The Slow Annexation of Britain 225 Pearls, Gold, Slaves?
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the slow annexation of britain 225 Pearls, gold, slaves? The slow annexaTion of BriTain Steven Rutledge My present fortune is as sordid for me as it is magnificent for you. i had horses, men, weapons, wealth. what wonder, if i lost these unwillingly? for if you wish to rule all, does it follow that all welcome slavery? Caratacus, Tac. Ann. 12.37 To steal, to butcher, to pillage they call by the false name “empire”, and where they make a desert they call it peace. Calgacus, Tac. Agr. 30 By the time Caratacus delivered his frank speech before Claudius and the roman senate, the romans had been involved in the conquest of Britain, on and off, for a century; another forty years intervened between Carata- cus’ defiant speech before rome’s senate and Calgacus’ defeat at Mons graupius. over time the conquest of Britain, and roman involvement in that province, has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. indeed, so prolific is the scholarship on roman Britain (itself attributable to a nexus of socio-political factors in Britain itself, as well as the very visible mark the romans left on the island) that it is fair to say that it constitutes a vir- tual industry. standard surveys of roman Britain include salway’s (1981), Todd’s (1981 and 2004), frere’s (1987), Potter and Johns’ (1992) and, most recently, Bedoyère’s (2006). The present discussion will attempt to synthe- size and distill some of the major questions and controversies surrounding the conquest of the province through a chronological narrative of roman involvement in Britain, from Julius Caesar’s initial foray onto the island through the tenure of agricola, at which point major attempts at the con- quest of the island were, for the most part, abandoned, with a policy of consolidation and containment on its northern boundary taking prece- dence. 1. From Julius Caesar to Caligula Caesar’s description of Britain’s disposition and geography is the earliest we have from a roman author (BGall. 5.12-13), and is one that influenced 226 steven rutledge subsequent descriptions such as those found in diodorus siculus (5.21.3-6) and strabo (1.4.1-3; cf. 4.5.2, 5).1 Both his description and his failed attempt at the island’s conquest take up Book 5 of his de Bello Gallico. his first at- tempt to bring the island within the roman sphere came in 55 BC, although the mission may have been intended simply for reconnaissance with a view to subsequent conquest (webster 1980, 36-7). To what degree the invasion of the following year, 54 BC, could have been a success we shall never know. while Caesar initially made inroads against the Britons, who were led by Cassivellaunus, serious trouble in gaul forced Caesar back to the conti- nent. in hindsight, we might view Caesar’s decision to invade Britain as rash, given his apparent miscalculation concerning the stability of his newly conquered province. however there were several motives, doubtless com- pelling ones in Caesar’s mind, that will have driven him to divert his atten- tion for the moment away from gaul towards Britain, and while there is no need to choose one excluding the others, some motives certainly carried greater weight. his expedition was doubtless intended to win him prestige for political gain. no one would challenge his clout after the conquest of gaul, the rhineland, and his invasion of the hitherto largely unknown is- land. indeed, that he was making a foray into unknown territory was an angle played up by Caesar himself, although the outcome of the expedition has led some scholars to view it less favorably as a clear case of overreach.2 while that might have been the case, a significant reason for Caesar’s fail- ure was not lack of preparation but his misjudgment of the situation in gaul. as webster has noted (1980, 84), the attempted conquest of Britain was undertaken by Caesar with the intent of ultimate victory, as the large forces he had already employed in 54 (five legions and 2,000 horse) indi- cate. Moreover Caesar’s ‘failure’ is somewhat moot since, in terms of en- hancing his reputation, his invasion had virtually the same effect as a successful conquest, generating considerable excitement in rome.3 de- tractors, however, imputed motives of greed to Caesar’s invasion (specifi- cally the hope of cornering Britain’s pearl market: suet. Iul. 47; 50). such criticism was not without merit. Trade and the exploitation of natural resources (noted in his initial description of the island) were cer- tainly on Caesar’s mind (Mitchell 1983, 80-99). he remarked that the island 1 for Britain in the roman literary imagination see stewart 1995, 1-10. 2 see Todd 2004, 42-3 for the exploratory angle and overreach; cf. Braund 1996, 12-23, 52-3. 3 see Braund 1996, 42-4; cf. 48-54 for Caesar’s portrayal of his venture into Britain..