DOCSLIB.ORG

Too Big to Fail: the Path to a Solution a Report of the Failure Resolution Task Force of the Financial Regulatory Reform Initiative of the Bipartisan Policy Center

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Too Big to Fail: the Path to a Solution a Report of the Failure Resolution Task Force of the Financial Regulatory Reform Initiative of the Bipartisan Policy Center Too Big to Fail: The Path to a Solution A Report of the Failure Resolution Task Force of the Financial Regulatory Reform Initiative of the Bipartisan Policy Center May 2013 ABOUT BPC Founded in 2007 by former Senate Majority Leaders Howard Baker, Tom Daschle, Bob Dole and George Mitchell, the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) is a non-profit organization that drives principled solutions through rigorous analysis, reasoned negotiation and respectful dialogue. With projects in multiple issue areas, BPC combines politically balanced policymaking with strong, proactive advocacy and outreach. ABOUT THE FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM INITIATIVE The Financial Regulatory Reform Initiative (FRRI) is co-chaired by Martin Baily and Phillip Swagel. Comprised of five task forces, FRRI’s goal is to conduct an analysis of Dodd-Frank to determine what is and what is not working along with recommendations to improve the system. THIS PAPER IS AUTHORED BY THE CO-CHAIRS OF THE FAILURE RESOLUTION TASK FORCE John F. Bovenzi Randall D. Guynn Thomas H. Jackson The authors appreciate the work and input of the initiative co-chairs, fellow task force members and BPC staff. DISCLAIMER This white paper is the product of the BPC’s Financial Regulatory Reform Initiative. The findings and recommendations expressed herein do not necessarily represent the views or opinions of the Bipartisan Policy Center, its founders, or its board of directors. Too Big to Fail: The Path to a Solution | ii Table of Contents Table of Contents....................................................................................... iii Executive Summary ................................................................................... 1 Recommendations .................................................................................... 8 Discussion .................................................................................................. 16 Detailed Executive Summary ........................................................................16 Maturity Transformation, Panics and Runs.............................................................16 Too-big-to-fail Problem ......................................................................................18 Distinction Between Capital and Liquidity ..............................................................19 Purpose, Conclusions and Recommendations.........................................................19 Orderly Liquidation Authority...............................................................................22 Single-Point-of-Entry (SPOE) Recapitalization Strategy ...........................................23 Bankruptcy Code ...............................................................................................33 Detailed Discussion .................................................................................. 36 Financial System, Maturity Transformation, Panics and Runs.....................36 Too-Big-to-Fail Problem...................................................................................42 The Trouble with Government Bailouts .................................................................43 Proposed Solutions ............................................................................................46 Least-Cost Test .................................................................................................46 Distinction Between Capital and Liquidity...................................................46 Government Bailouts: Capital and Uncompensated Risks ........................................47 Lender-of-Last-Resort Facilities: Liquidity .............................................................47 Orderly Liquidation Fund ....................................................................................53 Key to a Successful Resolution ......................................................................53 Orderly Liquidation Authority.........................................................................54 Single-Point-of-Entry (SPOE) Recapitalization Strategy...............................58 Public, Private, and International Reactions...........................................................58 Alternative Strategies for D-SIFIs and D-SIBs .......................................................63 Too Big to Fail: The Path to a Solution | iii Description of SPOE Recapitalization Strategy........................................................63 Bankruptcy Code............................................................................................70 Ex-Ante Proposals............................................................................................72 Break-up and Caps ............................................................................................73 “Cost-Free” Super Equity Capital .........................................................................77 Conclusion ................................................................................................ 