'Defection-Proofed' Militaries and Authoritarian Regime Survival
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Georgia State University ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University Political Science Dissertations Department of Political Science 8-8-2017 ‘Defection-Proofed’ Militaries and Authoritarian Regime Survival Hisham Soliman Abdelghaffar Soliman Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_diss Recommended Citation Soliman, Hisham Soliman Abdelghaffar, "‘Defection-Proofed’ Militaries and Authoritarian Regime Survival." Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2017. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_diss/44 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Political Science at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ‘DEFECTION-PROOFED’ MILITARIES AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIME SURVIVAL by HISHAM SOLIMAN Under the Direction of Michael Herb, PhD ABSTRACT The question of loyalty in autocratic regimes has drawn a sustained scholarly interest, especially with the resilience of many of these regimes over most of world history and over the past few decades in particular. Autocratic leaders need to secure the support of their militaries to survive in office and to minimize the risk of a coup. Among the commonly employed mechanisms in this regard is the extension of extra-budgetary financial rewards, including ‘Military-Owned Businesses (MOBs).’ Nevertheless, under the increasingly significant threat of an uprising from below, military defection remains the key for the success of the revolution. The question then becomes: under what conditions would a military defect from an autocratic ruling alliance? Although many answers have been proposed to solve this puzzle, an increasing number of cases are proving them insufficient. Alternatively, this project presents one novel answer to this question, which is: militaries are “defection-proofed” in the face of mass uprisings when they develop financial dependency on the regime. By contrast, when the management of the extra-budgetary resource for the military, i.e. MOBs, becomes the exclusive domain of the military and independent from the regime, the military is expected to defect. This proposed hypothesis represents a contribution to the democratization literature, both its installation, i.e. underlining a ‘pro-democracy’ capacity of the military in removing the dictator, as well as its consolidation, i.e. handling the legacy of the autocratic regime after the transition. This hypothesis is tested comparatively against the cases of mass protests in China (1989), Indonesia (1998), Thailand (2006), Iran (2009), and Egypt (2011). This comparative analysis represents another contribution of this study, bringing together a diverse array of cases unexpected to have much in common. Analysis draws on a mix of both primary resources collected from the field along with secondary materials. The comparisons are made considering the type of civil-military relations in each case, the size and type of financial rewards controlled by the military, and their effect, if any, on its decision to repress or defect based on the interaction between the military and the dictator. INDEX WORDS: Autocracy, Military-owned businesses, Repression, Mass protest, Dictator ‘DEFECTION-PROOFED’ MILITARIES AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIME SURVIVAL by HISHAM SOLIMAN A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences Georgia State University 2017 Copyright by Hisham Soliman 2017 ‘DEFECTION-PROOFED’ MILITARIES AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIME SURVIVAL by HISHAM SOLIMAN Committee Chair: Michael Herb Committee: Jennifer McCoy Charles Hankla Electronic Version Approved: Office of Graduate Studies College of Arts and Sciences Georgia State University August 2017 iv DEDICATION To my beloved family… v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Dr. Michael Herb, my dissertation adviser, for all his support and guidance throughout the process of bringing this project to light. I would like also to thank Dr. Charles Hankla for all his help and for his stimulating seminars, where I developed my research question for this project. The department of political science at Georgia State University has been all supportive throughout my attendance of the doctoral program. The financial support I received from the Faculty of Economics and Political Sciences at Cairo University in Egypt as well as from the Provost Office at Georgia State University was invaluable for my work. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................ V LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................... IX LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... X LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................ XI 1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................... 1 2 CHAPTER 1: ABANDONING THE PRINCE?! MOBS AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIME SURVIVAL .............................................................................. 6 2.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 6 2.2 Literature Review ................................................................................................. 8 2.2.1 Politically-Interventionist Militaries .............................................................. 8 2.2.2 Autocratic Rents and Regime Survival ......................................................... 10 2.2.3 Military-Owned Businesses as an Extra-Budgetary Resource.................... 16 2.2.4 Military Defection and Regime Change ....................................................... 20 2.3 Proposed Theoretical Argument: Independent Financial Resources (MOBs) as a Defection Mechanism ...................................................................................................... 23 2.3.1 Institutionalized Militaries ............................................................................ 27 2.4 Methodology ........................................................................................................ 31 3 CHAPTER 2: CHINA’S ‘INTERTWINED’ MODEL: THE ‘PEOPLE’S’ ARMY IN DEFENSE OF THE ‘PARTY’ ................................................................................ 35 3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 35 vii 3.2 Evolution of Party-Army Relationship in Communist China ........................ 38 3.3 Development of PLA’s MOBs ........................................................................... 42 3.4 The Challenge of Democracy Protests and PLA’s Defense of the Party ....... 46 3.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 51 4 CHAPTER 3: THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS: FROM SUBORDINATION TO GRADUAL DOMINATION ............................................................ 53 4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 53 4.2 The Politics of the Islamic Republic of Iran ..................................................... 55 4.3 ‘Civil’-Military Relations in Iran ...................................................................... 59 4.4 Military-Owned Businesses ............................................................................... 65 4.5 The Crisis of the 2009 Presidential Election .................................................... 67 4.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 70 5 CHAPTER 4: THE INDONESIAN MILITARY: FROM THE ‘NEW ORDER’ TO A ‘NEW PARADIGM’ ........................................................................................................ 72 5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 72 5.2 TNI in Politics: From Sukarno’s ‘Guided Democracy’ to Suharto’s ‘New Order’ 74 5.3 TNI’s MOBs: Growth and Decline ................................................................... 80 5.4 May 1998 Protests and TNI’s Defection ........................................................... 84 5.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 88 viii 6 CHAPTER 5: THE THAI MILITARY IN 2006: A MONARCHY-INDUCED DEFECTION ............................................................................................................................... 90 6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 90 6.2 The Role of the Military in the Thai Political System ..................................... 94 6.3 The Persistence of Civilian Rule and the Rise of Thaksin (1992-2006) ......... 98 6.4 MOBs and Military Disenchantment ............................................................. 102 6.5 Protests in “Color-coded Politics” .................................................................. 105 6.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................