Scipio Africanus and the Second Punic War Joint Lessons for Center of Gravity Analysis
The Battle Between Scipio and Hannibal at Zama, Cornelis Cort, after Giulio Romano, engraving ca. 1550–1578, Elisha Whittelsey Collection (Courtesy Metropolitan Museum of Art)
Scipio Africanus and the Second Punic War Joint Lessons for Center of Gravity Analysis
By Kenneth T. Klima, Peter Mazzella, and Patrick B. McLaughlin
Bellum parate, quoniam pacem pati non potuistis. [Prepare for war, since you have been unable to endure the peace.]
—sCipio afriCanus To HanniBal, prior To THE BaTTlE of Zama, in 202 BCE
102 Recall / Scipio Africanus and the Second Punic War JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 ublius Cornelius Scipio (236–183 the Mediterranean for nearly 6 centuries. desperation, the Roman Senate eventu- BCE), known more widely by the However, before we can use Scipio’s ally turned to an unproven 24-year-old P nom de guerre Scipio Africanus, campaign history to support our claims of Scipio—son of Publius Scipio, the general was a Roman statesman and general COG analysis, we must first understand defeated and slain by Carthaginian forces whose actions during the Second Punic the history and operational conditions in 211 BCE—to remove the threat of War (218–201 BCE) demonstrate the present during the Second Punic War. Hannibal’s forces from Rome’s doorstep. eternal qualities embodied by modern However, Scipio did not move to directly concepts of joint warfare. Scipio The Operational Environment challenge Hannibal in battle, as was employed said concepts at all levels of As the name suggests, the Second Punic expected by most Roman leaders, but in- war and showed an atypical ability to War was not the first skirmish between stead chose to take an indirect approach, integrate military and political objec- Rome and Carthage. The First Punic deploying forces to Spain to conduct a tives into a single system. Although the War (264–241 BCE) was a conflict multiyear campaign against Carthaginian period of antiquity was a time when over the control of Sicily that ended forces and allies.5 In Spain, Scipio isolated the concepts of strategy were only inconclusively. In the interregnum and defeated four armies (including two nascent, the study of Scipio highlights between the first and second conflict, led by Hannibal’s brothers, Hasdrubal practically every aspect of modern joint an unsteady peace existed as each side and Mago), destroyed lines of commu- planning and operations. In analyzing maneuvered for advantage. nication supporting Hannibal in Italy, Scipio, Basil H. Liddell Hart proposed Circa 218 BCE, Carthaginian and rebalanced Carthaginian allies back that his “[m]ilitary work has a greater general Hannibal Barca prepared for, to Rome. Furthermore, Scipio showed a value to modern students of war than and then renewed, Carthage’s efforts unique ability to conduct joint warfare, that of any other great captain of to subjugate its rival. Reportedly, he leveraging the unique attributes as- the past.”1 In fact, despite warfare’s inherited his father’s hatred of Rome sociated with the different units of the advancements in technology and indus- and, through a cult of personality, led his Roman army, navy, and marine forces. try, Hart’s observation of Scipio is as army from the deserts of Africa, across Scipio’s demonstrated ability to leverage applicable to today’s joint planner as it the Mediterranean, over the Alps, and strategic, operational, and tactical flexibil- was nearly a century ago. into the Italian peninsula, embarking on a ity yielded extraordinary success. Scipio Africanus’s European and bloody campaign to defeat Rome.2 In vic- Consequently, the victory in Spain African campaigns during the Second tory after victory, using the “mental and solidified the efficacy of Scipio’s unortho- Punic War serve as timeless lessons for material means for a stroke at the heart of dox approach, the Senate expanded his joint force planners on how to conduct the Roman power,” Hannibal’s tactical commission, and he moved his armies center of gravity (COG) analysis in sup- and operational genius crushed Rome’s toward Africa to threaten the city of port of theater and national military armies and established him as one of his- Carthage directly. The confluence of planning. The campaigns are a superb tory’s greatest commanders.3 Following these events compelled Hannibal to vehicle with which to examine five key Hannibal’s decisive defeat of the Roman abandon Italy and return to Africa, where lessons associated with today’s concept of forces at Cannae (216 BCE), Carthage his army was met and routed by Scipio’s COG analysis: gained control of the Italian coast of forces at the Battle of Zama (202 BCE). Magna Graecia, which resulted in mul- Hannibal’s defeat finalized Carthage’s de- achieving the desired endstate •• tiple Roman allies and economic vassals feat, securing for Rome a Mediterranean COGs as part of a system •• switching allegiances to Hannibal.4 Post- empire that would last nearly 600 years. the indirect approach to attacking •• Cannae, Hannibal was unable to lay siege COGs to Rome to force its surrender. Instead, Lesson One: COG Analysis how to move between direct and •• he launched a decades-long