Case study Civil society organisation involvement in urban water sector reform NGOs in Pakistan A WaterAid publication written by Timeyin Uwejamomere. have been active in Edited by Libby Plumb. helping the urban Written in 2007, with minor updates in 2009. poor gain access to safe water supplies This is one of a series of nine case studies outlining civil society organisations’ since the early (CSOs) involvement in urban water sector reform. The other case studies cover 1980s. the following locations: WaterAid/ • (Chittagong and ) Martin Punaks • Brazil (Recife) and Venezuela (Caracas) • Ghana (Accra) Front cover photo: • Kenya (Kisumu, Nairobi and Mombasa) A sewer line being • Nepal (Kathmandu) installed by a • Philippines (Manila) community in • Uganda (Kampala) Faislabad, with • Ukraine support from the NGO Anjuman The case studies accompany the guidance manual Our water, our waste, our Samaji Behbood. town, which offers support to civil society in engaging in urban water and WaterAid/ sanitation reforms. Martin Punaks The manual and case studies can all be downloaded at: www.wateraid.org/urbanreform

WaterAid’s mission is to overcome poverty by enabling the world’s poorest people to gain access to safe water, sanitation and hygiene education. Civil society organisation involvement in urban water sector reform in Pakistan Section one: Background and problem

There have been three phases of Commission was established to lead attempts at reforms to improve water the process in 19912. and sanitation services in the city of . Under the resulting World Bank- funded Karachi Water and Sewerage The first phase of reforms: Project running from 1990 to 1999, the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board the 1990-1999 Karachi Water (KWSB) was to be prepared for private and Sewerage Board reform sector participation. The World Bank In the early 1990s, many public helped the government in developing services in Pakistan were in decline. strategies and initiating discussions Service delivery had weakened, and with various stakeholders. On the public institutions had become less advice of the World Bank, a shortlist efficient and were deeply in debt. of eight international consultants was Contributing factors for their decline considered and Banque Paribas/Sir included population growth, political William Halcrow and Partners were interference in the management of recruited to implement the KWSB public services, the advent of the privatisation project in three phases in military in political governance, and 1995. These entailed the development the exclusion of local administrative of the most appropriate PSP strategy; systems and community organisations the preparation of a feasibility report from governance1. With an external on PSP; and the implementation of debt of Rs. 32 billion the Government the agreed programme3. of Pakistan planned to privatise public institutions providing The PSP strategy proposed that the various services including banking, KWSB would be managed under a electricity, aviation, railways, 20 – 25 year concession contract telecommunication, and natural awarded to a private entity. It gas. Also listed were the water and proposed to reduce physical water sanitation agencies (WASAs) in losses from 40% to 30%, improve various large cities, including Karachi, efficiency of labour and reduce Lahore and Faisalabad. A Privatisation costs by cutting staff numbers

1 Notes from conversation with Tasneem Ahmad Siddiqui, Chairman, Saiban - a retired civil servant working with the Sindh Katchi Abadis Authority for several years. 2 Noman Ahmed and M Sohail (2000): Privatisation of KWSB: An Analysis. City Press. 3 ibid

 Civil society organisation involvement in urban water sector reform in Pakistan

by 1,500 before privatisation and of promotional literature in Urdu and another 4,000 after privatisation. Bill English, and organisation of various collection was to more than double for stakeholder meetings, debates, connected households and increase seminars, workshops and question four-fold for unconnected customers. and answer sessions with a cross- Water tariffs were to increase annually section of people and organisations. by 20% in real terms, yielding a cumulative increase of 300% by the This advocacy and public fifth year under privatisation. Ahead of communication strategy was not quite privatisation, tariffs were increased by as successful as was envisaged. 30%. Opposition by the Karachi Water and Sewerage Network, an informal Coverage levels were proposed coalition of civil society groups, and a to increase from 80% to 100% petition to the Sindh (Provincial) High after an initial delay of three years Court, led to the suspension of the while systems were expanded to reforms, and a Commission of Inquiry meet additional demand for water into the process was established connections and water consumption4. following a court order.