81 Annex A. Process for Researching and Writing the Report................. 82 Annex B. Glossary..................................................................................... 90 Annex C. Bibliography........................................................................... 106 Figures Figure 1. SPOE: Group Structure Before Recapitalization...........................24 Figure 2. SPOE: Hypothetical Losses..............................................................25 Figure 3. SPOE Step 1 – Recapitalizing Business Transferred to Bridge Holdco..............................................................................................................25 Figure 4. SPOE Step 2 – Recapitalizing Operating Subsidiaries..................26 Figure 5. U.S. Basel III Proposals......................................................................29 Figure 6. SPOE Step 3 – Distribution of Equity in Bridge FHC in Satisfaction of Claims Left Behind in Receivership......................................30 Figure 7. SPOE Step 4 – Termination of Bridge Status ..................................30 Figure 8. Bank Closings During Banking Panics, 1873-1914.........................51 Figure 9. Bank Failures, 1910-1940 .................................................................51 Figure 10. Failed Banks / Thrifts, 1921-2012 ...................................................53 Too Big to Fail: The Path to a Solution | iv Executive Summary If there is one thing that all sides of the “too-big-to-fail” debate can agree on, it is that reliving the financial crisis of 2008 without an effective means of resolving all financial institutions would be unacceptable. A central premise of this report is that the too-big-to-fail problem would be solved if all financial institutions, including systemically important ones (SIFIs), could be resolved, that is, recapitalized, sold or wound down without triggering the type of contagious panic that can severely destabilize or even result in a collapse of the financial system and without resorting to taxpayer-funded bailouts to prevent such a catastrophe. A contagious panic results in a cascade of mass withdrawals of cash from the financial system – also known as liquidity runs or just runs – that force financial institutions to sell their illiquid but valuable assets at fire-sale prices. Fire sales not only result in wealth transfers, but also in deadweight losses and overall value destruction that hurts the economy as a whole. The reason banks and other financial institutions are vulnerable to liquidity runs and fire sales during a financial crisis is that one of their core activities is maturity transformation. Maturity transformation is the vitally important process by which financial institutions fund themselves with various forms of short-term money (e.g. bank deposits) and use these funds to make long-term loans or investments, which are often illiquid (e.g. small business loans). Without maturity transformation, our modern economy would grind to a halt. If financial institutions are forced to sell their illiquid but valuable assets at fire-sale prices, otherwise solvent firms can become insolvent. A feedback loop consisting of contagious panics, runs and fire sales will destabilize or even result in a collapse of the financial system. A destabilization or collapse of the financial system will result in a severe contraction in the supply of credit, which will in turn result in long-term damage to the wider economy in terms of higher unemployment and lower output and it will potentially create social unrest. The too-big-to-fail problem arises if government officials have no real choice other than between bailouts and a collapse of the financial system. If these two choices are the only ones available, responsible officials will typically choose bailouts as the lesser of two evils. To end the too-big-to-fail problem, government officials need a viable alternative to these two choices. The alternative must allow a SIFI to be recapitalized, sold or wound down in a way that does not risk a collapse of the financial system and without taxpayer-funded bailouts. Too Big to Fail: The Path to a Solution | 1 Taxpayer-funded bailouts are injections of public money as new equity, long-term unsecured debt or other capital structure liabilities of insolvent firms that insulate the holders of the firm’s capital structure liabilities against losses. So are government guarantees of a firm’s public debt, unless the government is properly compensated for
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Still Too Big to Fail
