Items-In-Cyprus - Chronological Files

UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title Page 117 Date 15/06/2006 Time 9:27:40 AM

S-0903-0006-09-00001

Expanded Number S-0903-0006-09-00001

items-in-Cyprus - chronological files

Date Created 15/07/1978

Record Type Archival Item

Container s-0903-0006: Peackeeping - Cyprus 1971-1981

Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit I 9aS-33SO _APEA CODE 212

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

TO THE UNITED NATIONS

B2O SECOND AVENUE

NEW YORK, N. Y. 1OO17 Ref: 2007/77/7 29 December 1978 Excellency, • . /... On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw Your Excellency's attention to the latest events in the part of the territory of Cyprus still under the aggressive occupation of Turkey's invasion army, in flagrant violation of the unanimous General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions. As already well known, the Greek Cypriot majority people in the invaded area have been genocidally expelled therefrom because of their ethnic origin, in the most abhorrent practice of racial discrimination. Thereafter, alien population illegally transported from Anatolia, Turkey is being massively implanted in the usurped homes and properties of the uprooted Greek Cypriots, on a pre-planned design to change * by force the demographic structure of Cyprus. These imported settlers,whose record of criminality has become notorious in the said area, were emboldened enough by the attitude of Ankara so as to form now a regular political party in the occupied north under the leadership of Colonel I'smael Tezer, a retired Turkish airforce officer. At a press conference on 22nd December, Col. Tezer declared the party's

. . . 2/ His Excellency Dr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General United Nations New York, N.Y. 10017 - 2 - policy to be the "partition of Cyprus" and its eventual "integration with the motherland" (Turkey). This party has been promptly registered under the name of "Turkish Unity Party" by the so-called "Turkish Cypriot authorities". Col. Tezer's further expression, at a press conference on 26th December, of "unreserved support for President Denktash" would imply an affinity of policy. These developments make still more manifest the unchanging pattern of partition that dominates Ankara's policy over Cyprus and is reflected in its instruments^the ruling "Turkish Cypriot leadership", imposed by Ankara upon the rank and file of the Turkish Cypriots,"-irrespective of the latter's wishes and true interests. I would be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly under item 28, and of the Security Council. Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Zenon Rossides Ambassador Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations UNITED NATIONS Distr. GENERAL

GENERAL SECURITY A/3U/51 S/1298T ASSEMBLY COUNCIL 29 December 1978 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY SECURITY COUNCIL Thirty-fourth session Thirty-third year QUESTION OF CYPRUS

Letter dated 29 December 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw Your Excellency's attention to the latest events in the part of the territory of Cyprus still under the aggressive occupation of Turkey's invasion army, in flagrant violation of the unanimous resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

As is already well known, the people of the Greek Cypriot majority in the invaded area have been genocidally expelled therefrom because of their ethnic origin, in the most abhorrent practice of racial discrimination. Thereafter, an alien population, illegally transported from Anatolia, Turkey, is "being massively implanted in the usurped homes and properties of the uprooted Greek Cypriots , in a preplanned design to change by force the demographic structure of Cyprus.

These imported settlers, whose record of criminality has become notorious in the said area, have been emboldened enough by the attitude of Ankara as to form now a regular political party in the occupied north under the leadership of Colonel Ismael Tezer, a retired Turkish Air Force officer. At a press conference on 22 December 1978, Colonel Tezer declared the party's policy to be the "partition of Cyprus" and its eventual "integration with the motherland" (Turkey). This party has been promptly registered under the name of the "Turkish Unity Party" by the so-called ''Turkish Cypriot authorities'1. Colonel Tezer's further expression, at a press conference on 26 December, of 'unreserved support for President Denktash" would imply an affinity of policy.

These developments make still more manifest the unchanging pattern of partition that dominates Ankara's policy over Cyprus and is reflected in its instruments, the ruling ;'Turkish Cypriot leadership", imposed by Ankara upon the rank and file of the Turkish Cypriots irrespective of the latter's wishes and true interests.

78-3263^ A/3U/51 S/1298T English Page 2

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under the item entitled "Question of Cyprus" and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES Ambassador Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations

X". •'6?

13 December 1978

DRAFT TALKING POINTS

1. I welcome the readiness of the Cyprus Government to resume the negotiating process as soon as possible. I agree that the time may be ripe for a serious new attempt to make progress toward a solution of the Cyprus problem. 2. It appears that both sides are now prepared to resume talks under my auspices, within the framework of the mission of good offices entrusted to me by the Security Council. Both have signified their continued acceptance of the existing negotiating arrangements, as well as their continued support of the Makarios-Denktash guidelines and of my suggestion of last May that resettlement of Varosha should be envisaged as a concrete first step to be linked with the resumption of inter communal talks. 3. The practical problem remains that the proposals submitted by the parties have in the past tended to be mutually unacceptable and incompatible. It would be counterproductive to stage a replay of the last rounds of intercommunal talks, in the course of which it proved impossible to develop genuine negotiations. 4. Consequently, it is essential to develop an agreed basis «*"» of negotiations. This does not mean a advance ornegotiations. It means that there has to be a common negotiating paper that could be used as a vehicle for discussion and amen'OfiJeiv^s, and to lend structure to the talks. It is obviously not possible to start with a completely open agenda, or solely with the conflicting proposals of the parties. However the positions of the parties as expressed in their previous proposals will obviously be taken into account. 5. The paper received by the parties and by the Secretary- General on 10 November could have substantial value in providing important components of such a new negotiating basis. I have specific assurances that it is not meant to remove the negotiating process from the auspices of the Secretary-General, or from his - 2 - good offices mission. 6. I understand that both parties see considerable merits in the paper. I also understand that both are confronted with certain domestic political problems in using that paper. Obviously, the Secretary-General must address himself to the substance of the problem, not to domestic political considerations which, after all, are the responsibility of the parties. With this understanding, the Secretary-General is of course prepared to be helpful. 7. The present situation, as stated in my report to the Security Council, is that I am awaiting the reactions of the parties to the suggestion that the talks should be resumed with the utilization of the new paper. If one party or both are not prepared to accept the new paper as a basis of the talks, it is

Aof course possible to devise another basis. However, this other >asis, if it is to be initiated by the Secretary-General, would M >»«««-«™"«*»~.«WmB]>ws.1,., ,.-*^«.«~.w^,«aw^.»^""'-"'™** -"~-«'''"=«-«x,,,,,» ..m igain have to be agreed upon by both iiBesT""'^^^trweffiRbd-^aiso^-to--.-.. a l Sf r: l &MXlWn^'.iKiiamji\'t&*i*-< '- -- ''' - '--\.^.,, ^ M[ _, ^,,v- . - ... •-=! J-.-'nijj,,^ ^have to satisfy the requirement that^lLt~would enhance the prospect of productive substantial negotiations. 8. In dealing with this problem, I could conceivably, and if deemed helpful by both parties, do the following things: (a) I could call on the parties to resume the intercommunal talks and as a first step invite the leaders of the two sides to meet under my auspices in or in in order to lay down the agenda and programme for the resumed talks; (b) In preparation for the high-level meeting, I would prepare a drjifj^aj^njia and programme of work that the leaders might consider adopting for the guidance of the interlocutors. This paper would contain substantial procedural elements (appointment of comniijbtees, etc.); it vould also contain, in suitable form, the main elements - 3 -

of the 10 November paper. In principle there would be no substantive "pre-negotiating" process, but I would naturally wish to sound out the parties in advance so as to ensure that the agenda and the programme will be adopted at the high-level meeting without difficulty. Khe text would make it clear that the paper is based on the Makarios-Denktash guidelines, drawing upon elements of the I960 Constitution and bearing in mind UN resolutions; it will also incorporate my suggestions concerning Varosha. (c) If all concerned agree, I would ask my Special Representative in Cyprus to engage in consultations, as soon as the parties are ready, with a view to developing the working basis and agenda for the renewed talks. 9. Obviously, this delicate process of starting the negotiations will depend in large degree on the good faith of the parties and on their confidence in the Secretary-General*s impartiality and discretion. It will also depend on a self-denying ordinance for all concerned on pufeliS?!^ statements, especially in the preparatory stages. I hope very much that the parties will find it possible to respond to my appeal in this regard so that we may overcome the preliminary obstacles and embark on a constructive process of real negotiation of the substantive issues involved. Ill

The "Framework for a Cyprus settle'ment" contains many elements unacceptable to the parties. It also contains some elements, which have either been decided upon by the United Nations or agreed between the parties in the past. In view of this, without prejudice to the positions of the parties and without the parties accepting the "fframe- work" as a basis for their negotiations but simply as a non-committing working paper to be discussed in addition to other ideas, which may be presented by the parties or the Secretary-General for discussion, they are prepared to negotiate, provided that the negotiations will be conducted freely under the auspices of the Secretary-General and without any outside interference.

It is noted that the contents of paragraph 12 of the "Framework" and of its Attachment do not refer to matters to be negotiated. They refer to a resettlement which must "be initiated in phase with the resumption of full intercommunal negotiations." It is necessary to arrange the modalities for such a resettlement in advance, in order to synchronise it with the initiation of the talks, II

The parties to the intercommunal talks agree to negotiate in good faith and in a sustained manner under the auspices and direction of the Secretary-General towards a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. The negotiation will be based on the following (in alphabetical order):

1. The constitution of I960; Pertinent elements of this constitution adapted to the concept of a bicommunal federal state. 2. The Guidelines agreed in February 1977 between Makarios and Denk.tash. 3. The United Nations Resolutions on Cyprus.

During the negotiations the parties may take note and may also discuss the contents of a document entitled "Frame- work for a Cyprus settlement." The parties do not consider the "Framework" as a basis for the negotiations and they have expressed their reservations for the contents of this document. The parties further agree that the Varosha area shall be resettled under United Nations auspices in accordance with the arrangements mentioned herebelow. Such resettlement shall be initiated in phase with the resumption of full intercommunal negotiations on a comprehensive agreement.

THE VAROSHA AREA

The parties to the intercommunal talks shall cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his representatives in arranging the modalities for an early resettlement of the Varosha area. The following guidelines will obtain: (a) The area for resettlement shall encompass territory lying to the east of the village of Ayios Nikolaos and to the south of the old Nicosia-Famagusta road. In defining the precise area for resettlement, the concerns of the Turkish Cypriot party for the security of Old Famagusta and Famagusta Harbor shall be taken into account. (b) The area for resettlement shall be administered under the supervision of the United Nations, and shall be considered as an extension of the present United Nations, buffer zone. There shall be a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot liaison officer to the United Nations authorities for this purpose. Cypriot laws and regu** lations shall be in force in the area of resettlement. (c) It is understood that as many former residents of the area of resettlement may return as choose. There shall be no fixed numerical limitation. (d) Those who return to the area for resettlement shall not be subject to further involuntary displacement. jter tie's td the intercommunal talks agree to negotiate in good faith and in a sustained manner under the auspices and direction of the Secretary-General towards a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. The negotiation will be based on the following (in alphabetical order}:

1. The Constitution of I960: Pertinent elements, of this constitution adapted to the concept of a bicommunal federal state.

2. The Guidelines agreed in February 1977 between ^

Makarios and Denktash.

3. The United Nations Resolutions on Cyprus.

The parties further agree that the Varosha area shall be resettled under United Nations auspices in accordance with the arrangements mentioned herebelow. Such resettlement shall be initiated in phase with the resumption of full intercommunal negotiations, on a comprehensive agreement.

THE VAROSHA AREA The parties to the intercommunal talks shall cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his representatives in arranging the modalities for an early resettlement of the Varosha area. The following guidelines will obtain: (a) The area for resettlement shall encompass territory lying to the east of the village of Ayios Nikolaos and to the south of the old Nicosia-Famagusta road. In defining the precise area for resettlement, the concerns of the Turkish Cypriot party for the security of Old Famagusta and Famagusta Harbor shall be taken into account. Cb) The area for resettlement shall be administered under the supervision of the United Nations, and shall be considered as an extension of the present United Nations, buffer zone. There shall be a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot liaison officer to the United Nations authorities for this purpose. Cypriot laws and regulations shall be in force in the area of resettlement. (c) It is understood that as many former residents of the area of resettlement may return as: choose. There shall be no fixed numerical limitation. (d) Those who return to the area for resettlement shall not be subject to further involuntary displacement. Draft Agenda and Programme of Work

I. Resumption and Basis of Talks

1. We hereby call for the resumption of intercommunal negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General and in pursuance of his mission of good offices, to be exercised by him personally or by his Special Representative on his behalf. The purpose of the talks will be to negotiate in good faith and in a

sustained manner toward a comprehensive Cyprus settlement.

jJC$ As indicated in the Makarios/Denktash Guidelines of 12 February 1977, the Republic of Cyprus shall be a bicommunal Federal State with two constituent

regions, one of which will be inhabited predominantly by Greek Cypriots, the other predominantly by Turkish Cypriots. The independent^ sovereignty and || territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus shall be assured, as shall its &j f|'i right to conduct a policy of non-alignment. The incorporation of all or part

of the Republic into any other state shall be expressly prohibited. Procedure 1. The venue of the talks will normally be Nicosia (UNFICYP conference area at the Ladra Palace Hotel). Meetings may also be held from time to time at United A Nations Headquarters in New York. Committees will normally meet in Nicosia. 2. Upon reconvening, the interlocutors, after their introductory general statements, will proceed to set up working committees to consider, and report

on, the following subjects: (a) constitutional aspects

(b) territorial aspects (c) economic aspects ("reconciliation fund") Provision will also be made for a drafting committee. Additional subsidiary bodies may be set up as necessary. 3. The committees will consist of deputies to be appointed by the interlocutors. The deputies may be assisted by a small number of experts. They will meet under the auspices of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General or a deputy designated by him. H. The Secretary-General êaMfrpfev-êtfayafliB^ta^^ may convene meetings of the plenary talks teasLsefeesBHiiassteteee'ât his discretion, and may recommend from time

to time and as appropriate joint high-level meetings. Hi* im'ay-°°aatefe«4B£Q.'Emal

parties and'pipirwBrlfen^^

: 5. -So- ajv^RQ^'-liOw j^kj3ai^Ji&g0fc4aAsfcE=.%> Ihere shall be no records of proceedings. However, as in the past, record shall be kept by the Secretariat for the Secretary-General's use only. Confidentiality of meetings shall be fully

respected. cAUATabpy .£fflL££»&aSilJ^^ caaseaibsit'agrlt8^ . 6. The committees will be so organized as to be able to meet simultaneously, III. Varosha -•'"" •' ,x" 1. The interlocutors, meeting in plenary under the auspices of the Special

Representative ^ will deal directly, in the first instance, with the question

of Varoshai It is agreed that in order to promote an atmosphere of good will /' and to-'resolve pressing human/problems, the Varosha area shall be re-settled under • / --••"" ) / United Nations auspices' in accordance with the attached arrangements. -• ' ' /' ^'Finalizing these arrangements and initiating their implementation shall not be

made dependant on any other matters or aspects of the negotiating process.