The proposal also allowed for The second phase of reform: renegotiation of service improvement goals, tariffs, and investment sewerage and sanitation commitment after five years. Although projects 1995 - 2005 no penalties were proposed for failure The second attempt at reform was to meet targets, the PSP proposal initiated under the Greater Karachi required the government to guarantee Sewerage plan. The plan was backed to review tariffs. by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and included the $100 million Korangi After the completion of the PSP Water and Sanitation Project to fix strategy and the preparation of a faulty drainage lines laid in the 1960s feasibility report, implementation of and channel them to treatment plants private sector participation was to be to be built under the project. rolled out, supported by an advocacy and public communication strategy A review by the Karachi Water and to generate support for privatisation. Sanitation Network, led by the Orangi The strategy was to publicise accurate Pilot Project, suggested that the and impartial information on the project proposal ignored the fact process and develop a broad-based that most of the city’s sewage was consensus with the use of a well being channelled by gravity through defined media campaign, publication open drains to the sea. The new

4 Pakistan Institute of Labour Education & Research (undated) Social Watch: Urban Water Reforms: Whose Water? Whose City? Advocacy for People’s Rights

 Civil society organisation involvement in urban water sector reform in Pakistan proposal depended on a system of The third phase of reform: pumps to carry sewage to treatment the internal reform of plants through a system of drains the utility or the return of not aligned to the city’s topography. They argued that it was as a result of privatisation? similar mistakes that the Orangi and Following a directive in January 2004 Baldal Sewerage Projects had failed, a third attempt at reform, currently with sewage not reaching treatment under way, aims to improve the plants due to faulty construction or KWSB’s service standards, boost maintenance problems with expensive revenue collection and reverse pumping systems. its ailing financial systems. The KWSB’s weak revenue base has had Pipes for a Following these objections, the debilitating effects on the operations community project was ultimately cancelled and and maintenance functions, leading to sewerage project in replaced with the Karachi Sewerage system depreciation and breakdown. Faislabad, Pakistan. Master Plan, designed by OPP in The government has opted for WaterAid/Martin collaboration with the government. the World Bank’s ‘Turn Around Punaks

 Civil society organisation involvement in urban water sector reform in Pakistan

Programme’, involving a restructure of customers to make payments using the utility and an injection of capital ATMs located across the city. It is aimed at transforming the utility into envisaged that the utility will further a sustainable and financially viable outsource some areas of its operation entity with higher service levels and a and maintenance, including the higher proportion of customers paying installation of wastewater services. their bills. The utility has also been investing in repairing leaks and improving its As part of the process, a new area- facilities. based management structure has been introduced with a team of Chief The proposals are being received Engineers responsible for service warily by CSOs, who fear full delivery and revenue generation privatisation of the utility will follow. Poor drainage is a within defined hydrological areas. KWSB officials have denied there big health risk to Monthly billing and revenue collection are plans to privatise the utility, but children in cities in has been outsourced to the private confirm that the utility is currently Pakistan. sector. In August 2006 an agreement undergoing internal reforms to WaterAid/ was signed with the National Data improve performance. Martin Punaks and Registration Authority to enable

 Civil society organisation involvement in urban water sector reform in Pakistan Section two: What CSOs have done

Karachi’s CSOs have been working order to temporarily freeze the reform with community groups to improve process. The court also ordered urban water and sanitation services an inquiry into the process. The since the early 1980s. Over time, their Independent Commission of Inquiry relationship with the government has was subsequently established and changed from opposition to dialogue the Usmani Committee Report was to eventual collaboration in the produced in 1999. Karachi utility reform process. The points on which civil society criticised the process were quite clear. CSO engagement in the first These include5: phase of reform: opposition • The possible adverse effect on the In the early 1980s NGOs began poor facilitating community self-help water • The proposed 20% increase in and sanitation projects and initiatives tariff every year for five years, in Karachi. These initiatives helped (a 300% cumulative rise) not to develop a rapport and a system for compatible with the economic collaboration between the NGOs and reality of the poor citizens as well as between CSOs. In • The guarantee provided by the the 1990s NGOs working on issues contract for the private sector of urban development, particularly operator’s profit and protection water supply and sanitation, under from operational risk, and an umbrella described as the Water • The absence of any viable and Sanitation Network, alongside accountability measure for trade unions, ex-officers of the KWSB, monitoring the performance of the sections of the press, CBOs, several operator professional associations and other public interest groups concerned CSO engagement in the about some aspects of the reform process, started a campaign to second phase of reform: oppose the proposed private sector from opposition to dialogue participation. A petition was also The Karachi Water and Sanitation submitted to the Sindh High Court Network identified that the concept (SHC) against PSP. This petition upon which the design of the Greater finally led to the SHC issuing an Karachi Sewerage Plan was based was

