Assessment of Community Planning for Mass Transit: Volume 3—Boston Case Study

February 1976

NTIS order #PB-252681 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

DIRECTOR’S OFFICE

Emilio Q. Daddario, Director Daniel V. De Simone, Dcputy Director

URBAN MASS TRANSIT ADVISORY PANEL

George Krambles, Chairman, Chicago Transit Authority

Walter J. Bierwagen Bernard M. Oliver Amalgamated Transit Union Hewlett-Packard Corporation Robert A. Burco Simon Reich Oregon DOT Gibbs and Hill Jeanne J. Fox Thomas C. Sutherland, Jr. Joint Center for Princeton University Political Studies Frederick P. Salvucci Lawrence A. Goldmuntz Massachusetts DOT Economics and Science Planning Dorn McGrath Stewart F. Taylor George Washington University Sanders and Thomas, Inc.

OTA TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM STAFF

Gretchen S. Kolsrud, Program Manager

Mary E. Ames Larry L. Jenney V. Rodger Digilio Bev Johnson Thomas E. Hirsch, 111 Teri Miles

CONTRACTORS

Skidmore, Owings and Merrill System Design Concepts, Inc.

. . 111 PREFACE

This report on urban transportation planning in the Boston, Massachusetts metropolitan area is one of nine case studies undertaken by the Office of Technology Assessment to provide an information base for an overall assessment of community planning for mass transit. The findings of the overall study are reported in the summary document, An Assessment of Community Planning for Mass Transit, which forms the first volume of this series. The assessment was performed at the request of the Committee on Appropriations of the U.S. Senate, on behalf of its Transportation Subcommittee. The study was directed by the Office of Technology Assessment’s Transportation Program Staff with guidance and review provided by the OTA Urban Mass Transit Advisory Panel. The firms of Skidmore, Owings and Merrill and System Design Concepts, Inc., were contractors for the study. This assessment is a joint effort, identifying different possible points of view but not necessarily reflecting the opinion of any individual. INTRODUCTION

This report assesses how one of nine major The assessment of transit planning in each of the United States metropolitan areas made its decisions nine metropolitan areas has been an inquiry into an about the development or modernization of rail evolving social process. Consequently, the study transit. results more closely resemble historical analysis The assessment of the nine cities attempts to than classical technology assessment. identif y the factors that help communities, facing This study employs a set of evaluation guidelines critical technological choices, make wise decisions to orient the investigation in the nine metropolitan that are consistent with local and national goals for areas and to provide the basis for comparative transit. The study investigates the following issues: judgments about them. The guidelines were derived from issues identified during preliminary • Are there major barriers to communication visits to the metropolitan areas, a review of Federal and cooperation among governmental requirements for transit planning, and an in- agencies involved in transit planning and vestigation via the literature into the state-of-the- operating ? Do these barriers interfere with art in the field. making sound decisions ? The evaluation guidelines cover major topics which were investigated during the case assess- ● Do transit decisions reflect the combined ment process. They deal with the character of the interests of all major public groups, in- institutional arrangements and the conduct of the cluding citizen organizations, trade unions, technical planning process. the business community, and others?

● Does the planning process provide enough information about the advantages and GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSMENT: disadvantages of alternative courses of INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT action to provide a solid basis for making decisions ? Some of the most significant influences on ● Does the availability or lack of financing, or transit planning are exerted by the organizations the conditions under which financing has responsible for conducting the planning and been provided, unnecessarily limit the making the decisions. Three guidelines were used range of options that are considered? to evaluate the institutional arrangements in the nine metropolitan areas: The ultimate purpose of the work has been to cast light on those prospective changes in national ● Agencies responsible for various aspects of transit policy and administrative programs which transit decisionmaking should cooperate might improve, in different ways and to different effectively in a clearly designated “forum”. extents, the way communities plan mass transit systems. The nine cities were selected to represent ● The participants in this forum should have the full range of issues that arise at different stages properly designated decisionmaking in the overall process of planning and developing a authority, and the public should have transit system. formal channels for holding decisionmakers accountable for their actions. San Francisco, for example, has the first regional rail system built in decades, while Denver is ● Citizens should participate in the transit planning an automated system, and voters in planning process from its beginning and Seattle have twice said “no” to rail transit funding should have open lines of communication proposals. with decision makers.

vii GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSMENT: representative of the transportation planning TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS institution and other main participants in the local planning process. The visits were supplemented by interviews with UMTA officials in Washington. The technical planning process provides the Pertinent documents—official plans, reports, information that public officials and their con- studies, and other material—were reviewed in each stituents draw upon in making plans and decisions. case. Four guidelines were used to assess the technical The information thus collected was used in planning process in the nine metropolitan areas: compiling a history of the transit planning process in each case area, organized around key decisions ● Broad, explicit goals and objectives should such as the decision to study transit, the selection of guide technical planning and decision- a particular transit system, and public ratification making. of the decision to pay for and build the system. The main political, institutional, financial and technical ● A range of realistic alternative solutions characteristics affecting the conduct of the plan- should be developed. ning process were then assessed in light of the ● The evaluation of these alternatives should evaluation guidelines. give balanced consideration to a full range The same set of guidelines used in assessing each of goals and objectives. case metropolitan area was employed in making a ● A practical and flexible plan for financing generalized evaluation of the metropolitan ex- and implementation should be developed. perience. The results of the generalized evaluation are summarized in the report, An Assesstnenf of Community Planning for Mass Transit: Summary Report, During visits to each of the nine metropolitan issued by the Office of Technology Assessment in areas, the study team interviewed the principal February 1976.

Vlll .—

CONTENTS

SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS ...... 1

METROPOLITAN SETTING ...... 3 General Characteristics ...... 3 Existing Passenger Transportation System ...... 6 Transportation Planning Institutions ...... 8

CRITICAL HISTORY OF TRANSIT PLANNING AND DECISIONMAKING ...... 11 Decision to Reevaluate Highway Plans: The Moratorium ...... 11 Decision to Recommend Transit Improvements: The BTPR ...... 14 Steps Toward Implementing Transit Improvements ...... 18

CHRONOLOGY OF THE TRANSIT PLANNING PROCESS . . . 21

ASSESSMENT OF THE PLANNING AND DECISIONMAKING PROCESS ...... 23 Institutional Context ...... 23 Technical Planning Process ...... 26

SUMMARY CASE ASSESSMENT ...... 33

ix Summary and Highlights

New light rail vehicles operate test runs on the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority’s Green Line

. Boston’s rapid transit system is one of the ● Unlike recent highway and airport oldest and most extensive in the country. controversies—both of which have arous- Because of its age and pattern of ed vigorous and polarized debate piecemeal growth through evolutionary throughout the Boston area—proposals stages, the Boston transit system incor- for expansion and improvement of the porates a melange of technologies: rapid transit and commuter rail system have not transit, streetcar trolley, trackless trolley, engendered significant organized op- commuter rail, and bus. In addition, position on basic ideological grounds. tunnels and vehicles in the four subway The consensus in favor of transit has been lines have different dimensions and both an asset and a liability. On the one operating characteristics. These physical hand, opposition to increased capital features constrain the operating efficien- investment in transit has been minimal. cy of the total system. On the other hand, proposed transit projects and new approaches to the ● Boston’s transit work force is among the highest paid in the country, with a delivery of transit services have not minimum annual salary for unionized received the same degree of critical workers totaling $14,000. The transit analysis and evaluation as have other unions, which have strong supporters in modes. the State legislature, have been . The Boston Transportation Planning successful in negotiating favorable con- Review (BTPR) changed the Boston area tract agreements. transportation planning process by

1 creating an open and participatory extensions. Although BTPR did in- framework for decisionmaking that has vestigate (and in some cases resulted in been institutionalized by creation of the the adoption of) other types of transit Joint Regional Transportation Com- services or facilities (e.g., preservation mittee (JRTC), a policy advisory body, and improvement of commuter rail serv- and the Central Transportation Planning ice, special mobility services for low- Staff (CTPS), the technical equivalent of income and elderly groups, circumferen- the BPTR study team. tial transit service), these services and facilities appear to remain lower in ● The Massachusetts Bay Transportation priority than rapid transit extensions, with Authority (MBTA), Boston’s transit the exception of the commuter rail operating authority, was a reluctant improvement program. participant in the BTPR process. MBTA resisted any fundamental reexamination or revision of its past plans and priorities. . Despite the apparent consensus in favor of an aggressive transit expansion ● The BTPR staff of consultants was program that was reached following the oriented by training and experience to BTPR, no Federal approvals have been highway planning, Its principal orienta- granted and no construction has been tion, from a transportation planning initiated on new transit projects during viewpoint, was to resolve specific the post-BTPR period (since January highway controversies that had arisen in 1973). State and Massachusetts Bay subregional corridors, and to reach Transportation Authority officials have project-related decisions on those complained about changing and am- proposed highway facilities. While this biguous environmental review re- orientation sharpened the focus of the quirements. In addition, in recent project BTPR effort, it also tended to work against hearings in the South Quincy area, the emergence of a regionwide transpor- considerable local opposition has been tation strategy and the development of voiced to the proposed Red Line exten- new approaches to transit service. sion project. This opposition indicates ● The BTPR rapid transit proposals are that specific project-related decisions largely consistent with the pre-BTPR may raise troublesome problems despite transit plans for suburban rapid transit the region’s overall protransit consensus. Metropolitan Settingl

