed, in the first instance, by the extent which he or she, after consultation with the President, the Minister of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) and a strong Finance and the responsible Minister, may determine: Provided that the reporting on any unauthorised expenditure or irregularity shall not be so limited except in the public financial management framework. Among other requirements, Chapter 13 disclosure of facts which will be to the detriment of the national interest” (RSA (which deals with Finance) states that “national, provincial and municipal budgets 1995, s6). and budgetary processes must promote transparency, accountability and the effective financial management of the economy, debt and the public sector” (RSA In brief, the above-mentioned are the accounts through which funds are allocated 1996, s215(1)). The legislative mechanism through which this goal is achieved is the by the National Treasury in the cases of (a) the civilian intelligence services, (b) the Public Finance Management Act, or PFMA (Act 1 of 1999). Defence Intelligence structures and (c) the SAPS Crime Intelligence and other state The PFMA stipulates that the political head of a department (Cabinet Minister departments which are involved in similarly „confidential‟ work. What is particularly or a provincial MEC) is responsible for political matters and outcomes of that striking about these acts is that they date back to the height of the apartheid era. department, whilst the head official (Director-General of a national department or Unlike the PFMA of 1999, which sought to introduce greater transparency in provincial head of a department) is responsible for outputs and implementation, public service accounting, these three pieces of legislation effectively retained the and is accountable to Parliament or the provincial legislature for the management cloak of financial secrecy under which the work of the apartheid intelligence of that budget‟s implementation. As stated in section 4.6 of the explanatory services had been carried out. memorandum on the PFMA, four key responsibilities are vested in head officials: However, there has been an amelioration of the secretive conditions. Section 77 a) the operation of basic financial management systems, including internal of the PFMA stipulates that an audit committee consisting of at least three controls in departments and any entities they control; (external) persons must also be established and meet at least twice a year (RSA b) to ensure that departments do not overspend their budgets; 1999). In the case of the intelligence services, the Minister for Intelligence Services c) to report on a monthly and annual basis, including the submission of annual opted to establish a single committee, in line with the provision in the PFMA that a financial statements two months after the end of a financial year; and single committee be established for two or more departments or institutions d) to publish annual reports in a prescribed format which will introduce (Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence 2008). performance reporting” (RSA 1999).

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Moreover, the Intelligence Services Oversight Act (Act 40 of 1994) empowers the “I did not obtain all the information and explanations considered necessary to Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) to obtain and consider audit satisfy myself as to the completeness and accuracy of the balances disclosed for reports on the civilian intelligence services, and to consider the financial statements accounts receivable, accounts payable, irregular and fruitless expenditure and of the services (s3, Act 40 of 1994). The practice that has developed is that contingent liabilities. There were no satisfactory alternative procedures that I could Auditor-General reports on the financial statements of the intelligence services are perform to obtain reasonable assurance that accounts receivable, accounts payable, submitted to Parliament via the JSCI. However, the financial statements themselves irregular and fruitless expenditure, contingent liabilities, operating expenditure and are not submitted, nor are they published for the benefit of the public, in sharp payables were recorded. Consequently, I was unable to determine whether any adjustments to these accounts were necessary” (Auditor-General 2012). contrast to the practices of other government departments whose full financial statements are attached to the Auditor-General reports issued annually. This is for This suggests that financial controls had nosedived by then. A more recent area of “strategic and security reasons” as stated in the 1997 report of the Auditor-General reporting for the Auditor-General has been performance reporting. In a nutshell, (Auditor-General 1997). In early debates with the Auditor-General, the intelligence this means that the Auditor-General reviews not only the financial statements, but services had in fact argued that the JSCI should not publish the Auditor-General‟s also whether the goals set out in the strategic plans have been achieved by depart report at all, but this was dismissed by the Auditor-General as a violation of its ments and entities subject to such audits. In its 2011/2012 report, the Auditor- constitutional and legislative obligations. The compromise position agreed on was General found that 51% of the targets set down by the SSA could not be mea that the Auditor-General reports would not be published independently, but as an sured. The three programmes where this trend was prevalent were Collection addendum to the annual public reports of the JSCI. (Programme 1), Analysis (Programme 2) and Counterintelligence (Programme 3), Since the start of the post-1994 intelligence dispensation, the Auditor-General areas which constitute the core business of the SSA. has raised concerns about financial oversight. In their 1996/1997 report on the The reports of the Auditor-General over the years have also pointed out financial statements of the civilian intelligence services, the Auditor-General ob deviations from Treasury procurement requirements, failure by SSA members to served that many of the problems of financial management within the intelligence perform remunerative work outside the agency with the necessary authority, and services were legacy issues from the apartheid period. These included poor control failure of members to disclose private or business interests in contracts awarded to measures over the payment of human sources or agents; the civilian intelligence government institutions. The Auditor-General also reported on the status of services‟ failure to compile an assets register; a lack of financial controls in the several investigations which have resulted in criminal charges being laid or con amalgamation of the TBVC states‟ security machinery into the national police sidered against offending members of the services. This includes an investigation service and the intelligence agencies; the lack of an appointment of an Inspector- into a Covert Support Unit of the NIA as a result of which senior members, General; and fruitless expenditure (Auditor-General 1997). including a Deputy Director-General for Operations, were suspended (Auditor- The same concerns were repeated in the 1997/1998 report of the Auditor- General 2012). General. Although the report indicated slow progress in attending to some of the To make matters worse, the reports of the Auditor-General have been delayed concerns raised, it acknowledged that the relationship between the Auditor- in recent years as a result of the JSCI‟s failure to publish its own reports. In March General and the intelligence services was “dynamic” and that there was an 2014, only a month before the national general elections, two annual JSCI reports emerging sense of accountability on the part of the services (Auditor-General were released and with them the Auditor-General reports for the years ending 31 1998). The concerns about financial management were not confined to the intel March 2012 and 31 March 2011, as the JSCI had finally been informed ligence services. Many departments attracted negative audit reports in the early (presumably by the SSA) that the reports did not contain information that could post-apartheid years, at once an indication of the legacy that they were adopting compromise national security (Burgess 2014). The fact that the release of the and of the lack of managerial experience on the part of many of those newly Auditor-General‟s report, a constitutional requirement, was delayed for over two elected into office. By the time of the report on the SSA‟s annual financial state years was a systemic weakness resulting from the agreement between the JSCI and ments for the year ended 31 March 2012, the Auditor-General was scathing in its the Auditor-General to publish the latter‟s reports under the auspices of the JSCI. criticism of the SSA‟s financial management. Not only was the documentation The JSCI‟s flaws thereby rub off on the Auditor-General, a situation which un provided inadequate, but the report raised the following litany of problems: dermines the independence and the reputation of this institution, and

85 86 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 S Africa Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 S Africa compromises its levels of public accountability. service under an express or implied assurance of confidentiality; (iii) any intelligence or counter-intelligence method employed by a service if such disclosure could 3. An uneven record of parliamentary oversight reveal or lead to the revelation of the name or identity of any person or body engaged in intelligence or counter-intelligence activities or the identity of the source Unlike other departments whose work and budgets are monitored by of any intelligence, information or document” (RSA,1995 s5). parliamentary committees, the proceedings of which are generally open to the public and the media, the filter through which the South African public receives the Moreover, information has to be handled in accordance with the written security Auditor-General reports on the intelligence services is the Joint Standing Com guidelines of the services themselves, or any other agreed conditions determined mittee on Intelligence (JSCI). Members of this committee are drawn from between the intelligence services and the chairperson of the Committee. As a result Parliament‟s National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. In order to of all these restrictions, the public generally only receives feedback from the JSCI serve on the Committee, members, who are nominated by their political parties, during the Minister‟s budget vote, or when a crisis or scandal involving intelligence must meet the criteria to receive a Top-Secret security clearance from the intel has developed and it has been exposed through the media. ligence services. Meetings of the committee are never open to the public or the Developing the budget is largely an executive prerogative, and the JSCI media. The Intelligence Services Oversight Act (Act 40 of 1994, as amended in ordinarily enters the picture, engaging with the intelligence budget, at the point 2002) sets out the functions of the JSCI, which are extensive. Firstly, it must initiate when the process has been all but finalised. The JSCI duly receives briefings on the or consider and make recommendations on all proposed legislation relating to the budget allocated to the intelligence services. Typically, this happens as the budget intelligence services, as well as any other intelligence and intelligence-related vote of the Minister is approaching; and enables them to debate aspects to raise activities. It must review and make recommendations on regulations pertaining to during the Minister‟s budget vote. There has not been an occasion when the JSCI the intelligence services and structures (the latter referring to Defence Intelligence has rejected the budget of the intelligence services, though disquiet has been and Crime Intelligence). growing among opposition party members in recent years about the lack of Specifically, in relation to the intelligence budget, the JSCI must consider and budget transparency. A former member of the JSCI, Dirk Stubbe remarked in his report on the appropriation of revenue or moneys for the functions of the intel response to the Minister‟s budget vote that it was unacceptable that the budget of ligence services, and receive a report on the budget from each relevant minister on the intelligence services should be subject to almost no meaningful parliamentary his or her intelligence budget (this covers Defence and Police). Following each scrutiny (Stubbe 2014). The source of the problem may well lie in a relatively financial year, it must obtain from the Auditor-General an audit report on the innocent clause in the Intelligence Services Act, or ISA (Act 38 of 1994) and the intelligence services compiled in terms of the Auditor-General Act (Act 12 of General Intelligence Laws Amendment Act (Act 11 of 2013) that has subsequently replaced it. Section 3(a) of the ISA states that: 1995) (now the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004), and after considering the report and relevant financial statements, report to Parliament on these. The JSCI can in fact “The Director-General shall, as far as is reasonably practicable, take steps to ensure deliberate upon, hold hearings, subpoena witnesses and make recommendations that on any aspect relating to intelligence and national security, including administration a) national security intelligence, intelligence collection methods, sources of and financial expenditure. information and the identity of members of the Agency or the Service, as the The Act provides that the JSCI should have access to intelligence, information case may be, are protected from unauthorised disclosure” (RSA 1994b). and documents in the possession or under the control of the services if such This clause provides grounds for the classifying of much information held by the access is necessary for the performance of its functions. However, the restrictions services, and their withholding from public scrutiny. In addition to the existence of on access to information are onerous: the intelligence services are not obliged to a Secret Services Account and a parliamentary process that does not allow for disclose to the JSCI: public interaction with the debate on what the requested or allocated funds are “ (i) the name or identity of any person or body engaged in intelligence or counter- meant for, a circle of secrecy is drawn around the budget. Yet, as Steytler (2004) intelligence activities; (ii) any intelligence, information or document in a form which reminds us, could reveal the identity of any source of such intelligence, information or document if that intelligence, information or document was provided to such 87 88 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 S Africa Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 S Africa