Implementation of the re-settlement arrangements shall be initiated in phase with

the •''commencement of the work of the committees.. ..-'-"'" ') 2. Simultaneously with the opening^'meeting of the interlocutors, a United /"""' nations survey team, accompanied by Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot liaison / / officers, will enter Varosha and will commence surveying the general area / indicated in paragraph (a) of the attached arrangements. The team will enjoy // . // freedom of movement in the entire area and the co-operation of all authorities,

military and civilian. The team will submit its initial report within two

weeks, and later reports as appropriate.

3. On the day of the commencement of the substantive work of the committees,

security functions psno? Sector A (see attached map) i.e., the Varosha areay

East of Dherinia Avenue and S^outh of ub ^k" •*$'• =*$ /^n^-t-i v-^-t ^-will be

taken over by UNFICYP. Turkish and Turkish Cypriot military personnel will be fu>- withdrawn from this area by the end of •&»• day. It. days after the commencement of the work of the committees,

UNFICYP will assume security functions in Sector B, comprising

5. During this process, the interlocutors in plenary will be discussing the

exact territorial coverage of the Varosha arrangements. This will affect the

exact limits of Sectors G and H (but will not affect Sector A-F). 2.

UWFICYP will assume security functions in Sectors G and H after agreement on territorial coverage for those sectors has teen reached, but not earlier than for Sections A to F. CONFIDENTIAL

THE VAROSHA AREA

The parties to the intercommunal talks shall cooperate with the Secretary General of the United Nations and his representatives in arranging the modalities for an early resettlement of the Varosha area. The following guidelines will obtain: (a) The area for resettlement shall encompass territory lying to the east of the village of Ayios Nikolaos and to the south of the old Nicosia-Famagusta road. In defining the precise area for resettlement, the concerns of the Turkish Cypriot party for the security of Old Famagusta and Famagusta Harbor shall be taken into account. (b) The area for resettlement shall be administered under the supervision of the United Nations, and shall be considered as an extension of the present United Nations buffer zone. There shall be a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot liaison officer to the United Nations authorities for this purpose. Cypriot laws and regulations shall be in force in the area of resettlement. (c) It is understood that as many former residents of the area of resettlement may return as choose. There shall be no fixed numerical limitation. (d) Those who return to the area for resettlement shall not be subject to further involuntary displacement.

CONFIDENTIAL IV. Matters to be Discussed by the Constitutional Committee

1. The Committee will negotiate a new constitutional structure for the Republic of Cyprus, incorporating an operative Federal system of Government, on the basis of paragraphs 3 and U of the Makarios/Denktash Guidelines. The negotiators will also draw upon pertinent elements of the Constitution of I960, and shall bear in mind United Nations resolutions. Substantial powers and responsibilities will be reserved to the two constituent regions in such manner as to protect the rights and to meet the concerns of members of both communities.

2. Fundamental human rights including freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, and the right to property ownership, shall be embodied in the Federal Constitution subject only to such modifications as are required to preserve the character of each region, the nature of the bi-communal Federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community. 3. Powers and Functions of the Central Government - Without commitment, the following is intended as a negotiating text in this regard: (Paragraph U of Framework Paper) k. Constitutional Structure of the Federal System - Without commitment, the following is intended as a negotiating text in this regard: (Paragraph 5 of

Framework Paper)

5. Regional Institutions - Without commitment, the following is intended as a negotiating text in this regard: (Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Framework Paper) 6. Return of Displaced Persons - Without commitment, the following is intended as a negotiating text in this regard: (Paragraph 9 of Framework Paper) 7. Demilitarization - Without commitment, the following is intended as a negotiating text in this regard: (Paragraph 10 of Framework Paper) V. Matters to "be Discussed by the Committee on Territorial Aspects This committee shall negotiate the delimitation of territory to be placed under the administration of each community. This shall be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership. The criteria of

security, population patterns arid historical factors will be taken into account.

It is understood that the Turkish Cypriot side will agree to significant geographical adjustments in favour of the Greek Cypriot side. VI. Economic Committee

This committee shall discuss the question of a Cyprus reconciliation fund.

Without commitment, the following is intended as a negotiating text in this regard: (Paragraph 11 of the Framework Paper). i 9S6-3360 V , '•-' "

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

82O SECOND AVENUE

NEW YORK. N. Y. 1OO17

Ref: 2002/77/2 4 December 1978

Excellency, I have the honour to draw Your Excellency's attention to the statement made on the 28th November at a Press Con- ference by Mr. Denktash, who in rejecting for the Turkish Cypriot community the recent resolution of the Security Council, declared as his belief that "the time has come for the esta-

blishment of a separate State" . Such manifestations by Mr. Denktash of his brazen contempt for the unanimous Security Council decisions, and particularly his eagerness for the partition of the island, are concrete facts of serious concern. They cannot be ignored in assessing the needed good faith in any intercommunal talks on the future constitutional arrangements for the Republic of Cyprus, on the terms of one undivided and independent State — when declarations by the prospective interlocutors from the other

side are so revealing of their partitionist objective and the lack of good faith, as to run counter to the very purpose of the negotiations.

. . . 2/ tt

His Excellency Dr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General United Nations New York, N.Y. 10017 - 2 -

By way of confirmation of the absence of good faith comes the second part of Mr. Denktash's statement in which he again tries to distort the proven agreement by which he undertook in the presence of the Secretary-General, as appears in the Official Report (S/11789, 5 August 1975), that the remaining 15,000 Greek Cypriots in the north would be "free to stay and they will be given every help to lead a normal life,, including facilities for education and for practice of their religion, as well as medical care and freedom of movement in the north". This agreement was in its entirety reneged and violated by the Turkish occupation forces and their accessories}who proceeded through intensified harassment and threats to life, to expel the remainina Greek Cvpriots from the north,with the result that the 15,000 have been reduced to 1,700. This is what Mr. Denktash is daring enough to call "exchange of population".

The fact that it was the Turkish army and not the Turkish Cypriots,, that actually violated by their force the agreement, could not provide a possible excuse. It simply proves that meaningful intercommunal negotiations are totally incompatible with the continued presence and activities of the Turkish forces the of occupation. This was envisaged, in/order of sequence of the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus.

I would be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the general Assembly and of the Security Council, Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of highest consideration.

Zenon R"6ssides Ambassador Permanent Representative of Cyprus to fehe United Nations PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

82O SECOND AVENUE

NEW YORK. N. Y. 1OO17 Ref: 67/77 24 November 1978

Excellency, Upon the instructions of ray Government, I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's notice the repeated violations of the airspace of Cyprus on three occasions by Turkish fighter jets on 22 November 1978. They were as follows: 1) At 0907-0919 hours, two phantom fighter jets flew over the

area of Skillouras-Kontemeno~~ u villages; >\. /' 2) At 1040 and 1113 hours, two F104 fighter planes flew over the sanie region; and later, 3) At 1145-1204 hours, once more, two phantom fighter jets flew over the same area.

In strongly protesting on behalf of my Government, these violations of the sovereignty of Cyprus by Turkey, r*:wish to >int out that such aggressive actions once;again take place • • ; r.q a delicate phase of the Cyprus problem.

'. . . 2/

His Excellency Dr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General United Nations New York, N.Y. 10017 - 2 -

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as .1 document of the Security Council. Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Zenon Rossides Ambassador Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations GLS/lb

POSSIBLE COURSE OF ACTlOl

1. The parties will inform the Secretary -^General that they are ¥ prepared to agree to the resumption of intercommunal talks, using as a basis for negotiations the Y suggestions" they received on 1O November 1978. (The parties may of course add various points designed to safeguard their position; in particular, they may wish to place on record that the use of the "suggestions" as a basis for negotiations is without prejudice to their position of substance. )

2. The Secretary-General will reply that on the basis of the views communicated to him, he is calling on the parties to the intercommunal talks to resume negotiations in good faith and in a sustained manner, under his auspices, toward a comprehensive Cyprus settlement. The "suggestions" paper would be used simply as a basis for negotiations and as a vehicle for amendments and discussions, without prejudice to the substantive positions of the parties. The intercommunal negotiations will : «SjBSa«*.sifthi«5» SM-'y- take place as before within the framework of good offices entrusted to the Secretary-General by the Security Council.

3. On these understandings, the Secretary-General intends as a first step to invite the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus to meet under his auspices in (Nicosia) in early February 1979 in order to lay down the agenda and programme for the resumed intercommunal talks.

4. In preparation for the high-level meeting, the Secretary- General will prepare a draft agenda and programme of work that the two leaders might consider adopting for the guidance of the - 2 - interlocutors at the intercommunal talks. There will be no substantive "pre-negotiating" process, but the Secretary-General will naturally wish to sound out the parties in advance so as to ensure that the agenda and programme will be adopted at the high-level meeting without difficulty.

5. The draft agenda and programme to be prepared by the Secretary-General for the high-level meeting will cover the following points:

(a) The leaders will call for the resumption of the intercommunal talks under the auspices of the Secretary- General and within the framework of his mission of good offices, to be exercised by him personally or by his Special Representative on his behalf.

(b) Upon reconvening, the interlocutors, after their introductory general statements, will proceed to set up working committees to consider and report,on the following sub j ects:

(i) constitutional aspects (ii) territorial aspects (iii) economic aspects ("reconciliation fund").

These committees will consist of deputies to be appointed by the interlocutors. The deputies may be assisted by a small number of experts. They will meet under the auspices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General or of a deputy designated by him. The Special Representative will be requested to prepare - 3 - working papers to assist: the committees in the consideration of the matters before them.

(c) The interlocutors, meeting in plenary under the auspices of the Special Representative, will deal directly^ in the first instance, with the question of Varosha, with a view to adopting a phased plan for resettlement. When this plan has been agreed, implementation is to start at once, with the assistance of UNFICYP. 11/7/78 CONFIDENTIAL

0 fa ,FRAMEWORK FOR A CYPRUS SETTLE <-A/^ gjxi ( vlI ~^ Th^eM vpartieS s to the intercommunal talks /wil3\/ \\\ negotiate V_ & \ in good faith and in a sustained manner, under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary General, towards a comprehensive Cyprus settlement on the basis of the following conceptual framework: (1) The Republic of Cyprus shall be a bicommunal federal state with two constituent regions, one of which will be inhabited predominantly by Greek Cypriots, the other predominantly by Turkish Cypriots. The independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus shall be assured, as shall its right to conduct a policy of nonalignment should it so choose. The incorporation of all, or part, of the Republic into any other state shall be expressly prohibited. (2) A new constitutional structure for the Republic of Cyprus, incorporating an operative federal system of govern-

o ment, shall be negotiated on the basis of the provisions set forth herein. The negotiators shall be guided by the Makarios-Denktash instructions of February 1977, shall draw upon, pertinent elements of the Constitution of 1960, and shall bear in mind United Nations resolutions. Substantial powers and responsibilities will be reserved to the two constituent regions in such a manner as to protect the rights and to meet the concerns of members of both communities

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

(3) Fundamental rights and liberties, to include freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, and the right to property ownership, shall be embodied in the federal Con- stitution subject only to such modifications as are required to preserve the character of each region. (4) The following powers and functions shall reside in the federal Government of Cyprus: Foreign Affairs, External Defense, Currency and Central Banking, Interregional and Foreign Commerce, Communications, Federal Finance, Customs, Immigration, and Civil Aviation. Powers and functions not explicitly granted to the federal government shall be reserved to the two constituent regions.. Powers and functions initially exercised by the regions may be assumed by the federal government upon joint agreement of the two regions. (5) The federal government shall be structured along the following lines: (a) Legislative authority shall be vested in a bicameral legislature, the upper chamber to represent the two communities on a basis of equality and the lower chamber to be elected in proportion to population. (b) In the event that a majority in the upper chamber fails to concur in a bill passed by the lower

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 - chamber, a subsequent affirmative two-thirds vote in the lower chamber shall be sufficient to enact, provided that at least three-eighths of the representatives from each community concur therein. (c) There shall be a President and a Vice Presi- dent, elected through democratic processes, one of whom shall be from one community and the other from the other community. In the event of the incapacity or temporary absence of the President, the Vice President shall act in his stead. The President and Vice President shall jointly appoint a Council of Ministers. Neither community shall have less than 30 percent of the ministerial portfolios. The President and the Vice President may jointly veto federal legislative acts, although their veto may be over- ridden by a two-thirds vote in each chamber. (d) A Federal Supreme Court shall be established, to consist of one Greek Cypriot, one Turkish Cypriot, and one non-Cypriot appointed jointly by the President and the Vice President. The Court shall have the function of interpreting the Constitution and shall act as the highest court of appeal where federal legislation is concerned. (e) Provision shall be made for the fair partici- pation of members of both communities in the federal civil

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

service. Senior appointments shall be subject to approval by the upper chamber of the legislature. (6) The two regions shall establish regional governmental institutions for the purpose of carrying out the powers and functions reserved or assigned to them under the Constitution. The executive and legislature of each region shall be democratically elected. The parties to the intercommunal talks shall discuss ways of ensuring the necessary degree of congruity between the governmental institutions of the two regions. (7) An Agency for Regional Cooperation and Coordina- tion shall be established, jointly headed by a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot and staffed by an equal number of representatives of each constituent region. The Agency will foster practical cooperation between the two regions, especially in the economic and commercial field; will seek the maximum possible compatibility between the two regions; and will promote the unity of the nation. (8) The specific territory under the administration of each region shall be negotiated on the basis of criteria such as economic viability and productivity, land ownership, security, population patterns, and historical factors. In this regard, it is understood that the Turkish Cypriot side will agree to significant geographical adjustments in favor of the Greek Cypriot side.

