The Self As the World Into Itself Towards Fichte's Conception

The Self as the World Into Itself. Towards Fichte’s Conception of Subjectivity

Marina Bykova

Standing historically between the two intellectual giants, Kant and Hegel, Fichte is often considered as a mere »mediator« in the dialogue of the two genii.1 Such an approach is not only mistaken, but it also essentially deval- ues the real philosophical significance of Fichte, especially in respect to his account of subject and subjectivity. In fact, Fichte’s deep revision of the Kantian concept of the subject is key to the emergence of post-Kantian German Idealism. Neither Schelling’s nor Hegel’s advancements in the theory of subject and subjectivity can be fully understood and appreciated without considering Fichte’s valuable additions and profound revisions of the Kantian concept of the transcendental subject. The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief sketch of Fichte’s account of the self and discuss it as a significant and unique contribution to the modern and 19th century theory of subjectivity that must be studied for

1 It should be noted that surely not all investigations into Fichte’s philosophy under- mine or misrepresent his role in the development of German Idealism, but the number of adequate and realistic interpretations is not very extensive. For positive examples in Anglophone literature see: Daniel Breazeale, »Check or Checkmate? On the Finitude of the Fichtean Self«, The Modern Subject: Conceptions of the Self in Classic German Philosophy, ed. Karl Ameriks and Dieter Sturma (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 87–114; Günter Zöller, Fichte’s Transcend- ental Philosophy: The Original Duplicity of Intelligence and Will (Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 1998); Anthony J. La Vopa , Fichte: The Self and the Calling of Philo- sophy (Cambridge University Press, 2001); Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Jerrold Sei- gel, The Idea of the Self. Thought and Experience in Western Europe since the Seven- teenth Century. (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 132 Marina Bykova its own sake and not seen merely as the stepping stones along the path leading to absolute knowledge about subject and subjectivity. This discus- sion mainly focuses on Fichte’s early works: his Jena projects of Wissen- shaftslehre, including the 1794/95 Grundlage der gesamten Wis- senschaftslehre and Wissensftslehre novo methodo (1796/1797). The choice of works to use is not a random one. For Fichte the Jena period was a time of profound searching for the foundations and structures of his philosophical system. He found such a foundation in a specifically shaped concept of subjectivity. Although that concept will be further detailed by Fichte in his later writings, it is already well articulated in the Jena works. Furthermore, in the later writings, the concept itself remains essentially the same in its major ideas and facets. This is especially true of Fichte’s account of the selfhood. This paper first discusses theoretical roots and an evolving process of Fichte’s conception of subject and subjectivity. Then it considers Fichte’s conception of the self how it is introduced in the Wissenschaftslehre. The final section provides a brief reflection on Fichte’s account of selfhood by placing it in the context of German idealists‹ discussions about subjectivity. This investigation does not intend to reconstruct a complete picture of Fichte’s account of subjectivity. It is complex enough to defy the grasp of many scholars. Instead, this paper attempts to provide a conceptual outline of the main points of the subjectivity theory introduced by Fichte in order to leave detailed, perhaps expository, analysis for future investigations.

1. Fichte and Challenges of Philosophy of Subjectivity

Fichte’s interest in subjectivity arises directly from his meditation on Rein- hold’s Philosophy of Elements (Elementar-Philosophie),2 and his occupa- tion with Schulze’s Aenesidemus.3 Despite all the differences between Rein-

2 See: Carl Leonhard Reinhold, Essay towards a New Theory of the Human Faculty of Representation. (Versuch einer neuen Theory des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermö- gens, Prague and Jena, 1789.) Parts II and III of the essay contain the only complete exposition of the Philosophy of Elements that Reinhold ever provided. 3 See: Gottlob Ernst Schulze, Aenesidemus oder über die Fundamente der von dem Herrn Prof. Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementar-Philosophie (1792); reprinted in