campaign Enables Desired Endstates indirect approaches throughout Italy during which, despite The failure to understand the desired the result of poor COG analysis. •• unending tactical success, he remained political endstate—what comes after the Despite the use of 2,200-year-old unable to achieve his military or political transition to civil authorities—invariably evidence, all five lessons demonstrate endstates: the subjugation of Rome. leads to challenges in war termination how the basic dictums of modern Hannibal’s tactical success did result and the establishment of legitimate gov- doctrine proved pivotal in determining in a shortage of qualified Roman generals ernments, institutions, and authorities whether Rome or Carthage would rule willing to march out and meet him. In in postconflict states.6 This challenge of overcoming the split between military and political planning is not a phenom- enon of the present age. Even a cursory Commander Kenneth T. “Max” Klima, USN, is Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff J2. study of Scipio expresses how the Lieutenant Colonel Peter Mazzella, USA, is the Joint Training System and Lessons Learned Branch Chief for North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command soldier-statesman must conduct a range (USNORTHCOM) J7. Major Patrick B. McLaughlin, USAF, is the Lead Joint Planner for the Aerospace of military operations within a spectrum and Homeland Defense Plans Branch, NORAD and USNORTHCOM J5.
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Klima, Mazzella, and McLaughlin 103 Scipio Africanus Storming New Carthage, ca. 1470, tempera on fabric, mounted on cassone panel, gift of Mr. and Mrs. Theodore W. Bennett (Courtesy Minneapolis Institute of Art) that simultaneously integrates all three successes to set the political conditions loyalty from Carthage to Rome—ir- levels of war while still supporting the for Carthage to comply with Roman revocably destroying Carthage’s supply desired political endstate (often referred will in its affairs. of personnel and financial support for to as “national strategic endstate” in Another example of Scipio’s political Hannibal’s Italian operations. joint doctrine). For example, during the foresight in the use of military means By remaining focused on the desired Second Punic War, the political end- was demonstrated after his successful political endstate, Scipio adroitly avoided state was not solely the destruction of seizure of the Carthaginian Spanish expected military practices that were the adversary’s military, but rather the colony of Cartagena (209 BCE). Rather counter to the postwar peace. Spain, a military means to achieve the political than destroy Spain’s Celtic-Iberian tribes hotbed of insurgents and untrustworthy aim of securing unrivaled control of the who supported Carthage—the very allies, was also the source of Carthaginian Mediterranean world.7 Throughout the same tribes whose revolt from Rome led troop levies, food supplies, and war war, Scipio’s military actions and opera- to the death of Scipio’s father—Scipio economics essential to Hannibal’s Italian tional approach demonstrated an ability broke with tradition and built close ties campaign. In addition to his military to directly link singular and multiple with former enemies. The day after his victories, Scipio’s benevolent treatment military actions toward the achievement triumph in Cartagena, Scipio showed of former foes had a compounding ef- of both the desired military conditions clemency and even mercy toward the fect in that other tribes and nations loyal as well as the desired political endstate. indigenous tribes both publicly and to Carthage surrendered to Roman Scipio’s every action, both on and off through policy. The Roman historian forces rather than battle Scipio or remain the battlefield, focused on achieving a Livy claims these acts actually endeared Carthaginian vassals.8 Consequently, in a lasting postwar peace in which Rome Scipio to the people throughout Spain few masterful strokes, Scipio won a regu- directed the course of a subdued but and were major causes toward undercut- lar war, ended an irregular war, destroyed integrated Carthage. This emphasis ting Carthage’s political control in the Hannibal’s supply chain, and integrated ignored the traditional military focus on region. Scipio’s actions may have gone the Spanish tribes into the greater Roman destruction of armies, industry, and eco- against the common military practice political and economic system in the nomic means and instead used military of the age, but his mercy shifted Spain’s Mediterranean. Scipio remarked to the