5 Ahmed and Sohail (2000)

 Civil society organisation involvement in urban water sector reform in Pakistan

perhaps the source of the drainage Sanitation Network, began work in problems the city was experiencing. Orangi, a slum community in Karachi A consensus was reached by the with a population of one million, in Karachi Water and Sanitation Network 1980. It observed people’s initiatives to oppose the initial design of the in the provision of basic services and Korangi Project, and a coalition of through its programmes demonstrated CBOs and NGOs lobbied against the that at the neighbourhood level, proposal. At first the government people can finance and manage ignored the CSOs, arguing that they facilities like sewerage, water supply, were not direct beneficiaries or schools, waste disposal and security. victims of the project. The coalition then contacted affected communities, The basic concept of the Sewerage raised their knowledge on the issue Master Plan was to secure the routes and started collecting their signatures of open drains and cover them so as on a petition calling for a review of to reduce encroachment. The plan the project. The exercise generated a ensured that the design would not debate in the media and amongst city lead to unnecessary evictions and residents. demolitions of homes to make way for sewers, but allowed community Ultimately, public pressure members to voluntarily demolish contributed to a decision by ADB houses so as to improve their to cancel the project, although environment. The plan was that the immediate explanation for the construction work should be paid for cancellation given by ADB was that with government funds rather than the government was not fulfilling its loans. The next phase of the proposal obligations under the terms of the is the development of treatment project. facilities, which may require some external funding. The Network entered into dialogue with the government on the need to CSO engagement in the prepare a sewerage plan that fully responded to the city’s realities, third phase of reform: from particularly the topography, in dialogue to collaboration drainage designs and construction. The third phase of reform attempts Based on evidence provided, of the city’s utility has led to a new including a volume of the city’s wave of Water and Sanitation Network drainage maps accumulated over engagement in the reforms. the years by the (OPP), a proposal was submitted The utility had started to engage to the government by OPP and OPP with a section of the NGO community was finally engaged to lead in the soon after the collapse of the earlier development of a Sewerage Master attempt to privatise its operation Plan for Karachi. OPP, an NGO and between 1995 and 1999 and member of the Karachi Water and the successful dialogue on the

 Civil society organisation involvement in urban water sector reform in Pakistan

development of the alternative new systems have led to newfound Pools of stagnant Karachi Sewerage Master Plan harmony in the relationship between water are a common proposed by the Network. To ensure the utility and CSOs. sight in Pakistan’s civil society was able to participate, major cities. a CSO Liaison Cell was established in Besides OPP, the KWSB is also in WaterAid/ the KWSB in March 2005. discussions with two other NGOs, Martin Punaks Urban Resource Centre and Saiban, A system of feedback involving the on how to improve services to the citizens and elected representatives Katchi-Abadis (slums) of Karachi. of the city’s regions has been Initial actions have included the introduced, particularly to monitor separation of the sewerage and water revenue and complaints handling. networks to reduce seepages, and It is expected that the CSO Liaison the introduction of household water Cell will be strengthened and about connections. The connection charges 100 Customer Service Centres will for some of the slum dwellers were be opened, equipped with modern waived. communication equipment. The

 Civil society organisation involvement in urban water sector reform in Pakistan Section three: Challenges and outcomes

