Chapter One December 1941-December 1942 a Necessary War
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Eugene B. Sledge MBM August 2020 FINAL.Pdf (3.688
HISTORY | LEGENDS Eugene B. Sledge and Mobile: 75 Years After “The War” Mobilian Eugene Sledge is recognized the world over as a USMC combat veteran of World War II, but there is even more to know, and admire, about “Ugin” of Georgia Cottage. text by AARON TREHUB • photos courtesy AUBURN UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES xactly 75 years ago this spring, in May and June 1945, Mo- bile native and U.S. Marine Corps PFC Eugene Bondurant Sledge was fighting on Okinawa as a mortarman with Com- pany K, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment of the 1st Ma- Erine Division. Sledge was already a combat veteran by this time, having received his baptism of fire on Peleliu in September and October 1944. He was 21 years old. Years later, Sledge described the fighting on Okinawa in mid-May 1945 and the recurring nightmares that it inspired. “The increasing dread of going back into action obsessed me,” he wrote. “It became the subject of the most tortuous and persistent of all the ghastly war nightmares that have haunted me for many, many years. The dream is always the same, going back up to the lines during the bloody, muddy month of May on Okinawa. It remains blurred and vague, but oc- casionally still comes, even after the nightmares about the shock and violence of Peleliu have faded and been lifted from me like a curse.” Nightmares haunted Sledge for decades after the war: as a com- bat veteran and student attending Alabama Polytechnic Institute (Auburn University) on the G.I. Bill in the late 1940s; as a young husband and father pursuing graduate degrees at API and the Uni- versity of Florida in the late 1950s; and as a professor of biology at the University of Montevallo from the 1960s through the 1980s. -
Reflections on Pearl Harbor Anniversaries Past Roger Dingman University of Southern California
Reflections on Pearl Harbor Anniversaries Past Roger Dingman University of Southern California By any measure, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was one of the decisive events of the twentieth century. For Americans, it was the greatest military disaster in memory-one which set them on the road to becoming the world's greatest military power. For Japanese, the attack was a momentary triumph that marked the beginning of their nation's painful and protracted transition from empire to economic colossus. Thus it is entirely appropriate, more than fifty years after the Pearl Harbor attack, to pause and consider the meaning of that event. One useful way of doing so is to look back on Pearl Harbor anniversaries past. For in public life, no less than in private, anniversaries can tell us where we are; prompt reflections on where we have been; and make us think about where we may be going. Indeed, because they are occa- sions that demand decisions by government officials and media man- agers and prompt responses by ordinary citizens about the relationship between past and present, anniversaries provide valuable insights into the forces that have shaped Japanese-American relations since 1941. On the first Pearl Harbor anniversary in December 1942, Japanese and Americans looked back on the attack in very different ways. In Tokyo, Professor Kamikawa Hikomatsu, one of Japan's most distin- guished historians of international affairs, published a newspaper ar- ticle that defended the attack as a legally and morally justifiable act of self-defense. Surrounded by enemies that exerted unrelenting mili- tary and economic pressure on it, and confronted by an America that refused accommodation through negotiation, Japan had had no choice but to strike.' On Guadalcanal, where they were locked in their first protracted battle against Japanese troops, Americans mounted a "hate shoot" against them to memorialize those who had died at Pearl Har- bor a year earlier.2 In Honolulu, the Advertiser editorial writer urged The ]journal of American-East Asian Relations, Vol. -
PEARL HARBOR WARNINGS 27 November and 3 December 1941
PEARL HARBOR WARNINGS 27 November and 3 December 1941 Message Sent by Navy Department, 27 November 1941: This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of the conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move is expected with the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of the naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in War Plan 46 [The Navy’s war plan]. inform district and army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Department of Army dispatch, 27 November: Negotiations with Japan appear to have terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest of possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat, cannot be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat, not to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned to Rainbow Five [the Army’s war plan]so far as they pertain to Japan. -
British Responses to the Holocaust