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL - 5 -

(9) The parties shall make provision, to the extent feasible and consistent with the bicommunal character of the Republic/ for the return of displaced persons to their properties and for the settlement of claims that may be made by those who are unable or do not choose so to return. (10) An integral part of a final settlement shall be the withdrawal of non-Cypriot armed forces (except for those specifically agreed to) from the territory of the Republic. Consideration may be given to a possible phased demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus in a manner that will best assure the security of the Republic and its citizens under a final settlement. It would be understood that demilitarization would not preclude lightly-armed regional police forces with the function of maintaining law and order within each region. (11) There shall be established a Cyprus Reconcili- ation Fund, financed primarily by the federal government and administered jointly by the two regions, that will provide funds for development projects designed to assist in the process of readjustment subsequent to a settlement and to assist those sectors of the Republic that have the greatest economic and social need. Other governments and international organizations would be invited to contribute to the Fund. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL - 6 -

(12) In order to promote an atmosphere of goodwill and to resolve pressing humanitarian problems, the Varosha area shall be resettled under UN auspices in accordance with the attached arrangements. Such resettlement shall be initiated in phase with the resumption of full intercommunal negotiations on a comprehensive agreement.

Attachment

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

THE VAROSHA AREA

CONFIDENTIAL CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

OPENING STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY

MR. NICOS A. ROLANDIS, MINISTER OF

FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, BEFORE THE PLENARY OF THE

33RD SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE QUESTION OF CYPRUS - NEW YORK

6TH NOVEMBER 1978 OPENING STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY MR. NICQS A. ROLANDIS, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, BEFORE THE PLENARY OF THE 33RD SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE QUESTION OF CYPRUS - NEW YORK 6 NOVEMBER 1978

Mr. President, This moment, which marks the commencement of the

discussion of the problem of Cyprus in this Parliament of the people of the world, is a sacred moment in my country. At this

very moment the people of Cyprus, six thousand miles away from here, are observing a ten minute silence in honour of the principles that this Organization and this Assembly stand for

and also as a show of respect for their own invincible and

indestructible will to free their country from the foreign presence,

military and other, which obscures life and happiness and has only brought darkness, despair and calamity to the people of

Cyprus, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike. Cyprus is one of the smallest countries in the world, but the pursuit of virtue has nothing to do with size. There is an equal moral value in a principled position taken by a

single individual, with that taken by the biggest nations in the world. For every Cypriot living on this planet, there are seven thousand people of other nationalities. Yet we feel that our

voice can be heard clear and loud in this Assembly, as long as

we stay on the side of justice. My country was physically crippled by the Turkish invasion. And yet, in the whirl of events and in the midst of the misery brought about by such a sacrilegious act, I state categorically

. . . 2/ that, if we had to choose, we would rather be the victims than the aggressors.

It is of course very easy, if it were not shameful,

for one country to physically cripple another country, which is eighty times smaller. It is very easy, if it were not shameful,

for a country which is an arsenal of the most modern war equipment, of hundreds of warplanes and warships and of thousands of tanks and napalm bombs to attack and overpower a defenceless neighbour. It is very easy, if it were not shameful, to exter- minate, annihilate and destroy the weak and unarmed.

Cyprus was crippled physically but never morally. I am

standing here in your midst, fully authorized by the most

suppressed and bereaved of my fellow citizens to say that we

refuse to succumb to the law of the jungle. And I am proud to

know that this voice of resistance is one amongst many in the halls of this Organization. SWAPO, Patriotic Front, PLO and many cithers are today symbols of dignity in a world which is being corroded by the principle of power, as opposed to the power of principles. The evolution of technology and the accumulation of power tend to obliterate the simple and yet fundamental laws of balance and justice which go to the root of human existence. However, it appears that there are nations

and people determined to carry the flag to the generations to

come.

This is the fifth consecutive year since the Turkish

invasion, that Cyprus resorts to the international community for

. . . 3/ - 3 - justice. You, the honourable representatives of the peoples of the world have decided that justice should be done in the case of Cyprus. By a number of landmark resolutions, taken by overwhelming majority you have demanded certain action which would have put an end to whatever wrong and criminal was done against Cyprus. And yet your voice and verdicts have been defied. In exactly the same way in which your voice and verdicts have been defied in almost all other cases brought before you. Before I left Cyprus, I made a statement by which I exoressed my concern at this sheer contempt for the voice of the representatives of the people of the world. Some people even criticized me for making such a statement, a few days before the Assembly was due to consider the question of Cyprus. However, I believe, that, on the contrary, the right moment to raise such an issue is exactly now when you are about to consider our problem. No- thing is to be gained by avoiding the truth. We all know very well, that the decisions of this Organization are often treated by such contempt from countries which are expected to comply with them that, unless the situation is contained, and soon, confidence, particularly that of smaller nations, will evaporate. This undesirable and dangerous state of affairs has been the subject of comment and criticism on hundreds of occasions. The distinguished Secretary-General, Dr. Waldheim, in his report on the Work of the Organization, dated September 1978, writes:

. . .47 "In the present political circumstances, the

United Nations is seldom, if ever, in a position to enforce its decisions and has little means of making them effective in the face of determined opposition.

This fact tended to downgrade the prestige and effective-

ness of the Organization and to detract from its primary

purpose as the impartial and respected guarantor of

international peace and security. The practical result has been that some small States no longer turn to the United Nations as the protector of their sovereign

rights". (Document A/33/1*, p. 5)

The United Nations resolutions on Cyprus abound with provisions clearly directed at Ankara, which can be implemented only by Turkey. Instead of complying with them the Turkish

Government resorts to distorted interpretations to justify her non-compliance. Where are we heading for, then? Are we to accept the audacity expressed by Thrassymachus in Plato's Republic that "justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger"? Is this Organization prepared to allow countries like Turkey to be acting in absolute defiance of its decisions without taking some drastic steps? Are we to remain apathetic and inactive observers of a conduct which will eventually shatter confidence in morals and principles? And then if we, being responsible Governments, tolerate crimes such as the one committed

against Cyprus and are reluctant to impose sanctions against the . . . 5/ - 5 - culprit, how can we ever expect to inspire our own citizens to comply with our internal laws? How can we tell these citizens that the same type of crime which may be committed without punishment at the level of international relations should be punishable at the level of private individuals?

And if we tell them shall we ever convince them? And shall we ever convince our children that they should strive for a world of beauty, morals and harmony if our heritage to them is one of world disorder, crime and international injustice? As I mentioned above, distinguished delegates, the attitude of Turkey during the four and a half years since she invaded and partly occupied Cyprus has been one of inventing

distorted interpretations of resolutions and excuses for her wrongful actions. She has even reached the point of "turning

black into white" and accusing us , the victims , of her aggres-

sion, of instransigence and negative approach. It is as if an

armed person invades your house, occupies by force four out of \ its ten rooms and then calls you instransigent because you refuse to negotiate the division of your house into two smaller houses one of which will belong to the trespasser. This is really nothing short of adding insult to injury. Despite the fact that the United Nations by repeated resolutions demand the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from the Republic of Cyprus and despite the fact that these

resolutions, adopted after the Turkish invasion are clearly and

indisputably pointing to the direction of Turkey,this latter

. . . 6/ - 6 - country maintains that there has been no aggression by her against Cyprus. She maintains that there has been a very civilized peace operation for the return of normality which

Turkey was compelled to undertake in conformity to her obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee. This is what we were told by Turkey in this Assembly last year. So, poor Turkey, was compelled to take this burdensome action. Being a law abiding country she had to comply with her legal obligations, which the other guarantor, the United Kingdom, did not care to fulfill. And the problem is that all of you, distinguished delegates, have failed to really grasp and realize Turkey's noble motives and objectives. You have been unable to elevate yourselves to the exalted level of the Attila morals. You have misjudged Turkey and you have been unfair to her. So why should she comply?

Of course the representative of Turkey failed to elaborate on some details of Turkey's noble operation — but after all these are unimportant details. The Sunday Times of London in its issue of 23rd January 1977, in which it published extracts from the 200-page report of the European Commission on Human Rights says: "The Report is a horrendous indictment against ; Turkey and its soldiers and civilians". The report was circulated by a number of organizations and those who read it were left shocked and speechless. The unfortunate fact for Turkey remains that if one is to describe her "law abiding" peace operation, one cannot avoid words such as "kill, "loot", — 7 — "steal", "desecrate", "usurp", "missing persons", "refugees",

"massive expulsions", "illegal colonization", etc. This is probably what has prompted you to take a very firm stand against

Turkey. This is probably what has turned the report of the

Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe into a horrendous indictment against Turkey. This is probably what renders the military occupation of Turkey a blot of shame in the history of the 20th century.

Of course, the representative of Turkey, being a diligent and distinguished diplomat, had to try to offset the repercussions of the above unbelievable acts by fabricating the story of the so-called "Greek onslaught against the Turkish, community". He said last year before this Assembly that from 196^ to 197^, for ten years, all the Turks of Cyprus were forced to live in isolated enclaves continuously subjected to threats, harassments, humiliation, economic blockade and very severe restrictions of movement . The statement that the Turks of Cyprus were forced to live in enclaves is correct, the question however is who

forced them to do it and what were the objectives of this move.

To give an answer to this question one has to go back to the days when Cyprus was a British colony. That ,is when, at first, the Turkish rulers in Ankara and their Turkish Cypriot agents in Cyprus masterminded the partition of the country. Let us then follow the sequence of events: 1. In the mid-1950's when Cyprus was still a colony, Turkey advocated the partitioning of Cyprus. - 8 -

2. In 1964, the leaders of the Turkish Cyprlots acting on directions from Ankara forced a large part of the Turkish Cypriots to live in enclaves and thus separate themselves from the Greek Cypriots. I quote from reports of the Secretary-General. (a) Report dated 15 June 1964 (S/5764, paragraph 113). The lack of movement of Turkish Cypriots outside of their areas is also believed to be dictated by a political purpose, namely to reinforce the claim that the two main communities of Cyprus cannot live peacefully together in the island without some sort of geographical separation. (b) Report dated 10th June 1965 (S/6426, paragraph 106). Indeed since the Turkish Cypriot leadership is committed to physical and geographical separation of the communities as a political goal, it is not likely to encourage activities by Turkish Cypriots which may be interpreted as demonstrating the merits of an alternative policy. 3. On the 5th June 1964, President Johnson of the United States writes to Prime Minister Inonu of Turkey, when the latter wanted to invade Cyprus. "The proposed intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of effecting a form of partition of the island." 4. On the 26th March 1965, the United Nations, mediator on Cyprus, Galo Plaza, writes in paragraphs 72 and 73 of his report: "The representatives of the Turkish Cypriots wished to be physically separated from the Greek community... Their proposal envisaged a compulsory exchange of population in order to bring _ Q _

about a state of affairs in which each community would occupy a separate part of the island". Do I have to say more to show who had created the enclaves and who had been threatening and humiliating and harassing the Turkish Cypriots? Do I have to say more to establish that both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots were the victims of the policy of partition practised by Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leadership? Do I have to cite authorities more reliable than U Thant, President Johnson and Galo Plaza to establish that there was a "political purpose" and a "political goal" of partition and not the need to protect the

Turkish Cypriots3 an argument often used by Turkey, which however neither U Thant, nor President Johnson, nor Galo Plaza entertained — on the contrary they talked of a political goal of partition. I would now turn to the question of the intercommunal talks,which has been the subject of undue exploitation by the other side. Turkey says we are intransigent. And some people approach us and say: "Why don't you talk with the Turks? They are good boys. Of course they have invaded and occupied your country. They have killed a few thousand people; they have raped your women, they have looted the whole place; they have dese- crated your temples; but why don't you negotiate with them?" And the Greek Cypriots sit back and reflect: We are a small country, with no military power, with no massive troops and we have to negotiate. We have to negotiate, even though our people

. . . 10/ - 10 - get up in the morning and see, a few miles away from the new places where they were transplanted by force, their birth- place under foreign military occupation. We are prepared to negotiate along the lines indicated by the international community, which transpires through the United Nations resolutions for a sovereign3independent and territorially integral Cyprus. But for goodness sake, do not ask us to negotiate the partition of our country. This is the reason why we refuse to support the resumption of the negotiations on the basis of the Turkish proposals of April 1978. The provisions in these proposals contain none of the attributes of a federation. They do not propose the creation of a federal state. The clear aim of these proposals is the creation of two separate states. Could anyone really argue that the Turkish proposals are credible and that they can lead to a solution other than partition when inter alia, (a) they provide that the sovereignty should continue to be shared equally by the two national communities through their respected federated States. Can you imagine a federal state whose sovereignty is not allotted to the federal state itself? (b) They provide that the states will have international responsibility and the right to enter separately into treaties with other countries. (c) There is no provision for federal defence and security and there is only provision for the creation of separate armed forces of each state stationed in its respective territory.

