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AUTHOR QUERY – S0022381613000017 1 There are no queries for this article. 1 1 2 Voting for Justices: Change and Continuity in 2 3 3 4 4 5 Confirmation Voting 1937--2010 5 6 6 7 7 8 Charles M. Cameron Princeton University 8 9 Jonathan P. Kastellec Princeton University 9 10 10 11 Jee-Kwang Park The American University in Cairo 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 The contentiousness of Senate voting on Supreme Court nominations increased dramatically from 1937 to 2010. 15 16 We identify four potential sources of the increase: (1) changes in the Senate; (2) changes in the nominees; 16 17 (3) changes in the political environment; and, (4) changes in senators’ evaluative criteria. Using new data and 17 18 improved statistical techniques, we estimate a well-performing model of senators’ individual voting choices on 18 19 Supreme Court nominees. Simulations allow an evaluation of the contribution of the four classes of factors to 19 20 increased contentiousness. The principal source of increased contentiousness was the combination of increasingly 20 21 extreme nominees and an increasingly polarized Senate. Also significant was the increased mobilization of 21 22 interest groups. In sum, increased contentiousness seems largely to reflect the ideological polarization of 22 23 American political elites. 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 n June 12, 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt a clear increasing tendency for senators to vote against 28 29 submitted three Supreme Court nominations Supreme Court nominees. Thus, confirmation politics 29 30 30 to the U.S. Senate, appointing Justice Harlan are clearly becoming more contentious. 31 O 31 32 Stone to the position of Chief Justice and James Byrne Why has Senate voting on Supreme Court nomi- 32 33 and Robert Jackson to associate justices.1 Within a nees become so much more contentious? Does it reflect 33 34 month, all three were confirmed by voice votes in changes in the Senate? Or does it reflect changes in 34 35 the Senate. Thus, Roosevelt was able to secure a new the nominees? Is increased contentiousness driven by 35 36 Chief Justice and replace 22% of the Court’s mem- changes in the evaluative criteria employed by senators? 36 37 37 38 bership seamlessly. Today, even the most ‘‘routine’’ Or does it mirror the growth of ideological interest 38 39 Supreme Court nomination involves months of vet- groups and other changes in society? In this article, we 39 40 ting by the Senate, significant media coverage, interest identify four types of changes potentially responsible 40 41 group activity on both sides, and usually a significant for the dramatic rise in contentiousness surrounding 41 42 number of nay votes by senators. For instance, despite Senate voting on Supreme Court nominees: 42 43 43 being a relatively uncontroversial nominee, Elena Kagan’s 44 d Changes in the Senate—including the growing 44 confirmationin2010wasopposedby37senators. 45 ideological polarization of the Senate. 45 46 These examples bookend a general trend in Supreme 46 d Changes in the nominees—including the increased 47 Court confirmation politics over the past three-quarters 47 ideological extremism of the nominees and changes 48 of a century. Figure 1A depicts the percentage of nay 48 in their perceived quality. 49 votes cast on every nominee from 1937 to 2010.2 The 49 50 d Changes in the political environment—including the 50 line, which is a locally weighted regression line, shows 51 mobilization of interest groups active in confirmation 51 52 52 53 1An online appendix containing supplemental information for this article is available at http://journals.cambridge.org/jop. Replication 53 54 code and data and supporting materials needed to reproduce the numerical results can be found at http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/18723. 54 55 55 2 56 Throughout the article we evaluate the 42 nominees in this time period who received a final confirmation vote by the Senate, including 56 57 voice votes. Three nominations—Homer Thornberry (1968), Douglas Ginsburg (1987), and Harriet Miers—were withdrawn before 57 they received a vote by the Senate. We exclude Abe Fortas’ nomination to become Chief Justice in 1968. Fortas was blocked by a cloture 58 58 vote and never received a final vote. 59 59 60 60 The Journal of Politics, Vol. 0, No. 0, xxx 2013, Pp. 1–17 doi:10.1017/S0022381613000017 61 61 Ó Southern Political Science Association, 2013 ISSN 0022-3816 1 2 charles m. cameron, jonathan p. kastellec, and jee-kwang park 1 FIGURE 1 Changes over Time in Supreme Court Nomination Politics 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 45 45 46 46 47 47 48 48 49 49 50 50 51 51 52 52 53 53 54 54 55 55 56 56 57 57 58 58 59 59 60 60 61 61 62 62 change and continuity in supreme court confirmation voting 3 1 politics and the opportunity to make high-impact the voting calculations of senators, especially Southern 1 2 move-the-median nominations. Democrats, as the nominees’ racial liberalism became 2 3 3 d Changes in senators’ evaluative criteria—including an important consideration in confirmation politics. 