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Home , Transportation in Boston

Critical History of Transit Planning and Decisionmaking

Although the principal focus of this case assess- was to be a series of major expressway facilities ment is transit planning, ’s recent transit within Route 128, including the Inner Belt (Route planning history can be understood only in the 695), a third harbor tunnel, the final extensions of context of all the transportation planning for both State Route 2 and Route 1-93, and construction of highway and transit in the Boston area. Serious Route 1-95 from Route 128 in the south, through interest in making improvements to the transit and the new harbor tunnel, to system grew primarily in response to community Route 128 in the north. opposition to proposed expressway projects. The The Inner Belt—seen as the keystone of the following discussion is organized around three entire expresswa system—was to be the last of the major phases of the planning and decisionmaking y three circumferential expressways serving Boston. process: (1) the period of highway planning and the It was to have encircled downtown Boston, passing citizen reaction to it that culminated in the 1970 through the Back Bay/ institutional com- moratorium on highway construction; (2) the plex, crossing the , and continuing period of study called the Boston Transportation through Cambridge and Somerville. Planning Review (BTPR) during which transit issues came into focus; and (3) steps toward This expressway system, which was rooted in the implementing the BTPR transit proposals in the 1948 Master Highway Plan, was revised and expanded period since 1972. The historical narrative is by the 1968 Recommended Highway and Transit Plan, a intended to provide a framework for the dis- multiyear, $2 billion highway and transit construc- cussions that follow of the institutional context and tion program affecting 152 of the State’s 351 technical work, in which particular emphasis is communities. The 1968 plan was a product of the placed on BTPR and its aftermath. The history is Eastern Regional Planning Project summarized in a chronological listing that follows (EMRPP). EMRPP was begun in 1962 as a joint this section. undertaking of the Massachusetts Bay Transporta- tion Authority (MBTA), the State Department of Public Works (DPW), the Metropolitan Area DECISION TO REEVALUATE Planning Council (MAPC), and the Department of HIGHWAY PLANS: Commerce and Development. THE MORATORIUM Although the 1968 EMRPP plan did include a number of transit extensions and other im- In the late 1960’s transportation issues in Boston provements, it was clear that only the highway centered around highway projects proposed during program was assured of the necessary local and several decades of planning. Controversy arose as Federal funding resources required for construc- citizens and elected officials within Route 128 tion. Through State constitutional limitations on began to realize the extent of residential and open the use of gas tax revenues, s the highway program space displacement that would necessarily accom- enjoyed a ready and growing source of local pany expressway construction. The pressure matching funds. At the Federal level, the highway increased until Governor Francis Sargent placed a program was generously funded and, for interstate moratorium on highway planning and construction facilities, required only a 10 percent local matching in February 1970. share. Beginning in 1948 the State, through the By contrast, transit construction projects re- Department of Public Works, engaged in a growing quired specific bonding authorization on a project- highway construction program that secured widespread support among the State’s business and s In 1974, voters removed this 1 i mi ta t ion i n a statewide industrial leaders. The culmination of this program referendum.