. . . 117 - 11 -

(d) There is almost complete absence of any federal, legislative, executive and judicial power. (e) They provide that domestic and international responsibility in matters of human rights and liberties belongs to the states and not to the federal government. (f) They provide that passports will be issued separately by the states. (g) They provide for separate central banks for each state with almost no federal revenues and federal finance, so that each state will be a separate economic entity, with a separate system of taxation, which will eventually lead to the establishment of guarded borders between the two states. (h) They provide that postal and telecommunication services will be the responsibility of the states and not of the federal government. There is really no sense in continuing, because the examples already given indicate very clearly that the objective of the above proposals is not the creation of a unified federal entity, not even of a Siamese entity but rather the creation of a twin entity. And then, where is justice and majority rule when the Turkish proposals provide that the 18$ minority should be equated with the 82% majority, so that in other words each Turk will have 4 1/2 times more rights than each Greek? Or when the minority of 18% wants according to the same proposals 36% of the land, which is twice as much as the laws of proportion dictate. . . . 12/ - 12 -

Who is Intransigent and unreasonable and who is not? The answer is not a matter of empty lipwork, it is a question of substantiated argumentation. Are we intransigent and unreasonable, the victims of invasion and foreign occupation, with, thousands of dead and missing persons, with our properties usurped and looted, who still propose a proportionally correct arrangement within the framework of a federal State? Or is the other s.ide Intransigent which has invaded and occupied by force, which has looted, destroyed and killed, which defies United Nations resolutions and which proposes that the Turkish Cypriots should keep a multiple of what proportionally belongs to them in a country partitioned into two? r know that each one of you down at heart has the answer to this question. Despite the bitterness and the justified indignation of my fellow citizens, despite the fact that there are wounds and scars all over the country, I am authorized to state before you from this international forum, that my Government is prepared to support a resumption of the negotiations between the two communities in good faith and goodwill provided that such negotiations will have meaning and substance. For us, and I know the same applies to you, there is no meaning in negotiating the partition of our country. For us, and for you, there is no sense to negotiate injustice. There is no sense to start with proposals incorporating partition and injustice with a vague assurance "that the other side will be flexible". Let us start correctly, with the right proposals, the orthodox way. Let the Turks be just

. . ./13 - 13 -

and inflexible rather than unjust and flexible.

Mr. President, Before concluding, I would like to reiterate once more

our profound devotion to the ideals which form the supporting

pillars of the building in which we are now. These ideals were extracted from the anguish, the humiliation and extinction

of values and the shattering effects of the second world war.

Let us keep to these ideals, let us cherish and preserve them

and let us try to find the way to give practical dimensions to our resolutions and substance to whatever we consider just.

I wish to thank all of you for your interest in Cyprus and for coming today to hear me voicing the 20th century odyssey of my country and her people. I wish to thank the Secretary-General for his continuous and untiring efforts to find a solution to the problem. I wish to thank those countries which have sent

military contingents to keep peace in Cyprus. But above all,

I wish to thank those countries, which by their support and

solidarity have kept our morale and our spirit of resistance alive. In Cyprus, six thousand miles away from here, people must have gone back to their work by now. The ten minute stoppage and meditation in honour of the Charter and its principles is over. They must now work for better days in Cyprus and for

a better world. PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS - j - ,

TO THE UNITED NATIONS v-» £>.";_-3.'.VO-1'^ j •-••.•' J-'-'

azO SECOND AVENUE C"feTTA- - J ^ & i

NEW YORK. N. Y. tOOTV

Ref: 2002/77/2 3 November 1978

Excellency, I have the honour to refer to a letter by the Permanent Representative of Turkey of 11 October 1978, (S/12892), attaching as annex a letter signed by Mr. Rauf Denktash, "President" of the so-called "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus". In my previous letters and more recently that of 17th October 1978 (S/12895), it has been conclusively shown that the so-called "State" is but a fictitious set up by Ankara in an attempt to cover up its invasion and continuing aggressive occupation of 40 per cent of the territory of Cyprus in violation of the unanimous General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on the subject. In that letter, Mr. Denktash strongly remons- trates that President Kyprianou spoke in the General Assembly as though representing-also the Turkish Cypriot community. The Presidentof Cyprus,however, has a right and a duty to speak on behalf of the whole people of Cyprus and was justified in expressing concern over the fate also of the Turkish Cypriot community, whose basic rights and vital interests have been . . . 2/ His Excellency Dr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General United Nations New York, N.Y. 10017 - 2 - trampled upon by the army of occupation and by the massively transported alien population from Anatolia, Turkey. more This flooding colonization from Turkey,further/endangers the very survival of the distinct identity of the Turkish Cypriot community as a people,as well as their standards of civilization and culture. Thus, by the conditions of forced separation from their ancestral homes and properties in the south, imposed on them by the partitionist policy of Ankara, the large majority of the Turkish Cypriots live in a climate of distress and misery under the oppressivenes-s of the army of occupation and of the imported colonizers from Turkey. The stark reality of this situation and its consequences on the Turkish Cypriots causing genuine concern to all Cypriots,is common knowledge and cannot be concealed by any pretence of the instruments of Ankara. Mr. Denktash simulates wonder why President Kyprianou in his address did not touch upon the accord between late Archbishop Makarios and himself of February 1977, and its guidelines. He knows, or ought to know, however, that the Turkish proposals prepared in Ankara and presented to the Secretary-General in April 1978, are in no sense for a federation but for two completely separate states in an express division of sovereignty, totally incompatible with any concept of unity of the State, as has been generally admitted and recognized, -Thus, they provide for separate and distinct passports, for separate defence forces without a joint command, separate ! 1 - 3 -

currencies, separate Central Banks and separate rights to negotiate international treaties. They thus, run counter to the agreed basis of preser- ving the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the island. The effect of these partitionist

proposals is, therefore, to violate, transgress and negate the aforesaid accord. In consequence, the two sides are now

shown to be at cross purposes with the end-result of any negotiation being rendered futile. The uselessness of negotiations in the present circumstances is recognized also by the Secretary-General. Particularly, as Mr. Denktash in his said letter reasserts that he stands by those partitionist proposals thereby making it obvious that there is in reality no common basis for a federal Constitution in an .undivided State. The rest of the letter under reply is but a repetition of allegations /about Greek Cypriot "onslaught" against the Turkish Cypriot community during the period 1964-1974, made at various forums and /were times. They/ fully contradicted and negated on each occasion by concrete reference to the authority of the semi-annual Reports of the Secretary-General for the period in question, with extraqts therefrom /establishing the very contrary namely, that the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots in enclaves, the refusal to allow their return to their homes and properties and the denial of their freedom of movement over the years were imposed on them by their on a own leadership /design to create conditions of separateness,

conducive to the objective of partition. (Security Council -

. . . 4/ - 4 -

S/PV1795 of 30 August 1974 and General Assembly A/PV 2380 of 8 October 1975). They were more recently refuted by my letter to Your Excellency of 30 March 1978 {A/33/74-S/12626) giving a complete picture of the situation On the island during the aforesaid 11-year period which for easy reference is reproduced in Annex "A" attached hereto. Other relevant

extracts from the Secretary-General's reports on the subject appear in Annex "B" attached hereto. The further allegation of an agreement on 2 August 1975 for an exchange of population^ made in the same vein of (S/117 89) untruth,is directly contradicted by the report/ of the Secretary-General which shows the very reverse^namely, that the remaining Greek Cypriots in the north (15,000) would be free to stay and enjoy security of life, freedom of movement and other facilities^ and that all relatives and others in the south would be allowed to rejoin them in the north. It is in a persistent effort to cover up the international crimes committed against Cyprus that such propaganda of systematic misrepresentations was lodged and still continues. We believe, however, that the policy of the "big lie" cannot

for long stand up against truth, which eventually always prevails. I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances o£->my

highest consideration.

Zenon \tossides Ambassador Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations Enclosures AN N E X "A"

Annex from -the -letter of the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations Secretary-General on 30 March 1978,A/33/74 " Ankara through her instruments in Cyprus tries, by the aforesaid letter, to create confusion by bringing in again a systematized repetition of the unsubstantiated charges to the effect that the Turkish Cypriots since December 1963 were the victims of an "onslaught" by the Greek Cypriots and were for 11 years, until 1974, harassed and compelled to be secluded in enclaves, and deprived of their homes and their freedom of movement. These irresponsible allegations were refuted by concrete and authoritative evidence in the official six monthly reports by the Secretary-General covering the whole 11-year period in question. Extensive extracts from these reports were quoted in our statements in the United Nations on more than one occasion namely in the Security Council on 30 August 1974, I/ in the Special Political Committee on 29 October 1974, 2/ and in the General Assembly on 8 October 1975. 3/ ~. On all-these occasions, as shown in the relevant records the statements have gone unanswered because they were unanswerable, But this does not prevent the Turkish side from irresponsibly reverting after a time-to those untrue allegations. The allegation that the Turkish Cypriots were a monority held under siege and terror by the Greeks is proven blatantly false also by other evidence and even Turkish evidence, which also reveals that the clashes were provoked and pursued under the banner of partition.

. . . 2/ - 2 -

The Turkish Cypriot newspaper Halkin Sesi, the mouthpiece of the then Vice-President Kutchuk, in its issue of 29 February 1964, writes: "The Greeks are in a state of distress in the full sense of the word. Starting from Nicosia in all clashes the Greeks suffered great losses, but they do not give the casualty figure". The paper continues : "The Turkish fighters have pledged to fight on until the realization of partition". Thus, the attitude of the Turkish minority has been admittedly one of provoking division and instigating armed conflict with the aim of partition. In yet another issue of Halkin Sesi, it is made clear that the avowed aim of partition is actually for annexation. In its issue of 9 August 1965, Halkin Sesi writes: "Cyprus is another Alexandretta in the history of Turkey. The power of Turkey will ensure an honourable life for the Turkish Cypriots in the same way as it did in Alexandretta by annexing it and bringing it under Turkish domination. The road in this direction has been opened by the Turkish fighters at Kokkina who are now fighting in every corner of Cyprus". Further evidence that this motivations of clashes came from Ankara appears in Prime Minister Inonu's words to the National Assembly of Turkey in October 1974: "Officially, we promote the federation concept rather than the partition thesis so as to appear as though within the provisions of the Treaty". Since the signing of the Zurich and London Agreements in 1960 and the establishment of the Republic, the Turkish

. . . 3/ leadership, egged on by Ankara, has been systematically obstructing the effective functioning of the State in order to promote divisiveness, friction and conflict. It was this policy, well under way by 1961, which led the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives to abuse their rights under the Constitution for a separate majority by preventing the passage of an admittedly normal and unobjectionable income tax bill. The result was a serious financial crisis and trouble. They next insisted on a house by house division of the towns, a proposition which was predictably impractical and proved unworkable. Armed clashes in December 1963 were thus the culmination of continued and provocative hampering on the machinery of the Government by the Turkish Cypriot leadership at the bidding of Ankara. This persistent obstructionism made it necessary for the President of Cyprus to address a letter to the Turkish Vice-President-, in November 1963, proposing amendments to the excessively divisive and unworkable elements in the Constitution and increasing, in exchange, the authority of the Turkish Vice- Presidents of the Republic and of the House of Representatives. The response,openly prompted by Ankara, was outright rejection coupled with the unnecessary and provocative appearance of Turkish Cypriot fighters, who showed themselves fully armed and ready to fight. It may be recalled that already in October 1959, even as the Zurich and London Agreements were being drawn up, Turkey

. . . 4/ was secretly shipping arms and ammunition to Cyprus in preparation for armed uprising. The vessel "Denis" was at that time actually caught by the British authorities in the very act of unloading an arsenal of weapons on the north of Cyprus. AT the same time, a special invasion force was being prepared in the Mersina area opposite the coast of Cyprus. No sooner had the clashes begun, than the underlying purpose for them became apparent by Turkey's attempt to invade Cyprus on 27 December 1963. Recourse to the Security Council halted the attempt. Vice-President Kutchuk, however, encouraged from outside,continued to give the signal of rebellion by declaring publicly that he was "no longer a Vice-President and that the Constitution is dead" (The New York Times, 4 January 1964) and "that partition is the best solution". He went so far as to propose the thirty-fifth parallel as "an ideal demarcation line", as reported in The Hew York Times of 4 and 11 January 1964 respectively, as well as in the Herald Tribune of 9 January 1964. At the bidding of Dr.Kutchuk, the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives resigned from the House. At the same time, all Turkish officials and employees in the Civil Service ceased functioning and withdrew from the public service. These proven facts belie the Turkish posture of an allegedly persecuted Turkish Cypriot minority deprived of their rights and their share in the administration.