Centre for Holocaust Education British responses to the Insert graphic here use this to Holocaust scale /size your chosen image. Delete after using. Resources RESOURCES 1: A3 COLOUR CARDS, SINGLE-SIDED SOURCE A: March 1939 © The Wiener Library Wiener The © AT FIRST SIGHT… Take a couple of minutes to look at the photograph. What can you see? You might want to think about: 1. Where was the photograph taken? Which country? 2. Who are the people in the photograph? What is their relationship to each other? 3. What is happening in the photograph? Try to back-up your ideas with some evidence from the photograph. Think about how you might answer ‘how can you tell?’ every time you make a statement from the image. SOURCE B: September 1939 ‘We and France are today, in fulfilment of our obligations, going to the aid of Poland, who is so bravely resisting this wicked and unprovoked attack on her people.’ © BBC Archives BBC © AT FIRST SIGHT… Take a couple of minutes to look at the photograph and the extract from the document. What can you see? You might want to think about: 1. The person speaking is British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. What is he saying, and why is he saying it at this time? 2. Does this support the belief that Britain declared war on Germany to save Jews from the Holocaust, or does it suggest other war aims? Try to back-up your ideas with some evidence from the photograph. Think about how you might answer ‘how can you tell?’ every time you make a statement from the sources. -
First Hand Accounts of December 7, 1941 in Pearl Harbor
First Hand Accounts of December 7, 1941 in Pearl Harbor William Brown East Carolina University Faculty Mentor: Wade Dudley East Carolina University ABSTRACT This project involves researching and writing a narrative combining the first-hand accounts of sail- ors in the United States Navy at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on December 7, 1941. The goal of the project is to gather the personal accounts provided in oral histories and to synthesize those into a narrative describing the emotions of that morning. This has been accomplished by examining the oral histories provided by five men who graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1941 and survived the Japanese attack. A sixth account is provided by Lt. Alexander B. Coxe, Jr., who was the executive officer aboard the U.S.S Breese. Each individual perspective provides a different angle to the horror that surrounded Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The research highlights the raw emotions as the Japanese planes flew above and the destruction and death surrounding these men. n the morning of December 7, by documenting their memory of the at- O 1941, the naval and aerial forces of tack. Each of these men graduated from the Japanese Empire secretly attacked the the United States Naval Academy in 1941 United States Navy at the naval base of with the newly bestowed rank of Ensign, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. For over two hours, except for Lt. Coxe. These men would two waves consisting of over three hundred begin their naval careers with the defin- Japanese aircraft destroyed the Pacific Fleet ing moment of Pearl Harbor. -
2Nd INFANTRY REGIMENT
2nd INFANTRY REGIMENT 1110 pages (approximate) Boxes 1243-1244 The 2nd Infantry Regiment was a component part of the 5th Infantry Division. This Division was activated in 1939 but did not enter combat until it landed on Utah Beach, Normandy, three days after D-Day. For the remainder of the war in Europe the Division participated in numerous operations and engagements of the Normandy, Northern France, Rhineland, Ardennes-Alsace and Central Europe campaigns. The records of the 2nd Infantry Regiment consist mostly of after action reports and journals which provide detailed accounts of the operations of the Regiment from July 1944 to May 1945. The records also contain correspondence on the early history of the Regiment prior to World War II and to its training activities in the United States prior to entering combat. Of particular importance is a file on the work of the Regiment while serving on occupation duty in Iceland in 1942. CONTAINER LIST Box No. Folder Title 1243 2nd Infantry Regiment Unit Histories January 1943-June 1944 2nd Infantry Regiment Unit Histories, July-October 1944 2nd Infantry Regiment Histories, July 1944- December 1945 2nd Infantry Regiment After Action Reports, July-September 1944 2nd Infantry Regiment After Action Reports, October-December 1944 2nd Infantry Regiment After Action Reports, January-May 1945 2nd Infantry Regiment Casualty List, 1944-1945 2nd Infantry Regiment Unit Journal, 1945 2nd Infantry Regiment Narrative History, October 1944-May 1945 2nd Infantry Regiment History Correspondence, 1934-1936 2nd Infantry -
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD— Extensions of Remarks E1998 HON. BETTY Mccollum HON. JOHN CONYERS, JR. HON. JO BONNER HON. CATHY Mcmorri