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS second ring, extending some 11 miles from Boston and roughly congruent with circumferential Route 128, includes a lower-density suburbanized belt of Boston is the cultural and economic “hub” of cities and towns, with nodal concentration around New England. The Boston area’s academic in- traditional town centers. The third ring, lying industries stitutions and research-oriented around Routes 128 and 1-495, is a predominantly support—and are supported by—a large group of open but suburbanizing portion of the Boston area. well-trained specialists. This group provides a resource of technically skilled persons whose Over the past 20 years, changes in type and specialties are either directly relevant or readily location of employment in Boston have affected adaptable to many of the complex issues raised by transportation needs. Employment has shifted transportation planning. dramatically from a manufacturing base to a predominance of jobs in service industries. At the same time the Boston area is comprised of Simultaneously, the past two decades produced a numerous cities and towns having strong, long- fairly slow but steady movement of jobs from the established, and separate identities. Even within core area (the city and inner suburbs) to the individual cities and towns, close-knit community suburban part of the region. and neighborhood districts—often with a strong ethnic character—provide a basis for organized In absolute terms, the shift in employment has public involvement in planning efforts. By their not greatly affected the distribution of work trips very nature, however, the existence of these strong between the City of Boston and its suburban ring; social and political units tends to work against the between 1960 and 1970 trips originating and development of regionally based constituencies and ending outside the city grew little more than 10 viewpoints. percent (see Figure 2). Nevertheless, the shift in Boston also is the capital of a small and highly employment has created the need for a transporta- politicized State. This factor tends to augment the tion system that can serve relatively low-density “visibility” of controversial transportation plan- employment concentrations because the new jobs ning issues in the State in general, and in Boston in tend to be widely dispersed; only about a third have particular. been in clustered locations like industrial parks or commercial-office complexes. Geographically, Boston (like all of New England) is distant from the Nation’s economic markets and The types of jobs that have tended to move to the is relatively poor in terms of exploitable natural resources. Although Logan Airport handles a large suburbs employ minority workers; the city lost an 80,000 segment of international air traffic, maritime estimated minority jobs in manufacturing 1950 1958, commerce suffers from competition with more between and while the suburbs gained 12,000. advantageously located east-coast ports such as Since minority workers tend to use public New York and Baltimore. transit to get to work, these shifts indicate increased dependence upon bus or auto in areas The Boston metropolitan area is physically with relatively low-density employment concen- defined by the ocean and three concentric rings of trations. development. The inner ring, with a radius of 5 to 5% miles from downtown Boston, comprises the The pattern of population growth and dispersal dense urbanized core, and includes Boston, reflects the change in location of employment Brookline, Cambridge, Somerville, Medford, centers. From 1960 to 1970 the population of the Everett, Chelsea, Revere, and Winthrop. The City of Boston fell 8.1 percent, and population density declined at a similar rate. Meanwhile, both population and density of the suburban ring grew I See Figure 1, pages 12 and 13 by 11.3 percent (see Figure 3).

3 WORK TRIP DISTRIBUTION

Center City to suburban Ring

suburban Ring to Center City

Beginning and Ending in Center City

Beginning and Ending in Suburban Ring

WORK TRIP MODE

FIGURE 2: BOSTON SMSA TRAVEL CHARACTERISTICS Source: Urban Transportation Fact Book, American Institute of Planners and the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc., 1974. A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (or cities) , usually with a population of at least 50,000 Plus adjacent counties or other political divisions that are economically and socially integrated with the central area.

4 LAND AREA (1970)’ (square miles)

Suburban Ring 941 Center City 46 Entire SMSA 987

Population/Density Percent Chanqe 1960-1970

POPULATION 11.3% Suburban Center Ring City

1960 1,898,284 697,197

1970 2,112,629 641,071

DENSITY (population/square mile)

Suburban Center Ring City

1960 2,017 15,156

1970 2,245 13,936 -8.1%

FIGURE 3: BOSTON METROPOLITAN AREA CHARACTERISTICS I Does not include two new townships added to the SMSA since the 1970 Census. Source: Urban Transportation Fact Book, American Institute of Planners and the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc., 1974. A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (or cities) , usually with a population of at least 50,000, plus adjacent counties or other political divisions that are economically and socially integrated with the central area.

5 Residents in the Boston central city as well as Belt (proposed Route 1-695) were deleted from the residents in the suburbs rely heavily on public region’s highway plan as a result of the BTPR transit for their commute to work. In 1970, 38 study. Route 1-93 was subsequently signed to percent of all employed central city residents used follow the Central Artery and the Southeast public transit to commute to work, while 14 percent Expressway to a junction with Route 128 south of of all employed suburban ring residents used public Boston. transit for this purpose. In each case, only New At the present time no major highway construc- York City had a higher percentage utilization of tion projects are proposed within the Route 128 public transit. By contrast, 44 percent of employed perimeter, although major upgrading, minor central city residents and 74 percent of employed connector roads, parking terminals, and other suburban ring residents commuted by auto. Again, related highway improvement projects slated for only New York City residents ranked lower in implementation within Route 128 carry an es- percentage commutation by auto. timated price tag of $1.2 billion to $1.8 billion. z In spite of Boston’s strong showing as a transit Boston’s extensive but aging transit system, city, transit use is declining in Boston, as it is in operated by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation most U.S. cities. The shift of jobs away from areas Authority, includes 37 route miles of rail rapid served by the current rapid transit and feeder bus transit, 43 route miles of streetcar lines, 3,538 systems parallels the drop in annual MBTA route miles of bus service, 8 route miles of trackless ridership. From the recent peak of approximately trolley, and 480.2 track miles of commuter rai] 185 million annual passengers in 1967 (versus 175 (operated through subsidy agreements with the million in 1963), ridership dropped steadily to 146 Boston & Maine and the Penn-Central Railroads). million in 1973. After a modest gain in 1974, ridership again began to decline in early 1975 (see The rail rapid transit network includes four main Figure 4). lines—the Red, Orange, Green, and Blue Lines. Having developed in piecemeal fashion over the years, the Boston system is comprised of non- EXISTING PASSENGER interchangeable vehicles. Not all tunnels in the TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM subway system can receive all vehicles currently in operation. In addition, high- and low-level plat- Highways in the Boston area include the Route forms are present on various lines. In essence, the 128 circumferential highway, one of the earliest subway system consists of four separate systems, “beltways” to be completed for a major American with different rolling stock and servicing facilities. city, and Route 495, an outer-ring circumferential. Added to this, electrical buses, regular buses, and A major portion of Route 128 has recently been the commuter rail system bring the total of designated as 1-95 in substitution for the previously separate transit systems to seven. proposed extension of Route 1-95 through the MBTA’s transit operations have long experienc- downtown Boston core. The 1-95 project was ed spiraling deficits. By 1960, when its annual shelved following the Boston Transportation operating deficit reached nearly $15 million, Planning Review (BTPR) study. Boston’s transit system was suffering dramatically Radial expressway facilities from Route 128 into greater losses than any other city studied. Today, the downtown core include the Southeast Ex- its annual operating deficit is second only to New pressway, the Massachusetts Turnpike (1-90), and York’s. A major reason for this situation is the fact Route 1-93. Route 2 extends inward from Route that Boston’s transit work force is among the 128 to the city of Cambridge, while the Northeast highest paid in the country, with a minimum salary $14,000. Expressway extends from downtown Boston to the for unionized workers totaling Other city of Revere. The Central Artery serves major reasons include MBTA’s outdated equipment and traffic flows within the downtown, connecting the fact that it generates much of its own power in with the Southeast Expressway, the Massachusetts inefficient, oil-burning power plants. Turnpike, 1-93, and (via the Mystic River Bridge) MBTA adopted a lo-year transit development the Northeast Expressway. Numerous arterials program in 1974 that includes both small- and and parkway facilities also serve major vehicular traffic flows. In addition to the deletion of proposed 2 Joint Regional Transportation Committee, Transportation Plan Route 1-95, an extension of Route 2 and the Inner for the Bodm Region, 1974-1983, Ju]y 1974.

6 VEHICLE MILES OPERATED (millions of miles)

Peak Year = 1969 (48.5 million miles) Low Year = 1965 (37.1 million miles)

1960 1965 1970 1974

307.4

198.9 REVENUE PASSENGERS’ (millions of passengers)

Peak Year = 1968 (307.4 million passengers) 144.3 Low Year = 1971 (144.3 million passengers)

1960 1968 1974

NET OPERATING REVENUE 1960 1965 1970 1974 (millions of dollars)

Peak Year = 1962 (-$10,332,457) Low Year = 1974 (-$128,508,677)

-$128.5

FIGURE 4: BOSTON TRANSIT OPERATIONS. 1960–1974 Source: American Public Transit Association records for operations of the Massachusetts Transit Authority and the Massachusetts Bay Trans- portation Authority.

IData on revenue passengers not available for 1961-1966, 1969-1970. A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (or cities), usually with a population of at least 50,000, plus adjacent counties or other political divisions that are economically and socially integrated with the central area.

7 67.445 () - 7fi - 3 large-scale improvements to the existing system. On January 1, 1975, the Executive Office of Extensions proposed for the Orange, Blue, and Red Transportation and Construction assumed respon- Lines are currently under study. The program calls sibility for the preparation and annual revision of for improving commuter rail and trackless trolley MBTA’s transit development program. EOTC has service. It also recommends consideration of a assigned this task to the Central Transportation circumferential transit system in the downtown Planning Staff. area using an advanced technology. Finally, it Central Transportation Planning Staff (CTPS) proposes investigating the feasibility of a new cross-harbor tunnel exclusively for airport The Central Transportation Planning Staff limousines, buses, emergency vehicles, and (CTPS) was organized to provide a technical possibly carpools. transportation planning resource for the region. This interagency group is intended to provide for the more effective use of available resources by permitting a more comprehensive and coordinated TRANSPORTATION PLANNING approach to transportation planning. At the request of EOTC, CTPS prepares the region’s INSTITUTIONS annual transit development program.