“Secrecy – the limitation on the right of access to information should be justified in captured as a sub-item of the budget allocation to the National Treasury, even terms of the limitation clause of the Bill of Rights. The point of departure is that though the Minister of Finance is not the minister responsible for the intelligence the state bears the burden of persuasion regarding the justifiability of secrecy. It services. In the 2014/15 Appropriation Bill, R4 366 250 000 is allocated to the must advance reasons and evidence why non-disclosure of information is Treasury for its 10th Programme, Financial Intelligence and State Security. This justifiable. The test to be applied is that secrecy must be „reasonable and justifiable in programme has two aims: an open and democratic country based on human dignity, equality and freedom”. “To combat financial crime, including money laundering and terror financing These provisions are upheld in the Promotion of Access to Information Act (Act activities (and) Gather intelligence for the purpose of national security, defence and 2 of 2000), with which all public and private bodies are expected to comply. The combatting crime”. Of the allocation to this programme, the State Security frustrations expressed by the Auditor-General in the 2012 report, along with the proportion is reflected under the heading Secret Services Account, and is broken up litany of problems identified in the audit report, suggest that the system of into two cryptic lines: R3 902 000 000 for operations and R265 544 000 for capital oversight has broken down. Given the problems that seem to be continuously expenditure (RSA 2014). repeating themselves, it may well be time to consider more robust powers for the The submersion of the intelligence services‟ budget in the budget of the Treasury JSCI and other oversight bodies, and to provide for greater transparency and results in only broad details being made public. Presumably, this is on the grounds accountability over what the intelligence services are engaged in. that to disclose more information could compromise national security. It also has 4. Executive oversight: addressing the right issues? to do with the fact that unlike the funds disbursed to other government depart ments, money is channelled from the National Revenue Fund to the Secret In assessing whether the Executive exercises appropriate levels of oversight of the Services Account. This was established through the Secret Services Account Act intelligence budget, we must look ultimately at whether their actions result in (Act 56 of 1978), which makes money available for secret services considered to be greater accountability and financial prudence on the part of the intelligence in the national interest. This is a practice that has been carried over from the services. In South Africa, the annual budget presented by the Minister of Finance apartheid period, when the intelligence budget was hidden in the budget of the is the culmination of a policy planning process led by the Cabinet and informed by Department of State Expenditure (now the National Treasury). In the 2007 an overall macroeconomic framework. Each year, the Medium-Term Guidelines Report of the Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence, the observation was set out the critical dates for the budget process, and the intelligence services are made that this was an obsolete practice from the apartheid era, which should be required to align their planning with these dates. Departments usually receive scrapped (Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence 2008). Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) guidelines and MTEF database Since 1995, intelligence ministers have been at pains to show their identification templates in mid-July, and over the following months make several submissions to with broader national fiscal concerns. In his address to the Senate on the reading the Treasury on their reprioritised expenditure estimates (National Treasury 2011). of the State Expenditure Budget on 12 May 1996, Deputy Minister for Intel Through the Medium-Term Expenditure Committee (MTEC), the National ligence, Joe Nhlanhla prefaced his budget request with support for the Treasury coordinates this process for the whole of government, and by the end of government‟s financial planning approach that included an overall reduction of the September this process ends, to be followed by the Treasury Committee. At some budget deficit; reprioritising government expenditure to meet the needs of the new stage in the process, there is both an Appropriation Adjustment process, and a final South Africa; providing a stable and competitive environment for growth and adjustment of estimates. Allocation letters are sent to departments by November, development; avoiding permanent increases in the overall tax burden; managing and on the basis of this they must make their inputs into the Estimates of National state department budgets downward; improving financial accountability; and right- Expenditure (ENE) chapters, which serve as the rationale for the Appropriation sizing the public sector through measures such as rationalisation (Nhlanhla 1996). Bill that Parliament is expected to pass each year. Like all other national depart Under-spending in the first year of the new intelligence services, however, did ments, the intelligence services have had to argue the case for their budget not make it easy to justify the resources being requested. Nhlanhla attempted to allocations. explain this state of affairs as being the result of the political transition, when much Every year, the Minister of Finance tables a single Appropriation Bill for of what had entered into the budget was based on assumption. The fact that little Parliament to approve. Funds earmarked for the civilian intelligence services are was known about what the intelligence services actually did made any efforts to 89 90 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 S Africa Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 S Africa secure support for a greater budget allocation quite difficult. Even the report of a work had been seriously compromised. Kasrils pledged to achieve a healthier commission established in 1996 aimed at reviewing the „transformation‟ of the balance between personnel, capital, and operational expenditure, and introduced civilian intelligence services, the so-called Pikoli Commission, was not released to several cost-cutting measures. In spite of his efforts to take charge of the budget, the public. The findings were briefly mentioned in the JSCI Report for 1997–1998 Kasrils was taken by surprise by claims that the NIA was engaged in illegal and served as the basis for Ministerial Directives that were subsequently issued by domestic surveillance in 2005, as he was by the embarrassing capture and detention the Minister of Justice and Intelligence Services (JSCI 1998). But they made very of a senior intelligence officer of the South African Secret Service (SASS) by the little difference to the funding that the intelligence services attracted. The allocation Zimbabwean authorities, following espionage allegations (Africa 2009). Following for 1995 was R818 million and by 2000 had only grown to R840 million – a mere the 2005 NIA debacle, the Director-General and several top management figures R22 million increase (Kasrils 2004). Taking the rate of inflation into account, the were fired. The systems in place did not give the Minister a high enough level of intelligence budget was practically static for the first five years of the existence of control over the intelligence services to detect such incidents. The incidents did the civilian intelligence services. lead to the Minister tightening control over covert operations, both domestically Nhlanhla‟s successor complained that a function as important as intelligence was and abroad, but this in turn raised questions about how the Minister should engage so poorly funded. Upon her appointment as Minister for Intelligence Services in with the operational work of the intelligence services, including control over 2000, Lindiwe Sisulu embarked on an extensive review of the services‟ capabilities. expenditure. To secure the necessary resources to finance her reforms, she argued for a special Kasrils was succeeded by Minister Siyabonga Cwele, who, together with the dispensation to process the intelligence budget. The Presidential Intelligence Ministers of State Security, Police, Defence, Home Affairs and Justice and Budget Advisory Committee (PIBAC), a sub-committee of Cabinet led by the Correctional Services, was tasked by President Zuma to review the structures of then Deputy President Jacob Zuma, was consequently established to give con the civilian intelligence community. In a 2009 statement, the Government Com sideration to the budgetary needs of the civilian intelligence services (Africa 2012). munication and Information System (GCIS) explained the decision to restructure As a result of this intervention, the intelligence budget grew dramatically under the intelligence services as arising from the need to better coordinate the structures Sisulu. Minister Kasrils (who succeeded her in the Intelligence Services portfolio) that had developed over the years. It pointed out: acknowledged that this was due to an ambitious expansion plan under Sisulu: “We are concerned that a large share of the budget allocated to the intelligence “The dramatic increase from 2001 onwards was necessitated by our growing services was being spent on corporate affairs rather than on operations which is the presence abroad; new construction projects; capital equipment for our National core business of any intelligence service…We are restructuring the intelligence Communications Centre‟s expanding role; the transfer of the Academy to services so as to refocus on intelligence priorities, improve controls over intelligence Mafeking; establishment of the ISC and Office of the Inspector General; growth priorities and the budget, eliminate duplication and mobilize all of our resources of the Ministry and increases in the overall staff compliment of all the Services”. (funds and personnel) to core business” (GCIS 2009). (Kasrils 2004). To what extent the President‟s tasking was based on a strongly felt collective view But the PIBAC process was terminated by Kasrils, who seemed to accept the within the executive was not clear. The creation of a State Security Agency was MTEC process led by the Treasury as adequate to determine the intelligence certainly not preceded by public debate, and the decision was operationalised by a services‟ budget and agreed with the allocation earmarked by the Treasury for the presidential proclamation, drawing sharp criticism for the haste and lack of services. The figure allocated in the 2004 budget year was R1 978 647 000. This, he consultation that it entailed. The JSCI and the Auditor-General were taken by said during his Budget Vote that year, was 0,53% of the total government budget, surprise by this development, as were members of the top management of the or 0,14% of GDP. It also represented a R316 million increase over the previous intelligence services, most of whom were replaced in the restructuring process that year‟s allocation (Kasrils 2004). followed. Kasrils pointed out that the budget for the intelligence services had more than It is worth noting that the restructuring of the civilian intelligence services was doubled over the previous four years, growing by 115%. However, the spending not accompanied by an overall review of the intelligence dispensation. The pro patterns of the services had become distorted over the years in favour of posed strengthening of the intelligence agencies was not accompanied by a parallel personnel and capital expenditure, and their capacity to conduct their operational strengthening of the oversight architecture. The perception has in fact developed 91 92 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 S Africa Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 S Africa that the JSCI has been ineffectual in recent years, at a time when accusations of executive supervision and control over covert units, attending to this weak spot poor governance of the SSA needs to be independently addressed. The fact that should be prioritised. There is a groundswell of public opinion that government the JSCI has been so tardy about producing the statutorily required annual reports must take responsibility for the failures of the intelligence services. The responsible only fuels this perception (Merten 2015). Minister has the duty to institute urgent measures to address the management failures. 5. Building (or rebuilding) oversight of the intelligence A serious discussion is also needed on whether the JSCI is playing an effective budget role in oversight of the budget. Members of the committee should display interest in and insight into intelligence work in order to ask the right questions. With the Wills (2012) has argued for “disclosing as much budgetary information as possible” issue of the adequacy of funding for the intelligence services having been over on the grounds that it respects the public‟s right to know how its money is being taken by scandals that point to shortcomings in oversight of the budget‟s spent. In its final report, the Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence in a utilisation, there is no reason why the Executive and Parliament should not be Constitutional Democracy remarked that “the overall legislative framework looking at a more stringent and transparent legislative and regulatory regime for the governing the funds, financial controls and financial oversight of the intelligence approval, funding, conducting and oversight of covert operations. services is comprehensive and sound” (Ministerial Review Commission on Intel There was also room for improved coordination. At a Strategic Planning ligence 2008). However, it stated that whilst the PFMA and the Public Audit Act meeting of the JSCI in July 2011, to which the Auditor-General and the Office of were modern state-of-the art pieces of legislation, the Security Services Special the Inspector-General were invited, the Auditor-General‟s office raised concerns Account Act of 1969 and the Secret Services Act of 1978 were „anachronistic about a possible overlap between their mandate and that of the Inspector-General relics of the murky business of covert security funding in the apartheid (JSCI 2012). It is not difficult to see why this claim would have arisen. The Intel era‟ (Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence 2008). ligence Services Oversight Act (Act 40 of 1994 makes provision for the appoint Having to report to the JSCI and the Auditor-General meant that there was at ment of an Inspector-General or Inspectors-General with the responsibilities to least some oversight taking place. Under these conditions the JSCI had received handle complaints, monitor compliance by the services with their own policies, and reports of investigations into theft, fraud and misconduct, and over the years these review the activities of the services. The Inspector-General is also required to have seen the light of day through the Annual Reports of the JSCI. It is all very annually submit a certificate to the JSCI for each of the intelligence structures on well that oversight mechanisms result in financial mismanagement being revealed, their state of organisation. In the 2011 meeting it was agreed that the matter of the but the point of oversight is also to exact higher standards of governance. overlaps would be the subject of a separate meeting of the structures concerned In spite of restrictions placed on it, the Auditor-General to an extent was (JSCI 2012). effective in exposing financial mismanagement. However, the first line of defence The actual intelligence products – the reports and assessments of various threats against maladministration should be preventive and for that, internal controls that are produced by the services – are not seen by some critical role-players who should be strengthened. In their 2008 report, the Ministerial Review Commission nevertheless influence the intelligence budget. These include the Minister of established by Kasrils had observed the inadequacy of internal controls over Finance, the National Treasury, the National Assembly, and in particular the JSCI. operations, and had suggested that agency directives were required: Secrecy in this context seems to work against the intelligence services‟ cause. “The directives should specify the process for targeting in light of Cabinet‟s Therefore, resolving the problem of how to make intelligence services‟ budgetary intelligence priorities; the criteria and procedures for authorising intrusive requests more credible and compelling cannot avoid a strategy of promoting operations; the level of authority required to approve these operations; the level and greater transparency (at least in respect of these parties) about the work of the system of supervision of operations; the procedures for dealing with incidental services and their benefits to the country, as well as a more effective methodology information; the details required for record-keeping; and the mechanisms for in the costing of the estimates of intelligence expenditure. monitoring compliance and dealing with non-compliance” (Ministerial Review A lower tolerance for abuses of power has had a ripple effect across the globe, Commission on Intelligence 2008). and political and public commentary in South Africa shows that the country‟s

Given that reports of the Auditor-General point consistently to the lack of citizens are concerned about these universal issues. It is for this reason that a critical