. . . 5/ - 5 -

In June 1964, Mr. Erkin, then Foreign Minister of Turkey, offered another clear insight when he said in a newspaper interview in Athens: "The radical solution would be to cede one part of Cyprus to Greece and the other, closest to the Turkish Asiatic coast, to Turkey". It is these designs of Ankara for partition and ultimate annexation which over the years have assiduously cultivated and nurtured a climate of friction and enmity between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The task was known to be a difficult one so much so that it had to be furthered through violence. An underground terrorist organization - TMT - set up and manned by officers from Turkey, began in 1958 systematically forcing the Turkish Cypriots through threats of heavy punishment, into discontinuing any friendly contacts and associations with their Greek Cypriot compatriots in a sustained effort to keep them apart as enemies. In that effort, all human rights of the Turkish Cypriots were denied them by their own leadership, imposed upon from Ankara. Their right of freedom of movement, freedom of residence and even to life — were violated by the Turkish Cypriot leaders working in league with TMT which terrorized the rank and file of the Turkish Cypriot community into complete submissiveness to its orders. A considerable part of the Turkish Cypriot people had thus been compelled_ by their leadership in conjunction with TMT to abandon their homes and properties even in areas far

. . . 6/ - 6 - removed from the site of conflict and to be segregated in enclaves so as to create the nucleus of a geographic division and promote the objective of partition. From those enclaves they were not permitted by order of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and TMT to get out, although longing to return to their homes. They could not leave the enclaves without special permit, and had to be back at a specific time. Those who tried to escape were shot on the spot. Many instances were quoted in our letters to the Secretary-General at that time. In his report of 10 June 1965, the Secretary-General states: "The Turkish Cypriot leaders have adhered to a rigid stand against any measures which might involve having members of the two communities live and work together, or which might place Turkish Cypriots in situations where they would have to acknowledge the authority of Government agents. Indeed, sinee the Turkish Cypriot leadership is committed to physical and geographical separation of the communities as a political goal, it is not likely to encourage activities by Turkish Cypriots which may be interpreted as demonstrating the merits of an alternative policy. The result has been a seemingly deliberate policy of self-segregation by the Turkish Cypriots". The Government's contention is thus borne out that: "... the hardships suffered by the Turkish Cypriot population are the direct result of the leadership's self-isolation policy, imposed by force on the rank and file". During the intercommunal clashes in the period 1963-1974, there were no doubt occasions of regrettable acts of violence by which both sides suffered. But how can these sporadic instances of irresponsible violence compare with the systematic violation of human rights by the army of invasion through verified

. . . 7/ ANNEX "B"

Herebelow are extracts from the Reports of the Secretary-General during the 11-year period in question:

S/7611, para. 139 8 Dec. 1966 11... The Turkish Cypriot leadership does not favour the return of the refugees to their homes and deters them from going back to their villages7.."

S/8286, para. 127

"For some considerable time, the Government has urged the refugees to return to their homes...it has repaired or rebuilt abandoned Turkish Cypriot houses... it is known that the Turkish Cypriot leadership does not" favour the return of the refugees to their former homes located in Government controlled areas at present. To justify this position, the Turkish Cypriot leadership stresses considerations of security and safety of the refugees, although there can be little doubt that one of the major reasons for its attitude.„.is a political one...". "...the maximum possible number of Turkish Cypriots must remain outside the Government's authority". (Ibid).

S/7611, para. 109 8 December 1966 "Except in rare and special cases, the Turkish Cypriot leadership denies entry into areas under its control to all Greek Cypriots, whether government officials or private - 7 - mass execution of innocent civilians by the thousands in a genocidal expulsion of over 200,000 Greek Cypriots from their ancestral homes and properties. This was immediately followed by implanting therein alien population, imported from Turkey, in the pre-planned design to change by force the demographic composition of Cyprus. A horrifying account of the atrocities involved in this sinister operation is contained in the studied report of the European Commission of Human Rights, partly published in the Sunday Times of 23 January 1977. Such decline in moral values and all sense of human decency in a presumably civilized world community is unprecedented in the annals of the United Nations and modern history. Yet, the rank and file of the Cypriot people - Greek and Turkish alike - yearn for conciliation and the resumption of their former amicable relations. They are forcibly prevented by outside interventions for purposes alien to the interest of the people---of Cyprus. In spite of all adversity and constant undermining of the moral fibre of the Cypriot people, we have faith in a better future for Cyprus compatible with its spiritual legacy. We con- fidently trust the United Nations will come to its own by applying the Charter and giving effect to its resolutions on Cyprus - 3 - to express serious concern at the lack of free access by Greek Cypriots to Turkish Cypriot controlled areas. Besides the Turkish Cypriot enclaves, a number of Turkish Cypriot villages and public trunk roads remain closed to Greek Cypriots although Turkish Cypriots have been moving freely throughout the Island for nearly two years except in militarily restricted areas (S/9233, para. 55)."

S/10199, para. 57 20 May 1971

"Again it is regretted that there has been no improve- ment on the problem of freedom of movement (S/10005, para. 85). The Governmnet has repeatedly espressed its disapproval of the policy of the Turkish Cypriot leadership in denying to Greek Cypriots the use of a number of major public roads. Complaints are also still being received from areas where Greek Cypriot farmers are being denied access to fields which lie in Turkish Cypriot controlled areas, particularly in the Chatos/Lefkoniko region."

S/7611, para. 139 8 December 1966

"Some attempts have been made by the Government to persuade Turkish Cyriot refugees to return to their villages,

and in certain villages such as Potamia, and more recently, individuals. This ban appears to be enforced as a matter of political principle with little attempt at justification on practical grounds... even where Greek Cypriots would be escorted by UNFICYP personnel, and security factors could not possibly be at stake."

S/9233, para. 55 3 June 1969

"Whereas Turkish Cypriots may move freely throughout the island except in a few militarily restricted areas, access to Turkish Cypriot enclaves, a number of Turkish Cypriot villages and certain roads continues to be denied to Greek Cypriots. Of particular concern" is the alck of free acess to five main communication roads: (i) Nicosia - Kyrenia (ii ) Famagusta - Chatos - Nicosia, etc. This abnormal situation, if not remedied, could mar the present favourable atmosphere as there is growing impatience and discontent among Greek Cypriots, now that the Turkish Cypriots have enjoyed full freedom of movement over the whole Island for some time, whilst the Greek Cypriots are still prevented from using some of the Republic's main roads".

S/9521, para. 54 3 December 1969

In the matter of freedom of movement there has regrettably been no major change. The Government has continued - 4 -

Skylloura, the Government has rebuilt and repaired Turkish houses in the hope that their owners will return to their former homes. But the Turkish Cypriot leadership does not favour the return of refugees to their homes and deters them from going back to their villages on the grounds that the basic political problems must be solved and the safety of their lives and property must be guaranteed. Mistrust and fear of further outbreaks of violence also cause individual families to put off returning to their villages". !o~ X . Sb PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS r ^ • —r-i ' '~,-\J_ i___-^^' TO THE UNITED NATIONS ' ;

BZO SECOND AVENUE O I "''"'• .' ' ' ^' "'l ' i >' NEW YORK. N. Y. 1OO1T './ •: /•/•'•

Ref: 2002/77/2 26 October 1978

Excellency, I have the honour to refer to a letter addressed .., . , to Your Excellency by the Permanent Representative of Turkey, _,--• A/33/294-S/12890 dated 9 October 1978, attaching as annex a document containing allegations calculated to create confusion by falsifying facts.

Thus, the allegation that the President of Cyprus in a radio address to the Greek Community in New York, spoke of hoisting the Greek flag on the bastions of Famagusta, Kyrenia, Morphou and the Karpass, is a pure fabrication. No such statement or to the like effect was made by President Kyprianou. In this connection, it is pertinent to remark that whereas the flag of the Republic of Cyprus flies over all Government buildings and is in display on all occasion, by contrast — in the area of Cyprus under the control of the

Turkish army of occupation, pretendedly the so-called "Turkish

Federated State of Cyprus, no Cypriot flag has ever been seen at any time. It is only the flag of Turkey that is in abundant display, signifying that 40 per cent of the territory of the Republic is under the foreign occupation of Turkey, and to all ; . . 2/ His Excellency Dr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General United Nations New York, N.Y. 10017 - 2 -

intents and purposes treated by Ankara as a part of the territory of Turkey coming within the Mersin district.

Another allegation in that document., which speaks of the "enactment" of a bill, tabled by the House of Represen- tatives, for the legalization of illegal militia forces, is equally a fabricated untruth. This allegation is flatly contradicted by the records of the House of Representatives and other irrefutable evidence.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as -a document of the General Assembly under item 28 and of the Security Council. •

Zenon Ambassador Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations <* ^ - ^~N - . t,- —

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS C.) ( J ^ ' , -

TO THE UNITED NATIONS f £ . y\'lf _ (ft? * j

NEW YORK. N. Y. 10017

Ref: 74/72 2 October 1978 /*" ^'<

Excellency ,• I have the honour to refer to a letter by the f Representative of Turkey dated 27th September 1978, attaching as an appendix a document issued by Mr. Rauf Denktash, which quotes malicious allegations against the President of Cyprus before the Assize Court of Larnaca by a certain Poyadjis standing accused of a series of crimes. That statement, made during those proceedings, proved to be fabricated and false by irrefutable evidence of facts and was thus completely demolished. Mr. Denktash gives extracts of that false statement and expands on them, but deliberately omits to mention that those allegations were definitely negated during those pro- more ceedings; and further/evades reference to the judgement of the Court, which was already issued on that date. The judgement clearly establishes that the allegations in question were flatly contradicted in every detail by Poyadjis1 previous voluntary statement, and by evidence of his own witness, . . . 2/ His Excellency Dr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General United Nations New York, N.Y. 10017 _ 2 —

Vassos Pavlides, as well as by the register of the National

Guard, which conclusively shows that Achilleas Kyprianou and Poyadjis never served in the same camp and, therefore, the latter was lying when he said that he had the opportunity to become acquainted with Achilleas Kyprianou while serving in the same group with him. The judgement, having examined the evidence and analyzed the version of the accused, came to the following

conclusion: "We are of the opinion that the accused, by

distorting certain facts and existing realities and after

embroidering details thereon, fabricated a satanic story for f evil purposes". Of significance is the peculiar antithesis between Mr. Denktash seeking talks with the President of Cyprus^, ostensibly in an effort for cooperation- towards solving the internal problem of Cyprus and at the same time publicly trying to throw mud at the President by the illegal use of false allegations. I would be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my

highest consideration.

Rosside^—' )assador Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations f. •

TO: THE SECRETARY-GENERvriA L

I • -f < ...... ^Ov. '«-*~\ Hjvp >ifH«.^'*V'.---v'-S» \ I

? . v\>^^ (•> f .. y ss '- ~ ' - -X~ - • • ^

f 9SG-3360 - , f- AREA CODE 2!2 j gs6.336l itlc'^L /7-X-

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS t TO THE UNITED NATIONS fft ffl - I * aao SECOND AVENUE ' ^'- • L> } J

NEW YORK. N. Y. 1OO1V >•£ \ f t ^ fj

Ref: 2002/77/2 17 October 1978

Excellency, f I have the honour to refer to the letter by the

Representative of Turkey, S/10278 dated 3rd October 1978,

to which a document is attached as annex containing a resolution by the "Legislative Assembly" of the so-called "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus". «.

This pretended "Legislative Assembly" can hardly be representative of the Turkish Cypriots or of their interestSj

considering that in its election the Turkish army of occupation

participated in the voting. For, all its members and their

families were unlawfully given full Cypriot citizenship,

including the right to vote, by an "enactment "of 7 February 1975. The colonizers from the interior of Turkey, massively transported since the invasion, were also given similar rights to citizenship and vote, No further argument is needed to show that such "Legislative Assembly" is not the voice of the Turkish Cypriots,

but rather the mouthpiece of the invader, under whose directions

it functions.

. . . 2/

His Excellency Dr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General United Nations New York, N.Y. 10017 - 2 -

The so-called "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" is but a fictitious entity,set up by Ankara on the invaded part of the territory of Cyprus, in an obvious design to:- First bring confusion into the burning international problem of Turkey's aggression and continuing occupation of the territory of Cyprus and make it appear as though it were merely an internal intercommunal issue. Second, to force open the way to partition and demolition of the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Such a unilateral act was calculated to forestall any other solution, thereby negating the meaning and purpose of a negotiating process. As fully explained in our letter of 1st November 1977, A/32/316, both territory and population of that bogus state are but the fruit of aggression. Territory — is none else than the region of the Republic of Cyprus invaded by Turkey and under its occupation. Population — pretendedly the 18% Turkish Cypriot community to be housed in 40% of the island.' As well-known, however, the invaded region has been depopulated by the wholesale expulsion of its indigenous majority (82%) Greek Cypriot people, in an abhorrent practice of racial discrimination. Alien population, transported mostly from Anatolia, Turkey, was massively implanted in their usurped homes and properties,to change by force continue the demography of Cyprus. All these activites/in contemptuous disregard of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant United Nations resolutions.