International financial institutions the poor. Instead, NGOs are serving as now operating in Pakistan have contractors to government”7. some concerns about the approach of CSOs to reforms in Pakistan and Civil society groups, on the other the effectiveness of their strategies, hand, see the IFIs’ country staff as based largely on the process of untrustworthy, disguising every the first phase of reform attempt. meeting as a consultation for a They partly attribute these to the project even when the meetings are weak capacity base and the lack of dominated by presentations made legitimacy for NGOs in advocacy6. by the IFIs. CSOs find it difficult to Generally, NGOs are perceived to work with the government against the be composed of elites with no grass advice of IFIs, or hold the government roots base and there is therefore a to account. They consider the attitude sense they could easily be captured of government and the civil service by donors. The big NGOs who can as patrimonial. Civil servants, include campaigns in their funding however, see CSOs as interfering in are perceived as uninterested in the mandate of government and resist campaigns and only focused on the seeming encroachment of their service delivery. ‘territory’8.

IFIs think the agenda being pursued These perceptions create a barrier by civil society in the reform between CSOs, the government process is not to the benefit of and IFIs. There is a near absence the poor. For instance, there is the of collaboration between CSOs question of why “CSOs are not in and IFIs in Karachi. The process of concert and campaigning against building trust between IFIs and CSOs the breakdown of services or the is therefore critical to improving lack of accountability and related communication and collaboration mechanisms to guarantee services for between the parties. Information

6 Notes from discussions with World Bank, WSP and ADB staff in Islamabad. 7 Notes from conversation with Syeda Maheen Zetra, Senior Institutional Development Specialist, WSP Pakistan 8 Tasneem Ahmad Siddiqui spoke extensively on this conflict between Government and CSOs but added that in the last 20 years some confidence has been developed within the civil service for CSO work and young civil servants are being seconded to CSOs to learn from their work.

10 Civil society organisation involvement in urban water sector reform in Pakistan sharing and transparency will be according to their ability and the a major step in that direction. The funding they can provide. This limits second phase of attempts at reform the need to raise any form of central improved on this scenario, albeit not funding for professional services. For as a planned process. example, OPP was selected as the hub on the Sewerage Master Plan because A relevant question to ask is how the of their expertise on the issue. The CSOs made the shift from running group discussion and acceptance of opposition campaigns to being the advocacy argument and campaign approached by the government for messages means that several engagement. In summary, CSOs stakeholders with diverse interests learnt some critical lessons from their speak with one voice on the issue. involvement in the early campaigns, which set them up for a different This approach has developed scenario in the second phase and trust among these organisations. much more so in the third phase of One of the NGOs is appointed reforms. The advocacy campaign that as the Secretariat but the Water resisted the privatisation of the KWSB and Sanitation Network remains in the 1990s resulted in a model an informal coalition with no of CSO consensus-building before management board, committee or engagement with the government paid officer. The network consists during the second phase of reforms. of about 23 members, who are themselves the fulcrum of an Developing consensus amongst the extended network of partners and NGOs entails developing robust, collaborators. For instance, PILER evidence-based positions among Centre (Pakistan Institute of Labour members before lobbying the relevant and Economics and Research) has authority. Specifically, NGOs, CBOs, relations and serves as the link with public interest professionals and the labour movement. These extended other collaborators work together networks of collaborators serve as the within an informal network, sharing source of legitimacy of most of the knowledge, skills, resources and arguments and advocacy actions of initiatives without minding who gets the coalition as they are mainly citizen the credit. Each network member’s and community groups9. research argument is challenged for its robustness by other members at In a nutshell, the steps followed are: meetings, debates, and seminars. identify the issue, call a public (CSOs) On acceptance of an argument or forum and agree a joint action. If research result by the team, an there is consensus, pursue the action implementation plan is designed plan and keep information flowing and each member is assigned a duty, among members. If no consensus is