104 Recall / Scipio Africanus and the Second Punic War JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Roman Senate that in Spain he had faced as those agreed upon prior to Hannibal’s Planning, echoes Scipio’s approach, down four enemy commanders and four return. Livy’s record shows this move identifying the need for “a clear un- armies, with the outcome being not a was not popular in Rome, as some leaders derstanding of the end state and the single Punic soldier remaining in Spain.9 wanted Carthage to suffer in defeat— conditions that must exist to end military Focusing on both military and political much like Germany would be made to operations. Knowing when to terminate endstates, Scipio’s actions effectively suffer by the victors after World War I. military operations and how to preserve neutralized the troublesome tribes of Scipio’s leniency toward his defeated achieved advantages is key to achieving Spain from supporting Carthage for the enemy indicates he believed a weakened the national strategic end state.”13 remainder of the Punic Wars.10 Carthage with a destroyed army and frag- Scipio’s success teaches joint plan- Scipio followed the same formula after ile institutions would have created a peace ners that a critical component of COG his initial victories following the invasion no different from that following the First analysis involves a greater understanding of Africa (206–204 BCE). Hannibal Punic War—sowing the seeds for yet an- of the desired political endstate. A clearer remained in Italy, but Carthaginian politi- other war between the two empires.11 understanding of the political condi- cal elites, fearing Scipio’s invasion force, Scipio’s ability to identify the desired tions informs the COG discussion and felt defenseless and sued for peace. The political endstate allowed each tactical furthers identification of the means for resulting peace terms were lenient for the and operational movement to advance destroying or disabling adversary COGs. age and indicate Scipio’s preference to in- toward achieving “a more perfect peace.” Current doctrine focuses on military tegrate Carthage and its colonies into the The result was that every action, small or termination and phase-transition criteria Roman system as contributing partners. large, was integrated into the overall op- and directs political endstates to be the The peace lasted until Hannibal returned erational objective of removing Hannibal province of political decisionmakers. JP to Africa to challenge Scipio directly. from Italy and subjugating Carthage. In 5-0 describes the process and products Nevertheless, after Hannibal’s defeat at doing so, Scipio successfully subjugated that the National Command Authority Zama and in spite of the Carthaginian the enemy while sustaining the smallest uses to develop national strategy, but Senate’s deceit, Scipio’s demands for a possible cost of life and resources.12 Joint does not discuss how the government final peace remained principally the same Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation develops desired political endstates for
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Klima, Mazzella, and McLaughlin 105 specific conflicts. Political entities and in- politics. This lesson may be the most pro- forces in Italy were not the strategic stitutions do not necessarily have clear (in found for modern military planners who COG—the level most interconnected Department of Defense terms) mecha- train to create a specific military endstate with the desired political endstate—but nisms to create identifiable endstates to and then speak of transition. more likely an operational COG.17 serve military planning objectives. JP 5-0 Current doctrine teaches today’s Moreover, this analysis indicates the does identify the commander’s need to planners that military planning cannot defeat of Hannibal at the operational work with interagency mechanisms, but be effective without a clear understand- level of war would not have led to a these efforts are varied and reliant on the ing of the military endstate and that the strategic defeat of Carthage. Conversely, individuals in command and do not lead termination of military operations is key improper or incorrect analysis limits the to clear integration of government insti- to achieving the “national strategic end ability to target or influence the whole, tutions and the military. state.”16 No single government institution and effects are isolated rather than In contrast to Scipio, Hannibal exem- is responsible for defining an individual systemic—hence Scipio’s decision to plifies the pitfalls of not integrating desired strategic endstate, particularly for major ignore the Senate’s orders to confront military and political endstates. According theater contingency plans, whereas Hannibal directly and instead seek an to the Roman record, Hannibal’s cavalry the military receives guidance directly indirect way of threatening the true leader Maharbal remarked to his com- from the National Command Authority strategic COG of Carthage itself. mander that Hannibal “knew how to through a byzantine process of strategic Hannibal’s reliance on Spain as a gain a victory” but did “not know how guidance and the labyrinthine Joint critical force enabler supporting his to use it.”14 Hannibal’s approach is akin Strategic Planning System. Unfortunately, operational COG—Carthage’s fielded to Mark Cancian’s 1998 discourse on the joint planner does not have a role in forces in Italy—made it the logical target the fallacy of COG analysis, as they both developing responsibilities in the interna- for Scipio’s indirect strategy. In sacking incorrectly identify the goal of all military tional system of states, and the crafters of the Spanish city of Cartagena, Scipio operations as attaining a battlefield advan- national strategy are not members of joint cut off Hannibal’s