. . . 3/ - 3 -

It is but natural that such an amalgam of international

crimes, brazenly presented as a State, was rejected outright by the international community and was condemned by the

United Nations resolutions. It should,furthermore,be noted that the setting up of

such state contravenes the Cyprus Constitution (1960) and violates

its basic provisions for the preservation of the unity, inde-

pendence, territorial integrity and demographic composition of

Cyprus. And it should be recalled that it is on this Constitution

alone that the Turkish Cypriot minority bases its claim to be a community with special rights arising from that Constitution. These rights cannot, therefore, be upheld,while at the same time the fundamental premise of the Constitution from where they arise is violated and demolished. It is indeed regrettable that Ankara's negative and

outdated policy for the partition of Cyprus brings her to such

untoward contradictions with herself,and to a needless conflict with the basic tenets of the international society in our present day interdependent world. That policy, geared on force and

domination still persisting,stands in the way of the desired mutual understanding, trust and cooperation for a peaceful settlement of the problem of Cyprus, in accordance with the unanimously

adopted General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions on the subject.

-. . . 4/ - 4 -

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly under item 28 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council. Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

' Ambassador Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations •tjONF I DENTI AL , 28 September 1978 GLS/lb

vrf] - REACTIONS TO' SOUNDINGS ON VARfi^ppa A AND ON THE RESUMPTION OF INTERCOMMUffiAL TALKS

The following reactions have been received to our informal soundings concerning a possible combined approach to the problems of interim arrangements for Varosha and of the resumption of the intercommunal talks:

Cyprus Government

The ideas floated by the Secretariat, while considerably more realistic than those of Mr. Nimetz, still leave a great deal to be desired. It is hoped that they can be improved. The following problems arise:

(a) Famagusta interim arrangements. It is difficult to accept negotiations concerning interim arrangements for Famagusta that would exclude the surrounding areas of the new town (Varosha and Kato Varosha), and would result in the resettlement of only a fraction of the Greek Cypriot population.

(b) Negotiations on a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem. What would be the basis of resumed intercommunal talks? Would it be merely an "open agenda"? The Greek Cypriot side considers that the Turkish Cypriots should submit, in advance of any talks, revised proposals that would improve on those of April 1978.

Cc) Procedure. The Greek Cypriot side considers it necessary to have assurances as to the substance of the -2-

matters to be negotiated. This substance should be care- fully prepared, through consultations, in advance of a formal resumption of the intercommunal talks.

The above points will be discussed in detail with the Secretary-General when President Kyprianou and Foreign Minister

Rolandis call upon him on 29 September 1978.

Turkish Government

(Ankara's reactions are informal and confidential. Any formal reactions would have to come from the Turkish Cypriot community).

Initially (21 September), the Turkish Permanent Mission reacted in an encouraging manner, stating that they thought the Turkish side would accept the establishment of a Committee on Varosha, composed of deputies to the interlocutors in the intercommunal talks. However, they considered that the intercommunal talks would have to be officially resumed first, and it would have to be understood that the work of the Committee would proceed in a parallel manner with the deliberations in the intercommunal talks on a comprehensive settlement.

On 28 September, the Turkish Permanent Mission, on instructions from Ankara, emphasized that the interim arrangements for Varosha could not be negotiated in isolation from the negotiations in the resumed intercommunal talks, which would have to proceed in a "result-oriented raanner". There could be no progress on Varosha as

long as there was no progress in other fields. —3 —

OBSERVATIONS

The reactions of the parties set out above suggest a hardening of positions concerning a possible combined approach to the problems of Varosha and the resumption of intercommunal talks. It will be recalled that we have been exploring a procedure under which the talks would be resumed ? one or two speeches would be made on the broader Cyprus question, whereupon the Secretary-General would invite the interlocutors to deal with Varosha (appointment of a Committee of deputies, etc.). The purpose of this procedure would be to place the Varosha negotiations within the framework of the intercommunal talks and of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices.

However, an attempt by the Turkish Cypriots to require progress toward a comprehensive settlement as a condition for an interim arrangement on Varosha would be tantamount to eliminating the possibility of such an interim arrangement. The positions of the parties are too far apart for immediate progress on the broader Cyprus problem.

Similarly, any attempt by the Greek Cypriots to demand that the Turkish side should submit a new comprehensive proposal, and any demands for outright transfer of Famagusta to Cyprus Government jurisdiction, would tend to rule out the approach that we have been

tentatively exploring.

The Secretary-General may wish to sound out the parties in

New York as to their willingness to deal substantively with the Varosha problem, within the framework of the resumed intercommunal talks, as a method for getting the negotiations going and facilitating progress on the broader issue. 9SS-33SO AREA CODE v I 9SG-3361

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

TO THE UNITED NATIONS

S2O SECOND AVENUS

NEW YORK, N. Y. 1OOI7

Ref: 2002/77/2 23 September 1978

Excellency, I have the honour to request that the hereto attached Aide Memoire be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly under Item 28 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council. Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Zenon Ross Ambassad^ Permanent Representative Cyprus to the United.^Na±.ions

His Excellency Dr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General United Nations New York^ N.Y. 10017

Attached: a/s { UB5-33(1 vfc

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

TO THE UNITED NATIONS

82O SECOND AVENUE

NEW YORK. N. Y. 1OOI7

AIDE MEMOTRE

The main subject before the General Assembly is the

aggression, invasion and continuing military occupation by Turkey of 40 per cent of the territory of the Republic and the international crimes committed by the army of occupation in the expulsion of one third of the total indigenous population of Cyprus, coupled with the forcible implanting in their usurped homes and properties of alien population transported from Turkey on a design to change the demographic structure of the island.

The gravity of this situation has rendered the question of Cyprus one of the three most serious problems in the United

Nations. Its forum, as previously, is the General Assembly

Plenary and no other.

On this grave problem, Turkey, and no one else, is accountable for her flagrant violations of the General Assembly and Security Council relevant resolutions and decisions. The Turkish Cypriots cannot be a party in an issue directly between Turkey and Cyprus.

The constitutional issue in which they are involved

is by no means the main issue. It necessarily comes after the

withdrawal of the Turkish occupation forces from the territory

of Cyprus in the appropriate sequence, established in the relevant United Nations Resolutions on Cyprus, so that intercommunal i «' -V - 2 -

negotiations could be genuine and not directed by Ankara, under whose domination the Turkish Cypriot leadership are

operating as the instruments of the invader. To this end} Resolution 3212 (XXIX) in its reference to the constitutional matters provides that relevant negotiations between the two communities should be "freely" conducted. At the present time the General Assembly has to deal

with the question of implementation of its Resolution 3212 (XXIX)V in accordance with its Resolution 32/15 of last year. The forum for this subject is obviously the General Assembly Plenary and no other, as it has constantly been every year. As a matter of compromise to the request that the Turkish Cypriots could have the chance of being heard, it was agreed by common consent that the relevant matters could be discussed in the Special Political Committee. This forum is still open.

20th September 1978 p * GLS/lb/ch

CONFIDENTIAL 22 September 1978

Note on the status of the Cyprus problem

The past three months have shown no advance toward an agreed, just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem, and the parties have displayed considerable reluctance to move in the direction of a resumption of the existing negotiating process. In the light of the experience gathered since 1975, the time may be ripe for a review of that process. The basic feature of the situation is that on the whole, and for totally different reasons, each side finds the status quo preferable to any solution that might conceivably be acceptable to the other side, and neither seems capable of generating proposals that could serve as a basis for negotiations. It is evident that the Turkish side will accept a settlement only if it results in dismantling the present Cyprus Government while maintaining and legitimizing virtually complete partition and offering only insignificant territorial concessions. This is totally unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots, as it might jeopardize their favourable economic and political situation, which depends on Continued control of the internationally recognized Government of Cyprus. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots feel that the Greek Cypriots will accept a settlement only if it maintains the latter«s control of the Government, reduces the military presence of Turkey and enables the Greek Cypriots to assert economic supremacy throughout the island, including the Turkish Cypriot areas. This would tend to endanger once again the political and economic position and the security of the Turkish Cypriot community and of its leadership. Facing near total economic stagnation and political isolation, the Turkish Cypriots cling to territory and separatism as their sole tangible assets. Negotiating process The formal position has remained since May 1978 that the Greek Cypriots, having rejected the Turkish Cypriot proposals of April 1978 as a basis for discussion, are refusing any resumption of the negotiating process based on those proposals. -2-

President Kyprianou has gone even further. In a somewhat bewildering series of statements, he has generally taken the position that it would be pointless to resume the intercommunal talks unless these were based on the provisions of the United Nations resolutions. The Turkish Cypriots, he says, should set aside their April 1978 proposals and submit new ones that would ensure the unity of the State and the "three freedoms" (of movement, settlement, and property). Mr. Kyprianou has made / derogatory remarks about Mr. Denktash, questioning his status as the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community and declaring that he "will never meet with him" (speech of 2O July). He has stated that a meeting between himself and Mr. Ecevit is essential if negotiations are to be resumed fruitfully. Even concerning Famagusta, he has taken the position (conversation with Galindo- Pohl on 28 July) that there is nothing to discuss with the Turkish Cypriot side and that the Turks should evacuate the city and hand it over to United Nations control unconditionally. The official Greek Cypriot strategy, as voiced by Mr. Kyprianou himself, as well as by Foreign Minister Rolandis and others, has been to emphasize the "internationalization" of the Cyprus problem so as to keep up international political pressure on the Turks to give up their conquests. This was done at the recent Belgrade meeting of non-aligned Foreign Ministers (which adopted a strongly pro-Greek resolution) and is to be continued during the coming months within the United Nations framework by a "recourse to the Security Council" and by debate in the General Assembly. The Council would be asked to adopt concrete measures to implement the substantive provisions of past General Assembly resolutions (withdrawal of Turkish troops, return of all refugees to their homes, etc.). However, following Mr. Kyprianou1s talks with Prime Minister Karamanlis in Athens in August, initial plans for a Security Council debate on Cyprus in September were abandoned. When he comes to New York toward the end of the month, President Kyprianou will explore whether a Security Council debate at a later date would be likely to produce the desired result. -3-

There are of course many Greek Cypriots who question the effectiveness of trying to solve the Cyprus problem by United Nations resolutions rather than by negotiations. The sceptics include not only Mr. Clerides but also former Foreign Minister Christophides and Mr. Papadopoulos. The latter was dismissed by president Kyprianou in July as the Greek Cypriot interlocutor in the intercommunal talks. No successor has been appointed so far. In recent months Mr. Kyprianou and his Foreign Minister have stated publicly and privately that the Makarios-Denktash guidelines of 12 February 1978 have lost their validity. Perhaps as a result of strongly critical reaction to this position in various quarters (including an expression of concern by the Secretary-General, which was conveyed to Kyprianou by Galindo-Pohl), Mr. Rolandis on 29 August somewhat retreated from it. He stated that his side continued to adhere to the guidelines, but that these must be interpreted on the basis of the United Nations resolutions. He further argued that the Turkish Cypriot proposals of April 1978 were totally inconsis- tent with the guidelines. Furthermore, the guidelines cannot supersede the resolutions of the General Assembly, and the negotiators, as well as the Secretary-General in the exercise of his good offices, are bound by their terms. In the^-face of Mr. Kyprianou's intransigent position, Mr. Denktash has followed a policy of conciliatory statements and appeals for the resumption of intercommunal talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General, on the basis of the February 1977 guidelines (without mentioning his proposals of April 1978), or with an "open agenda" within the framework of the guidelines (conversation with Galindo-Pohl, 27 July). Famagusta In view of the incompatibility of the positions of the two sides on a comprehensive settlement, the Secretary-General, in his report to the Security Council of 31 May 1978, suggested a new approach. This would involve "a concrete attempt to deal -4- with some important aspects of the existing stalemate on the ground" with special reference to Varosha, and also to the Nicosia International Airport (S/12723, paras. 78-79). After discussions with the United States and consultation with the Secretary-General (meeting with Ambassador Turkmen, 15 July), the Turkish side made public its proposal on Varosha on 2O July in the form of an "open message to the Greek Cypriot leadership" by Mr. Denktash (S/12782). This proposal calls for the establishment of an "interim administration" in Varosha under the aegis of the United Nations simultaneously with the resumption of the intercommunal talks on the basis of the February 1977 agreement. Initially, Mr. Kyprianou reacted by denouncing this proposal in harsh terms. After public criticism of this position (especially by the AKEL party, which is part of his coalition), he made a counter-proposal on 24 July which accepted the principle of resettlement of the Greek Cypriot sectors of Famagusta under interim United Nations security and police control, to be followed by resumption of the intercommunal talks with an "open agenda". Actual administration of the town would be in Greek Cypriot hands, and no prior negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots were envisaged. At the request of the Secretary-General, Mr. Galindo-Pohl has been exploring the thinking of the two leaders concerning the inter-related questions of Varosha and the resumption of the intercommunal talks. Judging by his reports, the gap between the positions of the parties, while substantial, does not appear too wide for negotiation. The outstanding issues concern such matters as territorial coverage, status of Varosha under the "interim administration" and its possible inclusion in the buffer zone, the nature of the United Nations role, the number of Greek Cypriots who might be resettled there and their freedom of access, the link between these arrangements and the resumption of the talks, and the question of whether the arrangements could be terminated and the "interim administration" abolished if the talks collapsed. -5-