93 94 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 S Africa Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 S Africa review of whether there are adequate controls and a system of sound oversight is the police and the intelligence services is another area of engagement, and it is in advanced. this framework that this article, which really only scratches the surface of this issue, In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA, there was renewed focus has been written. on the budget process. The 9/11 Commission proposed that the Intelligence Community declassify their budget. It also proposed giving the full appropriation Bibliography function to the intelligence oversight committees, arguing that this would improve Congress‟s oversight of the intelligence community (Rosinback and Peritz 2009). Africa, S (1992), “The SABTBVC intelligence services during an interim government period, The implication of this is that Congress would need to be briefed on secret intel Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol XIV, No 2, pp. 78-94. ligence programmes by the intelligence community, something strongly opposed Africa, S (2006), “Policy for managing access to intelligence information in Post-Apartheid South by those who argue that such transparency would weaken intelligence capabilities. Africa”, Unpublished PhD thesis, submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of PhD in Management, at the University of the Witwatersrand. http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/ In the case of the USA, Congress has significant „power of the purse‟, and the handle/10539/4617?show=full. annual intelligence authorisation bill allows Congress to reallocate funds and Africa, S (2012), “The policy evolution of the South African civilian intelligence services: 1994 to establish programmes that it deems necessary. For example, the bill allows 2009 and beyond”, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol XXXIV, No 1, pp. 97-132. https:// Congress to “define intelligence activities, create laws prohibiting certain activities repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/20766/Africa_Policy(2012).pdf?sequence=1. and press controversial policy issues” (Rosenbach and Peritz 2009). In contrast, Auditor-General (1997), “Report of the Auditor-General on the Secret Services Account for the South Africa‟s JSCI is relatively weak, performing more of a review function than year ended 31 March 1997”, Pretoria: Auditor-General. playing a proactive role in shaping the budget. This has much to do with the nature Auditor-General (1998), “Report of the Auditor-General on the Secret Services Account for the of the electoral system in the two countries, but it does pose the question of year ended 31 March 1998”, Pretoria: Auditor-General. whether parliamentary oversight in South Africa is designed in the most effective Auditor-General (2011), “Report of the Auditor-General on the Secret Services Account for the year ended 31 March 2011”, Pretoria: Auditor-General. way. Born, H and Leigh, I (2005), Making intelligence accountable: Legal standards and best practices for oversight of intelligence agencies. Oslo: Publishing House of the Parliament of Norway. https:// 6. Conclusion www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/making-intelligence.pdf. Breytenbach, W J (1992, “Security and intelligence structures: Regionalism and the federal/unitary The remedial actions proposed by the more recent Review Panel on the SSA (RSA, debate”, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol XIV, No 2, pp 23-43. The Presidency 2019) are a step in the right direction. Apart from recommending Burgess, C (2014) “Report: Outstanding Annual Reports: Joint Standing Committee on short-term measures such as conducting investigations and imposing sanctions on Intelligence (JSCI) for Periods 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 and 2012/2013”, http://pmg- those who have breached financial and other controls, the Panel has recommended assets.s3-website-eu-west-amazonaws.com/140305report.pdf (accessed 18 March 2015). that South Africa benchmark its controls for the conducting of intrusive Collaborative African Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI) and African Development Bank (AfDB) intelligence operations with those of other jurisdictions. Also promising is that the (2008), Budget Practices and Procedures in Africa. Panel has recommended finding a method for the „unfettered‟ auditing of the https://www.cabri-sbo.org/en/publications/budget-practices-and-procedures-in-africa. Agency‟s finances. Most importantly, the Panel has recommended that the Ministry Dlomo, D (2006), “An analysis of parliamentary intelligence oversight in South Africa with specific initiate a process, together with the ministries of Finance, Defence and Police, to reference to the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence”, Unpublished Master‟s dissertation. explore the options and consequences of repealing the Security Services Special Pretoria: University of Pretoria. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/27212. Account Act (Act 81 of 1969) and the Secret Services Account Act (Act 56 of Faizel, I (2009), “Who shall guard the guards? Civilian operational oversight and the Inspector- General of Intelligence” In ISS, To spy or not to spy: Intelligence and democracy in South Africa. 1978). The legislative repeal process, if implemented, is likely to take some time. A Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/103502 parliamentary committee that pays more attention to its tasks of oversight, and an MONO157FULL.PDF. executive authority with the political will to implement the recommendations of Government Communication and Information Service (GCIS) (2009), “Mobilising our resources the Review Panel, whilst important, are unlikely unless there is constant public to work together to do more to achieve national security”, Statement issued by the GCIS, 2 engagement around issues such as the right to information, the right to privacy, and October 2009. limitations on the powers of the security services. Research on the armed forces, Hough, M (1992) “The SATBVC and liberation movements‟ intelligence services in a changing

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smallholder farming, agriculture accounts for 35% of the country‟s Gross Ecological Change, Agricultural Development and Domestic Product (GDP), 85% of its labour force, and 90% of its foreign Food Production in Malawi: a Historiographical exchange (UNDP 2008). The estate sector largely produces cash crops, while the country obtains most of its foodstuffs from smallholder agriculture (Mhone Review 1987:30-51; Vail 1983: 39-86). Since the early 1890s, the state, in its various forms, made agricultural interventions to improve the levels of the peasants‟ food Bryson G. Nkhoma production in the face of various ecological, economic and political challenges Department of History and Heritage Studies, (Liebenow, 1987). The interventions included market regulation, the introduction of new crops and conservation agricultural methods, provision of agricultural Mzuzu University, Malawi inputs and the development of smallholder irrigation schemes. Although 85% of agricultural activities are carried out by smallholder farmers, agricultural policies Abstract have been framed in favour of the estates in terms of land allocation, crop marketing and extension services (Kydd 1985; Livingstone 1985; Pryor and Given its economic significance, agriculture has been at the centre of historical Chipeta 1990; Peters and Kambewa 2007). Yet, the country depends on the scholarship in Malawi. Yet despite the significant contribution this scholarship has smallholder farmers for the production of maize, which is its main food crop. made to the country‟s development, there has been no effort to systematically Given this economic significance, agriculture has been a subject of relatively reconstruct Malawi‟s agricultural historiography. This article, therefore, takes stock greater historical scholarship in Malawi. Since the mid-1950s, scholars have of the progress that has been made by historians on research in the country‟s attempted to reconstruct the historical patterns of agricultural and agrarian agricultural history since the mid-1950s. The ultimate goal is to establish not only changes, the emergence of the African peasantry and the country‟s food what might be regarded as the country‟s agricultural historiography, but also the production challenges. Yet despite the contribution this scholarship has made to place of food production, which has become an important food security aspect of the country‟s development, there has been minimal effort to systematically most Malawian peasants. After assessing the earlier works, the study observes that reconstruct Malawi‟s agricultural historiography. While Erik Green attempted to Malawi has an agricultural historiography which, prompted by the political and review the modern agricultural history of the country, he only limited his review to economic thoughts of the time, has conceptually evolved after the traditions of understanding how state policy-choices increased the levels of rural poverty in modernisation, underdevelopment and social history schools. It is argued here that, colonial and post-colonial Malawi (Green 2007). The absence of agricultural despite raising a strong case about the processes by which colonialism and historiography in Malawi is surprising considering the tremendous progress capitalism disrupted peasant food economies, the historiography has made little historians from the region and beyond have made in this regard (Arrighi 1970: 197- effort to explore the patterns of peasant food production that emerged through 234; Phimister 1979:253-268; Richards 1983: 1-72; Berry 1984:29-112; Isaacman this process, except for those studies that sought to understand the growth of 1993:1-120). As noted by Spear, an agricultural historiography would enhance famine and hunger. While resonating in many respects with the agricultural originality, reduce duplication of efforts and provide scholarly context for future historiography of southern Africa, the Malawi case has gone beyond to include research in the country (Spear 2019). smallholder irrigation farming, which despite being globally recognised as a This article, therefore, takes stock of the progress that has been made by panacea for maintaining food production in the changing climate, has been under historians on research in the country‟s agricultural history since the mid-1950s. The researched even in the dominating regional climate historiography. ultimate goal is to establish not only what might be regarded as the country‟s agricultural historiography, but also the place of food production, which has 1. Introduction become an important food security aspect of most Malawian peasants. The study traces the origins of these studies, the methods employed as well as the theoretical As most countries in southern Africa, Malawi, a country located to the southeast debates and narratives that sustained them. After assessing the earlier works, the of the region, pursues an economy that is predominantly agro-based (Thomas study observes that Malawi has an agricultural historiography which, prompted by 1975:35-51; Kydd and Christiansen 1982:355-375). Comprising of estates and

99 100 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 BG Nkhoma Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 BG Nkhoma the political and economic thoughts of the time, has conceptually evolved after the importantly their professional experiences, the works of these scholars provide a traditions of modernisation, underdevelopment and social history schools. There generic view of the problems affecting agricultural production, the evolution of has been a growth of literature approximate to a colonial historiography that colonial agricultural policies, and the overall contribution agriculture made to the attempted to demonstrate the so called “benevolence” of colonial science and country‟s development. 1As pioneering studies, the scholar ship made available the capitalism in transforming what it viewed as “backward” indigenous agricultural critical issues requiring attention in any analysis of the country‟s agricultural change practices in rural Malawi. This scholarship was characteristic of the studies prior to and peasant production as well as the requisite policies that guided state the 1970s. From the 1970s onward, there appeared another scholarly evolution, intervention into peasant economy in the late colonial period. Coming from people which as counter-narratives to the preceding colonial historiography, underlined the with intimate colonial ideological backgrounds and obligations, the scholarship disruptive nature of colonial science and capitalist developments on African rural highlights the so-called backwardness of Africans in matters of culture, agriculture life and economies. However, this scholarship has since the 1980s been challenged and ecology. It portrays the colonialists as agents of modernity and civilisation who again by a group of scholars who, subscribing to the emerging new social history struggled to bring peasants into what they thought were superior and modern ways approach of the time, drew attention to the dynamics of local agency in the of agriculture. Furthermore, the studies tended to be descriptive and deficient of agricultural and agrarian changes associated with colonial and capitalist encounter the analytical vigour that is essential for the historical scholarship of this nature. by emphasizing on African adaptation, resilience and resistance. The latter Most importantly, these studies are not recognisance of the historical indigenous contributed greatly to the narratives on the emergency of African peasantry, food agrarian initiatives in cash and food crop production. security and irrigation farming. Despite the growing scholarly popularity, the essay contends that the Malawi 3. The growth of underdevelopment school, 1960 - 1980 agricultural historiography has given peripheral treatment to the subject of food production. Mostly, the historiography has embedded the subject into the analysis The period beginning from the late 1960s has gone down in history as the turning of such grand topics as agriculture, peasantry, ecological and climate change. Those point of Malawian historiography of agriculture and the peasantry in particular and that fore-fronted food in their studies, only analysed it from the perspective of African history in general. Key to this development was the opening of the African food crisis and famine. While resonating in many respects with the , and particularly the establishment of the History Depart agricultural historiography of southern Africa, the Malawi case has, however, gone ment at Chancellor College, the constituent college of the university. As beyond to include smallholder irrigation farming, which despite being globally professionals, the members of the Department, who at this embryonic stage recognised as a panacea for maintaining food production in the changing climate, consisted largely of professors from the west, embarked on a reconstruction of has been under researched even in the dominating regional climate historiography. the history of the country paying attention to historical methodologies. Influenced by the nationalist historiography as well as the dependency and underdevelopment 2. Agriculture, ecology and food security in colonial school of the time, Brigdal Pachai, Martin Chanock, Colin Baker, Leroy Vail and historiography Kings Phiri set out to deconstruct the colonial historiography of Richard Kettlewell and John Pike. They sharply criticised not only the unscientific nature of Although Malawi became a British colony in 1891, the country‟s agricultural history the research methodologies they employed but also the modernization thesis which began to attract systematic scholarship from the mid-1950s. Prior to that lied at the centre of their analysis of the impact of colonialism and capitalism on agricultural issues were examined by colonial officials who, as anthropologists by rural economies (Baker 1974: 7-26; Chanock 1972: 113-129; 1977: 396-409; training, developed interest in documenting the everyday life of Malawians with Krishnamurthy 1972: 385-386; Pachai 1973: 681-698; 1974: 1-22; 1978; Phiri 1976: whom they interacted (Buchanan 1885; Johnston 1897; Murray 1922). The earliest 1-22; Vail 1977; 1982: 39-88). Other than modernising rural economies, the works in the Malawian historiography are those of Richard Kettlewell and John scholarship demonstrates in detail, how the colonial state applied policies on land, Pike, who despite being senior colonial government officials and amateurs in the taxation and labour to disrupt the pre-existing rural economies in the country. The field pioneered the studies of the history of the country‟s agriculture, economy and colonial state craftily and coercively appropriated land and labour resources. This ecological changes (Kettlewell 1955; Kettlewell 1965; Pike 1968). Using archival increased African vulnerability to unprecedented drought related famines and sources, government documents and newspapers at their disposal, and more natural disasters. In a bid to establish a viable capitalist economy, colonialism paid 101 102 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 BG Nkhoma Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 BG Nkhoma no respect to food production, but instead worked towards forcing Africans to people, topics that affected the everyday life of rural societies such as the tenancy supply cheap labour to settler farmers in the country and abroad. From 1906, the system, forced labour, taxation and food security were analysed with extensive use colonial state forced Africans to participate in the production of cotton and of oral sources. The historiography predominantly revolved around three themes: tobacco at the expense of food production. The scholarship argues that it would the emergency of the peasantry, food production and irrigation farming. be simplistic to celebrate colonialism and capitalism as agents of modernization in the face of glaring existing evidence of the failure of settler agriculture, which 4.1 Capitalist incursions, ecological change and agricultural came to a climax during the economic crisis of the 1920s and 1930s. It also draws development attention to the extent to which the inheritance of colonial economic structures The first theme was at first pursued by scholars such as John McCracken, Robin such as road and rail networks, estate agriculture and labour migration foredoomed Palmer and Robin Palmer, and later Elias Mandala, Owen Kalinga, Wiseman the success of agricultural developments of the post-colonial period. Chirwa and Wapulumuka Mulwafu (McCracken 1982: 21-35; 1983: 172-192; 1989: The strengths of these narratives lie in the fact that they provide a provocative 63-78; 2012; Palmer 1985: 211-245; Mandala 1990; Kalinga 1993: 367-387; Chirwa and strategic entry into the study of food production and food security. Firstly, they 1997: 265-280; Mulwafu 2002a:25-45; 2002b: 201-215; 2010; Green 2007; 2009; stimulate scholarly interest into understanding the nature of the pre-existing 2011; Bolt and Green 2015). Contrary to the nationalist historiography of the African food production practices, which colonial and capitalist incursion 1970s, the scholarship of the 1980s acknowledged the adverse impact of disrupted. Secondly, they make available the scholarly framework to future scholars colonialism and capitalism on the African peasantry. However, it puts a footnote who might be interested in understanding the anthropogenic basis of the food below the disruptive nature of colonial capitalism by drawing attention to patterns crises and food insecurity that affected the peasants in rural Malawi during the of peasant rationalism and heterogeneity as well as variations through which they colonial and postcolonial period. responded to colonial and capitalist incursions in rural Malawi. The major The major weakness of this scholarship, however, is that it treats Africans as a contention of this scholarship is that peasants in Malawi were not passive victims homogeneous entity that uniformly, passively and irreparably succumbed to the of colonial capitalism. Rather, the peasants acted creatively to minimize its effects disruptive effects of colonial and capitalist incursions. It ignores the heterogeneity through negotiation, resistance, adaptation and resilience. In complex ways, they of the peasantry based on age, class, gender and political status as well as the resisted and negotiated colonial manoeuvrings on the rural economies with some variations by which colonialism and capitalism affected such a dynamic degree of success. The scholarship further shows that state interventions into composition of the peasantry. These weaknesses originate largely from the peasant economy through agricultural conservation, which characterized colonial scholars‟ over-reliance on colonial archives, which represented the voices of the agricultural development policies from the late 1930s and 1940s, failed due to poor colonial administrators and the African elites rather than the voices of the rural timing, ideological incompatibility and the coercive approach by which the colonial masses. Centred on national studies, the scholarship fails to provide details of how state implemented its programs among the peasants. colonialism affected food security at the local level. This scholarship has laid the ground for the historical analysis of the interaction 4. Social history and agro-ecological studies in Malawi, 1980 between the peasants and the state. It gives clues to understanding how capitalism -1990 shaped the African peasantry. It also demonstrates how the peasants as rational beings creatively adapted to the forces that worked against them by negotiating the The emergence of social history in the early 1970s had far-reaching effects on terms of their participation. Furthermore, it provides a strategic entry into Malawian historiography in general, and particularly, the historiography of understanding the manner in which state interventions shaped and transformed agriculture, the peasantry and food production which started to dominate local agricultural technologies. The major weakness of this scholarship is that it scholarship from the early 1980s (Hobsbawm 1971:20-45; Joyce 2010:213 -248; discusses the interaction of the peasants and the colonial state in generic sense and Lloyd 1991:180-219). Typical of social history, scholars of this historiography concentrates on the confrontational relations that developed between the state and began to move towards analysing the agricultural history of the country from the the peasants over conservation. This compromises a critical examination of the perspective of the marginalized groups of the rural society such as peasants, extent to which state interventions affected food production among the peasants. workers, women and children. In an attempt to represent the voices of these 103 104 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 BG Nkhoma Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 BG Nkhoma