lifeline and crippled tage.15 Hannibal’s emphasis on battlefield planning groups, resulting in a natural fis- his operational capability without ever advantage resulted in a series of tactical sure between military and political ends. having faced the dreaded general on the and operational successes that never led to Modern planners therefore must learn battlefield. Livy records Scipio instructing strategic victory. Scipio’s approach stands from Scipio’s example and create a work- his forces, “You will in actuality attack the in stark contrast and serves as a reminder ing understanding of the political endstate walls of a single city, but in that single city to military planners that the transition rather than remain preoccupied solely on you will have made yourselves masters to a better peace does not occur simply the defeat or destruction of the opposing of Spain.”18 Liddell Hart further identi- because one has achieved the desired mili- militaries. Only with this understanding fied that the Spanish campaign was not tary endstate. can military success effectively translate to merely about Spain, as military actions at Other conflicts more recent than the lasting stability and peace after hostilities the operational level had systemic effects Second Punic War have demonstrated have ceased. influencing the strategic: both the difficulty today’s joint planners face in outlining war termination criteria Lesson Two: COG and Its Scipio, in whom the idea of strategic exploi- and the effective transition from military Elements Are Part of an tation was as inborn as the tactical, was to civil authorities and the importance Interconnected System not content to rest on his laurels. Already he in doing so. This is more likely a result Scipio’s second lesson is to view COGs was looking to the future, directing his view of military planners focusing principally as part of an interconnected system to Africa. As he had seen that Cartagena on military approaches to the transition in order to find which pressure points was the key to Spain, that Spain was the from peace to war rather than integrating yield the maximum effect. There remain key to the situation in Italy, so he saw that whole-of-government efforts focused deep, integral relationships between the Africa was the key to the whole struggle. on achieving the smooth transition from COGs at the varying levels of war that Strike at Africa, and he would not only war back to peace. Carl von Clausewitz create an interconnected system identi- relieve Italy of Hannibal’s ever menacing identified the ties between national poli- fied through COG analysis. Therefore, presence—a menace which he had already tics and the aims of conflict, but it was the ability exists to use analytical results reduced by paralyzing Hannibal’s source of General William T. Sherman who clari- to focus military operations to create reinforcement—but would undermine the fied that “[w]ar’s legitimate object is a system-wide impacts. Understanding foundations of Carthaginian power, until more perfect peace.” Historical examples COGs as a system means that even tacti- the edifice itself collapsed in ruin.19 provide evidence that responsibility falls cal actions can support strategic ends. to the rare soldier-statesman to have the Applying the modern rubrics of COG Scipio’s indirect approach into Spain greatest understanding of the national analysis to the Second Punic War, it provides planners a lesson in the ef- strategic ends: the transition between becomes clear that the integrated COG fectiveness of thorough COG analysis. politics-to-war-to-peace and then again to analysis of Scipio indicated Hannibal’s The military planner must not only
106 Recall / Scipio Africanus and the Second Punic War JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 understand the fact that COGs exist approach were three sequential battles, was too small and inexperienced to at multiple levels but also endeavor to each characterized by innovative tactics have any hope of victory. These orders understand how the connection between and massive battlefield successes that ignored the years of defeat suffered by those COGs and their elements (critical remain instructive for modern tacti- Roman generals who could do little capabilities [CCs], critical requirements cal planners and commanders. More more than check Hannibal’s advance [CRs], and critical vulnerabilities [CVs]) important, Scipio’s true mastery of through small skirmishes and delaying interact with one another.20 While attack- warfare is evident in how each individual tactics. With Hannibal’s army being ing a single vulnerability, one may create a action was part of a grand strategy to larger, more experienced, better armed, cascading effect that paralyzes or destroys defeat Hannibal (operational COG) better resourced, and better prepared, the enemy’s system from within—setting and Carthage (strategic COG). While Scipio had no prospect of victory using conditions for the desired endstate. Hannibal’s tactical successes never a direct approach. It was clear to him Several examples from Scipio’s placed pressure on Rome’s COGs, that Spain was the fundamental source of Spanish campaign emphasize the im- Scipio’s actions attacked all levels of the Hannibal’s