    Still Too Big To Fail Opportunities for Regulatory Action Seven Years after the Bear Stearns Rescue May 7, 2015 By Jennifer Taub Professor of Law Vermont Law School A project of the Corporate Reform Coalition About the Author Jennifer Taub is a professor of law at Vermont Law School. She is the author of the book Other People’s Houses: How Decades of Bailouts, Captive Regulators, and Toxic Bankers Made Home Mortgages a Thrilling Business (Yale Press, 2014). A graduate of Yale College and Harvard Law School, before joining academia, Taub was an associate general counsel at Fidelity Investments. About the Corporate Reform Coalition The Corporate Reform Coalition is made up of more than 75 or- ganizations and individuals from good governance groups, en- vironmental groups and organized labor, and includes elected officials and socially responsible investors. The coalition seeks to promote corporate governance solutions to combat undisclosed money in elections. For more information, please visit www.CorporateReformCoalition.org. Corporate Reform Coalition Democracy through Accountability May 6, 2015 Contents Summary 4 Remembering Bear Stearns 7 Lehman, AIG, and the Bailouts 10 Gaps and Opportunities for Regulatory Action 15 1. Ending TBTF Bailouts with Living Wills and Emergency Lending Accountability 16 2. Further Reduce Excessive Borrowing by the Top Banks 17 3. Reducing Dependence on Short-Term Wholesale Loans and Providing Transparency 18 4. Close Loopholes for Evading Derivatives Regulation 19 5. Accountability Through Pay Rules 21 6. Political Spending Disclosure Requirements 22 Conclusion 24 Bibliography 26 Still Too Big To Fail: Opportunities for Regulatory Action Summary Seven years after the financial crisis began, many of the conditions that helped cause the near collapse of our banking system — and that were used to rationalize the multi-trillion dollar U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Too Many Voters to Fail: in Uencing and Political Bargaining for Bailouts
    Too many Voters to Fail: Inuencing and Political Bargaining for Bailouts Linda M. Schilling∗ December 23, 2019 Abstract The paper provides a novel theory of how banks not only exploit but also cause being perceived as 'too big to fail'. Bank creditors are also voters. Economic voting prompts politicians to grant bailouts given a bank failure. The bank's capital structure acts as a tool to impact the electoral vote and thus the bail-out by changing the relative group size of voters who favor as opposed to voters who object the bailout. The creditors' anticipation of high bailouts, in return, allows the bank to reduce funding costs today, by this maximizing revenues. Key words: corporate nance, bail-outs, political economy, economic voting, capital structure, inuencing JEL codes: G3, P16, D72 ∗Ecole Polytechnique CREST, email: [email protected]; CREST, 5 avenue Le Chate- lier, 91120 Palaiseau, France, phone: +33 (0)170266726. I very much thank Allan Drazen for numerous insightful comments. I thank my OxFIT discussant Sergio Vicente and Sean Hundtofte for coming up with the title 'Too many voters to fail'. The paper started o during a 2017 research visit at the Becker Friedman Institute of the University of Chicago and concluded during a research visit at the Simons Institute at UC Berkeley. The hospitality and support of both institutions is greatly acknowledged. This work was also conducted under the ECODEC laboratory of excellence, ANR-11-LABX-0047. 1 Motivation Bank failures are politically important events. When a bank fails, bank creditors at risk of losing money can hold politicians accountable for their losses since creditors are also voters (Anderson, 2007).
    [Show full text]
  • Forum 4 2020.Indd
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Bénassy-Quéré, Agnès; Weder di Mauro, Beatrice Article European Pandemic Recovery: An Opportunity to Reboot Intereconomics Suggested Citation: Bénassy-Quéré, Agnès; Weder di Mauro, Beatrice (2020) : European Pandemic Recovery: An Opportunity to Reboot, Intereconomics, ISSN 1613-964X, Springer, Heidelberg, Vol. 55, Iss. 4, pp. 205-209, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10272-020-0903-3 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/224747 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ www.econstor.eu DOI: 10.1007/s10272-020-0903-3 Forum Agnès Bénassy-Quéré and Beatrice Weder di Mauro* European Pandemic Recovery: An Opportunity to Reboot After a period of hesitation, national governments in Eu- and government defi cits in the order of 10% of GDP or rope have reacted forcefully to the pandemic through more.
    [Show full text]
  • The Swiss Interest Rate Puzzle
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Kugler, Peter; Weder di Mauro, Beatrice Working Paper The Demise of the Swiss Interest Rate Puzzle WWZ Working Paper, No. 04/09 Provided in Cooperation with: Center of Business and Economics (WWZ), University of Basel Suggested Citation: Kugler, Peter; Weder di Mauro, Beatrice (2009) : The Demise of the Swiss Interest Rate Puzzle, WWZ Working Paper, No. 04/09, University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ), Basel, http://dx.doi.org/10.5451/unibas-ep61355 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/123398 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum (WWZ) der Universität Basel March 2009 The Demise of the Swiss Interest Rate Puzzle WWZ Working Paper 04/09 (B-093) Peter Kugler, Beatrice Weder The Author(s): Prof.