The Boston region’s institutional structure for Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority transportation planning is in the midst of transi- (MBTA) tion. Policymaking functions are being moved away The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authori- from older organizations that are tied to the State ty was established by the State legislature in 1964. legislature to new agencies with a direct line of It replaced the Metropolitan Transit Authority, responsibility to the Governor. expanding participation in the transit district from 14 cities and towns to 78 (now 79). MBTA was Executive Office of Transportation mandated to operate the area’s transit systems and and Construction (EOTC) to plan improvements. The cities and towns in the MBTA operating district are assessed according to The Executive Office of Transportation and a statutory formula for funds to offset operating Construction, a State cabinet-level office, was deficits, However, in 1974 and 1975 the State created in 1971 as part of the reorganization of legislature agreed to pay half the deficit out of State government. The reorganization clarified general revenues. The State legislature must lines of responsibility in the executive branch and approve bonding authority before MBTA can has resulted in the consolidation of many com- launch new capital projects. missions and State departments. Although not yet Until January 1975, MBTA policy was set by the implemented in full, the reorganization of State board of directors, and the executive function was transportation agencies should result in the performed by a general manager. The general streamlining of administration and a more con- manager position has been effectively eliminated solidated approach to solving transportation by the transfer of leadership to the chairman of the problems. board of directors. As noted, responsibility for preparing the TABLE I.—Federally Recognized region’s annual transit development program was moved in January 1975 from MBTA to the State Regional Agencies Executive Office of Transportation and Construc- Designation Agency tlon. A-95 Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC) MBTA Advisory Board MPO Five agency compact chaired by the Secretary The Advisory Board, consisting of appointed of the Executive Office of Transportation and representatives of the 79 cities and towns in the Construction and including the Department MBTA district, does not play an active role in of Public Works, the Metropolitan Planning transit planning. principal function is to approve Council, the Massachusetts Bay Transporta- Its tion Authority, and the MBTA Advisory Board. the annual operating budget of the authority. Since the operating budget depends in part on the nature

8 and extent of the overall transit system, the areas The EOTC Secretary is chairman of the Advisory Board is also empowered by statute to group. approve MBTA’s capital improvement program. It Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC) thereby has an important, although indirect, voice in the region’s transit planning and capital improve- The Metropolitan Area Planning Council, a ment programing functions. multi jurisdictional agency representing 101 cities and towns in the Boston area, was created by the The same legislation that revised the MBTA State legislature in 1963. It functions as the A-95 board of directors and transferred planning respon- project review agency. 4 MAPC is a signatory to the sibilities to EOTC also provided increased funds Memorandum of Understanding that established ($40,000 per year) for staff for the MBTA Advisory the MPO but its direct role in this committee is Board. The additional staff assistance should limited primarily to administrative functions. provide the Advisory Board with improved Massachusetts Department of Public Works capabilities in carrying out its review functions. (DPW) The Massachusetts Department of Public Works Joint Regional Transportation Committee (JRTC) historically was the dominant force in transportation planning in the Boston area. This dominance In 1973, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, ended with declaration of a moratorium on through its Executive Office of Transportation and highway construction in February 1970. Through Construction (EOTC) and the Department of the State government reorganization plan, much of Public Works (DPW), joined with Boston’s DPW’S policymaking role was transferred to Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC), the EOTC. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), and MBTA’s Advisory Board in a J The Urban Mass Transportation Administration and the Memorandum of Agreement to establish the Joint Federal Highway Administration require Governors to Regional Transportation Committee (JRTC). designate a Metropolitan Planning Organization (M PO) in each Representatives from the five signatory agencies, area to carry cm t the “con tin uing, comprehensive transportation planning process carried out cooperatively .“ (the “3-C” delegates from eight other State agencies, process) mandated by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 and representatives of a dozen cities and towns, and a the Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974. number of citizens designated by the EOTC sit on According to joint UMTA-FHWA regulations published ]n the committee, which functions as the region’s September 197.s, MPO’S must prepare or endorse (1) a long- policy advisory board for transportation planning range general transportation plan, including a separate plan for improvements in management of the existing transportation and programing. system; (2) an annually updated list of specific projects, called the Transportation Improvement Program (TIP), to ]mplement portions of the long-range plan; and (3) a multiyear planning Committee of Signatories prospectus supplemented by annual unified planning work programs, In March 1975 the same five agencies that J Office of Management and Budget Circular A-95 requires created JRTC established a second agreement to one agency in each region to be empowered to review all proposals for Federal funds from agencies in that region. service collectively as the region’s Metropolitan Circular A-95 replaced Circular A-82, which was created to Planning Organization and take charge of coor- implement Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and dinating transportation planning in the Boston Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 (42 U. SC. 3301).

9 Critical History of Transit Planning and Decisionmaking

Although the principal focus of this case assess- was to be a series of major expressway facilities ment is transit planning, Boston’s recent transit within Route 128, including the Inner Belt (Route planning history can be understood only in the 695), a third harbor tunnel, the final extensions of context of all the transportation planning for both State Route 2 and Route 1-93, and construction of highway and transit in the Boston area. Serious Route 1-95 from Route 128 in the south, through interest in making improvements to the transit downtown Boston and the new harbor tunnel, to system grew primarily in response to community Route 128 in the north. opposition to proposed expressway projects. The The Inner Belt—seen as the keystone of the following discussion is organized around three entire expresswa system—was to be the last of the major phases of the planning and decisionmaking y three circumferential expressways serving Boston. process: (1) the period of highway planning and the It was to have encircled downtown Boston, passing citizen reaction to it that culminated in the 1970 through the Back Bay/Fenway institutional com- moratorium on highway construction; (2) the plex, crossing the Charles River, and continuing period of study called the Boston Transportation through Cambridge and Somerville. Planning Review (BTPR) during which transit issues came into focus; and (3) steps toward This expressway system, which was rooted in the implementing the BTPR transit proposals in the 1948 Master Highway Plan, was revised and expanded period since 1972. The historical narrative is by the 1968 Recommended Highway and Transit Plan, a intended to provide a framework for the dis- multiyear, $2 billion highway and transit construc- cussions that follow of the institutional context and tion program affecting 152 of the State’s 351 technical work, in which particular emphasis is communities. The 1968 plan was a product of the placed on BTPR and its aftermath. The history is Eastern Massachusetts Regional Planning Project summarized in a chronological listing that follows (EMRPP). EMRPP was begun in 1962 as a joint this section. undertaking of the Massachusetts Bay Transporta- tion Authority (MBTA), the State Department of Public Works (DPW), the Metropolitan Area DECISION TO REEVALUATE Planning Council (MAPC), and the Department of HIGHWAY PLANS: Commerce and Development. THE MORATORIUM Although the 1968 EMRPP plan did include a number of transit extensions and other im- In the late 1960’s transportation issues in Boston provements, it was clear that only the highway centered around highway projects proposed during program was assured of the necessary local and several decades of planning. Controversy arose as Federal funding resources required for construc- citizens and elected officials within Route 128 tion. Through State constitutional limitations on began to realize the extent of residential and open the use of gas tax revenues, s the highway program space displacement that would necessarily accom- enjoyed a ready and growing source of local pany expressway construction. The pressure matching funds. At the Federal level, the highway increased until Governor Francis Sargent placed a program was generously funded and, for interstate moratorium on highway planning and construction facilities, required only a 10 percent local matching in February 1970. share. Beginning in 1948 the State, through the By contrast, transit construction projects re- Department of Public Works, engaged in a growing quired specific bonding authorization on a project- highway construction program that secured widespread support among the State’s business and s In 1974, voters removed this 1 i mi ta t ion i n a statewide industrial leaders. The culmination of this program referendum.

ti D1

o N 7

0 .

0 by-project basis, and the provision of bonding The highway opponents also found support in authority required a two-thirds affirmative vote on Boston’s City Hall, where liberal Mayor Kevin the part of the State legislature. Since many White had replaced former Mayor John Collins in legislators resided in areas of the State that would 1967. During his 8-year term, Collins alined closely not directly benefit from MBTA projects, and since with the Chamber of Commerce and other groups the State normally assisted MBTA in defraying that favored highway construction and had spoken debt service related to capital construction projects, out for the expressway system. Mayor White’s this legislative support was often difficult to obtain. political base, which was organized around Similarly, at the Federal level, little money was neighborhood interests, made his administration being made available for extensive transit improve- sensitive to the growing concern over displacement ment projects. and disruption. b In fact, several of White’s “Little City Hall” administrators were in the forefront of In this context popular concern over potentially the antihighway (and antiairport expansion) destructive side-effects of highway construction transportation struggles. Mayor White eventually began to grow. By February 1968, Cambridge and withdrew the city’s support of the South End Boston had been successful undemanding a restudy Bypass, a city-sponsored project that was essential of the Inner Belt. Federal Highway Administrator to the efficient operation of the proposed Lowell Bridwell committed the Bureau of Public Southwest Expressway (1-95). Roads to two new studies, one to review the need for the road and the other to develop roadway Thus, by 1969, the stage was set for a complete design solutions that attempted to minimize reassessment of the State’s transportation policies anticipated adverse effects of the facility. for the Boston area. Toward the end of the year, Governor Sargent appointed a task force, chaired However, the Inner Belt was but one proposed by Professor Alan Altshuler of MIT, to study the element of the planned system. Encouraged by the State’s transportation planning and decision- Inner Belt restudy but apprehensive that the new making process. Mayor White, other politicians, studies would turn out to be “whitewash,” local and spokespersons on the antihighways side strong- action groups continued to develop closer alliances ly criticized the Governor for taking a middle and to organize protest rallies and demonstrations. course, and within weeks the task force’s brief but Eventually, the Greater Boston Committee on the sharply critical interim report to the Governor Transportation Crisis (GBC) was organized in paved the way for the announcement of a general 1968-69, and served as an umbrella organization highway planning and construction moratorium in that began to wield considerable political clout. February 1970. T Sargent suspended property In 1969, Governor John Volpe resigned to acquisition in the proposed expressway rights-of- become Secretary of the U.S. Department of way and canceled the remaining portions of the Transportation. Governor Volpe, who had former- Inner Belt design study. He proposed a larger ly served as Commissioner of Public Works and had “rest udy,” which became the Boston Transporta- taken a strong stand in favor of highway construction Planning Review (BTPR), to determine tion, was succeeded by Francis Sargent, also a whether the new roads should be built, as well as former DPW Commissioner, who in the 1960’s had where and how. approved the very expressway system that was now being called into question. DECISION TO RECOMMEND However, Governor Sargent also had served TRANSIT IMPROVEMENTS: previousl as Commissioner of the Department of y THE BTPR Natural Resources. Continuing his strong interest in environmental matters, Sargent became concerned over the potential environmental degrada- Despite the long history of transportation- tion that could result from highway construction. related controversy, transit issues played a relative- Sargent and his policy advisors began to give ly limited role in the Governor’s moratorium favorable hearing to the antihighway forces. Atone critical point in August 1969, Sargent refused to b Displacement was a real concern, not a potential threat; DPW had begun land acquisition and clearance in several allow an immediate transfer to DPW of certain expressway corridors. State-owned parkland in the Fowl Meadow that 7 The moratorium was not applied to 1-93, which was by then was essential for the construction of Route 1-9s. well into construction.