4.2 Food production and food security 1983 respectively (Sen 1981; Watts 1983). Since then, food became a subject of scholarly attention in Africa, and Malawian scholars wanted to be part of this The second theme, which preoccupied the social historiography of agriculture intellectual revolution. from the 1980s, is that of food production and food security. This scholarship Two scholars distinguished themselves as specialists of food scholarship: Megan came as an intervention into the early historiography of agriculture and peasantry, Vaughan and Elias Mandala. Their scholarship explores the patterns of food which centred on narratives of cash cropping at the expense of food production. production during the precolonial and early colonial period. It also demonstrates Besides, the scholarship was a response to the global and regional concerns of the the manner in which the peasants coped and adapted to ecological and political time over the growing food crisis in Africa because of drought recurrences, changes, which over the years threatened their food security in rural Malawi population increases and civil wars (Berry 1984:59-112; Timberlake 1991). Since (Vaughan 1982: 351-364; 1987; Mandala 2005; 2006: 505-524). Using the political the 1970s, there has been growing academic and public interest in food production economy perspective, the scholarship demonstrates how colonial capitalism and consumption as well as food security in Africa. This interest has its origins disrupted rural economies through such policies as land alienation, cash crop from the growing concerns over the recurrences of unprecedented cases of production, taxation, labour migration, state control of food marketing and hunger, famine and undernourishment, caused largely by drought, population transportation. It argues that these policies succeeded only to increase the increases and civil wars which came to characterise the ecological landscape of the vulnerability of peasants to famine and hunger in rural Malawi. It criticises scholars continent. An African food crisis alarm was first blown at the World Food of environmental determinism for allowing racial prejudices to influence their Conference organised by the United Nations Organisations (UNO) in Rome in understanding of food insecurity (Thomas and Whittington 1969). But as noted by 1974 where Africa, which had for long been recognised as a world exporter of Megan Vaughan, food security in Malawi, like in any other parts of Africa, should food grain, was at the time arguably found the most adversely affected by the be understood within a broader context of multiple factors in which both global food crisis (Devereux and Maxwell 2011). Between 1986 and 1992, the ecological and anthropogenic factors shared responsibility (Vaughan 1987). World Food Committee of the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) Mandala‟s work, as noted above, goes beyond the political economy argument by conducted food surveys, which indicated that, of the 840 million people considering food insecurity as an everyday experience of the peasants of the undernourished in the world, 26% of them were in Africa (FAO 1996). Lower Tchiri valley of southern Malawi rather than an occasional occurrence. 2In Comparatively, the and the Sahel region represented the most doing this, Mandala‟s work draws attention to visible co-existence of feasts and affected region with the 1984 Ethiopian famine rated as the worst. famine in the daily, seasonal and the annual routines of the peasant life. In Southern Africa, at a regional conference of food security held by the Unlike the earlier historiography of agricultural change and the peasantry, this Southern Africa Development Coordinating Committee (SADCC) in Maseru, scholarship has directly, though modestly, placed food production and food Lesotho between 12 and 14 January 1987, it was revealed that Southern Africa was security at the core of its analysis. However, the historiography carries overtones of gradually drifting towards a food crisis with Mozambique rated as mostly affected dependence and underdevelopment theories by simplistically presenting a romantic followed by Lesotho, Botswana, , Angola, Tanzania, Madagascar, Malawi view of precolonial Africa as the historical epoch of plenteous and surplus food, and Namibia (Prah 2001). Malawi, together with Zimbabwe and South Africa, and colonial capitalism as the only factors that socio-engineered famine and hunger which were at the time credited for grain exportation in the region, had since 2000 in rural Africa. Besides, the scholarship is limited in scope, space and time. As joined the countries with serious food deficits (FAO 2015). It is subsequent to such promising as Megan Vaughan‟s works were, their analysis was not only limited to problems that the United Nations Organisation (UNO) made eradication of the period before the outbreak of the First World War and the 1948/9 famine, but poverty and hunger its number one goal of the Millennium Development Goals also confined to the Shire Highlands and the Upper Lower Shire. They also made (MGDs) of September 2000 (UNO 2000). The Sustainable Development Goals no effort to explore how the state interacted with the peasants to maintain food (SDGs) which have since 2016 replaced the MGDs have maintained eradication of security in these areas. While Mandala‟s studies have managed to explore in detail poverty and hunger as a critical goal (UNO 2016). As noted by Elias Mandala, how the peasants struggled to sustain food security in the face of droughts, floods these concerns were catalytic to the emergence of food scholarship in Africa and competing demands for food, they made little effort to chronicle various ways (Mandala 2005). The pioneers of this historiography were Amartya Sen and by which the state promoted food production among the peasants. Besides, the Michael Watts who studied the growth of famine and food insecurity in 1981 and 105 106 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 BG Nkhoma Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 BG Nkhoma studies dealt largely with peasants‟ everyday experiences of food security at production. Using the grand paradigms of modernisation, underdevelopment household rather than communal level, and only drew evidence from the and social history, the historiography has improved our understanding on the Mang‟anja people in the Lower Shire. This limits the universal generalisability of growth of food insecurity in Malawi by drawing our attention to the interplay of the experiences of the peasants in the country. Important also to note is that the ecological and political factors. While the effects of capitalism and colonialism Lower Shire is a distinctive agro-ecological zone often characterised by erratic on peasant food production has been noted, however, the study has observed rainfall, drought and extreme high temperatures. The only ecological consolation that little progress has been made to analyse the processes and methods by of the area is the presence of the Shire River, which brought seasonal floods that which the peasants produced their foodstuffs and how the processes have provided the Mang‟anja an alternative agricultural means of coping with famine progressively changed over the years, especially in the period after the First and seasonal hunger. There is need to understand how other communities in the World War. In other words, the article has contended that the agricultural country with different ecologies managed to sustain food security. historiography of Malawi has tended to lean towards the reconstruction of the historical trajectories of food crisis with respect to hunger, malnutrition and 4.3 The state, peasant irrigation farming and food security famine rather than the actual processes of food production. Related to the above scholarship is the theme of irrigation farming which came to The findings concur with the regional historiography which, despite noting dominate the agricultural historiography from 2002 (Mulwafu and Nkhoma 2002: the complex, dynamic, contested and varied ways by which capitalism and 839-844; Nkhoma and Mulwafu 2004: 1327-1333; Ferguson and Mulwafu 2007: colonialism affected the African peasantry, has treated food production 211-227; Nkhoma 2011a: 209-223; 2011b: 383-398; Nkhoma and Kayira 2016: 79- tangentially along the grand paradigms of agriculture, ecology and the peasantry 84). Drawing evidence from oral sources, archival sources, government documents, (Phimister 1988; Giblin 1992; ; Moore and Vaughan 1994; Isaacman 1996). As in field observations, focus group discussions and personal communication, this Malawi, the regional historiography has placed more emphasis on drought, scholarship has explored the evolution of irrigation farming and the challenges that hunger and famine in arguing that peasant famine was a function of political and undermined its success. By focusing on smallholder irrigation schemes that the economic factors than ecological and climatic conditions (Bates 1981; Maddox state constructed, the scholarship affords us a practical example of patterns of 1990; Sen 1981; Watts 1983; Wyle 1989:159-199; Illife 1990). Unlike in Malawi, state interventions into peasant economy and the possible factors that impinged on the regional historiography has extended the drought-famine analysis to cover such interventions. Although smallholder irrigation has been considered as a clime history (McCann 1999: 262-279; Carey 2012:233-249; Hannaford 2014: 7- panacea to food production in the face of changing climate, its reliance to river 25). diversions which draw their supplies from rains coupled by inability by service What remains is for this regional historiography to borrow a leaf from the providers to take local history and context in their planning, has been a major Malawi case which, despite paying a blind eye to climate history, has casually limiting factor for smallholder irrigation farming to achieve their intended goal. drawn attention to the extent to which rainfall variability affected the This has led not only to the growth of water related conflicts among the peasants, productivity of smallholder irrigation farming. Since in most African countries but also brought the state and local farmers into loggerheads. Although the this irrigation farming is predominantly dependent on rainfall for water supply, scholarship has underlined the contribution of irrigation farming to the net food the analysis of the interface between climate historiography and irrigation supply of the country, it is limited to the study of formal irrigation schemes, and historiography would provide historical lessons critical for sustaining irrigation represents only one form of state interventions into the peasant economy. Besides, farming which in the present vagaries of climate variability remains the only way the scholarship largely centres on post-colonial irrigation schemes with a focus on forward for maintaining food supply, not only Malawian peasants but also those from the region as well. the progressive processes under which irrigation policies historically evolved. Endnotes 5. Conclusion 1. Richard Kettlewell served as Director of Agriculture up to 1959, when he What this article suggests is that the Malawian historiography has made was appointed as Minister of Lands, Natural Resources and Surveys in Malawi. He was a firm tremendous effort to analyse the subject of agriculture, ecological change and food supporter of modernisation and conservation. John Pike once served as a senior hydrologist in the country between 1952 and 1962.

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2. One scholar who has been criticized for making conclusion about African famines based on linear Green, E (2011), “Agrarian populism in colonial and post-colonial Malawi”, African Studies progression thesis is Watts, Silent Violence. Review, Vol 54, No 3, December, 143-164.