4 4 5 the changing significance of race and variation in But the first or main dimension returned to a dom- 5 6 the importance of ideology as a criterion. inant position after the 1960s. In fact, we find that 6 7 ideological distance on the main dimension has played 7 8 Some of these potential sources have been discussed an unusually important role in explaining the high 8 9 in previous work. For example, several studies empha- level of votes against the three most recent nominees 9 10 10 11 sizetheroleofnomineeideologyandqualificationsin to the Court. Our results thus suggest that the increased 11 12 senators’ evaluation of potential justices (especially contentiousness in Supreme Court confirmation politics 12 13 Cameron, Cover, and Segal (1990) [henceforth CCS]; largely reflects the ideological polarization of American 13 14 Epstein et al. (2006); Kastellec, Lax, and Phillips (2010); political elites, and contentiousness is only likely to 14 15 andSegal,Cameron,andCover(1992)).Segal,Cameron, increase further as American politics becomes more 15 16 and Cover (1992) and Caldeira and Wright (1998) also polarized. 16 17 17 18 examine the impact of interest group participation on 18 19 confirmation voting. Several studies note the changing 19 20 significance of race in nomination politics (especially Sources of Increased 20 21 Overby et al. 1992, 1994). LeMieux and Stewart (1990) Contentiousness 21 22 emphasize the importance of ‘‘move-the-median’’ nom- 22 23 23 24 inees, as does Krehbiel (2007). Nonetheless, many of the The context of Supreme Court confirmation voting 24 25 possible factors have not been evaluated systematically has changed dramatically over the last 70 years. We 25 26 before, including the racial liberalism of nominees and highlight seven potentially important changes, grouped 26 27 the heightened ideological polarization of the Senate. within four broad categories: changes in the Senate, 27 28 No study has evaluated all these factors simultaneously changes in nominees, changes in the political environ- 28 29 within a unified framework. 29 30 ment, and changes in senators’ evaluative criteria. 30 31 In this article, we first review data on each of 31 32 the factors mentioned above, much of it newly Changes in the Senate 32 33 collected. Among the new data are measures of the 33 34 nominees’ racial liberalism (calculated in the sec- Ideological Polarization of Senators. One of the most 34 35 ond DW-NOMINATE dimension), the number of dramatic developments in contemporary American 35 36 36 37 interest groups involved in all nominations since 1937, politics is the ideological polarization of political 37 38 and each nominee’s move-the-median impact on elites, particularly members of the House and Senate 38 39 the Supreme Court calculated in the first (economic (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). Because ide- 39 40 liberalism) DW-NOMINATE dimension. We then ology is central to Supreme Court nomination politics, 40 41 estimate a multilevel model of individual voting on this development is potentially of immense consequence 41 42 nominees that incorporates all the identified factors. because it will increase ideological distances between sen- 42 43 43 44 We evaluate the performance of the model and show atorsandnomineesfromtheoppositeparty.Figure1B 44 45 that it accounts well for observed vote margins in almost depictspolarizationinSenatefromthe1930son(the 45 46 all the nominations over the last 70 years. measure employed is the ideological distance between 46 47 Next, we use simulations to evaluate the contri- the mean Democratic and mean Republican senator, 47 48 bution of each factor to the increased overall con- measured in the first dimension of the DW-NOMINATE 48 49 49 50 tentiousness of confirmation voting. The simulations space). Polarization in the Senate was low from the 50 51 indicate that the principal sources of this increase late 1930s to the mid-1950s. It then jumped upward 51 52 were the tendency of presidents to nominate more somewhat but remained stable until the late 1970s. 52 53 extreme individuals coupled with the growing ideo- Since then, however, it has skyrocketed.