E1998 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — Extensions of Remarks September 27, 2007 improving the condition of his fellow man for and more states are threatening to do so. lips penned his war memoir entitled, ‘‘You’ll Be nearly 50 years. These states impose a higher sales tax on na- Sor-ree!’’ f tionally distributed DBS subscribers than they Madam Speaker, the recognition of Dr. Sid- do on cable or other types of video providers. ney Phillips in ‘‘The War’’ documentary is an POPCORN WORKERS LUNG The legislation that I am introducing today appropriate time for us to pause and thank DISEASE PREVENTION ACT will ensure fair taxation to all consumers, and him—and all of the soldiers who fought in I hope to conduct hearings and request a SPEECH OF World War II. They personify the very best GAO study of this issue. America has to offer. I urge my colleagues to HON. BETTY McCOLLUM The State Video Tax Fairness Act of 2007 take a moment to pay tribute to Dr. Phillips OF MINNESOTA would prohibit discriminatory taxes against any and his selfless devotion to our country and IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES pay-TV service and apply the non-discrimina- the freedom we enjoy. tion principle to taxes on both services and Wednesday, September 26, 2007 equipment. f The House in Committee of the Whole State revenues would not be impacted. The House on the State of the Union had under Act would allow states to tax pay-TV providers IN HONOR OF THE 125TH ANNIVER- consideration the bill (H.R. 2693) to direct or their subscribers, provided that such taxes SARY CELEBRATION OF HOOPER, the Occupational Safety and Health Admin- are applied equally to all such services, includ- WA istration to issue a standard regulating ing cable and DBS. -
U.S. Coast Guard at Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941
U.S. COAST GUARD UNITS IN HAWAII December 7, 1941 Coast Guard vessels in service in Hawaii were the 327-foot cutter Taney, the 190-foot buoy tender Kukui, two 125- foot patrol craft: Reliance and Tiger, two 78-foot patrol boats and several smaller craft. At the time of the attack, Taney was tied up at Pier Six in Honolulu Harbor, Reliance and the unarmed Kukui both lay at Pier Four and Tiger was on patrol along the western shore of Oahu. All were performing the normal duties for a peacetime Sunday. USCGC Taney (WPG-37); Commanding Officer: Commander Louis B. Olson, USCG. Taney was homeported in Honolulu; 327-foot Secretary Class cutter; Commissioned in 1936; Armament: two 5-inch/51; four 3-inch/ 50s and .50 caliber machine guns. The 327-foot cutter Taney began working out of Honolulu in as soon as she was commissioned. On the morning of 7 December 1941, she was tied up at pier six in Honolulu Harbor six miles away from the naval anchorage. After the first Japanese craft appeared over the island, Taney's crew went to general quarters and made preparations to get underway. While observing the attack over Pearl Harbor, Taney received no orders to move and did not participate in the initial attack by the Japanese. Just after 09:00, when the second wave of planes began their attack on the naval anchorage, Taney fired on high altitude enemy aircraft with her 3-inch guns and .50 caliber machine guns. The extreme range of the planes limited the effect of the fire and the guns were secured after twenty minutes. -
Pearl Harbor Revisited: U.S
United States Cryptologic History Cryptologic States United United States Cryptologic History Pearl Harbor Revisited: U.S. Navy Communications Intelligence 1924–1941 Pearl Harbor Revisited Harbor Pearl 2013 Series IV: World War II | Volume 6 n57370 Center for Cryptologic History This publication presents a historical perspective for informational and educational purposes, is the result of independent research, and does not necessarily reflect a position of NSA/CSS or any other U.S. government entity. This publication is distributed free by the National Security Agency. If you would like additional copies, please submit your request to: Center for Cryptologic History National Security Agency 9800 Savage Road, Suite 6886 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755 Frederick D. Parker retired from NSA in 1984 after thirty-two years of service. Following his retirement, he worked as a reemployed annuitant and volunteer in the Center for Cryptologic His- tory. Mr. Parker served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1943 to 1945 and from 1950 to 1952. He holds a B.S. from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. Cover: First Army photo of the bombing of Hawaii, 7 December 1941; the battleship USS Arizona in background is on fire and sinking. Signal Corps photo taken from Aeia Heights. Pearl Harbor Revisited: U.S. Navy Communications Intelligence 1924–1941 Frederick D. Parker Series IV: World War II | Volume 6 Third edition 2013 Contents Foreword ...................................................................... 5 Introduction ................................................................. -
FDR and Pearl Harbor (Free Press, 2000), 258-260