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0 by-project basis, and the provision of bonding The highway opponents also found support in authority required a two-thirds affirmative vote on Boston’s City Hall, where liberal Mayor Kevin the part of the State legislature. Since many White had replaced former Mayor John Collins in legislators resided in areas of the State that would 1967. During his 8-year term, Collins alined closely not directly benefit from MBTA projects, and since with the Chamber of Commerce and other groups the State normally assisted MBTA in defraying that favored highway construction and had spoken debt service related to capital construction projects, out for the expressway system. Mayor White’s this legislative support was often difficult to obtain. political base, which was organized around Similarly, at the Federal level, little money was neighborhood interests, made his administration being made available for extensive transit improve- sensitive to the growing concern over displacement ment projects. and disruption. b In fact, several of White’s “Little City Hall” administrators were in the forefront of In this context popular concern over potentially the antihighway (and antiairport expansion) destructive side-effects of highway construction transportation struggles. Mayor White eventually began to grow. By February 1968, Cambridge and withdrew the city’s support of the South End Boston had been successful undemanding a restudy Bypass, a city-sponsored project that was essential of the Inner Belt. Federal Highway Administrator to the efficient operation of the proposed Lowell Bridwell committed the Bureau of Public Southwest Expressway (1-95). Roads to two new studies, one to review the need for the road and the other to develop roadway Thus, by 1969, the stage was set for a complete design solutions that attempted to minimize reassessment of the State’s transportation policies anticipated adverse effects of the facility. for the Boston area. Toward the end of the year, Governor Sargent appointed a task force, chaired However, the Inner Belt was but one proposed by Professor Alan Altshuler of MIT, to study the element of the planned system. Encouraged by the State’s transportation planning and decision- Inner Belt restudy but apprehensive that the new making process. Mayor White, other politicians, studies would turn out to be “whitewash,” local and spokespersons on the antihighways side strong- action groups continued to develop closer alliances ly criticized the Governor for taking a middle and to organize protest rallies and demonstrations. course, and within weeks the task force’s brief but Eventually, the Committee on the sharply critical interim report to the Governor Transportation Crisis (GBC) was organized in paved the way for the announcement of a general 1968-69, and served as an umbrella organization highway planning and construction moratorium in that began to wield considerable political clout. February 1970. T Sargent suspended property In 1969, Governor John Volpe resigned to acquisition in the proposed expressway rights-of- become Secretary of the U.S. Department of way and canceled the remaining portions of the Transportation. Governor Volpe, who had former- Inner Belt design study. He proposed a larger ly served as Commissioner of Public Works and had “rest udy,” which became the Boston Transporta- taken a strong stand in favor of highway construc- tion Planning Review (BTPR), to determine tion, was succeeded by Francis Sargent, also a whether the new roads should be built, as well as former DPW Commissioner, who in the 1960’s had where and how. approved the very expressway system that was now being called into question. DECISION TO RECOMMEND However, Governor Sargent also had served TRANSIT IMPROVEMENTS: previousl as Commissioner of the Department of y THE BTPR Natural Resources. Continuing his strong interest in environmental matters, Sargent became con- cerned over the potential environmental degrada- Despite the long history of transportation- tion that could result from highway construction. related controversy, transit issues played a relative- Sargent and his policy advisors began to give ly limited role in the Governor’s moratorium favorable hearing to the antihighway forces. Atone critical point in August 1969, Sargent refused to b Displacement was a real concern, not a potential threat; DPW had begun land acquisition and clearance in several allow an immediate transfer to DPW of certain expressway corridors. State-owned parkland in the Fowl Meadow that 7 The moratorium was not applied to 1-93, which was by then was essential for the construction of Route 1-9s. well into construction.

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Highway construction issues dominated Boston’s most significant recent transportation planning program, the Boston Transportation Planning Review

decision. The political issue was highway cost estimates for the 1966 plan based on construction—and more importantly, the en- preliminary engineering work and inflation factors. vironmental and community impacts associated However, the MBTA plan did not figure with highway construction. Transportation policy, prominently in the events of the following year. A as such, was not widely debated by the participants number of loosely related factors account for this. in the controversy, and there was little discussion First, highways presented an immediate, of transportation quality or service needs. recognizable threat around which political action Transit proposals had surfaced during the 1960’s could be organized. Boston already had an es- but drew little public attention. The Eastern tablished core transit system, and the highway Massachusetts Regional Planning Program had versus transit choice was not posed as starkly as it provided an extensive data base that MBTA used to might have been in a city with no rail transit prepare its Program for Mass Transportation in August services at all. Similarly, no major interest group 1966. The 1966 plan proposed a series of “action opposed transit, and even prohighway interests projects” costing an estimated $340 million. The agreed that transit was a valid type of transporta- proposals included extensions of the Orange and tion service, although of lower priority than Red Lines, replacements of rolling stock on the Blue highways, Furthermore, most of the proposed and Green Lines, and elimination of elevated transit improvements contained in the 1968 structures in Charlestown and South End/Rox- EMRPP report were located along underused rail bury. The 1966 plan was updated and revised by rights-of-wa y and would not require extensive MBTA in 1969 based on continuing planning displacement or disruption of the sort that often analyses conducted by ERMPP (which concluded its attracts the attention of political leaders. Finally, work that year). The 1969 revisions updated capital transit funding appeared too uncertain to allow