14 --

Highway construction issues dominated Boston’s most significant recent transportation planning program, the Boston Transportation Planning Review

decision. The political issue was highway cost estimates for the 1966 plan based on construction—and more importantly, the en- preliminary engineering work and inflation factors. vironmental and community impacts associated However, the MBTA plan did not figure with highway construction. Transportation policy, prominently in the events of the following year. A as such, was not widely debated by the participants number of loosely related factors account for this. in the controversy, and there was little discussion First, highways presented an immediate, of transportation quality or service needs. recognizable threat around which political action Transit proposals had surfaced during the 1960’s could be organized. Boston already had an es- but drew little public attention. The Eastern tablished core transit system, and the highway Massachusetts Regional Planning Program had versus transit choice was not posed as starkly as it provided an extensive data base that MBTA used to might have been in a city with no rail transit prepare its Program for Mass Transportation in August services at all. Similarly, no major interest group 1966. The 1966 plan proposed a series of “action opposed transit, and even prohighway interests projects” costing an estimated $340 million. The agreed that transit was a valid type of transporta- proposals included extensions of the Orange and tion service, although of lower priority than Red Lines, replacements of rolling stock on the Blue highways, Furthermore, most of the proposed and Green Lines, and elimination of elevated transit improvements contained in the 1968 structures in Charlestown and South End/Rox- EMRPP report were located along underused rail bury. The 1966 plan was updated and revised by rights-of-wa y and would not require extensive MBTA in 1969 based on continuing planning displacement or disruption of the sort that often analyses conducted by ERMPP (which concluded its attracts the attention of political leaders. Finally, work that year). The 1969 revisions updated capital transit funding appeared too uncertain to allow

15 antihighway leaders to present transit as a viable on the designated highway facilities; and political alternative for the short-term future. commitments had been made at all levels to reach final highway decisions as quickly as possible. Moreover, very few people had a clear concept of Moreover, the battle lines between prohighway the political or functional interrelationships and antihighway groups were still clearly and between highways and transit. Two major and bitterly defined. visible exceptions were then State Representative (now Governor) Michael Dukakis, and Professor Meanwhile, there was no pressure to reach Altshuler. Dukakis pressed Governor Sargent in definitive transit decisions. Very few direct adverse 1969 to provide more highway money in the impacts were attributable to any of the transit western part of the State, where he said it was facilities under study, and those that were present needed, and to greatly expand mass transportation were minimal in comparison to the adverse impacts in Boston: of the proposed highway facilities. Although in 1971 the legislature had authorized $124 million in In the western part of the State, the imbalance bonds for transit facility construction, the ability to of highway money is an excellent political move forward was limited by the availability of issue. And the absence of an adequate rapid Federal assistance and, more importantly, by the transit system is a damn good political issue in fact that several of the most important transit the east. s projects were to be built jointly with proposed For his part, Altshuler supported a joint funding highway projects, so that no real progress was mechanism for highways and transit and perceived possible until the highway issues had been put to the role transit should play in a total transportation rest. system, Equally important, most of the key members of As the BTPR Study Design was being formulated the BTPR consultant team had had considerable during the latter part of 1970, however, increasing prior experience with major projects elsewhere in attention was being given to transit options, Under the country. They were prepared by training and the direction of Professor Altshuler, the BTPR experience to focus on highway issues and proved Steering Committee (composed of municipal to be less well prepared for conceptualizing and appointees and a broad array of community detailing innovative transit solutions. Although organization spokespersons) defined a “sketch MBTA had experienced transit planners on its own planning” process designed to facilitate considera- staff, the MBTA executive staff declined to tion of a wide range of alternatives—including participate actively in the technical work of the modal alternatives as well as highway location and BTPR or to advocate forcefully an expanded transit design options. With all land acquisition and program or an innovative transit solution. MBTA’s prime objective was to assure that nothing that highwa y construction activities suspended until completion of BTPR, the pressing concerns over occurred during the BTPR would significantly highway displacement and disruption began to disturb MBTA preestablished plans and relax, and the possibility of developing a transpor- priorities—which had been cleared through the tation policy for Boston (as opposed to antihighway State legislature, whose members had been in the policy) appeared realistic. past, and would be in the future, required to approve MBTA’s bonding requests. Nevertheless, once the Study Design was completed and the BTPR consultant team selected, it Despite these constraints, BTPR did identify and was clear that the highway issues retained first analyze a number of transit projects that had not priority, for both political and practical reasons. received top priority in previous transit planning Considerable sums had already been expended to studies. These projects included (a) the Commuter acquire rights-of-way and to prepare them for Railroad Improvement Program (CRIP);9 (b) a construction; Federal interstate highway monies proposal for circumferential transit service along were available and, at that time, could be spent only the inner belt corridor; lo (c) analysis of replacement service for Roxbury and the South End; ll (d)

8 Lupo, Colcord, and Fowler, Rites of Way: The Politics of Transportation in Boston and the U.S. Boston: Little Brown, 1971. The g BTPR, Commuter Rail )mprouement Program. Boston 1972. long and often bitter history of highway opposition in Boston 10 BTPR, ClrcUmferen/fa/ Tran5if, Boston 1972. has been ably chronicled in this book. I I BTpR, sou~hu~est Corridor Reporf. Boston 1972.

16 studies of special mobility needs; 12 and (e) a bus or Green Lines. The circumferential route could tunnel alternative to the third harbor crossing. 13 improve service on these and other already crowded lines. In a broad conceptual study of the (a) The proposed track bed, rolling stock, and circumferential line, both PRT and conventional station improvements recommended by the CRIP transit systems were investigated, as well as study were supported by Governor Sargent and alternative alinement locations and distances. The have been incorporated into BMTA’s 10-Year most extensive version given serious study would Transit Deuelopment Program. The Boston area’s connect South Station in Boston to Sullivan Square extensive commuter rail network had been sorely in Charlestown. neglected for years. MBTA’s rapid transit extension program favored the gradual replacement of (c) MBTA’s proposed Orange Line Relocation commuter rail service by rapid transit extensions and Extension would have resulted in a reduction of which would generally occupy existing rail rights- rapid transit service to two heavily transit- of-way. Suburban commuter rail patrons argued dependent Boston neighborhoods. Largely as a strongly that substitution of transit service often result of continued political pressure, these com- meant several years’ suspension of any service munities were able to direct the attention of BTPR during construction, and that the completed rapid toward an analysis of potential transit replacement rail extensions rarely served as large an area as the services, Although the precise nature of these commuter rail system, despite the high capital costs replacement transit services has yet to be defined in involved. BTPR investigated the feasibility of detail, the 10-Year Transit Development Program does upgrading and retaining the commuter rail system provide for “high standard” replacement service to in light of the costs to MBTA for continued each community as part of the Orange Line subsidization of commuter rail service. The CRIP Relocation Program. This commitment represents study paralleled the State’s negotiation for and a recognition of the need to balance a policy of subsequent purchase of the Penn-Central suburban-oriented rapid transit extensions with a Railroad’s trackage on the southern side of Boston, policy of continued quality service for transit- a step which has preserved some 140 miles of track dependent inner-city neighborhoods. for transportation purposes. (Similar negotiations (d) BTPR staff assisted several communities i with the Boston & Main Railroad for purchase of n analyzing the need for special mobility and trackage to the north of Boston were completed in coverage transit services in addition to existing bus July 1975.) and rapid transit services. Although very few (b) The circumferential transit service project is concrete changes resulted from these studies, briefly described in MBTA’s Transit Development several new bus routes were established, and Program but is not proposed for construction MBTA has begun to give more attention to within the next decade. The concept was studied management and other low-capital-intensive tran- late in 1971 after Governor Sargent decided not to sit programs that serve special mobility needs or construct the Inner Belt expressway. The new provide broader transit coverage. In addition to a facility was considered both because it could make reduced fare for the elderly, which was introduced use of lands already acquired by the State and prior to BTPR, recent innovations include the use because it could provide a much-needed transit link of prepaid passes, “dime time” fares during midday between the existing radial rapid transit lines. The hours, and increased express bus services.14 possibility of connecting the Red Line in Cambridge (e) AS an alternative to a general-purpose third with the Green and Orange Lines in the Back harbor tunnel, BTPR developed a two-lane bus Bay/Fenway institutional complex in Boston was tunnel option that would be open only to buses, particularly attractive. Presently, large volumes of taxis, airport limousines, emergency vehicles, and trips are made between these points, either by bus possibly multioccupancy automobiles. The bus or by traveling by transit to downtown Boston and tunnel would provide sufficient capacity to relieve transferring to an out-bound rail car on the Orange congestion in the existing harbor tunnels but would not entail the cost or disruption of the

I z BTpR, Moblllt~ Problems of Elderly Cambridge Residents. Boston 1972, and BTPR, Spetlai Moblllfy Staff Report. Boston 1972. See also, BTPR, Study E/ement ,? Summary Report: Community Liaison and 1 ~ The “dime.time” reduced fare experiment failed to increase Te[hnlcal Assistance, Boston 1973. off-peak riders hip on the subway system and was discontinued IS BTpR, ~hlrd Harbor Cross]ng. Boston 1972. in August 197s,

17 previously proposed six-lane general-purpose process within the JRTC/CTPS framework), and tunnel. Although this facility was supported by the restructuring of MBTA, each discussed Governor Sargent, the legislature has failed to elsewhere in this case assessment. Each major shift remove a statutory restriction that prohibits of powers and responsibilities has invoIved exten- construction of any new vehicular tunnels in sive interagency negotiations and compromise. At proximity to the existing harbor tunnels. times these political realinements took priority over technical and administrative matters.

