DRDC-RDDC-2015-P117 A Systems Approach to Naval Crewing Analysis: Coping with Complexity Renee Chow, Commander Ramona Burke, Lieutenant-Commander Dennis Witzke* As the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) transitions to the and inadequate shore support), and maintenance.2 Th e Arctic Off shore Patrol Ship (AOPS), the Joint Support Ship US General Accountability Offi ce (GAO) now estimates (JSS) and the Canadian Surface Combatant, any decisions that “the annual per ship costs for LCS are nearing or may on crew size and composition will have signifi cant impact exceed those of other surface ships, including those with on both total ownership costs and operational capabilities. greater size and larger crews, such as frigates.”3 In 2000 the US Naval Research Advisory Committee determined that 70% of total ownership cost is due to Th e challenge, therefore, is to design ships with the operations and support and 51% of the operations and right-sized crew, especially because decisions made in support cost is tied to personnel, which suggests that the design phase are estimated to lock in 80-90% of the reducing crew size can result in signifi cant cost savings.1 procurement and operating and support costs.4 If the crew However, the US Navy’s (USN) recent experience with size is over-estimated in the design phase, then design and the Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) suggests that these build costs may be infl ated by the need for additional crew ships, which were designed to have very small crews, accommodation. If the crew size is under-estimated, then may present signifi cant risks for manning and logistics the platform may fall short in operational capability or (i.e., high workload and inadequate sleep for the crew, readiness, and there may be limited feasibility, signifi cant Class James R. Evans USN st Credit: Mass Communication Specialist 1 Th e Littoral Combat Ship USS Freedom (LCS 1) during sea trials, 22 February 2013. Th e ships were planned to have a 3:2:1 manning concept – i.e., three ship crews and two hulls for each ship on station at any time. Th e other ship and other two crews not on deployment would be either preparing for deployment or in rotation in or out of theatre. It was hoped that the net result would be a 50% reduction in ships and a 25% reduction in crews than traditional deployment practices. 16 CANADIAN NAVAL REVIEW VOLUME 11, NUMBER 3 (2016) costs, or delayed schedules associated with subsequent Th e purpose of this systems approach is to support an design changes. informed crew estimate at any point in the design process, even when there are information gaps and uncertainty. Determining the right-sized crew early on in ship design Th is approach recognizes that a crew estimate is essential has several key challenges: to decision-making and planning, that every estimate • technology decisions may not have been made should be based on clear and documented assumptions, (e.g., availability of automated storing capabil- and that assumptions are subject to change and the esti- ity would aff ect the number of crew required to mate must be modifi ed accordingly. support replenishment at sea); Platform design decisions determine what roles are re- • policies and procedures are evolving (e.g., will quired within the crew. A supply ship with four Replen- Naval Boarding Parties be an integral capability ishment at Sea (RAS) stations, for example, may require built into each ship’s crew, or will they be brought a minimum of four RAS teams, whereas a ship with on as required as part of a mission fi t?); and only two RAS stations may need fewer RAS teams. • military occupational structure is evolving (e.g., Similarly, the location of ship compartments may aff ect who will operate unmanned air or underwater crew requirements. Where combat systems that require vehicles from a naval platform? Will there be the same expertise are located in close proximity, for common operators across all warfare areas?). example, fewer repair teams may be needed to provide In the past four years, Defence Research and Develop- adequate coverage for all systems. Once a platform design ment Canada (DRDC) has worked closely with the RCN is assumed, the number and types of special teams can be to develop a systems approach and a decision support tool defi ned, followed by the number of roles within each team to conduct crewing analysis for naval platforms. Th e tool, and the qualifi cations (i.e., occupation, level of training) called Simulation for Crew Optimization for Risk Evalu- required for these roles. ation (SCORE), supports what-if analysis on whole ship Th e decision to invest in certain technologies also deter- crewing by: mines which roles are required within the crew. For • identifying and exposing factors that are relevant example, the type and degree of automation available to to crew size and composition; support RAS may dictate