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DOC't~I RE C09 DOC't~i RE C09"f OrJGI ... .... ~ " .,. , ".. ". Defending liberty SCIl"NCl" & TEcHNCL.CGY LAW Pursuing Justice 1008-1009 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION Section of Science & CHAIR Rulh Hili Bro Technology Law One ~'rudentIJI Plazd I JU t Randolph St 321 N. Clark Street Chicago, IL flOoOI Received & Inspected IL CHAIR-ELECT Chicago, 60654-7598 1I1r1s!m€ M Crdnl (312) 988-5599 1:;15 Brook B,'nd I'nncelOn, NJ OH54il April 23, 2009 WR ?. 4 7nnq FAX: (3121 988-6797 VICE-CHAIR 51ephen 5. \""" [email protected] 1(,6 M~ln 51 www.abanet.org/scitech Los Altu" CA 94022 \{OOm Marlene H. Dortch Voce Nlail SECRETARY tCit Y. DrO~1I1 )~[) Iin,d" SI, Sune 2400 Secretary HIrlAh,lm. MA 0204J BUDGET OFFICER Federal Communications Commission Kimberly ""f'fer Pcrrl!1 John C. Kl'nnl'v Bldg 445 12th Street, SW 11)\h Jnd ("Ollstltutlon, NW, ",uilt' bllll W~<;hlngton, Dr 21J5Jll Washington, DC 20554 IMMEDIATE PAST CHAIR Gilberl F WhJTtrlll<lrt' 54 Candl 51, 5,,,1<' lOll Bo';lon, M.A il211~ SECTION DELEGATES TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES Ellen j. Flannery Re: Coalition United to Tenninate Financial Abuses for Television Ill) I F\'TH1,;ylvanl,1 Ave, NW INJ,hln"ton, DC 20004 Transmission's (CUT FATT) Petition For Rulemaking and Request For Bonnie Foughl I '.0. Box 2521341 Declaratory Ruling (MB Docket No. 09-23) ~,ln rranci;,co, CA 94118 COUNCil MEMBERS William R. Bdh-r W~shln~,on, DC 51'."Vf'll flro1Wi?r Dear Secretary: IrVine, CA Jorge L lonlrer<l'; W,l,hlngIOll, DC Ime [ CUZmJIl, jr I am filing the enclosed comments on behalfofRuth Hill Bro, Chair ofthe SJn FrMKlsco, CA. Timothy H;,il'h American Bar Association Section of Science & Technology Law, with regard to ryson~ Comer, VA Mark D LllvJck MB Docket No. 09-23. As requested, enclosed are the original comments and L", Angelrs, CA WillLdl!'). LurJrJv Ir four copies. Blork 1,IJnlL KI HeJlht"l I ME'{'ker P,lln.Alro, CA Juhn M ,>"l",;<ong Please let me know ifyou have any questions. I can be reached by email at Tuuon,"<t RJmly V. Sabetl [email protected] at (312) 988-5601. WJshlnglon, DC LU~re;J~~~'~s~~ Sincerely, BenJ<lmln Wilson S,Ih L~kC' ,<Iy, UT lAW STUDENT DIVISION LIAISON 'UA ~\~~ YOUNG LAWYfR DIVISION liAISON EUf\C'nlo WA C('I~('I-Slmounet Ch,j~I'dn~lt'rI, VI Shawn Taylor Kaminski BOARD OF GOVERNORS LIAISON Director, ABA Section of Science & Technology Law MJlhew L. Nelson 5Jnt" Monl(d, CA IURIMETRICS JOURNAL EDITOR-IN-CHIEF L<lu,ence H. Winer Enclosures Tempe, AZ THE SCITECH LAWYER fDlTOR-IN-CHIEF Juk FI"mlllg Rrown All~nT~, GA GRANTS AND FUNDING R,ch.ml D. M<lrk, Mclf·M'. VA PROGRAM CHAIR IMlC Billie", S~ntJ Mon,ca, C'\ No. of Copies rec'd SECTION DIRECTOR 0 ..J--t Shawn Taylor K~mln~kl UstABCDE 1312)988-5601 ,;k,lm In~k 1@,tJ ff.Jbanet .Ol~ SEalON MfMBfRSHIP AND COMMITTEES MANAGER )ulL~ C. Gillespie 1312198C-5594 gille~PJI1iisrolff.duanel.orr;: ADMINiSTRATIVE ASSiSTANT MJfI.l L Gamboa 1J12)':1tl(l·55'l9 J;,lmboam@5Iaff ~hanel.org ABA Midyear Meeting, February 11-14, 2009, Boston, MA ABA Annual Meeting, July 29 - August 2, 2009, Chicago, IL ... II... II t C ~ • ".. <I F Defending liberty SCIENCE & TU:HNDl.DG'Y LAW Pursuing Justice 2008-2009 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION Section of Science & CHAIR R\lth Hili Bro Technology law One Prud,'ntl~1 Plaz.l 130 E. Randolph S1. 