Cold War Battle in Finland Begins, 1948– 1949

chapter 2 Cold War Battle in Finland Begins, 1948–1949

1 ird Takes the Initiative

The British Government’s growing desire to counter the Soviet Union’s propaganda offensive finally led to the establishment of a secret anti-communist propaganda unit, known as the Information Research Department, at the For- eign Office in January 1948. The idea of establishing the department was sold to the left-wing members of the Labour party by linking it with the ‘Third Force’ concept, by which the idea of ‘socialist foreign policy’ had become known. In- deed, the ird was initially given the role of supporting this policy by adver- tising social democracy and the British way of life in a positive light against communism, rather than attacking the Soviet Union as such. The ‘Third Force’ idea remained, however, more or less mere rhetoric, and the Labour Govern- ment’s support for it soon faded. As a result, the ‘positive’ approach was soon rejected and the ird’s work focused increasingly on revealing the weaknesses and injustices of the communist system in the Soviet Union and its satellites. The ird’s main mission was to collect information about communist policies and propaganda as well as co-ordinate the discreet production and dissemination of fact-based anti-communist material to opinion formers both home and abroad. After the rejection of the Third Force idea, the department’s general objective was defined as follows: “to pass over to the offensive and not to leave the initiative to the enemy, but make them defend themselves”.1 The ird particularly focused on areas outside the Eastern Bloc that were estimated to be under communist threat. The Soviet campaign was combated by select- ing and slanting carefully produced information, such as studies on Soviet policies, without revealing the original source. This chosen work method, based on the tactics of ‘grey’ propaganda, could be described as distributing truth with a certain ‘spin’.2 For the distribution of ird propaganda material through British missions overseas, a special network of ‘influential people’ was built in each country. This arrangement offered a valuable addition to the more usual channels made available to the ird, namely the British Overseas Information Service, the press

1 Taylor 1999a, p. 237. 2 Wesley Wark, “Coming in from the Cold: British Propaganda and the Red Arm Defectors, 1946–1952”, The International History Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, (February 1987), p. 51.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | DOI:10.1163/9789004416420_004 88 CHAPTER 2 and the radio. Distribution of ird content was very much the responsibility of the information officers of each mission, who for the most part were former officers of the war-time moi.3 The material fell into two categories: one consisted of secret and confidential studies on Soviet policies that were distributed to high-level politicians and the other of more general and less classified material sent to journalists, academics and labour leaders for background use.4 Mis- sions worldwide played an active part in the production of this content by re- sponding to London’s requests for information about communist activities in their parts of the world. The bulk of the produced material was sent to highly influential figures, but at first the ird defined the broader masses as an equal- ly important target group. Even though the activity of reaching working class audiences through foreign social democratic parties and trade unions turned out to be successful in many Western European countries, in the 1950s the ird often stressed that its basic method was to influence opinion leaders rather than to make a mass appeal.5 Close contacts with the new coi were also important for the coordination and distribution of ird material, while liaison with MI6 and the Chiefs of Staff (cos) was regarded as essential for the collection and use of intelligence information. The ird’s relationship with MI6 was not always frictionless, as many intelligence officers believed that the department was too low-key and defen- sive for producing effective results. On the other hand, the ird’s involvement in the dissemination of ‘black’ material, such as forgeries, lies and fabrications for use by its own outlets as well as MI6-funded radio stations and news agen- cies also raised some doubts about the department’s credibility and merits, especially in Foreign Office circles.6 Although the intention was to keep the ird small, it soon became clear that greater resources would be required to perform tasks of collecting information about communist policy and providing material for anti-communist publicity

3 Mr Moorehead to Mr McNeil, ‘British propaganda in Europe’, May 13, 1947, FO 953/4H, NA. 4 For example, Hugh Wilford, “The Information Research Department: Britain’s Secret Cold War Weapon Revealed”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1998), p. 358; Lyn Smith, “Covert British Propaganda: The Information Research Department: 1947–77”, Millenni- um: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1980), p. 73. 5 For example, ‘ird’s circular letter to Posts’, June 6, 1955, FO 1110/716, NA. 6 Stephen Dorril, MI6 – Fifty Years of Special Operations (London 2000), p. 79. The FO had orig- inally wished to avoid receiving such a reputation by keeping some distance from MI6 and cos as far as the ‘black operations’ taking place in the communist countries as well as in Germany and Austria were concerned, but as time passed the ird’s involvement in them became more commonplace. For example; ‘Anti-Communist Propaganda – Memorandum of the Secretary of Cabinet’, April 1948; W.O. Hayter to FO, June 2, 1948, both FO 1093/375, NA.