15 antihighway leaders to present transit as a viable on the designated highway facilities; and political alternative for the short-term future. commitments had been made at all levels to reach final highway decisions as quickly as possible. Moreover, very few people had a clear concept of Moreover, the battle lines between prohighway the political or functional interrelationships and antihighway groups were still clearly and between highways and transit. Two major and bitterly defined. visible exceptions were then State Representative (now Governor) Michael Dukakis, and Professor Meanwhile, there was no pressure to reach Altshuler. Dukakis pressed Governor Sargent in definitive transit decisions. Very few direct adverse 1969 to provide more highway money in the impacts were attributable to any of the transit western part of the State, where he said it was facilities under study, and those that were present needed, and to greatly expand mass transportation were minimal in comparison to the adverse impacts in Boston: of the proposed highway facilities. Although in 1971 the legislature had authorized $124 million in In the western part of the State, the imbalance bonds for transit facility construction, the ability to of highway money is an excellent political move forward was limited by the availability of issue. And the absence of an adequate rapid Federal assistance and, more importantly, by the transit system is a damn good political issue in fact that several of the most important transit the east. s projects were to be built jointly with proposed For his part, Altshuler supported a joint funding highway projects, so that no real progress was mechanism for highways and transit and perceived possible until the highway issues had been put to the role transit should play in a total transportation rest. system, Equally important, most of the key members of As the BTPR Study Design was being formulated the BTPR consultant team had had considerable during the latter part of 1970, however, increasing prior experience with major projects elsewhere in attention was being given to transit options, Under the country. They were prepared by training and the direction of Professor Altshuler, the BTPR experience to focus on highway issues and proved Steering Committee (composed of municipal to be less well prepared for conceptualizing and appointees and a broad array of community detailing innovative transit solutions. Although organization spokespersons) defined a “sketch MBTA had experienced transit planners on its own planning” process designed to facilitate considera- staff, the MBTA executive staff declined to tion of a wide range of alternatives—including participate actively in the technical work of the modal alternatives as well as highway location and BTPR or to advocate forcefully an expanded transit design options. With all land acquisition and program or an innovative transit solution. MBTA’s prime objective was to assure that nothing that highwa y construction activities suspended until completion of BTPR, the pressing concerns over occurred during the BTPR would significantly highway displacement and disruption began to disturb MBTA preestablished plans and relax, and the possibility of developing a transpor- priorities—which had been cleared through the tation policy for Boston (as opposed to antihighway State legislature, whose members had been in the policy) appeared realistic. past, and would be in the future, required to approve MBTA’s bonding requests. Nevertheless, once the Study Design was com- pleted and the BTPR consultant team selected, it Despite these constraints, BTPR did identify and was clear that the highway issues retained first analyze a number of transit projects that had not priority, for both political and practical reasons. received top priority in previous transit planning Considerable sums had already been expended to studies. These projects included (a) the Commuter acquire rights-of-way and to prepare them for Railroad Improvement Program (CRIP);9 (b) a construction; Federal interstate highway monies proposal for circumferential transit service along were available and, at that time, could be spent only the inner belt corridor; lo (c) analysis of replacement service for Roxbury and the South End; ll (d)

8 Lupo, Colcord, and Fowler, Rites of Way: The Politics of Transportation in Boston and the U.S. Boston: Little Brown, 1971. The g BTPR, Commuter Rail )mprouement Program. Boston 1972. long and often bitter history of highway opposition in Boston 10 BTPR, ClrcUmferen/fa/ Tran5if, Boston 1972. has been ably chronicled in this book. I I BTpR, sou~hu~est Corridor Reporf. Boston 1972.