power to organize for war—a portance of understanding systemic Carthaginian system. Scipio’s example conversion point for levies and material relationships of COGs. The lenient demonstrates the value of understanding and economic support.24 Liddell Hart treatment of the Spanish tribes—an the systemic nature of COG, CCs, CRs, comments, “By swiftness of movement, operational CR for Hannibal’s man- and CVs and approaching each step with superior tactics, and skillful diplomacy he power needs, and those of Carthage at calculated forethought, considering the converted this defensive object into an the strategic level—eventually led Spain systemic impacts associated with the in- offensive, if indirect, thrust at Carthage to switch sides and support Rome’s terconnected nature of war.23 and at Hannibal.”25 Victory validated this future operations in Africa. Then there approach; Scipio won Spain for Rome is Scipio’s leniency following his victory Lesson Three: Using the without facing Hannibal’s main force, at Cartagena, which led to the defec- Indirect Approach and by taking Spain he struck at the tion of the Numidian leader and cavalry Scipio’s indirect strategy of defeating COG—Hannibal’s army. commander Masinissa from Hannibal Hannibal and Carthage offers joint Scipio would continue an indirect to Scipio. Specifically, after learning planners a third lesson—how to use approach throughout the Second Punic one of the prisoners was the nephew of an indirect approach to attack COGs. War. Following victory in Spain, he Masinissa, Scipio provided care for the Regardless of the interpretation of prepared to invade Africa with an army youth and ensured his safe return home. Clausewitz, the application of COG built on the Roman legions defeated This single act attacked Carthage’s sys- analysis theory often devolves into by Hannibal at the Battle of Cannae. tem by affecting multiple CRs and CVs planning to attack an enemy where it is The Senate again ordered him to at- of Carthage and Hannibal, resulting in the strongest and falsely believing that tack Hannibal in Italy. Roman Senator a systemic ripple effect that shaped the when the identified strength is defeated, Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus execution and outcome of the Second the enemy’s will to resist will crumble. (surnamed Cunctator), who had previ- Punic War. Through sparing the life of a The direct approach maintains that ously conducted a campaign to delay small boy, an oddity of restraint in that meeting enemy strength with friendly Hannibal’s army, criticized Scipio’s age, a key Carthaginian ally in Africa strength is the best use of force and indirect approach: “Why do you not became sympathetic to Rome, helping leads to the greatest possible massing apply yourself to this, and carry the war nullify Carthage’s powerbase.21 of armies. The interpretation continues in a straight forward manner to the place As a final example from the campaign that COG is therefore the recipe for where Hannibal is, rather than pursue in Spain, following Scipio’s victory at rapid and decisive victory. Those who that roundabout course, according to Cartagena, the Carthaginians split into decry COG analysis often lean on this which you expect that when you have three armies-in-being, with two com- misunderstanding as the major point of crossed into Africa Hannibal will follow manded by Hannibal’s brothers. Rather their assertions of the uselessness of the you tither.”26 than staying on the defensive and en- concept. The review of Scipio not only Scipio countered his political oppo- abling the Carthaginian armies to mass, counters the fallacy of misunderstand- nents and again sought to fight Hannibal Scipio moved from the siege warfare ing COG analysis but also emphasizes indirectly by taking the war to Africa: of Cartagena to operational maneuver how the application of proper analysis “Provided no impediment is caused here and eliminated each of the Carthaginian can avoid resource-intensive, force-on- [in the Senate], you will hear at once that armies in succession without allowing force battles that exhaust militaries and I have landed and that Africa is blazing them to combine. Adept at using his national will but do not result in the with war; that Hannibal is preparing new allies as intelligence networks, Scipio culmination of strategic aims. to depart from this country. . . . I shall was able to maneuver his smaller force Although Scipio’s senatorial com- . . . have the opponent you assign me, to bring larger enemies to battle where mission specifically directed him to Hannibal, but I shall rather draw him and when he chose.22 The results of his attack Hannibal in Italy, his initial force after me than be kept here by him.”27