321 N. Clark Street Chl,ago, IL 110601 Chicago, IL 60654-7598 CHAIR-ELECT Received &Inspected Ch".,!lne M Gr.lnt (3121988·5599 I \] ~ Brook lIenrl PrmU'lorl, NJ 08540 FAX: (3121 988·6797 VICE-CHAIR Steph"11 5 Wu APR 24 ?009 [email protected] 1f:,(, M.lln St. lo~ AII(», (A ')4022 www.abanet.orglscitech SECRETARY fCC Mail Room En, Y. l)ro~llI ,')() Lincoln SI, SUite 2400 H"l~ham, M,A IJ2041 BUDGET OFFICER April 23, 2009 Klmberlv Kld<,r Perelll lohn ( Kenney Bldg. 10th and Con,liIUII<ln, NW. SWllf' hill) Wa,hlnl-\Ion, nc 20~~O Marlene H. Dortch IMMEDIATE PAST CHAIR Gilhf'rt l-. \.,,'hiltemorp 54 (dnal,1 , SUlle 300 Secretary Boslon, MA02114 Federal Communications Commission SECTION DElEGATES TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES Ellen) FlJnn('ry 445 12th Street, SW I~OI Penn,ylv.1nlJ A.e., NW Washinl-(loll, UC 20004 Washington, DC 20554 Ilmmie Foul-\111 PO Box 2828-41 San ,'r~rKI<;co, CA ')"ILB COUNCil MEMBERS \-\';lI,am B. BJker Re: Coalition United to Ternlinate Financial Abuses for Television W,l<hmglon, DC Sleven Brower Transmission's (CUT FATT) Petition For Rulemaking and Request For Declaratory Irv;ne, CA lorge L. Conlreras Ruling (MB Docket No. 09-23) Wa,h,nll!0n, DC )fJ<;'-' F (juzm~n, Jr '>~n FrJnll,co, CA TlIllOlhy HSI~h Ty,orll (orner, VA Mark [) Litvack Dear Secretary: lo;, A"g,'le<, CA Will,'~m I Luddy, Jr Block Island, RI He<1ther J Mrrkf'r This comment is submitted on behalf ofthe American Bar Association P.11L>A!to, CA Joh" M Mes5ing ("ABA"), Section of Science & Technology Law (the "Section") concerning the Tucson, AZ R~l1dy V :'.1hell Commission's request for comment on the Coalition United to Terminate Financial WJ.shml-\lon, DC Abusesfor Te/f'vision Transmission's ("CUT FATT") Petition For Rulemaking And L~re~~~~~:~V~ Request For Declaratory Ruling (hereinafter "the Petition"). These views are being Ben]Jrl"n WII<on ~.1II LJ\.:" City, UT presented on behalfofthe Section only and have not been approved by the House of LAW STUDENT DIVISION LIAISON 18A Delegates or the Board ofGovernors ofthe American Bar Association and should not YOUNG LAWYER DIVISION LIAISON be construed as representing the position ofthe Association. fUllenlO W.A G,'lg"I-Slmounet Chrisll,m,led, VI BOARD OF GOVERNORS LIAISON The ABA is the largest voluntary professional association in the world. With M.-Ilhew L. Nelson .S.",I.) Monica, CA more than 400,000 members, the ABA provides law school accreditation, continuing IURIMHIl.ICS JOURNAL legal education, information about the law, programs to assist lawyers and judges in EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Laurene(' H. Winer T('lrllle, AZ their work, and initiatives to improve the legal system for the public. The Section was THE SCITECH LAWYER fDITOR-IN-eHIEF fornled in 1974 to provide a forum for addressing issues at the intersection oflaw, Julie Fiemlllg Brown A1IJrlla, C,"" science, and technology. The Section has long addressed the issue of standardization, GRANTS AND FUNDING Il.lChard D Morb as essential to technological development. The Section's Technical Standardization McL,,~n, VA PROGRAM CHAIR Committee seeks to improve