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Abstract

This study examines the trajectory of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy by establishing the extent of change or consistency in its implementation since

1994. Under the ruling African National Congress (ANC), South Africa has emerged as a promising international actor, particularly within the Southern African region and on the African continent in general. The authors provide a historical analysis of the major trajectories of foreign policy articulation under the administrations of Presidents Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma spanning the period 1994 to 2018. In investigating the conception and execution of foreign policy under these dispensations, the authors unravel a consistent but skewed pattern of national role conception that underscores Pretoria‟s vision to be a major actor in international affairs, both regionally and globally. We conclude that South Africa‟s foreign policy during this period was marked by Mandela‟s altruism, Mbeki‟s Afrocentrism and the antediluvian

signature of Zuma.

1. Introduction

Following the African National Congress‟ (ANC) electoral triumph in 1994, the Republic of South Africa arose as a formidable regional foreign policy actor. The democratic dispensation that emerged following one of the most epic global political struggles promised to promote peace and development and be committed to human rights. Its international relations stance also seemed to usher in a new era in Africa (Marthoz 2009: 1). According to Mthembu (2017), post 1994 was the time South Africa ceased to be known as a pariah state. 113 114 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 L Gqiza and O Ogunnubi Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 L Gqiza and O Ogunnubi

Expectations were high for the newly democratic country; the international -governed state has faced challenges at both micro- and macro-policy level. community expected South Africa to play a very active role in Africa and to a Their work analyses South Africa‟s foreign policy development from 1994 into certain degree, the world stage. The fact that Pretoria has the second highest the 2000s, its achievements and failures, and progress made in many areas of number of embassies after Washington DC demonstrates South Africa‟s role development. Since 1994, the South African government has prioritised African and interest in global politics. It suggests that post 1994 South Africa has been development in its foreign policy and has assumed a leadership role on the an active player in the international arena. continent. However, it has confronted some challenges in implementing such The post 1994 South Africa recognised itself as a very important actor on the policy, which the literature mainly ascribes to overlapping commitments and continent that would act as a mediator and send peacekeeping troops to conflict multiple principles. These intersecting commitments have placed South Africa in -ridden areas. South Africa also launched ambitious plans to develop Africa and difficult positions in the past. guide the reforms leading to the rebirth of the African Union (AU) (Marthoz A clear example is when South Africa failed to arrest the former Sudanese 2009: 1). This focus on Africa was accompanied by a strong commitment to the President Omar al-Bashir when it was ordered to do so by the International Global South and the forging of associations with other developing states such Criminal Court (ICC). Omar al-Bashir was charged in 2009 and 2010 with as democratic Brazil and (Marthoz 2009: 1), particularly during the Mbeki genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Sudan‟s Darfur region. era. South Africa committed itself to the development of the Global South by This is important because South Africa is known for its advocacy for human being an integral part of development associations such as IBSA and BRICS. rights and democratic values yet it failed to arrest and handover al-Bashir to the Over the past two decades, South Africa has recorded some important victories ICC. South Africa was part of the International Criminal Court and was and has become one of the most critical players in the international community. advocating for the African Agenda. So this placement left South Africa in a However, while the ANC had shown that it can disagree with the West, for peculiar position. Commentators believe South Africa chose Africa over the example, during the apartheid era when a number of Western countries sup West as it disregarded the calls made by the ICC. There is general agreement that ported the racist white government, belonging to the South does negate the fact South Africa‟s robust foreign policy has been assisted by its relatively strong that the country‟s telecom and banking corporations and multinational mining economy and substantial military power in Africa. However, while some interests have substantial links, interests, and affinity with the developed Global scholars believe that the country is an African hegemon, others argue that it North (Marthoz 2009). should be seen as a continental leader that is interested in the region‟s develop The critical question addressed in this research is: has there been change or ment. It, therefore, eschews any hegemonic label, especially given that it does consistency in South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy? It is answered by not hold preponderant material resources in the region. Thus, much remains to means of an examination of the foreign policy trajectories of the Mandela, be done in order for South Africa to be identified as a powerful state at the Mbeki and Zuma administrations spanning the period 1994 to 2018. The global level. findings are used to draw conclusions on the future direction of South African The primary advantage that the democratic government elected in 1994 had foreign policy. The study is a comparative study based on a qualitative paradigm. over its apartheid predecessors was support from the international community. It draws on multiple sources of secondary data drawn from journals, textbooks, This called for changes in all sectors of the country‟s polity. The first democratic newspaper articles, government publications, dissertations, and verifiable president, Nelson Mandela declared on the eve of the 1994 Presidential internet sources. Content analysis was used to organise, integrate, and examine elections that human rights and democratic values and norms would guide the the data and the Realist theoretical framework is adopted to make meaning of country‟s foreign policy (Mandela 1993: 87). According to Alden and le Pere the analysed data. (2003: 12), "by incorporating experiences of the anti-apartheid struggle into the conduct of foreign policy, the ANC leader sought to imbue the practice of 2. South Africa’s Foreign Policy: A Historical Review international affairs with an orientation towards the promotion of civil liberties and democratisation". Scholars such as Alden and Soko (2005), Landsberg (2006), le Pere and van After 1994, South African policymakers confronted the challenge of Nieuwkerk (2002), and Prys (2009) have analysed South Africa's foreign policy- rendering the country functional following the devastation wrought by decades making as well as its application in Africa and beyond. They argue that the ANC 115 116 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 L Gqiza and O Ogunnubi Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 L Gqiza and O Ogunnubi of isolation from the international system as a result of apartheid policies. The Community (SADC) and the AU and is well-known for promoting good causes country‟s foreign policy has come a long way since the apartheid era when the such as cooperating with Canada and New Zealand to eradicate anti-personnel white minority used brutality to get its way. Mandela announced that ethical mines (Barber 2005: 1082). foreign policy would be adopted in order to establish the country as a model South African foreign policy suggests that South Africa seeks the status of emer global citizen and to replace a racist, unjust, and authoritarian government with a ging power and is sometimes treated like one. For instance, as noted earlier, the non-racial, just, prosperous and democratic nation (Marthoz 2012: 2). country was granted a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council for three From the Mandela administration to Zuma‟s time in office, South Africa periods. South Africa also joined India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) group, became confronted massive challenges. It had to formulate its foreign policy from a member of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS); and co-chairs scratch, forge relations with states that shunned the apartheid government and the Development Working Group of the G20 with South Korea. join international organisations that the country was previously barred from. Some scholars have described South Africa‟s foreign policy as being realist driven Furthermore, its foreign affairs bureaucracy had to be shifted from its previous (Hughes 2004). They argue that the Department of Foreign Affairs‟ (DFA) focus on defending white supremacy (Ogunnubi 2014). Importantly, it also adoption of the theme, „security wealth creation‟; the South African government‟s focused on redefining its foreign relations with states that had been complicit in commitment to being a visible partner in Africa and to promoting regional apartheid South Africa's rogue policies. Finally, it had to redirect international economic development; and the centralisation of the foreign policy body in the economic relations that were affected by the United Nations (UN) sanctions Presidency‟s office fits with the realist theme as it seeks to promote South Africa‟s (Marthoz 2012: 2). national interests at the international level. However, it is important to examine the In 1945, South Africa was one of the 51 founding members of the UN. major themes of foreign policy since 1994. Membership now stands at more than 200. South Africa was readmitted to the UN in 1994. Since then, it has pursued a foreign policy that is based on the 3. Mandela’s Altruistic Era centrality of the UN in the multilateral system (Rodriguez 2013). Twelve years President Nelson Mandela took over the reins of South Africa in 1994 in what can after South Africa was re-admitted to the UN, it was endorsed by the AU and be regarded as an exciting but difficult time. His priority was to end the country‟s elected by an overwhelming majority to serve as a non-permanent member of international isolation. Between 1994 and 1999, South Africa‟s foreign policy was the UN Security Council for the periods 2007-2008, 2011-2012 and more inspired by Mandela‟s towering personality, international prestige, and stature. recently 2019-2020. It has used this platform to promote an African Agenda of According to le Pere (2002), Mandela‟s command of every major foreign policy peace, security, and development. decision and issue was impressive and overshadowed the role played by the DFA, South Africa has thus fully reintegrated itself into the international arena as a Cabinet and even parliament. While all decisions made by the President require respectable member of the comity of nations and has played an active role in approval by Cabinet, le Pere believes that during Mandela‟s presidency, South seeking to forge a new international order, especially with regard to Africa, as Africa‟s image and foreign policy were equated with the president‟s profile and that well as the Global South where it has partnered with other key players to launch his public statements rather than the policy were what counted (le Pere 2002: 15). an alternative international economic order (Marthoz 2012). The country has However, the new government struggled to find its feet and familiarise itself also hosted international events such as the 2001 World Conference against with a confusing and fast-changing post-Cold War global order. It was committed Racism in Durban, the Rugby and Cricket World Cups, the FIFA Soccer World to becoming a full and respected member of the family of nations and to Cup in 2010 and the COP17 Climate Change Summit in 2011. These are clear diplomacy that conformed to institutionalised, accepted practices aligned with indications of South Africa‟s importance in the international arena (Marthoz international law and diplomatic conventions. 2012). It has also hosted a range of international bodies, including the Non- The following seven principles guided President Mandela‟s foreign policy thrust: Alignment Movement (NAM), the AU, World Economic Forum, the World 1) human rights are important to international relations, and they extend across the Trade Organization (WTO), African Union Parliament, the UN Conference on political, economic, social and environmental landscape; 2) Just and long-term Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Commonwealth amongst others. solutions to the problems of humankind can only come about by advancing South Africa is a committed member of the Southern African Development democracy worldwide; 3) Considerations of justice and respect for international

117 118 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 L Gqiza and O Ogunnubi Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 L Gqiza and O Ogunnubi law should guide interactions between nations; 4) All nations should strive for moralistic, ethical foreign policy while simultaneously promoting the country‟s peace and when it breaks down, globally acceptable non-violent me chanisms must economic interests. The government sought to be both non-aligned and close to be adopted, with effective arms-control by governments; 5) The challenges and the West, while Africa came first, and the Global South was also at the top of its interests of the African continent should be mirrored in South Africa‟s foreign foreign policy agenda. The Mandela administration learned that it was difficult to policy choices; 6) Economic development rests on developing regional and practice diplomacy along the lines of a set of seemingly contradictory doctrines as international economic cooperation in an interdependent world; 7) South Africa‟s the government struggled to promote human rights on the African continent foreign policy interactions should reflect deep commitment to the consolidation of (Landsberg 2012: 26). For example, it aimed to promote democratisation and its democracy (Mandela 1993: 87; African National Congress 1994). human rights in countries such as Nigeria but also required these countries as As noted earlier, Mandela and the ANC‟s main concern was the quest for strategic partners to promote peace in the DRC and Burundi. The Mandela human rights, including economic, social, environmental, and political rights. administration thus emphasised ethical foreign policy goals while building African Furthermore, they held that just and long-term solutions to global problems can unity and solidarity. only be achieved through the elevation of democracy world-wide. Other principles included respect for international law and promoting peace, disarmament, and 4. Thabo Mbeki’s Afrocentric Posture universality. Four contexts further informed these principles. The first was the Change as well as consistency in certain areas marked South Africa‟s foreign policy separation between the First and Third Worlds (Barber 2005: 1079). In pursuit of during the Thabo Mbeki era. The most striking change occurred at the top when economic equality, the new regime aligned itself with the Third World, emphasising the more reserved Mbeki replaced the charismatic Mandela. As Mandela‟s Vice- its concerns in relation to economic inequality and an unfair global trading system. President, Mbeki was influential in South Africa‟s foreign policy arena. This role The second was the community of international organisations; Mandela met with became more pronounced during the latter part of Mandela‟s presidency. Dr. bodies such as the UN, the NAM, the OAU, and the Commonwealth as they were Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who replaced Alfred Nzo on his death, was more vital to the pursuit of human rights, peace, and equality. The third context was forceful than Nzo but followed Mbeki‟s lead. Mbeki introduced a new ideological demilitarisation; South Africa declared that its army would only be used in self- thrust to foreign policymaking. Laurie Nathan states that this comprised of defence, and for peacekeeping and peace-making. As interactions with other democratic, Africanist and anti-imperialist elements (Barber 2005: 1087). Nathan countries changed, it was anticipated that this would produce financial savings, concludes that while Mbeki's Africanist and anti-imperialist features sat easily which would be diverted to social development. Finally, it was acknowledged that together, this was not automatically the case with 'democratic' as the ANC linked South Africa's destiny lies in Africa, which was owed a debt for its support for the 'human rights' to 'democracy', adding that, when questions were raised, "usually the liberation struggle. In terms of the future, it was clear that South Africa could not democratic position gives way" (Barber 2005: 1088). flourish while bordered by extreme poverty; this required that it partner with According to Landsberg (2012), there was much continuity between the neighbouring countries (Barber 2005: 1080). Mandela and Mbeki governments‟ domestic and foreign policies. However, Mbeki The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which was launched modified national and international strategies in line with his promotion of a just prior to the 1994 election (Barber 2005: 1081) was regarded as replicating the developmental state and development goals. He argued that, in class and material views of those inclined towards the Western market economy rather than those terms, the country consisted of two different economies and two nations, which subscribing to socialist principles. The RDP was replaced by the Growth, was the legacy of white domination during the apartheid era (Landsberg 2012). In Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) programme. Rukhsana Siddiqui noted order to address the deep divisions in society, Mbeki introduced a new notion of that GEAR accepted "the challenge of an open global system" and aimed "to the nature of the state and pushed for transformation and development. During increase savings and also attract more foreign inflows in order to increase levels of his second term of office, he promoted the new strategy of making South Africa a investment" (Barber 2005: 1081). developmental state, a fast-growing, industrialising nation that put education and The Mandela government was aware of the need to strengthen and consolidate health at the top of its agenda. Between 1999 and 2008, while Mbeki was the young democracy in order to gain respect abroad. Different experiments were President, Africa was a foreign policy priority and South Africa assumed an undertaken as it searched for its new role. The new government aimed for a important role as the foremost champion of the continent‟s political and socio-

