Scipio Africanus and the Second Punic War Joint Lessons for Center of Gravity Analysis
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
The Battle Between Scipio and Hannibal at Zama, Cornelis Cort, after Giulio Romano, engraving ca. 1550–1578, Elisha Whittelsey Collection (Courtesy Metropolitan Museum of Art) Scipio Africanus and the Second Punic War Joint Lessons for Center of Gravity Analysis By Kenneth T. Klima, Peter Mazzella, and Patrick B. McLaughlin Bellum parate, quoniam pacem pati non potuistis. [Prepare for war, since you have been unable to endure the peace.] —SCIPIO AFRICANUS TO HANNIBAL, PRIOR TO THE BATTLE OF ZAMA, IN 202 BCE 102 Recall / Scipio Africanus and the Second Punic War JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 ublius Cornelius Scipio (236–183 the Mediterranean for nearly 6 centuries. desperation, the Roman Senate eventu- BCE), known more widely by the However, before we can use Scipio’s ally turned to an unproven 24-year-old P nom de guerre Scipio Africanus, campaign history to support our claims of Scipio—son of Publius Scipio, the general was a Roman statesman and general COG analysis, we must first understand defeated and slain by Carthaginian forces whose actions during the Second Punic the history and operational conditions in 211 BCE—to remove the threat of War (218–201 BCE) demonstrate the present during the Second Punic War. Hannibal’s forces from Rome’s doorstep. eternal qualities embodied by modern However, Scipio did not move to directly concepts of joint warfare. Scipio The Operational Environment challenge Hannibal in battle, as was employed said concepts at all levels of As the name suggests, the Second Punic expected by most Roman leaders, but in- war and showed an atypical ability to War was not the first skirmish between stead chose to take an indirect approach, integrate military and political objec- Rome and Carthage. The First Punic deploying forces to Spain to conduct a tives into a single system. Although the War (264–241 BCE) was a conflict multiyear campaign against Carthaginian period of antiquity was a time when over the control of Sicily that ended forces and allies.5 In Spain, Scipio isolated the concepts of strategy were only inconclusively. In the interregnum and defeated four armies (including two nascent, the study of Scipio highlights between the first and second conflict, led by Hannibal’s brothers, Hasdrubal practically every aspect of modern joint an unsteady peace existed as each side and Mago), destroyed lines of commu- planning and operations. In analyzing maneuvered for advantage. nication supporting Hannibal in Italy, Scipio, Basil H. Liddell Hart proposed Circa 218 BCE, Carthaginian and rebalanced Carthaginian allies back that his “[m]ilitary work has a greater general Hannibal Barca prepared for, to Rome. Furthermore, Scipio showed a value to modern students of war than and then renewed, Carthage’s efforts unique ability to conduct joint warfare, that of any other great captain of to subjugate its rival. Reportedly, he leveraging the unique attributes as- the past.”1 In fact, despite warfare’s inherited his father’s hatred of Rome sociated with the different units of the advancements in technology and indus- and, through a cult of personality, led his Roman army, navy, and marine forces. try, Hart’s observation of Scipio is as army from the deserts of Africa, across Scipio’s demonstrated ability to leverage applicable to today’s joint planner as it the Mediterranean, over the Alps, and strategic, operational, and tactical flexibil- was nearly a century ago. into the Italian peninsula, embarking on a ity yielded extraordinary success. Scipio Africanus’s European and bloody campaign to defeat Rome.2 In vic- Consequently, the victory in Spain African campaigns during the Second tory after victory, using the “mental and solidified the efficacy of Scipio’s unortho- Punic War serve as timeless lessons for material means for a stroke at the heart of dox approach, the Senate expanded his joint force planners on how to conduct the Roman power,” Hannibal’s tactical commission, and he moved his armies center of gravity (COG) analysis in sup- and operational genius crushed Rome’s toward Africa to threaten the city of port of theater and national military armies and established him as one of his- Carthage directly. The confluence of planning. The campaigns are a superb tory’s greatest commanders.3 Following these events compelled Hannibal to vehicle with which to examine five key Hannibal’s decisive defeat of the Roman abandon Italy and return to Africa, where lessons associated with today’s concept of forces at Cannae (216 BCE), Carthage his army was met and routed by Scipio’s COG analysis: gained control of the Italian coast of forces at the Battle of Zama (202 BCE). Magna Graecia, which resulted in mul- Hannibal’s defeat finalized Carthage’s de- achieving the desired endstate • tiple Roman allies and economic vassals feat, securing for Rome a Mediterranean COGs as part of a system • switching allegiances to Hannibal.4 Post- empire that would last nearly 600 years. the