CONFRONT THE ISSUE Almost as soon as the attacks occurred, conspiracy theorists began claiming that President Roosevelt had FDR AND prior knowledge of the assault on Pearl Harbor. Others have claimed he tricked the Japanese into starting a war with the United States as a “back door” way to go to war with Japan’s ally, Nazi Germany. However, PEARL after nearly 65 years, no document or credible witness has been discovered that prove either claim. Most HARBOR scholars view Pearl Harbor as the consequence of missed clues, intelligence errors, and overconfidence. The causes behind the Japanese attack are complex and date back to the 1930s, when Japan undertook a military/colonial expansion in China—culminating in a full-scale invasion in 1937. America opposed this expansion and used a variety of methods to try to deter Japan. During the late 1930s, FDR began providing limited support to the Chinese government. In 1940, Roosevelt moved the Pacific fleet to the naval base at Pearl Harbor as a show of American power. He also attempted to address growing tensions with Japan through diplomacy. When Japan seized southern French Indo-China in July 1941, Roosevelt responded by freezing Japanese Scroll down to view assets in the United States and ending sales of oil to Japan. Japan’s military depended upon American oil. select documents Japan then had to decide between settling the crisis through diplomacy or by striking deep into Southeast from the FDR Library Asia to acquire alternative sources of oil, an action that was certain to meet American opposition. and excerpts from the historical debate. -
Out-Producing the Enemy: American Production During WWII
“Out-Producing the Enemy” American Production During WWII The National WWII Museum 945 Magazine Street New Orleans, LA 70130 (504) 528-1944 www.nationalww2museum.org/learn/education © The National WWII Museum “Out-Producing the Enemy:” American Production During WWII Before the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor and the United States entered WWII in December 1941, the American economy was still weak from The Great Depression. In 1939, the US unemployment rate was high at 17.2% and America’s military was small, ranking 18th largest in the world after the nation of Romania. A year before America’s entry into the war in 1940, Adolf Hitler, the Nazi leader of Germany, predicted that American war supplies would not be enough to help the Allies win the war. Hitler said that “an American intervention by mass deliveries of planes and war materials will not change the outcome of the war.” However, US president Franklin Delano Roosevelt was determined to prove Hitler and the Axis Powers wrong. Roosevelt told the American people that they must all work together to win the war because “powerful enemies must be out-fought and out-produced.” In this lesson, discover how the United States was able to out-produce all other countries during World War II and create a “production miracle.” Students will analyze and graph historical statistics, and use primary sources like photographs, quotes, and propaganda posters to explain how US production helped the Allies to win the war. OBJECTIVES: Students will be able to: Identify and analyze primary and secondary sources including quotes, photographs, and propaganda posters to learn about the American Home Front experience during WWII. -
Was Armament Minister Albert Speer Really Responsible for the German
Was armament minister Albert Speer really responsible for the German “armament miracle” during World War II? New doubts arising from the annual audits of the German aircraft producers. Jonas Scherner University of Mannheim Jochen Streb University of Hohenheim Abstract Armament minister Albert Speer is usually credited with causing the upswing in German armament production after 1941. Exploring the annual audit reports of the Deutsche Revisions- und Treuhand AG for six different firms, we question this view by showing that in the German aircraft industry the crucial political changes already occurred before World War II. The government decided in 1938 that aircraft producers had to concentrate on a few different types, and in 1937 cost-plus contracts were replaced with fixed price contracts. What followed was not a sudden production miracle but a continuous development which was fuelled by learning-by-doing and by the ongoing growth of the capital endowment. Preliminary version. Please do not quote. Comments are welcome. 1 The German armament miracle In December 1941 the Russian army stopped the German Wehrmacht near Moscow. That along with the United States’ entry into World War II brought the National Socialists’ strategy to fight so-called Blitzkriege, which could be waged with a comparatively low number of soldiers and arms, to a sudden end.1 Now confronted with the prospect of a long-lasting war against the Unites States and Soviet Russia, the German military planners acknowledged that they had to increase their armament production considerably. This insight was frankly made public by the economic journal Deutscher Volkswirt (1942, p.