the development of solutions to policy issues having a Ian C. B.1llon SMlta MOnica, C-'I mixture of legal and technical factors by seeking to balance or change the law or rules SECTION DIRECTOR Shdwn Taylor Kaminski applicable to standards development and use. The Section's Telecommunications and 012)')88-5601 5b[Jlin~kI@.'ra~.abJnet.org Mass Media Committee addresses the entire range of legal issues involving domestic SECTION MEMBERSHIP AND COMMlTIEES MANAGER and international communications, information services, the Internet, and other mass Julia C Gi),'e,;ple i312\988-55'J-4 glllesPJ@;,1 0I!"banel.orl-\ media. ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT MMiJ l. Camboa (312\981l·,)5'J9 f;amho,[email protected] ABA Midyear Meeting, F-elbr"ary 11-14, 2009, Boston, MA ABA Annual Meeting, July 29 - August 2, 2009, Chicago, IL In its Petition, CUT FATT makes a number ofrequests and proposes rules that would require the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to regulate patent royalty rates associated with the Advanced Television Systems Committee ("ATSC") digital television ("DTY") standards. (see www.atsc.org). The Section takes no position on whether or not the Commission should assume any role as requested by the Petition or modify any policies regarding DTY patent licensing but rather comments here on the complex and factual considerations that would be implicated by CUT FATT's request that the Commission:) [D]eclare that ATSC royalty demands that exceed international comparables are presumed to exceed the FCC requirements, and that each patent holder with higher fees has the burden ofproving that its proposed license fees are reasonable and non-discriminatory." 2 The Section provides these comments because we believe we have pertinent expertise concerning the issues raised in the Petition by the above-quoted request. This expertise is reflected in the ABA's Standards Development Patent Policy Manual (the "ABA Manual"), developed by the Technical Standardization Committee and published in August 2007. The ABA Manual was developed and drafted with significant input from more than twenty Section representatives each bringing his or her own unique perspective and experiences involving patent licensing issues and standards development and adoption. As a result ofthe extraordinary diversity ofthese contributors, the ABA Manual reflects not only the variety ofcurrent practices relating to patents and standards, but also where there is consensus among this diverse group of stakeholders3 The ABA Manual addresses several topics relevant to CUT FATT's Petition including: distinctions between RAND licensing commitments and RAND licenses, terms and conditions associated with RAND licensing commitments, definitions ofEssential Claims subject to RA1\.'D licensing commitments, and the scope ofRA.""IT) licensing commitments. ) The Section notes that CUT FATT has made several different requests and has proposed rules that it would have the FCC adopt. The fact that the Section does not address all the requests or the proposed rules should not be construed as the Section's agreement, acquiescence, approval, or otherwise support for such requests or proposed rules.
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