indirect approach to attacking • Cannae, Hannibal was unable to lay siege COGs to Rome to force its surrender. Instead, Lesson One: COG Analysis how to move between direct and • he launched a decades-long campaign Enables Desired Endstates indirect approaches throughout Italy during which, despite The failure to understand the desired the result of poor COG analysis. • unending tactical success, he remained political endstate—what comes after the Despite the use of 2,200-year-old unable to achieve his military or political transition to civil authorities—invariably evidence, all five lessons demonstrate endstates: the subjugation of Rome. leads to challenges in war termination how the basic dictums of modern Hannibal’s tactical success did result and the establishment of legitimate gov- doctrine proved pivotal in determining in a shortage of qualified Roman generals ernments, institutions, and authorities whether Rome or Carthage would rule willing to march out and meet him. In in postconflict states.6 This challenge of overcoming the split between military and political planning is not a phenom- enon of the present age. Even a cursory Commander Kenneth T. “Max” Klima, USN, is Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff J2. study of Scipio expresses how the Lieutenant Colonel Peter Mazzella, USA, is the Joint Training System and Lessons Learned Branch Chief for North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command soldier-statesman must conduct a range (USNORTHCOM) J7. Major Patrick B. McLaughlin, USAF, is the Lead Joint Planner for the Aerospace of military operations within a spectrum and Homeland Defense Plans Branch, NORAD and USNORTHCOM J5. JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Klima, Mazzella, and McLaughlin 103 Scipio Africanus Storming New Carthage, ca. 1470, tempera on fabric, mounted on cassone panel, gift of Mr. and Mrs. Theodore W. Bennett (Courtesy Minneapolis Institute of Art) that simultaneously integrates all three successes to set the political conditions loyalty from Carthage to Rome—ir- levels of war while still supporting the for Carthage to comply with Roman revocably destroying Carthage’s supply desired political endstate (often referred will in its affairs. of personnel and financial support for to as “national strategic endstate” in Another example of Scipio’s political Hannibal’s Italian operations. joint doctrine). For example, during the foresight in the use of military means By remaining focused on the desired Second Punic War, the political end- was demonstrated after his successful political endstate, Scipio adroitly avoided state was not solely the destruction of seizure of the Carthaginian Spanish expected military practices that were the adversary’s military, but rather the colony of Cartagena (209 BCE). Rather counter to the postwar peace. Spain, a military means to achieve the political than destroy Spain’s Celtic-Iberian tribes hotbed of insurgents and untrustworthy aim of securing unrivaled control of the who supported Carthage—the very allies, was also the source of Carthaginian Mediterranean world.7 Throughout the same tribes whose revolt from Rome led troop levies, food supplies, and war war, Scipio’s military actions and opera- to the death of Scipio’s father—Scipio economics essential to Hannibal’s Italian tional approach demonstrated an ability broke with tradition and built close ties campaign. In addition to his military to directly link singular and multiple with former enemies. The day after his victories, Scipio’s benevolent treatment military actions toward the achievement triumph in Cartagena, Scipio showed of former foes had a compounding ef- of both the desired military conditions clemency and even mercy toward the fect in that other tribes and nations loyal as well as the desired political endstate. indigenous tribes both publicly and to Carthage surrendered to Roman Scipio’s every action, both on and off through policy. The Roman historian forces rather than battle Scipio or remain the battlefield, focused on achieving a Livy claims these acts actually endeared Carthaginian vassals.8 Consequently, in a lasting postwar peace in which Rome Scipio to the people throughout Spain few masterful strokes, Scipio won a regu- directed the course of a subdued but and were major causes toward undercut- lar war, ended an irregular war, destroyed integrated Carthage. This emphasis ting Carthage’s political control in the Hannibal’s supply chain, and integrated ignored the traditional military focus on region. Scipio’s actions may have gone the Spanish tribes into the greater Roman destruction of armies, industry, and eco- against the common military practice political and economic system in the nomic means and instead used military of the age, but his mercy shifted Spain’s Mediterranean. Scipio remarked to the 104 Recall / Scipio Africanus and the Second Punic War JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Roman Senate that in Spain he had faced as those agreed upon prior to Hannibal’s Planning, echoes Scipio’s approach, down four enemy commanders and four return.