    [Show full text]
  • UBS AG (Registrant’S Name)
    UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 FORM 6-K REPORT OF FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUER PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-16 OR 15d-16 UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 Date: May 7, 2014 Commission File Number: 1-15060 UBS AG (Registrant’s Name) Bahnhofstrasse 45, Zurich, Switzerland, and Aeschenvorstadt 1, Basel, Switzerland (Address of principal executive office) Indicate by check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual reports under cover of Form 20-F or Form 40-F. Form 20-F ⌧ Form 40-F This Form 6-K consists of the News Release of UBS AG which appears immediately following this page. UBS 7 May 2014 News Release Results of the Annual General Meeting of UBS AG At the Annual General Meeting of UBS AG, held on May 7, 2014, UBS’s shareholders confirmed in their offices those members of the Board of Directors who stood for re-election. 1,666 shareholders attended the meeting, representing 1,994,794,917 votes. Zurich/Basel, 7 May 2014 – At the Annual General Meeting UBS AG shareholders approved the Annual Report and Consolidated Financial Statements for 2013 and confirmed Ernst & Young AG, Basel, as auditors and the Independent Proxy (ADB Altorfer Duss & Beilstein AG, Zurich). They also approved the distribution of a dividend of CHF 0.25 per share (98.80%) from capital contribution reserves. Compensation Report approved In an advisory vote, a majority of shareholders (85.93%) approved the Compensation Report for 2013. Discharge approved Shareholders approved the discharge of the members of the Board of Directors and the Group Executive Board for the 2013 financial year (87.30%).
    [Show full text]
  • Banks and Cross-Border Capital Flows: Policy Challenges and Regulatory Responses
    Banks and Cross-Border Capital Flows: Policy Challenges and Regulatory Responses Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform SEPTEMBER 2012 Markus Brunnermeier Philip R. Lane Dani Rodrik José De Gregorio Jean Pisani-Ferry Kenneth Rogoff Barry Eichengreen Eswar Prasad Hyun Song Shin Mohamed El-Erian Raghuram Rajan Andrés Velasco Arminio Fraga Maria Ramos Beatrice Weder di Mauro Takatoshi Ito Hélène Rey Yongding Yu Banks and Cross-Border Capital Flows: Policy Challenges and Regulatory Responses Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform SEPTEMBER 2012 Markus Brunnermeier Philip R. Lane Dani Rodrik José De Gregorio Jean Pisani-Ferry Kenneth Rogoff Barry Eichengreen Eswar Prasad Hyun Song Shin Mohamed El-Erian Raghuram Rajan Andrés Velasco Arminio Fraga Maria Ramos Beatrice Weder di Mauro Takatoshi Ito Hélène Rey Yongding Yu Table of Contents Preface . iii Executive Summary . iv 1 . Introduction . 1 2 . Some Key Features Of Capital Flows . 6 3 . Policy Implications . 20 4 . Summary And Recommendations . 29 References . 32 Appendix A: Subsidiarization . 37 Appendix B: On Europe . 44 BANKS AND CAPITAL FLOWS: POLICY CHALLENGES AND REGULATORY RESPONSES II Preface he Committee on International Economic in global economic management and economic Policy and Reform is a non-partisan, indepen- governance. Each Committee report will focus on Tdent group of experts, comprised of academics a specific topic and will emphasize longer-term and former government and central bank officials. rather than conjunctural policy issues. Its objective is to analyze global monetary and fi- nancial problems, offer systematic analysis, and The Committee is grateful to the Alfred P. Sloan advance reform ideas. The Committee attempts to Foundation* for providing financial support and identify areas in which the global economic archi- to the Brookings Institution for hosting the com- tecture should be strengthened and recommend mittee and facilitating its work.
    [Show full text]
  • The Too BIG to FAIL Problem Is Alive, Well and Getting Worse
    The Too BIG to FAIL Problem Is Alive, Well and Getting Worse Presentation to the Financial Stability Board workshop at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York SEPTEMBER 16, 2019 Dennis M. Kelleher, President and CEO, Better Markets, 1825 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006 “Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.” - George Santayana BetterMarkets.com | © 2019 Better Markets, Inc. | 1 Too BIG to FAIL Is Alive andBetter Well Markets Lehman Brothers collapsed into bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, 11 years ago yesterday, which ignited the worst financial crash since the Great Crash of 1929 and caused the worst economy since the Great Depression of the 1930s. “Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.” - George Santayana That may be fine for decisions by individuals who suffer the consequences from their own actions. • However, it is a dereliction of duty for public officials, policymakers and regulators who should know better given very recent history, • particularly because the American people eventually are going to suffer the consequences of their actions. BetterMarkets.com | © 2019 Better Markets, Inc. | 2 Too BIG to FAIL Is Alive andBetter Well Markets FSB stated purpose of the evaluation of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) systemiCally important banks (SIBs) reforms “Assess wHetHer tHe implemented reforms are reducing tHe systemic and moral Hazard risks associated witH systemically important banks (SIBs). It will also examine tHe broader effects of tHe reforms to address TBTF for SIBs on tHe overall functioning of tHe financial system.” BetterMarkets.com | © 2019 Better Markets, Inc. | 3 Too BIG to FAIL Is Alive andBetter Well Markets The better objeCtive of the FSB evaluation of TBTF SIB reforms “Assess wHetHer tHe implemented reforms are [sufficiently and effectively] reducing tHe systemic and moral Hazard risks associated witH systemically important banks (SIBs).