STEPS TOWARD IMPLEMENTING Fourth, UMTAdeclined to accept any of the draft TRANSIT IMPROVEMENTS environmental impact statements prepared by BTPR. UMTA judged these statements to be inadequate because, Iike the BTPR study process Although Governor Sargent dropped most of the itself, they focused largel on highway facility major pending highway proposals and announced y alternatives. Thus, MBTA has been compelled to an aggressive transit improvement program for the develop additional alternatives and to restudy the Boston area during a statewide televised broadcast environment} effects of each of the transit in November 1972, little tangible progress has projects included in its current program. Both taken place during the 2% years since that time. A former EOTC Secretary Altshuler and the present number of interrelated factors account for this secretary, Frederick P. Salvucci, have said that failure to move forward with the region’s transit UMTA’S decision created unnecessary delays in the improvement program. implementation of Boston’s transit program, First, despite the generally favorable press particularly due to the length of time consumed in response and public acceptance of the Governor’s UMTA’S reviews of the new studies, (UMTA— transportation policy, some prohighway sentiment unlike the Federal Highway Administration— continued during the months following the BTPR retains the responsibility for actually preparing and study. The Governor and his transportation circulating the formal draft and final environmen- advisers came under backstage pressure for a full or tal impact statements despite its small, overworked partial reconsideration of various highway project staff. ) Secretary Salvucci has argued further that decisions. the region’s transit program should be exempt from strict application of environmental review Second, the source of funding for the transit procedures since transit projects are environmen- improvement program was not clear. Secretary tally “clean,” particularly in comparison with Altshuler had been instrumental in lobbying for highway facilities. In any event, the two secretaries’ inclusion of an interstate transfer provision in the arguments to date have been ineffective and, some Federal Highway Act of 1973. Even though a critics say, they may have contributed to further transfer provision favorable to Massachusetts was delays in advancing projects for final approval and enacted, a considerable amount of time and effort implementation. was expended by State officials in working out the details of the interstate transfer program with Fifth, despite a continuing broad-based consen- Federal officials. The more than $600 million that sus in favor of the general transit policy underlying was eventually promised to the State was essential Governor Sargent’s transit improvement program, to the definition of a credible transit construction opposition to specific transit project location and program, and until this amount was finally design details has arisen—as witnessed by con- committed, the State had difficulty in developing a troversies over the planning and design issues workable schedule and list of priorities for the surrounding the relocated Orange Line in the region’s 10-year program. southwest corridor; the Red Line extension from Third, practical and political difficulties involved Harvard Square through Cambridge, Somerville, in the various transportation agency Arlington, and Lexington; and the Red Line reorganizations also have occupied a substantial extension from Quincy along the South Shore. In amount of staff time. These include the continuing brief, local citizens and officials have expressed consolidation of transportation planning and concern over potential environmental, land use, policymaking responsibilities within EOTC, the parking, and local street congestion impacts due to creation of both JRTC and CTPS (as well as the new transit construction and operation, especially development of an open participatory planning in the vicinity of transit stations. In large part the opposition has been aggravated by a lack of affects progress toward transit improvements, as adequate information regarding the potential evidenced by the recent abandonment of MBTA’s social, economic, and environmental effects of the off-peak hours “dime time” fare experiment, which various projects. However, each of the major proved to have been unsuccessful in attracting new interdisciplinary studies now underway (or soon to ridership. be initiated) 15 should provide the technical data required to conduct an informed debate on the At the same time, the long-term outlook for issues, even if they do not fully resolve the points in Boston’s transit future remains optimistic. The contrivers y. basic consensus in favor of an aggressive and extensive transit improvement program has con- During the 1974 gubernatorial election cam- tinued, despite differences over specific location paign, the present Governor, Michael Dukakis, and design details, the appropriate transit mode, sharply criticized Sargent for his administration’s and implementation priorities. Reorganization of lack of transit construction activity and promised to the region’s and the State’s transportation agencies push vigorously at the regional, State, and Federal promises to improve transit planning and opera- levels for increased transit assistance and project tion. The recent purchase of the Boston & Maine approvals. Nevertheless, despite a continuing Railroad’s trackage north of Boston for $39 million commitment to transit progress, the Dukakis (subject to approval by the bankruptcy trustees), administration has not had any notably greater like the previous Penn-Central system acquisition success in advancing the transit program into to the south, will provide a ready source of rights- actual construction. The basic problems cited of-way for transit and other transportation im- above, as well as the State’s current and pervasive provement facilities. Finally, the growing fiscal crises, continue to plague the program. awareness and concern over environmental, land MBTA’s continually rising operating deficit also use, and energy consumption problems may tend to encourage transit programs in Boston, provided I‘ see page 29 localized impact issues can be successfully resolved.

19 Chronology of the Transit Planning Process

1825 The first omnibus line was started 1969 MBTA released a Reuised Program for Mass between Boston and Roxbury. Transporlalion. 1889 The first electric streetcar line was 1969 Governor Sargent appointed a transpor- opened. tation task force to advise him on steps to take in reevaluating the region’s 1897 The first subway in the United States highway program. was opened. (It is still in use as part of MBTA’s Green Line.) 1970 In January, the transportation task force’s interim report recommended a 1924 The Boston Harbor transit tunnel was moratorium on highwa construction converted to rapid transit use. (It is now y and planning, and on February 8, part of Blue Line.) Governor Sargent formally announced 1926 The Report on Improved Transportation the moratorium. Facilities developed a plan for the exten- Later in the year a Governor-appointed sion of rapid transit facilities. Steering Committee published Study 1945-7 Reports by the Metropolitan Transit Design for the Boston Transportation Recess Commission (Coolidge Commis- Planning Review. sion Reports) recommended extension 1971 The State legislature authorized bonds and improvement of rapid transit routes totaling and the creation of a Metropolitan $124 million to finance designated transit improvement pro- Transit Authority (MTA). jects. 1948 The Master Highway Plan, was published. A program to reorganize State ad- This plan set the philosophy and, with ministrative agencies was begun and the modifications, the location of major Executive Office of Transportation and proposed expressway facilities within Construction created. and including Route 128. It was prepared by C. A. Maguire & Associates. 1971-3 The 18-month Boston Transportation Planning Review (BTPR) study was 1957 The Report on Traffic Studies for the Boston conducted. At its conclusion the Gover- Meiropolitan Area reexamined the Master nor deleted several proposed ex- Highway Plan in light of revised travel pressway projects within Route 128 and forecasts. It was prepared by Coverdale opted instead for a transit strategy. & Colpitts. Subsequently the Governor began seek- 1962 The Eastern Massachusetts Regional ing transfer of Federal interstate funds Planning Program (EMRPP) began. and additional transit funds to carry out a more than $1 billion transit program. 1964 The Massachusetts State legislature established the Massachusetts Bay 1973 The State legislature voted to assume 50 Transportation Authority (M BTA), percent of MBTA’s operating deficit. expanding the 14 city-and-town MTA The U.S. Federal-Aid Highway Act of District to 78 (now 79) cities and towns, 1973 authorized transfer of certain 1966 Program for Mass Transportation was interstate funds to transit projects and published by the MBTA. relaxed the Urban Systems program to allow some transit funding. 1968 The Eastern Massachusetts Regional Planning Project published its The Joint Regional Transportation Recommended Highway and Transit Plan. Committee (JRTC) was created by joint

21 agreement of the Executive Office of Line, Blue Line, and Red Line extension Transportation and Construction, the projects. the Department of Public Works, 1975 In January, the Executive Office of Metropolitan Area Planning Council, Transportation and Construction the Metropolitan Boston Transporta- (EOTC) assumed responsibility for tion Authority, and the MBTA Advisory preparing the region’s annual transit Board. improvement program. In March, the State designated a multiagency group to 1974 The U.S. Department of Transportation be the Metropolitan Planning Organiza- approved an interstate fund transfer of tion. This group was created by a five- over $600 million to Boston. agency compact signed by the Executive The Central Transportation Planning Office of Transportation and Construc- Staff (CTPS) organization was created tion, the Department of Public Works, by State transportation officials. the Metropolitan Area Planning Coun- cil, the Massachusetts Bay Transporta- 1974-5 MBTA issued its 10-Year Transit Develop- tion Authority, and the MBTA Advisory ment Program and selected planning- Board. The EOTC Secretary was named engineering consultants for the Orange chairman.

22 Assessment of the Planning and Decisionmaking Process .

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT and the General Court (the State legislature) shared the power to identify and implement new The institutional context for transit decision- capital improvement projects. The General Court making in the Boston region is complex because of must approve new bonding authority by a two- the sheer number of jurisdictions in the area and thirds affirmative vote. Since such authority the presence of the State capital. However, over the traditionally has been granted on a project-by- past few years a relatively effective institutional project basis, the General Court has retained a structure has evolved in which the State Executive substantial measure of control over the timing and Office of Transportation and Construction location of new capital improvement projects. (EOTC) plays the lead role, working closely with Considering that $389 million in bonding authority the region’s Central Transportation Planning was authorized during the first 10 years of MBTA’s Staff. existence (1964-73), the General Court has enjoyed considerable leverage over MBTA’s construction Forum for Decisionmaking program. Historically, transportation decisions in Boston As of January 1, 19’75, however, an additional were made by semiautonomous highway and major actor has been inserted into the decision- transit agencies and local governments. Recent making process. On that date the Exectuive Office agency reorganization programs have centralized of Transportation and Construction (EOTC) transportation policymaking in EOTC and clarified assumed responsibility for preparation of the transportation planning and project development region’s annual program for mass transportation. responsibilities in the Boston area. Because the Secretary of Transportation and Historically, the Massachusetts Bay Transit Construction is appointed by and serves at the Authority (MBTA), the MBTA Advisory Board, pleasure of the Governor, the executive branch of