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Klima, Mazzella, and McLaughlin 107 defense of Carthage with Scipio’s army in Africa. The Carthaginian Senate ordered Hannibal to end his Italian campaign and return to Carthage’s defense. A masterstroke of strategic craftsmanship, Scipio’s COG analysis drove Hannibal from Roman lands even though he had not lost a major battle. The lesson from antiquity is clear to joint military planners—the adversary’s army should not be the focus of military strategy. The use of the indirect approach provides means to neutralize or defeat an enemy or enemy force without necessar- ily attacking strengths or, at times, even forces. There are no unlimited resources in war, and the force that can better meet military and political ends through the ef- ficient use of force has the advantage. The indirect approach also offers the ability to create better postwar political conditions by controlling force and thus minimiz- ing its collateral effects. Scipio’s indirect approach is an example of how the ad- versary’s integrated political and military system can be analyzed to most effectively apply force in pursuit of statecraft. As the system becomes clearer, the means to collapse that system also become clearer. Notably, the use of COG analysis toward an indirect approach aligns with modern maneuver doctrines among the land components, the evolution of airpower doctrine, and distributed lethality con- cepts in the maritime domain. It stands to reason that if proper analysis could help avoid costly military overextension in conventional war, it would also assist in identifying better ways of applying military force in our current irregular wars. To plan for the future of combat, it appears the joint force must return to antiquity: Scipio’s indirect approach to the use of force within adversarial COGs could and should inform the develop- Bronze bust of Scipio Africanus in Naples National Archaeological Museum, dated mid-1st century ment and execution of modern doctrine. BCE, from Villa of Papyri in Herculaneum, modern Ercolano, Italy (Courtesy Miguel Hermoso Cuesta) In the invasion of Africa, Scipio will of the political elites of Carthage to Lesson Four: Moving Between moves firmly from the operational to continue the war. With the main body of Indirect and Direct Approaches the strategic in his approach to imple- the Carthaginian army abroad, Scipio’s Scipio’s use of the indirect approach menting his COG analysis. His words combined/joint amphibious assault into to attack COGs comes with a caveat. and actions indicate an understanding Africa threatened “regime change” in Should direct military action offer an of how the indirect approach provided Carthage proper. Whereas Hannibal’s opportunity for a debilitating blow, so the greatest systemic effects by threaten- army in Italy was necessary to defeat long as it supports the COG analysis ing a strategic COG—in this case, the Rome, it was wholly irrelevant in the and the risk to one’s own force is lower,
108 Recall / Scipio Africanus and the Second Punic War JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 one should take the opportunity and taking no direct action until drawing Senate appeared to understand to some strike. In 205 BCE, while preparing Hannibal away from his lines of com- extent its own COG in that it weighed to invade Africa, intelligence indicated munication and ensuring he was located each of Hannibal’s military moves in the leaders of Locri favored Rome in territory advantageous to the Roman relation to his ability to take Rome. This over Hannibal, their occupier. Scipio force. Only at Zama did Scipio return to Roman view is similar to Clausewitz’s departed from his plan and launched the direct approach, attacking the opera- instruction to consider “the dominant a swift seaborne raid, the shock of tional COG: Hannibal’s forces. characteristics of both belligerents,”32 which caused the rapid evacuation of all Scipio’s excellence in generalship as well as Sun Tzu’s duality that victory Carthaginian forces at Locri. Hannibal was not only in the use of the indirect requires understanding the adversary and quickly moved to counter but found approach over the direct but also in his self.33 Hannibal would threaten the city of himself exposed to a trap laid by Scipio, ability to switch and know when to switch Rome—the source of political will and the who had combined operational decep- between the two. A deep understand- Roman Empire’s strategic COG—only tion with an expeditionary assault ing of the environment and the enemy once. Following his triumphant victory behind Hannibal’s lines. Hannibal with- must exist to have this level of battlefield at Cannae, Hannibal moved to attack drew. The result of the movement from cognizance, and such understanding is the heavy defense of Rome but was un- the indirect to direct approach was the an element of planning developed during able to secure victory due to a lack of addition of another Italian ally to Rome, COG analysis. Current doctrine, such as siege machines and enablers for urban the reduction of a Carthaginian ally, a JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation combat. Hannibal’s lack of COG analysis moral victory for Scipio’s legions, and a of the Operational Environment, discusses and its resulting impact on operations moral defeat for Hannibal’s army.28 how one should conduct COG analysis amplified his failure to alter or change his Scipio’s caveat to the indirect ap- but does not cover the flexible use of the operational approach.34 Despite years of proach appears similar to Admiral Chester theory and how COG analysis can pro- campaigning, Hannibal never built the Nimitz’s calculated risk order to his vide a level of understanding that