However, the real issue does/net concern these formal differences. It rather concerns. apparent unwillingness of President Kyprianou to envisage at this stage a negotiating process with the Turkish Cypriots to bridge those differences, lest this compromise his position in the General Assembly and the Security Council next month on the broader Cyprus problem. Apparently he considers that the quest for additional United Nations resolutions poses fewer risks for him than the resumption of negotiations. In a conversation with Mr. Galindo-Pohl on 1 August he recommended that the United Nations should "lie low" until well after the meeting of the Security Council. After this phase of "open diplomacy", a "strengthened mission of good offices" by the Secretary-General and "productive quiet diplomacy" could ensue. Missing persons The Greek Cypriots have proposed that the third member of the proposed joint investigatory body should be designated by the Secretary-General (rather than by the International Committee of the Red Cross)? the Secretary-General would receive reports from him and would convey these to the Security Council (quarterly) and to the General Assembly (annually). On 2O September, Denktash rejected this as an attempt to turn a humanitarian operation into a propaganda exercise. Nicosia International Airport There has been no progress on, and there seems to be little interest in this problem. (It will be recalled that Denktash revived this matter in the paper he issued after he spoke to the Secretary-General in New York on 22 May). Nimetz visit Mr. Matthew Nimetz, Counsellor of the U.S. State Depart- ment, visited Nicosia from 3 to 7 September. He informed Brian Urquhart on 2O September that President Kyprianou did not depart from his well-known positions, including his demand for the unconditional return of the Greek Cypriot part of -6-

Famagusta district (including Kato Varosha, to the west of Varosha proper) to Cyprus Government jurisdiction, subject only to UN police and security control. According to Nimetz, Denktash showed flexibility on the territorial aspect and did not rule out concessions even on Kato Varosha. However, Mr. Nimetz indicated neither side wished to deal with the Famagusta interim arrangements in isolation from the broader Cyprus problem. Kyprianou fears that "Famagustization" would cause the world to lose interest in a comprehensive solution for Cyprus. Denktash fears that if he returned Varosha to the Greek Cypriots, he might get nothing in return. Neither side is inclined to negotiate on the basis of the other side's proposals on Varosha or, for that matter, on the broader problem. Consequently, Mr. Nimetz questioned the utility of pursuing the present negotiating method, based on the submission of mutually unacceptable proposals by the two parties. He suggested that a high-level Mediator, appointed by the Secretary-General, might be able to generate new ideas and proposals, engage in negotiation by "shuttle" diplomacy and obtain the necessary political support from governments to induce the parties to accept compromise suggestions. Mr. ufquhart explained to Mr. Nimetz that the notion of a Mediator had been anathema to the Turkish side since 1965, on account of the Galo Plaza experience. The function envisaged by Mr. Nimetz could well be performed by Mr. Galindo-Pohl. The important thing was to create a machinery which would generate ideas and produce negotiating papers that might be the basis for progress, within the framework of the Secretary-General»s mission of good offices and of the intercommunal talks. Observations In the present circumstances, we may have to accept the fact that the negotiating method followed since 1975 has outlived —7 —

its usefulness. Because of the nature of the problem and the positions of the parties, it is inevitable that all the proposals produced by the parties have been one-sided, mutually incompatible, and totally unsuitable for generating a meaningful negotiating process. The Secretary-General has made it plain (most recently in his report to the Security Council of 31 May 1978) that he is not prepared to call for a resumption of the intercommunal talks unless and until a basis of negotiations acceptable to both sides has been established. Since the parties are clearly incapable of devising such a basis, either on the broader question or on individual limited issues, they will have to be provided with the necessary assistance if any progress is to be achieved. This might involve presenting the parties with informal negotiating papers which would attempt to bridge the differences between them. In view of the apprehensions of the Turkish Cypriot side about "mediation", it may be wise to initiate this procedure in a low key. Thus the Secretary- General might ask his Special Representative, acting on his behalf within the framework of his mission of good offices, to assist the parties in devising an agreed basis of negotiations, as necessary, on procedural questions, on individual practical problems (such as Varosha) and on elements of a comprehensive Isolution. The Secretary-General may wish to take advantage of the presence in New York of President Kyprianou and Mr. Denktash, and of the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, to explore the feasibility of the adjusted negotiating method outlined above. This would of course remain within the framework of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices and would not require any change in the existing Security Council mandate. The first application of the proposed method might deal with the framework for a combined approach to the problems of Varosha and of the resumption of the intercommunal talks. Certain preliminary ideas in this regard have been explored during the past three months, on a very informal basis, with the -8- parties and with interested governments. Essentially, these call for an "interim arrangement" that would place Varosha irreversibly within the UN buffer zone. To this end the intercommunal talks would be officially resumed. After one or two formal statements by the interlocutors on the broader Cyprus problem, the Secretary-General would ask them to take up the concrete practical problem of interim arrangements for Varosha,and to agree to set up a committee consisting of their deputies, which would negotiate details of the arrangements in Nicosia. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General would exercise good offices on the Secretary-General's behalf and would assist the committee as appropriate along the lines indicated above. The committee would submit its agreed report to the plenary intercommunal talks. Meanwhile, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would also engage in consultations with both sides on aspects of a comprehensive settlement and would endeavour to develop negotiating papers on them. '-I /' •• 'A/-; - -'-'./- /•<' -I i

986-33SO ^A CODE 212 [ 9BS-33S1

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

TO THE UNITED NATIONS

82O SECOND AVENUE

NEW YORK. N. Y. 1OO1V

25th July 1978

Ref: 2002/77/2 V?/r-

Excellency:

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw to your Excellency's attention and that of the members of the Security Council to the recent "open message" of Mr. Denktash concerning Famagusta in relation to the resumption of the intercommunal talks. In this respect, I wish to reiterate my Government's stand on that message that its contents cannot constitute a basis for the resumption of meaningful and constructive negotiations nor a goodwill gesture of conciliation as Mr. Denktash tried to present it. It is another manifestation of Turkish deviousness to cover up its intransigence as well as an attempt to create false impres- sions misleading international public opinion and particularly the United States Congress. At the same time, I wish to re-affirm my Government's readiness and willingness to take part in negotiations under the aegis and guidance of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Waldheim, in search for ~h just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem, in accordance with relevant resolutions of the United Nations. As it is well-known numerous rounds of intercommunal talks have produced no results due to the Turkish intransigence and insistence on a partitionist solution culminating with the recent totally unacceptable proposals which made the resumption of the talks impossible. In the earnest desire to seek a prompt, just and lasting solution, I wish to convey the following proposal put forward by my Government:

His Excellency Dr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General United Nations New York N.Y. 10017 _ o —

1. All Turkish troops to withdraw from Famagusta and the town to be free from Turkish occupation so that all the inhabitants of Famagusta to return to their homes and properties. The town of Famagusta will be under the policing and security control of the United Nations, for a period of time. 2. As soon as this proposal is accepted by the Turkish side and the town is free and put under the policing and security and control of the United Nations as stated above and the lawful inhabitants of Famagusta begin to return to their homes, the Greek Cypriot side will be immediately ready for negotiations with an open agenda under the aegis and guidance of the Secretary-General of the United Nations with a view to seeking a solution conforming with the resolutions of the United Nations and the Declaration and Covenants of Human Rights.

It is hoped that the Turkish side will respond to this proposal in a positive way. I would be grateful if this letter were to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly under provisional agenda item 28 and of the Security Council. Please accept Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Angelos M. Angelides Charge d' Affaires a.i. co* - t r

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS - ' ' '""' •'' V ' ) ^ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ~) <-' T' & (-^°"'!~-f *" T "*"

S2O SECOND AVENUE .' 1'}' „ ,.. '.-> ''"f"'" .1 • .-•'-"

NEW YOHK. N. Y. 1OO17 '''''

24th July 1978 *iV /Tv. /. Ref: 2002/77/2 , VT " "^

Excellency:

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to a letter dated 20th July 1978, (A/33/117, S/12782) from the Permanent Representative of Turkey attaching as appendix a document entitled an "open message", of Mr. Rauf Denktash, regarding the new town of Famagusta, Varosha. The purported proposals of the Turkish Cypriot leader, having regard to their time of submission and their content, show that they are patently devoid of good faith and earnestness. More particularly, the proposal regarding the opening of Varosha, hitherto a sealed-off city, is made with the single objective in mind, to deceive world opinion and in particular the United States Congress, in light of the consideration by the United States Senate of the lifting of the arms embargo placed on Turkey in 1974. Behind the shield of the so-called "security of the Turkish Cypriots", Mr. Denktash1s proposal makes it abundantly clear that not all the rightful residents of Varosha will be allowed to return to their homes and properties, and that a substantial part of the city would be retained under the Turkish occupation. Security for all the people of Cyprus can only be secured if the proposal by President Spyros Kyprianou for complete demilitarization under the supervision of the United Nations, is accepted. Furthermore, the Turkish proposal makes it clear that any measures to be taken to set up an "interim administration" will not affect the present status of Varosha. In other words, the town will remain under Turkish control. If the Turkish proposal is

His Excellency Dr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General United Nations New York N.Y. 10017 - 2 - accepted, it would mean that the Cyprus Government accepts the occupation of Cyprus territory by Turkey. The Cyprus Government is invited to participate in the "Turkish Administration" of this occupied territory, in a restricted way, since such an interim administration will only deal with municipalities and the police.

The whole Turkish exercise could only be akined to the proverbial mouse from the labour of a mountain, having regard to the well-staged public relations campaign during the last few months. The fraudulent character of the Turkish proposal on Famagusta, is clearly shown in the relevant explanatory note attached hereto.

Not long ago, Mr. Denktash was missing no opportunity to state that Varosha or "Maras" as the town was unlawfully renamed, would remain for ever Turkish, and Mr. Ecevit himself, ordered the colonization of the town during the short time he served as an interim Prime Minister in June 1977. It is therefore, clear that this remains the intrinsic policy of the Turkish side, otherwise, how could one explain Turkey's unprecedented efforts toward the lifting of the embargo, ranging from blackmail, as Senator Charles Percy said, in a Senate speech on 21st instant, to pretence of flexibility, and its failure to come up with a convincing gesture, despite the counsel of the Carter Administration.

The Turkish continuing intransigence is so thinly veiled that the New York Times in a leader entitled "Cyprus and the Senate", in its issue of July 22, 1978, describes the offer as "vague" and "scarcely sufficient" and goes on to admonish that "Congress should not yet relax the restrictions on arms sales because ending Turkey's occupation remains an essential first step toward creating an atmosphere of trust". The New York Times description of the Turkish offer on Varosha, and the call on the Senate to uphold the embargo until Turkey terminates the occupation of 40 per cent of Cyprus, exposes the Turkish ploy, on the eve of the debate in Congress of the embargo and reveals Turkey's policy of wanting to have its cake and eat ft too.

It is encouraging that, besides the Cypriot people, a growing number in the international public opinion understand the fine print in the offer.

As regards the commencement of intercommunal talks, the Cyprus Government's position is that in order that a meaningful and productive dialogue becomes possible, the Turkish side should:-

(a) abandon its partitionist policy and withdraw its proposals based on dividing the island territorially and politically,

(b) shows respect for internationally accepted democratic principles in the constitutional structure of the State, and, - 3 -

(c) conforms with the principle of establishing a true federal Republic within the strict legal meaning of the term and not to talk about federation while proposing partition. If Denktash's proposal was not intended to mislead the members of the American Congress, in view of the discussion of the Turkish arms embargo this week, and the Turkish side is sincerely wishing to find a just and viable solution to the problem of Cyprus, safeguarding the true interests of the people of Cyprus, Greeks and Turks alike, it should, as President Kyprianou said, submit a concrete proposal to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the return of Famagusta to the Government, along with new proposals of genuine federation safeguarding the principle of free movement, freedom of settlement, right of property and the withdrawal of the foreign troops. The Secretary-General would then be able to call for the resumption of the intercommunal negotiations in keeping with the agreement reached with the Secretary-General during his last visit to Cyprus. In concluding, I wish to reiterate once again, that, my Government remains firmly attached to the procedure of intercommunal talks provided that there are the necessary pre-requisites that they would be fruitful. It is generally accepted that the Turkish proposals of April 13, 1978, did not offer the basis for the resumption of negotiations and therefore, any new Turkish proposals should offer common ground for a meaningful and constructive dialogue. I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly under item 28 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council. Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Angelos M. Angelides Charge dr Affaires a.i, J

Explanatory Note concerning the Turkish proposals on Famagusta The area of the city of Famagusta proposed to be under interim United Nations authority can house about 5000 Greek-Cypriots since it consists of 1/7 of the area previously under the authority of the Famagusta Municipality. This fraction would, itself, be an enclave entirely within the Turkish occupied zone. When the Turks talk of the return of 30-35,000 Greek-Cypriots obviously they mean that the refugees will be returned to the hotels and high-rise apartment buildings, and not to their own homes and neighborhood which would remain under Turkish occupation.