    [Show full text]
  • From the Center for Economic Policy Research (1).Pdf
    Mitigating the COVID Economic Crisis: Act Fast and Do Whatever It Takes Mitigating the COVID Economic Crisis: Act Fast and Do Whatever It Takes Edited by Richard Baldwin and Beatrice Weder di Mauro Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street A VoxEU.org Book London EC1V 0DX CEPR Press Tel: +44 (0)20 7183 8801 Email: [email protected] www.cepr.org CEPR Press Mitigating the COVID Economic Crisis: Act Fast and Do Whatever It Takes CEPR Press Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street London, EC1V 0DX UK Tel: +44 (0)20 7183 8801 Email: [email protected] Web: www.cepr.org ISBN: 978-1-912179-29-9 Copyright © CEPR Press, 2020. Mitigating the COVID Economic Crisis: Act Fast and Do Whatever It Takes Edited by Richard Baldwin and Beatrice Weder di Mauro A CEPR Press VoxEU.org eBook CEPR Press The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and not those of CEPR or any of the institutions with which the authors are affiliated. The editors would like to acknowledge the important and timely contribution of research assistance from Guilia Sabbatini and Anmol Kaur Grewal, together with Anil Shamdasani, Sophie Roughton and Alex Southworth’s hard work on production to enable this eBook to be produced so quickly. Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) The Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) is a network of over 1,500 research economists based mostly in European universities. The Centre’s goal is twofold: to promote world-class research, and to get the policy-relevant results into the hands of key decision-makers.
    [Show full text]
  • Systemically Important Or “Too Big to Fail” Financial Institutions
    Systemically Important or “Too Big to Fail” Financial Institutions Marc Labonte Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy Updated September 24, 2018 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R42150 Systemically Important or “Too Big to Fail” Financial Institutions Summary Although “too big to fail” (TBTF) has been a long-standing policy issue, it was highlighted by the financial crisis, when the government intervened to prevent the near-collapse of several large financial firms in 2008. Financial firms are said to be TBTF when policymakers judge that their failure would cause unacceptable disruptions to the overall financial system. They can be TBTF because of their size or interconnectedness. In addition to fairness issues, economic theory suggests that expectations that a firm will not be allowed to fail create moral hazard—if the creditors and counterparties of a TBTF firm believe that the government will protect them from losses, they have less incentive to monitor the firm’s riskiness because they are shielded from the negative consequences of those risks. If so, TBTF firms could have a funding advantage compared with other banks, which some call an implicit subsidy. There are a number of policy approaches—some complementary, some conflicting—to coping with the TBTF problem, including providing government assistance to prevent TBTF firms from failing or systemic risk from spreading; enforcing “market discipline” to ensure that investors, creditors, and counterparties curb excessive risk-taking at TBTF firms; enhancing regulation to hold TBTF firms to stricter prudential standards than other financial firms; curbing firms’ size and scope, by preventing mergers or compelling firms to divest assets, for example; minimizing spillover effects by limiting counterparty exposure; and instituting a special resolution regime for failing systemically important firms.