allows siege weapons or combat arms necessary operational commander prior to the commanders to seize the initiative and to strike at the heart of his enemy—Rome Battle of Midway: “In carrying out the convert from the indirect to the direct itself. Consequently, despite his invincibil- task assigned in Operation Plan 29-42 approach.30 Expansion of our current ity on the battlefield, Hannibal could not you will be governed by the principle of doctrine can provide commanders a far win the war. calculated risk, which you shall interpret greater level of understanding through A second example of poor COG to mean the avoidance of exposure of which force maybe applied. analysis comes from Carthage’s failure your force to attack by superior enemy to check Scipio’s ability to maneuver forces without good prospect of inflicting, Lesson Five: The Result throughout the Mediterranean, par- as a result of such exposure, greater damage of Poor COG Analysis ticularly using sealift. In the First Punic to the enemy.”29 In the cases of Locri and Lessons from the Second Punic War War, Carthage held a numerical and Midway, the victory weakened a compo- include the effect of negligent or non- technological edge in maritime warfare, nent of an identified COG. For Hannibal, existent COG analysis of the enemy. forcing Rome to execute a massive ship- it was the perception of the invincibility Polybius, the Hellenistic historian who building program. Rome used innovative of the commander, whereas at Midway, it is the closest primary source of the techniques and new technology to turn was the loss of four Japanese aircraft carri- Punic Wars, noted, “Those who have the Mediterranean into a contested ers. Scipio’s and Nimitiz’s approaches to won victories are far more numerous maritime environment, winning six of transition from the indirect to the direct than those who have used them to their seven major naval battles and setting the approach show the power of measured advantage.”31 In the Second Punic War, conditions for an unsteady peace. Both boldness and of how the operational im- the absence of the elements of COG states maintained a sizable naval capability pact of switching to the direct approach analysis by Hannibal was at minimum a through the Second Punic War, with each at a time and place of their choosing was contributing factor to Carthage’s ulti- heavily relying on sealift for the move- fundamentally supported by the previous mate defeat. ment of forces. Scipio, for instance, used use of the indirect approach. Each had Hannibal’s strategy against Rome a fleet of 50 warships and 400 transports at his disposal all the personnel and re- focused on defeating armies and subjugat- to transfer his forces to Spain. Carthage sources to take advantage of the situation. ing allies. Historical hindsight indicates maintained a large maritime force in Nimitz had three carriers and critical in- this was an incorrect analysis because the war and was able to move whole telligence, whereas Scipio had trained and Rome’s power came from the institutions armies—first the army of Hannibal’s experienced legions, significant sealift, that bound its Senate and its people. This brother, Mago, from Gaul to Africa, and intelligence from disaffected allies. analysis of Rome’s COG is strengthened and then Hannibal himself from Italy After Locri, Scipio principally re- by the fact that repeated military defeats to Carthage—during its course. Proper turned to the indirect approach. He were never able to sway Rome from its COG analysis would have indicated sealift maneuvered once Hannibal was in Africa, strategic goals. Furthermore, the Roman as a CR of Scipio’s force, and Carthage
JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Klima, Mazzella, and McLaughlin 109 would have had the ability to attack it provides for thinking about war. In other violence is employed in the pursuit of with good prospects of contesting the sea words, the process of determining centers national security interests. Perhaps more lines. In this endeavor, Carthage would of gravity may be as important as the than those of any other historic figure, not have needed to defeat Roman navies, product.”38 Moreover, poor analysis that Scipio’s exploits provide the modern which they appeared to lack the aptitude reinforces biases or prejudices and fails to joint force anecdotal excellence in the to do, only to challenge Rome’s ability implement a thorough approach almost application of modern military theory— to use the sea lines and in so doing com- certainly leads to defeat. The example particularly in the realm of COG analysis plicate or disrupt the ability of Scipio’s of Scipio shows how understanding the and its use in supporting combat forces. forces to move by sea. operational environment enables the In studying the victories and defeats of Yet the Carthaginian strategic failure commander to make sense from chaos history’s great captains, modern joint to appreciate the nature of contesting when complex military challenges are planners should use joint doctrine as a the maritime domain is evident in one analyzed and viewed systemically. prism to view and distill the genius and of the most referenced elements of the folly that resulted in victories and defeats. Second