23 State government is now directly involved in the However, due to the jealously guarded in- transit planning and decisionmaking process. As its dependence of local cities and towns in the Boston transit planning responsibilities have shifted to area, MAPC usually exercises a cautious, advisory EOTC, MBTA has come to function primarily as a role in the region’s affairs. This approach has transit operating agency. The MBTA Advisory tended to limit the influence exerted by MAPC in Board, however, still participates in transit recent years on transportation planning and policymaking, albeit in a minor way, through its decisionmaking, on both a technical and policy statutory power to approve MBTA’s capital level. improvement program. Since its creation in 1974 the Central Transpor- EOTC holds a powerful position in Boston’s tation Planning Staff (CTPS) has become the transportation decisionmaking by virtue of its vehicle for most technical transportation planning responsibility y for all transportation issues— work in the region. CTPS is an interdisciplinary highway, rail, port, and airport. Since the group of technical specialists modeled after the governmental reorganization plan of 1971, EOTC BTPR study team. The structure facilitates close has consolidated under one administrative roof a coordination between transportation and land use number of agencies, boards, and commissions that planning. previously were autonomous in terms of setting Although officially responsible only for the transportation policies and operating transporta- technical aspects of the planning process, CTPS tion facilities within the Boston area. These entities tends to become involved in policy matters through include the Department of Public Works, MBTA, a close working relationship with EOTC. When Massport, Masspike, and certain transportation EOTC recently was given responsibility for functions of the Metropolitan District Commis- preparing the region’s annual transit development sion. program, it delegated this task to CTPS. In March 1975, ETOC’S lead role in regional The Joint Regional Transportation Committee transportation planning was officially sanctioned (JRTC) acts principally as an advisory body. when the EOTC Secretary was named chairman of Through this organization DPW, MBTA, and the five-agency collective Metropolitan Planning MAPC—along with numerous delegates from Organization. Thus the EOTC Secretary is ul- cities and towns as well as private organizations— timately responsible for the distribution of all can review decisions reached by EOTC and CTPS. Federal transportation grants within the area. JRTC does not have a technical staff and has no EOTC provides an effective centralized forum for specific planning responsibility other than its creation and coordination of basic transportation reviewing and advisory duties. policy. This forum has led to more efficient transportation planning and management of Accountability of Decisionmakers operations. The recent statutory reallocation of transit The Department of Public Works (DPW), like decisionmaking responsibilities, discussed in the MBTA, has transferred much of its policymaking preceding paragraphs, tends to focus considerable function to EOTC. Although DPW retains a attention on the Office of the Secretary of considerable amount of power—due to its size Transportation and Construction and— budgetary resources, and political connections ultimately—on the Governor’s office as well. The throughout the State—major policy and project Governor is the only elected official involved in decisions are made by the Secretary of EOTC. transit-related decisions who is responsible to the Similarly, although DPW’S Bureau of Transporta- entire regional electorate, and therefore the tion Planning and Development maintains a large gubernatorial election is the public’s most direct staff of transportation planners, CTPS has taken formal check on the decisionmaking process. the lead role in technical transportation planning in Lodging the power for transit decisionmaking in the Boston area. a Governor’s appointee has several advantages in Because it is the region’s A-95 review body and terms of accountability. Decisionmakers are most coordinates the area’s land use planning efforts, the directly accountable if the public can vote them in Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC) and out of office. The EOTC secretary is not might be expected to take a relatively strong elected, of course, but his direct superior is. For the position in regional transportation decision making. past several years Massachusetts Governors have

24 been deeply involved in Boston transportation philosophy has been carried over to the newly issues. The Governor and the secretary therefore, established JRTC and CTPS. are not only more directly accountable than the The BTPR process greatly expanded and refined other transportation decisionmakers in the area the process of citizen and public agency participa- but they bring greater visibility to the process. In tion in the transportation planning process. addition, the Governor and EOTC can view issues Numerous individuals, groups, and agencies that with more of a truly regional perspective than previously had little interest or means for becoming representatives from local jurisdictions, who involved in transportation decision making were understandably tend to give first priority to more provided with a forum in which conflicting views parochial interests and obligations. could be debated and resolved. While not without MBTA is directed by a board of directors who, flaws, the process of discussion, negotiation, although initially appointed by the Governor, serve compromise and—most important y—mutual for a fixed term and have no direct accountability to education was greatly facilitated. the electorate. However, the chairman of the board BTPR involved many private groups and in- of directors, who also functions as the chief dividuals beyond the traditional and relatively well- executive officer of MBTA, does serve at the organized economic and political interests that pleasure of the Governor. traditionally participated in the formulation of By virtue of voting to approve financing for regional transportation policies. The Steering major transit projects, the State legislature in- Group that developed the BTPR Study Design was a fluences transit decisions. These legislators are broadly representative body with delegates from subject to election and therefore can be held cities and towns, State agencies, and private accountable for their actions. However, represen- organizations throughout the Boston area. It tatives of the State legislature are accountable only continued in operation during the BTPR in a policy to their limited geographic constituencies and— advisory capacity as the BTPR “Working Com- since many representatives are elected from mittee.” Many of the same groups continue to be districts outside the MBTA area—a large number involved in transportation planning through

have no political ties to the residents and voters of membershi p on the Joint Regional Transportation the MBTA district itself. Committee. Similarly, members of the MBTA Advisory On the other hand, criticism of the BTPR Board are appointed by each of the 79 member cities approach to community participation was voiced by and towns of the MBTA district. Their accoun- organizations and individuals who were dissatisfied tability is also limited to the local area which they with the study’s findings and felt their interests represent. Likewise, each MAPC representative were not adequately represented. In particular, owes allegiance to one of the 101 cities and towns groups fearful that curtailing highway programs participating in that agency. would harm Boston’s economy, and particularly the viability of the downtown, charged that the The Joint Regional Transportation Committee prohighway point of view was under-represented (JRTC) is an advisor body in which nearly half the y in the participation scheme. The Boston Chamber committee members represent various interest of Commerce, for example, produced its own groups. Although the structure may improve the evaluation of the economic effects of eliminating extent to which the full range of public viewpoints the Southwest Corridor, recommending that the is brought to bear on the transit decisionmakin g highway—which would have provided the I-95 process, there are no formal channels for members connection between Boston’s CBD and Providence of the public to exercise approval or disapproval of and New York to the south—should be built. The the way their interests are being represented, The Chamber’s report made little impact on BTPR Central Transportation Planning Staff (CTPS), decisionmakers, but post-BTPR citizen involve- because it consists of technicians, is further ment campaigns have been careful to welcome removed from accountability. groups such as the Chamber of Commerce and Public Involvement other traditional urban -develop men t-oriented organizations into the process. BTPR constituted a major experiment of nationwide significance in its approach to develop- The BTPR community involvement philosophy

ing an open, participatory study process. The BTPR has been incorporated in the procedures and

25 institutions that have been established since formal objectives intended to guide the refinement 1973—notably in the Joint Regional Transporta- of proposals for transit improvements. tion Committee, as well as in project-by-project “working committees” formed from represent- When MBTA was authorized in 1964, its atives of local and regional groups and public enabling legislation set forth a general statement of agencies having a stake in specific project decisions. the new agency’s purpose. MBTA was expected to Staff support for active and continuing community “develop, finance, and operate the mass transporta- participation is provided by the Central Transpor- tion facilities and equipment in the public in- tation Planning Staff and, as a matter of policy, all terest . . . and to achieve maximum effectiveness in planning budgets or consultant contracts are complementin g other forms of transportation in expected to set aside 10 percent of project planning order to promote the general economic and social resources for the purposes of community liaison well-being of the area and of the Com- and technical assistance. monwealth. ”l6 Although project public hearings continue to provide a definite formal point of public presenta- MBTA’s 1966 Program for Mass Transportation tion and comment, numerous smaller briefings, elaborated on these broadly stated goals in the working meetings, and presentations are normally course of explaining the advantages of its proposed held as a matter of course for every major and most transit improvements. As stated in the 1966 minor planning studies. The comments and program, MBTA’s transit objectives were criticisms which surface during this involvement overwhelmingl y oriented towards cost-efficient process have an important impact—although one “hardware” improvements which would attract difficult to measure—on decisions reached by the additional patronage by improving both the image responsible decisionmakers. and the convenience of the region’s transit system. Primary emphasis was given to rapid rail transit Nevertheless, the considerable public opposition extensions, new equipment, and modernization of to MBTA’s proposed $3o million Red Line exten- existing stations. “Outmoded” systems—such as sion to the South Shore is evidence of the need to commuter rail service—were to be reemphasized devote more attention to the early identification unless “satisfactory cost reductions” could be and resolution of potential community-based op- achieved. No mention was given either to regional position. or transit station area land use considerations, to planning process concerns, or to the identification TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS and minimization of adverse impacts that might be associated with a given improvement project. While these and other nontransportation issues are With the growth of an increasingly open recognized in the sections of the 1966 program transportation planning process, as well as the containing detailed descriptions of improvement involvement of politically and technically astute projects, they are conspicuously absent from the community and public agency participants, transit overall statement of objectives. planning in Boston since BTPR has been characterized by greater technical detail and clarity. A broad set of goals has evolved, and at least a In terms of the social and economic bases of the beginning has been made toward a thorough 1966 program, MBTA relied exclusively on the land evaluation of alternative project designs. However, use and travel forecasts prepared by the Eastern lack of attention to innovative transit im- Massachusetts Regional Planning Program provements and the tendency to disregard transit’s (EMRPP). Although the EMRPP study helped possible harmful impacts both are potential advance the national state-of-the-art in the applica- obstacles to continued progress. tion of transportation planning and travel behavior theory, it miscalculated the future changes in the Boston area’s distribution of population and Goals and Objectives Prior to BTPR, transit goals for the Boston region were relatively narrowly focused. In contrast, BTPR’s goal-setting process was broadly participatory and has led to a comprehensive set of 10 section 5 (a) of Chapter 161A of the General Laws.