4 Note from conversation with Perween Rahman, Director, OPP.

11 Civil society organisation involvement in urban water sector reform in Pakistan

reached, the issue is dropped. This is interest, the second step is rolled because experience has shown that out. This entails taking the issue to when an NGO pursues an action alone the extensive network of grass roots it exposes itself and its leadership to organisations and citizens’ groups to threats and fatal attacks10. build public pressure through raising awareness, building a consensus Children playing in The Network then lobbies the relevant and implementing a joint action plan, an open drainage authority for changes in the planned such as a campaign. The media are channel. development or process of reform. engaged as partners in the process WaterAid/ Where this fails to achieve change from the early stages of planning. Martin Punaks or the issues have more grass roots

10 Conversation with Mahammed Younus, Director, Urban Resource Centre. It should be noted that the history of the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board is intertwined with that of the country. Established in 1983 as part of the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC), the City Government, the KWSB was separated from the KMC and authority for approval of its annual budget was transferred to the regional government in 1996. However, the head of the Board has been appointed by the central government since 1995. The last four successive Managing Directors have been either serving or retired military officers.

12 Civil society organisation involvement in urban water sector reform in Pakistan Section four: Lessons learnt and top tips

Lessons learnt engage community groups in such CSOs: CSOs need to understand the processes. operations and psychology of the government, civil service and IFIs to Governments: Governments should be able to influence urban reform ensure that CSOs are taken on board processes. Some CSOs have realised from the early stages of initiating a that it is more productive to work reform process, from the negotiations with the government rather than of any external support to the with IFIs, since the government is implementation of the project. accountable to its citizens. But IFIs can be instrumental in insisting that Media: The media can make a a governments be more transparent great deal of difference on advocacy. as part of project processes. World CSOs can collaborate with the media Bank project appraisals, for instance, to raise awareness of debates and require a commentary on how educate the public on relevant issues. engagement with stakeholders has been carried out. IFIs: The recruitment by utilities or IFIs CSOs in Karachi show that of specialists to deal with CSOs or collaboration is desirable. A lot of social issues can be useful in building resources can be wasted by CSOs a conducive work environment for trying to reinvent the wheel either reforms. Several IFIs depend on when they are unaware that others technical staff to deal with issues have gone down that route before or of social nature and therefore lose because they are non-collaborative good opportunities for dialogue and in their approach. The desire to building social cohesion. always take the credit for actions and outcomes sometimes leads to this The lead IFI in any transaction also attitude. has the responsibility for ensuring that the process is transparent and The legitimacy of most advocacy or inclusive of civil society in its design campaign work lies in the ability of and decision-making. the organisers to engage the grass roots. However, it takes effort to divert INGOs: International NGOs can the attention of the average citizen play very valuable roles including from daily struggles to engage in brokering relationships between IFIs, advocacy. NGOs have to be patient the government and CSOs. and understanding when trying to

13 Civil society organisation involvement in urban water sector reform in Pakistan

Top tips

1. Engage with civil service officers 3. Specialise in your area of expertise even if you have direct access to the rather than trying to be ‘a jack of all leadership of the reforming institutions trades’. Such specialisations create and political leaders. Continuously expertise within networks and help to working with the civil service and enhance their effectiveness. building a relationship with them can be productive in the long run. 4. Prepare well for media briefings. Otherwise, the civil service may Providing the media with relevant develop animosity towards CSOs. evidence-based information will maximise the chance of media 2. Be ready with various options and coverage achieving your aims and alternatives to meet your objectives. In minimise the chance of the media Karachi, the Greater Karachi Sewerage looking for sensational stories, which Plan advocacy actions were successful may be detrimental to an approach because practical alternatives were which aims to carefully criticise, offered. request dialogue and promote alternatives.

14 Civil society organisation involvement in urban water sector reform in Pakistan Sanitation and Case study sewerage: Is- sues, problems and actions body Case Study Sub head

There have been three phases of attempts to reform water and sanitation services in the city of Karachi. The first phase, attempting to privatise the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB), was suspended, partly due to CSO opposition. The designs of second phase proposals to improve sewerage were criticised by CSOs as unworkable, but following dialogue with the government were replaced with a project featuring CSO design input. The third phase, to improve the KWSB’s service standards and financial viability, features active CSO involvement.

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