16 studies of special mobility needs; 12 and (e) a bus or Green Lines. The circumferential route could tunnel alternative to the third harbor crossing. 13 improve service on these and other already crowded lines. In a broad conceptual study of the (a) The proposed track bed, rolling stock, and circumferential line, both PRT and conventional station improvements recommended by the CRIP transit systems were investigated, as well as study were supported by Governor Sargent and alternative alinement locations and distances. The have been incorporated into BMTA’s 10-Year most extensive version given serious study would Transit Deuelopment Program. The Boston area’s connect in Boston to extensive commuter rail network had been sorely in Charlestown. neglected for years. MBTA’s exten- sion program favored the gradual replacement of (c) MBTA’s proposed Orange Line Relocation commuter rail service by rapid transit extensions and Extension would have resulted in a reduction of which would generally occupy existing rail rights- rapid transit service to two heavily transit- of-way. Suburban commuter rail patrons argued dependent Boston neighborhoods. Largely as a strongly that substitution of transit service often result of continued political pressure, these com- meant several years’ suspension of any service munities were able to direct the attention of BTPR during construction, and that the completed rapid toward an analysis of potential transit replacement rail extensions rarely served as large an area as the services, Although the precise nature of these commuter rail system, despite the high capital costs replacement transit services has yet to be defined in involved. BTPR investigated the feasibility of detail, the 10-Year Transit Development Program does upgrading and retaining the commuter rail system provide for “high standard” replacement service to in light of the costs to MBTA for continued each community as part of the Orange Line subsidization of commuter rail service. The CRIP Relocation Program. This commitment represents study paralleled the State’s negotiation for and a recognition of the need to balance a policy of subsequent purchase of the Penn-Central suburban-oriented rapid transit extensions with a Railroad’s trackage on the southern side of Boston, policy of continued quality service for transit- a step which has preserved some 140 miles of track dependent inner-city neighborhoods. for transportation purposes. (Similar negotiations (d) BTPR staff assisted several communities i with the Boston & Main Railroad for purchase of n analyzing the need for special mobility and trackage to the north of Boston were completed in coverage transit services in addition to existing bus July 1975.) and rapid transit services. Although very few (b) The circumferential transit service project is concrete changes resulted from these studies, briefly described in MBTA’s Transit Development several new bus routes were established, and Program but is not proposed for construction MBTA has begun to give more attention to within the next decade. The concept was studied management and other low-capital-intensive tran- late in 1971 after Governor Sargent decided not to sit programs that serve special mobility needs or construct the Inner Belt expressway. The new provide broader transit coverage. In addition to a facility was considered both because it could make reduced fare for the elderly, which was introduced use of lands already acquired by the State and prior to BTPR, recent innovations include the use because it could provide a much-needed transit link of prepaid passes, “dime time” fares during midday between the existing radial rapid transit lines. The hours, and increased express bus services.14 possibility of connecting the Red Line in Cambridge (e) AS an alternative to a general-purpose third with the Green and Orange Lines in the Back harbor tunnel, BTPR developed a two-lane bus Bay/Fenway institutional complex in Boston was tunnel option that would be open only to buses, particularly attractive. Presently, large volumes of taxis, airport limousines, emergency vehicles, and trips are made between these points, either by bus possibly multioccupancy automobiles. The bus or by traveling by transit to downtown Boston and tunnel would provide sufficient capacity to relieve transferring to an out-bound rail on the Orange congestion in the existing harbor tunnels but would not entail the cost or disruption of the

I z BTpR, Moblllt~ Problems of Elderly Cambridge Residents. Boston 1972, and BTPR, Spetlai Moblllfy Staff Report. Boston 1972. See also, BTPR, Study E/ement ,? Summary Report: Community Liaison and 1 ~ The “dime.time” reduced fare experiment failed to increase Te[hnlcal Assistance, Boston 1973. off-peak riders hip on the subway system and was discontinued IS BTpR, ~hlrd Harbor Cross]ng. Boston 1972. in August 197s,

17 previously proposed six-lane general-purpose process within the JRTC/CTPS framework), and tunnel. Although this facility was supported by the restructuring of MBTA, each discussed Governor Sargent, the legislature has failed to elsewhere in this case assessment. Each major shift remove a statutory restriction that prohibits of powers and responsibilities has invoIved exten- construction of any new vehicular tunnels in sive interagency negotiations and compromise. At proximity to the existing harbor tunnels. times these political realinements took priority over technical and administrative matters.