119 120 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 L Gqiza and O Ogunnubi Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 L Gqiza and O Ogunnubi economic development. This was achieved by negotiating common rules, understood in geographic terms, there are other geopolitical considerations, principles, and values and crafting common institutions. Mbeki's African Agenda namely: held that there is no peace without development and no development without 1. South Africa's responsibility to Africa arises from the support that a number peace and he ensured that this theme was adopted by the AU (Landsberg 2012: of African states provided to the national liberation struggle as a result of 27). Functionalism (the usefulness of a state as a form of social organisation) which they suffered cross-border raids by the apartheid regime; and institutionalism (a focus on formal institutions of government) were the 2. South Africa‟s experience of internal negotiations and agreement could work policy thrusts of the African Agenda, highlighting the need to build solid as a template for other conflicts in Africa; continental and regional institutions, with South Africa playing the role of 3. Recognition that South Africa's political and economic future depends to a institution builder and policy inventor (Landsberg 2012: 27). certain extent on the fortunes of the continent and that its well-developed While Mandela's administration was vocal about domestic and continental economy could play a leading role in Africa's economic development interests and universality, Mbeki pursued an ambitious policy to put these words (Sidiropoulos 2007). into action. He presented South Africa as a dynamic agent of progressive change as he pursued a foreign policy of redress and development. Mbeki wanted to see Making Africa a priority thus makes sense from both an altruistic and hard-nosed South Africa become the key actor in Africa and a dependable global player domestic and economic viewpoint. Mbeki aimed to spearhead Africa‟s recovery whose foreign policy pursued a progressive agenda. He relied on negotiations and increase its influence in global multilateral forums. South Africa's engagement and diplomacy in what became known as soft power in the pursuit of his foreign with Africa during this period rested on three pillars, namely: policy ambitions (Landsberg 2012). It can be said that Thabo Mbeki was the leader of a modernising develop 1. Strengthening Africa's regional (SACU and SADC) and continental (AU) ment model for Africa in the form of New Partnership for African institutions by improving South Africa's proactive contribution to these Development (NEPAD). He also played an important role in negotiating a bodies aimed at promoting integration and development. strategic partnership between Africa and First World countries based on mutual 2. Playing a supportive role in the implementation of Africa's socio-economic accountability and responsibility with the establishment of the African Peer development programme, NEPAD and SADC's Regional Indicative Strategic Review Mechanism (APRM). South Africa set out to be Africa's leading part Development Plan, the regional expression of NEPAD. nership builder, while remaining sensitive to widespread perceptions that Pretoria 3. Strengthening bilateral interaction through effective structures for dialogue was seeking to become the dominant hegemonic power in Africa. On the and co-operation. This includes support for peace, security, stability, and post- contrary, the Mbeki regime opted to be a non-hegemonic partner in order to conflict reconstruction initiatives and South Africa's contribution to Africa's address the country‟s political and developmental challenges (Landsberg 2012). peace and security agenda and management of peace missions (Sidiropoulos Cooperation with the Global South gave rise to the IBSA trilateral forum and 2007). the New Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership (NAASP). The Mbeki government In sum, South Africa demonstrated a preference for dialogue to promote good also endorsed the idea of a North-South discourse in which developing states of governance and democracy over strict non-interference. This was encapsulated in the Global South and Africa sought to gain relief from obligations to the the notion of an African renaissance. Under Mbeki‟s tenure, South Africa worked industrial powers arising from decades of colonial domination and exploitation. hard to increase Africa's developmental and security profile in the eyes of the Mbeki and his government also supported global governance transformation, North, particularly with the adoption of NEPAD in 2001. It has also played an which highlighted the need for reform of international institutions such as the important role in engaging with the G8 (Sidiropoulos 2007). UN Security Council, the IMF, World Bank, WTO and others that perpetuate Overall, Mbeki assumed Mandela's mantle of domestic change and reform, the Global South/Global North divide (Landsberg 2012: 27). skilfully introduced a transformational programme at home, and associated it with The change in the level of South Africa's commitment to other African a proactive role in foreign diplomacy. South Africa needed the West as much as the countries from Mandela to the Mbeki administrations was significant. As noted West needed South Africa and this symbiotic relationship had profound effects for earlier, Africa is a vital element in South Africa's foreign policy. While this is Mbeki's influence on the continent and in multilateral organisations. It gave Mbeki

121 122 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 L Gqiza and O Ogunnubi Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 L Gqiza and O Ogunnubi a strong bargaining chip and he was, at times, forceful in his criticism of the South Africa was obliged to do so based on its international obligations under West. the Rome Statute. For his part, Mbeki had opposed the indictment of the Therefore, it can be established that Mbeki‟s leadership showed a pattern of President of Sudan by the ICC (Thipanyane 2011). Landsberg (2012) stated that skewed consistency in continuing Mandela‟s foreign policy. As he became more the political shift that occurred in Polokwane did not result in much change in comfortable in his position, he introduced changes to promote a more the ruling party‟s domestic and foreign policy (Landsberg 2012). Referred to as prominent role for South Africa in regional and global decision making. national interest-oriented, Zuma's foreign policy was directed to benefit the people and the state. Some of the factors that informed it was similar to 5. Jacob Zuma’s Antediluvian Outlook Mandela's government, such as promoting non-racialism and non-sexism, the supremacy of the Constitution and respect for human dignity and human rights. nd The democratic coup at the ANC‟s 52 National Conference in Polokwane in The Zuma government‟s paradigm of national interest, which it adopted in 2007 that saw Jacob Zuma replacing Mbeki created enormous expectations, 2012, is important and unique because it is considered to be broad, wide-ranging especially among Zuma's supporters. These included the notion that a change in and highly of national interest, which it adopted in 2012, is important and personality would lead to a shift in actual policies (Landsberg 2012: 75). unique because it is considered to be broad, wide-ranging and highly diverse. Mbeki followed a four-pronged strategy that sought to bring the foreign policy Before this date, national priorities included economic growth, job creation, in sync with domestic policies. It included the African Agenda, South-South co- rural development and improving health and education. operation, North-South dialogue, and socio-economic and political security, While Zuma‟s government aimed to ensure that foreign policy specifically which would promote growth (Landsberg 2012). It was against this background responded to the domestic imperatives of generating economic growth and job that the Medium-term Strategic Framework to Guide Government's opportunities, improving social and human development and combating crime Programme for the Electoral Mandate Period 2009-2014 was released. The and corruption, there is little evidence that international relations were linked to document signified that the Zuma administration would pursue a foreign policy these priorities. Instead, the government adopted grand positions concerning guided by the comprehensive rubric of Pursuing African Advancement and African progress; consolidating South-South co-operation; improving strategic Enhanced Co-operation. A number of pillars that were similar to those of relations with the North; actively contributing to global governance; and Mbeki were adopted, including: strengthening bilateral relations while seeking to enhance economic diplomacy. 1. Reducing the gap between domestic and foreign policy, or the national Like its predecessors, the Zuma administration was interested in reconciling interest; moralistic approaches (altruistic identities) to foreign policy with utilitarian, 2. Encouraging SADC integration; economic self-interest considerations. Landsberg (2012) states that moralistic 3. Prioritising the continent through African Advancement; pronouncements on human rights disagreed with statements that South Africa 4. Reinforcing South-South relations; was open for business. As James and Mills (2018) assert, the ANC‟s 2015 5. Reinforcing political and economic relations; and foreign policy discussion document reflects the party‟s antediluvian stance. 6. Contributing to the global governance system. (Landsberg 2012) The Zuma regime was also marked by a renewed focus on developing countries of the South in the form of South-South Cooperation. It also focused Of major interest to critical observers was the fact that these foreign policy goals on the consolidation of the African Agenda, demonstrating continuity from the signified a marked shift in, or strengthening of those pursued by Thabo Mbeki Mbeki administration. This is also demonstrated by South Africa‟s membership (Landsberg 2012). in BRICS. The aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis strengthened South It was hoped that Zuma's term of office would reverse the move away from Africa‟s relationship with China (Shoba 2018). Therefore, the intense focus on human rights in South Africa's international relations. However, International regionalism clearly defines the Zuma era. Criminal Court (ICC) judges strongly criticized South Africa for failing to arrest Zuma‟s foreign policy has had its fair share of criticism over the years. For President Bashir of Sudan, who was wanted on charges of crimes against example, the government maintained that South African troops were deployed humanity for his government‟s violence against civilians in the Darfur conflict, to the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2013 in order to honour the capacity- when he visited Johannesburg for an AU meeting in 2015. It was suggested that

123 124 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 L Gqiza and O Ogunnubi Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 L Gqiza and O Ogunnubi building agreement with CAR President Bozize. In contrast, International Renaissance. According to him, these themes were historically determined first the Relations and Cooperation Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane stated that, more long years of ANC‟s affiliation with African countries who were sympathetic to broadly, the mission was part of a broader effort to safeguard democracy and the struggle against apartheid and secondly through rhetoric and practice of its respect for international law in Africa. These mixed justifications raised „political commitments‟ towards an African agency of reversing the damaging questions as to whether South Africa‟s involvement was to safeguard national or effects of colonialism on the continent and its people. individual commercial interests. After the death of South African soldiers near The Mandela administration pursued an ethically-based foreign policy which Bangui, Zuma‟s ruling party quickly dismissed allegations in a national emphasised an altruistic orientation marked by a focus on human rights, newspaper that the soldiers were sent to protect the commercial interests of democratisation, and respect for international law. On the other hand, Mbeki high-level officials (Dudley 2013). opted for pragmatist foreign policy that was mainly concerned with the delivery of Another important signature of the Zuma tenure was the numerous an African posture, officially dubbed "The 'new' African agenda” (Landsberg controversies surrounding his leadership such as the state capture and several 2005). Mandela downplayed South Africa‟s ambitions in Africa and emphasised corruption allegations. These domestic issues spilled to the international arena, the need to engage the African continent as a partner rather than as an arrogant where South Africa lost its reputation as a well-run and economically stable regional superpower bent on supervising a civilisation mission. This perceived non country. Zuma‟s foreign policy was accused of three inter-related ills that took -hegemonic position was perfected by the Mbeki government and signified the South Africa backward. According to Qobo (2018), there was a defective country‟s national role conception (Landsberg 2005). When Mbeki took the political culture and institutional paralysis. Qobo (2018) suggests that South presidency after Nelson Mandela, there was a great deal of continuity in South Africa‟s dealings in the international arena were based on personal gains rather Africa‟s domestic and foreign policy. This was evident from the fact that Mbeki than the good of the country. Secondly, poor leadership of the International was, in effect, the prime minister of South Africa during the Mandela Relations and Cooperation Department led to most of its strategic objectives administration when he carried the title of Deputy President. Additionally, many not realized. Thirdly, the majority of diplomatic missions were political domestic policies carried over from the Mandela administration to Mbeki‟s first appointments wherein appointments were not based on merit. In essence, term. during the Zuma administration, the country was consumed by its domestic The Mbeki regime followed a grander foreign policy agenda in search of greater politics, which were connected to corruption scandals, institutional erosion and international status. During his first term of office, South Africa pursued a rule- an increase of public unrest (Klingebiel 2017). As a consequence, the based global order and saw itself as a bridge-builder between the developed and international perception of South Africa following the transition from apartheid developing worlds and, more importantly, as a bona fide representative of Africa in has changed dramatically and that has equally affected South Africa‟s global international forums. South Africa rejected unilateralism and actively endorsed relations. multilateralism. The country was regarded as the premier norms and values creator As noted above, Zuma‟s foreign policy took some leads from the Mbeki in Africa and pursued mechanisms and rules in defence of governance, government. After he assumed office in 2009, the government emphasised the democratisation, peace, and security through the AU, NEPAD and the APRM need for a marked change in foreign policy direction, but in retrospect, very little (Landsberg 2005). changed under Zuma‟s tenure, and his foreign policy themes were consistent Since the transition to democracy, South Africa has prioritised an Afrocentric with Mbeki‟s seven pillars. foreign policy which is embedded in national liberation, the pursuit of African renewal, and attempts to address the legacy of colonialism and neo-colonialism. 6. Any Trend or Pattern? This has led to major, ambitious African initiatives and support for the transformation of the continent‟s political-economic institutions (DIRCO 2011). The centrepiece of South Africa‟s Afrocentric foreign policy ideology can be South Africa's foreign policy takes into account current socio-economic realities, summed up in what Zondi (2015) calls the three pillars of “Africanist but it has been criticised for its slow progress in addressing the historical legacy of internationalism” which include Africanity, pan-Africanism and African economic inequality despite its contribution to Africa. Mandela ensured that human rights were at the forefront of South Africa‟s