Punic War: Hannibal’s overland Conclusion They should look upon the battles of an- movement of his army from Spain to The campaigns of Scipio Africanus tiquity as laboratories for honing doctrinal Italy. The feat is often heralded as master- provide an ancient example of the appli- principles and crucial lessons in military ful, but Hannibal in fact lost half of his cation of the modern doctrine of center acumen prior to employing them in the elephants and half of his army along the of gravity. COG analysis is not a new field. The lessons identified only scratch route. Alfred Thayer Mahan pondered concept, and the universality exposed the surface of the practical application that Carthage’s refusal to check Rome’s navy in an example from 2,200 years ago exists within the study of Scipio. There by considering “how different things underscores the vital linkages between still exists a wealth of intellectual treasure might have been could Hannibal have today’s modern doctrine and the wars from generals and battles that have been invaded Italy by sea, as the Romans of antiquity. While COG analysis is a “lost” due to a lack of familiarity among often had Africa.”35 Rome, conversely, doctrinal process, its value in application modern readers. Such is the case with remained concerned with Carthage’s is directly proportional to the skill of Scipio Africanus, arguably history’s great- ability to use sea power throughout the its use. Using this analysis to entrench est general, wherein many studies have war. Following Scipio’s Spanish victories preconceived notions about force-on- focused not on his victories, but on the (207 BCE), he was ordered to yield a force battle or to support an individual’s failures of the general he defeated. JFQ large element of his navy to the military views related to the dictums of strategic governor of Sicily because intelligence science, is a misapplication that is as indicated the threat of Carthaginian detrimental to the desired military and Notes maritime forces blockading the Italian political endstates as battlefield defeat. 1 coast.36 Throughout the course of the Proper COG analysis through all levels Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Scipio Africa- nus: Greater Than Napoleon (Boston: Little, war, Rome kept multiple fleets to protect of war, including the pursuit of “a Brown, 1927), vi. its territorial waters from Punic raids, more perfect peace,” assists the military 2 Ibid., 20–21. Hart provides commentary secure vital sea lines of communication, planner in constructing military means on the emotional and moral aspects of Hanni- and stave off a second-front war engi- of supporting an integrated approach bal’s Italian campaign: “During the long interval neered by Carthage with Macedon—all to the culmination of the desired politi- of outward peace this Carthaginian Bismarck prepared the mental and material means for indicating that Rome continued to view cal endstate. COG analysis enables the a stroke at the heart of the Roman power, Carthaginian maritime forces as a key planner to better think about what educating his sons and followers to conceive the threat. Minimal Carthaginian efforts to goal is trying to be achieved (ends) and conquest of Rome as their goal, and using Spain interdict or destroy communications, how it is to be achieved (means).39 A as the training ground for the Barcinse school envoys, or supplies would have cre- well-executed COG analysis allows one of war, as well as the base of their forthcoming military effort. In 218 B.C., Hannibal, crossing ated detrimental systemic effects across to anticipate which parts of one’s own the Alps, began his invasion of Italy to reap the Scipio’s force, at a minimum delaying system the adversary may attempt to harvest for which his father had sown the seeds.” his timelines and possibly preventing his directly or indirectly target, giving the 3 Ibid., 21. ultimate invasion of Africa. Carthage had thoughtful planner greater insight into 4 Polybius, The Histories of Polybius, vol. 1, the forces to do so, as became apparent in the opponent’s intent.40 trans. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh from the text of F. Hultsch (London: Macmillan, 1889), book 3, the final treaty of the war wherein Scipio To find examples of the effective ap- chapter 118. ordered the entire navy of Carthage de- plication of COG analysis, joint force 5 For the purposes of this article, modern stroyed save for 10 ships to allow the city planners can return to antiquity. During geographical boundaries will be used except to defend its commerce from piracy.37 the Second Punic War, Scipio Africanus where doing so would complicate the narrative. Whereas COG is not necessarily demonstrates multiple historical models Spain refers not to the political entity but to the Iberian Peninsula, and Italy to the Italian the pathway to victory, its “true value that show timeless and universal themes Peninsula. . . . may be the framework the concept of war that exist whenever sanctioned
110 Recall / Scipio Africanus and the Second Punic War JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 6 Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Opera- available at
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