26 employment. 17 The EMRPP assumed that con- Development and Evaluation of Alternatives tinued low-density suburbanization of population Unlike areas that do not have an existing transit and employment was both desirable and system in operation, the Boston region is not inevitable—assumptions that are being called into engaged in a debate over basic transit systems question by environmentalists and urban com- alternatives. Each of the major elements in the munity representatives in the Boston area. MB- existing system—rapid rail, commuter rail, express TA’s 1966 Program for Mass Transportation reflected and local bus service—is recognized as a necessary this assumption by giving priority to building component of a total system. Moreover, changes in attractive and efficient rapid transit extensions to any single component in the existing system are growing suburban communities rather than im- limited to a degree by the practical necessity of proving services and facilities in established joining with other existing facilities. Thus, the residential communities in and around the regional rapid rail extensions join with existing terminals or core. with other major intermediate station locations. BTPR provided a forum for articulating and BTPR carried out the most significant alter- debating alternative transportation and land use natives analysis in Boston transportation planning goals for the Boston region. As a result of the BTPR history. This significance is not due to the depth of study, new goals and objectives have been analysis of transit alternatives. BTPR was fun- developed to guide MBTA’s planning projects. damentally a highway study, in which the transit These goals reflect a broad range of social, alternatives examined were in large part MBTA’s and transportation economic, environmental, long-standing rapid transit proposals. Instead, the issues and have been incorporated into MBTA’s 10- strengths of BTPR lay in its procedures for 1974-83 Year ‘Transil Deve/opmenl Program— to assist in alternatives analysis and citizen involvement carrying out the region’s emerging transportation processes. policy of greater emphasis on transit. The entire alternatives selection process was One of the MBTA’s principal goals calls for carried out at a corridor level, in each of the four emphasizing improved access to existing areas of transportation corridors considered by the BTPR. dense development, particularly the downtown, in First, as many transportation alternatives as order to support efforts to reduce sprawl and possible were generated for each corridor. Each concentrate development at nodes. The central suggestion—from planners, citizens, the business business district is considered a “unique regional community, or other sources—was developed at a and indeed national resource” to which “State and broad sketch plan level of detail, and the less city policy” encourages workers to commute by promising options were eliminated. The remaining transit. Another important goal, addressing the alternatives were studied in greater depth. The question of equity, calls for “an integrated network evaluation process was iterative, building time into of public transportation facilities and services” in the study schedule for reexamining alternatives which “intensive coverage of dense close-in that had been passed over and for adding new residential areas is as important as extensions into options. When the final decisions evolved, a full the suburbs. ” Environmental objectives also are environmental impact statement was made for presented, such as the use of existing transporta- each set of final alternatives. tion rights-of-way. These newly defined goals and objectives provide a point of reference for BTPR’s citizen participation program used four evaluating specific transit programs and improve- vehicles for citizen involvement. The strongest ment projects within the Boston region forum was the Working Committee, a widely representative group that worked with planners for over 3 years—all the way from the designing of the work program and setting goals to the period of I - The miscalculations were not due to lack of technical final design at the conclusion of the alternatives expertise. EM RPP’s analyses were based on reasonable es- evaluation. More conventional forums included timates of future conditions; they continue to be an invaluable formal public hearings and a great number of source of information on transportation planning in the Boston informal meetings with private individuals and region. These projections proved wrong because of inherent difficulties in forecasting future shifts in public policies, values, local groups with specific smaller-focus problems. and priorities for growth and development. Finally, there was a number of community

27 organizers hired individually to help citizens who taking a thorough reevaluation as the next step in felt excluded from the study proceedings. the planning process. Since BTPR, three issues have figured most The popular appeal of conventional rail rapid prominently in MBTA’s development and evalua- transit may account for MBTA’s continued tion of alternatives. One issue involves the emphasis on extending and improving its transit selection of projects for study. Another concern is system with attractive new equipment. The 10-Year the question of setting priorities among the Transit Development Program reflects relatively little proposed projects. The final issue relates to the attention either to programs for expanding bus procedures to be followed in the project-level service and other lower-cost transit alternatives or technical work. to technological and service innovations. The current transit program incorporates MB- Regardless of the grounds for selecting projects, TA’s long-standing rapid transit proposals, once the list is compiled the question becomes how supplemented by a renewed emphasis on the to set priorities among them: funds spent in one retention and improvement of commuter rail corridor will not be available in another. MBTA’s service. Several reasons account for the survival of strategy has been to give equal weight to three the MBTA projects over nearly 10 years marked by categories of improvement projects: changing public opinion and a major transportation ● Improvements to Existing System planning program, Most importantly, until recently transit proposals were considered noncontrover- Urgent remedial improvements sial, and no major interest group opposed them. Construction of new bus garages The public—and BTPR—were concerned primarily Continued updating of revenue with highways, which threatened far more serious equipment fleet impacts than the MBTA transit proposals 18 but did Continued modernization of not challenge the earlier ones, which still dominate existing plant MBTA’s list. Continued station modernization The selection of projects to appear on MBTA’s ● Commuter Rail Improvements longstanding list of rapid transit proposals, which was updated most recently for the 10~-Year Develop- Increasing the adequacy of the ment Program, appears to have been influenced in revenue equipment fleet some cases by considerations beyond strictly Improving rights-of-way now defined transportation needs. As in previous owned by MBTA MBTA plans, major improvement projects are Acquisition and improvement of

distributed among all important transit corridors, additional rights-of-way although in some cases the need for a particular Terminal and service facilities project has been questioned. For example, exten- improvements sion of the Blue Line to the North Shore is included ● Extensions to Electrified System in the program, although BTPR found that no extension would be needed due to the presence of Completion of Red Line to commuter rail service in the corridor. In a different South Braintree kind of case, MBTA had budgeted funds to allow Extensions to Orange Line depressing the Orange Line when it is relocated to North Shore Blue Line the Penn Central right-of-way embankment, even improvements though the added cost will be $4o to $60 million. In Extension of the Red Line beyond both instances, MBTA appeared to be responding Harvard Square to public demand for top-quality transit service and Relocation of Orange Line improved community quality. The proposed op- While this listing provides a generalized state- tions may in fact be the most desirable ones, but the ment of priorities within each category, there is no questions they raise create pressure for under- discussion of potential trade-offs and no schedule showing the sequence of improvements over the next decade. MBTA assumes that projects in each category will be pursued concurrently, both to 1~ See page 16. permit implementation of some while the in-

28 evitable delays and reversals hold up progress on Implementation of the 10-Year Transit Development others, and to be in a position to take advantage of Program is estimated to cost a total of $1.75 billion, the maximum amount of Federal aid as it may with the Federal share amounting to $1.4 billion, become available even on short notice. Thus, a final and the local share $35o million (see Table 2). definition of priorities has been postponed pending Funding at these levels will require a marked a clarification of project approval requirements and increase over previous levels of expenditure in the receipt of Federal funding assistance, By hedging Boston area for both locals and the Federal the priority question in these ways, MBTA avoids Government. Between 1965 and 1973, Federal promising to move forward with one project at the transit assistance to MBTA averaged $32 million expense of another. per year, while local funding averaged $15 million per year (see Tables 2 and 3). The current program With respect to the project-level evaluations of would require Federal fundin at an average rate of alternative location, design, and modal options, g $140 million per year with local funding at $35 MBTA is relying on project study teams organized million per year, in concert with the Central Transportation Plan- ning Staff to investigate the impacts and benefits of Under current legislation, the Federal transit specific alternatives. The goal is to develop a local program could not provide the $1.4 billion sum consensus on a preferred alternative, taking into without seriousl undercuttin assistance to other account non transportation as well as transporta- y g urban areas. However, some $6OO million in tion factors in a broad-based evaluation process. Federal funds is expected to become available Three project study teams are in the process of through the interstate transfer provisions of the organization or have already begun technical work. 1973 Federal-Aid Highway Act, leaving only $800 These include the Southwest Corridor study of the million to be obtained from UMTA’S regular Orange Line relocation, the North Shore study of program—a figure that appears reasonable within the Blue Line extension to Lynn, and two studies in the context of increased Federal funding support the Northwest Corridor concerning the Red Line for transit. extension from Harvard Square to Route 128 in Lexington. As yet, the work has not progressed to In terms of local funding, only $100 million of the the point where the technical products can be total $35o million projected for the lo-year critically evaluated. program has been authorized by the State legislature. Thus, it is assumed that the remaining 1n the past, at least, there has been a tendency to $242 million will be authorized when needed in the compare the transit improvement programs with future. Given the State’s current financial crisis, it the impacts of previous highway system plans is unclear whether these funds will be forthcomin rather than to conduct an assessment of transit g without difficulty, especiall since the State proposals on their own merits. This attitude is y traditionall has assumed responsibility for a major reflected in the resistance of State transportation y share of MBTA’s debt service requirements. If the officials to recognize that major new transit State continues to assist MBTA in defraying facilities often involve significant social, economic, current operatin costs, it may become increasingly and environmental impact issues. This approach, if g unwilling to compound its financial obligations it continues to exist, could hinder the application of unless it can be demonstrated that the new projects technically sound evaluation procedures in the will result in operating cost savings or efficiencies. recently initiated studies. However, each of these major studies has been structured to allow in-depth Most critically, however, MBTA’s lo-year cost consideration of a full range of alternatives, estimates are stated in 1974 dollars and therefore

are lower than the real costs will be, depending on Financing and Implementation when the projects are carried out. The program explicitly assumes that the level of Federal aid will As noted, MBTA has not addressed the question be increased during the next decade “at a rate at of priorities in detail. In part, this issue has been least equal to the rate of inflation,” and it is implicit avoided by assuming the maximum availability of that State funds also will keep pace with inflation. Federal aid, with the implicit assumption that local Any difficulties in meeting the stated funding funding will be authorized as needed to match requirements, of course, will grow more serious as available Federal funds. costs rise.

29 TABLE 2.—Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority 1974-83 Transit Development Program Capitai Improvements in Miiiions of Doiiars

Total for Local Share Federal Share Project Period Funded Unfunded Total FY 74-75 FY 76 FY 77 FY 78 FY 79-83 IMPROVEMENTS TO EXISTING SYSTEM Plant Modernization ...... $221.9 $31.1 $13.3 $177.5 $74.1 $19.0 $39.8 $6.0 $38.6 Power System Improvements Consolidated Bus Garages Plant Maintenance Centers Plant Improvements-Ill Communications Fare Collection Private Bus Carrier Blue Line Improvements Green Line-n Tracks and Signals Haymarket-North South Bay Plant lmprovements—lV-V Station Modernization ...... 53.0 10.6 42.4 25.0 17.4 Rolling Stock Modernization* ...... 27.0 5.4 21.6 21.6 New Streetcars and Trackless Trolleys ...... 27,0 1.9 3.5 21.6 8.7 12.9 New Buses ...... 68.0 5.1 8.5 54.4 20.5 4.0 4.3 4.3 21.3 SUB-TOTAL ...... 396.9 43.5 35.9 317.5 124.9 23.0 82.0 10.3 77.3

COMMUTER RAIL IMPROVEMENTS R-O-W Improvements ...... 52.0 10.4 41.6 10.0 15.0 16.6 Rolling Stock ...... 28.0 5.6 22.4 7.0 8.4 7.0 Terminals and Terminal Facilities . . 20.0 4.0 16.0 5.0 5.0 6.0 SUB-TOTAL ...... 100.0 20.0 80.0 22.0 28.4 29.6

ELECTRIFIED EXTENSIONS Blue Line North Shore ...... “82.0 10.0 6.4 65.6 4.0 6.0 26.8 28.8 Back Bay ...... 80.0 16.0 64.0 64.0 Orange Line-North, Oak Grove-North ...... 70.0 6.4 7.6 56.0 3.5 10.0 21.0 21.5 Red Line-Northwest Harvard-Arlington Heights ...... 293.0 3.0 55.6 234.4 14.0 26.0 40.0 87.2 67.2 Arlington Heights Route 128 Lexington ...... 39.0 1.0 6.8 31.2 .3 1.6 5.0 5.0 19.3 Orange Line-Southwest So. Cove-Forest Hills ...... 248.0 2.0 47.6 198.4 12.0 28.0 40.0 98.0 20.4 Forest Hills-Needham ...... 63.0 12.6 50.4 3.0 17.0 30.4 Replacement Service South End ...... “58.0 .5 11.1 46.4 25.4 21.0 Roxbury ...... ““275.0 .5 54.5 220.0 20.0 20.0 160.0 Red Line-South Shore So. Braintree ...... 42.0 8.4 33.6 33.6 SUB-TOTAL ...... 1,250.0 44.4 205.6 1,000.0 70.4 88.6 208.6 260.5 371.9

PROGRAM TOTAL ...... 1,746.9 107.9 241.5 1,397.5 217.3 140.0 320.2 270.8 449.2

Federal Aid Received in FY 74 prior to 5-1-74. 17.5 $234.8

● Modernization of Red Line and replacement of Orange and Blue Line fleets would result in a $62M project cost.