It should be emphasized though that even if all the hotels and apartment buildings for touristic purposes are used to house the returnees in no way can they accommodate the 30-35,000 refugees. In late April, 1978, the Secretary of the Famagusta Municipal Authority, Mr. N. Nikiforos, and the Cyprus Tourist Organization analysed the proposals submitted by Turkey to U.N. Secretary-General Waldheim, in Vienna earlier that month: following is the summary of their analysis:- (a) What the Turks want to keep: 1. 16 hotels within a capacity of 2505 beds 2. The only hospital 3. The police headquarters and only police station 4. The Government offices 5. Telecommunications Building 6. Electricity Authority Building 7. Main Banks 8. Commercial center of the city 9. The Municipal Markets 10. The Court house 11. Municipality building 12. The harbour of Famagusta 13. The marina 14. Both stadiums 15. Both municipal tennis courts 16. Seven churches 17. Seven public and private high schools (gymnasiums for classic and economic studies, Lyceums for commercial studies and foreign languages, as well as for hotel business) 18. Eleven elementary schools.

Over and above all this, the Turks want to keep thousands of houses, complexes and high-rise buildings. - 2 -

(b) What do they "offer" to the Greeks in the new enclave they are planning to establish?

1. 30 hotels with a capacity of 4699 beds 2. No hospital 3. No police station 4. No Government offices 5. No Court house 6. No municipality building 7. No harbour 8. No stadiums 9. Three churches 10. One high school (gymnasium) 11. Four elementary schools.

Houses to house about 5,000 and, in addition, high-rise buildings designed for the use of tourist situated in the 1/7 section of the city.

In a recent statement, the Mayor of Famagusta, Mr. A. Pougiouros, strongly protested against the Turkish proposals with the following statement: "The Turkish proposals for Famagusta constitute an unprecedented fraud. The Turks say they are ready to allow for a number of persons -- always at their discretion -•- to return to a small territory in order to reactivate the hotels and the other tourist enterprises of the area.

Most of the hotels and the tourist enterprises are situated in this area and it^is ovbious that their target is first to let the Greeks re-activate the hotels to work and gain the tourists. Once this is done, the second step is to force the Greeks out, using the same methods and tactics they used in Karpasia in the north. If the Turks mean to allow the return of people related to the hotel industry, this affects some 200 to 300 people. If they mean to allow the return of Greek- Cypriots to the 1/7 of the city, then, they really mean that up to 5,000 persons can return to their homes." Note for the record

1. The Charg6 d*Affaires of Cyprus, Mr. Angelides, called on me on 21 July and "brought up two questions. 2. Firstly,he stated that he had been instructed to requestjbhe Secretary-General, on behalf of President Kyprianou, to ask UHFICYP to take urgent steps to make the necessary arrangements for President Kyprianou to visit the Karpas enclave at an early date. Mr. Angelides pointed out that the visit was motivated mainly by humanitarian reasons. I recalled that his Government had made a similar request at the beginning of July and that UHFICYP had done what it could in this regard. I however undertook to bring new request to the Secretary-General's attention. 3. Secondly, Mr. Angelides recalled that in his speech at Pancyprian rally on 20 July, President Kyprianou stated that "if Mr. Denktash goes to the United Nations Secretary-General and presents to him a plan under which Famagusta would be handed over to the Government, and if Mr. Denktash produces a plan for true federation based on the principles of freedom of movement, ^^"^"^*•"•^ freedom of settlement and the right to property and withdrawal of the foreign troops, then the Secretary-General could invite the Greek Cypriot side to negotiate*^. Mr. Angelides indicated that this was the Cyprus Government's official position.

F.T. Liu 21 July 1978 . . _ . PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS (, ~ , ..^

r^: TO THE UNITED NATIONS . . / . \ . ' ,•:'." ^ * ,' ,• O -•' • \,- ' 820 SECOND AVENUE •-- ' ' ' " : ' •" * " """' '

NEW YORK, N. Y. 1OOT7 : ^ •:

July 18, 1978

Ref : 2002/77/2 ^. /.. lj J _:~ ? ""' : " o ~ '

Excellency: On instructions from my Government I have the honour to bring to your Excellency's attention the new evidence from inside information, of the methods used by the Ankara regime to import into Cyprus settlers from Turkey, including the falsification of identity papers showing the settlers as though born in Cyprus, on a preplanned design to change the demographic structure of Cyprus. These methods are revealed by the first hand account of a written statement by Yusuf Veli Akyuz, who fled to the free part of the islafid, in consequence of the ill treatment and oppressiveness he had experienced from the armed forces in the occupied area. His statement, was voluntarily given in his mother tongue to the Cyprus authorities on June 22, 1978. Excerpts of it appear in the attached annex in English translation.

. . ./2 His Excellency Dr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General United Nations New York N.Y. 10017 - 2 - The criminality involved in the effort to change the demography of Cyprus and the whole unacceptable situation in the occupied North, still under the aggressive occupation of Turkey, are but the outcome of the lack of enforcement measures to give effect to the resolutions of the Security Council, as duly provided j i in the Charter. Such enforcement measures daily become a more compelling need in the interest of solving international problems like that of Cyprus through establishing the conditions for international legal order and security. I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 28 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council. Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

zenoa Rossides Ambassador Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations o ANNEX

"I was born on August 8, 1957 in Turkey in the village of Kalyan j Cayrle in the district of MACKA in the province of Trebizond. At the age of six, I went to the village school where I studied for five years. After the invasion of Cyprus, Ecevit sent a notice to the Muktar of our village Mahmoud Yiadirin inviting those who wished to go to Cyprus as immigrants to make the necessary application. Seventy (70) families applied including mine. Among the seventy (70) families who came to Cyprus from my village were: Ali Dek, Mehmet Dek, Hassan Dek, Yusuf Dek, • Dursu Ali Yeslilyuz, (and other names). Subsequently another notice arrived, referring to what was to be given to the immigrants in Cyprus, and those wishing to go were told to sign the appropriate forms. They were to be given television, fridges, furniture, a house and at least 50 donums of land. The state would pay for transportation from the village to Cyprus. ~- There were 150 families in my village of whom 70 applied to come to Cyprus. We went from the village to Mersin by bus. We left the village on the 6th January 1975. We stopped at Trebizon where our passports were arranged as to show that we were going to Cyprus as tourists although we were really going to Cyprus as settlers. _ o —

We reached Mersin on the 18th January.... We boarded the ship on January 21, 1975 - 200 families altogether that is 70 from my village and the rest from other parts of Turkey but I don't know which parts. On January 22, 1975 we reached Famagusta where we were met by the Turkish Cypriot Director of the housing department who welcomed us.

• • • • We were transferred to Vassilia where they settled us. My family was given a lemon grove of five donums, a house, 3 donums of irrigable land, and 5 donums for growing grain. The division of land was proportionate to the size of the family. They did not give us a television and fridge or household equipment, because we did not arrive in time for the looting. We came a little late. They only gave us beds, a table and a few chairs....

• * • • There are also about 80 Turkish Cypriots in Vassilia. We had continual quarrels with them in the village because each interfered with the other's property. There was a big gunfight between Turkish Cypriots and settlers. There were no victims. The army and the police had to intervene. I learnt later that other families that came with us settled in Ayia Triada, Tricomo and Davlos. - 3 -

Six or seven months after our arrival in Cyprus we were given TFSC citizenship. They gave us identity cards. My identity card states that I was born in Nicosia. There are settlers all over Cyprus from Famagusta to Morphou. Settlers are still coming from Turkey, that is, they come as tourists, and stay in Cyprus as immigrants. Most settlers came from the district of Adana. The settlers are poor men and they are nearly all illiterate. There are some skilled workers but the vast majority are farmers and thieves. Their attitude is "You have. I don't have. I come and take". When an owner leaves his house, it will certainly be visited by thieves. Papers referring to our army duty came through the Turkish Embassy. The Embassy gave the fact to the appropriate Turkish Cypriot authorities summoned all those concerned to Kyrenia on February 6, 1978. That day 67 settlers from all over the district came to Kyrenia to enlist. The TFSC Minister of the Interior wanted to send us to Turkey for training. The Turkish Commanding Officer Hassan Saglam did not agree with the Minister of the Interior's proposal and ordered that we should be trained at Gulseran camp in Famagusta.... On January 1, 1978, another 115 settlers were enlisted. There will be another enlistment of settlers on June 22, 1978. The 115 settlers who were enlisted on January 2, 1978 are also being trained at Gulseran.

At about the beginning of March the training of those enlisted on January 1, 1978 was completed.... - 4 -

Our training consisted in drill and use of small arms. They divided us in two platooms. In the first platoom in which I am, we were trained in the use of A4 machineguns. The second division was trained in 60,81 kmtr mortars, recoiller PAO guns and antiaircraft guns. They also showed us the four barelled antiaircraft gun which they brought from the next camp. This camp contained an antiaircraft unit - I think about a company...

On March 6, 1978, our training was completed and the 67 trainees were sent to units of the 7th Regiment at Aheritou. The commander of the regiment is a Turkish Cypriot, Ozman Kemal. Before enlisted in the army, there was a fight at a wedding in which my name became entangled. I was kept under arrest for one month. While under arrest, I was beaten and violately mal- treated. I lost two teeth during the beating. This was one of the reasons why I decided to desert to the Greek side. Also because of the oppression and barbarism in the army which was unbearable... .v' ISfflt.

c , .

COHFIDSNTIAL <—^ Notes on a meeting in the Secretary-General's office at 12OO noon on Saturday, 15 July 1978

Present: Ambassador Tilrkmen Mr. Dogu Gilrakan (Turkish Mission)

The Secretary-General Mr. P. T. Liu

The Secretary-General said he had asked Ambassador Turkmen to meet with him in order to discuss the new Turkish proposal on Varosha, which had been conveyed to him by the United States Mission. Ambassador Turkmen stated that the proposal had originated from an idea conceived by Prime Minister Ecevit in the light of the observations made by the Secretary-General on Varosha in his last report to the Security Council and in the hope that this could lead to an early resumption of the intercommunal talks. The Turkish Government hoped that the Secretary-General would see his way to reconvening the intercommunal talks on the basis of the new proposal or.at least^would agree to make a public statement in which he would, take note of the new proposal and express the view that this constituted an important step forward towards the resumption of the talks. The Secretary~General stated that no one was more anxious than he to have the intercommunal talks resumed, but he had every reason to believe that the Turkish proposal in its present form., and in particular the observations on the joint interim administration, would be rejected outright by the Greek Cypriots. He felt that to achieve progress towards -2-

a resumption of the negotiating process, the Turkish side would have to make a more substantial offer, such as the return of Varosha to the Greek Cypriots or, at the very least, the placing of Varosha under exclusive UNFICYP control. If the Turkish Government were to revise its proposal on Varosha along those lines and if it were willing to discuss the question of the re-opening of the Nicosia International Airport, then the prospects of an early resumption of the intercommunal talks would be greatly enhanced. Therefore, the Secretary-General saw two possible courses of action. First, he could inform the Greek Cypriots of the Turkish proposal as it stood, but as he had indicated earlier, this would certainly be rejected by them. Secondly, the Turkish Government could agree to revise the proposal to make it more acceptable to the Greek Cypriots. In this case the Secretary-General would inform the Greek Cypriots of the revised proposal and he would try to persuade them to agree to the resumption of the intercommunal talks. He did not believe that a public statement by him at this stage would be useful. Ambassador Ttirkmen stated that he would report faithfully the Secretary-General's views to his Government. ss-t e-.'»

1Interim Administration of Varosha/ \rr7—i ( > Q In his May 31, 1978 report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus, Secretary-General Waldheim observed that "The time may be ripe for a concrete attempt to deal with some important aspects of the existing stalemate on the ground, thus creating an opening for further significant steps. The status of Varosha, which obviously should not be kept in its present empty and decaying condition, may provide an opportunity for this kind. Since Varosha is situated in the immediate vicinity of the buffer zone, it would seem natural to envisage United Nations assistance in this connection." The Turkish Cypriots had already indicated that the Greek Cypriot inhabitants of Varosha would be able to begin returning to their homes and properties in the city as soon as the intercommunal talks are reconvened. They have specified that as many as 35,000 Greek Cypriots can thus be resettled commencing shortly after the resumption of negotiations. The legitimate security concerns of the Turkish Cypriot community should not be ignored in defining the area of resettlement and establishing the practical arrangements therein-. The Turkish side has made it clear, moreover, that the future political status of Varosha is fully open to negotiation. In conjunction these elements represent a constructive opening position,^expressive of Turkish Cypriot good will and sincerity. With the above in mind, the following proposals are hereby made: — Pending a final settlement and upon the resumption of intercommunal talks on the basis of the Denktas-Makarios agreement of 12 February 1977, an interim administration shall be set up in Varosha without any prejudice either to the existing Turkish Cypriot jurisdiction over the area or to the final political status thereof. The interim administration which v/ill function under the supervision of the UNFICYP shall be composed of the representatives of the Greek Cypriots who will settle in the area, repj-__ r^s_entatiyes of_Jthe Turkish__Cyp_r_iot__a,dministration and "the "UNFICYP. ' "x- v-~" - 2 -

— The interim administration's organs and functions which shall include the supervision of essential municipal services and the exercise of normal police functions shall be determined through negotiations between the Turkish Cypriot administration and the UN Secretary-General or his representative. The resettlement of Varosha shall proceed by stages, with the expectation that up to 15,000 persons will be able to return within six months after the resumption of meaningful and result- oriented negotiations. The United Nations shall provide such technical assistance as may be necessary to survey and rehabilitate the city's infrastructure and buildings and to facilitate the process of resettlement.