    [Show full text]
  • The Myth of Too Big to Fail, Imad A
    Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions Series Editor: Professor Philip Molyneux The Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions are international in orientation and include studies of banking within particular countries or regions, and studies of particular themes such as Corporate Banking, Risk Management, Mergers and Acquisitions, etc. The books’ focus is on research and practice, and they include up-to-date and innovative studies on contemporary topics in banking that will have global impact and influence. Titles include: Yener Altunbas¸, Blaise Gadanecz and Alper Kara SYNDICATED LOANS A Hybrid of Relationship Lending and Publicly Traded Debt Yener Altunbas¸, Alper Kara and Öslem Olgu TURKISH BANKING Banking under Political Instability and Chronic High Inflation Elena Beccalli IT AND EUROPEAN BANK PERFORMANCE Paola Bongini, Stefano Chiarlone and Giovanni Ferri (editors) EMERGING BANKING SYSTEMS Vittorio Boscia, Alessandro Carretta and Paola Schwizer COOPERATIVE BANKING: INNOVATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS COOPERATIVE BANKING IN EUROPE: CASE STUDIES Roberto Bottiglia, Elisabetta Gualandri and Gian Nereo Mazzocco (editors) CONSOLIDATION IN THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL INDUSTRY Alessandro Carretta, Franco Fiordelisi and Gianluca Mattarocci (editors) NEW DRIVERS OF PERFORMANCE IN A CHANGING FINANCIAL WORLD Dimitris N. Chorafas CAPITALISM WITHOUT CAPITAL Dimitris N. Chorafas FINANCIAL BOOM AND GLOOM The Credit and Banking Crisis of 2007–2009 and Beyond Violaine Cousin BANKING IN CHINA Vincenzo D’Apice and
    [Show full text]
  • Economics in the Time of COVID-19 Economics in the Time of COVID-19
    Economics in the Time of COVID-19 Economics in the Time of COVID-19 Edited by Richard Baldwin and Beatrice Weder di Mauro Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street A VoxEU.org Book London EC1V 0DX CEPR Press Tel: +44 (0)20 7183 8801 Email: [email protected] www.cepr.org CEPR Press Economics in the Time of COVID-19 CEPR Press Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street London, EC1V 0DX UK Tel: +44 (0)20 7183 8801 Email: [email protected] Web: www.cepr.org ISBN: 978-1-912179-28-2 Copyright © CEPR Press, 2020. Economics in the Time of COVID-19 Edited by Richard Baldwin and Beatrice Weder di Mauro A CEPR Press VoxEU.org eBook CEPR Press The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and not those of CEPR or any of the institutions with which the authors are affiliated. The editors would like to acknowledge the important and timely contribution of research assistance from Guilia Sabbatini and Anmol Kaur Grewal, together with Anil Shamdasani and Sophie Roughton’s hard work on production to enable this eBook to be produced so quickly. Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) The Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) is a network of over 1,500 research economists based mostly in European universities. The Centre’s goal is twofold: to promote world-class research, and to get the policy-relevant results into the hands of key decision-makers. CEPR’s guiding principle is ‘Research excellence with policy relevance’. A registered charity since it was founded in 1983, CEPR is independent of all public and private interest groups.
    [Show full text]
  • Prof. Dr. Isabel Schnabel CURRICULUM VITAE
    Prof. Dr. Isabel Schnabel CURRICULUM VITAE Oktober 2019 Professorin für Finanzmarktökonomie Institut für Finanzmarktökonomie & Statistik Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn 53012 Bonn Telefon: (0228) 73 9202 Fax: (0228) 73 99 504 E-Mail: [email protected] URL: http://www.finance.uni-bonn.de/schnabel Twitter: @Isabel_Schnabel PERSÖNLICHE DATEN Geburtsdatum 9. August 1971 Geburtsort Dortmund Geburtsname Gödde Staatsangehörigkeit deutsch Familienstand verheiratet Kinder 3 Kinder (2004, 2006, 2008) GEGENWÄRTIGE BERUFLICHE STELLUNG Professorin (W3) für Finanzmarktökonomie an der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, seit Dezember 2015 Mitglied des Sachverständigenrates zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, seit Juni 2014 Sprecherin des Excellenzclusters 2126 “ECONtribute – Markets & Public Policy” (Universität Bonn und Universität zu Köln), seit Januar 2019 Ko-Vorsitzende des Deutsch-Französischen Rates der Wirtschaftsexperten, seit Oktober 2019 Research Affiliate am Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Gemeinschaftsgütern, Bonn, seit September 2007 Research Fellow des Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) im Bereich „Financial Economics“, seit Januar 2015 (Affiliate seit Dezember 2006) Research Affiliate und Vorstandsmitglied des Reinhard Selten Institute, Bonn und Köln, seit April 2017 1 FORSCHUNGSINTERESSEN Finanzkrisen, Bankenregulierung, „too big to fail“, systemische Risiken Internationale Kapitalströme, Finanzintegration Wirtschaftsgeschichte (Finanzkrisen und -institutionen)
    [Show full text]