STEPS TOWARD IMPLEMENTING Fourth, UMTAdeclined to accept any of the draft TRANSIT IMPROVEMENTS environmental impact statements prepared by BTPR. UMTA judged these statements to be inadequate because, Iike the BTPR study process Although Governor Sargent dropped most of the itself, they focused largel on highway facility major pending highway proposals and announced y alternatives. Thus, MBTA has been compelled to an aggressive transit improvement program for the develop additional alternatives and to restudy the Boston area during a statewide televised broadcast environment} effects of each of the transit in November 1972, little tangible progress has projects included in its current program. Both taken place during the 2% years since that time. A former EOTC Secretary Altshuler and the present number of interrelated factors account for this secretary, Frederick P. Salvucci, have said that failure to move forward with the region’s transit UMTA’S decision created unnecessary delays in the improvement program. implementation of Boston’s transit program, First, despite the generally favorable press particularly due to the length of time consumed in response and public acceptance of the Governor’s UMTA’S reviews of the new studies, (UMTA— transportation policy, some prohighway sentiment unlike the Federal Highway Administration— continued during the months following the BTPR retains the responsibility for actually preparing and study. The Governor and his transportation circulating the formal draft and final environmen- advisers came under backstage pressure for a full or tal impact statements despite its small, overworked partial reconsideration of various highway project staff. ) Secretary Salvucci has argued further that decisions. the region’s transit program should be exempt from strict application of environmental review Second, the source of funding for the transit procedures since transit projects are environmen- improvement program was not clear. Secretary tally “clean,” particularly in comparison with Altshuler had been instrumental in lobbying for highway facilities. In any event, the two secretaries’ inclusion of an interstate transfer provision in the arguments to date have been ineffective and, some Federal Highway Act of 1973. Even though a critics say, they may have contributed to further transfer provision favorable to Massachusetts was delays in advancing projects for final approval and enacted, a considerable amount of time and effort implementation. was expended by State officials in working out the details of the interstate transfer program with Fifth, despite a continuing broad-based consen- Federal officials. The more than $600 million that sus in favor of the general transit policy underlying was eventually promised to the State was essential Governor Sargent’s transit improvement program, to the definition of a credible transit construction opposition to specific transit project location and program, and until this amount was finally design details has arisen—as witnessed by con- committed, the State had difficulty in developing a troversies over the planning and design issues workable schedule and list of priorities for the surrounding the relocated Orange Line in the region’s 10-year program. southwest corridor; the Red Line extension from Third, practical and political difficulties involved Harvard Square through Cambridge, Somerville, in the various transportation agency Arlington, and Lexington; and the Red Line reorganizations also have occupied a substantial extension from Quincy along the South Shore. In amount of staff time. These include the continuing brief, local citizens and officials have expressed consolidation of transportation planning and concern over potential environmental, land use, policymaking responsibilities within EOTC, the parking, and local street congestion impacts due to creation of both JRTC and CTPS (as well as the new transit construction and operation, especially development of an open participatory planning in the vicinity of transit stations. In large part the opposition has been aggravated by a lack of affects progress toward transit improvements, as adequate information regarding the potential evidenced by the recent abandonment of MBTA’s social, economic, and environmental effects of the off-peak hours “dime time” fare experiment, which various projects. However, each of the major proved to have been unsuccessful in attracting new interdisciplinary studies now underway (or soon to ridership. be initiated) 15 should provide the technical data required to conduct an informed debate on the At the same time, the long-term outlook for issues, even if they do not fully resolve the points in Boston’s transit future remains optimistic. The contrivers y. basic consensus in favor of an aggressive and extensive transit improvement program has con- During the 1974 gubernatorial election cam- tinued, despite differences over specific location paign, the present Governor, Michael Dukakis, and design details, the appropriate transit mode, sharply criticized Sargent for his administration’s and implementation priorities. Reorganization of lack of transit construction activity and promised to the region’s and the State’s transportation agencies push vigorously at the regional, State, and Federal promises to improve transit planning and opera- levels for increased transit assistance and project tion. The recent purchase of the Boston & approvals. Nevertheless, despite a continuing Railroad’s trackage north of Boston for $39 million commitment to transit progress, the Dukakis (subject to approval by the bankruptcy trustees), administration has not had any notably greater like the previous Penn-Central system acquisition success in advancing the transit program into to the south, will provide a ready source of rights- actual construction. The basic problems cited of-way for transit and other transportation im- above, as well as the State’s current and pervasive provement facilities. Finally, the growing fiscal crises, continue to plague the program. awareness and concern over environmental, land MBTA’s continually rising operating deficit also use, and energy consumption problems may tend to encourage transit programs in Boston, provided I‘ see page 29 localized impact issues can be successfully resolved.

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