the number of line handlers • supporting the RCN in explicitly defi ning and or winch operators required to conduct RAS. Th e avail- combining the current assumptions on the rele- ability and reliability of remote sensors, remote actuators vant factors; and remote monitoring for the combat systems or for • supporting the RCN in systematically evaluating the engineering plant will infl uence the human tasks and comparing the impact of these assumptions; and will, in turn, infl uence the number of crew and the and required qualifi cations. Once specifi c technologies are • enabling the RCN to modify these assumptions assumed, a specifi c number of roles can be defi ned for the as new information becomes available, and to crew to operate and/or maintain these technologies, and modify the crew estimate as required.5 the qualifi cations can be defi ned for each role. Although warships remain exempt from civilian maritime regulations, the regulations enacted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), such as the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certifi cation and Credit: DND Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), and Transport Canada’s marine personnel regulations must be consid- ered when designing crew sizes and composition. Th ere are also RCN directives that defi ne the size and compo- sition of special parties, such as Section Base Teams, Emergency Repair Teams and Casualty Clearing Teams, during emergency situations. As technologies, such as the Integrated Platform Management Systems, and practices, such as damage control procedures, evolve in domestic and international maritime operations, policies and Artist rendering of the defi nition design for the RCN’s Joint Support Ships procedures will also be revised. Roles for watchkeeping showing two Replenishment at Sea (RAS) stations. or for special parties need to be defi ned by assuming the VOLUME 11, NUMBER 3 (2016) CANADIAN NAVAL REVIEW 17 practices described in current publications, but these roles SCORE Crew Validation and Generation and their qualifi cations may need to be redefi ned when Figure 1 depicts how a proposed crew size and composi- new publications are draft ed. tion (i.e., a ‘crew manifest’) is validated using SCORE, and how diff erent proposals are compared. SCORE enables As the RCN adapts to challenges in recruiting, retention RCN stakeholders to make explicit and documented and force generation, options that will optimize the use assumptions about platform design, technology, policies of personnel, such as the amalgamation of trades and the and procedures, or personnel, by defi ning specifi c roles reassignment of duties and training must be considered. that must be fi lled by the crew, and specifi c qualifi cations To propose crew sizes and composition for future plat- for each role. For example, two diff erent sets of roles (each forms, some assumptions must be made on the required called a ‘confi guration’) can be defi ned. One confi guration qualifi cations (e.g., any trade required, a specifi c occupa- may assume existing automation, and another confi gura- tion, or one of several occupations) for each role that is tion may assume advanced automation, which may have defi ned for watchkeeping, maintenance, special parties, fewer but diff erent roles for the crew. A new confi guration or departmental work, based on the current or planned (i.e., a set of roles associated with a set of activities) can military occupational structure. Th ese objective assump- also be created to combine assumptions (e.g., advanced tions can be used to propose a crew but there are other automation with current damage control procedures factors that must be considered in, or that may be aff ected versus advanced automation with revised damage control by, crew composition. Perhaps most critical is force procedures). Th e user can provide one or more scenarios generation. In the AOPS instance, the RCN determined (i.e., schedule(s) of activities) based on assumptions of that, while a smaller crew of ‘seasoned’ sailors could eff ec- diff erent operational requirements (e.g., for a high readi- tively operate the ship, a small crew of experienced sailors ness ship versus a standard readiness ship). aff orded no opportunity to develop the next generation of sailors. Th e user can then assign specifi c members of the proposed crew to specifi c roles in the selected confi guration. SCORE Similarly, crew composition must align with, or cause to provides feedback on the crew in terms of confl icts (i.e., change, the occupation structure of the RCN and its exist- whether the same crew member needs to perform two or ing allocation of skills and tasks. Th is can, at times, result more concurrent but incompatible duties in the scenario), in an arbitrary requirement for a specifi c occupation and, and utilization (i.e., how much time each crew member thus, drive crew composition.