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foreign policy and global efforts to foster democratic government (Thipanyane slight element of change. This usually arises from a change in per sonnel, for 2011). Experience has shown that this had lasting benefits for South Africa in instance, in the Presidency with the incoming President applying his version of terms of the county's international and regional standing as well as its economic, foreign policy outlook while drawing on crucial elements adopted by his social, and national security interests. This approach requires a long-term vision predecessors. It suggests that, in the future, South Africa‟s global influence will coupled with a real commitment to democracy and human rights in govern ment, be predicated on the extent of the consistency in the expression of its foreign which should involve specific training of all officials and diplomats. The credibility policy and its ability to achieve a careful balance between domestic priorities, of post-apartheid South Africa in the global arena and its long-term economic, social national interest, and multiple foreign policy considerations. In order for South and political interests will depend on how it conducts itself as a beacon of Africa‟s foreign policy to prosper, improved coordination is required between democracy and a champion of human rights in the international arena and the government departments. The issue of transparency is also vital and requires extent of its participation as a global citizen and norm entre preneur will be critical careful attention, especially in light of South Africa‟s military efforts in other in the future. African states. South Africa‟s foreign policy actors must also reach consensus on South Africa's foreign policy experience represents a history of both the formulation and execution of a foreign policy that reconciles the state‟s con consistency and change. This skewed pattern rests on a number of factors such as flicting inclination towards respect for other states‟ sovereignty, non- institutional, environmental and personality traits. Features such as decision- intervention, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. making styles, beliefs, socialisation, and human and financial resources have also impacted on the country‟s foreign policy. All these factors have impacted on the 7. Conclusion direction and degree to which successful governments transverse between the themes of altruism, Afrocentrism and an antediluvian world view. Costa South Africa‟s post-apartheid foreign policy has demonstrated a pattern of Georghiou‟s argues that “persistence and change coexist uneasily, and it is this consistency over the past 24 years, broadly reflecting the three major themes of mixture that makes the future so uncertain. The twin forces of integration and altruism under Mandela‟s tenure, Afrocentrism, which characterised the Mbeki disintegration, continuity and change, create a mood of both confidence and period and an antediluvian orientation during Zuma‟s term. While these themes disorientation in international politics" (see Landsberg 2012: 1). overlap in the formulation and expression of South Africa‟s foreign policy Zuma inherited from Mbeki a well-institutionalised foreign policy that during this period, they are guided by varied principles that impact on the extent borrowed heavily from aspects of the foreign policy rubrics of his predecessor of the expression of each theme. In the authors‟ view, the African orientation of under the theme of pursuing African advancement and improved international South Africa‟s post-apartheid foreign policy has been more strongly visible than cooperation. President Zuma made it clear that, in keeping with Mbeki‟s approach, altruism and the antediluvian outlook. his government would pursue a broad-based developmental foreign policy Bibliography trajectory. Mbeki stressed an African agenda, South-South cooperation, North- South dialogue, and global governance. Zuma‟s government articulated a similar African National Congress (1994), “Foreign Policy Perspectives in a Democratic South Africa”. set of foreign policy pillars, including African development, reinforcing South- Johannesburg, ANC. South interactions, engaging the North and actively contributing to the global Alden, C and G le Pere (2003), South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: from Reconciliation to governance system. The Zuma administration‟s emphasis on foreign policy Revival?. Oxford, Oxford University Press. motivated by domestic considerations was also a continuation of Mandela and Alden, C and M Soko (2005), “South Africa‟s Economic Relations with Africa: Hegemony and Mbeki‟s outlooks (Landsberg 2012). While it was assumed that foreign policy its Discontents”, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 43, No 3, pp. 367-392. would change when Zuma came to power, on paper, the measures ado pted Barber, J (2005), “The New South Africa's Foreign Policy: Principles and Practice”, International suggest continuity, but with a more in-depth focus on parochial national priorities. Affairs, Vol 81, No 5, pp. 1079-1090. As far as the future of South Africa‟s foreign policy is concerned, as long as the DIRCO (2011), “Building a better world: The diplomacy of Ubuntu: White Paper on South ANC is elected to power, it is unlikely that any significant changes will occur. While Africa's Foreign Policy”, Pretoria: DIRCO. the country‟s foreign policy has shown more consistency than change, there is a Dudley, A (2013), “South Africa‟s Foreign Policy: Striving towards Mandela‟s ideals”, Africa Institute of South Africa Policy Brief, No 89, pp. 1-4.

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James, W and Greg Mills (2016), “Op-Ed: South Africa‟s Foreign Policy after Zuma”, Daily Rodriguez, C. (2013). Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations http:// Maverick, 13 December 2016. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-12-13-op-ed- www.southafrica-newyork.net/pmun/ resetting-south-africas-foreign-policy/#.Worw0hPFKgQ. Shoba, M. (2018). “South Africa‟s Foreign Policy Position in BRICS”, Journal of African Union Klingebiel, S (2017), “South Africa: Emerging Power or Fading Star?”, Cape Town: Heinrich Böll Studies 7(1): pp. 173-188. Stiftung. Sidiropoulos, E. (2007). National Director of the South African Institute of International Landsberg, C (2005), “In search of global influence, order and development: South Africa's Affairs (SAIIA) Johannesburg. foreign policy a decade after political apartheid”, Policy Issues and Actors, Vol 18, No 3, pp.1-2. Thipanyane, T. (2011). South Africa's foreign policy under the Zuma government: A human Landsberg, C (2006), “Foreign Policy-making and Implementation in Postsettlement South rights-based policy or a pragmatic approach based on political and economic considerations? Africa”, in Venter, A. & C Landsberg (eds.) Government and Politics in the New South Africa. 3rd ed. 64(1): pp. 3-7. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers, pp. 250-267. Williams, M.C. (2005). The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations. Cambridge, Landsberg, C. (2012). “Continuity and change in the foreign policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Cambridge University Press. governments”, Africa Insight 41(4), pp. 1-16. Zondi, S. (2015). Africanity, Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance: South Africa‟s Africa Landsberg, C. (2012). “100 years of ANC Foreign Policy”, The Thinker 35, pp. 24-29. Agenda under Mbeki and Zuma, in Masters, L., Zondi, S., van Wyk, J., and C Landsberg Landsberg, C. (2012). "The Jacob Zuma government's foreign policy: Association or (eds.), South African Foreign Policy Review Volume 2. Pretoria, Africa Institute of South Disassociation" Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations 1(1): pp. 75-76. Africa, pp. 97-11. Le Pere, G. (2002). South Africa’s foreign policy in a globalising world: an overview 1994-2002 http:// www.thepresidency.gov.za/docs/pcsa/irps/pere1.pdf. Le Pere, G. and Van Nieuwkerk, A. (2002). The Evolution of South Africa’s Foreign Policy, 1994-2002. In McGowan, P.J. and Nel, P. (eds.), Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa. 2nd ed. Lansdowne: Institute for Global Dialogue, pp. 248-266. Mandela, N. (1993). South Africa's Future Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs 72(5): pp. 86-97. Marthoz, J. (2009). Jacob Zuma, President of South Africa at the Opening Plenary on Africa and the New Global Economy at the World Economic Forum on Africa, Cape Town, 2009 http:// www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=170018. Marthoz, J. (2012). “The changes and ambiguities of South Africa's foreign policy”. NOREF Report. Oslo, NOREF. Parliamentary Monitoring Group, (2014). White paper on South Africa‟s Foreign Policy: Department of International Relations and Cooperation briefing http://www.pmg.org.za/ report/20140312-white-paper-south-africas-foreign-policy-department-international-relations- cooperation-briefing. Mthembu, P. (2017). South Africa on the Global Stage: Between Great Expectations and Capacity Constraints. Perspectives Africa. https://za.boell.org/sites/default/files/ perspectives_jan_2017_web_reduced.pdf Nathan, L. (2013). African solutions to African problems, South Africa’s foreign policy http:// web.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/46/1322/17295/WeltTrends-92-Thema-Nathan-S%C3%BCdafrika- Afrikanische-Union-Sicherheitspolitik-Diplomatie.pdf. Ogunnubi, O. (2014). Hegemonic Order and Regional Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparative Study of Nigeria and South Africa. University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Unpublished doctoral thesis. Prys, M. (2009). “Regional Hegemon or Regional Bystander: South Africa‟s Zimbabwe Policy 2000-2005”, Politikon, 36(2): pp. 193-218. Qobo, M. (2018). A new era for South Africa’s foreign policy https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ opinionista/2018-03-13-a-new-era-for-south-africas-foreign-policy/amp/.

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author comprehensively assesses comparable cases of Reigns of Terror in several Book Reviews countries and provides a sense of the differentiation of the purposes of transi- tional justice, memory, museum, different reconciliation commissions, truth telling Bridget, Conley. Memory from the Margins: Ethiopia’s Red Terror and court trials. The book is enlightening as it clarifies the major concepts includ- Martyrs Memorial Museum, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, ing Red; terror; decentralised violence; revolution; memory; memorialisation; mu- 2019, pp 255. seum; survivors; victim; docent; trauma; truth telling; and reconciliation commis- sion; democracy; human rights; reform; transition; and state‟s pretention for legiti- This book consists of six chapters. The first chapter deals with the essence of macy via coercion. “Memory from the Margins”. The second chapter discussed the „Ethiopian rev- Furthermore, the book interestingly articulates the dynamics of Ethiopian poli- olution and the Dergue Regime‟s red terror (1974-1978)”. The third and fourth tics across regimes: the era of Emperor Haile Selassie (1916-1974), the Dergue‟s chapters also discusses post-Dergue “Transitional influences (1991-2005)” and military regime (1974-1991), the Tigray People‟s Liberation Front (TPLF) domi- “the shape of memory (2003-2010)”. The fifth chapter covers the “Tour as nated Ethiopian People‟s Revolutionary Democratic Front-EPRDF period (1991- traumatic performance, 2010 to present)” and the last chapter concludes “on 2018), and the post-2018 EPRDF leadership under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed the memory and future transitions”. also locally known as Oro-mara-EPRDF. It discusses the role of the army since First, I would like to appreciate the author for presenting us her book about the 1960 coup and its interest in state power and politics; the dichotomies of Ethi- one of the key chapters in modern Ethiopian political history: the history of opian revolution, counter-revolution idioms and the major questions that shaped Red Terror and its legacy on memory, history and quest for democracy, torture, the politics of the time; Ethiopian students‟ activism and social activism since trauma, survivor docent/victims, reconciliation, museum and transitional justice 1960s. as well as the ideals “reform and revolution”. This book is timely and detailed in The book analyses struggles against national oppression and class questions terms of discovering the Red Terror atrocities and survivors‟ trauma and cap- ( armed and non armed) among the different Ethiopian liberation forces including turing similar experiences in other parts of the world. It also inspires open dis- Ethiopian people‟s revolutionary party (EPRP), All Ethiopian socialist movements cussion on memory of traumatized Ethiopian citizens during the reign of (locally known as MEISON), Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF- aka Jebha), Eritrean Dergue (1974-1991) that was a less remembered chapter of Ethiopian history; people‟s Liberation Front (EPLF- locally known as Shaebia), Tigray People‟s Liber- the Red Terror and lessons to deal with today‟s security and political challenges ation Front (TPLF) that later evolved into EPRDF after the downfall of the Mili- facing Ethiopia. Since 2015, Ethiopians are in their heyday of debating on the tary Dergue Regime in 1991, Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Ogaden National role of Ethiopian history and composition of societies, fundamental contradic- Liberation Front (ONLF) and many others. The discussion goes over such crucial tions of nation building projects, understanding of power and the state‟s right to elements as the Red Terror, decentralised violence, types of torture; Dergue‟s chal- use coercion that has been negatively affecting the hope of citizens about the lenge to the Ethiopian political culture, moral and religious values prospects for democratic Ethiopia. Furthermore, the Ethiopians are also debat- (instrumentalization of fear, terror, distrusts, disrupting social fabric); the EPRDF ing on the history and intents of the Dergue‟s Red Terror; the support and op- reform and transition: its transitional justice; democratization (definition and objec- position to the memorial museum and the slogan of “never ever again”; the tives), challenge of human rights; the hopes and fears of post 2018 “reform and inadequate studying of the brutality of the past; the teaching of the new genera- transition”- changes and continuities; Ethiopia‟s aspiration for national equality, de- tion to be ethical and moral; its role in relation to the democratic culture in to- velopment and the democratisation fatigue (aspiration and reversal). day‟s Ethiopia; the current mantra of transition and reform,; and the closure of The book also details accounts or memories of survivors or victims; torturer the notorious prison centers locally known as “Maekelawi” and “Kerchele” in and tortured relations; solidarity in prison among prisoners of Red Terror; the Red 2019. Terror survivors and their desperate migration to the United States, Canada, Eu- The book also discusses the interdisciplinary nature of the field of memory rope; the survivors; disruptions of life plan (pattern of life) and challenge of em- studies and transitional justice, cutting across such subjects as history, literary, so- ployment (joblessness, most of them fated to be elementary school teachers); legal ciology, anthropology, psychology and political science. In the first chapter the struggles against their former torturers; and political and security changes in the