● * High estimate.

30 TABLE 3.—Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Statement on Federal Grants and Loans-Approved Projects March 15, 1974

PROJECT DESCRIPTION DOT PROJ. No. TYPE OF GRANT DOT SHARE LOCAL SHARE TOTAL

1965 Station Modernlzatlon ...... MA-03-0001 Capital $6,077,280 $3,038,640 $9,115,920 1966 Bus Acqulsltlon (150) ...... MA-03-0002 Capital 3,136,654 1,568,327 4,704,981 Haymarket Tunnel ...... MA-03 -OO03 Capital 12,000,000 6,000,000 18,000< 000 $15,136,654 $7,568,327 $22,704,981 1967 Haymarket SoIls Inst...... MA-06-0008 Demonstration $160,000 $80,300 $240,900 Southwest Corridor Study ...... MA-09-0001 Technical Stu. 484,484 242,242 726,726 $645,084 $322,542 $967,626 1968 South Shore RT ...... MA-03-0004 Capital $34,547,333 $17,273,667 $51,821,000 South Shore RT ...... MA-03 -0(M)4 Relocation 617,000 — 617,000 Tralning Grant ...... MTTR-2 Managerial 19,976 6,658 26,634 $35.184.309 $17.280.325 $52.464.634 1969 Haymarket North ...... MA-03-0005 Capital $50,862,000 $25,431,000 $76,293,000 Southwest Corridor Amend . . . . MA-09-0001 Technical Stu, 13,333 6,667 20,000 Central Area Systems Stu ...... MA-09-0002 Technical Stu, 522,067 261,034 783,101 HN SoIls Instr Amend ...... MA-06-0008 Demonstration 144,971 72,486 217,457 Service Development ...... MASS-MTD-7 Demonstration 35,178 8,252 43,430 Tralnlng Grants ...... MTTR-3 Managerial 15,303 5,102 20,405 $51,592,852 $25,784,541 $77,377,393 1970 Tralnlng Grants ...... MTTR-4 Managerial $10,238 $3,412 $13,650 1971 SS Rapid Transit Amend ...... MA-03-0004 Capital $3,657,263 $1,828,632 $5,485,895 So. Bay Maintenance Cen . . . . . MA-03-0007 Capital 18,800,000 9,400,000 28,200,000 Systemwlde Modernlzatlon . . . . . MA-O3-OO1O Capital 3,000,000 1,500,000 4,500,000 Bus Acqulsltlon (310) ...... MA-03-0011 Capital 8,100,250 4,050,125 12,150,375 Valldatlon Study ...... MASS-MTD-8 Demonstration 346,616 51,422 398,038 Valldatlon Study Amend ...... MASS-MTD-8 Demonstration 35,100 7,296 42,396 Tralnlng Grants ...... MTTR-5,6,7,8,9 Managerial 22,738 7,579 30,317 $33,961,967 $16,845,054 $50,807,021 1972 Bos Trans. Plan. Review ...... MA-O9-OO1O Technical Stu. $1,693,500 $846,750 $2,540,250 Light Rad Veh. Spec...... MA-06-0015 Demonstration 109,084 20,841 129,925 So Bay MaIn. Cen. Amend. , . . . MA-03-0007 Capital 320,000 180,000 480,000 Sta. Modernlzatlon Phase II . . . . MA-03-0013 Capital 9,565,086 4,782,544 14,347,630 Green Line Improvements ...... MA-03-0015 Capital 25,413,333 12,706,667 38,120,000 Non-Revenue Equipment ...... MA-03-0021 Capital 568,940 284,470 853,410 $37,669,943 $18,801,272 $56,471,215 1973 Light Rail Veh Spec. Amend . . . MA-06-0015 Demonstration $24,514 $8,486 $33,000 Green Line Vehicles , ...... MA-03-0022 Capital 32,800,000 16,400,000 49,200,000 Plant Improvements PH I ...... MA-03-0017 Capital 1,573,146 786,574 2,359,720 Rapid Transit Cars (80) ...... MA-03-0025 Capital 18,410,600 9,205,300 27,615,900 Safety Improvements ...... MA-38-0025 Capital 10,601,640 5,300,820 15,902,460 Plant Improvements , ...... MA-03-0026 Capital 7,933,092 3,966,548 11,899,640 Trackless Trolleys-50 PH II . . . . . MA-03-0028 Capital 1,781,500 890,750 2,672,250 Haymarket North Amend, ...... MA-03-0005 Capital 13,126,410 6,653,206 19,689,616 Penn Central Acquisition ...... MA-03-9001 Loan 19,500,000 0 19,500,000 $105,750,902 $43,121,684 $148,872,586 1974 Rest Orange Line Str...... MA-03-0029 Capital $4,456,872 $1,114,218 $5,571,090 Transit Development Prog...... MA-09-0016 Technical Stu. 1,200,000 300,000 1,500,000 $5,656,872 $1,414,218 $7,071,090

Source MBTA, 10-Year Transit Development Program, 1974-83, Boston: 1974, pp, II I-3—III-4

31 .—

TABLE 4.—Federal Assistance to Boston Transit In summary, MBTA’s financial plan rests on Programs From F.Y. 1962 to May 31, 1975 assumptions that may not be reliable. If Federal and local funding does not become available in the Type of Assistance Federal Share Total Costs amounts that are needed, MBTA will be faced with Capital Grants ...... $322,852,000 $650,620,000 the necessity of making hard choices among the Capital Loans ...... 19,500,000 19,500,000 many improvement projects that have been Interstate Transfers ...... 33,040,000 41,300,000 described in its current lo-year development Technical Studies ...... 4,965,000 7,108,000 program. Total ...... $380,357,000 $718,528,000

Source: Urban Mass Transportation Administration

32 Summary Case Assessment

●

● I

The purpose of this section is to summarize the transit agencies and local governments. transit planning and decisionmaking process in the Recent agency reorganization programs Boston region in light of the guidelines listed in the have centralized transportation policymak- Introduction to the case assessments. The sum- ing in the Executive Office of Transporta- mary, therefore, is divided into two parts: (1) tion and Construction (EOTC) and have Assessment of the Institutional Context, and (2) clarified transportation planning and proj- Assessment of the Technical Planning Work. ect development responsibilities in the Boston area. Through the reorganization of EOTC and the Massachusetts Bay 1. ASSESSMENT OF THE Transportation Authority (M BTA), as well INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT as the five-agency Memorandum of Agree- ment that established Joint Regional . Forum for Decisionmaking.—Historically, Transportation Committee and the Cen- transportation decisions in Boston were tral Transportation Planning Staff, the made by semiautonomous highway and Boston area has developed the institutional

33 mechanisms necessary to permit effective tives provide a basic point of reference for interagency and intergovernmental coor- judging specific projects and proposals dination, As its planning responsibilities contained in the region’s transit develop- have been transferred to EOTC, MBTA ment program. has come to function primarily as a transit ● Development of Alternatives.—The cur- operating agency. rent transit improvement program incor- . Accountability of Decisionmakers.—The porates MBTA’s longstanding rapid transit Secretary of EOTC—and, ultimately, the extension proposals, supplemented by a Governor who appoints him—are becom- renewed emphasis on the retention and ing increasingly involved in setting improvement of commuter rail facilities. transportation policy and reaching major However, programs for expanding bus project decisions in the Boston area. services and other lower-cost approaches Because the Governor is the sole elected to transit improvements as well as official directly accountable to all the technological and service innovations all citizens residing within the MBTA service merit greater study. district, the shift of decisionmaking power . Evaluation of Alternatives.—BTPR con- to EOTC gives citizens a greater degree of ducted the most significant alternatives formal control in the transportation plan- analysis in Boston transportation history, ning process. The State legislature con- involving an in-depth iterative process tinues to exercise considerable influence with continuous citizen and public agency over the region’s transit programs through participation. In general, however, there its power to approve or disapprove bonding has been so little serious controversy over authority. transit projects in Boston, at least until . Public Involvement .—The Boston recently, that State transportation officials Transportation Planning Review (BTPR) have resisted undertaking detailed analysis constituted a major experiment of of the social, economic, and environmental nationwide significance in its approach to impact of transit. Each of the major studies developing an open, participatory study now underway has been structured to process. The BTPR philosophy and ap- allow indepth consideration of a full range proach have been carried over to the newly of alternatives. As yet, the work has not established JRTC and CTPS institutions. progressed to the point where the technical products can be evaluated. . Financing and Implementation.—MBTA’s current schedule and capital budget es- 2. ASSESSMENT OF THE timates appear optimistic in light of the TECHNICAL PLANNING WORK authority’s recent lack of success in secur- ing Federal project approvals and funding . Goals and Objectives.—The transporta- commitments, as well as in the assumption tion goals and objectives for the Boston that State and Federal funds will keep pace region—originally developed during BTPR with future construction cost inflation. and subsequently refined and extended— The State’s current financial crisis and constitute a thoughtful attempt to incor- MBTA’s rising operating deficit (which porate a broad range of nontransportation would be further aggravated by an ex- objectives as well as transportation-related panded transit system) also may hinder concerns in the region’s transportation completion of the capital program on its planning process. These goals and objec- current schedule.

[1. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1976 0 - 67-445