131 132 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 host countries (as the Red Terror perpetrators got citizenship mainly in USA and failures of founding fathers like emperor Menelik, Yohannes-IV and Haile Selassie. Canada), which in turn complicated the victims‟ struggle to bring about justice in The opponents of the EPRDF are also continuing to criticise the EPRDF‟s transi- Ethiopia; the struggle to build the memorial museum; survivor-docents‟ challenge tional justice trial, RTMMM‟s and its slogan of “never again” and even closure of to work in the museum, tell their memories, forget or heal their wounds and build Maekelawi. new ethical generation; and see democratic Ethiopia. This also covers efforts to This book also criticises the Abiy Ahmed led EPRDF‟s appreciation of the ensure that the atrocities of red terror would not recur following the post-2015 Dergue military regime policies, Ethiopia- first nationalism and its symbols. This in- protests in Ethiopia. cludes flag competition and Dergue‟s dehumanising tactics against its opponents More importantly, the book also analysed the contending interpretations of visi- like anarchist, reactionaries, Arab mercenaries, anti-Ethiopian and by the same to- tors (from religious, moral, ethical, political, historical point of views) of the Red ken, Abiy Ahmed also repeating the same dehumanising labeling against the Tig- Terror Martyrs Memorial Museum (RTMMM) between Ethiopians and foreign- rayan opponents like “day hyena”, cancer, Tigrigna speakers. The author also criti- ers; Ethiopian old generation and new generation; Dergue opponents and sup- cises Hailemariam Desalegn‟s (former Prime Minister of Ethiopia, 2012-2018) visit porters; EPRP opponents and Supporters; EPRDF supporters and opponents; to Mengistu Hailemariam (who was responsible for the Red Terror atrocities) in survivor docents‟ pedagogical duties (building ethical generation) visa viz. work Zimbabwe for his insensibility to the Red Terror victims . “difficulty” or “hate”; promoting the motto “Never again!”. Furthermore, the role Based on the foregoing review, it is safe to conclude that this book on the Ethi- of martyrs memorial museum and memory in democracy, history and politics; opian Red Terror memory and history is enlightening. It has profound implica- need for comparative study of the Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, Red terror martyrs tions for the post-2015 emerging security and political crisis in Ethiopia. This museum against Dergue and Haile Selassie monuments are also discussed. should be understood within the context that Ethiopia is facing unprecedented As the author of states and in my understudying of Ethiopian political history, political and security crisis particularly after the ascension of Prime Minister Abiy the Red Terror was a special chapter in this history that changed forever the rela- Ahmed to power in April 2018 as the first Oromo prime minister in modern his- tionship between the Ethiopian state and its citizens (subjects including the tor- tory of Ethiopia. Since April 2018, Ethiopia continues to dominate media as a tured one and their families); political cultural (including polarized- un-Ethiopian leading country in internally displaced persons (IDPs), inter ethnic identity and reli- solution, winner-losers dichotomies); the concept of state sovereignty, the use of gious conflicts. Ethiopia is recently branded as “failed state” characterised by a violence and coercion to eliminate opponents in the name of “summery justice” complex web of political and socio-economic ills. According to the author, the leg- or transitional justices; role of the army in the state; pattern of life and so on); and acy of the Red Terror atrocities are not well understood by the Ethiopian citizens consensus building; moral understanding; intergeneration integration (old and and even the RTMMM is still facing contradictory interpretations. The Red Terror new); instruments of negotiation and conflict resolution (violence, anonymous history was the special era in the history of modern Ethiopian politics and quest grave, and dehumanisation visa viz. dialogue and compromise); willingness or stub- for democratization. As a result it changed the Ethiopian political discourses forev- born of the Ethiopian generation to accept their failures for the purpose of recon- er and complicated the prospects for an inclusive multinational nation building. In ciliation and healing and its implications are still remaining untransformed. It also generally, the Red Terror changed a prior understanding of the purpose of the changed the relationship between urban Ethiopia and rural Ethiopia: the rural state, government, citizenship in Ethiopia. Lastly, but not least, it is my well- Ethiopia served as battle field/shield and hosting centers for the insurgent move- considered view that this book deserves a place in any library that prides itself with ments fighting the governments in Menelik palace modeling after Chinese Long patrons that have an interest of African affairs. march. Meressa Tsehaye Gebrewahd This book argues that the failure to fully recognise the atrocities of Red Terror, Center for Peace and Reconciliation, Department of Political the politics of memory and the memorial museum could undermine the role of Science and Strategic Studies, history, museum and memory and willingness to face the national reality: lack of Mekelle University commitments for forgiveness and reconciliation, at least negotiation. Indeed, the author argued that the Ethiopian generations are not willing to openly recognise the agony of Red terror. But they are simply focusing on the distant agony, i.e. the

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racy. As a result, non-Western scholarship was overlooked, thus, the reviewer be- Steven Freidman, Power in Action: Democracy, Citizenship and Social lieves it created a conceptual fog on how African scholars view and purport de- mocracy. The concerted effort of the definitions of democracy provided in this Justice. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2018, 271pp. book gives an overall impression that „African‟ scholars are largely not active- participants in democracy scholarship. Researchers such as Dahl, Morlino, Dia- Professor Steven Freidman‟s book on the challenges facing South Africa‟s democ- mond and Tilly, inter alia, rigorously use Eurocentric lens to give their overall con- racy comes at a time when the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) just strual on democracy. To this end, Afrocentric thinkers‟ contributions towards the hosted the highly contested national elections since 1994. Again, the book comes definition of egalitarianism in Africa in this book is almost non-existent. However, at a period where cut-throat power struggle politics of coalition governments at to some extent, chapter four diluted the Northern scholar‟s dependence as various local government level are at their peak. The momentum and growth of opposi- arguments on human rights and popular sovereignty in Africa were from African tion parties after 25 years of democracy in South Africa signal the growth and ma- voices/scholars (pp 80-98). turing of the „Rainbow Nation‟ democracy. Opposition parties such as the Eco- Max Weber and Lipset claim that “modern democracy in its clearest forms can nomic Freedom Fighters (EFF) are in an expedition to influence the African Na- only occur under unique conditions of capitalist industrialisation.” Lipset further tional Congress (ANC) led government to amend or review the South African claims non-Western or Third-World countries‟ democracy flourish when there is Constitution of 1996; aimed at addressing the triple-headed monster rapid economic growth and thus industrial development creates a conducive envi- (unemployment, income inequality and poverty). This book is also released at a ronment for democracy to strive (pp 49-68). Flowing from the aforementioned time when troubled African states such as Sudan and Zimbabwe had undergone notions, the reviewer asserts that democracy is a system to westernise the world to coup d’état and violent national protests over democracy upliftment. This premise advance the economic system of capitalism. In Africa, democracy is vandalising rightly coincides with Freidman‟s contention that authoritative leaders particularly African norms, values and culture as myelinated (black) Africans are becoming an in Africa deploy democracy to win elections but they are unable to ostensibly oper- audience floating in the midst of a system managed by elites (Western forces) in ate within democratic norms (pp vii-ix). This reflection can be well aligned to the conglomeration with „clever blacks‟. Learning from Morgan Cassady‟s reflection assertion of Kenyan public intellectual, legal expert and scholar, Professor Patrick on constructing a book review, “review the book in front of you, not the book Lumumba “democracy is a competition of ideas, sustained by the constant dialogue where the mi- you wish the author had written. Do not criticise it for something it was never in- nority have their say and the majority have their way.” tended to be”. However, during the reading of this book, I was keen on reading Power in Action is published by Wits University Press, a relatively well-known the historical African form of governance or democracy equally known as Ubuntu publisher of democracy scholarship in South Africa. Freidman‟s book is a compi- in South Africa, which unfortunately was not mentioned. Contextually, the schol- lation of chapters deliberating on issues ranging from (the problematic terming of arly contributions on the inseparable marriage between democracy and capitalism democratic consolidation, the topical dispute of who should be included in a dem- throughout Power in Action were sensitively debated, which highlights the ongoing ocratic community, contradictions between good governance and popular sover- crude attempts to conceal the devastating economic cleavages created by corporate eignty, democracy as an endorsement against Islamic fundamentalism and com- capitalism in South Africa and Africa at large. munism, to minimalist notions of the unconventional task in testing if elections Drawing lessons from an African proverb “criticism on its own sake is not wis- are „free‟ and „fair‟ and the debate on the requirements for political systems to be dom.” Freidman‟s book is profound in substance. This is because it locates the dubbed democratic). fundamental challenges haunting South Africa‟s democracy on issues such as in- This book contains thought-provoking arguments that are highly recommended corporating the poor to decision-making, social justice, equality before the law and for policy crafters and scholars who seek in-depth insight about democracy. alliances (pp 101-190). The challenges are multi-vectored as explained by Freidman speaks truth to power regarding the tailored popular sovereignty rules by Freidman. Thus, they require amicable solutions such as developing strategies the minority in democratic societies to peddle their interests (pp 21-41; p 197). He which will establish conditions where citizens can freely agree to the rules of pop- speaks from a Eurocentric angle as various examples and scholarly debates ular sovereignty, and they can influence power-holders on laws and policy imple- throughout the book emanate from the Western scholar‟s observation on democ- mentation (pp 197-208). This book has a high-quality academic writing style and

135 136 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 41, No 2 Nov /Dec 2019 limited grammatical errors. With its strong narration on democracy in general and South Africa‟s democracy in particular, this book deserves its rightful place in every Style Guidelines for Authors library and bookshelves across the country, continentally and internationally. The The Strategic Review for Southern Africa is a bi-annual publication of the Institute for book suits all audiences that wish to study democracy, social justice and citizenship Strategic and Political Affairs, in the Department of Political Sciences, University of in detail. In teaching and learning, Freidman‟s book can be used as the linkage be- Pretoria. The Institute publishes original articles in English. The Strategic Review for tween Northern democracies with the South. Lastly, Power in Action is highly rec- Southern Africa is listed as an accredited journal in South Africa as well as on the IBSS ommended for fields such as Political Science, History, Sociology, Public Admin- (international) list of accredited journals. All submissions are peer-reviewed by at istration, Local Government and Developmental studies. least two members of the Editorial Committee and/or external reviewers. Articles published in the Strategic Review for Southern Africa qualify for a subsidy from the South Vongani Muhluri Nkuna African Department of Higher Education and Training. University of Limpopo, South Africa Please follow our style guidelines when preparing manuscripts for submission. We reserve the right to return manuscripts if they do not meet the formal requirements. For addtional enquiries you can contact the journal‟s editorial assistant Nomzamo Malin- disa or the Editor Siphamandla Zondi through [email protected]

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